

the Foreign Office to see Mr. Peter Hayman, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

EMBASSY VISIT

Mr. Hayman conveyed to Mr. Vasev "the British Government's strong protest against the lawless and outrageous conduct of certain members of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in kidnapping Dr. Kachenko on the Bayswater Road and in obstructing the British authorities at London Airport when they were engaged in their legitimate duty".

The consequences of this behaviour by Soviet officials were being considered.

Last night Dr. Kachenko's wife went to the Russian Embassy.

At 11:30 on Saturday morning Dr. Kachenko was seen by several members of the public apparently being forced against his will into a car owned by the Russian Embassy. He called for help.

At the airport he said he wished to speak privately to the British authorities, and when they escorted him from the aircraft Soviet officials tried to stop him physically.

He told the British authorities that he did not wish to go to Moscow. He said he had been given an injection against his will at the Soviet Embassy. A medical examination by a British doctor later supported this.

Mr. Vasev's meeting at the Foreign Office lasted more than an hour. Afterwards he said: "I have received the British version of the incident. But I protested and asked for an immediate explanation."

POLICE CRITICIZED

Police action in boarding the aircraft, forcefully removing Dr. Kachenko, and isolating him from his wife and from the people who could help him and speak the same language was "a travesty of anything which any country should offer in the way of hospitality".

As translated by a Tass News Agency correspondent, a Russian Embassy statement last night said that Dr. Kachenko travelled from Cambridge with his wife during Friday night and went straight to the Embassy at 5 a.m. Told to come back later, he returned with her at 9 a.m. The statement said:—

He spoke to Embassy officials saying that he was very tired and was thinking of cutting short his time at Cambridge. His wife had come to see him at Cambridge on her annual leave, and he thought about going back to Moscow with her before her leave expired.

He said his programme at Birmingham University was finished and he saw no special reasons to continue staying here. He was told the Embassy would get in touch with the Academy of Sciences in Moscow and would let him know their decision.

But during the conversation at the Embassy he behaved rather strangely. For example, he suddenly asked someone to confirm that the woman was his wife. Everyone was astonished, and started asking his wife what it was all about. She said that lately her husband had been in some strange nervous condition. She did not know the reasons for this condition.

The only thing she knew was that he was taking some medicine for his nerves.

WIFE IN CHASE

While she was talking with the people at the Embassy, Kachenko left the Embassy after telling the man at the door that it was not the Soviet Embassy at all.

His wife and some Embassy people ran after him and caught up with him near Lancaster Gate. They offered to take him back to the Embassy and got into a car. He hesitated, and then agreed to get into the car.

The statement added:—

When they got back he kept saying it was not the Soviet Embassy and wanted someone to confirm that it was. The Chargé d' Affaires, Mr. Vasev came out. . . . Kachenko asked him to confirm that he was the Chargé d' Affaires and asked him to produce some document.

Eventually, he agreed to come inside the Embassy, where he was seen by the Embassy doctor and some people who knew him personally. Asked how he was feeling, he said that he was feeling very badly, but then he said he was feeling perfectly well.

It was decided he and his wife should leave London on an aircraft which was leaving that day—in about an hour. He agreed, but then said he had some difficulties about leaving keys of his flat in Cambridge, which he was supposed to return. Eventually he agreed that someone else should send them by post.

CALL TO AIRPORT

The Embassy agreed. They telephoned Aeroflot to keep the plane until they came. A representative of Aeroflot agreed, and they went off to the airport.

They passed through all the formalities and the plane was getting ready to leave the airport when the pilot received an order from the control tower to wait because of some technical reasons.

At this very moment, several cars drew up to the plane. In them were police and immigration officials. They entered the plane and one person, in civilian dress, who knew Kachenko, pointed him out. A police officer then demanded that Kachenko leave the plane in order to speak with representatives of the authorities.

According to the statement, Dr. Kachenko refused, but physical force was used against him, his wife, members of the Embassy and the pilots.

Then Dr. Kachenko was pulled off the aircraft. His wife was offered asylum, although she did not ask for it. She refused and returned from the airport to the Embassy.

[From the Daily Telegraph, Sept. 18, 1967]
SOVIET OFFICIALS FACE EXPULSION—BRITAIN CONDEMNS KIDNAP PLOT—DECISION TODAY ON RUSSIAN SCIENTIST

(By Walter Farr and David Loshak)

Britain is considering expelling Russian Embassy officials who tried to kidnap a young Russian physicist on Saturday. This was made clear last night after the Foreign Office sharply protested to the Soviet Chargé d' Affaires, Mr. Vladilleu Vasev, against the kidnapping attempt.

The Soviet Embassy countered with a statement attacking Britain for taking the physicist, Dr. Vladimir Tkachenko, from a Moscow-bound airliner. The Embassy put the blame for "the consequences of these anti-humanitarian actions" on the British authorities.

Mr. Vasev flew last night to Prestwick Airport where today he will see his Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, who is en route to the United Nations. Meanwhile, Dr. Tkachenko has been driven, under Home Office protection to "a place of safety" in southern England where he is under medical supervision.

A Home Office spokesman said last night: All through the day Tkachenko has been recovering from the drugs administered by Soviet Embassy officials. He has been examined by doctors and by an eminent psychiatrist.

Their reports are being urgently forwarded to Ministers, who will consider them and, in the morning, make a decision about what should be done.

JOINT DECISION—TWO MINISTERS

The decision, he said, would be taken by "the Home Secretary in consultation with the Foreign Secretary."

Earlier at the Foreign Office, Mr. Peter Hayman, Assistant Under-Secretary, protested strongly at the "lawless and outrageous" conduct of Soviet Embassy Staff involved in the kidnapping attempt.

Mr. Vasev was told that Britain could not allow the staff of a foreign Embassy to take the law into their own hands. Dr. Tkachenko, it was pointed out, was entitled to the full protection of the police.

Mr. Hayman also protested against the obstructive tactics of the Russians at Heathrow airport after Dr. Tkachenko had been escorted aboard the plane.

WARNING TO VASEV—"CONSEQUENCES" CONSIDERED

Mr. Vasev, who had been summoned to the Foreign Office for the hour-long meeting, was told "that the consequences of this behaviour by Russian officials are being considered."

The question of whether Dr. Tkachenko will be given asylum in Britain will, it was stated, be decided when he is fully recovered from the effects of the injection. His wife flew to London a week ago to see him.

Dr. Tkachenko was seen in Bayswater Road, London, on Saturday, not far from the Russian Embassy, being dragged against his will by four men into an Embassy car, while he shouted for the police. He was traced to Heathrow where he was seen being escorted aboard a Moscow-bound plane.

TUG OF WAR—TUSSELE ABOARD PLANE

Immigration officials boarded the plane, which was not allowed to leave until Dr. Tkachenko had been taken off. A tug-of-war between British and Russian officials developed on the steps to the plane.

Dr. Tkachenko confirmed to the British authorities that he did not wish to go to Moscow in the plane. He said that "after being kidnapped in the Bayswater Road he had been taken to the Soviet Embassy and was there given an injection against his will."

"His general manner confirmed that he was under the influence of some drug. Subsequent medical examination by a British doctor showed that an injection had indeed been given and the physical evidence "indicated the use of a drug."

It was emphasized in Whitehall that although expulsions are being considered it is not intended that the incident should be allowed to cast a shadow over Anglo-Soviet relations as a whole.

Mr. Brown, the Foreign Secretary, is expected to meet Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, at the United Nations this week.

As a result of information about the kidnapping in the Bayswater Road, the Chief Immigration Officer at Heathrow, accompanied by police officers, boarded the Soviet Aeroflot plane on which Dr. Tkachenko was about to leave for Moscow on Saturday.

Dr. Tkachenko said when they entered the plane that he wished to speak to the British authorities privately. The Soviet Consul, who had joined the aircraft at the same time as the British authorities, attempted to prevent a conversation and said that the British authorities had no right to respond to Dr. Tkachenko's request.

The Consul said Dr. Tkachenko was not to be allowed to leave the plane.

When after prolonged attempts to resolve the matter by discussion had failed, and Dr. Tkachenko was being escorted from the aircraft, Soviet officials tried to obstruct this physically.

After leaving the plane, in the presence of the Soviet Consul and Mrs. Tkachenko, Dr. Tkachenko repeated his request to see the British authorities alone.

After leaving the Foreign Office, Mr. Vasev said Dr. Tkachenko was a very ill man.

"He was not drugged. I must most emphatically deny this.

"The kind of illness he had was mental, which needs isolation and requires him to be with people most close to him, his wife and parents. Certainly treatment in these cases is better in Russia than in a foreign country."

WIFE LEFT PLANE—WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN

Mr. Vasev added that Dr. Tkachenko was to have been taken to Russia by his wife. Mrs. Tkachenko left the aircraft on Saturday with her husband but her whereabouts are not now known. She is regarded as a free agent by British authorities.

Dr. Tkachenko would probably have returned to Britain.

"The police action in boarding the plane, forcefully removing him, isolating him from his wife and from the people who could help him and speak the same language, under his very medical condition, is, of course, a travesty of anything which any country should offer in ways of hospitality."

BIRMINGHAM STUDIES—DUE HOME NEXT MONTH

Dr. Vladimir Tkachenko, who is about 25, had been at Birmingham University since January, doing post-graduate work in low-temperature physics, using helium gas. He was not due to return to Russia until next month.

He came to Britain under a science student exchange scheme, administered by Royal Society, which was set up by the current Anglo-Russian cultural agreement. He was one of four scientific research workers exchanged in the last academic year.

He was regarded as a highly able student but was not engaged on any secret work. Prof. P. B. Moon, head of Birmingham University's Department of Physics, said yesterday that he was "a very good physicist indeed, good enough for the Russians to want him back".

He is understood to have worked in close and friendly cooperation with British scientists on the highly-specialized problems of low-temperature physics.

Dr. Tkachenko was due in Cambridge in the next few days to work in the Cavendish laboratories. He should have been staying in the Kapitza Hostel, which is leased to Churchill College by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Last night Lady Cockcroft, wife of the Master of Churchill College, Sir John Cockcroft, said: that Dr. Tkachenko had visited Cambridge twice. "He was due here shortly and he had been offered the hospitality of the college. He was going to read papers in the Cavendish."

MOSCOW CONFERENCE CALLED

(By John Miller)

Moscow, Sunday.—Russia's Foreign Ministry officials were summoned to a conference in Moscow today to discuss the unsuccessful attempt in London to kidnap Dr. Vladimir Tkachenko.

It was understood that the Russians were not planning to wreck the whole range of Anglo-Soviet cultural exchanges for the sake of Dr. Tkachenko. But the student exchange scheme, which was broadened after talks in London this year, could be jeopardized.

A British spokesman said that 45 British students had arrived in Moscow last week to study at Russian universities.

The Russian embassy's statement that Dr. Tkachenko was suffering from "mental" illness indicated that it believed he was planning to defect. This is a traditional Russian way of explaining a citizen's intention to defect.

The aircraft from which Tkachenko was taken arrived last night at Moscow's International Airport some four hours late.

"OBVIOUSLY DRUGGED"—BRITONS' ACCOUNT

Three British businessmen who travelled to Moscow in the plane said Dr. Tkachenko was "obviously drugged" when dragged aboard the plane an hour after the plane was due to take off.

"He looked like a doped seaman," one said.

"He was obviously drugged," said another. "It stuck out like a sore thumb. He was semi-conscious with his head lolling from side to side. He didn't know where the hell he was."

Another businessman took up the account. He said: "The plane's engines started. But nothing happened and eventually they stopped."

"Two British officials, followed later by a uniformed policeman, boarded the plane."

"We want to talk to this gentleman privately," the businessman quoted the immigration official as saying. "If you can clear the plane, we will talk to him on the plane."

"The lad leapt up, trying to get off the plane. The senior Russian official pushed him back into his seat and said they would not clear the plane."

TALK WITH ENVOY—RUSSIANS ADAMANT

"Then the Russian officials asked to talk to the Russian Ambassador in London. Two Russian officials went to the telephone, returned and remained adamant."

The businessman quoted the immigration official as saying:

"This plane will not leave until we get him off."

"But this is a Russian airplane," the Soviet official reportedly said.

"And this is a British airport," the immigration official replied.

"What if we refuse to obey?" the Russian reportedly asked.

"We will enforce this with violence if necessary," the British official said.

The Russians scoffed at this and pointed out that if there was violence, it would go badly for the British as 80 per cent of the passengers were Russian and 20 per cent were British.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ABM CONSTRUCTION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, like many of my colleagues who for several years have urged the construction of an antiballistic missile system for defense of the United States, I welcome yesterday's announcement by the Secretary of Defense that construction of such a system would begin this year.

This represents the first peek of the administration from behind the blinders that they have been wearing. I hope that some day soon Secretary McNamara will take off his blinders and take a good hard look at what is happening in the Soviet Union.

This commitment to proceed is a positive step forward and it is a welcome change from the previous policy of the administration. However, I wish to point out that the program which the Secretary of Defense described is not all that should be done or could be done.

Most of the people do not understand the problems involved in trying to avert a nuclear war. They assume that America is strong enough to deter any country from making that kind of attack, but the development of the nuclear bomb in Communist China and the deployment of the Soviet ABM system means that we will have to do far more than has been planned to protect the American people against a surprise attack.

In this regard I take issue with one of the basic principles of the announced U.S. ABM deployment. It is, according to Secretary McNamara, a "thin" missile defense system that is "Chinese-oriented," and not the more extensive Soviet-oriented system that has been

supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In my opinion the real threat still remains with the Soviet Union. Further, the system proposed yesterday by Secretary McNamara is almost "too little and too late." It will protect some of our missile sites, but it will not protect the American people. Instead of defending against the more serious threat it defends against a lesser danger.

The reason for this unexpected attention of the administration to the threat of a Chinese missile attack was explained by Vice President HUMPHREY last night.

In a televised statement that appeared on the Huntley-Brinkley program, the Vice President said he firmly believed that a portion of the Soviet ABM system was constructed for defense against Communist China. He added that China was a reckless potential nuclear power, and a threat to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

That may be true, but it is a known fact that the major part of the Soviet ABM defense cuts across the "threat corridor" of land-based missiles launched from the United States over the North Pole or from Polaris submarines in the North Atlantic. This fact was discussed in depth in an article by Richard J. Whalen, entitled "The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense," which appeared in the June 1967 issue of Fortune. He stated that the Soviet ABM installations at Moscow and the several hundred mile installation known as the Tallinn Line face the northwest.

Whalen said:

It is the unanimous judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Tallinn Line is an anti-missile system.

We have, therefore, creditable evidence that the Soviet Union has already deployed a U.S.-oriented ABM defense. In the face of this information, I fail to see how the administration can take the position that we do not now need a Soviet-oriented ABM defense of our own. How can the Vice President say, as he did last night:

We are also seeking to work with the Soviet Union on a basis of responsibility and respect for their power and they for ours by saying, "Look, why waste billions and billions of dollars in a contest over an anti-ballistic missile system which cannot guarantee you with the protection that it seems to on first glance.

There is no doubt that Soviet missiles are aimed at our cities. The Washington Post issue of September 3, 1967, carried a report from Moscow in which Soviet Marshal Nikolai Krylov warned the United States of this fact. The Soviet missile chief said that populated administrative centers were considered targets equally as valid as military installations and industrial objects.

With this clear warning, with the best military judgment of the opinion that the Soviet Union is not only closing the offensive missile race, but also ahead of us in deploying the ABM, I believe that the Secretary of Defense and the Johnson administration are the victims of fallacious reasoning. As early as April 1963, I warned the Senate that Russia had an operational ABM system, and I urged immediate construction of an ABM system for our defense. The problem has not

gone away. It cannot be rationalized out of existence.

While I am pleased to see a change of heart in the administration's stand on this vital issue of missile defense, the proposed system is not enough. I will continue my fight to make the administration take its head out of the sand and give the country the ABM defense that it deserves.

VISIT TO VIETNAM BY HARRY ASHMORE AND WILLIAM BAGGS

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I think it is most unfortunate that a public dispute has arisen, growing out of the visit made by Mr. Harry Ashmore and Mr. Williams Baggs to Hanoi. In my opinion, the Department of State, true to its statements, attempted to explore every means of bringing the South Vietnam dispute to the negotiating table. It went out of its way in collaborating with Mr. Ashmore and Mr. Baggs in the hope that they would be able to produce advance toward bringing an end to the South Vietnam war. It should, however, be remembered that while the State Department and the present administration attempted to utilize the services of these two men, it would have been completely wrong to abdicate to them the performance of the principal responsibility, which lay with the President and the Secretary of State.

These two men expected, obviously, by what has recently been said, that the President should have gone into the background and allowed them to be the negotiators of peace, which all our citizens and public officials are praying for. They arrogated to themselves a power and an efficiency which are completely unjustified. They derogated, by the statement which was recently made, the duty and the responsibility of the President.

If any mistake was made by the administration, it was in giving to these two men a credit completely beyond that to which they were entitled.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement issued by the Department of State be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967

We have had a number of inquiries concerning news stories published today, based on an article by Mr. Harry Ashmore in a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (CSDI).

The facts concerning the Department's contacts with Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs are as follows:

1. During the summer of 1966, Mr. William Baggs told the Department that CSDI was planning a major conference in May of 1967 in Geneva, to follow up on the first *Pacem In Terris* meeting held in New York in February of 1965. Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the Center was making to invite North Viet-Nam to attend, and the Department responded sympathetically to the idea of the Conference and to these efforts. These initial contacts were with Mr. George Ball and Mr. William Bundy. The President and Secretary Rusk were informed, and Mr. Ball was directed to handle contacts with Mr. Baggs on behalf of the United States Government.

2. In mid-November and again in early December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ashmore in calls at the Department. In these calls, the progress of the conference plans was reviewed, and the two visitors indicated that they had a tentative invitation to go to Hanoi, with Mr. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to conduct useful explorations of North Vietnamese views towards peace. Mr. George Ball having then left the Department, the primary responsibility for these conversations passed to his successor, Mr. Katzenbach, who kept the President and the Secretary of State informed as a matter of course.

In these conversations, Department representatives accepted the Baggs/Ashmore suggestion and undertook to cooperate fully. Accordingly, the position of the United States Government on key issues relating to peace was discussed at some length, so that Baggs and Ashmore could represent it accurately in Hanoi.

3. On December 23, Baggs visited the Department just prior to the departure of the three-man group on December 28. At that meeting, the basic understanding of the United States Government position was reaffirmed, and it was further agreed that Baggs and Ashmore would report confidentially what they were able to pick up in Hanoi.

4. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore visited Hanoi from January 6 to January 14. They then returned to the US and on January 18 dictated for the Department a full and confidential account of their conversations. This covered in particular a conversation with President Ho on January 12. In this conversation, Ho had insisted that there could be no talks between the US and Hanoi unless the bombing were stopped, and unless also the US stopped all reinforcements during the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be adamant against any reciprocal military restraint by North Vietnam. The record does not show that he solicited any USG response to these remarks.

5. Concurrently, prior to January 18, on US initiative and without any connection to the Baggs/Ashmore actions, US Government representatives had established a direct channel for communication with North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow. With the apparent agreement of both sides, this channel was being kept wholly confidential, and was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in their discussions at the Department. It is, of course, fundamental to the USG dealing with Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that there existed at the time this direct and secret channel. Exchanges through this direct channel continued through January and early February and culminated in President Johnson's letter to President Ho of February 8 (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as February 2). As has been stated by representatives of the Department, a wide variety of proposals was put before Hanoi in these Moscow contacts, without at any time producing any useful response.

6. Toward the end of January, Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore returned to Washington and expressed to the Department the strong hope that they could be given a message for transmission to Hanoi. The Department decided that, while the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and must at all costs be preserved, it would be useful to send a more general message through Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be consistent with the important messages being exchanged in Moscow. In view of this channel (of which Baggs-Ashmore were unaware) there was some question as to the further utility of detailed informal communications. It seemed clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore that their channel of communication had been established with the primary purpose of exchanges concerning North Vietnamese attendance at the

May conference. Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they could send any messages for Hanoi through the regular mail to a North Vietnamese representative in Phnom Penh, who in turn would relay it to a North Vietnamese official who had been the principal contact of Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore in Hanoi. Accordingly, the letter now published by Mr. Ashmore was worked out with the representatives of the Department, and authorized to be sent on February 5. We were subsequently informed by Mr. Ashmore that this letter reached Phnom Penh on February 15.

7. No useful purpose could be served by giving further details on what took place in the Moscow channel. We can say, however, that on February 7, while that channel was still open and in operation, separate discussions were initiated in London between Prime Minister Wilson and Premier Kosygin of the USSR. The combined reading of the Moscow channel and of these discussions led to the dispatch on February 8 of President Johnson's letter to President Ho. This letter was of course published unilaterally by Hanoi on March 21, and is a matter of public record. It rested on, and was of course read by Hanoi in relation to, the various proposals that had been conveyed in the Moscow channel. There was no change of basic position whatever between February 5 and February 8, but President Johnson's letter did include a specific action proposal that speaks for itself, as does the tone of his communication.

8. As already noted, Hanoi had not responded in any useful way to the variety of suggestions conveyed in the Moscow channel. Its sole and apparently final response was reflected on February 13, in a letter by President Ho to Pope Paul VI. This letter, in the words of one press account today, "coupled an unconditional end to the bombing with the withdrawal of American forces and the recognition of the National Liberation Front." On February 15, President Ho replied formally to the President in similar terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the Moscow channel.

9. Hanoi's attitude remained negative throughout. The Baggs/Ashmore efforts were necessarily handled by the Department with an eye to the direct and then-confidential channel that existed concurrently to Hanoi. The latter appeared to be by far the more reliable and secure method of ascertaining Hanoi's views.

10. Finally, we note with regret that Mr. Ashmore is apparently ignorant of the subsequently published report of the Moscow contacts, and of their confirmation by Department representatives. We note with still greater regret that at no time since has he consulted with the Department in order to attempt to understand the interrelationship that necessarily obtained between the Moscow channel and his own efforts. As this case shows, the Administration has been prepared at all times to cooperate with private individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi in any way, and who are prepared to act responsibly and discreetly. This policy continues, although it seems clear that the present disclosure will not reassure Hanoi that such private contacts will be kept secret.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McIntyre in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S 13266

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

September 19, 1967

APPOINTMENTS TO 12TH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair wishes to announce the appointment of Senators WAYNE MORSE and BOURKE HICKENLOOPER as representatives to the 12th Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member Nations of the Organization of American States to be held in Washington, D.C., September 22 through September 24, 1967.

ADJOURNMENT TO 11 A.M.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there be no further business to

come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 11 a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5 o'clock and 35 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, September 20, 1967, at 11 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate September 19 (legislative day of September 18), 1967:

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Glenn T. Seaborg, of California, to be the Representative of the United States of America to the 11th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The following-named persons to be alternate representatives of the United States of America to the 11th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency:

Verne B. Lewis, of Maryland.
Herman Follack, of Maryland.
James T. Ramey, of Illinois.
Henry DeWolf Smyth, of New Jersey.
Gerald F. Tape, of Maryland.

IN THE NAVY

Having designated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5231, Rear Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler, U.S. Navy, for commands and other duties determined by the President to be within the contemplation of said section, I nominate him for appointment to the grade of vice admiral while so serving.