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This is the very basis of our problem—those who make a career of crime, and it is here that prosecutors, judges, juries, and parole boards can and should act. And it is time our people demand they do so now.

Mr. Speaker, I will not go into the great detail on the repeat offender contained in the 1966 Crime Index. But permit me to cite a few facts from the summary on page 1:

55 percent of offenders released to the street in 1963 were rearrested within two and one-half years.

57 percent of the offenders released on parole were rearrested within two and one-half years.

67 percent of prisoners released early in 1963 after earning "good time" were rearrested.

83 percent of those persons acquitted or dismissed in 1963 were rearrested within 30 months.

72 percent of persons granted probation in 1963 for auto theft repeated in a new crime. Of the young offenders under 20 released in 1963, 65 percent repeated.

Mobility study reveals over 60 percent of the repeaters charged with robbery, burglary, auto theft, sex offenses and forgery were rearrested in two or more states during their criminal careers.

I say it is time we act, Mr. Speaker. I challenge those whose only answer to our crime problem is advocacy of a harsh firearms law that does little but pile unworkable and unnecessary restrictions on the law-abiding citizen, to study the facts. Why do you ignore the criminal, when he is the source of our problem, and single out the law-abiding citizen for harsh restrictions?

I say again, Mr. Speaker, if we need more prisons to hold these hoodlums—to isolate them from society—then let us build them. Let us strike hard at the criminal, not those who own, use or sell firearms in accordance with our laws and regulations.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in seeing that this Congress enact legislation such as I've authored, and to see that the rights of the decent citizens are protected.

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

THE VOICE OF AN AMERICAN

(Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, I have received a copy of the forthright statement of Mr. Eugene T. Bartkowiak, president of the National Association of Polish Americans, Inc.

Each of us Americans is of a minority origin. What better definition of an American can there be? Not one people except in a common loyalty and dedication to work together under our constitutional system.

Under the unanimous consent I insert Mr. Bartkowiak's statement here in the RECORD, followed by his biography from the Post Eagle, of Clifton, N.J.

STATEMENT OF EUGENE T. BARTKOWIAK, PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF POLISH AMERICANS, INC.

In the White House, the President of the United States not only brought disgraceful dishonor to himself and his Office, but degraded this entire Nation when, over coast to coast television our President literally begged for an end to the wasteful rioting and civil disorder which has erupted throughout this country. The President's plea was certainly not to the law-abiding citizens who were hopefully listening for an intelligent Executive solution, but to the gangsters such as the young punk named H. Rap Brown who was a few blocks up the street from the White House applauding the murder of a policeman during the recent riots in Plainfield, New Jersey. This barbarian is the national chairman of the so-called "Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee" and finds himself at liberty to nauseously describe the Plainfield slaying as "beautiful" and "the most successful rebellion to date—one casualty—one honky cop."

Mere disapproval and reiteration of the need for law and order will not stop the firebrands or does it serve as a solution to the problem. Emotional BEGGING is not the answer either. Our President, our Congress, all of our leaders in positions of public trust must face the facts that riot-breeding conditions are made by the people—the slums are made by the people. How well the American Pole knows that you can be poor, deprived, and discriminated against but still remain morally and physically pure, preventing the creation of a man made slum.

In the past three and a half years the greatest legislative effort in the history of the United States has been directed at discrimination, disease, not enough jobs, slums, etc. The Congress has passed the Rent Supplement Act, the Civil Rights Acts, The Model Cities Act, Medicare and Medicaid, Head Start, the Job Corps and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Manpower Development and Training. For what? Have conditions improved? No! Instead, the Congress now has before it The Safe Streets and Crime Control Act and The Gun Control Act. The citizens have before them increased taxes and genuine fear.

What is the answer? The Polish people of America (and throughout the world) have managed to survive and progress because this simple answer has been bred into them. The strong family structure of the American Poles has created a code which is relatively simple for anyone to follow and would cost our government very little to publicize and teach to others. It goes something like this:

Work hard to earn what you have and you will appreciate and not be wasteful. Do not expect something for nothing for God helps those who help themselves. Work in the spirit of penance, considering it an honor to employ and develop the gifts received by God. Build a strong family union between husband and wife—parents and children. Ask only the love and grace of God and with these you will be rich enough and desire nothing more.

BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE T. BARTKOWIAK

WASHINGTON, D. C.—Eugene T. Bartkowiak, president of The National Association of Polish Americans, Inc., was born in the City of Buffalo, State of New York, on May 5, 1929. A bachelor, he is the youngest of six children reared by Victoria and the late Lawrence Bartkowiak. As a proud American youth he had barely reached manhood when he joined the Armed Services of the United States; and like his brothers he served his country well and was honorably discharged from active

duty. Following his discharge from the service he was not able to resume his formal education but continued his studies through a program of self education and evening courses at various colleges and universities in the Buffalo and Washington, D.C. areas. His business experience includes that of public relations executive for a subsidiary of the Eastman Kodak Company of Rochester, New York, branch manager for a microfilm corporation, and office management consultant for several national trade associations.

The inborn pride which Mr. Bartkowiak has in his Polish ancestry was enhanced in his youth when his parents proudly taught him to love the Polish customs and the many other assets of his heritage. Realizing that much emphasis is placed on the past history of Poland in her outstanding political, scientific and cultural achievements, but little recognition is given today to the present achievement of the Polish people throughout the world, he has founded the National Association of Polish Americans, Inc. The NAPA is the only national service organization dedicated to fighting defamation and in obtaining the proper recognition of the Polish people of America, as well as in preserving the many benefits of the proud Polish heritage.

TRENDS IN STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE: UNITED STATES VERSUS U.S.S.R.

(Mr. RARICK (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council has recently released their report "The Changing Strategic Military Balance" which should be read and analyzed by every citizen of our country.

The report can be obtained through the council's office at 1101 17th Street NW., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert portions of the report following my remarks and invite particular attention to the chart entitled "Range of Estimates From Unclassified Sources."

I. SOVIET UNION VERSUS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Trends in the strategic military balance

The basic frame of reference for comparing the strategic strength of the Soviet Union and the United States is an examination of their national objectives, both military and political. It is not our task here to explore Soviet political objectives *in extenso*, although it must be kept in mind that these cannot be separated from the U.S.S.R.'s military goals. For a half-century, Soviet leaders have time and again repeated that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination. But many in the Free World simply refuse to believe that the Soviet leaders mean what they say.

In the realm of strategic military weapons, the United States has, in recent years, demonstrated much the same inclination to disbelieve or to discount Soviet achievements and advances. This is particularly so with respect to the new ballistic missile defenses of the Soviet Union and to Soviet boasts of an orbital bomb capability.

Yet, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has a goal of strategic superiority designed to *win* a nuclear war rather than merely *deter* one. Once in a war-winning posture, the U.S.S.R. would be ideally situated to practice nuclear blackmail and would not even have to fight a nuclear war. Some strategic analysts assert that this is the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, and

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that it depends upon a defense against nuclear retaliation.

The United States has exchanged its goal of a war-winning strategic superiority for a strategy of mutual deterrence. The United States strategy of mutual deterrence is said to increase "stability" and reduce international tensions. Hence, American officials are striving to convince Soviet leaders that a race to build anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems would be pointless.

Not only has the Soviet Union already deployed an ABM system, but much evidence indicates that it is driving hard toward a goal of overwhelming superiority in the decisive field of nuclear weaponry.

CONTRAST BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

The thoughtful words of President John F. Kennedy clearly illustrate the contrast between U. S. and Soviet political objectives.

Regarding U.S. objectives, President Kennedy said:

"Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world community of free and independent states—free to choose their own future and their own system, so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."¹

Regarding Soviet objectives, President Kennedy said:

"Where we feel the difficulty comes is the effort by the Soviet Union to communize, in a sense, the entire world. If the Soviet Union were merely seeking to protect its own national interest, to protect its own national security and would permit other countries to live as they wish—to live in peace, then I believe the problems which now cause us much tension would fade away."²

In the speech prepared by President Kennedy and intended for delivery in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, were these prophetic words:

"Our adversaries have not abandoned their ambitions, our dangers have not diminished, our vigil cannot be relaxed."³

In the year 1967, the Soviet Communists are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. During all of that time, Soviet leaders, both political and military, have continuously repeated declarations that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination.

Our own experience and current research fully confirms that the Communist objective is still that of world conquest. We affirm the current validity of the following statements by J. Edgar Hoover and Robert S. McNamara:

"Since the time of Lenin, atheistic communism has surged forth from Russia to enslave nearly one-fourth of the earth's surface and a third of her peoples. Nowhere are its advance battalions more active than in our own Western Hemisphere, where agents trained by the Kremlin continue to burrow deeply into countries of the Caribbean and Central and South America. Their deadly objective is to undermine legitimate governments, foment revolution and create a Soviet Union of Latin American Republics.

"I have said this before and I would like to repeat it here: We are at war with communism and the sooner every red-blooded American realizes this the safer we will be."⁴

"I do not believe that we can reasonably assume that these manifestations of a change

in policy reflect a change in the ultimate objective of the Soviet leadership, which is to extend the sway of Communism over the rest of the world. Their dispute with the leadership of Communist China is not over the ultimate objective but how it is to be achieved and who is to control the worldwide Communist movement. Expansionism is so deeply engrained in Communist doctrine that it would be naive for us to expect any Communist leadership to repudiate it."⁵

In January 1967, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked in a series of questions if, in his opinion, the Soviets have abandoned their goal of world domination and were mellowing. He expressed his belief that they had not abandoned their goal of world domination. On the question of mellowing, he said:

"I don't believe they are mellowing at all. I believe they have adopted new tactics and are seeking new routes to the same objective."⁶

As Leonid I. Brezhnev, first Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, said in his March 29, 1966 report to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"Ever harder times lie ahead for capitalism. The fact that it is doomed is becoming increasingly clear. But the capitalists will never surrender their rule voluntarily. The working class and the laboring masses will achieve victory only in the course of stubborn class battles. . . . At our Congress today we once more repeat the appeal: close ranks more solidly for the struggle against the common enemy!"⁷

SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

From our analysis, it is clear that the overall Soviet military objective is to achieve absolute strategic superiority.

The main thrust of the authoritative book, *Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal Sokolovsky, was toward achieving superiority. In a discussion of strategic missile forces, attainment of qualitative and quantitative superiority was set as one of the "most important problems in organizing and developing the forces." It was further pointed out that establishing superiority over the enemy in modern weaponry was the material prerequisite for victory.⁸

Recently-deceased Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky made a clear-cut statement concerning strategic superiority. In a pamphlet published in late 1962 by the Soviet Ministry of Defense he wrote: "The most characteristic feature of the present stage of development in Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it rests on the superiority of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism, both in military-technical resources, and from the morale and battle standpoint. This superiority and the just goals of our Armed Forces give us a firm confidence that in a future war . . . the victory will be won by us."⁹

Malinovsky's pronouncement takes on added significance in the light of a 1966 statement in the authoritative Soviet journal, *Communist of the Armed Forces*, that "mili-

tary-technical superiority along with moral-political superiority is one of the most important factors in our time for the reliable defense of the country . . . (T)he significance of military factors themselves, in particular military-technical superiority over the enemy, has grown in contemporary circumstances as never before." The article goes on to stress that achieving military-technological superiority is a constant process and that "the stern dialectics of development are that the struggle for superiority must be waged continually . . ."¹⁰

How do the Soviet leaders define superiority? *Communist of the Armed Forces* is quite clear: ". . . Military-technical superiority is such a correlation of quantity of military equipment and weapons, of the degree of troop training in using them and also of the effectiveness of the organizational structure of the army, that the given side has the advantage before a real or potential enemy and can defeat him . . ."¹¹

This same 1966 article noted that Soviet superiority is derived from mobile Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and from Soviet advances in space technology. Soviet science, it continued, has created weapons new in principle "secretly nurtured in scientific research bureaus and construction collectives."

Additional evidence of the Soviet drive to attain strategic superiority is supplied by a January 1967 statement of the late Defense Minister Malinovsky. He hinted at Soviet expansion of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) emplacements and at a burgeoning Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program.¹²

What would they do with strategic superiority? Here's the basic doctrine:

"The essence of Soviet military doctrine is this: if a future war is unleashed by the imperialists, then it will be the decisive collision between the two opposing social orders, and nuclear rocket weapons will inevitably be used. All this pre-supposes an extremely violent and dynamic character of the conflict, high maneuverability of combat operations, the absence of continuous fronts and well-marked boundaries between front and rear, the appearance of possibilities for striking sudden blows of great force, both against the troops and the homelands of the warring nations. In connection with this, very great attention is devoted to the initial period of the war."¹³

In other words, if general war comes, the Soviets will try for a knockout nuclear first strike in the initial period of the war.

Official Communist policy statements, however, emphasize their intention of winning world domination without a general nuclear war. This was expressively stated by Nikita Khrushchev in a speech in July 1963 as follows:

"Today the imperialists pretend to be brave—but only in words; in reality they tremble before the socialist world which is growing and gaining in strength. And let them tremble! So much the better for us!

"A fight is in progress between these two systems, a life and death combat. But we communists want to win this struggle with the least losses, and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall win. This is why we are striving for victory, for the triumph of communism, without unleashing a world thermonuclear war."¹⁴

¹¹ "Military-Technical Superiority is the Most Important Factor in a Reliable Defense of the Country," V. Bondarenko, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 17, September 1966 (In Russian).

¹² *Ibid.* (Emphasis added.)

¹³ *Washington Post*, January 18, 1967.

¹⁴ "Increased Organizational and Directive Influences of the Party in the Armed Forces," L. P. Frusanov, *Problems of the History of the CPSU*, Moscow, February 1965.

¹⁵ *Soviet News*, July 22, 1963, pp. 51, 52 and 53.

¹ Footnote No. 1 not shown in RECORD.]

² State of the Union Message, January 11, 1962.

³ *The New York Times* (Interview with editor of *Izvestiya*) November 29, 1961, pp. 1, 13, 19.

⁴ *Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy 1963*, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 894.

⁵ J. Edgar Hoover, Address to Brotherhood of the Washington Hebrew Congregation, December 4, 1963.

⁶ Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Statement before Joint Session of Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, January 1964, p. 4.

⁷ Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 407.

⁸ *Pravda*, March 30, 1966, pp. 2-9.

⁹ *Military Strategy*, V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.) Moscow, Voenizd-vo, 1963, (In Russian) p. 237.

¹⁰ *Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace*, U.S.S.R., Ministry of Defense, 1962

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Official statements of Soviet policy since that time differ only in their choice of language.

However, we can draw little comfort from such statements because, as shown herein-after, the principal Soviet military thrust has been to develop a massive and superior capability for nuclear war.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

The latest and most authoritative unclassified statements of United States objectives are to be found in the 1967 Senate testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his principal assistants.¹⁶

The testimony of all the principal witnesses relating to U.S. grand strategy in these Senate Hearings is the most definitive in the last six years. Much of it borders on the sensational, and the divergence of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense is stated and explained far more frankly and specifically than in previous official testimony. The focus of much of the most significant testimony is on the strategic effects of the Soviet deployment of anti-missile defense systems, whether and when the U.S. should deploy such a system, and the level of total U.S. strategic power required to maintain sufficient security on the U.S. side of the strategic balance.

The Secretary of Defense left no doubt that the military strategy of the United States is based on the concept of deterrence through a second strike in retaliation against a Soviet first strike. Thus he explained that: "Our general nuclear war forces should have two basic capabilities:

"1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike.

"2. In the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit damage to our population and industrial capacity.

"The first capability we call 'Assured Destruction' and the second 'Damage Limitation.'"¹⁷

In determining what this policy contemplates in relation to the strategic military balance, it is helpful to examine Mr. McNamara's testimony on the anti-ballistic missile. The principal reason given for his conclusion that "we should not initiate an ABM deployment at this time" is that "the Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further . . ."

In explaining why he did not actually plan to deploy a damage limiting system, he said, "If the general nuclear policy of the Soviet Union also has as its objective the deterrence of a U.S. first strike (which I believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we might consider an 'acceptable level') would put pressure on them to strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent (offensive) forces." (Italic added.)

¹⁶ Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, on S.666, Military Authorizations, Defense Appropriations, 1968, January 25-February 2, 1967. Included in the printed Hearings at the front of the report is Secretary McNamara's prepared statement on Military Posture and the 1968-72 Defense Program, which was released to the public on January 23, 1967. Both the prepared statement and the actual testimony of the witness have been subject to deletions stated to be for purposes of national security.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

This is consistent with McNamara's February 1963 testimony that we were about to enter a new era in strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he called an era of "mutual deterrence." At that time, McNamara said, "More armaments, whether offensive or defensive cannot solve the nuclear war dilemma. We're approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a devastating retaliatory load. This may result in future betterment . . ." ¹⁸ 1967 was the year mentioned by McNamara as the most likely beginning of the new era.

Under questioning by Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, following the above testimony, McNamara denied that his anticipation of "mutual deterrence" could properly be equated with nuclear "parity" or "stalemate," and said he had repeatedly stated that it is his intention to "maintain nuclear superiority in terms of numbers of warheads versus the Communist bloc."

1967 testimony of Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, however, indicates that the United States policy may be to accept "parity":

"Militarily the Soviets have a very formidable missile force. They are building missiles very fast. . . . You see, we have leveled out our missile forces. We announced how big our missile force was going to be. Our plans are that 5 years from now we will have just as many missiles as we have right now. They have known that. They have known that for a couple of years, and they keep on building.

"Now we can afford to let them build for a while, if they feel they want to 'catch up.' But there is evidence that if we stop, they don't necessarily stop. They haven't stopped. I think that in our position, we can afford to let this go on for awhile, without over responding."¹⁹

In the final analysis, the best way to determine actual differences between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. strategic military objectives is to compare their performances. For this purpose we will examine hereinafter such key areas as development of space weapons, production of nuclear materials, strategic military budgets, attitude toward research and development and the changing strategic military balance.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS

The United States policy on space weapons was first announced in 1961 by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric:

"An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I can think of no greater stimulus for Soviet thermonuclear arms effort in space than a U.S. commitment to such an effort. This we will not do."

This policy was confined in October 1963, when the United States announced its adherence to the United Nations General Assembly resolution banning the "Placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner."²⁰

This resolution, however, contains no provision for inspection and no penalties for violation.

¹⁸ The New York Times, Western Edition, February 11, 1963, p. 12.

¹⁹ Senate Hearings, January 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 and February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 876.

²⁰ Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Executive M. 88th Congress, 1st Session (Exec. Report No. 3) Government Printing Office, 1963.

Although the Soviet Union has announced its compliance with the U.N. resolution, its official publication, *Izvestiya*, noted that while the U.N. had banned the orbiting of rockets that constitute weapons of mass extermination, it by no means banned "the manufacture of such missiles."

On July 4, 1965, Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev declared that the Soviet's possess "orbital rockets."²¹

Brezhnev's claim was supported by the display of a three-stage missile in the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965. On November 8, 1965, both *TASS* and *Izvestiya* described it as an orbital missile. This weapon has since been code named SCRAG.

Subsequently, the Department of State announced that it had asked Moscow whether, in the light of the Soviet display of an orbital rocket in the Revolution Day parade, the Kremlin still planned to abide by its pledges not to put such weapons into orbit.²² The Soviet answer was that the agreement did not bar development of such weapons.

While waiting for an official answer from the Kremlin, the Department saw fit to keep our country on record (as reported by UPI):

"The State Department reiterated the U.S. position that although either the United States or Russia could put such a weapon into orbit, there would be no military sense in doing so."

The Soviet attitude should have been no surprise to anyone. After an examination of the long history of broken Soviet treaties and agreements, a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee reported that:

"It keeps no international agreements at all unless doing so is clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union."²³

On March 12, 1964, at hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee, Dr. Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, now Secretary of the Air Force, was asked how much money was being spent on studies of orbital bombardment vehicles. This is his official answer:

"My recollection is that we have no more than three or four people working in one of the contract organizations studying this question. We are not doing any hardware work. So that I would be surprised if more than a couple of hundred thousand dollars in fiscal 1964 is being spent on this, and certainly no more than that is planned for 1965.

"There are two reasons: First, it is not a very good idea. . . . Second, there is now a U.N. resolution which we subscribe to and the Soviets have subscribed to, not to put bombs in orbit. This does not prevent people from doing the development on it, but apparently neither the Russians nor we believe it is a very important strategic weapon. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Late in 1966, President Johnson announced that the United States, the Soviet Union and more than 100 nations on the United Nations Political Committee had agreed upon the language of a formal treaty outlawing nuclear weapons in space. It has now been passed by the U.S. Senate. Again, no provision for inspection was included in the treaty.

The only known effective ways to assure the world that none of the nuclear-rocket powers are orbiting nuclear weapons are to inspect space rockets before launch, or to rendezvous with the orbiting rockets and open them to inspection in space ("go up there with a screwdriver," as one AEC authority put it).

²¹ *Izvestiya*, July 4, 1965, p. 2.

²² United Press International dispatch dated Washington, November 19, 1965.

²³ *Soviet Political Agreements and Results*, Internal Security Subcommittee, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Third Revision, Volume I, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, Foreword, p. VIII.

General Earle G. Wheeler's statement on the Treaty on Outer Space includes the following comment on verification:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned about the assured verification capability with regard to weapons in orbit. The deployment of prohibited orbital vehicles could have serious implications, especially if it enabled an enemy to achieve effective surprise attack against our command and control facilities and military forces. Weapons in orbit could become a matter of grave consequence, particularly when utilized in conjunction with other strategic systems. The focus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concern is upon the capability which the United States would have to define and respond to such a threat. . . .

"This threat can be answered only through intensified U.S. efforts to develop capabilities to detect and verify the orbiting of nuclear weapons or those threatening mass destruction. We must develop the capability of dealing with that threat should it materialize, with or without a treaty."²⁴

PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Another area to examine the implementation of the respective policies may be found in the requirements and the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

President Johnson announced in January 1964, the partial shutdown of American plants producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. On January 24, 1967, it was reported that the fifth such plant was deactivated.²⁵ The Soviet Union has made no comparable moves in this direction. The Atomic Energy Commission reported in November 1965, that there is "no evidence" that the Soviet Union had carried out nuclear materials cutbacks announced on April 26, 1964. Actually, according to Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of *The New York Times*, the Soviet Union had doubled its production of weapons-grade nuclear materials during 1965.²⁶

Without access to classified material it is difficult to deal in quantitative terms with the comparative positions of the Soviet Union and the United States in the matter of nuclear stockpiles and production capacities. A generalized way of indicating Soviet interests in maximum production of nuclear fuel is to examine the expansion of Soviet gross requirements of fuel by function, and compare this in some crude way with United States requirements.

By 1960, the Soviet Union had expanded its list of uses for nuclear materials to include bombs, civilian uses, surface ships, submarines and missiles. Up to then, the gross requirements of both countries, by function, grew in parallel, with the United States slightly ahead because of its presumed lead in overall nuclear development.

Beginning in 1961, the United States' testing program was notably less active than the Soviet Union's. The Soviet Union broke the undeclared moratorium in September 1961, with a massive series which was impressive in many ways, one of them in the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material expended.

It was in this test series which extended from September 1961 into early 1962 that the Soviet Union was rumored to display an unusual interest in the anti-ballistic missile. That interest was substantiated over the years and Secretary of Defense McNamara announced in December 1966, that the Soviet Union was deploying an operational ABM system.

Hanson W. Baldwin has reported that the Soviet nuclear tests were conducted in 1961

in such a way as to destroy two incoming missiles.²⁷ *U.S. News and World Report* reported a Soviet breakthrough in antiballistic missile defense that "produces the so-called 'X-ray effect' in intense proportions."²⁸ This effect is said to neutralize ICBM guidance equipment and fissionable material at great distance from the actual ABM explosion. Soviet ABM tests in 1961 and 1962 provided the knowledge which has permitted the U.S.S.R. to rush ahead with its ABM development and outstrip the United States. The atmospheric nuclear test ban has denied the United States the opportunity of ever catching up.

Anti-ballistic missiles, in order to be effective against many attacking ICBMs must be widely deployed. The U.S.S.R.'s TALLINN system covers a vast area.²⁹ Although remarkable advances in anti-ballistic missile accuracy are claimed, it must still be assumed that, as in the air defense weapon systems, many defending weapons must be launched against each incoming warhead in order to achieve a high probability of destruction. In this respect, it would seem that the ABM's task will be similar to that of conventional anti-aircraft, setting up a radioactive shield or screen of fire through which the ICBM must pass. Either way, an ABM system will require a prodigious amount of fissionable material.

It can be assumed, therefore, that the Soviet Union has foreseen, at least since 1961, this tremendous requirement for weapons-grade nuclear material to counter American ICBMs. In this connection it would also appear that the United States had rejected the idea of producing an extensive ABM system as long ago as January 1964, when President Johnson announced cut-backs in manufacture of fissionable materials. (See Annex.)

STRATEGIC MILITARY BUDGETS

The increases of the U.S.S.R.'s military budget for 1967 to 14.5-billion rubles, up 1.1 billion rubles or 8.2 percent over the 1966 figure, is another reflection of the Soviet drive for military superiority when it is analyzed. In 1964 and 1965, when the Soviet Union announced budget cuts, actual spending continued to rise. Much other defense spending is filed under such headings as "science" and "financing the national economy." From such evidence it is estimated that Soviet military spending in 1967 may approach 20-billion rubles, or 30 percent above the announced figure.

Also,

"... While the Russians have a much larger standing army, the United States spends a lot more to pay, clothe and equip each of its soldiers. And Soviet tanks, a basic item of ground equipment, are hard to price accurately since they are made with heavily-subsidized coal and steel.

"Because of this 'warped' pricing structure, it would be useless to multiply the Soviet defense budget by the \$1.10 official exchange rate and use the resultant dollar figure to compare with America's defense effort, it is said.

"Officials estimate that if the Russians had to enter the American market place to buy the military goods and services that go into their defense establishment, they would have to pay from \$50-billion to \$60-billion a year."³⁰

According to *U.S. News and World Report*, "Russia . . . is found to be investing almost 70 percent of the budget in strategic offensive and defensive systems."³¹

Other experts on the Soviet budget estimate that "substantial" portions of the Soviet defense effort will be devoted to three principal areas: conventional forces, strategic attack forces, and air and missile defense forces, on a coequal basis.³²

Using Mr. Beecher's estimates, the Soviet strategic military budget is the equivalent of \$33½-billion to \$40-billion a year. Even at the official exchange rate, the Soviet strategic budget would be \$14.7-billion.

In his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara reported that the total United States 1967 military budget would be \$68-billion. The budget for strategic forces was \$7.1-billion or 14 percent of the total military budget.

The above budget figures show a clear difference between the U.S. and Soviet strategic military intentions.

SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

"First of all, we are facing today a formidable Soviet aerospace threat and a concerted Communist effort to achieve critical scientific breakthroughs, both of which factors pose a serious challenge to the continued strategic superiority of the U.S. Armed Forces."

General JOHN P. McCONNELL,³³
Chief of Staff Air Force.

It should be more widely understood that science and technology provide the vital impulse in the Soviet society. The Soviet leadership views each new level of technology, each new medium for political or military operations, as offering opportunities for furthering its objectives. Unanticipated technological breakthroughs may be realized for leapfrogging American's means of deterrence. Thus, the Soviets are aggressively moving forward on the frontiers of strategic weapon technology.

Space is one of the first arenas of major public interest in which Soviet industry, technology, and science gained—in fact, not in words—a leading international position. This is so despite the not inconsiderable United States achievements in space. In the public mind, apparent technological advantage in space has been readily translated into an image of military advantage.

One of the primary strengths of Soviet research and development and production programs is the use of scientific planning with cybernetics. This new technique is noted throughout U.S.S.R. weapons programs. Scientific planning, theory of games, optimum solution of complex programs, automatic control, and hundreds of similar subjects all pertinent to the modern techniques of scientific planning and development of aerospace weapon systems, are featured in Soviet cybernetic literature.³⁴

An analysis of overall Soviet power must now take into account the integrated cybernetic systems optimized for Soviet military and national security purposes.

UNITED STATES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

U.S. Defense Department policy toward advanced research has been perceptively and most cogently stated and explained by a scientist who is in a commanding position to know the actual facts. Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of the Weapons Division of the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, spoke at a recent Air Force Association symposium in San Francisco, on "The Technological Threat."

²⁴ *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

²⁵ *U.S. News and World Report*, February 6, 1967, p. 36.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, February 5, 1967, p. 1.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, William Beecher, December 25, 1966, p. 27.

²⁸ *U.S. News and World Report*, February 6, 1967, p. 34.

³² Beecher, op. cit.

³³ Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Service Committee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 874.

³⁴ Text of the Resolution Passed at the Third A.I.-Union Conference on Automatic Control, translated by L. A. Zadeh. (Odessa: 1965), p. 1.

²⁹ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on the Treaty on Outer Space, March 7, 13 and April 12, 1967, p. 84.

³⁰ *The New York Times*, January 25, 1967, p. 9 (See Annex "Chronology of Weapons—Grade Nuclear Materials Cutbacks.")

³¹ *The New York Times*, July 14, 1966, p. 14.

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According to *Technology Week*:³⁵

"AEC's Dr. Harold Agnew declared that there appears to be a new concept of the balance of power.

"Agnew, whose comments drew the largest ovation at the symposium, said the present philosophy seems to be based on a concept that assumes that balance or equality is the optimum state for one nation to have vis-a-vis another state in order to have stability. . . . 'from my experience stability is gained and maintained only through superiority. Yet more and more today, we see decisions being made which have as their long range objective equality between the U.S. and other powers rather than superiority of the U.S. over other powers.'

"The apparent drift in national policy on the concept of balance of power and stability is resulting in a stifling of innovation. We find ourselves being authorized to build or to consider only those systems which respond to a clearly defined threat. As a result, we are continuously reacting on the defensive . . . since we react only to those systems or threats which have been proven to exist, and it takes several years to react, we are continually in danger of coming up with answers to threats which have changed, if indeed we come up with answers in a time frame which is relevant at all.

"We are completely vulnerable to surprises, to new systems which we have not heard about, but which all of a sudden appear."

"Agnew said it is clear that the Soviet Union recognizes the increased importance of technological breakthroughs. He quoted a recent Soviet Defense ministry document which said that Russia 'is not limiting itself to those military means which the adversary already has.' He said this contrasted with the position of some U. S. committees, such as the one on arms control headed by Jerome Wiesner and Roswell Gilpatric, that the U. S. should not innovate new weapons because this would be destabilizing.

"A specific example of this, he said, is the recommendation that we avoid an effective anti-missile system because it would upset what Wiesner and Gilpatric called the 'delicate balance of terror.'

"One of the greatest faults of U. S. policy makers, Agnew declared, 'is that they seem not to understand that technology will never be stagnant. It will not stand still.'"

This thesis of the U.S. policy-planned stagnation of innovation in U.S. advanced research was also comprehensively stated and extensively documented by Hanson W. Baldwin, in a "landmark" article³⁶ under a title which states his theme: "Slow-down in the Pentagon." He reports that research, development, and innovation have sunk into stagnation in the Pentagon because of three major policies or attitudes: (1) "the technological revolution is over"; (2) disarmament or arms limitation "is the only way to political salvation and that therefore continued technological military development worsens the situation"; and (3) "the requirements merry-go-round"—mandate from the Secretary of Defense that every new project has to be justified on the basis of demonstrated military requirements, that is, that there must exist in advance a clear-cut military mission for a new weapons development.

Mr. Baldwin further points out that:

"Many promising developments—particularly—in space—could never be pushed, or even demonstrated, if developments had

to wait for the establishment of requirements.

"Invention has never followed this path; the machine gun and the tank would still remain blueprint dreams if their development had awaited the specification of clear-cut military requirements. One cannot state a requirement for an inventor's hopes.

"As Dr. Edward C. Welsh (acting Chairman of the National Aeronautics Space Council) pointed out, 'If we had required a clear-cut prior mission, we would probably have developed no airplanes, no spacecraft, or in fact, no wheel.'"

Both Dr. Agnew and Mr. Baldwin have done an outstanding job of explaining why the strategic military balance is changing.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE

To analyze the present strategic military balance, the following sections of this study compare the numbers of delivery vehicles and the total megatonnage delivery capabilities of the various strategic weapon systems. In addition, the figure on page 31 and the table on page 32 also show the general trend in total megatonnage delivery capability from 1962 to 1971 as delineated by the range of estimates derived from unclassified sources. These performance figures are the key to determining the real strategic military intentions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The general trend was established by plotting all available responsible unclassified estimates on a graph.

The preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is succeeding in its massive drive toward strategic military superiority and that the United States is cooperating in this effort by slowing down its side of the arms race.

In 1962, the United States had a total megatonnage delivery capability ranging between 25,000 megatons and 50,000 megatons. The corresponding figures for the Soviet Union ranged between 6,000 megatons and 12,000 megatons.

The year 1967 falls in a crossover period with the U.S.S.R. estimates ranging between 16,000 and 37,000 megatons, to equal or exceed the U.S. estimated range of between 8,000 and 29,000 megatons.

It should be noted that the "nuclear capable" U.S. aircraft carriers are not included in the strategic balance either here or by Secretary McNamara.

For 1971, it appears that a massive megatonnage gap will have developed. U.S. delivery capability is estimated to range between 6,000 megatons and 15,000 megatons, whereas the estimated high for the Soviet delivery capability is 50,000 megatons, and the projection of the established Soviet range-cure indicates a low figure for the Soviets of approximately 30,000 megatons.

On the basis of this projection, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will have reversed their roles in a ten-year period.

Using the above approach, U.S. and Soviet strategic forces are approximately equal in strength at the present time. However, measurement of the strategic balance requires consideration of many additional factors including the following:

1. The above figures are based on peacetime inventory. Since the U.S. is committed to a second strike-policy, we should count only those U.S. strategic weapons which would remain after a Soviet first strike. There is no solid basis for estimating the remaining U.S. strategic weapons because the U.S. has not tested very high-yield warheads and therefore does not know the weapons effect of Soviet super-yield weapons of 50 megatons and over.

2. Some of the remaining U.S. missiles would be destroyed by the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense. This important factor was not included in the above figures because of the lack of adequate unclassified data on the numbers and yields of Soviet ABMs.

3. Also, "a lesser amount of nuclear explosive does much greater damage to the United States than to the Soviet Union because of America's geography, urbanization and weather patterns."³⁷ The Soviet Union has three times as many square miles as the United States and its industries and cities are better dispersed.

4. Unclassified sources for the Soviet missile count appear to be based on the number of operational missile sites without consideration of refire capability. Thus, the actual Soviet missile count may be substantially larger than the unclassified estimates.

5. Many of the unclassified estimates as to Soviet strategic weapons yield are low because the sources have not given the Soviets credit for their great improvement in warhead yield/weight ratio in their 1961 nuclear tests. (See ICBM section for detail.)

Behind the Iron Curtain unclassified sources report that the strategic military balance has changed in their favor. For example, in a comprehensive article analyzing the strategic military equation which he based on unclassified sources, Lt. General Khristo Dobrev concludes:

"The deciding power in the world today is the socialist states. They have at their disposal everything necessary for taming the imperialist aggressors. The bare fact that it is not Moscow but Washington which is putting forward the question of reaching an agreement on 'freezing' the anti-missile defense system speaks sufficiently clear on which side lies the military superiority."³⁸

The United States does not appear to have a superior position in deliverable strategic weapons. There is still time to regain superiority but time is on the side of the one which uses it. Because of long lead times for weapon development and production, however, the decision to do so must be made in the year 1967.

Range of estimates from unclassified sources; trends of total megatonnage delivery capabilities—All strategic weapons systems
[Figures approximate]

	Megatons of delivery capability ¹
United States:	
1962 -----	25,000 to 50,000
1963 -----	22,000 to 46,000
1964 -----	18,000 to 42,000
1965 -----	15,000 to 37,000
1966 -----	12,000 to 33,000
1967 -----	8,000 to 29,000
United States (estimate at present rate of decline):	
1968 -----	7,000 to 25,000
1969 -----	6,000 to 22,000
1970 -----	5,500 to 18,000
1971 -----	5,000 to 15,000
U.S.S.R.:	
1962 -----	4,000 to 10,000
1963 -----	6,500 to 15,000
1964 -----	10,000 to 18,000
1965 -----	12,500 to 23,000
1966 -----	15,000 to 27,500
1967 -----	18,000 to 32,500
U.S.S.R. (estimate at present rate of increase):	
1968 -----	21,000 to 36,000
1969 -----	24,000 to 41,000
1970 -----	27,000 to 46,000
1971 -----	30,000 to 50,000

³⁷ Arthur T. Hadley, *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control* (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), p. 34. Hadley's study is based upon the findings of a Summer Study Seminar held in Dedham, Mass., in 1960 under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Twentieth Century Fund. The participants included physicists, psychologists, lawyers, economists,

Footnote 38 is on p. H10376.

³⁵ "AEC Weapons Expert Blasts DOD Technology," *Technology Week*, March 27, 1967, pp. 15, 16.

³⁶ *Foreign Affairs*, January 1965, p. 262.

ANNEX

CHRONOLOGY OF WEAPONS-GRADE NUCLEAR MATERIALS CUTBACKS

December 1962: President Kennedy on the "overkill" thesis in the course of a radio-TV program, "There is just a limit to how much we need, as well as how much we can afford, to have a successful deterrent . . . I would say when we start to talk about the megatonnage we could bring into a nuclear war, we are talking about annihilation. How many times do you have to hit a target with nuclear weapons?" (*The New York Times*, January 5, 1962, p. 14.)

November 1963: Oak Ridge Laboratory graphite reactor to be shut down in November after 20 years' operation. Dr. Linus Pauling puts U.S. nuclear arsenal at 240,000 megatons, U.S.S.R.'s at 80,000; says U.S. has 12 times stockpile needed to wipe out U.S.S.R. (*The New York Times*, September 29, 1963, p. 51.)

January 1964: President Johnson, ordering cutbacks in manufacture of fissionable materials and manufacture of arms, urges U.S.S.R. do likewise as step toward "eventual abolition of arms," State of Union Message; suggests move is possible because building of arsenal is at point where it is becoming excessive; administration officials note arsenal has increased 50 percent in last 3 years, now includes tens of thousands of weapons; AEC sees cutback saving \$50-million in fiscal '65, \$70-million in next year. (*The New York Times*, January 9, 1964, p. 1.)

January 1964: Two uranium-processing plants to close; operations at two others cut. (*The New York Times*, January 12, 1964, p. 33.)

February 1964: U.S.S.R. Marshal Krylov holds U.S. stockpile exceeds needs. (*The New York Times*, February 23, 1964, p. 21.)

June 1964: AEC stresses stockpile increases but at reduced rate, comment of President Johnson statement on cut. (*The New York Times*, August 21, 1964, p. 1.)

December 1964: Seaborg reports AEC will cut outlays for production of fissionable material, news conference after conference with President Johnson. (*The New York Times*, December 31, 1964, p. 1.)

January 1965: As part of the U.S. plan for curbing the spread of atomic weapons, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said in February 1964, that the U.S. was "prepared to permit international inspection" of one of the four plutonium production reactors scheduled to be shut down by the U.S. Since then, two of the reactors have been shut down, one at Savannah River, S.C., summer of 1964, and one at Hanford, Wash., on January 2, 1965. The two remaining at Hanford were scheduled to be shut down in May and June of 1965, leaving the AEC with 10 reactors producing plutonium for atomic weapons. (*The New York Times*, January 11, 1965, p. 13.)

February 1965: Excerpt from *AEC Authorizing Legislation—1966*, p. 1919. (Summary of operating programs Fiscal Year 1966) ". . . Production of special nuclear materials will decline somewhat in 1966 as a result of reduced cascade power and the first full year of operations after the shutdown of four production reactors during 1964 and 1965. Work

mathematicians, political scientists and weapons specialists. Among those who took part were Donald T. Brennan, Hans A. Bethe, Morton H. Halperin, Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Leo Szilard, Victor F. Weisskopf and Jerome B. Wiesner.

*Lt. General Khristo Dobrev, "On Military-Political Subjects: Anti-missile-Defense, A New Nightmare for U.S. Imperialists," *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia, Bulgaria: April 10, 1967).

will continue on process improvements to assure continuity and safety of operation and more economical methods of production Weapons program.—Operating costs for the weapons program are estimated at \$705.4-million in 1966 compared with 1965 estimated costs of \$753.3-million and 1964 actual costs of \$754.9-million. The weapons program encompasses the production of atomic weapons; the maintenance of stockpiled weapons in a state of constant readiness; the design, development, and underground testing of new weapons types; preparation for and maintenance of a readiness capability to resume atmospheric testing; and participating with the Department of Defense in the development of test detection methods."

April 1965: President Johnson's comments on AEC program, April 17, 1965, letter to Chairman Seaborg, "The orderly cutback in the production of fissionable materials is a significant example of this realism . . ." (*AEC Authorizing Legislation—1966*, p. 1886.)

November 1965: AEC reports "no evidence" U.S.S.R. has carried out nuclear materials cutbacks announced April 20, 1964. This question has been raised by Senator Jackson. (*The New York Times*, November 25, 1965, p. 15.)

January 1966: President Johnson's Budget Message puts AEC appropriations and estimated expenditures below Fiscal 1966 level; expenditures down \$90-million. (*The New York Times*, January 25, 1966, pp. 18, 22.)

January 1967: The Administration, in a budget-motivated gesture toward slowing the atomic arms race, announced today (January 24, 1967) a further cut-back in the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. On July 1, 1967, AEC will shut down the plutonium production reactor at Hanford, Washington. This will be the fifth reactor closed since 1964. Senator Henry M. Jackson expressed concern over the decision "particularly in light of the substantial requirements that could develop if a decision is made to produce and deploy an anti missile system." Senator Jackson observed that the Soviet Union has been "expanding its output" of fissionable materials. (*The New York Times*, January 25, 1967, p. 9.)

GUNS AND AMMUNITION

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. PRYOR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I became quite concerned about the easy accessibility to arms and ammunition of paramilitary, extremist groups in our country. Since then, I have addressed my colleagues numerous times on the activities of such groups as the Minutemen, and the need for controls over the surplus Government ordnance and free ammunition distributed by the civilian marksmanship program in conjunction with the National Rifle Association. Most recently, I have testified before the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee about this problem.

Mr. Speaker, I request unanimous consent to include an article and an editorial from the Washington Post concerning a newspaperman who obtained an NRA membership card in the name of a convicted murderer. This highlights what I have been saying for some time: free ammunition and potentially dangerous guns are available indiscriminately to anyone.

GUNS, UNLIMITED

The National Rifle Association, that exclusive society of Nimrods, has long boasted that it scrutinizes applications for membership with meticulous care. Anxious to avoid low company of any sort, it says that it admits only those who measure up to its exacting standards of law-abiding citizenship. This is no mere snobbery, of course; it is a proper precaution in view of the fact that NRA members get free targets and ammunition from the United States Government, not to speak of discount prices on firearms.

We hardly know what to say, therefore, about the bad manners of a Dayton, Ohio, reporter who applied for membership in the NRA in the name of one Cleo Vernon Keaton, a local character of extremely poor repute who has been convicted of one murder and is under indictment for three others. No problem. The NRA's arms (no pun intended) were open to the applicant, regardless of the alias and the reputation. As the Dayton *Journal Herald* reporter put it somewhat harshly, "Anyone with \$5 who is willing to tell two nonlitigable fibs can join the NRA, and then buy handguns from mail order suppliers advertising in the NRA's *American Rifleman* and be eligible to purchase government surplus ordnance." Reminds one, doesn't it, of the fellow who, not so long ago sent off to a mail order house for a Carcano carbine in the name of Lee Harvey Oswald? He received it, too; no questions asked and no delay.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1967]
NEWSMAN JOINS RIFLE GROUP USING DOOMED
KILLER'S NAME
(By Abe S. Zaidan)

COLUMBUS, OHIO, Aug. 9.—A Dayton newspaperman says he became a member of the National Rifle Association while using the name of a convicted killer now awaiting execution in the Ohio Penitentiary.

Richard Zimmerman has written in the current issue of the Dayton *Journal Herald* that he obtained membership in the NRA as "Cleo Vernon Keaton." Keaton is a Dayton man who has been convicted of one murder and is under indictment for three others.

Zimmerman claimed he used the ruse to gain membership "not simply to embarrass a national organization which offers many legitimate services to sportsmen. But when lobbying at both the state and national levels against stronger firearms control laws, NRA members like to leave the impression that there is something special about being an NRA member."

At the same time, Zimmerman said he wanted to find out whether the NRA "makes more of an effort to check out applicants than do firearms sellers in checking out gun buyers." He added that he also was interested in whether the NRA's requirements for endorsements of the applicant from an NRA member, public official or commissioned officer "involved even a cursory check."

"I got my answer early this month," Zimmerman wrote. "Anyone with \$5 who is willing to tell two non-litigable fibs can join the NRA, and then buy handguns from mail order suppliers and be eligible to purchase Government surplus ordnance."

Zimmerman said he used his newspaper's post office box number during his correspondence with the NRA so that any reference checks on his application would have been in the Dayton area, where Keaton is well known.

The NRA's only apparent attempt to qualify the application was an endorsement blank the NRA sent to "Keaton." Zimmerman said he signed the blank with his own name and address, checked the "public official" box and returned it to the NRA.