

October 6, 1967

that almost any policing plan that would include such straightjacketed mechanisms as the International Control Commission is doomed to failure. Not only would the present members of the I.C.C., if they are retained, end up in bickering and in vetoing of each other's purposes and prerogatives, but they conceivably would tend to exacerbate friction among the Vietnamese seeking to resolve their own problems.

What the Viet Nam situation desperately demands is a more free revolutionary expression of its own ethos, something which, during the long and tragic postwar period when the French refused to let go in the South, was denied it, and which, under Diem and since, has continued to be precluded. If the South is to rediscover its own revolutionary traditions, and to preserve or modify them in relation to the communist North, it must be as unmolested and even as unsupervised as possible. This naturally involves risks of communist domination or subversion, but the risks must be taken in a true revolutionary atmosphere and milieu, and not under the gaze of an ineffective international police element.

This does not mean that the Americans and the Russians and possibly other powers should not play a role, but in so far as possible the role should be of a "good offices" nature. A Geneva-type conference might properly define the purpose of such a mission, and the United Nations might underwrite it. It could project its own mechanism for action, either if called upon by the Vietnamese or perhaps on the basis of its own readings of the unfolding situation in Viet Nam, as a result of which it might interpose suggestions for resolving potential or actual issues and quarrels. There remain some substantive preliminary matters that should rightfully be considered and acted upon at a conference. These include the phased withdrawal of troops from South Viet Nam, both American and North Vietnamese, the surrender of as many weapons as can feasibly be uncovered in the villages during the prolonged cease-fires (obviously some weapons will always remain hidden), the dismantling of bases or the procedure for turning them over to the Vietnamese, the reestablishment of fuller trade and communication between North and South Viet Nam, and perhaps the selection of a date, no less than five years away, for the holding of a referendum on reunification. The implementation of a Mekong Valley development program, the benefits of which, as President Johnson has pledged, would extend to North Viet Nam, could also logically be brought within the purview of a broad agreement that genuinely concerned itself with the future of all of Southeast Asia.

None of this is meant, furthermore, to deny or exclude considerations of power or influence. The often stated determination of the United States to remain involved in Southeast Asian affairs is one that this writer strongly shares, though the commitment today is confused and undefined. Such involvement unavoidably requires the existence of a military shield. There would appear to be ample reason to reapproach this matter with a fresh set of ideas and to replace the somewhat tarnished Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with something more acceptable to the Asians and perhaps more palatable to at least part of the neutral and unaligned if not the communist world. To expect that this might become part of a larger Russian-American accommodation is too much, and is illusory or naive for Moscow cannot afford to renounce its own concept of revolutionary development and will undoubtedly continue to project it in competition with Peking. We cannot realistically assume anything otherwise. However, we can operate in the hope that a peaceful contest for influence in Southeast Asia, on behalf of nationalist development in revolutionary terms, will prevail; though it would also be

naive to presume that the Chinese will not continue their efforts to disrupt such peaceful evolution by fomenting violence in Thailand, the Philippines and again in Indonesia. The effort, on our part, should nevertheless be designed to encourage as much peaceful development as possible, and, if that proves ineffective or insufficient, to promote successful programs of counter-insurgency.

Whatever impetus to regional cooperation develops out of a Vietnamese settlement—such cooperation is already burgeoning in several fields, such as education, transportation, banking and finance—should not be inhibited by threats or interpositions of major military might from any outside source, including the United States. Once the Viet Nam situation is regulated, the security of the area will nevertheless depend in the immediate future on the existence of a protective shield supplied in large part by the United States, with the help of Australia and perhaps a lingering British contribution. In the final analysis, the degree of American determination to support nationalist development in Viet Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and to back up its support with its multifarious resources, will prove the key factor, politically and economically more than militarily. One of the generally unrealized benefits of the war in Viet Nam has been an awareness on the part of Asian leaders—as best expressed so far by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—that the United States has bought time in Viet Nam for the rest of Southeast Asia to get together and avoid another Viet Nam. The success of the American commitment in the future will depend on our inner resolve, on our understanding of the area's problems and potentialities, as well as on our patience and willingness to remain "involved" indefinitely.

If Viet Nam has been a tragic and often misconstrued chapter of this American commitment and involvement, the trend toward withdrawal and neo-isolationism, which has become the confused domestic political by-product of the conflict, does not either represent a practical solution or augur well for acceptance of our unavoidable responsibilities in a world that remains highly combustible and revolutionary. The crisis of indecision that confronts us in Viet Nam has simply prolonged and aggravated the confusion, and has made it more difficult to deal with the long-term problems of creating a constructive peace in Southeast Asia. Whatever the risks involved, we now must face up to the "indecisiveness" of the war and attempt, as best we can with the best elements among the Vietnamese we can find, to reach a political solution for a war that has always been essentially political.

ABM
TOUCH OF TRAGEDY IN ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, as the Chicago Sun-Times said in an editorial comment upon this Nation's decision to undertake an anti-ballistic-missile defense system, there is a touch of tragedy involved. It lies in the fact that such a system, designed to guard us against possible attack by the unstable Chinese nation, can be effective in neutralizing the danger of nuclear holocaust but not the danger of continued guerrilla warfare as practiced by Mao Tse-tung and his followers.

This is not to say that such sophisticated defenses are not needed. Indeed, as this editorial aptly points up, the need for nuclear weapons and deterrents against their use will remain with us so long as the battle for men's minds and world se-

curity is not won. It is that battle in which we are now engaged, of course, in Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Sun-Times editorial, entitled "Escalation for Safety," published on September 20, 1967, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ESCALATION FOR SAFETY

The U.S. decision to build an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense network to guard against a nuclear attack from Red China is significant in two areas. It recognizes the growing threat of Red China's nuclear weapon capacity. It acknowledges that the United States is confident that Russia, and its nuclear armory, poses no present threat to world peace.

Sec. of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in announcing the new ABM network, made the point that neither the United States nor Russia possesses "first-strike capability." That is, neither nation has the ability to attack the other with nuclear weapons without suffering lethal retaliation. Nor, in McNamara's assessment, is either nation likely ever to gain such an advantage.

McNamara says both Russia and the United States are at the point where an escalation of defenses or weaponry by either nation would result in matching escalation by the other. In McNamara's opinion such an effort, which would result in the same balance of deterrence that now exists, would be futile—although the United States is willing to spend any amount of money and effort to protect itself.

The unknown danger to the United States and the world is Red China. Isolated, suspicious, torn by internal dissensions, possibly irresponsible, Red China and its future actions cannot be charted. Its animosities cannot be assessed. Its potential for destruction has been computed. McNamara said a limited ABM defense against the Red Chinese nuclear weapons armory would have a "higher degree of reliability against a Chinese attack than the much more massive and complicated system some have recommended against a possible Soviet attack." The proposed ABM network is thus a necessary effort to safeguard the future.

The tragedy of such a necessity is that a major power can guard itself and others against nuclear attack with the most sophisticated of weapons and defense measures. However, that same sophistication is no deterrent to the Communist guerrilla who, as Mao Tse-tung has said, operates as a "fish swimming in the sea of the enemy."

The battle to neutralize the danger of nuclear attack can be won. The battle for men's minds, and world security, is not won. Until it is, the need for nuclear weapons and deterrents will remain.

FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, I am pleased to invite the Senate's attention to the action taken by a distinguished organization on the question of electoral reform. At its convention held recently in San Francisco, the Federal Bar Association adopted an eight-point resolution favoring an amendment to the Constitution which would provide for the election of the President and Vice President by a direct, nationwide, popular vote. It is gratifying to note that the stand taken by the Federal Bar Association conforms closely with the features of Senate Joint

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Resolution 2, the constitutional amendment which I introduced on January 11, for myself and 18 other sponsors.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Federal Bar Association resolution, adopted at the convention in San Francisco, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolved that the Federal Bar Association hereby places itself on record as favoring an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which will:

1. Provide for the election of the President and Vice President by direct nationwide popular vote;
2. Require a candidate to obtain at least 40 per cent of the popular vote in order to be elected President or Vice President;
3. Provide for a national run-off election between the two top candidates in the event no candidate receives at least 40 per cent of the popular vote;
4. Require the President and Vice President to be voted for jointly;
5. Empower Congress to determine the days upon which the original election and the run-off election are to be held, which days shall be uniform throughout the United States;
6. Provide that the places and manner of holding the Presidential election and the inclusion of the names of candidates on the ballot shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof, with the proviso that Congress may at anytime by law make or alter such regulations;
7. Require that the voters for President and Vice President in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for persons voting for members of Congress, with the proviso that each state may adopt a less restrictive residence requirement for voting for President and Vice President provided that Congress may adopt uniform age and residence requirements; and
8. Contain appropriate provisions in case of the death of a candidate.

NATIONAL 4-H WEEK

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, tomorrow marks the conclusion of this year's observance of National 4-H Week. Nearly 3 million members of 4-H in every State and territory, residing in both urban and rural environs, are now undertaking diverse new projects for the coming year.

As a former member of 4-H, I know firsthand the incalculable contributions being made by this program emphasizing head, heart, hands, and health. It would, I think, be very difficult to overstate the tremendous contribution 4-H Club activities have made over the last five decades to rural America.

I think it is also appropriate to note, particularly during National 4-H Week, the increasing contribution which these programs are making to urban youngsters. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report on the fiscal year 1968 agricultural appropriations bill, observed this fact and urged that additional funds and effort be expended for providing additional opportunities to underprivileged youngsters in our great cities to participate in 4-H type youth development projects. That report stated that—

The wholesome effect of 4-H club activities has been so beneficial to rural youth that additional efforts to bring 4-H programs

to young people in the congested and deprived urban areas of the United States would make an invaluable contribution to the moral, spiritual, and economic strength of this Nation.

I most heartily concur in the committee's recommendation.

I have, in fact, introduced legislation in the Senate which is designed to bring these beneficial programs to the young people of one of our greatest cities—Washington, D.C. At the present time, the District of Columbia is the lone city statutorily denied the opportunity to participate in the activities of the Extension Service of the Agriculture Department, a principle source of support and leadership for 4-H. My proposal, S. 2105, would eliminate this barrier to the development of 4-H Clubs and related youth-development activities in the District of Columbia. I am pleased to report that the bill has received wide support, as well as favorable attention, by Senator JORDAN's Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation. I am most hopeful that S. 2105 will be reported and approved by the Senate at an early date.

Mr. President, 4-H contributed greatly to me as an individual. Its contribution to the Nation as a whole is known by every Member of the Senate. I am honored to have this opportunity to express my personal appreciation to those millions of youngsters and adults whose cooperative efforts over the years have made, and continue to make, 4-H one of America's most worthwhile organizations.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATIONS, 1968

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12474) making appropriations for NASA for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, and for other purposes.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent—and this has been cleared all around—that there be a time limitation on all amendments of 30 minutes, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment and the floor manager of the bill [Mr. MAGNUSON], and 1 hour on the bill, to be equally divided and controlled

by the majority leader and minority leader or whoever is designated by them.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, reserving an objection, I wonder if there is going to be an opportunity for me, under that time limitation, to make a speech of about 5 or 6 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. There will be plenty of time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this time will not start until after the distinguished manager of the bill, the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], makes his opening remarks.

I ask unanimous consent at this time that the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK] may have 10 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the understanding is agreed to.

CRASH-LOCATOR BEACONS

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, an article in the Washington Post of 3 days ago was undoubtedly noted by many of my distinguished colleagues with a great deal of remorse. I refer to the report of the diary written by 16-year-old Carla Corbus and her mother, whose remains were found almost 6 months after their plane went down in the mountains of California. I only hope the top echelon of the Federal Aviation Administration, who have consistently refused to require installation of crash-locator beacons in private aircraft, will take note of this tragic incident.

At this point, Mr. President, I would like to recapitulate on some of the points I have brought out in previous statements urging requirement of crash-locator beacons. On August 7, in this Chamber, I pointed out the number of fatalities resulting from general aviation accidents, noting that 53 percent of these fatalities have resulted from crashes occurring more than 5 miles from an airport—only 20 percent of the total general aviation accidents.

The costs incurred in searching for lost aircraft have been tremendous—\$59,224,142 for search and rescue missions flown by the Air Force alone in fiscal 1966. I am sure no one will argue the justification of using taxpayers' funds for these missions, but I do question the refusal of the FAA to take such an urgently needed step to reduce the hazards and the expense of conducting searches for missing aircraft. And, as so tragically illustrated by the report of 3 days ago, crash-locator beacons would most assuredly save lives.

Just 2 months ago, a plane crash in the Colorado mountains was the object of a weeklong search by the Civil Air Patrol and private citizens. I reported in detail to the Senate on this incident in a statement August 18. In this case, there may not have been survivors of the crash—a question which will never be answered. Nevertheless, a full week was spent by ground and air units before the wreckage was finally found, and with