

The Russians, when possible, avoid shipping vital items across Red China. One reason, according to intelligence sources: The Chinese insist on opening all shipments crossing their territory, often stamp, "From China With Love", over the Russian characters.

Reports are heard, also, that the Chinese have delayed shipments of SAM's and late-model MIG's while their technicians removed them from the crates to make copies for themselves.

Soviet prudence? It is agreed here in Saigon that the Russians have not gone as far as they could in arming North Vietnam. "In fact," says one U.S. official, "the Russians have been extremely prudent in some ways. We think it very likely that Hanoi has asked for such items as battlefield missiles for use in the South, perhaps even for submarines to use against the Seventh Fleet in the Tonkin Gulf."

Another senior officer adds: "It is clear what the Russians are up to. They want to keep us tied up in knots out here. So far they have refused Hanoi the weapons to wage a bloody campaign against U.S. forces in the South, but is that to be permanent? The Soviets want Hanoi to win, and they are playing a very clever and cagey game."

Top analysts insist that Russia's basic strategy for conquest in the world has not changed; to weaken the U.S. position wherever it can in the world, while the Soviets seek to strengthen their own.

Russia is viewed as supporting a "war of national liberation" in Vietnam in precisely the way foretold by their top strategists.

Despite an impression fostered in Washington that the Russians really want peace in Vietnam, analysts here find the evidence in the other direction. "The Soviet Union," reports one official, "has done nothing publicly or privately to help start negotiations. We don't buy the Moscow line that they have no influence in Hanoi."

In view of the Russian record in Vietnam, fighting men here are puzzled at what seems to be efforts by U.S. to make one accommodation after another with the Soviets—space treaties, airline pacts, efforts to set up more consulates in both countries, attempts to expand East-West trade while war goes on.

In Washington, Senator Karl E. Mundt (Rep.), of South Dakota, said on January 18 he was appalled at the number of key U.S. items already being traded behind the Iron Curtain. He said: "We're doing this in the face of the fact that every sophisticated weapon being used to kill our boys in Vietnam is furnished by Russia. The deaths of many of them could be marked: 'Made in Moscow.'"

Soviet military aid to north Vietnam Millions

1955-64 (Soviet figures)-----	\$35
1965 (Soviet figures)-----	550
1966 (estimated)-----	700
1967 (Soviet promise)-----	800

VITAL WAR SUPPLIES—EVERYTHING FROM OIL TO MODERN JETS

Supplied by Russia in past 18 months

SAM surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft batteries, 75 to 100 MIG warplanes, coastal ships, IL-28 light bombers, field-artillery pieces, helicopters, advanced radar defense system, heavy-construction equipment, bridge-building materials, military trucks, rolled-steel products, fertilizer, pyrites, drugs, surgical instruments, 300,000 metric tons of oil, cargo transports, heavy infantry weapons.

In addition, Soviets are training hundreds of North Vietnamese pilots in Soviet Union, have sent about 2,000 Russian technicians into North Vietnam to train and help SAM missile crews. Soviet experts help run North Vietnam's mining, power, engineering and technical industries, serve at the port of

Haiphong, at Hanoi factories, supervise construction of new plants.

AMERICA'S CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. GUDE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, the March 1967 edition of Reader's Digest carries a provocative and sobering interview with Nathan F. Twining the retired Air Force general who served as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957 to 1960. Asked about the present state of U.S. defenses, General Twining stated:

During the past few years our ability to deter an enemy attack has been severely eroded. I am convinced that if the present trend is not reversed, and fast, the United States will soon find itself in very serious danger.

It will be remembered that the United States and the U.S.S.R. agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing in 1958, at which time it was stated that little progress was to be expected by further development of nuclear explosives and that the field of missile defense was designated as particularly barren. In 1961 the Soviets broke the moratorium and conducted high-yield tests which placed them well beyond us in the area of very-high-yield technology. Not too long thereafter the United States signed the test ban treaty which substantially froze our technology in the very-high-yield area.

In the field of missile defense, the situation is equally alarming. Attempts were made in 1963 to allot money for initial planning on an antiballistic missile defense system. Such attempts were defeated and to this day we are still debating the advisability of proceeding with the program. Meanwhile, it is now common knowledge that the Soviets are ahead of us in this area and have such a system, although to a limited degree.

After getting burnt on the 1958 moratorium, the United States signed the test ban treaty, thereby freezing the very-high-yield technological gap in favor of the Soviets. Now, with the Soviets ahead in the antiballistic missile defense area, we are talking of signing another pact with Russia to limit the antiballistic missile defenses. The words of General Twining are worth remembering in this respect:

If we keep trying to appease the Soviets with foolish offers and concessions, and keep reducing our military capabilities toward their level, and also keep tying our military technology into unrealistic cost-effectiveness straitjackets, I believe we can look forward to a major crisis.

It is ironic that those who favor making concessions of various types to the Soviets' claim to be insuring peace and lessening tensions, when just the opposite is true. The more we place ourselves at a disadvantage by our agreements with the Soviets, the more we increase the chances of war. For it must be remembered that the same forces that shed

blood in Budapest, Hungary in 1956, in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania and in other European nations, is the same enemy that we are dickering with today.

There is one major difference: It will not be quite so simple from now on to just shake our heads when another nation is smothered by the Soviets; it will not be so easy to let the passage of time wipe out the injustice done to free and innocent peoples. For destructive Soviet ICBM's have a U.S.S.R.-to-United States itinerary and the people of the United States are now directly involved. Advice such as that of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Earle Wheeler, should be heeded now. An antiballistic missile system must be started now and in dead earnest. The objection of some—Secretary of Defense McNamara is a prime example—that concentration on an ABM system would touch off an expensive arms race is similar to the case of D. Jerome Wiesner and the military parity argument which General Twining mentions in the following article. Some Alice-in-Wonderland argument is concocted, U.S. leadership buys it, the Soviet Union continues on its merry military way, and the people of the United States are left holding the bag. It is high time the American people realize that holding a high office in Government does not guarantee infallibility—the mistakes of high officials in the past easily prove that. The hard-nosed commonsense, always a characteristic of our citizens in the past, must be applied to high-level decisions, just as it is used in the average American home.

With permission, I place the article, "America's Clear and Present Danger," from the Reader's Digest of March 1967, in the RECORD at this point:

AMERICA'S CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
(An interview with Nathan F. Twining, General, U.S. Air Force (retired))

(NOTE.—In his current book, "Neither Liberty Nor Safety,"* Gen. Nathan F. Twining, who served as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1957 to 1960, discusses the alternative courses of cold-war strategy open to the United States: (1) to disarm the nation gradually in the hope that communist countries will follow suit; (2) to maintain overwhelming military superiority as a deterrent to aggression. In an interview with editors of The Reader's Digest, General Twining explains why he considers the former course—the one the United States is now pursuing—a blueprint for national suicide.)

Q. General Twining, in your book you express serious misgivings about the present state of U.S. defenses. What has you so worried?

A. During the past few years our ability to deter an enemy attack has been severely eroded. I am convinced that if the present trend is not reversed, and fast, the United States will soon find itself in very serious danger.

Q. Do you mean actual military danger?

A. I do. We have technologically competent enemies who are determined to destroy us. They have been working hard and steadily to advance their military technologies; we have not. The Soviet Union presents the most immediate danger, and clearly is aiming at across-the-board nuclear supremacy. But Red China, too, is rapidly developing an important nuclear capacity.

*Published by Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Q. Won't our ICBM's, our missile-firing submarines and our strategic bombers continue to be an effective deterrent?

A. The force that we have today has done exactly what it was meant to do: it has provided the United States with overwhelming military supremacy through the mid-1960's. But military supremacy is not a permanent fact of life. To keep it, you must keep working at it. If you don't, sooner or later an ambitious enemy is bound to achieve technological breakthroughs which will shift the balance of power in his favor. This, I'm afraid, is what has been happening.

All the major weapons systems now in our combat inventory were started in the 1950's. Since then, we have added nothing significant. We have thrown away more than half a decade of irretrievable lead time in the development of the advanced weapons systems we will need to present a convincing deterrent through the mid-1970's and beyond.

At the same time, we have been discarding existing strength. For example, soon after the 1962 agreement by the U.S.S.R. to withdraw its medium-range ballistic missiles from Cuba, to the amazement of our military professionals and our allies we suddenly announced that all our ballistic missiles in Europe were outmoded and ineffective, and took them out—from Turkey, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The truth is that these weapons were still effective, and by removing them we greatly simplified both the offensive and the defensive problems for the Soviets.

Then we canceled plans to produce a mobile medium-range ballistic missile for NATO Europe, whose vital centers are now within range of hundreds of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles. We made major reductions in the production of materials for nuclear weapons. We are now engaged in a rapid phase-out of our strategic bombardment force.

Q. What have the Russians been doing in the meantime?

A. Evidence mounts that the Soviets have been pursuing a vigorous weapons program. They have developed a high-yield nuclear-weapons technology, and it seems likely that they can produce warheads of 100 megatons and more. In addition, reliable evidence indicates that they are rapidly deploying an operational anti-ballistic missile system for the defense of vital target areas. There have also been reports that they are increasing substantially the size of their ICBM force.

Q. Do you think that if they achieve breakthroughs in their military technology they will attack?

A. We certainly could look forward to some interesting nuclear blackmail. I think they might attack if they were convinced that they had achieved a clear strategic ascendancy and could strike with acceptable losses to themselves.

Q. Why have we not been developing our own military technology?

A. Two forces have been at work. One is an anti-nuclear clique of moralists, pacifists and academic dreamers associated at influential levels with the State and Defense departments and the White House. These people may be sincere, concerned and patriotic, but they have never been able to acclimate themselves to the nuclear age. They don't believe that the Soviets mean it when they tell us that someday they will destroy us. They insist that our military supremacy has been "provocative" and largely responsible for the tensions of the past two decades. They theorize that if we scale down our strategic capability to the point where it is equal to or even a little inferior to Russia's, the Soviets will stop competing, the arms race will end and peace will reign.

To my mind, such views are indicative of an inability, or a refusal, to cope with reality. But the anti-nuclear clique is vociferous. It

has been a major force in the retardation of our weapons technology and in the weakening of our deterrent.

Q. Who are these anti-nuclear people?

A. The leaders are, mainly, scientists who have been active politically for many years. They advised President Truman not to develop the hydrogen bomb. In fact, there might not have been an American H-bomb if Dr. Edward Teller, a scientist who is in touch with reality, had not presented convincing evidence that we could develop it, and that for national security we *must* build it. As it turned out, the Soviets tested their first H-bomb within a few months of ours; so it was obvious that they were not guided by any considerations of what the United States might or might not do, but had developed the H-bomb as fast as they could. There is no telling whether this country would still exist if Truman had not decided to proceed with development of this weapon.

Q. Then, in 1958, we joined the Soviets in a moratorium on nuclear testing?

A. That's right. At first we had insisted on a foolproof inspection system—we didn't mind stopping if we knew that no one else was testing and developing. But the Soviets didn't want any sort of inspection. They wanted us to stop our nuclear-weapons program, and to take their word for it that they had stopped theirs. Communist propaganda went to work, and our own anti-nuclear clique picked up the cry, giving assurances that we were so far ahead in nuclear technology that we would lose little even if the Soviets *did* test clandestinely.

Every responsible American military leader and our more responsible nuclear scientists, again led by Dr. Teller, opposed a no-inspection moratorium. They insisted that it was a trap, and would end in a double cross. But they were overruled. Of course, the Soviets continued secretly, and in 1961 they ended the "gentlemen's agreement" with a series of tests of great sophistication, technological depth and military significance. We gave them three free years, and they made the most of them.

Q. Did we then re-establish the development capabilities we had when we stopped testing?

A. No. We should have, but we didn't. Gen. Curtis LeMay, then chief of staff of the Air Force, organized a committee of nuclear and military professionals to study the military implications of the Soviet tests. When we finished our study, we went to the White House to recommend urgently that the United States get cracking in exploring the high-yield nuclear-weapons field. But Dr. Jerome Wiesner, who was chief science adviser to President Kennedy, and others did not agree. We were turned down. The underlying conviction of those who opposed us, it seemed to me, was that the American posture of nuclear supremacy had to be cut back so that "military parity" with the Soviet Union might be achieved.

Even after we learned that the Soviets had made sensational progress with their nuclear-weapons programs, Dr. Hans Bethe, another influential scientist, said he thought that this contributed to stability and reduced Soviet fears of an attack by the United States. I believe most Americans must find such reasoning as upside down as I do.

A year after the Soviets completed their tests, knowing that they had advanced well beyond us with their very-high-yield technology, our government signed a formal nuclear test-ban treaty with them which substantially froze our technology where it stood. Our proposals for on-site inspections were turned down.

Q. Why is it so important to test a high-yield device?

A. Because the Russians have this big weapon, and we do not know what effect it might have on our missile systems. We cannot afford this information gap.

Q. Don't we have an underground testing program?

A. Yes, but you can't measure underground the exact phenomena which might develop from a detonation in the atmosphere or in space.

Q. Has the United States remained ready to resume atmospheric testing immediately, if it should become necessary?

A. It would take a long time—possibly too long—to re-establish a comprehensive testing and development program. It is impossible to keep together, against a day which may or may not come, the kind of scientific talent such a program requires. People disperse. It is unrealistic to think you can stop such a program and then start it up again immediately.

Q. Is the anti-nuclear clique still active in government?

A. Dr. Wiesner recently headed a committee for President Johnson which suggested a total ban on nuclear testing, plus a new concept of flexibility on the matter of mutual inspection, and a total halt in the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. In other words, the committee seems to me to say that the United States should quit the nuclear-weapons business altogether and take it on faith that the Soviets will do the same. The plan strikes me as a blueprint for suicide.

But I would not dare predict that we won't implement portions of it. In fact, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg has proposed in the United Nations that the United States would retire vast amounts of nuclear-weapons materials if the Soviet Union would retire about two thirds as much—leaving the Soviets to do with the remaining third whatever they wished. This is an incredible proposal.

Q. Does our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency do a sensible job of planning and negotiating?

A. Many in Congress feel that the 1961 Act which established the agency exceeded the original intent of Congress, which was to provide an arms-control research service for the President. As passed, however, the Act charges the agency with preparing for and managing American participation in international negotiations—even though it is not answerable to Defense or State, and has no overall responsibility for national security. Of course, those who staff this agency want to succeed at what they conceive to be their primary mission—disarmament. Thus, the agency is bound to use its influence on such matters as nuclear testing and development of new weapons—and to lean toward the concept of "no inspection" or "minimum inspection" for the sake of reaching some form of agreement with the communist powers.

The military assigns knowledgeable officers as advisers to the agency, to try to make sure that the family jewels are not given away. Even so, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be abolished and its functions returned to the departments of Defense and State.

Q. You said that two forces have combined to retard the development of our military capability. One is the anti-nuclear clique. What is the other?

A. The rigid application of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's cost-effectiveness theory to defense planning. Cost-effectiveness is simply a way of measuring the most economical way to accomplish a military mission. I don't quarrel with the theory. But it becomes self-defeating when it is made the dominant factor in defense planning, almost to the exclusion of other vital elements of judgment. Most military professionals believe that this poses a grave danger to the future security of the nation because it stifles research and development. It is usually impossible to produce in advance from the thresholds of new technologies conclusive proof that a proposed weapons system will accomplish a mission more

effectively and more economically than it could otherwise be done. You must move off the thresholds, conduct serious explorations in promising fields, give some leeway to disciplined imagination. If McNamara's policies had been in effect during the 1950's we would not have the ballistic-missile force we have today.

Q. Don't the senior military officers speak freely to Congress on such matters?

A. No. The Defense Department monitors everything they say, and the officer who talks out of turn may expect some kind of reprisal. I believe strongly in civilian control of the military. But I don't believe that the military posture of the United States is the private business of an autocratic civilian authority, such as the Defense Department has become. When the elected representatives of the people seek professional military judgments, I believe that they are entitled to straightforward answers, and that such answers should be given without fear of reprisal. As the situation now stands, the civilian managers of Defense have effectively silenced the military, and are tightly managing the news that reaches the people.

Q. For a country that isn't doing much to advance its military technology, isn't our defense budget inordinately high?

A. Yes—but primarily because of the war in Vietnam. Any war is extremely expensive—which is another excellent reason for staying militarily strong enough to keep wars from happening.

Q. What must we do? How should we assign priorities?

A. The Defense Department is making our strategic posture a Maginot Line of missiles. If we fail to reverse this trend quickly, the President in some future crisis is going to find himself in a dangerous, inflexible military position. An all-missile strategic force will not give him much choice in the response we can make, since missiles cannot be used for anything short of general nuclear war.

To ensure operational flexibility, we need a mixed force. We need a new manned bomber, one with great range and speed, and the ability to penetrate existing and projected air defenses. Such a bomber, called AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft), has already been through the preliminary design stages. It can be built.

Q. What has been holding it up?

A. The Defense Department argues that the need for AMSA is not clear. The military and Congress disagree. Congress keeps appropriating funds and authorizing the Defense Department to proceed. But Defense keeps saying year after year that it is "studying the matter." Millions for study, nothing for hardware.

Q. What else should we be doing?

A. I am deeply concerned at the lack of attention the United States has paid to the really awesome military potential of space. We have done no significant work in developing offensive and defensive space-weapons systems. Yet the Soviets are on record as recognizing and planning for the military utilization of space; in fact, in the past year they have paraded a weapon that they call an orbital bomb. We have been governed in our approach to space by the same absurd and dangerous logic that thwarted development of our nuclear technology. Now, a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space has been worked up, and high officials of our government are hailing it as a great step toward peace. I'm sure that the Soviets will respect this treaty just as they respect all the agreements they enter into—until it suits their purposes to break it.

Q. In the past, it has taken war or the threat of war to snap America out of peacetime weapons development lethargy. Do you think it will happen this way again?

A. If we keep trying to appease the Soviets with foolish offers and concessions, and keep

reducing our military capabilities toward their level, and also keep tying our military technology into unrealistic cost-effectiveness straitjackets, I believe we can look forward to a major crisis. Such a crisis will be far more serious than any we have been through before—certainly more serious than the Cuban missile crisis. Next time, an enemy who no longer can see such a clear strategic superiority on our side may not be inclined to back off so quickly. There would be grave danger of miscalculation. There could be war. I believe that such a crisis is coming. I also believe that such a crisis need not come. But if we are to prevent it, we have no time to lose. The hour is late, and the enemy is watching the clock.

TAX INCENTIVE WOULD HELP MINNESOTA FIGHT AIR, WATER POLLUTION

(Mr. NELSEN (at the request of Mr. GUDE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, there is little question that air and water pollution problems are mounting in Minnesota as well as in other States. The Governor's Committee on Air Resources, reporting on Minnesota air pollution in 1966, labeled air pollution "a problem of statewide concern." The committee reported that at least 356 towns and cities in Minnesota, not including Minneapolis or St. Paul, had one or more sources of air pollution. The committee warned—

The State can expect to encounter more air pollution as it continues to grow in population, productivity and urbanization.

With respect to water pollution, in spite of encouraging efforts, sewage and industrial wastes continue to contaminate the State's waterways. As an example, of a total 849 municipalities in the State on January 1, 1967, some 366 were without sewer systems and another 32 were without any treatment plant, according to the Minnesota Department of Health. Some 64 additional municipalities have been found by the Minnesota Water Pollution Control Commission to have inadequate treatment plants.

And it should be pointed out that these figures do not indicate the extent of damage to plant and animal life through air and water pollutants associated with industrial plants.

Damage from all kinds of pollution is considerable. While figures on Minnesota exclusively are difficult to come by, it has been estimated that the economic loss to the average individual as a consequence of air pollution alone amounts to at least \$65 per capita per year, or a total of over \$12 billion per year in the United States. The Governor's Committee study in our State last year pointed out—

If the per capita loss in Minnesota were only one-third the national average, or \$22, the annual cost in the State could come to something like \$82.5 million.

Nor should it be assumed that such damage is confined largely to industrial areas. The 1962 National Conference on Air Pollution, for example, estimated that the national agricultural losses resulting from presently recognized air pollutants already amount to hundreds

of millions of dollars a year. In a State such as Minnesota, concentrations toxic for certain crops may be found as far away as 100 miles from the sources of pollution, according to the Governor's committee.

The problems of air and water pollution, while mounting, are being increasingly recognized by an informed public. A recent Minnesota poll, conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune, reported February 12:

More than three out of four Minnesotans (76 per cent) think pollution of the state's rivers and lakes is a serious problem.

I request inclusion of the entire poll report at this point in my remarks.

SEVENTY-SIX PERCENT: WATER POLLUTION IS SERIOUS PROBLEM

More than three out of four Minnesotans (76 per cent) think pollution of the state's rivers and lakes is a serious problem, according to a statewide survey by the Minneapolis Tribune's Minnesota Poll.

"Water pollution is caused primarily by manufacturers who dump waste materials into the rivers and lakes," said a St. Paul sales manager.

Fifty-three per cent of the state residents interviewed said that business and industry is mainly responsible for the water pollution problem.

President Johnson has asked Congress to appropriate \$306 million to fight water pollution, including nearly \$4 million for projects in Minnesota.

Six hundred adults from all parts of the state were asked:

"Do you think pollution of Minnesota's rivers and lakes is or is not a serious problem?"

The replies:

	Percent
All adults:	
Is serious problem.....	76
Is not.....	15
Other and no opinion.....	9
Men:	
Is serious problem.....	76
Is not.....	16
Other and no opinion.....	8
Women:	
Is serious problem.....	77
Is not.....	14
Other and no opinion.....	9
Grade school:	
Is serious problem.....	62
Is not.....	22
Other and no opinion.....	16
High school:	
Is serious problem.....	79
Is not.....	15
Other and no opinion.....	6
College:	
Is serious problem.....	85
Is not.....	10
Other and no opinion.....	5

About one out of four people (23 per cent) agree with the Rochester housewife who said, "The carelessness of the public is responsible for pollution—refuse is strewn along the beaches and banks of lakes and rivers."

"Too many communities simply do not have adequate purification systems."

That comment from a St. Louis Park engineer is typical of the responses received from 16 per cent of the public who blame pollution on cities and towns.

"People living along lakes and rivers completely disregard sanitation by dumping untreated waste materials into the water," said a 39-year-old St. Paul man.

The question asked was: "Who or what do you think is mainly responsible for water pollution?"

The explanation of all respondents:

	Percent
Manufacturers, factories, industry.....	53
The public, tourists, sportsmen.....	23
Cities, towns.....	16
Sewage, drainage from ditches.....	14
Farmers, fertilizers, insecticides.....	4
Motorboats, ships.....	4
Detergents, soaps.....	3
Other causes.....	6
No opinion.....	16
Total.....	139

The above table totals more than 100 per cent because some people supplied more than one reason for pollution.

Interviews were conducted with a balanced cross-section of adults in early January.

D. C. Townsend, editor and publisher of the Belle Plaine Herald in the Second Congressional District, is among many editors in my congressional district who have expressed themselves on the subject of increased pollution. I ask that a recent editorial by Mr. Townsend be made a part of the Record at this point in my remarks.

In the increasing discussion on water pollution, particularly of the rivers in or near the Twin Cities—The Mississippi, Minnesota and St. Croix—special mention has been made of the condition of the lower Minnesota river. During the past six to ten years, practically every town in the lower Minnesota from Mankato to the mouth of the river financed disposal plants, and that should have greatly reduced the pollution factor. However, the more than twenty miles from Shakopee to the mouth of the river, serving the extensive industrial area on the south, and the vast residential area of Bloomington on the north, creates the charge of bad pollution in the lower Minnesota river. The afflicted areas know it, but are reluctant to spend their own money in correcting the situation as did the towns and industrial plants on our portion of the river.

From such evidence, Mr. Speaker, it is apparent Congress should leave no stones unturned in doing what is sound, reasonable, and in the public interest in controlling pollution.

I am therefore today introducing legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code to liberalize the tax treatment accorded facilities for water and air pollution abatement. Initially sponsored by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN], and a great many other Republicans in the House, it would encourage industry to act promptly in building antipollution facilities by giving a 20-percent tax credit for such investments. The facilities could be expensed as they are built or over a period up to 5 years. Certifying agency for the tax benefit facility would be local authority in compliance with Federal regulation.

This tax incentive would apply to all costs of pollution abatement work, including buildings, improvements, machinery, equipment and land costs. The project would require approval from the appropriate State authorities, however, in order to qualify.

Mr. Speaker, from the research I have done, it appears at least 148 Minnesota businesses could have been stirred to faster antipollution efforts in the last 2 years alone if liberalized tax treatment had been available as an incentive. My

estimate is based on a report issued earlier this year by the Minnesota Water Pollution Control Commission, which indicated at least 148 businesses and corporations had initiated some action to check pollution.

Such businesses would be stimulated to more rapid development of waste control projects if they were assured that such sizable investments undertaken not for profit, but to protect the public interest, could be partially written off through a tax credit.

For such important reasons, I hope the tax incentive legislation so many of us have introduced will receive early and favorable consideration.

BILL INTRODUCED TO ALLOW MINT MARKS

(Mr. CLEVELAND (at the request of Mr. GRUBB) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill which would repeal the prohibition of mint marks on U.S. coinage.

Since the establishment of our coinage system, these marks have been an important part of it, identifying the mint from which our coins were issued. Thus an important part of our historic heritage is preserved in the "CC" mint marks on coinage from the old Carson City, Nev., Mint; it is long since closed, but the "CC" mark remains as a collector's item and a reminder of the prosperous and thriving mint which once existed as our Nation's borders pushed westward.

Mint marks were deleted from our coinage with the enactment of the Coinage Act of 1965. This was an emergency measure, attributed to the critical shortage of coins in circulation at that time. It was felt that coins with no mint marks would be less valuable to collectors, and especially speculators, and would be more likely to stay in circulation where they were desperately needed.

Now, Mr. Speaker, Treasury Department and Bureau of the Mint officials acknowledge that the coin shortages of 1964 and 1965 have ended; that sufficient coinage is now in circulation to satisfy our Nation's commercial needs. With the end of this shortage, I feel the historically significant mint marks should be restored to our coinage.

Late in the second session of the 89th Congress, a bill was introduced by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANNUNZIO] to do this. It had the support of literally millions of numismatists, who, incidentally, comprise one of the fastest-growing hobby groups in the Nation. Neither the Bureau of the Mint nor the Treasury Department expressed any opposition to the bill. But, unfortunately, it was lost in the rush for adjournment, as business more vital to the Nation's welfare had to be considered.

Now, as we start a new Congress, I hope this bill will be given thoughtful consideration and eventual passage. Its adoption would end emergency regulations where it has clearly been shown the emergency no longer exists.

NATIONAL SCHOOL SAFETY PATROL WEEK

(Mr. CUNNINGHAM (at the request of Mr. GRUBB) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, on the first day of this session, I introduced House Joint Resolution 39 which would provide for the designation of the second week of each May as "National School Safety Patrol Week."

I introduced a similar measure last year.

The sight of a young man or young woman with his arms outstretched and a safety patrol belt on is a familiar sight to all the Members of this body. I am certain. They should be. There are over 900,000 patrol members in the United States. They serve 40,000 schools in 15,000 communities.

In addition there are some 156,000 patrol members serving in 20 foreign countries.

More than 16 million have served on safety patrols since their establishment in 1922.

When one considers these schoolchildren, who must be from the upper elementary or junior high school grades, protect some 19 million schoolchildren, it is easy to see the tremendous job they are doing.

Some may ask, "What good are these patrols?" The answer can best be given by citing the fact that since 1922, the year the patrols were first instituted, the traffic death rate school-age children has dropped nearly one-half, while the death rate of all other age groups has doubled.

Each year, the American Automobile Association joins with the schools and police in sponsoring the National School Safety Patrol Parade here in Washington, D.C. More than 22,000 boys and girls from 20 or more States annually participate in this colorful event.

I am happy that this year there will be a contingent of 12 youngsters from Omaha, Neb., participating in the parade down Constitution Avenue on May 13. William S. Mitchell will be in charge of the group, which is being sponsored by the Cornhusker Motor Club in Omaha.

In connection with the parade, the American Automobile Association each year presents Gold Lifesaver Medals to those young patrol heroes who have actually saved the life of a schoolmate in traffic danger. Among those who have made the presentations in the past are: Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman; Vice Presidents HUMPHREY and NIXON; and Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY.

I would like to take this opportunity to invite my colleagues to join with me in sponsoring this legislation, which will call national attention to the wonderful work being done by these youngsters, and I include in my remarks some remarks from the "School Safety Patrol Member's Handbook":

A good school safety patrolman is always on the job. Make your school and schoolmates proud of the way you appear and the way you act on the street.