

The Atomic Arms Race **NEW YORK TIMES** 3066 67  
MAGAZINE

# A 'Mad Momentum' May Be Under Way

By **ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC**

**B**OTH the United States and the Soviet Union have said repeatedly that they share common aims in avoiding an atomic arms race, preventing nuclear war and reducing the amount of their national resources now devoted to military uses. But no formal agreement to that end exists or is in prospect, and meanwhile the actions of the two superpowers are inconsistent with their aims. The present trends in the United States and Russia toward more and better nuclear armaments would not only jeopardize the accomplishment of the nonproliferation treaty

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which they are jointly advocating but could well signify a turn for the worse in their own strategic relationship. Let us examine both sides of this two-sided looking glass.

**T**HE United States is now ahead of the Soviet Union by a ratio of 3 or 4 to 1 in numbers of nuclear warheads, sometimes called target kill capability. In terms of megatonnage, however, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal may already be on a par with or possibly ahead of the United States'.

In keeping with its strategic objective of maintaining a second-strike capability through the assured destruction of Soviet missile sites, the United States is proceeding with a

number of qualitative advances in its strategic weapons. It is equipping our Minuteman III's, the most advanced of that family of ICBM's, with devices that will enable them to penetrate Soviet missile defenses. It is pushing the development of Poseidon submarine-launched ICBM's which will surpass Polaris missiles in range, destructive power and targeting accuracy. Also in the works is a new concept of multiple warheads for American missiles—called Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV's)—that will multiply the effectiveness of our present ICBM's without adding to the number of launchers. The MIRV missile will be designed to carry from 5 to 10 warheads that can be separated in flight to strike independently at a corresponding number


of widely dispersed, preselected targets.

In view of this development and because American strategy does not depend on retaining our existing overwhelming quantitative superiority, our Government is not at the moment contemplating any major additions to the size of its missile force. In the early research and development stage, however, there is exploratory work going forward on a new long-range missile (Strat X), the nature of which is highly classified but which presumably would be more effective and less vulnerable to counterattack than existing ICBM's. Similar effort continues on the propulsion system and avionics for a more advanced long-range bomber in the event it is later decided that still another generation of manned strategic-weapon delivery systems is needed.

**F**OR its part, the Soviet Union is stressing a major quantitative improvement in its strategic offensive forces. It is adding more hardened land-based and submarine-launched ICBM's in an attempt to reduce the present disparity between its missile forces and those of the United States. It is still emphasizing large warheads—that is, megatonnage rather than precision targeting—in its missiles, and it continues to stress advanced missile development, as shown by the new missiles exhibited at the 50th-anniversary military parade in Moscow on Nov. 7.

Rather than seeking to match United States capability in long-range manned bombers, the Soviets are apparently initiating a system of delivering nuclear warheads from orbit. The delivery vehicle for such a weapon would be fired in a low orbit, about 100 miles above the earth, from which its bomb would be released against unprotected targets, such as American bomber bases, with a flight time considerably less than that of an ICBM. This system, which our Defense Department calls a Frac-

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## **All-News, All-Music, All-Ghetto**

### **Radio Is a Success**

# **The New Sound of Radio**

By WILLIAM H. HONAN

**R**ADIO station WEVD in New York City is looking for a Chinese disk jockey. Applicants should be acquainted with such personalities as Poon Sow Keng (the hottest rock 'n' roll singer today in Hong Kong), be able to report the time, news and temperature in easy-going Cantonese, and quote Confucius in the original. The resulting program may be of limited appeal—beneath the notice, one might guess, of a mass-media adman worth his double martini—and yet, it is chiefly this sort of specialization, or “fractionalization of the market,” as they say in the trade, that accounts for the remarkable sonic boom reverberating from radio these days.

Right now, for example, there are more radios in the United States than people—262,700,000 at the last count. Forty-seven million sets were sold last year alone. Such profusion cannot be attributed merely to teen-agers buying transistor radios with which to annoy their parents—although that is a not inconsiderable factor. But parents are buying radios like hot cakes, too. They get them nowadays built into their tractors, hairdryers, Scotch bottles and even sunglasses. And the knobs on all these instruments are being clicked and twirled with astonishing frequency.

In fact—and this may be enough to make even Marshall McLuhan gulp with wonder—a recent Trendex survey conducted for the National Broadcasting Company found that more Americans now listen to radio in the course of an average week than watch TV. The audience for individual radio programs, of course, cannot compare with that of the most popular TV shows, but on a cumulative basis the figures indicate that 90.5 per cent of the adult population tunes in a radio sometime during the week as compared with 87 per cent who flick on television. That finding, the Trendex survey supervisor reported, “puts radio right back in the league with the other major media in terms of total audience dimensions.”

**T**HE robustness of radio is also illustrated by the fact that the giant advertisers, most notably such bellwethers as the soap and automotive

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**ETHNIC BROADCASTING**—Otherwise, and commonly, known as “ghetto radio,” it is an increasingly important specialization. Here, Ed Samuels interviews a man in Harlem for WLIB, one of New York’s three Negro stations.

companies which shifted from radio to TV in the early nineteen-fifties, have once again become substantial radio time buyers. Colgate-Palmolive, for example, which was not even listed among the top 100 radio spot advertisers as recently as 1964 was 23d on the list last year. Ford, General Motors and Chrysler were first, second and third, respectively, with a total expenditure last year of \$56-million—up 17 per cent over the previous year and up 56 per cent over that of the year before.

The explanation for this renaissance of a medium which many condemned to a lingering death as recently as 10 years ago lies, to a great degree, with that sought-after Chinese disk jockey. For, once radio broadcasters began to face up to the fact that television had permanently taken their place as dispenser of general entertainment for the masses, they began experimenting with new formats and discovered that, collec-

tively, they could recapture their old audience piecemeal by directing strong appeals to specific fractions of the population.

This discovery led to the development of all manner of limited-appeal programs, and the advancing trend is now doing away with even these one-hour or half-hour shows, since the stations themselves are beginning to take on the characteristics of a single, 24-hour program, narrowly addressed to a distinct slice of the population. Such broadcast parochialism is now revolutionizing the industry, with several stations almost every month dropping their old-style eclectic programming in preference for the new “continuous format.”

Competition in a city like New York, where no fewer than 63 different AM and FM stations vie for attention, has naturally pushed specialization to an extreme, and some of the more popular formats appear

to have been divided, subdivided and virtually pulled apart with tweezers in order that each station may find a niche (and presumably a distinct audience) it can call its own.

For example, WMCA, WABC, WJYZ and WOR-FM are all what the casual listener might consider standard rock 'n' roll stations, but connoisseurs are aware that WMCA tries to add a local home-town flavor by using such disk jockeys as Joe O'Brien, who has a Yonkers accent; WABC seeks to impart an all-American tone to the proceedings with disk jockeys like Herb Oscar Anderson, who is from Minnesota and full of corn and good cheer; WJYZ restricts itself exclusively to that close relative of rock 'n' roll known as country-Western music, and WOR-FM lays stress on the subdivision known as folk rock, which may include such controversial ballads (which the other

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**Atomic Arms Race (Cont.)**

(From Page 55)

tional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), would thus materially reduce the 15-minute warning time that now enables American bombers to become airborne prior to the impact of any Soviet missile attack on the United States.

**T**HERE are also significant differences in the approaches being followed by the two countries with respect to their strategic defenses. The United States has decided to go ahead with a limited or "thin" deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABM's) consisting of from 10 to 15 sets of missile batteries and radar installations so located throughout the coun-



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try as to be able, thanks to the 400-mile range of the interceptor missiles, to protect the entire nation. The defensive missiles will be provided with a new nuclear warhead designed to destroy incoming missiles by releasing bursts of X-rays. Although this area missile defense system, called Sentinel, is conceived primarily as a countermeasure to Chinese Communist nuclear development rather than as a shield against a Soviet missile attack, it has been

intended that even such a limited deployment of ABM's would provide, as a concurrent benefit, a further defense of our Minuteman sites against Soviet ICBM's. No significant radioactive fallout is anticipated from the operation of the Sentinel system so that no great increase in our shelter program would be needed. To defend against the Russian orbital bomb, if that materializes, the United States will rely on over-the-horizon radar which will give as much warning time as we now would have in the case of an ICBM attack, and on its existing capability of destroying spaceborne weapons.

When it comes to ABM's, the Soviets have already gone well beyond United States planning by deploying a full-scale set of ABM installations around Moscow and Leningrad, and the Russians may be extending another antimissile system around most of western Russia. Eventually the Soviets will undoubtedly set up systems to defend against Chinese Communist missiles.

**M**EANWHILE, there are considerable pressures on both Governments to build up their nuclear stockpiles even further. Within the Soviet Union the military still constitutes a powerful force, with probably more influence under the present collective leadership of Podgorny, Brezhnev and Kosygin than in the heyday of Khrushchev as undisputed top man in the Politburo.

In the United States, military influence on national security policy is likewise strong, particularly through organizations dominated by retired officers and through Congressional committees. In recent months there has appeared under the aegis of the American Security Council a report, entitled "The Changing Strategic Military Balance—U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.," which reached the conclusion that in terms of megatonnage the Soviets have already wiped out the United States margin of security in nuclear arms, and warning of further Soviet gains in strategic weapons. Among those associated with this report and the American Security Council were such former Air Force leaders as Generals LeMay, Powers and Schriever.

Later, another report came out, also predicting that, if present trends continue, the Soviets will soon surpass the United States in numbers of ICBM's. This report was prepared by the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University, a group headed by Adm. Arleigh Burke, retired Chief of Naval Operations.

Several Congressional groups

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will put more rather than less emphasis on offensive and defensive strategic weapons. A subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, headed by Congressman Porter Hardy Jr., is continuing in executive session a comprehensive review of the entire United States strategic position. The Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, chaired by Senator Henry M. Jackson, which is conducting a full-scale inquiry into the ABM issues, has been told that the Soviet Union is deliberately challenging the nuclear superiority of the United States. The Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, under Senator John Stennis, can be expected to be heard from to the same effect.

The net effect of these activities and attitudes is to keep the Johnson Administration under constant pressure to demonstrate that its actions with respect to strategic weapons will not shift the military balance in favor of the Soviet Union. From the time it was announced early this year, President Johnson's effort to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a moratorium on the deployment of ABM's has been regarded with growing skepticism in Congressional and military circles. The timing of recent announcements on strategic weapons system developments reflects the concern within the executive branch over these Congressional-military points of view. Secretary McNamara's September speech in San Francisco announcing the Administration's decision to deploy a thin ABM system followed by a few days a talk in Connecticut by Senator John O. Pastore, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, strongly urging a full ABM deployment. The October announcement of Secretary McNamara that the Soviets were apparently testing FOBS barely preceded the start of the hearings on the ABM issues by Senator Jackson's subcommittee.

**T**HESE pressures, which are naturally fed by resentment at Soviet aid to North Vietnam, will grow in intensity both in the near term as the Johnson Administration formulates the portion of its fiscal 1969 military budget dealing with strategic forces, and during the Presidential election campaign next year. Unless the still-to-be-begun American-Soviet talks on halting the growth in nuclear arms produce some dramatic results, the likelihood is that United States military plans and programs for the future

will put more rather than less emphasis on offensive and defensive strategic weapons.

The prospects of nuclear arms restraint on the Soviet side are even less encouraging. In the first place, the current Russian arms budget is up at least 15 per cent, and all the indications point to a continuation of the Soviet military's ability to claim an increasing share of their national resources. No one on the civilian side of the Soviet leadership seems capable or willing to control the appetites of their military. Furthermore, arms decisions within

the Soviet Union, as is true also in the United States, will continue to be made in the context of each country's policy with respect to "wars of national liberation." The clash of such policies finds its immediate expression in the Vietnam conflict. Although that war is being waged with conventional weapons, the effect of each side's moves on the other is strongly influenced by the balance of nuclear power backing up the respective positions of the two main protagonists.

Indeed, it can well be argued that the interaction between conventionally armed and nuclear forces is such that the trends in each cannot long move in opposite directions. In the American military budget, the support

for nuclear strategic forces has been progressively reduced from \$11.2-billion in 1962 to \$7.1-billion in 1967, while the sums appropriated for non-nuclear general-purposes forces nearly doubled, rising from \$18-billion in 1962 to \$34.3-billion in 1967. The increase has, among other things, financed a 45 per cent increase in Army combat divisions (from 11 to 16), a 73 per cent increase in naval ship construction and modernization and a 40 per cent increase in Air Force tactical squadrons. Now the indications are that the strategic curve will also turn upward; for the current fiscal year the cost of United States strategic forces will go up by \$1-billion, or 15 per cent.

On the Soviet side, the pattern has been one of adding to both the nuclear and nonnuclear forces. Besides setting out to overcome the United States' nuclear lead, the Soviets are seeking, through long-range airlift and sea-based air power, to emulate our capability of projecting conventional military power on a global scale.

**O**NE of the most frightening aspects of the American-Soviet military equation is the inexorable rhythm of its measures and counter-measures. Secretary McNamara calls it the "mad momentum intrinsic to

the development of all new nuclear weapons.

Starting with Sputnik I, the history of the missile age has been characterized by a series of American reactions to Soviet moves and vice versa. The pioneer effort by the United States in submarine-launched missiles was a response to the vulnerability of the first-generation ICBM's with their soft sites and flammable fuels. As successive generations of ICBM's became less vulnerable, the Russians proceeded along parallel lines of producing larger warheads with greater destructive power and at the same time strengthening their missile defenses. United States missile development, on the other hand, has emphasized continuing improvement in penetrability to counter more sophisticated Soviet defenses.

**T**HE United States reaction to the recent disclosure that the Soviets are testing a new kind of space weapon—FOBS—is but another illustration of how inescapable is the pattern of response. Although Secretary McNamara does not regard the development as one that should cause concern for the state of American security, Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed a viewpoint common to many of his colleagues when he insisted that the United States' reply to the latest Soviet arms challenge should be for us to develop our own orbital bomb.

So much depends in these matters on from which side of the looking glass one views a power struggle such as that going on in Vietnam or in the Middle East, where the two superpowers also have major interests and where, in the eyes of President Johnson, the same kind of issues are at stake. What the United States considers an effort to keep the peace or to protect independent nations from externally generated aggression looks to the Russians like another projection of American military power as well as an intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Similarly, in the light of the overseas base structure built up by the United States during the cold-war period, its current disavowals of any intention to maintain military bases in Southeast Asia cannot carry much conviction in Russian minds.

The Soviet Union is not the one one to indulge in ambivalent attitudes. For its part, the United States makes scarcely credible distinctions between the military aid which it furnishes to its friends

and the arms which the Soviet Union provides to those on its side. Thus, while fielding an American Army of nearly half a million soldiers in South Vietnam, supported by a naval force of 100 vessels and thousands of aircraft, we take umbrage at what the Soviets are doing on a far smaller scale for the North Vietnamese.

The prospects, then, are poor that either the United States or the Soviet Government will find itself in the immediate future so domestically positioned as to be able to level off, far less scale down, its nuclear arms program. Should the Johnson Administration go slow in developing and procuring more and better strategic weapons, it will be accused by its critics among the military and the Congress and by its opponents in the Presidential campaign of shifting from a strategy of "nuclear superiority" to one of "nuclear parity" with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership can hardly be expected, without some reciprocal move by the United States, to relax in its efforts to overcome or at least narrow the margin of nuclear advantage which the United States now enjoys.

**I**N these circumstances, is there any alternative to a continuation, if not an intensification, of the arms race beyond the now somewhat forlorn

hope that considerations of logic and economic self-interest might prevail in both Washington and Moscow? The only new factor in the equation is the growing nuclear power of Red China, which, on account of its proximity, constitutes a more immediate threat to the Russians than to the Americans. From an ideological viewpoint, it seems inconceivable that even a common threat from Red China could cause the Soviet Union and the United States to mitigate their current competition in arms. Certainly, in the case of the Soviet Union, it would take an overriding sense of national self-interest for it to make common cause with the United States to the detriment of Communist China. The United States has taken a step in that direction by orienting its missile defenses against the Chinese rather than the Soviets. Could we go further,

**66In view of its present superiority, the initiative toward deflecting downward the nuclear arms race continues to rest on the U.S.99**

and if so, would the Soviets reciprocate?

Questions such as these must be pondered by whatever national Administration resides over American des-

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