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ity, exciting programs that some expect to see on so-called educational television may never be offered if we accept the view of the well-known columnist Howard K. Smith as it appeared in the Washington Star on October 1.

Mr. Smith cautioned against expecting changes of any great magnitude in either commercial or educational television as we know it. While I do not share Mr. Smith's appraisal of the Congress or his thinking about many other matters, I thought my colleagues might be interested in this assessment by a liberal member of the fourth estate.

Under unanimous consent I include the article in full in the RECORD:

DON'T EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM PUBLIC TELEVISION

(By Howard K. Smith)

The House of Representatives has passed the public television bill. The Senate will almost certainly do so too, and a source of government-authorized, tax-supported TV will come to exist alongside our private, ad-supported, commercial TV. As television is thought to affect greatly the mental and spiritual climate of America, this might be an important development.

People who understand television but little, however, are premature and hyperbolic in seeing a new age of wonders about to open. A leading figure in our nation stopped me on Capitol Hill the other day and said, "You commercial TV people had better straighten yourselves out, or the audience is going to desert you now that public television will be available." A leading Washington newspaper commented that TV was "on the verge of delivering to the public those great cultural and public affairs programs it has all too frequently failed to deliver in the past."

Criticizing the fare on commercial TV is without doubt America's chief popular avocation, more practised than watching baseball or even than discussing Lyndon Johnson's faults. But for an exercise Americans indulge in so much, it is odd how ill thought out are their assumptions. There is not going to be any hegira away from commercial to public TV. There is nothing magic in public TV that is going to increase the quantity of genius or imagination in our nation.

All the paraphernalia of commercial TV—the quest for the highest profits, the ratings, the fear of offending—undoubtedly help to create mediocrity on commercial TV.

By far the most limiting factor on quality, however, is the rarity of genius, and even of creative talent. The notion that there are reams of undiscovered Hamlets or rejected "Death of a Salesman's" waiting only for an outlet, is a myth. Good plays or programs simply do not exist in quantity, and public TV is not going to change that.

The rarity of high-grade material did not begin with the television age. Now that we can watch decades of Hollywood's output on the late show night after night on television, it is clear that there were never really many good movies. The list of national paperback book best-sellers (a more reliable guide than the hardback book best-sellers which a minuscule number of Americans read) is led by some books that are several years old, and they were not outstanding when they were first published. William Shakespeare is far the best contriver of stories the human race has produced, yet most of his plays were pretty dreary potboilers.

In the realm of documentary TV reporting, one needs only watch those produced of educational television. They are duller and more timid than those on commercial TV—which is quite an indictment.

Far from being more interesting than commercial TV, there is even a real possibility that public TV may be less interesting. Con-

gress will have ultimate control over its flow of lifeblood—money. Congress is consistently a good 10 to 20 years behind the times, as has been demonstrated by its slowness to enact the minimal legislation needed to avoid explosion in our cities. Congress excels at negating, and is downright suspicious of creativity.

There is the famous example of the display of American art put on by the USIA in West Berlin in the 1950s. To show that experimentation was afoot in our nation, the exhibition featured a wall of examples of pretty far-out art. A junketing group of Congressmen visited Berlin and went to the exhibit and went through the roof, so to speak. Was this what their appropriations were being squandered on? The USIA promptly removed the paintings and substituted a display of antiseptic American photographs. Is Congress going to sit still while public TV falls on its face with experiment—without which good art in any realm is impossible?

Unless public television is effectively insulated from congressional pressure I foresee a timid, proper and dull series of programs. The ardent controversies which are the absorbing spirit of real life will be blurred or blunted. The drama is likely to be horrendously safe. And if there are comics, they had better be careful about whom they make the butt of their jokes.

[R., O.] seems to us a sensible way to protect personal privacy and also supply the government with useful information. His bill specifies that mandatory answers be required of only seven basic questions: Name, age, address, race or color, marital status, relationship to the head of the household, and number of resident visitors. All other questions would be listed separately and plainly marked as voluntary.

Anyone answering questions voluntarily would probably give more accurate answers than someone required to answer under duress. Also, with the state of the art of computer analysis of survey information, the census bureau could get most or all of the information it needs from projection of a voluntary sample.

Undoubtedly more than enough Americans would be willing to volunteer information to the census bureau. They should be allowed to do so with the feeling that they are contributing to knowledge about the nation, not because they face a jail sentence if they don't answer.

The Log Export Problem

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 3, 1967

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, last April I told the House that export of raw logs to Japan was threatening the health of the timber industry in the Pacific Northwest. In the intervening months, the rate of these exports has accelerated. This serious situation has attracted the attention of many of my colleagues in the House and Senate, and was one of the topics discussed during the recent United States-Japan General Trade Conference conducted at the State Department.

At that time, our Government agreed with the Japanese to study the log export problem in depth. The agreement stated that discussions would include such matters as the level of exports, the geographical concentration of log purchases by the Japanese, diversification of purchases to include finished lumber, and programs designed to increase supplies of timber resources.

Our Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman, was designated as representative of the U.S. Government to meet with the Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Secretary Freeman recently visited the Pacific Northwest and understands the impact of log exports on the American timber market. No date has been set for the first meeting, but the State Department is hopeful that the discussions can be undertaken before Christmas. Industry officials will be invited as observers to these negotiations.

In order to acquaint my colleagues with recent developments in the Japanese export situation, I am including in the RECORD a recent article from the lumber and plywood market report, Random Lengths. This knowledgeable trade paper, circulated worldwide by Mr. Lester E. Anderson, of Eugene, Ore., presents a balanced and reasoned discussion of the many difficult policy decisions which must be made to resolve the log export problem.

Snooping in the Census

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 11, 1967

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, Chicago's American for October 7 contained an editorial regarding the decennial census that will be conducted in 1970.

A number of Members of the House of Representatives, including my distinguished neighbor, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKI], have expressed opposition to some of the questions that have been proposed. He feels, and I agree with him, that they constitute an invasion of privacy.

The editorial discusses the subject logically, fairly, and temperately, and I would like to bring it to the attention of my colleagues, as follows:

SNOOPING IN THE CENSUS

Is the Federal census bureau trying to infringe on the privacy of American citizens by asking personal questions? Rep. Edward Derwinski [R., Ill.] says it is, and blames Congress for failing to keep the bureau in check; by now, says Derwinski, it has "gotten completely out of control."

Derwinski has joined a group of congressmen opposed to certain questions proposed for the 1970 census, the first in history to be conducted by mail. Queries include how many persons share a single shower, the number of flush toilets there are in a dwelling, and how many times an individual has been married. Those who fail to answer any census questions may be fined \$100 and sentenced to 60 days in jail.

The growing complexity of American society might justify seeking information beyond counting noses for the purpose of congressional redistricting—the original purpose of the census. But it obviously must not be used to compel answers to questions that invade privacy.

A bill introduced by Rep. Jackson E. Betts

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SABMIS Answers the Red China Threat

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 20, 1967

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, of particular interest to the Congress is the Navy's seaborne anti-ballistic-missile interception system, SABMIS. The effectiveness of SABMIS has been explored in the current—October 16—Washington Report of the American Security Council by Anthony Harrigan, as follows:

SABMIS: FORWARD ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE

(By Anthony Harrigan)

When Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great naval strategist, wrote two generations ago of the influence of sea power upon history he could not in his wildest dreams have imagined that one day the mobility of the surface ship would make possible the projection of national defense envisioned in the new SABMIS concept—the sea-based, anti-ballistic missile intercept system. Yet this concept, now under consideration as a vital addition to the nation's nuclear deterrent in the cold war, offers the United States a forward defense of the continental United States.

The public is familiar with the marriage of the nuclear-armed missile and the nuclear-powered submarine. The nation's fleet of 41 Polaris submarines, completed this past summer when the USS *Will Rogers* was commissioned, is widely understood as a key element in America's atomic-age strategic forces. Beyond Polaris, however, lies the SABMIS system, designed to give sea power a new strategic defense role by providing forward protection for the United States and its allies.

The SABMIS concept provides for placing anti-ballistic missiles aboard surface ships. If this system were authorized and deployed, a number of naval vessels—some equipped with powerful radar and others outfitted as launch ships—would be assigned stations in the path of enemy missiles aimed at the United States from land bases in the communist countries. This sea-based system would give the U.S. a forward line of ABM defenses. The ABMs aboard ship in the Pacific or North Atlantic would have the task of intercepting enemy missiles long before they entered their terminal phase of flight.

Dr. Paul C. Davis of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, writing in *Orbis*, has cited the possible forms a sea-based, anti-ballistic missile defense system might take.

"Theoretically," he said, "one could devise a system based solely on submersible and airborne or spaceborne components. Since, however, a sea-based, anti-Chinese system would be needed, if at all, by 1975, or even earlier, the present analysis is based upon a relatively unsophisticated system, one in which the main elements are mounted on surface vessels. The launching platform might be a converted transport or small carrier; the missile system might be an adaptation of the Nike Zeus; and detection systems might be carried by picket ships or converted destroyers, supplemented by carrier-based picket aircraft."

The SABMIS system under discussion would have the initial task of serving as a counter to the potential nuclear threat offered by Communist China. The system is needed, moreover, not simply as a means of dealing with a possible attack on the United

Those who negotiate for the United States in the upcoming talks with Japan must recognize the serious ramifications log exports are having throughout the entire lumber and timber industry. If exports continue to grow at their accelerating rate and the damage to the domestic timber industry is permitted to continue, remedies far more stringent than diplomatic accommodations may be necessary. Congressional action may eventually be required if the diplomatic effort stalls.

I include the comments from Random Lengths in the Record at this point:

In August and early September, while lumber and plywood prices skyrocketed primarily because of an impending shortage of raw material, there were huge log decks at the Washington ports of Olympia, Bellingham, and Everett. These logs were earmarked for export, principally to Japan.

The extreme market fluctuation of late summer, ranging from \$10-15 on many items, cannot be blamed directly and solely on these specific log decks. There had been a faltering improvement in the consumption of lumber throughout the Summer; there had been an unusually long dry spell in the Northwest which hampered normal logging operations. But, there also had been an increasing volume of logs sold for export, and a significant increase over a year ago in the price these export logs commanded, effectively blocking off many domestic manufacturers from access to such logs as were available. What developed in domestic lumber and plywood markets was a foretaste of a problem outlined here August 4: The forests of the Northwest, under present practices, cannot for long meet the lumber and plywood requirements of an expanding domestic market and, at the same time, supply wood fiber for unrestricted export; not, that is, without economic dislocation which is most likely to affect the domestic consumer of forest products.

The growing seriousness of the impact of log exports was recognized recently in a decision to undertake a joint U.S.-Japanese examination of the use of timber resources of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska. This examination was agreed to at the annual meeting of the cabinet officers of the two nations. Exports have been a matter of concern among forest products producers for some time. Finding a solution satisfactory to all the parties involved is a matter important to both nations. *The U.S. and Japan need each other's trade.* The domestic forest products industry needs at least equal access to raw material grown in this country.

At the moment, there are no clear indications of the ground the cabinet-level examination will cover. Certainly it will be necessary to determine the probable needs of both this country and Japan. Housing construction in the United States over the next decade has been projected at an average of 2 to 2.5 million units annually; Japan recently announced a government program to build 1.2 million units annually over the next 10 years. While the materials requirements are quite different in each country, both are major users of structural wood products. Japan needs the wood fiber; softwood lumber which is imported primarily from British Columbia and, for domestic reasons, logs which can be processed in Japan.

If the Pacific Northwest cannot meet domestic demand, and supply Japanese requirements as well, where is the wood to come from? The most logical source is Japan

itself. Most of the wood consumed there comes from Japanese forests. But these are being cut many times faster than can be sustained by growth. (However, something like one-fifth of Japan's national forests are unroaded; would road development permit the managed harvest of more timber?) Another source of timber has been Russian. In the past, U.S. exporters have threatened that Japan would turn to the Russians for more of their timber needs if they could not get logs from this country. But, the Russians say they are exporting only surplus logs and as equipment (much of it supplied by the Japanese) becomes available for domestic manufacture the volume of timber available for export is expected to drop.

Alaska has seemed to many to be a logical source of both timber and lumber for Japan. U.S.-Japanese combines now are shipping a large portion of the lumber and pulp produced in Alaska to the Far East; recently logs from private ownerships have been exported. But federal timber in Alaska is being held for the development of local industry and is restricted from export. At this time, however, the market which would cause this development is in Alaska and Japan.

Therefore, only about half of the annual allowable cut of Alaskan forests is being harvested. The use of the remaining unharvested half of this state's annual timber yield to develop roads and other facilities is worth considering. Finally, the Pacific Northwest, the principal source of Japan's log imports, might be able to supply a substantial volume of timber without damage to domestic manufacturers. This might be accomplished under any of several intensive management programs which have been discussed but never adopted. One such program, calling for the investment of \$80 million a year for eight years in development of a thinning program, has been estimated by the Forest Service to permit an increase of 500 million board feet per year in the allowable cut of the national forests of Oregon and Washington.

In addition, there is private timber which is, and will continue to be, available for export. However, the export of large volumes of private timber might create problems if public timber is excluded from export. What, for example, should be the policy toward a firm which sells its own timber for export, taking the benefit of the capital gains tax, and uses this revenue in the *preclusive purchase of public stumpage* with which to operate its domestic plants?

It is not going to be easy to find reasonable and satisfactory solutions to the log export problem. But, answers must be found without a great deal of diplomatic hemming and hawing. Through the first six months of this year, exports from Oregon and Washington were about 40% greater than in the same period of 1966. It is expected that exports for the full year will climb from just over one billion board feet last year to between 1.8 and 2 billion feet this year.

This is a matter of concern not only to manufacturers but also to distributors. Consider that the 159 million feet of logs shipped out of Oregon and Washington in July alone (56% more than in July, 1966) would have provided raw material—at a time when it was critically needed—for more than a full week's production of lumber in these same states. The loss of this volume of products can be sustained by our economy. But, not if it happens repeatedly and over a long period of time. If this occurs, and there is no evidence that a prompt and reasonable solution can be found, the demand for the unwanted solution—that exports be flatly prohibited—may reach proportions which cannot be ignored.

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States but also with the threat of a Chinese attack on U.S. allies in Asia.

Armed with nuclear weapons, Communist China within a few years will have a much greater capacity for international blackmail than it has at present. Peking can be expected to threaten Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and other Asian countries with nuclear attack unless they break all defense links with the United States and move into Peking's orbit. Indeed more than a year ago, a leading leftist journal in Europe recommended "socialist counter-escalation" in the future, and suggested the likelihood of "graduated reprisals" with rockets against U.S. air-naval bases on Formosa, Okinawa and in the Philippines.

Unless the United States is to withdraw its forces deep into the Central Pacific, abandoning all the Asian countries protected at such vast expense over so many years, the credibility of American deterrence of atomic-armed missiles in the hands of Peking must be enormously enhanced. The utility of an anti-Chinese, sea-based ABM thus is enormous.

It should be borne in mind that Peking does not need an especially sophisticated missile delivery system, as its primary goal will be political blackmail and psychological terrorism—not pinpoint destruction of key targets. It is this threat that Japan and other friendly Asian countries must be protected against in the relatively near future. The land-based, ABM system on American territory can be largely concerned with the more complex danger of Soviet rocket attack, a problem which does not particularly worry Japan, Thailand and other friends of the U.S. at this stage of the cold war. It is possible, of course, that Japan has the know-how to develop her own ABM defense, but Japanese defense authorities face a formidable constitutional hurdle in obtaining authority for the acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons. Thus the real burden of free world interests in Asia will, for many years to come, fall on the United States. In addition, the U.S. government, which is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons—even of a nominally defensive type—may prefer to increase the American capability rather than encouraging a defense partner to build her own atomic shield.

A major advantage of a sea-based, anti-ballistic missile defense for Asia is its mobility. The Asian countries with which the United States is concerned embrace a vast area of this continent. Furthermore, the Chinese nuclear missile threat is likely to shift from one political theater to another. With the SABMIS system in operation, the United States could shift its anti-ballistic missile defense structure as needs dictated. The balance of these ABM forces could be altered according to the weight of specific threats at particular times. Thus SABMIS vessels could be deployed in a variety of areas and formations from the Bay of Bengal to the Sea of Japan. SABMIS ships thus would be as effective in protecting India or Japan against Chinese Communist nuclear threats as the Seventh Fleet has been in guarding the free Chinese on Formosa from amphibious invasion. Indeed the security of Formosa has to be given special consideration when analyzing the Chinese nuclear-armed missile threat. This bastion of the legitimate Republic of China remains as a special political target of the powers-that-be in Peking, and a truly contemporary defense system for the island must involve an ABM defense.

Yet even on Formosa the construction of land-based ABM sites would pose a variety of political problems. Any change in the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China, because of an alteration in the leadership of either nation, could create the possibility of a major defense system becoming inoperative because of political conditions. On the ocean, however, there is no problem of base agreements or disagree-

ments over hands on the triggering mechanism. In addition, a sea-based ballistic missile system eliminates the problem of providing adequate security against terrorist attack. ABMs on shipboard would escape the surveillance the enemy would maintain if they were on land in the Far East.

Another tremendously important advantage of a sea-based, anti-missile system is that it would eliminate the danger of radiation and blast effects in the vicinity of U.S. cities. An ABM system on American territory would necessitate significant protection measures for the civilian population. In a sea-based, anti-missile system the area of radiation and blast would be over water. This means that both the United States and its allies would be spared the cost of constructing shelters.

Existence of the SABMIS system would give an added measure of protection to civilian populations in the event of a nuclear attack because the enemy would have to concentrate fire at the sea-based, anti-missile systems. Therefore, civilians would have more time to insure their own survival.

The forward deployment assured by SABMIS would be in keeping with the long-time efforts of the United States to offer prime resistance to cold war enemies on our advance strategic frontiers from Berlin to Vietnam. It always is wiser for the United States to move its power out from the center of national life to the rim area where armed conflict will not directly or immediately impinge on the lives of our people at home.

SABMIS is especially attractive from the fiscal standpoint inasmuch as the concept does not include a requirement for a new and extremely costly type of vessel. The Polaris missile system is housed in a multi-million dollar atomic submarine. SABMIS, however, could be installed aboard existing vessels of conventional design. The only special protective system required would be augmentation of anti-submarine forces in the SABMIS operating areas. The United States is fortunate, however, that Communist China, though seeking status as an undersea power (See WR 65-27), still lacks an effective undersea fleet and could not develop one rapidly without expenditures currently beyond its capacity.

Approval of the SABMIS concept is likely to be difficult, it should be acknowledged, in view of the extreme reluctance of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to authorize any major new strategic counter-measure. Despite his announcement of token ABM system designed only to face a future Red Chinese threat, Mr. McNamara remains basically hostile to the deployment of a full ABM defensive system, whether on land or on sea. He apparently places his faith in negotiation with the Soviets to reduce the arms race to a walk.

This faith, nonetheless, does not remove the reality of Chinese Communist fanaticism which places Peking beyond the range of reasonable discussions on any subject.

As Dr. M. H. Halperin has written, "China's nuclear capability will pose a threat of massive destruction to Asian cities in the short run and to American cities in the long run." This threat makes it ever more vital that additional ways be found to eliminate Red China's nuclear gains. SABMIS offers optimal detection and interception of Chinese missiles aimed at Tokyo and Manila as well as those aimed at U.S. territory. At the same time, as SABMIS would concentrate on mid-course interception of Chinese missiles, land-based ABMs in the United States could concentrate on terminal intercept of Soviet inter-continental weapons. SABMIS also would permit more realistic training in remote ocean areas. Nuclear defense drills on U.S. territory, after all, necessarily are hedged around by the most elaborate precautions which somewhat inhibit the development of the offensive spirit. Nor, in the case of

SABMIS, would there be any problem with disaffected citizens such as those who have attempted to halt troop trains carrying soldiers to points of embarkation. SABMIS could perform its mission far from the shores of America in an environment of maximum operational freedom. All in all, SABMIS offers a valuable opportunity to the United States to redress the strategic balance.

Military Rule in Greece

SPEECH
OF

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 19, 1967

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, one of the most perceptive and best-informed writers on the military regime in Greece is Maurice Goldbloom. Mr. Goldbloom, a freelance writer, was labor information officer for the U.S. economic mission to Greece in 1950-51. He has since returned to the country many times and has numerous sources of information that give authority to his articles on recent Greek developments. Following is an article that appeared in the September 24 New York Times Magazine:

AFTER THE ARRESTS: HOW THE MILITARY RULES
8 MILLION GREEKS

The military junta which seized power in Greece last April 21 is still nervous, but with each passing day it is less and less vulnerable. By now, neither a decision by King Constantine to break with it, nor a decision by the United States to cut off military aid would automatically topple it, though either would undoubtedly weaken it.

The attitude of most Greeks toward the King's role is summed up in a mot that has been going the rounds in Athens: "In the process of seduction, there is a point at which a girl must decide whether she is going to remain a virgin. The King has passed that point with the junta." In his recent appearances in the United States—in Washington with the President, in Newport for the America's Cup races—Constantine has apparently been acting as the regime's envoy. For its part, the United States, through its initial acquiescence, has given the junta the time it needed to dig in.

In other words, the junta, though not noticeably more popular, does seem to be more solidly entrenched. The coup was staged by no more than 200 to 400 officers—out of some 10,000 in the Greek Army. The ability of such a small group to seize power without significant opposition was largely the result of mistaken identity. Greeks had long been expecting—and right-wing Greeks had been hoping for—a coup by a large, nominally secret, but in fact well-known, organization dominated by senior officers known as IDEA. But over the years a small, rival organization of junior officers, called EENA, had been growing up almost unnoticed. At the time of the coup its leadership included only one general—Styllanos Patakos, now Minister of the Interior—and he had been made a brigadier only three months before. The group's most important leader was Col. George Papadopoulos—who happened also to be the man assigned by IDEA to transmit the orders for its coup to its followers throughout the army.

It was EENA that struck, but when Papadopoulos gave the signal its recipients thought they were obeying IDEA. Because there was no organized democratic group in the army, there was no military resistance.

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Because civilian political groups—including the weak and demoralized Communists—were prepared only for lectoral activity, there was no popular resistance.

Once in, the junta lost no time in broadening its base of military support. Increasing the officer corps by approximately 10 per cent has enabled it to win the support of perhaps twice that many officers through promotions and new appointments. Key officers on whose loyalty it could not count were forced to retire. In the army, this purge for the most part took place immediately after the coup; in the navy, where the coup had received almost no support, the junta moved more slowly. Still, by mid-August more than 60 naval officers, mostly of high rank, were said to have been removed, and 11 to have been arrested.

Arrests, indeed, have been the junta's most conspicuous activity. The cases of former Premier George Papandreou of the Center Union, his son, Andreas Papandreou, and Mikis Theodorakis, composer of the score for "Zorba the Greek," have attracted worldwide attention, but there are thousands more, and the arrests show no signs of abating.

The original wave of arrests was based largely on an army list of suspects prepared nearly 20 years ago; the conspirators had been afraid to ask for more recent lists for fear of tipping their hand. Thus, many of those arrested in the first sweep were people who, whatever they might have been in the turbulent nineteen-forties, had long since ceased to be politically active.

Later arrests—which by now certainly outnumber those of the first wave—have been more selective. They affect all sections of the political spectrum, including parliamentary deputies, former Government ministers and several of the country's leading journalists. They also include a man who criticized the King in a telephone conversation with his sister, a bus driver who objected to letting a soldier ride free and numerous persons accused of such offenses as having five or more guests in their home or possessing a mimeograph and not registering it with the police.

Of those arrested at the time of the coup, more than 8,000 were sent to a hastily opened concentration camp on the island of Yiaros. (Some 1,500, most of whom had been arrested because of their official positions rather than for their politics, were soon released, though many remained under house arrest.) The Government has now announced the opening of a second major concentration camp on the island of Leros, to which prisoners are being transferred from Yiaros. This should be an improvement.

Yiaros is a completely waterless and barren island, swept by high winds. Before the coup it had an old and unused prison, with cells for a few hundred persons. When the detainees were dumped on the island, the prison was used to house some of the women. The other prisoners were housed in tents, 25 to a tent, grouped in three camps.

Some weeks later, at a time when the Government claimed to have released about a third of the prisoners originally there, it announced plans to construct reservoirs on the island which would make it possible for each prisoner to receive 15 liters (a little less than 4 gallons) of water a day. Clearly, the water supply during the first several weeks must have been barely enough for drinking, let alone sanitation.

Later, other ameliorations were promised. These included an improvement in the diet, which was said to have consisted mainly of beans, and the opening of a canteen at which prisoners could purchase additional food and other small necessities. Some of these improvements may have taken place. It at least appears reasonably certain that the canteen was opened—since underground channels reported a few weeks later that it had been closed again.

There are inevitable gaps and time lags in information on conditions in the various places of detention, since Yiaros and most of the others have been barred to journalists and foreigners. A representative of the International Red Cross has, to be sure, been permitted to visit them. But in accordance with the normal practice of that organization, his report was submitted only to the Greek Government, which never made it public.

The Government did, however, release a letter in which the Red Cross representatives asked on humanitarian grounds that the 250 women confined in the old prison on Yiaros be transferred elsewhere, to accommodations more appropriate to their sex. (The circumstances of this release were such that one is impelled to wonder if the Government really desired to give it wide publicity. In the Greek Government press office, official releases are normally laid out on tables, arranged in the order of the numbers which they bear. They are available in Greek, English and French. This release had no number, it was not with the others, and it was available only in Greek.) I have seen no report indicating that such a transfer has in fact taken place, although the women may be among those now being moved to Leros.

If conditions on Yiaros have improved in some elementary physical respects, it appears that they have recently become worse in other ways. Some 250 of the "most dangerous" prisoners are said to have been segregated from the others, and to be confined to their quarters 20 hours a day. During the four hours in which they are allowed out, the other prisoners are confined, in order to prevent any contact between the two groups. And the three camps on the island are kept isolated from one another.

These changes probably result from the regime's disappointment at the failure of the prisoners to break down under its pressure. A condition for release is that the detainee sign a pledge to refrain from "antinational and anti-Governmental activity." Few politically significant prisoners have been willing to sign, regarding it as dishonorable.

Interior Minister Patakos complained to me: "Some of them are getting more hardened instead of reforming. They have organized by tents; a leader for each tent, and a group leader for each 8 or 10 tents. They have a president for each of the camps, and a general commander for the whole island. They have collected 250,000 drachmas [a little more than \$8,000] among themselves, for what purpose I do not know, but I am sure it is not a good one."

As one of the "Communist" leaders of the hardened prisoners, Patakos mentioned Dimitrios Stratis. When I remarked that the 78-year-old Stratis, a veteran trade-union leader and left-wing parliamentary deputy whom I know well, was not a Communist, Patakos replied: "He calls himself a Socialist, but he is a Communist. In Greece, we have right people and wrong people. All those who are against the country are Communists. Stratis is a Communist in his heart and his works. They are all liars."

Yiaros and the courts-martial which hand out sentences of five years for writing slogans on walls and eight years for *lese-majeste* are not the Government's only instruments of intimidation. Some Greeks beyond the borders have had their citizenship revoked—most notably, the actress Melina Mercouri, who seems to have come out ahead on the exchange.

Many persons regarded as potential troublemakers have been taken to police stations and badly beaten, as a warning, without being formally arrested; this treatment has been most often used on students and other young people. The security police have visited private employers with lists of "unreliable" individuals who are to be discharged. Many people have had their telephones removed because of their political views; all have been discouraged from talking politics on the phone or writing about it to friends by the

knowledge that phones are likely to be tapped and letters opened.

But the junta has not relied on terror alone to consolidate its position. Rather, it has systematically endeavored to entrench itself in every aspect of Greek life. On the national level, despite the existence of a nominally civilian Government, an army officer plays a key role in every ministry—in some cases as minister, in others as secretary general, in still others as a political commissar without official title.

The tenure of civil servants has been abolished; many have been removed for their ideas, and all have been ordered to pledge their loyalty to the regime on pain of dismissal. The purge has not been confined to such politically sensitive departments as the police, where 118 high-ranking officials and police doctors were dismissed in mid-August. (Others had been ousted previously, individually or in smaller batches.) It has even affected the director of the Byzantine Museum, an internationally known scholar.

Locally, the regime has destroyed the system of nonpolitical nomarchs or district administrators, whose establishment American advisers once regarded as one of their major achievements. More than half the nomarchs have been removed; most of their replacements are army officers. While asserting its belief in the decentralization of authority, the Government has removed large numbers of elected mayors and local councils and replaced them with appointees chosen in Athens.

Nor has it confined itself to the governmental sphere. It has seized control of the Orthodox Church. It has dissolved hundreds of private organizations and removed the officers of numerous others, including bar associations, agricultural cooperatives and the Jewish community.

The United States Embassy in Athens clearly does not like the regime, though most Greeks regard it as responsible for the coup—an opinion the junta assiduously encourages. (A skeptical friend remarked to me, after seeing one of the coup leaders in action, "Now I believe what you say about the Americans not being behind the coup; they'd never have chosen *these* people!") But the Embassy also regards the present Government as a lesser evil than a revolt against it, and has therefore placed its hope in persuading the junta to practice self-denial and restore democracy voluntarily. Its influence is limited, since the junta now feels certain that the United States will continue military aid whatever happens. (Some weeks after the coup, the U.S. did cut off certain items, estimated by the Defense Department at 10 per cent of the total.)

Nevertheless, the Embassy and State Department see great cause for optimism in the appointment of a committee of jurists to draw up a revised Constitution by the end of the year for submission to a plebiscite. This is supposed to lead to a speedy and orderly restoration of constitutional government.

This assessment appears to contain a large measure of wishful thinking. The group named to draw up the new Constitution included a few persons of some distinction, several conservative nonentities and a few with rather unpleasant reputations. But the members were not consulted before their appointments were announced, and some of the best-known have refused to serve.

The Government's influence on the deliberations of the committee is not likely to be cast on the side of democratic institutions. While Premier Constantine V. Kollias has said the new Constitution will be only slightly changed from the present one, journalists close to the junta have called for much more drastic alterations. Among the suggestions offered are a ban on political activity by anyone who has ever cooperated with the extreme left, a requirement that all candidates have loyalty certificates from the security