

DONALD RUMSFELD, FRED SCHWENDEL, and ROBERT TAFT, JR.

Also, included at the end of our summary statement is a report issued Wednesday, November 15, 1967, by Mr. George Gallup showing public backing for the plan to raise pay of soldiers to the minimum wage level, one of the principal recommendations in our book.

The summary statement is as follows:

#### SUMMARY STATEMENT

Both the study and the 31 specific recommendations that it makes have been written and should be viewed within the context of keeping the debate on the draft as constructive and responsible as possible.

There are some people who countenance evasion of the draft. We do not.

There are some people who are opposed to the draft primarily because they are opposed to the war in Vietnam. Our study was not undertaken because of the war in Vietnam nor should it be interpreted in any way as criticism of military or foreign policies of the United States.

There are some people who advocate an end to the draft regardless of its consequences for the national security of the country. We do not.

The basic conclusions of our study demonstrate the constructive and limited nature of our recommendations. Those conclusions are as follows:

1. An all-volunteer military force is desirable if, without the draft, an effective and efficient military force can maintain the national security.

2. The draft, however necessary, is inherently incompatible with the basic principles of democracy.

3. An all-volunteer armed forces would not necessarily be overrepresentative of the socially or economically deprived segments of the United States population, but neither is it inappropriate for the services to offer an opportunity to the deprived to better their economic conditions.

4. An all-volunteer armed forces may be possible within two to five years, if preliminary steps are taken now in pursuit of that objective. This is true even if we must maintain the current force levels required by the Vietnam war.

5. We are opposed to raising military pay to a level in excess of civilian pay scales—and we believe it would be unwise to create an all-volunteer military force if this were the only means by which it could be achieved.

6. On the other hand, current military pay is not only not an inducement to enlistment, it is an obstacle to enlistment. To the degree possible military pay should be made commensurate with pay for equivalent jobs in the civilian economy.

7. We are opposed to the abolition of the Selective Service System but favor a maximum effort to reduce draft calls down to zero. The Selective Service registration process should be continued even if an all-volunteer army is created, in order to assure adequate flexibility in potential military manpower procurement to meet sudden crises in defense of the nation.

8. Official Defense Department studies have greatly exaggerated the cost of evolving an all-volunteer service—primarily because they have centered only on the single reform of increasing pay rather than examining an orchestration of reforms similar to those recommended in this study.

9. The total maximum cost of the comprehensive reform package recommended by this study is \$3.96 billion per year. (This assumes that the military pay bill, already passed by the House, will soon become law.) We emphasize that this is the total maximum cost. It has been derived by intentionally taking the maximum estimates for expenditures involved and the minimum estimates for savings involved.

Most of the recommendations specified in *How To End the Draft* require no Congressional or legislative action. They can be implemented immediately by the Department of Defense—and we hope that they are. Not a single recommendation in the 31-point program would commit the United States government to an irreversible course toward a voluntary system which would jeopardize national security. Each of the reforms described would amount to an adjustment of current policy leading toward the evolution of an all-voluntary system. We do not advocate the abolition of Selective Service. We advocate a program of reforms which individually and collectively can work to reduce the size of draft calls—hopefully down to zero.

We emphasize that no single reform by itself will result in sufficient voluntary enlistments to remove the necessity of relying upon the draft. But, collectively, reliance on the draft will in our judgment be unnecessary if the 31-point reform package recommended in the study is adopted and implemented.

The thirty-one recommendations described in *How To End the Draft* include the following points:

Rather than assume reliance on the draft by assigning draft quotas before enlistment quotas are fixed for recruiting stations, recruiting station quotas should reflect total service needs and should serve only as minimum objectives for recruiting personnel. Draft calls for each month should be equivalent only to the difference between enlistment quotas and actual enlistment for the previous month.

The basic pay of a new service volunteer or draftee should be raised to the minimum wage level.

Eventually service pay should approximate civilian pay for the equivalent job.

The military services should change their pay system from one of multiple allowances to one of salaries.

Under a salary system of pay the services should permit enlistment at ranks higher than recruit for those who are fully qualified and wish to volunteer for specific jobs which carry the higher rank.

With a new salary system for pay the military services may find it possible to do away with re-enlistment bonuses and similar incentives.

With a new salary system of pay, a new program for retirement benefits can be adopted in which a serviceman would not contribute from his pay to the retirement benefits of others, as is now the case, in effect.

When opportunities for advancement in the military services occur, those who have volunteered to enter the military should be considered before those who were drafted, assuming equivalent skills and performance.

A modest enlistment bonus should be granted to those members of the reserves who volunteer to active duty service.

The Defense Department should give constant attention to the adequacy of non-pay-related benefits, such as on-base and off-base housing conditions, comfortable and convenient recreational activity centers, and increased opportunity for low-cost (or free) travel on leave time both within the region of assignment and even overseas.

In the field of in-service education available for off-duty study, the program of technical training courses should be expanded to assure that it is similar to apprenticeship programs available in civilian life.

Educational programs available for service personnel for study in off-duty hours should be made equally available to dependents of military personnel on active duty.

The in-service off-duty program of educational opportunities now available to active duty personnel should be made available to all members of the reserve forces.

Rather than utilizing a fluctuating recruitment advertising budget that varies in accordance with the number of service per-

sonnel needed, the Department of Defense should establish a fixed recruiting advertising budget. The army recruitment budget should be fixed at \$7 million a year which would be twice the level of the highest budget in recent years. This is one area in which a relatively small expenditure might yield very wide results.

The Department of Defense should prepare a fully comprehensive booklet outlining the various service alternatives available through voluntary enlistment, for the information of young men registering with the draft. (No such information is now provided by Selective Service.)

Under no circumstances should the services' standards of acceptability for voluntary enlistment be more difficult than they are for the draft. (At the present time in both the areas of mental and "moral" standards it is possible to be unacceptable for voluntary enlistment but to be drafted nonetheless.)

Project 100,000, designed to accept into service those with remediable physical or mental deficiencies should be limited exclusively to volunteers, rather than to include draftees as is presently the case.

In the light of the Defense Department's own testimony, Project 100,000 can and should be expanded—to that point where the financial costs of special training approach a point of diminishing returns.

In view of the Project 100,000 experience, Defense Department mental and acceptability standards should and can be lowered without impairing the efficiency of the military services.

The Defense Department should permit the voluntary enlistment of young men who do not meet physical standards of combat, and whose deficiencies are not remediable, but who can perform technical and clerical jobs unrelated to combat service.

The Defense Department's program to replace some non-combat uniformed personnel with civilians should be significantly expanded.

A current Defense Department study should be undertaken of total manpower service needs—including analysis of the necessary level of U.S. troops in Europe, and the optimum means of maintaining adequate numbers of rotation personnel to replace combat casualties or units.

The Defense Department should analyze the optimum organization of the Reserves to treat the following issued without prejudgment: the proper priority of recourse for procurement of rotation personnel for combat assignments among active duty personnel, the reserves, and the draft; the appropriate size and structure of the reserve forces; the best feasible means of assuring a uniformly high state of readiness and training among reserve personnel.

The subject of the draft is generally treated only in emotional terms. *How To End the Draft* is, to the best of our knowledge, the first effort to define systematically a specific program of action which can lead to an all-volunteer service and the elimination of draft calls. We hope that it will receive detailed consideration by the Administration, by the Congress, by the broader political community, and by the public at large.

#### PUBLIC BACKS PLAN TO RAISE PAY OF SOLDIERS TO MINIMUM WAGE LEVEL

(By George Gallup)

PRINCETON, N.J., November 14.—An issue likely to arise in next year's presidential election campaign is that of raising the pay of persons going into the armed forces to the minimum wage paid by business and industry. And a nationwide survey just completed shows that it is an issue with widespread voter appeal.

Eight in every ten persons (80 percent) favor such a plan, recently proposed by a group of 22 congressmen as a way of reducing drafts calls and putting the armed forces on a volunteer basis. Only one person in six (17

per cent) opposes the plan. Unlike many issues covered, only a very small percentage—3 per cent—are unable to express an opinion.

If such a plan were to go into effect, it would greatly increase the pay of members of the armed forces, even beyond the 5.6 per cent hike in basic pay recently approved by the House and waiting likely positive action by the Senate.

Recruits in all the services now receive a base pay of \$90.60 a month. If soldiers were paid on the basis of the current federal minimum wage of \$1.40 per hour, they would receive a base pay of about \$240 per month on the basis of a 40-hour week. Out of this sum would come the costs of the usual benefits, but the soldier would still realize a significant cash gain.

Fifteen hundred sixty-five persons were interviewed in a survey that reached into 325 localities across the nation. This question was asked first:

"It has been suggested that the base pay of young men who go into the armed forces be increased to make their pay equal to the minimum wage paid by business and industry. Would you favor or oppose this plan?"

The results:

	Percent
Favor -----	80
Oppose -----	17
No opinion -----	3

The plan receives bi-partisan support and is favored among all levels of society and in all income groups. Women, however, are somewhat more inclined to favor the plan than are men.

A middle-age housewife offered a common view: "Why should a soldier receive so much less money than a guy holding down a civilian job. After all, the soldier risks his life."

**MAKE DRAFT UNNECESSARY?**

One of the stated purposes of a boost in service salaries would be to make the service more appealing to young men and thereby reducing draft calls down to zero.

To determine public attitudes, the following question was asked:

"Do you think this higher pay would attract enough young men into the armed services to make the draft unnecessary?"

Half of all persons interviewed express doubts that such a plan would make the draft unnecessary, but as many as 4 in 10 said they think it would, as seen in the following table:

	Percent
No -----	50
Yes -----	42
No opinion -----	8

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**GOOD FARM SUGGESTION**

(Mr. MIZE (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MIZE. Mr. Speaker, one of the problems which plagues us in the rural areas is how to keep our younger people interested in farming so that they can take over the family farm or launch out on their own.

One deterrent is the difficulty of making a farm investment on their own. In this regard, one of my constituents, Wilfred Elliott, of White City, Kans., has come up with an excellent suggestion. His proposal has been the subject of an editorial in the Wichita, Kans., Eagle. I respectfully direct the attention of my colleagues to this proposal by Mr. Elliott, which follows:

**GOOD FARM SUGGESTION**

The suggestion of a member of the Kansas Farmers Union will strike a responsive chord in the hearts of many ambitious but frustrated young men.

Wilfred Elliott of White City proposes creation of a federal land transfer agency which would buy land from a retiring farmer or rancher on a voluntary basis.

The agency in turn could sell the land to a young farmer at long-term low-interest credit.

This makes more sense than a lot of other farm programs in the federal government. It puts help in the hands of the individual farmer, the backbone of much of this country's greatness.

And unless something is done soon, the individual farmer will have vanished, the victim of the corporation. As things are now, it is nearly impossible for a young farmer to go into business on his own.

Today's farmer for the most part is a big operator with large acreage and thousands of dollars tied up in superefficient machinery. He must play tax angles and support powerful lobbies in Topeka.

The pace is too swift for the young man who is not fortunate enough to inherit a farm.

The trend is the same in other areas of the economy.

A few years ago a young printer or reporter could easily borrow or save the \$2,000 or \$3,000 capital needed to purchase a newspaper. The same money today wouldn't buy the parking lot.

A few years ago a young clerk in a grocery store could work a few years and save enough money to open a competitive store across the street. Today a neighborhood grocery store would have a tough time of it, and the money it takes to establish a supermarket is prohibitive.

It is still possible to get into business for yourself, but it is becoming increasingly difficult.

Government assistance appears to be the only alternative to the eventual end of free enterprise as we have come to know it in the past 100 years.

(Mr. SMITH of Oklahoma (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. SMITH of Oklahoma's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. MESKILL (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MESKILL'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

**ABM**

**ARMS RACE IN ORBIT**

(Mr. RUMSFELD (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, a recent editorial in the Chicago Daily News discusses the disturbing implications of the recent disclosure that the Russians are developing an orbital bomb. The editorial notes the threat which such a warhead might present to the United States, the likely escalation of the arms race, and the violation in spirit of the United

States-Soviet space treaty. The full text follows:

[From the Chicago Daily News, Nov. 7, 1967]

**ARMS RACE IN ORBIT**

Defense Sec. McNamara was blandly reassuring when he announced that the Russians are apparently readying an orbital bomb. Such a weapon wouldn't be very accurate, McNamara said. Besides, a new U.S. long-range radar system will probably help to offset it.

The development is nonetheless disturbing not only on military grounds, but in what it tells about Soviet attitudes.

In simple terms, the new Russian system would enable them to send warheads the long way around the globe instead of lobbing them on a direct route with intercontinental missiles. By coming in the back door at an altitude of 100 miles—compared to the 800-mile height at the top of an ICBM trajectory—the warhead would defy calculation of its exact target until three minutes before it hit. Even if accuracy is in doubt, the system's threat of only three minutes' warning is something to think about. Over-the-horizon radar could tell when such a missile had been fired, but that would provide only the most general kind of a warning until the thing left its orbit and headed for a target.

The United States considered and rejected such a system years ago, McNamara said. But now that the Russians seem intent on escalating the arms race by adopting it, pressures will doubtless mount for the United States to do likewise. The situation is comparable to that which followed Soviet deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. The United States held off on ABMs until it was clear the Soviets were proceeding; then came a decision to take corresponding action.

In this case, the Russians are not only giving a new boost to the arms race, but coming perilously close to violating the treaty on outer space signed with such ceremony only a few weeks ago. That treaty specifically outlaws the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth.

There is a technical out, in that the Russian system would bring down the bomb short of one complete revolution of the Earth—hence McNamara's use of the term Fractional Orbital Bombing System (FOBS). The space treaty also fails to mention any ban on developing an orbital bomb, provided it is not used.

But even if the Russians are sticking to the letter of the treaty, they are plainly taking advantage of the fine print and pushing to the outer limit of the permissible. Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) put it well when he described the Soviet move as "a good-faith violation."

It isn't yet clear what the Soviet FOBS is going to cost in money, anxiety, and worsening U.S.-Russian relations. But what does come clear is that American negotiators had best be more careful about the fine print in any treaty with the Russians. If there's a loophole, they'll find it and push a new weapon system through it. It's a warning for the people now working on an antiproliferation treaty to paste firmly in their hats.

**ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY**

(Mr. MORSE of Massachusetts (at the request of Mr. RUPPE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORSE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw to the attention of my colleagues an editorial appearing in this morning's Washington Post. The editorial, entitled "All-Volunteer Army," praises our colleagues Congressmen STAFFORD, HORTON, SCHWEIKER,