

June 28, 1967

territorial adjustments. Yet adjustments must be made if a stasis is to be effected in the Middle East and peace is to be preserved. I salute Israel for its efficiency and bravado, and I am assured that her success will in no way tempt her to deviate from those principles that she was fighting for: freedom, political independence, and territorial integrity.

If these proposals are carried out, then, in President Johnson's own words:

That land, known to everyone of us since childhood as the birthplace of great religions and learning for all mankind, can flourish once again in our time.

Mr. Speaker, although history never actually repeats itself, it sometimes comes very close. The history of this conflict has many lessons to teach to all. It is my hope that these lessons have been well learned. Freedom is a precious thing, and free men everywhere are willing to die for it. Israel showed once again that a people cannot be intimidated by bellicosity and saber rattling, that they do not shrink from an enemy who is disproportionately larger or stronger, when the existence of their nation is at stake. Indeed, true men would rather die on their feet than live on their knees. And this, Mr. Speaker, is no less true today than it was 191 years ago when our forefathers stood with their flintlocks and fought for their independence against the strongest empire in the world.

Let this be a lesson to all those who would underestimate the hearts of men or try to subjugate them to the blind forces of power hunger or ideology.

(Mr. DORN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include an address by the President of the United States.)

[Mr. DORN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

DM

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, many of us here in the House have long been concerned about our national policy, or lack of policy, on the question of an anti-ballistic missile defense. This has not been a partisan concern, but one of profound differences of judgment between the President and the Secretary of Defense on the one hand, and entire Joint Chiefs of Staff and many of the most knowledgeable members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats, on the other.

In recent weeks my concern over this question has greatly increased. However, in view of the presence of Premier Kosygin in this country and the prospect of his talks with President Johnson I have withheld detailed comment until now.

June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her first Hydrogen Bomb. That was 11 days ago.

October 16, 1964, Red China detonated her first nuclear device. That was 2 years and 8 months ago.

The first atomic explosion by Communist China was rated around 20 kilotons. The latest thermonuclear blast was estimated between 2 to 7 megatons—at least 100 times as powerful as Red China's first atomic explosion.

Each of Red China's six nuclear tests has evidenced more rapid technological progress and greater sophistication than most U.S. experts had predicted.

It took the United States 6 years and 3 months to get from the first Alamogordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb at Eniwetok.

It took the Soviet Union 3 years and 11 months to cover the same stages of development, after the United States had shown the way.

Red China took 2 years and 8 months to join the H-bomb club.

Throughout that entire period of peril, a one-sided debate has paralyzed administration policy on the life-and-death question of an anti-ballistic missile defense system for the United States. The almost unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's top professional military experts, and the cognizant committees of the Congress has been in favor of proceeding with some form of ABM development and deployment which, the Defense Department estimates, might save millions or tens of millions of American lives.

The debate has been one-sided because President Johnson, as Commander in Chief, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, his civilian deputy, have repeatedly deferred this decision and declined to spend preproduction funds appropriated by Congress for ABM defense.

At first, the administration argument was that an ABM defense was impractical and would be a waste of money. When rumors first spread, through press reports, early in 1963, that the Russians apparently were developing an ABM defense, Secretary McNamara engaged in semantic hair-splitting with congressional questioners which seemed to deny that the Soviet Union had an ABM "system"—defining system in the technical sense of a complete weapons system—and thus implying that the United States was at least even with the U.S.S.R. in this technological race. That was 4 years ago.

More recently, the administration line has shifted to the theme that Soviet leaders might be persuaded, in a hopeful atmosphere of detente, to agree to stop the costly ABM race on which they were well along and the United States had not yet decided to start. But, despite numerous authoritative articles and discussions in the press, there was no official administration confirmation of the deployment of a Soviet ABM defense until November 10, 1966—2 days after the 1966 national elections—when Secretary McNamara announced there was considerable evidence to this effect. He also said it was "much too early to make a decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat." The Red Chinese had just tested a nuclear-tipped 400- to 500-mile ballistic missile on October 27, 1966. That was 8 months ago.

In his latest state of the Union message, January 10, 1967, President John-

son noted two developments, an increase during the past year of Soviet long-range missile capabilities and the beginning of an antiballistic missile defense around Moscow. But his main emphasis was on what he termed his "solemn duty to slow down the arms race between us—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—if that is at all possible, in both conventional and nuclear weapons and defenses."

That was 5 months and 2 weeks ago.

In the Republican appraisal of the state of the Union delivered January 19, 1967, I said:

The Administration has finally admitted to the American people that the Soviet Union has increased its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capability and is deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In anticipation of a life-and-death decision on just such a development, Congress has voted millions of dollars which the Administration did not seek and apparently has not used.

The Congress did its duty and gave the President a clear expression of its will and the means to carry it out.

Before more precious time is lost, Congress and the American people are now entitled to a clear explanation from the President of the perils and problems facing the United States in the new global balance of strategic power.

We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round in the nuclear arms race. But the least the Nation must do now is to speed up its readiness to deploy Anti-Ballistics Missiles in a hurry if our survival requires it.

That was 5 months and 1 week ago. I repeat it again today.

In his budget message to Congress on January 24, 1967, the President spelled out his decision on an ABM defense for the United States, pledging that during fiscal 1968 he would—

Continue intensive development of Nike-X but take no action now to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate discussions with the Soviet Union on the limitation of ABM deployment; in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful, we will reconsider our deployment system.

That was 5 months ago.

Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin gave an oblique answer at a news conference in London on February 9, 1967. This is from the New York Times' account:

Premier Kosygin suggested at a news conference today that defensive anti-ballistic missile systems were less dangerous to mankind than offensive systems, and therefore more desirable even if they should prove more costly.

While avoiding a direct answer to a question on the subject, he gave no encouragement to hopes for a moratorium on anti-ballistic missile defense development as a means of limiting the arms race between the great powers. . . .

His reply was that "a system that serves to ward off an attack does not heighten the tension but serves to lessen the possibility of an attack that may kill large numbers of people."

It is difficult not to agree with the Communist leader in the way he dismissed the cost-effectiveness argument favored by Mr. McNamara.

It might be cheaper to build offensive than defensive systems.

Kosygin said—

But this is not the criterion upon which one should base oneself in deciding this problem.

This was 4 months and 2 weeks ago.

Nevertheless, President Johnson continued to support Secretary McNamara or vice versa. Testifying March 6, 1967, before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, McNamara conceded the continuing split between himself and the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented by their Chairman, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, on the ABM question.

General Wheeler told the House Armed Services Committee that he had gone to President Johnson, on his own initiative, to present the Joint Chiefs' case to the Commander in Chief in this important difference of opinion with the Secretary of Defense.

In the heavily censored transcript of committee testimony, it is evident that Mr. McNamara still felt that the Russians were wasting their resources on defensive measures against a missile attack and that the United States should not follow suit. He argued that the U.S. response to a Soviet ABM system should not be a U.S. ABM system, but a step-up in our deterrent offensive capability. If we embarked upon an ABM defense, Mr. McNamara assumed that Soviet planners would use the same reasoning as he used and increase their offensive capability. At the same time he acknowledged that, even though the United States had widely advertised that it was not proceeding with any ABM deployment, the Soviet Union was increasing its offensive missile capability anyway. But he persisted in the view that the United States should not expedite an ABM deployment.

General Wheeler took the position that "the Soviets will undoubtedly improve the Moscow system as time goes on and extend ABM defense to other high-priority areas of the Soviet Union." He estimated that they have the resources to do so and are willing to spend whatever it takes to gain strategic superiority or strategic parity with the United States.

On behalf of his colleagues of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler testified that the Soviet objective—both in offensive and defensive strategy—is "to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war."

While the debate on the desirability of a U.S. ABM defense system has concentrated until very recently on sharply varying U.S. estimates of Soviet intentions and capabilities, Red China's breakthrough into the select group of four thermonuclear superpowers injects an entirely new factor.

The timing of Red China's H-bomb breakthrough was most significant. It came as the whole world was groping to assess the lessons of the Israel-Arab war and the near-confrontation of great powers that had been averted. The most immediate conclusions from this crisis are:

First. As proved by Israel, a sudden and preemptive air strike has not been summarily discarded by military planners of other nations. This is especially true if the odds against a successful defense are very unfavorable.

Second. As proved by Nasser, fanatic and authoritarian regimes do not neces-

sarily act rationally or evaluate risks by the same standard we do. Furthermore, they can suffer what a Western government would consider unacceptable human and material losses and still survive politically.

Third. As proved by the United States and the Soviet Union, when the two superpowers neutralize each other with their mutual nuclear deterrents, lesser nations are pretty much left free to resolve regional issues by force.

None of these lessons, I am sure, was lost on Red China or on the other nations of Asia.

I hope they are not lost upon Secretary McNamara, and will cause him quickly to reverse his 1966 postelection view that it is "much too early to make a decision for a deployment against the Chinese threat."

Even those who cherish the most optimistic hopes that Russian Communist leaders will act reasonably and with restraint in their thermonuclear strategy cannot possibly put the Chinese Communist leaders in the same category. Peiping itself does not.

Red China's capability in the field of nuclear weaponry consistently has been downgraded and underestimated by administration policymakers. When Red China achieved atomic status, Americans were told it would take many years for them to perfect advanced systems for delivering a nuclear weapon. When, within 6 months, Red China mounted an atomic warhead on a 500-mile ballistic missile, Americans were reassured that it would be many more years before the Chinese could pose any intercontinental threat to the United States.

Secretary McNamara testified on January 25, 1966 before the House Armed Services Committee that "the Chinese Communists have detonated two nuclear devices and could possibly develop and deploy a small force of ICBMs by the mid-to-latter part of the 1970's." Whether this estimate is better or worse than Mr. McNamara's previous estimates on the Vietnam war, the necessity of a U.S. merchant marine, the usefulness of Reserve forces and the future of manned aircraft and nuclear-powered ships, cannot yet be determined. His danger date, however, is only 8 to 10 years away.

Other Pentagon officials have pointed out that a primitive submarine-launched nuclear-tipped missile could be developed by Red China in a much shorter period, and conceivably could already exist.

Fortune magazine in an authoritative June 1967 article on ABM defense estimates that 5 to 7 years, from the time the go-ahead is given, would be needed to deploy even a thin U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense. Cost estimates, depending upon the degree of protection provided, range from \$3 billion to \$40 billion, spread over a period of years.

The article quotes Lt. Gen. Austin Betts, Chief of the Army's Nike X research and development, as believing the optimum moment has arrived to begin production. It points out that further delay could mean the breakup of contractor teams and the onset of obsolescence in components.

There appears to be general agreement that the current fiscal 1968 Defense Appropriation, voted 407 to 1, contains as much money as could be used in the coming 12 months—some \$908 million on top of the \$4 billion previously provided for antiballistic missile research and development. This includes the extra \$167.8 million which Congress voted last year for initial deployment which the administration declined to use.

I can no longer see any logic in delaying this crucial decision for an indefinite time while the United States attempts to get agreement with the Soviet Union to slow down an expensive ABM race. Premier Kosygin threw cold water on any ABM moratorium at his U.N. news conference June 25 and President Johnson has not revealed any progress on this subject during their private talks at Holly Bush.

What is perfectly clear is that U.S. reluctance to move forward on ABM defense deployment has in no way slowed the Soviet program, defensively or offensively, nor impaired the thermonuclear progress of Red China. Both are moving full speed ahead.

Gen. Harold Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, summed up the sentiment of professional military leaders when he told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on March 10, 1967:

Now, one cannot argue against discussing the issues that are to be discussed with the Soviets, you cannot argue that at all. However, the uneasiness that I feel is basically this: *When do we stop discussing and when do we reach a decision point?*

That was 3 months and 2 weeks ago. Representative GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB of California, ranking Republican on the subcommittee, summed up the House Appropriations Committee's answer to the President and Secretary McNamara on the House floor June 13, 1967. He said:

In commenting on the reluctance to begin to deploy the Nike-X system on the part of the Administration, our committee report states:

"It would appear that the initiation of deployment of light or thin defense, now, may very well be a most useful first step toward whatever level of ballistic missile defense ultimately appears necessary." In other words the report, adopted unanimously by the committee, says: "Get Going!"

That was 2 weeks ago. The key word is "now."

Four days after the House overwhelmingly endorsed this view of the urgency to get going on ABM, the Red Chinese H-bomb was exploded.

Initial reports on this significant event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangling on the Middle East, quoted Washington weapons specialists as surmising that "Red China would be more likely to set it off on a test stand so that its yield and other effects could be measured more precisely"—another disturbing sign of assuming a potential enemy thinks exactly as we do.

Later, after Japanese atomic scientists said their analysis showed the bomb had been exploded at a high altitude, the Washington Post on June 22 quoted Washington intelligence officials as believing the Red Chinese H-bomb was

June 28, 1967

dropped from an airplane. It added that—

The Pentagon has said of the Chinese H-bomb that it does not require any change in U.S. military strategy.

I disagree.

With the United States and the U.S.S.R. standing each other off in nuclear deterrents, the possession of even one Red Chinese nuclear weapon that can be carried in one conventional bomber radically alters the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific—areas which President Johnson has specifically proclaimed as vital to America's national interest and the fate of the free world.

If the elementary weapons system represented by what Red China evidently has already produced is not an immediate threat to the continental United States, or even to Alaska, Hawaii and Guam, what about its threat to Japan, South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines which the United States has solemn treaty obligations to defend?

Time, unlike money, cannot be recovered. Wasting time is therefore a far more serious matter than wasting funds. The arguments about the cost effectiveness of ABM defense which Mr. McNamara has argued for years and years, backed by the President, must now give way to the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the cognizant committees of Congress that the United States cannot risk running second in any aspect of this grim game.

If any practical step could conceivably save 100 million American lives—or 1 million or 1,000—how much is too much to spend on it? Yet what we lack is not the money but the decision to "Get going." The funds have been provided. I call upon President Johnson to act without another day's delay.

PREPARING FOR POWER FAILURES

(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, power failures occurring in the East over the past year or so can provide invaluable lessons in thwarting tragedy and minimizing inconvenience if plans for future breakdowns are effected at once.

The most serious aspect of blackouts to date has been the generation of bureaucratic demands for further Government intrusion into the electric power business, but nevertheless the consequences of sudden power losses could have grave implications unless the Nation is prepared to meet them.

Earlier this month a tower carrying high voltage transmission lines in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland interconnection was severely damaged by a heavy vehicle presumably deliberately driven into it. The section of the line is a link between a generating facility in northern West Virginia and the Keystone plant in Indiana County, Pa., and will delay new capacity that is needed on the Atlantic seaboard.

The incident should serve as a new warning that industry, business, institutions, and the general public must cooperate to reduce the danger of electricity shortages. Further emphasis was provided a week ago last Friday when there was emergency curtailment of power in the Philadelphia area after temperatures climbed into the 90's and air-conditioning equipment was put to work overtime.

Faced with many weeks of hot summer weather, we might be well advised to anticipate that utilities will have to cut service in various areas for short periods of time after advance notification to power customers. The plan has worked successfully in other parts of the country and can help to avert overtaxing of generating equipment that sometimes results in wholesale power failures.

Meanwhile, more attention must be given to emergency measures that would be needed when unexpected power cut-offs occur. For example, all elevators should be equipped with independent lighting facilities and with openings for proper ventilation. I have read of a number of incidents in which persons have been trapped in elevators for an hour and more, an experience that could have serious results for a person with a heart condition or with an extremely sensitive nervous system.

One group caught for an hour and 10 minutes in a pitch dark elevator reported to me that the air was so bad that there was a very real fear of suffocation. The manager of the apartment house explained that there was a plastic panel that could have been removed from the roof of the car, but the fact is that the passengers had no way of knowing about it because it would have been too dark to read the instructions even if there had been any such information available.

So it is time to get ready for such emergencies or one of these days we are going to read about fatal consequences. Our electric utilities are doing an outstanding job of keeping up with the surging demands created by increased industrial activity, growing population, and a continually rising use of air-conditioning equipment. When the great minc-mouth generating plants in central and western Pennsylvania go into operation, there will be a sharp increase in supply of electric power for the East. But it is unlikely that our vast power networks will ever be completely immune to mechanical failure or sabotage, and the way of the wise is to begin at once to take all possible precautions against resultant hardship.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

(Mr. HALEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. HALEY. Mr. Speaker, I have asked permission to place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this time one of the interesting articles that is so typical of my friend, Editor O. A. Brice, of the Lake Wales, Fla., News. His column of June 22, 1967, is a reminder of the importance

of sound human relationships. As he so well points out, youth must learn respect and tolerance for the old.

The editorial column follows:

OVER IN MY CORNER

(By O. A. Brice)

I sat in a restaurant the other evening and watched a group of young people enjoying their half hour lunch. They all seemed to be youngsters who came from first class homes—boys and girls who held their parents in high regard and who normally would go out of their way to give assistance to some older person.

I admired young America as I saw it in flesh, with bright eyes and glowing cheeks and I thought of the wonderful opportunities which faced these young people as they emerge from their school duties and then take on the responsibilities of life.

Then suddenly the whole scene changed so far as I was concerned, and I altered my opinion as to the kind of future they faced if they failed to see the "red light" that caused them to show the disrespect for someone less fortunate, which I witnessed.

The occasion arose when an old lady, wearing a sun-bonnet, walked in and quietly took a seat at a nearby table. With a half smile (just to be courteous), she looked toward the youthful crowd, maybe thinking of the days when she was young and gay, but without any sign of envy or criticism for their mirth.

True her face was wrinkled and still truer was the fact that she had difficulty in selecting from the menu the food she desired for the evening meal, but she finally made her wants known and the waitress most graciously then went on to fill the order.

But the "snickers" which were plainly heard by me from the group of youngsters, reached the old lady's ears and she was hurt to a point where it was embarrassing to others who saw the incident.

Somehow the old lady seemed to grow in stature with me even though her stooped shoulders had lessened her in inches over the years gone by. Somehow that wrinkled face and the eyes which had lost most of their sparkle made her stand out as someone who should be eulogized instead of mocked.

Regardless of the mirth the youngsters enjoyed over her appearance and her difficulty in understanding the menu, the fact remained that she was "somebody's mother", and that perhaps those lines in her face had been brought about in an endeavor to build the very society which now permitted these nattily dressed youngsters to enjoy the freedom they were finding.

The whole incident impressed me with the lack of tolerance we often find these days, not only in our modern youth but in our adult lives as well. It isn't everyone who has enjoyed huge prosperity during the epoch through which we are passing.

Everyone hasn't been privileged to partake of the good things of life in abundance and not everyone has had the advantages which we see now bringing forth so much independence these days.

Sometimes I think I am too observing of the little things which may not be meant to be wrong. Thinking over the other night's incident I feel pretty sure the young people involved brought a little heartache to the old mother all unconsciously, yet through their little act, they made her feel uncomfortable and as she thinks of modern youth she may become cynical and a trifle narrow in her appraisal of what education is doing for them.

I delayed my cup of coffee a few moments to watch the old mother leave the cafe table. She arose, gave a smile to those nearby, equally as sweet as the one she wore when she entered, and she walked to the door, not as an "old-fashioned woman" who deserved

the snickers of others, but more saintly and Godly than she would have been had she not been able to show her tolerance in the fashion which she did.

Our world will never reach the point of reasoning where we all live as "one world," until both old and young learn and understand that tolerance, respect and love form the keystone upon which genuine good neighbors can exist. And respect for old age must never be thrown aside as debris if our younger generation is to get the most out of life and the future they are responsible for moulding.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PANAMA CANAL

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, today I have introduced a House concurrent resolution, joined by several other Members, expressing the sense and will of Congress that the administration maintain and protect its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Panama Canal and that the administration in no way forfeit, cede, negotiate, or transfer any of these sovereign rights or jurisdiction to any other sovereign nation or international organization.

The prime reason for the introduction of this concurrent resolution is a proposed new treaty between the Republic of Panama and the United States. The terms and the treaty itself have come to light in the past few days. Only through the careful scrutiny of our two colleagues the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FLOOD), and the gentlewoman from Missouri (Mrs. SULLIVAN), have the American public been made aware of this "sell out" of the U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Panama Canal Zone.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to join me and my cosponsors in expressing the will of Congress that it is for maintenance and preservation of U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction in the strategically important Panama Canal. A copy of the resolution follows:

H. CON. RES. 389

A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the Panama Canal

Whereas it is the policy of the Congress and the desire of the people of the United States that the United States maintain its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone; and

Whereas under the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 between Great Britain and the United States, the United States adopted the principles of the Convention of Constantinople of 1888 as the rules for the operation, regulation, and management of said Canal; and

Whereas by the terms of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, between the Republic of Panama and the United States, the perpetuity of use, occupation, control construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection for said Canal was granted to the United States; and

Whereas the United States has paid the Republic of Panama almost \$50,000,000 in the form of a gratuity; and

Whereas the United States has made an aggregate investment in said Canal in an amount of over \$4,889,000,000.00; and

Whereas said investment or any part thereof could never be recovered in the event of

Panamanian seizure or United States abandonment; and

Whereas 70 percent of the Canal Zone traffic either originates or terminates in United States ports; and

Whereas said canal is of vital strategic importance and imperative to the hemispheric defense and to the security of the United States; and

Whereas a treaty has been proposed between the United States and the Republic of Panama which in effect would greatly impair if not all but eliminate the known and admitted sovereign rights of the United States in said canal; and

Whereas under said proposed treaty, said canal becomes the property of a non-American government; and

Whereas the Suez Canal has been closed twice in the past ten years, subject to the discretion of the Egyptian Government and that the most recent closing, this June 1967 has meant a very substantial increase in United States shipping costs: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) That it is the sense of the Congress that the Government of the United States maintain and protect its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over said Canal and that the United States Government in no way forfeit, cede, negotiate, or transfer any of these sovereign rights or jurisdiction to any other sovereign nation or international organization.

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD (at the request of Mr. BURKE of Florida) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.)

VIETNAM: THE MODERATE SOLUTION, ADDRESS BY JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

(Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the request of Mr. BURKE of Florida) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Speaker, our justifiable concern for the situation in the Middle East has shunted into the background our deep and misguided involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, which continues to devour our young men and to waste our substance.

The most recent view of the situation was expressed today by our former Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, and I bring it to the consideration of my colleagues.

VIETNAM: THE MODERATE SOLUTION

(Address by John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul M. Warburg professor of economics Harvard University at "Negotiations Now: A National Citizens Campaign To End the War in Vietnam," in Washington, D.C., June 28, 1967)

A singular and well-observed feature of war is for the view in retrospect to depart radically from that which attended the beginning. Dangers which at the outset of hostilities seemed to justify the most sanguinary steps in the perspective of years seem slight, sometimes frivolous. And prospects which at the beginning of conflict seemed easy and brilliant come to measure only the depth of the miscalculation. The case of men who in the last thirty years have planned expeditions against Moscow, Pearl Harbor and Pusan not to mention Jerusalem

and Tel Aviv sufficiently establishes the point. At the same time war turns reason into stereotype. Acceptance of what in the beginning is an estimate of national interest becomes an article of faith, a test of constancy, a measure of patriotism. At least while it lasts, war has a way of freezing all participants in their original error.

The war in Vietnam, by various calculations, has now gone on for more than half a decade and with mounting intensity for three years. It has shown these classical tendencies. The march of history has massively undermined the assumptions which attended and justified our original involvement. No part of the original justification—I do not exaggerate—remains intact. More remarkable, perhaps, very few of the assumptions that supported our involvement are any longer asserted by those who defend the conflict. Yet the congealing intellectual processes of war have worked to the full. Action which is not defended is still adhered to as a dogged manifestation of faith. Let me also be fair. Those who are committed not to support of this venture but to opposition have also shown a tendency to become frozen in fixed positions. For the first time since 1815 we are engaged in a conflict to which a very large part of the population is opposed. The unanimity rule which has previously characterized our national conflicts does not exist. Those who defend and those who attack both lost some of their capacity to accommodate their thoughts to new evidence.

My purpose here is to see if, however slightly, one can rise above these rigidities. I do not wish to pretend to view our situation in Vietnam with any special insight or wisdom. These I do not claim, and even if I did so, I would be cautiously aware of our well-recognized and exceedingly valuable tendency to greet such pretension with something between skepticism and outright vulgarity. I would like merely to inquire how this conflict will look when minds, those of supporters and adversaries alike, are no longer subject to the congealing influences of war. And I would like then to propose the course of action—I venture even to call it the solution—that emerges from such a view.

Many will think that in labeling this a "Moderate Solution" I have made an unhappy choice of words. Moderation in these days is not in high repute. The term itself, in some degree, has come to imply pompous and comfortable and well-padded inaction. Thus, it rightly arouses suspicion. And increasingly men are divided between those who want the catharsis of total violence and those who want the comforts of total escape. Yet if our national mood opposes moderation, history favors it. It does not vouchsafe us sharp, well-chiselled solutions. It gives us blurred edges and dull lines. Whatever the ultimate bang or whimper, we can be sure that in between there will be only compromises. Let me begin with the terrible treatment that history has accorded our original justification for this conflict.

II

No one can completely rationalize our involvement in Vietnam. We are there partly as a result of a long series of seemingly minor steps. Each of these steps, at the time, seemed more attractive—less pregnant with domestic political controversy and criticism—than the alternative which was to call a firm halt on our involvement. The aggregate of these individual steps—more weapons, more advisers, a combat role for our men, progressive increases in our troop strength, bombing of North Vietnam, a widening choice of targets—is larger by far than the sum of the individual parts. The resulting involvement on the Asian mainland is not a development that all who asked or acquiesced in the individual actions wished to see or even foresaw.