

collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor and the elimination of discrimination in employment. The ILO is, in fact, the only international organization to have set precise standards implementing many of the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by incorporating them into binding international instruments capable of world-wide application.

Although the ILO cannot, of course, wield any coercive force against delinquent Member States, it can and does keep a vigilant eye on the way governments are carrying out their obligations under ratified Conventions. Permanent machinery exists for this purpose and cases of dereliction are made part of the public record. The Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, referred to above, is part of this machinery.

Taken together, the 250 or so Conventions and Recommendations that have been adopted by the ILO form the International Labor Code, which now runs to two thick and heavily annotated volumes. The standards embodied in the Code transcend the significance of the specific matters covered. They represent a common pool of accumulated experience available to countries at all stages of development. As it now stands, the result of deliberations over a period of nearly half a century, the Code is an international *corpus juris* of social justice; it has been, and will remain, one of the main formative influences on the development of social legislation throughout the world.

The ILO Constitution requires that all Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the Conference be brought to the attention of the competent authorities, that is the authorities competent to enact legislation. In the case of a federal State, such as ours, this is done on two levels. Where the instrument refers to matters within the scope of the federal government it is presented to our Congress, with recommendations by the Executive Branch for appropriate action. Where the matter involved is appropriate in whole or in part for State action, the instrument is transmitted to our Congress and to the Governors of the 50 States for information. All of the conventions and recommendations adopted at the conference will be submitted in due course to the Congress.

The only ILO Conventions ratified by the United States have dealt with maritime matters. During the past months, a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations has held two hearings to receive testimony in support of ILO Conventions. The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg, U. S. Representative to the United Nations, testified on February 23, 1967, in support of a number of Conventions dealing with human rights, including the ILO Convention for the abolition of forced labor. Then on April 27, 1967, representatives of the Department of Labor and the Department of State testified in support of other ILO instruments.

I strongly endorse the views expressed on those occasions and urge that prompt action be taken on these pending instruments. The United States has been and is a world leader in the area of human rights and ratification of these Conventions would underscore the fact that our country, faced with many problems of diverse character, has nevertheless addressed itself to these problems. As Ambassador Goldberg stated in his testimony (page 20 of Committee Print) "... failure on our part to ratify conventions which do no more than put into an international area commitments to which the United States is bound by its Constitution and laws is very difficult to explain and very difficult to justify . . ." I am satisfied in the light of my own experience that our failure to ratify this type of convention raises serious questions in the minds of other delegates as to what is our law and practice in these matters.

During the period of my visit in Geneva I

met also Representatives O'Hara and Ashbrook. The Conference was engaged in consideration of the reports of its various committees and acting on those reports. This activity constituted a living demonstration of democracy at work in an international forum and I was impressed by the similarity of the Conference procedures with those of our own distinguished body.

I was favorably impressed with the competence of the United States Delegation under the experienced leadership of the Honorable George L-P Weaver. Members of this Delegation, who are listed in an annex to this report, were technically qualified and well prepared. They operated as a close knit team. This, to me, demonstrated the wisdom and indeed the necessity for continuity in delegations to meetings of the ILO as it requires long service to understand fully ILO operations.

In conclusion, I express my conviction that the role of the United States in the International Labor Organization is most creditable and that this Organization deserves our every support.

U. S. DELEGATION TO THE 51ST SESSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE OF THE ILO, GENEVA, JUNE 7-29, 1967

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT

*Delegates*

Chairman, Honorable George L-P Weaver, Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, Department of Labor.

Mr. George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs, Department of State.

*Substitute delegate*

Mr. Robert B. Bangs, Special Assistant for ILO Affairs, Department of Commerce.

*Congressional advisers*

Honorable Wayne L. Morse, United States Senate.

Honorable Jacob K. Javits, United States Senate.

Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr., House of Representatives.

Honorable William H. Ayres, House of Representatives.

Honorable John Ashbrook, House of Representatives.

Honorable James G. O'Hara, House of Representatives.

*Technical advisers*

Mr. Harry M. Douty, Senior Research Consultant, Office of the Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor.

Miss Margaret Pallansch, Deputy Counsel for International Affairs, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Labor.

Mr. James H. Quackenbush, Chief, Division of International Technical Assistance, Office of Program Development and Coordination, Department of Labor.

Mr. Floyd A. Van Atta, Deputy Director, Office of Occupational Safety, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor.

Dr. Gene Wunderlich, Chief, Resource Institutions Branch, Natural Resource Economics Division, Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture.

Mr. William Yoffee, Technical Liaison Office, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

*Other advisers*

Mr. Leonard O. Evans, Commissioner of Labor, Nashville, Tennessee.

Mr. John T. Fishburn, Labor Attache, U.S. Mission, Geneva, Switzerland.

Mr. John E. Lawyer, Director, Office of International Organizations, Department of Labor.

Mr. Irvin S. Lippe, Labor Attache, United States Embassy, Paris, France.

Mr. Edward B. Persons, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State.

Mrs. Mary D. Carres, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

Mrs. Alicebell S. Mura, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

Miss Marie Giovannelli, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor.

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS

*Delegate*

Mr. Edwin P. Nellan, President & Chairman of the Board, Bank of Delaware, 901 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19899.

*Advisers*

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Mr. Howard Jensen, Vice President & General Counsel, The Lone Star Steel Company, West Mockingbird at Roper, Dallas, Texas 75209.

Mr. Lee E. Knack, Director of Labor Relations, Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., 319 Broadway, Boise, Idaho 83706.

Mr. Robert S. Lane, Counsel, Mobil Oil Corporation 150 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10019.

Mr. Charles H. Smith, Jr., President, The Steel Improvement & Forge Co., 970 East 64th Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44103.

Mr. E. S. Willis, Manager of Employee Benefits & Practices Service, General Electric Company, 570 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS

*Delegate*

Mr. Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 1300 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

*Advisers*

Mr. I. W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers of America, 1500 Commonwealth Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222.

Mr. William E. Fredenberger, President, International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, V.F.W. Building, 5th Floor, 200 Maryland Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

Mr. Matthew Guinan, President, Transport Workers Union of America, 1980 Broadway, New York, New York 10023.

Mr. Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Mulholland, Hickey & Lyman, Tower Building, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Mr. David P. McSweeney, Directing Business Representative, District No. 38, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Machinists' Hall, 96 Chestnut Hill Avenue, Brighton, Massachusetts 02135.

Mr. W. Vernie Reed, First Vice-President, Laborers' International Union of North America, 905 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Mr. Ralph Reiser, President, United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America, 556 East Town Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

Mr. Bert Seidman, Director, Department of Social Security, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 815 16th Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20006.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum, without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

S 10364

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 27, 1967

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Vietnam war—and now the Middle East crisis—have dominated our thoughts and all but numbed our senses. Yet there is other pending national business that demands our attention. Aside from the Vietnam war, I believe the most pressing issue before us is whether the United States should build and deploy an antiballistic-missile defense.

I speak today in support of President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, who have decided against such deployment. As Senators know, the deployment of an ABM system has become a particularly serious issue now that the Soviet Union has deployed a so-called anti-ballistic-missile defense around Moscow in addition to the Tallinn system, which may or may not be a primitive antiballistic missile system, in other parts of the country. At the outset it should be stated that neither of these systems could protect Moscow or any other part of Russia from complete destruction by our intercontinental ballistic missiles were we to attack Russian targets in strength.

Nevertheless, a momentous question is now before us. Should we follow the Soviet Union's lead and deploy our own ineffective Nike X ABM's, or should we merely strengthen our offensive strategic weapons as the Secretary has recommended? Should not the United States resist the temptation to take its appointed turn in moving the nuclear arms race up one more notch?

In my view, the American public is thus far only dimly aware of the perplexing character of the antiballistic missile question and almost certainly unaware of the full implications of the choices we will be forced to make in the near future.

Let me say at once that I fully support the position of President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, as reflected in the Defense appropriations program for 1968, that the United States defer any decision on the deployment of an antiballistic missile system. President Johnson feels that our present research and development program is adequate and that his request for a contingency fund of \$377 million for a possible deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system is all that is necessary at this stage. As Senators know, the United States and Russia have agreed to discuss the deescalation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. It is hoped that negotiations will get underway in the immediate future. There is some reason to believe the Russians are not yet in accord within their own Government as to what line to pursue. We can afford to give them a reasonable time to make up their minds.

What concerns me this morning, Mr. President, is not the Defense Department's program for antiballistic missiles for fiscal year 1968, but reports that Secretary McNamara is under heavy pressure to decide favorably on the deployment of the so-called area and spot ABM defense for the United States.

The area defense concept calls for the emplacement of a number of Spartan anti-ballistic-missile batteries around

the periphery of the country with the mission to protect us from a "light" nuclear attack—whether launched by the Soviet Union or also, most notably and specifically, Communist China. Such a defense, if accompanied by a "spot" defense of sprint missiles deployed either around a few cities or more likely around our own ABM launching sites, might be effective against the first or even the second oncoming enemy IBM. It would be useless against an attack in strength.

I think it imperative that all of us should take a careful look at not only the military arguments for this ABM system, but also the psychological and political implications of such a program for both the United States and its allies. I say this because I am firmly convinced that if the United States should decide to deploy a "light" area and "spot" antiballistic-missile defense, we would simultaneously be making the decision to build and deploy a full anti-ballistic-missile system as well. Let us not be confused by what is at stake here. Our country is simply incapable of taking halfway measures.

Buy the area defense at bargain rates and you have bought the whole package at many times the cost. With this assumption as a starting point, the first question to be answered is: Why are we considering an anti-ballistic-missile system? Can it really protect us?

Mr. President, ever since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, sensible men have been saying that there is no defense against nuclear weapons. This does not mean that the United States is incapable of destroying attacking aircraft, submarines, or even some ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. What it means is that there is no defense in sufficient depth against nuclear weapons which is reliable enough to prevent the offense from overwhelming the defense and destroying the target. Cyrus Vance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, underlined this elemental fact of international life when he told the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last May something about "winning" a nuclear war:

Let me simply say—

And here I am quoting Mr. Vance—nobody could win in a nuclear war. It should be suicide for both countries.

Operating under this threat of what the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] has appropriately called coannihilation, the nuclear powers have made the foundation of their security the deterrence of nuclear attack not through defensive but through offensive weapons. To maintain this balance of coannihilation the United States and the Soviet Union have built powerful offensive strategic forces capable of overcoming all efforts at defense. In the process, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a point of "nuclear stand-off" where nuclear war has become unlikely under ordinary circumstances.

Despite the fact that an effective defense against nuclear attack is, for the foreseeable future, unattainable, the champions of defense systems such as the antiballistic missiles are constantly

trying. The United States and the Soviet Union have, since the war, invested enormous amounts in surface-to-air missiles in the hope of protecting their cities from aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. Each effort in both countries has failed. Radar networks, air defense centers, automatically aimed surface-to-air nuclear missiles of all varieties—all these are part of the many billions of dollars the United States and the Soviet Union have spent on defense in a futile attempt to keep up with the offense. The trouble is you cannot be even reasonably sure of hitting the first attacking missile and there is very little chance of hitting the second or third.

I give you one example of the futility of the defense in trying to catch up with the offense. In 1959, the U.S. Army proposed the deployment of the Nike-Zeus system, the father of the present highly touted Nike X system. The total cost of deploying the system was then estimated at \$13 to \$14 billion. This proposal was turned down by President Eisenhower who said that—

It is the consensus of my technical and military advisers that the system should be carefully tested before production is begun and facilities are constructed for its deployment.

I think we should remember these words as we approach the decision on the Nike X system.

We should also heed the words of Secretary of Defense McNamara when he referred to the Nike X system in January of this year. Mr. McNamara said:

Had we produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the Nike-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the Nike-X system as presently envisioned.

The Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which subcommittee I am a member, has recently completed a series of hearings on the general question of what the United States should do about the Soviet Union's apparent decision to deploy an antiballistic missile system. The witnesses we heard included Richard Helms of CIA, John Foster, Director of the Defense Department's Research and Engineering, Drs. May and Bradbury, nuclear specialists of the AEC, Cyrus Vance, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary Rusk. I came away from these hearings convinced that the present Soviet antiballistic defenses, both the Moscow system and the Tallinn system, are quite incapable of defending the Soviet Union or its people against anything except the most primitive missile attack. We were also told that our own Nike X system can easily be overcome by an all-out Soviet attack, no matter where our defenses are located or in what form.

Moreover, Secretary Vance told the subcommittee that if the United States built and deployed a Nike X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of sophisticated missile attack the

July 27, 1967

Soviets are presently capable of launching, the result would be, and here I quote:

... would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security by either side.

I might also add Mr. President, that if the United States built and deployed an anti-ballistic-missile system and then for some reason it failed at the moment of attack, casualties would be higher than if we had not built such a system.

If from a military standpoint the construction of an anti-ballistic-missile system is pointless, then why is there so much agitation in the United States and in the Soviet Union to build such a system? Because the Russians rarely allow their intragovernmental struggles to go on before the public, it is difficult to know what is going on within the Kremlin on the anti-ballistic-missile issue. It is safe to say, however, that the Soviet economy, like our own is badly strained and that the economists in the Soviet leadership are under pressure from their military to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system.

In an unprecedented exchange of public statements, Soviet military leaders have quarreled over the effectiveness of their anti-ballistic-missile defense systems. For example, several months ago, an important Soviet general publicly claimed that no enemy missile could penetrate Soviet defenses around Moscow. This statement was quickly denied by the present Defense Minister, Marshal Greckho. Marshal Greckho said:

Unfortunately there are no means yet that would guarantee the complete security of our cities and the most important objectives from the blows of the enemy weapons of mass destruction.

In fact, I have it on good authority that Soviet scientists are convinced that their ABM defense is useless against a sophisticated nuclear missile attack and fear that if he is not careful, Mr. Kosygin may be duped by his own military into believing the Soviet Union could be protected from a U.S. attack. Apparently Defense Minister Greckho and Mr. McNamara have more in common than one would suspect.

Mr. President, there is no doubt that the discussions and hearings on anti-ballistic-missile problems have shown conclusively that any presently feasible ABM system is unworkable against a heavy attack, since both the Soviets and the United States can take offensive measures to destroy its effectiveness. This being the case, the champions of an anti-ballistic-missile deployment have now shifted their ground. As Senators will remember, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are in the vanguard of the ABM enthusiasts, first recommended that a decision be made to deploy a Nike X system to defend either 25 or 50 cities at a cost of \$20 to \$40 billion. This system of the so-called thin ABM defense was recommended as a defense against what the Joint Chiefs called a low Soviet threat. After this recommendation had been submitted to Congress, it soon became clear from scientific testimony both within and without the Pentagon that the selected city defense concept was militarily use-

less and politically unacceptable. First, no one could quite define what a "low" Soviet threat was. If it meant more than two missiles directed at the same target, the third one would get through and kill millions of civilians as well as destroy whole cities.

Second, as a practical political matter, the idea that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for choosing the 25 or 50 cities had to be quickly abandoned after it became public information that one of the cities would be Charleston, S.C., a town of 81,400 inhabitants and the home of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

To suggest that in a democracy we can confine protection to our major cities, letting the rest go without defense, was absurd; to permit the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine who would be saved was to accept the philosophy of the military direction of the country through a "nuclear elite." And so the selected city defense concept has been quietly shelved. But the demand for an anti-ballistic-missile defense has not been stilled. There is too much money and too much military status involved.

The Joint Chiefs and their industrial allies, who stand to make hundreds of millions of dollars from ABM deployment, have now turned their attention to recommending that we defend ourselves against attack from Communist China or some other new nuclear power. The recommendation is now for the so-called area defense, which is a system of long-range detection radars and large interceptor missiles called the Spartan, plus a number of short-range missiles, called the Sprint, intended to protect military launching sites. This system is advocated as an effective defense against the Red Chinese missile threat we think they may have in the 1970's—that is a small number of missiles with a relatively unsophisticated missile technology. The area defense is also offered as a safeguard against a missile accident.

On the surface the area defense has much to recommend it. Its cost is advertised as less than \$5 billion over a period of 5 years, and we are told the system will give us protection against a possible Chinese attack.

Before "buying" this rather naive argument, let us remember that China has no effective air force against our strategic bombers and no effective surface-to-air defense against either high-flying aircraft or ballistic missiles. If China were to give any evidence of violating her pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, it would be far cheaper and far more effective to destroy her nuclear capability than to build a light ABM defense. Let us therefore take a careful look at what is involved before we agree to this form of ABM deployment.

(At this point, Mr. Spang took the chair as Presiding Officer).

Mr. CLARK. First of all, why are the Joint Chiefs of Staff so confident that an area antiballistic-missile defense will provide a foolproof defense against the Chinese in the 1970's? The argument is that a Chinese attack—if one can believe the Chinese would be mad enough

to attack the United States—will consist of a few unsophisticated ICBM's that our ABM defense will sweep from the sky. Splendid theory. But how dumb do we think the Chinese are? What if the Chinese instead of international missiles use long-range submarines not as yet in existence to fire medium-range ballistic missiles under an ABM defense? Or simply fire very "dirty" nuclear weapons into the atmosphere off the coast of California and allow the prevailing westerlies to cover the United States with deadly radiation or even smuggle nuclear bombs into Chinatown in a suitcase. Moreover, can we be sure, given Chinese skills, that by the 1970's China will not have a large number of missiles and other penetration aids and decoys, which will diminish, if not destroy, the effectiveness of our area antiballistic-missile defense—just as Russia can do today?

Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now using China as the justification for an ABM deployment. Suddenly China is in the foreground of our defense consideration; yet only a few months ago, before the selected city defense proved bankrupted, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had this to say about China and an ABM defense:

We do not believe we should deploy at this point in time an antiballistic missile system purely to defend against the Red Chinese threat.

This was because the general believed we had plenty of leadtime to stay well ahead of Chinese capabilities. Why have the Joint Chiefs of Staff now changed their minds? Is it because of the recent Chinese nuclear success? This is highly unlikely because, according to the Defense Department, the Chinese experiment did not come as a surprise; even the general public expected it sometime this year.

I suggest that the reason for this shift to recommending an area defense—backed up by the Sprint missiles around particular sites—is simply that this form of ABM defense is thought to be salable to a gullible public, while its predecessor turned out not to be. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs have described this area defense concept as a "first step." Therefore, we can be confident that if the United States builds and deploys a "light" ABM defense, we will not stop with this first stage. We will be imprompted by the manufacturers of ABM and the military to go on to a full-scale ABM deployment even though, by the Defense Department's own admission, such a system will not protect the United States from a sophisticated Soviet attack.

Third, why is the United States considering the immediate deployment of a system which has not been fully tested? Senators should know that the United States has not yet experimented with using the Sprint, the Spartan, and the radars together and probably will not be capable of doing so for at least 2 years. How can we consider deploying, at a cost of some \$5 billion, a system that has never been fully tested? I personally think that such an expenditure is outrageous, considering the crying need that this country has for funds for domestic programs to alleviate poverty, to pro-

July 27, 1967

vide adequate education for our youth, to rebuild our cities, to feed the hungry, and to eliminate air and water pollution.

A large part of the problem we face with these new demands for an ABM deployment stems from that highly organized military-industrial complex against which General Eisenhower warned us in his last speech as President in these words:

In the councils of government—

He said—

We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

President Eisenhower went on to say:

In holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become captive of a scientific-technological elite.

We should all realize that the United States is all too often victimized by the zeal of our scientific-military elite—the “weapons cult,” if you will. Let me read you what one such cultist has had to say about the advance of weapons technology and public opinion. In March of 1967, Dr. Harold Agnew, Director of the Los Alamos Laboratories Weapons Division, remarked that—

The basis of advanced technology is innovation and nothing is more stifling to innovation than seeing one's product not used or ruled out of consideration on flimsy premises involving public world opinion.

This is indeed a shocking statement and a dangerous one. If we have any role here in the Senate it is to advance what Dr. Agnew calls the flimsy premises of public opinion, or, in other words, the impact of an aroused democracy against the weapons cultists. Over the next few months, as the United States brings to a head this longstanding issue of whether to produce and deploy an ABM system, we will be inundated by all shades and varieties of expertise—both real and bogus. How can we be expected to sort out the scientifically sound from the self-serving? We will be asked whether the lives of a few million American citizens are not, for example, worth an investment of \$4 to \$5 billion. Senators will be hard pressed to deal with such arguments, particularly when the cultists are so anxious for their own pride and their pocketbooks to go forward with an ineffective ABM system.

I, for one, have confidence in the good sense of the American people, once they are informed of the facts. I do not believe that they or their representatives can be stampeded into taking an unwise, indeed a dangerous, step if they understand clearly the issue before them. But they must have the facts. They must have the benefit of full and free discussion in the Congress and in the public media, uninhibited by false demands for secrecy. We were told the basic facts in the hearings before the Disarmament Subcommittee, but then the testimony was so censored by the Defense Department, the AEC, and the CIA that I have been unable to use in this speech many facts the American people should be told. And this involves the clear and scientific reasons why our

ABM system is no good and why the Russian ABM system is no good. But I am not permitted to state these facts, because expediency has been allowed to intervene with what I believe is incontrovertible evidence to support my contention.

Mr. President, I am convinced that the construction and deployment of an ABM system at the present time is both unwarranted and unwise. I also believe that this conclusion is strategically sound and militarily defensible.

In any issue of this magnitude, however, there is inevitably a political consideration as well. At a time when the peace of the world is based to a large extent upon a tenuous balance of nuclear power—a delicate balance of terror, as it has been so often called—the concept of national security is directly affected by progress in the field of international disarmament—the only viable alternative to mutual annihilation.

It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I have long regarded the negotiations in Geneva on a nonproliferation treaty as of overriding importance to our own security, as well as to the security of other nations from which ours in part derives. I have also proposed that if agreement is ultimately reached on this issue, the chances for a further extension of the nuclear test-ban treaty to include underground experiments be explored in the light of current scientific detection techniques.

Unfortunately, as of this date, direct negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the ABM issue have not yet commenced. However, President Johnson and Premier Kosygin were afforded a unique opportunity at Glassboro to compare their respective positions on the question of antiballistic-missile defense systems and offensive weapons, as well as on more wide-ranging arms control measures. If the results of this meeting are to have any significant effect on the future of United States-Soviet relations, precipitate deployment action in the ABM field should be postponed at least until an intensive diplomatic effort to reach agreement has taken place and failed.

For it is apparent that the debate which has raged in the Pentagon in recent years over this subject has also been carried on behind closed doors in the Kremlin. Our deployment of an ABM system at this juncture without serious efforts to come to an agreement would certainly have the effect of strengthening the hand of those Russian military advocates of such an investment in the U.S.S.R.—probably at an accelerated pace. The result, I am convinced, would be a vast, competitive expenditure of money and resources with little gain in real defense capability for either side, as Mr. Vance has so clearly pointed out.

Mr. President, the history of the past two decades has taught us—if it has taught us anything—that every decision to escalate the arms race is an irrevocable decision in the long run.

Before such a decision is taken and in order to provide the public with a full and unbiased account of the ABM issue, I recommend to the President that he convene a blue ribbon commission to deal

with the question of an ABM system. Such a commission could provide a careful and objective evaluation of the course the United States should follow. The precedent for such a commission was established immediately after the Second World War when President Truman decided to establish an independent commission to assess the complexities of U.S. defense policies in the air age. The resulting report of what came to be called the Finletter Commission was bluntly entitled “Survival in the Air Age”; and this report, primarily because of the authoritative and independent stature of the commission members, came to be the focal point around which subsequent international discussions of air strategy revolved.

Ten years later—in 1957—President Eisenhower established a blue ribbon commission to assist him in coping with the problems of defense in the era of strategic missiles. Impressed by the military, political and even psychological implications of developing an American retaliatory offensive force President Eisenhower established the so-called Gaither Commission. The Gaither Commission was comprised of distinguished figures from the Nation's business, financial, scientific, and academic communities. These men included H. Rowan Gaither, a former head of the Ford Foundation, William C. Foster, now Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, James R. Killian of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Earnest O. Lawrence, I. I. Rabi, John J. McCloy and Jerome B. Weisner, who later became a Department of Defense adviser to President Kennedy.

There is no doubt that the Gaither Report had a significant effect both within and outside the U.S. Government and led to some very hard thinking about America in the missile age.

A critical moment in our Nation's life came when the Gaither report presented the President with an objective account of U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's and, in the process, I interpolate, Mr. President, it destroyed some myths which had been projected for a good long while by certain members of the military-industrial complex of which I have spoken today.

Now another 10 years have passed and again these seems to be justification for the President to convene another blue ribbon commission, this time to deal with the momentous question of ABM deployment. Surely the ABM question is of such magnitude that it is essential to have a careful and objective evaluation of the course the United States should follow. I do not believe, for the reasons I have already mentioned, that the military-industrial complex is objective enough to advise the U.S. Congress or the President on how we should proceed. This being the case, I strongly suggest that a temporary blue ribbon commission drawn from all sectors of national life is the best way to bring a thorough inquiry into the issues.

Our very national survival may be at issue in the ABM controversy. It is time we put the best and most objective minds in the country to work.

Mr. President, unless the Senate has further business, I have been requested by the majority leader—

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I was about to yield the floor. I will be happy to yield, if the Senator wishes to engage in colloquy.

Mr. THURMOND. Has the Senator completed his address?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, I have.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I did not interrupt the Senator during his address, but there are a number of points I should like to discuss in connection with it. I do not know when I have heard an address on the floor of the Senate that has contained so many erroneous statements.

The Senator did make one very accurate statement in his address, however, on the last page, when he said, "Our very national survival may be at issue in the ABM controversy." I heartily agree with him in that statement.

The issue boils down practically to this: If the Soviets have an effective antiballistic missile, and we do not, if they can knock down our missiles and we are unable to knock down theirs, where are we?

It simply means they can pound us to death without our being able to effectively counter and respond to their offensive.

Mr. President, this is a very important question. For 10 years—10 long years—I have been advocating that our Government build and deploy an anti-ballistic-missile system. The state of the art has matured during that period of time, and will certainly continue to do so. Our research has been highly successful. We are ready to go forward with it. All that now waits is a decision of the President.

Mr. President, in my judgment, this is one of the most important steps, if not the most important, that this Nation can take along the lines of national defense. The building and deployment of an antiballistic-missile system is critical to the future security of this Nation. It has been estimated that more than 100 million lives could be saved, should we sustain an all-out attack, if we have an anti-ballistic-missile system. Even the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, who has not yet recommended that we go forward with it—chiefly, I suppose, because of the cost—has admitted that we can save millions of lives if we have such a system.

There has been a system recommended, that would be effective, it is said, possibly against Red China, that would save 40 million or 50 million lives, and an even more effective system that would save from 80 to 125 million lives, that would be effective against the threat posed by the Soviets.

I do not know of an issue today that is more important to the American people than proceeding with the building and deploying of an anti-ballistic-missile system.

Mr. President, in all probability it will take us from 5 to 7 years after the decision is made to begin, to actually deploy the system. We are making a great mis-

take, in my judgment, to delay this matter 1 day more.

The Senator feels that if we had gone forward some years ago, we would have wasted a lot of money because of the relative primitiveness of that system compared with what we have today. When Thomas A. Edison invented the electric light, he did not start out with the fluorescent lamp; he started with the incandescent lamp. If he had not done that, later we would not have had the fluorescent lamp. A start had to be made.

But we have done additional research in the meantime. We are at the point now where we can intercept the enemy's missiles and render them ineffective. What we need to do now is to proceed to build the system, to protect the American people.

Yes; I agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania in his statement, on his last page, that our very national survival may be at issue in the ABM controversy. I am in hearty accord with that. On the other hand, Mr. President, I wish to point out certain other areas of disagreement. On page 1, the allegation is made that President Johnson and Secretary McNamara have decided against deployment. The truth is that no final decision has been made, but the delay in deployment has been taken by some to mean that the decision not to deploy has been made.

A decision has not been made not to deploy. I hope that the President will yet see fit, and do it soon, to make the decision to deploy the ABM.

Also on page 1—

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I challenge the accuracy of the statement the Senator has just made. The President, acting upon the advice of Secretary McNamara, has decided not to deploy, and has made a public statement to that effect, despite the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the contrary.

Mr. THURMOND. When did the President make the decision not to deploy the antiballistic missile?

Mr. CLARK. There have been statements after statement in the press throughout the past several months to that effect. I shall be glad to document it later, if the Senator wishes. Secretary McNamara appeared before the Committee on Armed Services, of which the Senator is a member, and said he was opposed to it.

Mr. THURMOND. The Secretary of Defense has said he was opposed to it, but the Secretary of Defense, acting with the President, has taken the position, as I have understood it, that if some arrangement could not be worked out with the Soviets on this issue, then they would be forced to employ it, and the President has delayed his decision. The President, I repeat, has not made the decision not to deploy the ABM.

Mr. President, on page 1 of the Senator's speech he says that the United States and Russia have agreed to the de-escalation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.

The truth is that the United States has on numerous occasions indicated its willingness to discuss this issue, but the Soviet Union has not so agreed and has been particularly reluctant to agree to a discussion of its defensive systems.

On page 3 of the Senator's speech—

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I challenge the accuracy of the Senator's statement.

It has been stated in the public press several times that President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have agreed, and so has Secretary Rusk and Mr. Gromyko, to a discussion of both offensive and defensive missile deescalation.

At Glassboro, when asked when the discussions would commence, Mr. Kosygin was somewhat evasive about renewing the discussion in the future.

These discussions have continued, and we have been told this in the Foreign Relations Committee on several occasions.

The Senator is incorrect in what he has just said.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President the Senator is confusing an agreement to discuss the matter with an agreement to deescalate.

Mr. CLARK. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. They may have agreed to discuss the matter, but there has been no agreement to deescalate, and I challenge the Senator to present one.

Mr. CLARK. I never said there was an agreement to deescalate. I never said there was anything more than an agreement to discuss. If the Senator says that I said otherwise, he is misquoting.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on page 1 of the speech of the Senator, is it not the effect of the statement that the United States and Russia have agreed to deescalate both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons?

Mr. CLARK. No; that is not the effect at all. It is merely that they agreed to discuss it.

Mr. THURMOND. I frankly do not look for the Soviets to agree to anything, even for them to agree to seriously discuss the matter. The Soviets are not going to agree to anything unless it suits them.

The goal of the Soviets—and the Senator seems to lack a basic understanding of this—is to dominate and enslave the world.

The Senator will rue the day when he accepts at face value any step that the Soviets take in the world today, since their policies are all calculated to contribute to their domination of the world.

Mr. President, on page 3 of the Senator's speech, it is said that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a point of nuclear standoff where nuclear war has become unlikely under ordinary circumstances.

The truth is that the point of nuclear standoff has, from all indications, been eroded because the United States clear superiority in offensive capability in relation to that of the Soviet Union is in jeopardy. An exact "balance" increases the chance of nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail since the advantage is on the



side of the first strike, and the U.S. position is that we will never strike first.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I take it that the Senator does not agree with the testimony given by Under Secretary of Defense Vance before the disarmament hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The Senator is quite at liberty to disagree with Secretary McNamara, with President Johnson, and with Mr. Vance. That is his right as a U.S. Senator. However, I think it should be pointed out that he is disagreeing with the leaders of our Defense Establishment.

Mr. THURMOND. I certainly do disagree with Mr. McNamara. He has made more bad decisions than any man who has ever been Secretary of Defense, in my judgment. And I regret that President Johnson has so little wisdom as to want to follow Mr. McNamara's judgment.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I would like to have the Record show my supreme admiration for Secretary McNamara.

Mr. THURMOND. Well I am not surprised. The Senator's thinking, I imagine, is about in line with the Secretary's.

If Secretary McNamara had his way, we would not have very much of a Defense Establishment. About the only thing he has produced in his lifetime, that I have heard of, is the Edsel.

On pages 4 and 5 of the Senator's speech, it is said that if the United States built and deployed an anti-ballistic-missile system and then for some reason it failed at the moment of attack, the casualties sustained by the United States would be higher than if we had not built such a system.

The truth is that it is impossible to sustain an allegation of this nature, assuming that all other factors remain constant. Even an absolute failure could hardly result in more casualties for the United States than our present naked status would result in.

Mr. President, I emphasize again that the United States today stands naked, completely nude, against an attack by missiles. We have no system deployed to protect the lives and the safety of the American people from nuclear attack by ballistic missile.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is asinine to continue this policy. The enemy can shower missile after missile in here, and we have nothing with which to stop them.

Why do we not go ahead and build the system? We have the know-how. We have done the research. We are ready to proceed. All we need is the decision of the President. He need not wait on Mr. McNamara, because I do not believe Mr. McNamara would ever on his own advise the President to proceed.

If Mr. McNamara does so advise the President, it will be under coercion from somebody because down in his heart, I understand that he does not believe in it. He does not want to spend the money for it.

We are making a great mistake in not proceeding in that way. It may cost \$20 million or \$30 million. What is \$30 million?

In Detroit they burned over \$200 million of property a few days ago. We can spend \$30 million, \$40 million, or \$50 million and save billions of dollars' worth of property and, more important and more precious than that, save 80 million or 150 million American lives.

I say that is worth the cost.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I might point out briefly the rationale of my statement that if we built an antiballistic missile system and it did not work, more American lives would be lost than otherwise. This is based on testimony before our Subcommittee on Disarmament by Secretary Vance and by Dr. Foster, the Defense Department's Director of Research and Engineering. Both of these gentlemen testified that the inevitable result of our constructing an antiballistic missile defense would do to escalate the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union, just as Secretary McNamara has indicated that the inevitable effect of the Soviet Union's deploying an antiballistic missile system, ineffective though it may be, would be to escalate our offensive systems.

Therefore, if we build such an ABM system, it will force the Soviets to build a better offensive missile system than they now have and we will lose more lives.

This is the uncontradicted testimony of the Defense Department before our subcommittee.

I suspect that the Senator from South Carolina quite inadvertently said millions of dollars when he meant billions of dollars.

I have no doubt that he will correct that when he comes to look at the text of his remarks.

Mr. THURMOND. What figure is the Senator speaking about?

Mr. CLARK. The Senator on several occasions during his last comment spoke about \$30 million and \$40 million. I am sure he meant \$30 billion and \$40 billion.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct. If I used the word millions, it should have been billions.

I repeat that if this great Nation, the richest in the world, can spend \$30 billion or \$40 billion and save 80 million or more American lives and billions of dollars worth of property, it is a good investment.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I will be glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I recall some years ago when we held a session behind closed doors and discussed the missile

program. That was some time ago. Can the Senator recall when it was?

Mr. THURMOND. 1963.

Mr. CLARK. May I say to my good friend, the Senator from Louisiana, that I have the floor. Of course, I would be happy to yield to him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Louisiana, for whatever purpose he wishes, so long as I do not lose my right to the floor.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I thank the Senator.

I had gained the impression that the Senator from Pennsylvania had yielded the floor.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator from South Carolina asked me to yield to him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. May I say to the Senator from South Carolina that my understanding was that at that time the basis of the argument that we should not proceed forthwith to develop an antiballistic missile system was that the services had not adequately perfected a sufficiently sophisticated weapon to justify building and deploying it. That was 4 years ago.

Mr. THURMOND. The basic argument used was that it had not reached the necessary state of the art. The Senator is correct. That was the excuse given then. The excuse given now is that if you build one, it will make the Soviets more militant, and they will try to build a better one, or they will pursue some other course.

Anyone who knows the Soviets knows that they are going to follow their course to build the best weapons in the world; and if we do not build better ones, they will have the advantage, and they would not hesitate to attack this country and take it over, as they have taken over and have behind the Iron Curtain 36 percent of the world's population.

Mr. CLARK. Can the Senator tell me whether or not the Soviets are in the process of deploying an antiballistic missile system?

Mr. THURMOND. The Soviets already have deployed now, at this very moment, an ABM system around Leningrad and Moscow. It is ready to go. It has been developed; it has been deployed.

We have only carried on research, and we have put in money for preproduction engineering and development, and Secretary McNamara did not even permit that appropriation to be obligated. We are several years behind the Soviets. It would take several years to build and deploy a system after a decision had been made to proceed.

The Senator has said, on pages 5 and 6 and elsewhere in his speech, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have abandoned their original plan which involved the defense of certain areas by deployment around certain cities. That was the allegation.

The truth is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff still are unanimously behind the original concept, which involves deployment around certain cities which were chosen on a basis of factors involving optimum defense of maximum security

July 27, 1967

interests. No political factors were involved, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff stand unanimously behind this recommendation.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the Senator from South Carolina for his constant courtesy in yielding to me.

I would challenge the accuracy of the Senator's statement. I believe I can produce a number of press releases from the Pentagon in recent weeks which would make it pretty clear that they have gotten away from the plan to defend the cities and are now speaking of a much different system, which will be concentrated around missile sites instead of around cities.

In all friendliness, I would not agree with the statement the Senator has just made about the present position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I spoke today, over the telephone, with General Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I asked him, "Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff still stand behind the ABM system? Do they still want it? Do they still recommend it?"

He said, "We do."

They have unanimously recommended it for the last 2 years. Every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended it. Mr. McNamara has not recommended it. This great military figure, McNamara, is not in favor of it. He wants to save a few dollars, he says. But, Mr. President, he is gambling with the lives of American citizens when he does not go forward.

It was not a political decision. I asked General Wheeler if these cities were chosen from a political standpoint, and he said, "Absolutely not." He said the Army chose those cities, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed them and approved them.

I said, "Did any politics enter into it?"

He said, "Absolutely not."

Now, the Senator, on page 6—

Mr. CLARK. Before the Senator proceeds, Mr. President, will he yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am pleased to yield.

Mr. CLARK. I do not question that the Joint Chiefs of Staff still favor the deployment of an antiballistic missile system. What I do question seriously—and I wish the Senator would produce an up-to-date statement from General Wheeler—if that they are still proposing to defend 25 or 50 cities of their own choosing.

Mr. THURMOND. I spoke with General Wheeler about that, and he said the Army chose those cities, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed them, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved them. There was no politics involved, in spite of the insinuation in the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania to the contrary.

On page 6 of his speech, the Senator says:

Second, as a practical political matter, the idea that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for choosing the 25 or 50 cities

had to be quickly abandoned after it became public information that one of the cities would be Charleston, South Carolina, a town of 81,400 inhabitants and the home of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. President, that is absolutely incorrect. The facts are just as I have stated—the Army chose these cities. They did not have to abandon any plan. What is mentioned here about the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan being abandoned is absolutely incorrect. I asked General Wheeler about that.

Some weeks ago, the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania referred to this matter on the floor. He was wrong then, and he is wrong now. He said, speaking of Charleston, "81,400 inhabitants." If the Senator knows anything about an ABM, he knows it covers more than Charleston. Charleston and the suburbs alone contain more than 300,000 people. Why does he want to say 81,400 right in the corporate limits of Charleston, when North Charleston has a larger population than the city of Charleston—and it is not incorporated—and the entire area around there contains more than 300,000 people? In addition to population density factors there are many defense essential installations to be considered. It is not only for the good people of Charleston, although it would be worth while to build the system for them. Here is what you have:

Headquarters of the 6th Naval District, the Polaris submarine base, the naval shipyard, the naval base, headquarters of the Atlantic Mine Fleet, the mine warfare school, the Military Airlift Command, the naval ammunition depot, the Army transportation depot, the Veterans' Administration hospital, the naval hospital.

These are all defense installations, located in and around Charleston. And the antiballistic missile system could well be deployed there to protect these vital defense installations, but this is not, by itself, the only factor involved in placing an ABM installation in the Charleston vicinity.

At that location is the only Polaris submarine base in the United States. One is being built on the west coast, but this is the only one now, and the main one, and it will continue to be the main one. It will be the only one on the east coast. It is worth protecting. Our Polaris submarine is one of the most powerful weapons we have, one of the most important; and if you are going to put an ABM anywhere, it should be put in that area.

I was surprised that the Senator criticized the distinguished chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. It was Representative RIVERS who helped to save the naval shipyard in Philadelphia. It probably would not be there now if it had not been for Representative RIVERS.

In addition to the Federal installations I have mentioned, there are Parris Island, the Marine Corps Recruit Depot; the Beaufort Marine Air Corps Air Station; the Beaufort Naval Hospital. The ABM would protect those Federal installations.

North about 80 or 90 miles, in the lower

part of Aiken and in parts of Allendale and Barnwell Counties, is the great Savannah River atomic energy plant, which is most vital to our Nation. The ABM would protect that.

There is the Citadel in Charleston which is training young men and Reserve officers and which is a great asset to our national defense. There is the Port of Charleston, which is one of the finest natural ports in the United States, which would be of extreme importance to the United States in time of war, and is certainly important from a commercial standpoint at all times.

There are all of these Federal and State installations and yet the Senator from Pennsylvania wants to insinuate that the reason that Charleston, S.C., was chosen was because it is the home of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. That insinuation is false and it is not true. The Senator from Pennsylvania is not fair to him when he makes such an insinuation.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the able and distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina is also a major general in the U.S. Army, is he not?

Mr. THURMOND. In the Reserve.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator for his candid answer.

Mr. THURMOND. And I am proud of it.

Mr. CLARK. I am a colonel in the Air Force, I might say. I am happy to yield the floor to the senior Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. I wish to thank the Senator for his courtesy.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on page 7 of his address, the Senator states that we could launch a "preemptive" attack against Red China, upon any indication that she intended to attack us with nuclear weapons.

The truth is that the first likely indication that we would have of any such attack by Red China would be after it was too late to prevent the launching of the attack and would be disastrous if we had no defense against the incoming missiles. Also, I am very surprised to hear the senior Senator from Pennsylvania suggest that we consider a preemptive strike against any country short of an all-out attack against us, since that appears to me to be contrary to every position he has ever taken. It would avail the United States very little to destroy Red China after they had loosed a nuclear attack against the United States against which we were defenseless.

On page 7 of the speech it is alleged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now using Red China as the justification for an ABM deployment.

The truth is that this is plainly contrary to the facts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff justified deployment of an ABM on the military threat from all our potential adversaries. While they must take into account the new threat which Red China has developed, the original justification against the threat posed by the Soviet Union is certainly still valid.

Mr. President, in closing I wish to repeat that there is nothing more important than this Nation can do to build up our strategic military posture and protect this Nation than to build an antiballistic missile system. The antiballistic missile system will be a deterrent to an attack because if we have such a system, then the Soviets and Red China will know and other Communist nations will know that if we can incapacitate their missiles they will hesitate a long time in launching any attack because, although some of their missiles might get through, they would not be totally effective. They would know that if they were to begin such an attack that we could still respond in kind and that would be a double deterrent, and I say that would help stave off a war.

Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania for yielding to me and allowing me to respond to the many erroneous statements made in his speech.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the senior Senator from South Carolina, in addition to being a good friend of mine, is always very courteous to me. It was a pleasure to yield to him. It does not surprise him any more than it does me that we do not see eye to eye, but that is one of the reasons for having a democratic institution such as the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial which was published in the Toronto Globe and Mail on July 13, 1967, entitled "Super Megaton Madness."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Toronto Globe and Mail, July 13, 1967]

#### SUPER MEGATON MADNESS

Perhaps the gloomiest remarks made by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in his press conference after the Glassboro summit meeting were on the subject of missile defenses. Before the meeting President Lyndon Johnson said he hoped for agreement to prevent a race to install costly systems of anti-intercontinental ballistic missiles (ABMs). A journalist asked Mr. Kosygin if there could be safeguards for such an agreement, and his reply showed that he and President Johnson could not have been talking the same strategic language.

Mr. Kosygin said he was willing to talk about complete disarmament, but not about preventing this sort of race. ABMs, he said, were a defensive weapon; and the world would be worse, not better, off if the money saved on ABMs were spent on aggressive weapons.

It is a characteristic remark. But it is totally at cross-purposes with the approach of United States Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and its effects can be seen this week in increasing pressure on Washington to launch its own ABM program, which would cost \$40 billion over 10 years. The Russians have already spent \$4 billion in ABM defenses around Moscow and Leningrad.

This pressure has been building up for months, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff leading some influential senators against the McNamara school. But extra weight was added on Tuesday by a study signed by four former top generals and Dr. Edward Teller, the nuclear scientist. In their report to a congressional committee they raised the bogey that by 1971 Russia would enjoy a massive advantage in the nuclear megaton-

nage it could theoretically drop on the United States in an all-out war.

They argued that an ABM system had to be built to give the President two options in a crisis. Since the United States had declared it would never initiate a nuclear war, they complained that at present we have no defense other than our threat to strike back.

They are, in fact, as far away from Mr. McNamara's thinking as Mr. Kosygin is. The Defense Secretary has argued for years the only true defense is an "invulnerable second strike" system, for it would deter the initial enemy move. He describes an ABM system as an offensive scheme because it encourages a power to think it cannot suffer a retaliatory attack. He once went so far as to say "the sooner the better" to the idea Russia might achieve full second-strike capacity; and his critics derided him, saying he should give Moscow some Polaris submarines forthwith.

Yet, if anyone makes sense in the mad world of missiles, surely Mr. McNamara does. The ABM system would, as the Chiefs of Staff themselves calculated, only save one-quarter of the American population from nuclear death. Tuesday's congressional study estimated that by 1971 Russia could have 50,000 "deliverable megatons." That is exactly 2½ million times the amount of TNT required to equal the Hiroshima atomic explosion.

Obviously that would go far beyond the borders of saturation and "overkill."

The ABM argument in Washington cannot be isolated from other developments. If the McNamara line is abandoned in favor of an ABM escalation, it could mean further delays before anyone signs a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with non-nuclear nations becoming more suspicious of the big powers.

It would also offer extra arguments for the Kremlin hawks, whose struggle with Mr. Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny was described yesterday in a New York Times report. Some influential Americans are arguing that now more than ever, the Russian doves need an achievement to point to if hope of big-power co-operation is to survive: de-escalation of the Vietnam war, some stride toward a Middle East settlement that would salvage Arab pride and justify Mr. Kosygin's cautious tactics. Either is urgently needed; either would be a better defense than ABMs.

#### RESPONSE TO THE NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on July 26, 1967, there appeared in the New York Times an editorial under the caption "While Cities Burn." I am mentioned in this editorial, and not particularly in the happiest and most favorable way. I presume it comes about because of a statement made by the Republican National Coordinating Committee. Frankly, I did not prepare that statement nor was I on the subcommittee that did so, but there was an allusion to factories that manufacture Molotov cocktails and, of course, that must have aggravated the pink-shirted editorial writers who sit in the Ivory tower on Times Square and write these things.

Mr. President, I presume that the lines of communication between the editorial department and the city desk have evidently fallen down and are out of order, or it could be that a Berlin Wall has been suddenly erected between these two divisions of this great newspaper and it has become one of these huge unmanageable, and uncontrollable conglomerates. We could use that phrase in the Antitrust Subcommittee.

If the editors of the New York Times had bothered to read their own newspaper on Tuesday, July 18, 1967, they would have discovered an article in that newspaper with a caption which looks to me as if it is at least three centimeters high, and the title is "Arson 'Factory' Discovered Here." The subheadline is "Brooklyn Marshals Seize Cache of Fire Bombs." The first line of the article states:

A Molotov cocktail "factory" was discovered in a vacant building in the Brownsville Section of Brooklyn yesterday by two fire marshals cruising the area in search of arsonists.

Mr. President, it is rather curious that the editors who wrote this editorial had forgotten to read the paper just 9 days earlier. With its headline, how could they miss? I think I should dispatch a note of sympathy to the New York Times and tell them it should be prescribed reading for the editorial department to take a look at their own newspaper now and then and see what the reporters dish up.

In connection with my remarks, even though it is very uncomplimentary, I like to have the world know all these things they say about me.

Because the statement was so misleading and so irresponsible, Senator Dirksen, that thick-skinned, battle-hardened political veteran, evidently could not bring himself to face up to a defense of it to skeptical reporters and ran away from his own press conference.

Now, I shall tell what happened. I did get up at the press conference, and when I did get up in the press conference in our press gallery at 5 o'clock on Tuesday and a reporter said to me, "Well, it looks like you are getting a little sensitive," I said, "I am not getting sensitive; I haven't lost my cool; there are times when I want to show my unspeakable contempt for somebody, and that is when I get up in a meeting and walk out."

So, Mr. President, there is the whole story. That battle-scarred, political veteran from Illinois does not run out for or on or about anyone, including the New York Times. The New York Times does not count for much, out where I live.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the editorial and article referred to, so that the wise, the prudent, and the self-reliant people of Illinois will know what Times Square, or at least some pink-shirted editorial writer, thinks about me. I want them to know it.

There being no objection, the editorial and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 26, 1967]

#### WHILE CITIES BURN

The nation has cause for deep concern if the leaders of both political parties are unable to forget political considerations when murder, arson and looting are sweeping some of its major cities. This grave domestic crisis demands a level and a quality of mature leadership that have been shocking in their absence.

Because he holds the highest office and therefore bears the highest responsibility both to act and to set an example, President Johnson offended most conspicuously in his