

a number of preliminary steps are necessary, such as: more adequate employment data; manpower programs that offer basic education and skills leading to jobs in the competitive labor market; upgrading the ability of public schools to teach the culturally deprived; enforcement of up-to-date construction codes for housing; and provision of more public transportation to serve central city areas.

**Something Is Wrong**

**HON. JOE SKUBITZ**

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, I would like to have inserted in the RECORD an editorial from the Wellington, Kans., Daily News of April 15, entitled "Something Is Wrong," and a record published by Warner & Swasey of Cleveland concerning amounts our Government has been authorized to give or "loan" to other nations from 1945 through 1966. The source of the figures in the second article is the Agency for International Development, and the article is entitled "No Wonder We're Broke—And Getting Worse."

I cannot vouch for the accuracy of all the figures in the two articles. I know some of them are absolutely correct. But both articles pertain to matters that should make every Member of Congress stop and ponder for a moment.

The articles follow:

[From the Wellington Daily News, Apr. 15 1968]

**SOMETHING IS WRONG**  
(Author unknown)

Hey Uncle, How much does it cost to rear a child?

You allow us taxpaying parents only \$600 a year to feed, clothe, house and train a youngster. In your Federal Government Job Corps you spent seven thousand dollars a year!

Now, which is the correct figure? Either we're allowing you too much or you're not allowing us enough.

You allow taxpaying parents a six hundred dollar deduction for the care and feeding of each child—

Yet under the Cuban Refugee Program you assume minimal upkeep requires \$1200 a year—and if the Cuban boy or girl is attending school—an extra \$1000 a year.

How come you shortchange the homefolks? In the austere environs of a federal prison, you have discovered that it costs—to maintain one person, with no frills, no luxuries, and no borrowing Dad's car—\$2300 per year! By what rule-of-thumb do you estimate that Mom and Dad can do it for one-fourth that amount?

Under Social Security, you will pay \$168 a month to maintain the elderly. What makes you think we can maintain our youngsters on \$50 a month?

And, Uncle, your Vista Program (Volunteers in Service to America) spent \$3.1 million this last fiscal year to turn out only 202 trainees. That indicates that the cost of maintaining and training youth for one year is more than \$15,000.

How come we taxpaying parents get an exemption of only \$600 to maintain and train one youth for one year?

Or let's see how much you spend upkeep-ing one youngster in military uniform. House \$55.20 a month, Food \$30.47 a month, cloth-

ing upkeep, \$4.20, that comes to \$1,076.04 a year.

How in the world do you expect parents to provide all these things, plus clothes, recreation, books, medicine . . . for \$600 a year? With your own figures, you admit it can't be done.

It is possible, Uncle, that you expect us parents to manage more efficiently than you, because we usually do. With all our expenses, we American individuals have more than enough savings to offset our debts, you don't. With all our prosperity, you, Uncle, are still spending per year \$2.9 billion more for relief than during the depths of the depression. So it may be that you are uncommonly extravagant.

But however we try to rationalize and explain in you and excuse you, it is still a hurtful affront when you allow us hard-working, dues-paying homefolks only \$600 a year to rear a legitimate child. . . . While you under A.D.C. will pay more than \$600 a year to upkeep an illegitimate one!

**NO WONDER WE'RE BROKE—  
AND GETTING WORSE**

Here is what you, the American taxpayers, have authorized your government to give or "loan" to other nations, 1945 through 1966. This was not to win the war (you had already paid for that, too) but since the Second World War's end.

And if you think it might have been an investment in the future, look down the list and see how many dependable friends you can find. Yet we are still giving away more billions—billions we haven't got, billions we have to borrow (and pay interest on) to give away, billions we desperately need at home.

Here are your gifts. What has it all accomplished?

Albania	\$20,400,000
Austria	1,198,000,000
Belgium-Luxembourg	2,004,900,000
Czechoslovakia	193,000,000
Denmark	920,500,000
East Germany	800,000
Finland	134,400,000
France	9,409,600,000
Germany (Federal Republic)	4,997,400,000
Berlin	131,900,000
Hungary	31,500,000
Iceland	84,000,000
Ireland	146,500,000
Italy	6,092,900,000
Malta	6,100,000
Netherlands	2,470,400,000
Norway	1,236,000,000
Poland	554,500,000
Portugal	519,100,000
Spain	2,004,300,000
Sweden	109,000,000
United Kingdom	9,044,900,000
U.S.S.R.	186,400,000
Yugoslavia	2,863,900,000
Europe regional	2,735,000,000
Australia	275,300,000
New Zealand	27,700,000
Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands	125,400,000
British Solomon Islands	400,000
Tonga Island	300,000
Canada	36,300,000
Vietnam	4,590,100,000
Burma	100,600,000
Cambodia	341,100,000
China (Republic of)	4,899,500,000
Hong Kong	41,900,000
Indochina, undistributed	1,535,200,000
Indonesia	834,600,000
Japan	3,972,900,000
Korea	6,676,700,000
Laos	473,400,000
Malaysia	47,500,000
Philippines	1,925,000,000
Ryukyu Islands	340,600,000
Thailand	1,089,200,000
East Asia regional	731,800,000
Afghanistan	346,400,000

Ceylon	\$101,500,000
Cyprus	19,300,000
Greece	3,749,400,000
India	6,769,200,000
Iran	1,752,000,000
Iraq	102,700,000
Israel	1,104,500,000
Jordan	572,800,000
Lebanon	87,900,000
Nepal	97,800,000
Pakistan	3,079,800,000
Saudi Arabia	209,100,000
Syrian Arab Republic	73,800,000
Turkey	5,039,800,000
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	1,133,300,000
Yemen	41,800,000
Central Treaty Organization	52,800,000
Near East and South Asia regional	1,082,300,000
Argentina	768,600,000
Bolivia	460,600,000
Brazil	3,185,700,000
British Honduras	4,400,000
Chile	1,242,200,000
Colombia	834,800,000
Costa Rica	149,000,000
Cuba	52,100,000
Dominican Republic	320,100,000
Ecuador	279,600,000
El Salvador	108,100,000
Guatemala	209,200,000
Guyana	24,400,000
Haiti	108,800,000
Honduras	88,500,000
Jamaica	44,300,000
Mexico	1,068,200,000
Nicaragua	183,100,000
Panama	173,000,000
Paraguay	106,200,000
Peru	678,900,000
Surinam	10,100,000
Trinidad and Tobago	52,200,000
Uruguay	119,400,000
Venezuela	392,200,000
Other West Indies	3,700,000
Regional	83,100,000
Latin America regional	997,600,000
Algeria	179,400,000
Botswana	7,400,000
Burundi	6,700,000
Cameroon	27,200,000
Central African Republic	3,500,000
Chad	5,500,000
Congo (Brazzaville)	2,200,000
Congo (Kinshasa)	351,000,000
Dahomey	9,700,000
Ethiopia	317,500,000
Gabon	5,800,000
Gambia	600,000
Ghana	174,800,000
Guinea	75,700,000
Ivory Coast	28,800,000
Kenya	57,200,000
Lesotho	1,100,000
Liberia	241,600,000
Libya	220,000,000
Malagasy Republic	9,600,000
Malawi	11,800,000
Mali, Republic of	18,700,000
Mauritania	3,000,000
Morocco	584,100,000
Niger	10,600,000
Nigeria	190,300,000
Rwanda	5,500,000
Senegal	21,500,000
Sierra Leone	32,500,000
Somali Republic	52,200,000
South Africa, Republic of	150,600,000
Southern Rhodesia	7,000,000
Sudan	108,400,000
Tanzania	50,000,000
Togo	12,000,000
Tunisia	487,900,000
Uganda	21,000,000
Upper Volta	6,800,000
Zambia	36,100,000
East Africa regional	18,400,000
Regional USAID/Africa	1,300,000

Africa regional ----- \$76,000,000  
Nonregional total ----- 6,462,800,000

Total, all countries... 122,358,500,000

Source: Agency for International Development.

As we said the last time we published such a list—any sane American can write his own editorial on this subject. Or obituary.

## The Press and the Bay of Pigs

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, many issues surfaced in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. One of the most important and perplexing arguments concerns the role the press played in the incident. Jesse Gordon of the Nation has called to my attention a series of responses to an article entitled "The Press and the Bay of Pigs," written by Mr. Gordon and Victor Bernstein and appearing in the fall 1967 issue of the Columbia University Forum. These letters discuss the responsibility of the press in general and in relation to the Bay of Pigs.

I commend these letters from the spring 1968 issue of the Columbia University Forum to the attention of my colleagues as a part of the historical record relating to the Bay of Pigs:

[From the Columbia University Forum, Spring, 1968]

### THE PRESS AND THE BAY OF PIGS—II

As one of the opposition "consciences at work" the night *The New York Times* watered down Tad Szulc's story about the "imminence" of the Bay of Pigs invasion and reduced its play from the planned four-column headline leading the paper to a single-column head in a less important position, I should like to add a couple of footnotes to the article by Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon.

The authors express the opinion that it probably would have done no good for the *Times* to have "told all" on April 7, 1961, ten days before the invasion, saying that the planning had reached the point of no return. That may well be, but it also may well not be. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in *A Thousand Days* says, in a sentence immediately following one containing the phrase "early in April," that "Had one senior adviser opposed the adventure, I believe that Kennedy would have cancelled it" (pages 258-9). The only opposition, he says, came from Senator Fulbright and himself. Schlesinger also quotes the President as having said, "You know, I've reserved the right to stop this thing up to 24 hours before the landing" (page 256). It does not seem impossible that had the *Times* printed the Szulc story as planned, the prestigious exposure of what was supposed to be a secret operation and the public outcry and pressure that probably would have followed might well have given Kennedy exactly the excuse he needed to call the whole thing off.

The President is quoted as having said a fortnight later to Turner Catledge, then managing editor of the *Times*: "If you had printed more about the operation, you would have saved us from a colossal mistake." Messrs. Bernstein and Gordon dismiss this as an attempt "to share his monopoly of wrong decisions." But Schlesinger, too, says, "In retrospect I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disas-

ter" (page 261). Schlesinger had no wrong decisions to share.

That word "irresponsibly" raises an additional point requiring clarification. I contend that it would not by any means have been irresponsible to print the Szulc story as written and to display it as originally planned.

On the night of April 6 when Orvil E. Dryfoos, then publisher of the *Times*, decided after consultation with Catledge and James Reston, to eliminate some material from the Szulc story and to reduce its play, Lewis Jordan, the news editor, and I not only objected but were distressed. It was the only instance of any importance that I could recall in which a publisher of the *Times* had interfered with a decision by the editors responsible for the presentation and display of the news. The next day Mr. Dryfoos, aware of our distress, asked me to come to his office so that he could explain his thinking. He said the matter had been put to him on the basis of the national interest. His motives, of course, were of the highest and he had acted on that basis. I argued that there was a distinction between the national interest and national security and that he had confused the two. I pointed out, to underscore the absence of a national security consideration, that not a single American life would have been imperiled by our original plan for presenting the news.

When matters of national security arise in a war situation or a near-war situation, there is not the slightest question about what course the press should follow. Editors cannot have the information or specialized knowledge that would allow them to dispute an official determination that the country's safety might be jeopardized. But matters of national interest are different. They may well be political issues, and one man's opinion of what is in the nation's interest may be as good as another's. The distinction is much like that between a doctor's hustling you off to the hospital for an emergency appendectomy and his suggestion that you cut down on liquor.

In matters of national interest the press has not only a proper option but indeed a bounden duty to speak up. The press must keep in mind that even the President himself plays different roles on different occasions: sometimes he is the constitutional commander-in-chief, sometimes he is the country's political leader. The organs of public information have to draw the line between the national security and the national interest and then act appropriately.

THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN,  
Assistant Managing Editor, the New York Times.

Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon write: "In speculating on what effect a news story might have on a President no longer able to give evidence, hindsight provides no more assurance of truth than foresight. Still, we were guilty of making the first speculation and Mr. Bernstein is assuredly entitled to his. We continue to prefer our own line of reasoning. If Mr. Schlesinger scores for Mr. Bernstein on pages 258-9, he scores for us on page 251: 'But [the President] too began to become a prisoner of events.' As if to round out this thought, Mr. Schlesinger on page 242 quotes Allen Dulles as saying on March 11, 1961: 'Don't forget that we have a disposal problem. If we have to take these men out of Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the United States, and we can't have them wandering around the country telling everyone what they've been doing.'" And Mr. Schlesinger comments: 'Having created the Brigade as an option, the CIA now presented its use against Cuba as a necessity. Nor did Dulles' argument lack force' (italics added).

"Tad Szulc, Mr. Bernstein's newspaper colleague and author of the played-down April 7 dispatch to the *Times*, put the matter even

more clearly in the book *The Cuban Invasion*, which he co-authored with Karl Meyer: 'Once the original order to organize an army had been issued, and once the army became the best-known "secret" force in the world, the avenue of strategic retreat was sealed off. Like a djinn released from the bottle, the CIA's creation soon seemed to develop a will of its own' (page 100).

"Eisenhower's decision to have a Cuban force trained in Guatemala was made on March 17, 1960; American readers got the first hint of what was going on from *Hispanic American Report* and *The Nation* in November of that year; the force became a 'best-known "secret"' after a story about the Guatemalan base appeared in the *Times* of January 10, 1961. The time for the press to have behaved 'irresponsibly'—Mr. Schlesinger's word—was not on April 7, 1961, ten days before the invasion, but in the long months between March of 1960 and January 10, 1961.

"None of the foregoing is meant to detract in any way from the admiration due Messrs. Bernstein and Jordan for the courageous position they took at the *Times* and for the validity of the arguments they advanced in support. Mr. Bernstein's distinction between the 'national security' and the 'national interest' seems particularly apt, and it occurs to us that this distinction, as it relates to the role of the press, would make a worthwhile agenda for an Arden House Assembly."

Where did Messrs. Bernstein and Gordon do their researching? In the files of the newspapers they condemned? Certainly 'neither reporter took the elementary step of interviewing,' one of their principal targets—Lem Jones Associates.

Had they done so they could have seen the communiqués and found there was never any mention of a Russian submarine; that nothing was ever released that referred to capture of Castro's brother, or the Isle of Pines; that nowhere was there the slightest hint of a Cuban navy revolt.

Similarly, they would have learned that even the noted historian, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., can be wrong when he "wryly intimates" that the Cuban Revolutionary Council knew nothing of our having been hired. Not only had Dr. José Miró Cardona, Council President, hired us, but Council member, Dr. Antonio Sillo, former Judge of the Cuban Supreme Court, was left behind as authorized spokesman for the Council in New York City and approved every communiqué before it was released.

Our agreement with Dr. Miró was that once a beachhead had been established, I personally would go in with the Provisional Government as press liaison.

That old Latin-American hand, Frank McCarthy, of the United Press International, should have set *The Nation* boys straight with his statement. Of course the Guatemala training camp was old that by the time *The Nation* caught up with it; there was recruiting openly in New York City, as well as Miami long before *The Nation* got wise.

LAMOYNE (LEM) A. JONES,  
Assistant city editor and Albany bureau chief for the *N.Y. Herald Tribune*; speech writer and press secretary for Thomas E. Dewey, press secretary to Wendell Willkie in his 1940 Presidential campaign; special consultant to the late Herbert H. Lehman, then UNRRA Director; speech writer for Jacob K. Javits in his first campaign for the U.S. Senate; member of the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Overseas Press Club, Public Relations Society Association, Silurians, and Nacoms.

Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon write: "Mr. Jones flatters himself; he was not one of our 'principal targets.' He was guilty of nothing but the relay of bits of fiction manufactured by the CIA. He alleges we exaggerated the exaggerations put out by his office. Perhaps, in some instances, we did; if so, we more than made up for it by mini-

mizing others. He chides us for not having read his communiqués. We did, *Bulletin No. 1*, issued in the early hours of the day of attack, said: 'Before dawn Cuban patriots in the cities and in the hills began the battle to liberate our homeland.' *Bulletin No. 2* said: 'Our information from Cuba indicates that much of the militia in the countryside has already defected from Castro.' *Bulletin No. 5* said: 'In spite of the continuous attacks by Soviet MIGs . . . the Revolutionary Command has completed . . . contact with guerrilla groups in the Escambray mountains.' Needless to say, Cuban patriots in Cuba stayed home in remarkable numbers; Castro's militia didn't defect any more than did the Navy; there is evidence that no Soviet MIGs were on the scene; and if there were guerrillas in the Escambray mountains, they must have been playing pinchle, or the Spanish equivalent. And aside from the bulletins, it should be noted that Mr. Jones' office was giving out information of like reliability to questioning newsmen, much of it via telephone.

"On another point, perhaps Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Mr. Jones were both right: Dr. Miró may have known about the hiring of Lem Jones Associates, but not the rest of the Council—at least until after the event.

"Was there really open recruiting for the invasion in New York and Miami before Nov. 19, 1960, the day of *The Nation* editorial? If so, where were *The N.Y. Times*, *Daily News*, *Post*, etc., etc.? We thank Mr. Jones for this contribution (whether authentic or not) to the case against our principal target: the American press. We regret that the failure of the Bay of Pigs deprived him of opportunity for a well-deserved promotion."

"Thank you for sending me a copy of THE FORUM containing the piece by Jesse Gordon and Victor Bernstein.

I am glad to see that it is quite detailed, and, so far as I can tell at this point, most accurate.

CLIFTON DANIEL,  
Managing Editor, *The New York Times*.

I think it ["The Press and the Bay of Pigs"] is a perceptive and important piece of analysis, the kind of examination of the role the U.S. press plays constantly as part of the Establishment (when it should instead serve as an independent check and balance on the excesses of government) which I wish we could have more of.

LEE LOCKWOOD,  
WGBH.

BOSTON, MASS.

The major fact which has not been allowed to escape to the American people is that for at least twenty years the foreign policy of the United States has been one of global counter-revolution. The Bay of Pigs was a detail. So is Vietnam. At critical moments, when it is impossible to maintain the general blur, silence and lies, as at the Bay of Pigs, are called into play. . . .

This foreign policy is contrary to the best interests of the American people as well as to the people of the world; I really do not expect the conventional press, that is to say, most of the press, to behave differently, since it is, after all, an institution of the system out of which the counter-revolutionary policy flows.

JAMES HIGGINS,  
Assistant Editor, *York Gazette and Daily*,  
YORK, PA.

I have read "The Press and the Bay of Pigs" with a great deal of interest and it seems to me the article has two failures. First, as I pointed out in a speech to the National Press Group in September of 1966, I was sitting between President Kennedy and Mr. Catledge at the meeting where the

President is alleged to have made the remark that if the *Times* had printed more about the operation, "you would have saved us from a colossal mistake." While I do not question Mr. Catledge's veracity, and the President may have said this to Mr. Catledge as the meeting was breaking up, it did not represent President Kennedy's private view of the press handling of the Bay of Pigs.

It seems to me, however, that the more important question resulting from the Bay of Pigs is not even discussed in the article. That question is whether a democratic society can in fact mount a covert operation in advance of what it considers to be its national interest. The openness of our society indicates that the answer to the question is probably "no," but at a time in our history when our adversaries are resorting more and more to covert operations against us, it seems to be a subject worthy of more penetrating discussion.

I have always maintained that the concept of the Bay of Pigs was a disaster from the beginning, and that the premature disclosure of U.S. intentions by the press cannot in any way be singled out as the reason for the failure of the operation. At the same time, however, the element of surprise was withdrawn from the Cuban brigade in this matter, and as we say so dramatically this year in the Israeli-Arab war, the element of surprise is not unhelpful.

PIERRE SALINGER,  
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.

On "The Press and the Bay of Pigs" . . . I threw my hat over the chandelier. It's splendid.

We are approaching traffic developments. There is little doubt that a bigger escalation is in the offing, that Cambodia will be the next victim, and it seems to me very likely that Johnson, rather than give up his power in 1968, will provoke China into counterintervention, and the lemmings, otherwise known as American citizens, will go rushing over the cliff to mass suicide. I hope I'm wrong.

CARLETON BEALS,  
KILLINGWORTH, CONN.

**Immigration Must Not Be Denied to Any Country**

**HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR.**  
OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced legislation to insure a continued flow of immigrants from all countries to the United States. The aims of our immigration policy have been frustrated by amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act which have not satisfactorily bridged the transition from the discarded national origins system to the concepts set forth in the act of October 3, 1965.

I believe that U.S. immigration policy is just and fair. It is a policy based on the tenets of reuniting families giving preference to those who will contribute to our expanding society and offering asylum to refugees. This policy was implemented and given full effect when the act of October 3, 1965, became law. This act gave recognition to the dignity of the individual and repealed the national origins concept based upon place of birth as a system for selecting immigrants.

This important legislation, as laudable as it was, unfortunately created certain unintended inequities. The closer July 1, 1968, approaches—the date that the act of October 3, 1965, becomes fully operative—the more obvious the shortcomings are.

This legislation, as originally proposed in Executive communications submitted to the Congress by both President Kennedy and by President Johnson, was sound. The legislation as enacted into law was deficient.

The Executive communications suggested a 5-year phaseout of the national origins system. Each country's quota was to be reduced during this period by 20 percent annually and the quota numbers freed by this annual deduction were placed in a quota reserve pool which also contained unused quota numbers from the previous year. The numbers from the pool were to be available to otherwise admissible aliens who were unable to obtain prompt issuance of visas due to oversubscription of the quotas or subquotas as determined by the Secretary of State. After 5 years all quota numbers would be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis without regard to national origin. As a safety feature, the original bills contained provision to authorize the President to set aside certain numbers which could be used to avoid undue hardship resulting from the reduction of annual quotas. In fact, a statement accompanying the Executive communication said:

Exceptions to the principle of allocating visas on the basis of time-of-registration within preference classes are provided to deal with exceptional problems. Since some countries' quotas are now current, their nationals have no old registration on file. To apply the principle rigidly would result, after four or five years, in curtailing immigration from these countries almost entirely. This would be undesirable, not only because it would frustrate the aim of the bill that immigration from all countries should continue, but also because many of the countries that would be affected are our closest allies.

However, during the course of deliberations in the Judiciary Committee, the proposal was advanced that a phaseout of the national origins system in less than 5 years would be desirable and workable. It was also advocated that the first-come, first-served system be instituted immediately without any phaseout period.

On June 27, 1965, I introduced H.R. 9312, which provided for a 3-year phaseout period. During each of the 3 years, one-third of the annual quota of each quota area would be put in a pool. This scheme, I felt then as I feel today, would have had the effect of causing countries with large quotas to realize and fully anticipate the day when they too would have to compete on a worldwide basis for visas. By reducing such quotas annually, priority dates could have been established which, on July 1, 1968, would have led to a more equitable, reasonable and workable first-come, first-served approach.

My major concern and principal objective in considering the immigration legislation pending in 1965 was the immediate repeal of the national origins

systems. The system had been proven to be unworkable and repeal was long overdue. The repeal was accomplished, but not without some compromise in the area of the phaseout provisions. As we are all aware, a 3-year phaseout period was adopted and unused quota numbers were put in an immigration pool. However, by compromise, no part of annual quotas was deducted with a consequence that countries such as England and Ireland found it more facilitative to use their great abundance of nonpreference numbers and thus avoid a buildup of priorities under the preferences. Thus, for those countries there was, in effect during the phaseout period, business as usual under the national origins concept. There was an additional impediment to immigration from some countries, such as Ireland, because of the labor certification provision.

By guaranteeing that countries such as Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany, would not be disadvantaged by quota deductions during the phaseout period, the law only served to place these countries at a disadvantage in July 1968.

Therefore, I think the time has arrived to take direct action and call a spade a spade. We in the Congress are concerned, as are people throughout the country, about the drastic decline in immigration from Ireland and the probable decline in immigration from England, Germany, and Scandinavia. This tragedy we cannot permit. I, therefore, by my bill seek to continue the flow of immigrants from Ireland and at the same permit the Irish to create priorities over the next 2 years so that they can compete on a fair and equitable basis with other intending immigrants. I have refrained from adopting a complicated, mechanical formula which would disguise the true objectives of affording the Irish an opportunity to emigrate to the United States, as well as to decrease existing backlogs for visa issuance.

Although I recognize the need for a revised preference system and have introduced legislation to amend that system which would guarantee a more reasonable breakdown in preferences and a guarantee of visas to nonpreference immigrants, I feel that at this time when we are fast approaching July 1, we can best avoid hardship by delegating to the President authority to reserve up to 25 percent of the unused numbers from fiscal 1968 for use over the next 2 fiscal years to make visas available to prospective immigrants who unfortunately because of recent amendments to the law are denied visas. Time is of the essence and a direct approach is demanded to alleviate what may be complete curtailment of immigration from Ireland.

Therefore, to summarize the provisions of my bill:

Section 1 provides that the President may reserve up to 25 percent of the unused numbers from fiscal year 1968 for use during fiscal years 1969 and 1970, if he so proclaims, to avoid undue hardship resulting from the deduction in the number of immigrants admitted from any country.

Section 2 would make available unused numbers from fiscal 1968 for reallocation, notwithstanding the per country limitation or overall ceiling to preference immigrants on oversubscribed preference lists.

Section 3 is designed to prevent one foreign state from getting a disproportionate share of third-preference visas to the detriment of other states by providing that no country will receive more than 10 percent of the visas available under the third preference.

The Department of State estimates that at the end of fiscal year 1968 there will be approximately 70,000 visa numbers that will go unused. The American Irish Immigration Committee has indicated that there is a need for 5,000 numbers annually to meet the demands if immigration from Ireland. The authorization for the President to set aside in reserve 25 percent of the available unused numbers will satisfy the needs for Ireland as well as make numbers available to alleviate hardship from the United Kingdom, if such arises. Testimony has also been developed that under present circumstances the inequities in the disproportionate number of immigrants from some countries will level off in 2 or 3 years so long as intending immigrants proceed to register for immigration to the United States.

I think that my bill will meet the needs that exist today and overcome the discrepancies that the present law has developed. There are other bills pending before the Judiciary Committee which seek to accomplish the same aims—some increase the number of possible immigrants and others tend to reactivate the principles of national origin. I sincerely maintain that we cannot return even in the faintest degree to the national origin concept. My bill does not increase the overall ceiling on immigration but merely authorizes use of those visas which will go unissued.

**Carl Sandburg, Poet Laureate, Becomes Part of the Tradition of a New York East Side School**

**HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, a constituent of mine in New York City, an elementary school on the East Side, reports to me an event which is laden with a story of national interest that should inspire the public schools of our Nation and show the way with standards to be followed, and I wish to place it on record.

The event was immersed in so much good will because it happened in the midst of a series of holidays—the Lincoln and Washington Birthdays, St. Valentine's Day dedicated to mothers, and Brotherhood Week. The event itself was the dedication on February 14 of the Carl Sandburg memorial plaque at

the Anna Silver School, P.S. 20, on the East Side of New York City. This is a document of immense good will which should be disseminated widely.

Aaron Fishman, the dedications chairman, writes me:

This was the 5th anniversary celebration of the new school rededicating the historic old P.S. 20. The Carl Sandburg memorial plaque was on this occasion unveiled in the presence of Kate Rodina Stelchen, Sandburg's niece who came down from Connecticut to represent the family. Joining her were Dr. I. Edwin Goldwasser, the principal of sixty years ago, Benjamin Fa'lon, the present principal and the Hon. Charles H. Silver, an alumnus and former president of the Board of Education.

The color guard presentation and the pledge to the flag opened the program using the school's traditional music of the "Coronation March" of Meyerbeer. The children now also had a chance to hear the music to the pledge to the flag which alumnus Irving Caesar had written and presented to the Congress of the United States as a gift from ASCAP.

As an In Memoriam to Carl Sandburg, a national laureate and famed biographer of Abraham Lincoln principal Fa'lon opened the exercise by reciting a teacher to child message immortalized in Sandburg's moving poem "I Love You":

*"I love you for what you are,  
But I love you yet more for what you are  
going to be.*

*"I love you not so much for your realities as  
for your ideals.*

*I pray for your desires that they may be  
great,*

*Rather than for your satisfactions, which  
may be hazardously little.*

*"A satisfied flower is one whose petals are  
about to fall.*

*The most beautiful rose is one hardly more  
than a bud*

*Wherein the pangs and ecstasies of desire  
are working for larger and finer  
growth.*

*"Not always shall you be what you are now.  
You are going forward toward something  
great.*

*I am on the way with you and therefore  
I love you."*

("One Thousand Beautiful Things,"  
Croller Inc.)

A group of the children responded by reciting together some of the Sandburg poems written for children. The unveiling committee including a boy and a girl proceeded to the plaque set on an easel on the stage and unveiled it as a boy at the lectern recited the text of the plaque: *The restless and venturing human spirit of youth may perform tomorrow with exploits today called visionary and impossible. What the young people want and dream across the next hundred years will shape history more than any other motivator to be named. The walls of this school might be saying, "Youth when lighted and alive and given a sporting chance is strong for struggle and not afraid of any toils or punishments or dangers or death."* As the boy recited this text, the glee club hummed "America the Beautiful". It was alumnus Harry Golden, the biographer and neighbor of Carl Sandburg in North Carolina that obtained this statement for this school.

Dr. Mark Van Doren of Columbia University, expert on Sandburg sent a message which said, "The words of the plaque are entirely characteristic of this poet whose faith in the human race, and particularly in the younger members of it, could never be shaken. Carl Sandburg will long be remem-