

Yarmouth Castle was one of those ships, built in 1927.

The amendments will eliminate from the international passenger trade, vessels with a great deal of wood in them. All basic ship structure must be of steel. Fire barriers will be required at certain intervals. All passenger accommodations must be separated from dangerous areas in the ship such as galleys and machinery places by steel bulkheads. If cabins are not separated from each other by some incombustible material, then a sprinkler system must be provided.

In short these amendments provide a significant advance in international fire safety for ships.

Implementing legislation will not be required to make these amendments effective for the United States, since the Congress in effect has already enacted such legislation in Public Law 89-777 last year.

At the public hearing on March 16, the subcommittee was told that there is no opposition domestically to these standards. A few foreign countries thought that they were too high but the administration believes that even they will ratify these amendments.

The Senate has already passed once on the substance of these amendments when it passed the bill which became Public Law 89-777.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from the report be printed in the RECORD at this point, further to explain the treaty now before the Senate.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENTS

These amendments to the 1960 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention are designed to improve the fire protection of ships, particularly passenger vessels. The principal methods of doing this is by eliminating from the existing SOLAS Conventions the so-called grandfather clauses which exempted vessels built before their effective date from many of the safety standards embodied in them.

The effect of these amendments is to eliminate from the international passenger trade vessels with wooden hulls, decks, and deckhouses. The basic structure of a ship will be required to be of steel. Steel fire barriers not more than 131 feet apart will be required on ships to isolate any fire that does start. Accommodation places for passengers will be separated by steel bulkheads and decks from such hazardous places as cooking, cargo, and machinery spaces. The various rooms within the passenger quarters will have to be separated by incombustible partitions or sprinkler systems will have to be provided.

In sum, when these amendments are approved, the wood structural contents of the old ships used for passengers will have to be eliminated or these ships will have to be scrapped.

BACKGROUND

Just as the sinking of the *Titanic* in 1912 in part led to the first SOLAS Convention—that of 1929—and the collision at sea of the *Andrea Doria* and the *Stockholm* in 1956 led to the 1960 SOLAS Convention, so the burning of the *Yarmouth Castle* in 1965 has resulted in the proposed amendments to the 1960 SOLAS Convention.

In between 1929 and 1960, there was also the 1948 SOLAS Convention which took into account technical advances and broadened the application of the 1929 standards. Each succeeding SOLAS Convention replaced the

one before it, except that 1948 convention is still in effect for some parties. The pending amendments do not replace the 1960 convention, and in fact, by reference, revive certain provisions of the 1948 SOLAS.

The U.S. Government took a very active part in the negotiations of the amendments. On its motion, the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) met in an extraordinary session in May of 1966 to formulate the present amendments, which were then agreed to with minor changes by an extraordinary session of the IMCO Assembly in November 1966, at which 48 countries were represented.

At the same meeting, the assembly also approved a recommendation by the Maritime Safety Committee, that these amendments are so vital to safety of life at sea that contracting governments should not await their formal entry into force but should act immediately to put the recommended measures into effect to the maximum extent and as soon as possible. The entry-into-effect date is 12 months after the date on which the amendments are accepted by two-thirds of the contracting governments, including two-thirds of the governments represented on the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee. As of this date, no government has ratified the amendments.

In the meantime, the *Yarmouth Castle* fire with its disastrous loss of American lives became a matter of domestic concern as well. A subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee held 5 days of hearings on the question of safety of life at sea in April and June of 1966. It had available to it during the latter part of this consideration the May 1966 recommendations of IMCO's Maritime Safety Committee and on this basis, the following provision of Public Law 89-777 (approved November 2, 1966) was enacted:

“ * * * any foreign or domestic vessel of over 100 gross tons having berth or stateroom accommodations for 50 or more passengers, shall not depart a United States port with passengers who are United States nationals, and who embarked at that port, if the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating finds that such vessel does not comply with the standards set forth in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, as modified by the amendments proposed by the thirteenth session of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization * * * dated May 1966 * * * ”

The effective date of this provision is the date of entry into force of the amendments now under consideration or November 2, 1968, whichever is earlier.

No further implementing legislation will be required since there is considered by the administration to be no conflict or inconsistency in substance between Public Law 89-777 and the final amendments adopted by the IMCO Assembly shortly thereafter.

U.S. passenger ships already meet very high safety standards and no significant changes will be involved for the industry. For existing U.S. ships the SOLAS amendments and recommendations are covered by Coast Guard regulations to which only minor amendments will be made. Foreign vessels, however, picking up U.S. passengers at U.S. ports, however, upon entry into force of these amendments, will have to meet their fire safety standards.

COMMITTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION

The amendments were submitted to the Senate on February 27, 1967, and referred to a subcommittee consisting of Senators Lausche (chairman), Dodd, McCarthy, Carlson, and Case on March 3, 1967. At a public hearing on March 16, the subcommittee heard testimony by William K. Miller, Director, Office of Maritime Affairs, Department of State, and Adm. Willard J. Smith, Command-

ant, U.S. Coast Guard, Approval was strongly urged by these witnesses and they stated that there was no opposition to the amendments within the United States known to them. The prepared statement of Mr. Miller is appended to this report.

On March 20, the subcommittee recommended approval of these amendments to the full committee which endorsed this action.

As the leading proponent of these amendments, it appears to the committee to be entirely appropriate that the United States should be the first to ratify them.

While domestically, the U.S. Government has already taken appropriate steps to insure the safety of passengers embarking from U.S. ports, the safety of all American travelers embarking from ports anywhere is at stake and can be assured only through international agreement.

For these reasons the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give prompt advice and consent to their ratification.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the amendments are designed to improve fire protection of ships, particularly passenger ships. The amendments are technical, as are the 1948 and 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Conventions—SOLAS—to which they apply. Their principal effect is to eliminate from these conventions the so-called grandfather clauses which exempted old ships from most of the safety standards laid down by them. The present amendments will eliminate from the international passenger trade vessels with wooden hulls, decks, and deckhouses. Steel fire barriers not more than 131 feet apart will be required as well as the separation of accommodation spaces by steel bulkheads and decks from such hazardous areas as galleys, machinery spaces, and cargo spaces.

The fires aboard the *Yarmouth Castle* and *Viking Princess* around the turn of 1965 sparked the drive for improving the fire safety of passenger vessels, which was led by the United States. The United States called for the May 1966 meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organizations—IMCO—at which the present amendments were formulated. They were adopted with only minor changes by the Third Extraordinary session of the IMCO Assembly in November 1966.

On the basis of the May 1966 recommendations of IMCO's Maritime Safety Committee, Congress enacted Public Law 89-777 after thorough hearings conducted by the Commerce Committees of the House and Senate. According to the letter of the Secretary of State transmitting the treaty to the President, there is no conflict or inconsistency in substance between these amendments and Public Law 89-777 and no further implementing legislation will be required.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the convention will be considered as having passed through its various parliamentary stages up to the point of consideration of the resolution of ratification, which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the

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amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, annexed to the Resolution A. 108 (ES. III) by which they were adopted on November 30, 1966, by the Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) at its Third Extraordinary Session, held in London November 28-30, 1966. (Executive E, 90th Congress, 1st session).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is not my intention to ask for a vote at this time, but at an appropriate time I will ask that there be a vote at a time certain; and then, at a further appropriate time, I will ask for the yeas and nays.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by unanimous consent, the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1968

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 666), a bill to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1968 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the almost \$21 billion in authorization of appropriations this bill provides is a foundation for a Defense program in 1968 that amounts to \$75.3 in new obligational authority and about \$73.1 in expenditures. It will be seen that of a total national budget of \$144 billion, the functions of the Department of Defense account for more than half.

Seventy-five billion dollars is a lot of money by any standard of comparison. I know most Members of the Senate regret the necessity for spending it. It would be fallacious to assume, however, that if our security did not require this funding, the \$75 billion would be spent for education, medical care, housing, or other social benefits. For those who view defense spending with excessive regret because of a view that social spending is thereby preempted, I remind them of the quotation from Sir John Slessor's "Strategy for the West" that "the most important social service that a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free." That is the purpose of this bill.

I think we can agree that the defense we need should be provided as efficiently as possible. Since later in my remarks I intend to indicate some differences with his recommendations, perhaps this is a good place to say that I think Secretary of Defense McNamara is entitled to the highest praise for the administration he has brought to the Department of Defense. Sometimes, I wish he was a little less sensitive about the few areas in which the views of the Congress differ from his and that he did not have to react so defensively and combatively to the exercise of our responsibilities. But it should be said that except for the

progress he is largely responsible for in such activities: as refining the calculation of requirements, eliminating unnecessarily costly frills, and shifting to more competitive forms of procurement, the defense budget would be much larger, indeed, by billions of dollars.

The war in Vietnam heavily influence the size and form of the 1968 defense program. When presenting the supplemental authorization and appropriations requests for 1967 to the Senate earlier, I expressed my opinion that the conflict in southeast Asia is causing us to spend \$2 billion a month more than we otherwise would be spending. By way of summary, I arrived at that estimate by beginning with the approximately \$50 billion annually that was spent by the Department in the last year before we became significantly involved in southeast Asia. To this, \$5.4 billion for pay increases in the last 2 years was added. The sum was subtracted from the \$73.1 billion in expenditures expected in 1968 to produce a difference of about \$17.7 billion annually or about \$1.5 billion per month. Secretary McNamara came up with a figure of about \$22 billion annually by going through each appropriations account and trying to isolate specific costs that would not be incurred except for Vietnam.

Neither method takes into account the depletion of stocks and supplies that were already on hand and neither makes any allowance for diverting resources to Vietnam from tasks to which they were assigned before. With a reasonable allowance for stock depletion and diversion of resources, the cost of the Vietnam war probably exceeds \$24 billion annually.

Also, in discussing the 1967 supplemental funding, I informed the Senate that unless circumstances change drastically, the Department does not plan to submit a major supplemental in fiscal year 1968. In determining its funding requests for 1968, the Department has included enough to last through the procurement leadtime following the time when the fiscal year 1969 obligational authority will be given to it—normally, this would be in the summer of calendar year 1968. This means that on such things as ammunition, which has a 6-month leadtime, the fiscal year 1968 funds will finance requirements through December of 1968. For aircraft, which has a leadtime of 18 months, the 1968 program funds requirements through December of 1969.

Members of the Senate need not be told there is no absolute defense in today's world. In defense as in many other aspects of life it always is hard to know how much is enough. Logistics objectives are based on judgments of the threat we face and assumptions on the kind and location of the combat our forces might have to participate in in defense of our national objectives. In carrying out our responsibilities as Members of Congress, an examination of the strategic concepts and the postulates on which our level of forces are proposed is fundamental.

STRATEGIC FORCES

In the area of strategic forces, there is a high level of understanding and commendable public support for the

proposition that we must have a nuclear strike force that could survive an attack initiated by an enemy and then retaliate against that enemy with such destructive power that the attacker would be destroyed. There can be little doubt we have such a force today. This force is composed of nearly 1,000 Minuteman missiles, Polaris missile-firing submarines that will number 39 by the end of this fiscal year, and strategic bomber forces—however, not modern—of about 550 B-52's and 80 B-58's. Likewise, 54 Titan missiles are in the force for the next few years.

The vital point now is to maintain this ability to respond with overwhelming force to a nuclear attack. There is evidence the Soviet Union is deploying an antiballistic missile defense and that she is building more offensive intercontinental missiles than we thought she might at this time. The former—that is, the defensive missiles—might intercept and destroy a substantial number of our retaliatory missiles. The latter—that is, the offensive missiles—if they have the ability to destroy hardened targets, might destroy a significant number of Minuteman missiles we are depending on as a large part of our second-strike strength.

In trying to keep our strategic offensive forces ahead of the defense, the 1968 defense program includes the continued development and production of the Poseidon missile and a contingent funding for an antiballistic missile system to protect Minuteman sites from an intercontinental ballistic missile attack. The Poseidon missiles, which will have a vastly improved power to penetrate a ballistic missile defense, will be substituted for Polaris missiles aboard our fleet ballistic missile submarines in a retrofit program over a period of several years. For the entire Poseidon program contemplated, the cost is \$3.3 billion, of which \$900 million is included in the 1968 program, in the bill before us.

I shall have more to say about the antiballistic missile system later in my remarks. For now though, I should also say that a large part of our Minuteman force will be equipped with reentry vehicles designed to penetrate an antiballistic missile defense, that the Department of Defense is studying the need to develop a new intercontinental ballistic missile system, and that the SRAM standoff type missile is being developed for installation on the 210 F-111 bomber force and for possible use on the 255 B-52's of the G and H series that will be retained after the other B-52's have been inactivated.

In my opinion, there is little justification for any contention that the United States is not doing enough to maintain its capability to launch a devastating nuclear retaliation.

But there are honest differences of opinion on whether our strategic defensive forces are all that they should or could be. Foremost among these differences is the continuing controversy over beginning procurement for deployment of a ballistic missile defense. Another prominent consideration is the desirability of procuring a new manned inter-

ceptor to replace the aging and obsolete aircraft upon which we now depend to defend against a bomber attack.

In the committee's hearings that are available to the Senate, and in a censored form to the public, there was extensive testimony and questioning about the decision of the executive branch that our deploying a ballistic missile defense would touch off a new and expensive arms competition with the Soviet Union without really affecting the balance of terror and that there is plenty of time to wait and see whether we should deploy such a system against the growing Red Chinese nuclear threat.

In my opinion, and I think in the opinion of a majority of the committee, there are some defects in the reasoning that leads to these conclusions.

I do not wish to do an injustice to the case against deployment by summarizing it at too short a length, but to respond to the argument, the argument should be stated in brief. It runs generally that our deploying an ABM will cause a response in offensive capability by the Soviet Union, resulting in no diminution in the risk of a Soviet nuclear attack and no meaningful reduction in the damage to the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack if deterrence should fail.

Concomitant arguments are first, that it would take longer for Communist China to develop and deploy a significant ICBM force than it would take for us to produce and deploy a missile defense against; and, second, that to protect our Minuteman sites against the kind of heavy, sophisticated attack the Soviets may be able to launch in a few years, it may later be desirable to provide a missile defense for some of the Minuteman sites. About \$377 million is included in the 1968 budget to permit a start on some such system of missile defense if negotiations with the Soviet Union on an agreement restricting the deployment of an ABM system are not successful.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Would the \$377 million be for the actual deployment of our present antiballistic missile system, which I understand is the Nike X?

Mr. RUSSELL. It is to begin long leadtime procurement for the deployment of the latest we have, the Spartan and the Sprint. I do not know that it would actually result in the deployment, but it would start the procurement program, because of the long leadtime involved, which would enable us to make a start in the deployment of the antiballistic missiles.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] is chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations which has been holding hearings in some depth on the antiballistic missile system. I attended most, if not all, of the hearings. I must talk with caution because of what was disclosed in executive session, where classified information was given. The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] is on the floor. He can correct me if I am wrong. It is my understanding, from the views expressed by intelligence officials, officials

from the Atomic Energy Commission, and from the CIA, that both the Spartan and the Sprint were several years away from being capable of being deployed. I had thought they were several years away in terms of research development and being able to be procured. Can the Senator enlighten me on that?

Mr. RUSSELL. I do not think that information conforms to that which we have, though, as I have stated, they cannot be deployed immediately.

Mr. CLARK. Because they have to be procured.

Mr. RUSSELL. That is what I say; you have to procure the long leadtime items.

If the Senator will permit me to finish, I shall be glad to discuss the matter with him at such length as he may desire.

Mr. CLARK. Certainly.

Mr. RUSSELL. In trying to support its conclusion that it is expensively futile to build an ABM defense against the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense presented an involuted series of assumptions, hypotheses, and assumptions upon assumptions. In its latter stages, this exercise gets too esoteric for me to follow. If one accepts every premise in this syllogism, he will arrive at the conclusion the Department desires. In a way, this is a little like the crack about the statistician who drew a straight line from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion. More seriously, the Department's case is based more on what General Wheeler, who disagrees with the Department's conclusion, referred to as the assumption that the reaction of the Soviet Union to our ABM deployment would be "equal, opposite, feasible, and possible."

From 1955 through fiscal year 1967, the United States will have spent about \$4 billion in research on ballistic missile defense, including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X, and Project Defender. As a result, we have developed concepts and equipment for a system that competent evaluators consider would provide valuable, if imperfect, protection against a relatively light, unsophisticated attack. It could provide nearly perfect protection against an attack of the accidental type or of the type that Communist China might be able to launch in the 1970's. From a fairly basic beginning that provided a thin area defense for the entire United States and a more concentrated defense for some of our missile sites at a cost of slightly more than \$4 billion, this system could be expanded to provide more defense against Soviet missile attack for 25 cities at a total cost of just under \$10 billion or the same kind of defense for 50 cities for a total cost of slightly more than \$19 billion.

To these cost estimates Secretary McNamara adds predictions of cost overruns, the cost of procuring a new interceptor force to prevent a bomber attack from negating our missile defense, and the cost of an expanded fallout shelter program to arrive at his conjecture that we would eventually spend \$40 billion once we started. I referred only partly in jest to this figure as being intended as a congressional deterrent. Any part of this that is spent would be spread over

a period of 5 to 7 years. I do not agree that we would inevitably spend this, and even if we did, it is not staggering in relation to the importance of the objective, our ability to pay it, or what we are spending annually in Vietnam.

Of greater concern than the cost is the Secretary's belief that even expenditures of this magnitude would not reduce U.S. casualties in the slightest if the Soviet Union reacted to the deployment of an ABM defense here by increasing the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. I referred earlier to the uncertainty and skepticism, apparently shared by General Wheeler and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Soviet Union would respond in such a way that our defense would be negated. If they did not, even the Department's figures estimate that the \$10 billion investment would save 80 million Americans and that investment of the \$19 billion would save 90 million Americans in the event of a Soviet first strike. It seems to me that the objective in defense should be to prepare to save all that you can, even if you are unable to save everything and everyone.

Last year the committee took the initiative in recommending an additional \$167.9 million to begin production for the deployment of a missile defense system. This action has been erroneously attributed elsewhere but the record will show that it originated in this committee and in the Senate. That amount, which has not been used; and the \$377 million that is in the budget for possible use in 1968 are enough, when combined, to finance the first year's cost of any one of several possible deployments. Fortunately, it is not necessary to decide now what the ultimate scope of the deployment need be.

The committee, of course, does not oppose negotiations with the Soviet Union on an agreement banning the deployment of complicated, expensive, and extensive missile defense systems. We believe, however, that these negotiations should take into account that a bilateral agreement would leave us vulnerable to a possible nuclear attack from Communist China, from future members of the nuclear "club," or even an accidental attack. The committee feels that full consideration should be given to permitting deployment of at least the "thin" ABM defense. If an agreement that fully protects the interest of the United States cannot be consummated within a reasonable period, the committee strongly believes that the available funding should be used to begin production for deployment of a missile defense system, a program that requires several years to accomplish.

This position is shared with some highly competent company, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I noticed in the press last week, I believe, that Dr. Harold Agnew, the head of the Scientific Laboratory Weapons Division of the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos laboratory, now holds to this view.

In an article in the Washington Post of March 17, Dr. Agnew was quoted as fearing that the companies working on Nike X are now ready for the next step

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but might disband their technical teams and convert their facilities to other uses if the system is kept in suspension another year. I also like his deprecation of the suggestion that anything good for us militarily also has to be good for our potential adversaries. In addition, he is reported to have criticized the idea that any increases in our capability can be considered good only if they contribute to stability. To his disapproval of these notions, I say "hear, hear," and his willingness to stick his neck out in this respect I salute.

In the bomber field, the Department of Defense still has not been persuaded that the Air Force should develop the new bomber that has become known under the acronym of AMSA, standing and advanced manned strategic aircraft; \$26 million will be spent for work on engines and avionics for such a new bomber but there is no decision to proceed with contract definition, which is a prerequisite to getting down to business on production. I did not note any great enthusiasm by the Secretary of Defense in that direction. For bombers, the Department's plans still call for producing 210 FB-111's, the bomber version of the TFX that will be equipped with the air-to-surface standoff missile called SRAM, and retaining 255 of the later model B-52's.

Under the Department's plans, the earliest we could get anything better would be fiscal year 1976. By adding extra authorization and appropriations for this purpose for several years, the Congress has demonstrated its conviction that we will need a new bomber in the middle 70's. By refusing to accelerate the bomber development, the civilian heads in the Defense Department have shown that they doubt very much that a follow-on bomber has any purpose in our strategic forces. It probably would be futile to try to change their mind again this year, but I would not want the lack of any additional authorization this year to be construed as a change of my view that the Department should be moving faster to provide another long-range bomber with a large weapon-carrying capacity and high speed at both high and low altitudes.

Having dwelled for perhaps too long on only one phase of our defense efforts—although perhaps the most controversial—I should move along to other subjects.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Thus far I have referred not at all to our general purpose forces, those that are deeply involved in the fighting in Vietnam and the kinds that would be used in resisting aggression against Western Europe, at least in the early stages. Most of the Army's combat units, nearly all the Navy forces except the Polaris submarines, the Marine Corps, and the tactical units of the Air Force are in this category.

One of the reasons for the steep increase in military spending since the end of fiscal year 1965 is that by the end of this fiscal year, we will have about 730,000 more men on active duty than we had when the decision to send U.S. combat forces to Vietnam was made.

The pending bill is an authorization of appropriations or purposes other than personnel costs, but more personnel requires more weapons and equipment, and therefore the level of forces and their deployment are important determinants of major procurement and therefore defense spending.

Our ground force strength objective for fiscal year 1968 is 31½ division force equivalents, a term defined as a division itself plus all its supporting forces. The Army will have 18½ active division equivalents and the Marine Corps will have four. Of these 22½ active divisions, 8½ will be deployed in southeast Asia—6½ Army and two Marine Corps—five in Europe, and two in Korea. Seven divisions—five Army and two Marine Corps—will be held in the United States as a central reserve. In addition, there are nine divisions in the reserve—eight Army and one Marine Corps. These are the ground forces upon which we would rely for response to any expansion of the war in southeast Asia or if fighting to which our security interest requires us to respond breaks out elsewhere in the world.

To supply these forces with the weapons, equipment, ammunition, and supplies they need in combat, procurement objectives are established generally on the basis of how much is needed to keep our forces fighting before production can be increased enough to replace those items consumed in combat.

ARMY

In progressing toward the Army equipment authorization of 26½ division sets, the 1968 procurement program involves continued purchase of the Iroquois, Cobra, Chinook, observation, and heavy lift helicopters and Mohawk fixed-wing observation aircraft. Missile systems receiving funds are ground support equipment for the Pershing, the Lance division support missile that will replace Honest John, the Tow and Shillelagh antitank missiles, and the Redeye and Chaparral missiles for air defense of troops in the field.

There is tentative approval for the conversion of an Army airborne division to an airmobile type like the 1st Air Cavalry Division that has given such a good account of itself in Vietnam. The timing of this conversion will depend on details of a conversion plan to be formulated by the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it has been provisionally scheduled for the early part of fiscal year 1969.

NAVY

The Navy's carrier force program is for a fleet of 15 attack carriers and 12 air wings. No new carrier is in this year's program, but it is understood that a nuclear-powered one probably will be in the fiscal year 1969 request. The shipbuilding program approved by the Department of Defense for 1968 is substantially smaller than the one that had been projected earlier. Changes include reductions in the approved number of nuclear-powered attack submarines from five to three, in amphibious ships from 17 to one, and in logistics ships, from 15 to three. These reductions are unrelated to the Committee's decision to dis-

approve construction of a new class of so-called fast deployment logistics ships that I shall discuss in a few moments.

The Navy is designing a new class of escort ships now called DX that may be procured under the total package procurement concept. The same system may be used for a closely related development of a new class of guided missile ships now designated DXG. Both of these new types could have the same hull but employ different weapon systems or they may have common bow and stern sections, but different midsections for each type. Also under development for possible procurement under the single package plan is a new kind of amphibious ship, designated LHA, that will be capable of providing over-the-beach and vertical envelopment assault tactics for the Marine Corps. It will be designed to launch landing craft as well as helicopters and will combine the characteristics now in two different amphibious types, the LPH and the LPD.

Major types of aircraft to be procured by the Navy and Marine Corps include the RASC for reconnaissance, the A6A for all-weather attack, the EA6B for electronic countermeasures, the A7A for close support, interdiction, and light attack missions, the OV10A for counterinsurgency missions, and the P3B for anti-submarine warfare patrol.

In Navy aircraft, I have purposely left until last the F-111B, the Navy version of the highly controversial TFX. The Navy intention is to use this aircraft, equipped with the new Phoenix missile, that will be capable of detecting several different hostile aircraft at long ranges and launching missiles to destroy them, as an interceptor. But this plane has had many problems, notably weight. It has yet to be demonstrated that the aircraft can be made suitable for carrier operations. The Secretary of the Navy insists that all alternatives to it have been carefully explored and that the Navy has passed the point of no return in its commitment to the E-111B for the period when this aircraft will be needed. Based on these assurances, the Committee has left the authorization for it untouched, but before appropriations against this authorization are made, further evidence of progress in solving the many problems that have beset development of this aircraft will be needed.

AIR FORCE

Major aircraft procurement for Air Force general purpose forces will be of the F-111A, the F-4E, and the A-7. There has been some problem in matching the engine to the airframe of the F-111A, but there is little doubt that this will prove to be an effective attack aircraft for the Air Force.

AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

Disapproved by the committee was a proposal to begin the construction of seven fast deployment logistics ships toward a planned force of 30 of these ships. In concept, these vessels would have been loaded with heavy, bulky equipment used by ground forces in combat and they would have been constantly deployed in forward areas throughout the world. Theoretically, ground troops would be

flown to a combat area to find the heavy equipment already there.

The committee was concerned about the psychological effect, both at home and abroad, of being committed to deployment of these huge floating arsenals all over the world. In the judgment of the committee, we should not unilaterally assume the function of policing the world. Some nations would consider this facility for intervention anywhere, anytime as an intimidation. As for the effect of too much pre-positioning on our own decisions, there is reason to think, to put it colloquially, that if it is easy for us to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Do I correctly understand the Senator to say that we had contemplated seven ships initially, fully supplied logistically, with an ultimate goal of 30, to be stationed everywhere or anywhere throughout the world?

Mr. RUSSELL. All over the seven seas.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would that not in effect make us a world policeman and make us subject to actions for which we might not assent in Congress?

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, that was one of the beliefs that moved the committee to reject this proposal. As I have just stated, we did not think that we should go any further in a unilateral effort to police the entire world or impose a pax Americana.

Of course, if these large ships, each of 40,000-ton displacement and loaded with heavy equipment, were scattered throughout the world, one of them would be constantly positioned near any possible danger spot. The demand would be for Uncle Sam to use the ships and send troops to take care of the situation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it appears to me that this would be an invitation on our part which I think should be foreclosed.

Do I correctly understand the Senator to say that this proposal was eliminated by the committee?

Mr. RUSSELL. The committee has recommended that it be eliminated, and the Senate has agreed to the amendment which eliminates it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted.

Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.

Reduction of the Navy's shipbuilding authorization request by \$301.1 million to effectuate the committee's action does not mean the Armed Forces are left without provision for the heavy equipment they would need in combat overseas. In many areas where we are committed by treaty or otherwise to resist aggression it is possible to pre-position this equipment on land. This has been done in Western Europe. Moreover, we already have some Victory class ships that can provide a limited amount of pre-positioning at sea, if this is a wise course to follow. Furthermore, the C-5A, a new, very large, air transport that is being developed, will be capable of carrying 98 percent of the equipment

an Army division needs. Incidentally, since the C-5A will be produced in my own State of Georgia, I anticipate criticism that my reaction to the FDL was influenced by the hope that production of the C-5A might thereby be increased. While it might be argued that without the FDL's we should need even more C-5A's, I suspect that there was at least a mild attempt to coerce me during these hearings in the suggestion that if one does not accept the necessity for a rapid deployment capability of the FDL type, the numbers of C-5A required might have to be reduced. I think the committee's action demonstrates that what was perhaps a veiled threat did not color my judgment of the issue.

Incidentally, Mr. President, since the C-5A will be produced in my own State of Georgia, I anticipate criticism that my reaction to the FDL was influenced by the hope that the production of the C-5A might thereby be increased. That argument could be made, of course, but I suspect there was at least a mild attempt to coerce me during the hearings by the suggestion that if one does not accept the necessity for this vast fleet of ships of the FDL type, the numbers of the C-5A required might have to be reduced. I think the committee's action demonstrates that what was perhaps a mildly veiled threat did not color my own judgment on this issue.

I think it would be inadvisable for us to pre-position some thirty of these mighty floating arsenals all over the world. There is no limit to what it could eventually cost us. If we are engaged in a war with a nation using sophisticated weapons, these ships would be sitting ducks for submarines and aircraft. Escort ships would be required, and there is no way to ascertain at the present time just how much it would cost to protect each one of these ships in pre-positioned locations.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Although my statement already has run to probably excessive length, I must comment at least briefly on the \$7.2 billion this bill provides in authorization of appropriations for research, development, text, and evaluation.

In reviewing the requests of the military departments and the defense agencies, the Secretary of Defense made reductions of about \$900 million in these requests. The committee has decided to recommend no further reductions, although it recognizes that much of this effort is, by the very nature of research, unproductive.

Considering the \$7.2 billion as a measure of research effort is misleading, because about \$2.4 billion of this is for development work on systems that have already been approved for deployment.

Much of the rest of the R. & D. authorization is for development work less advanced than that on systems approved for deployment.

A more accurate measure of the effort devoted to the technology base for future weapons development is to combine the \$409 million budgeted for research, one of the five sequential steps into which the Department organizes its R. & D. effort, with the \$988 million budgeted for

exploratory development, another of the sequential steps and the second most elementary of them.

In 1968, \$27 million has been budgeted for the program started in 1967 that has the objective of broadening the geographic base of the Department's program of research conducted by colleges and universities. This program, which is styled THEMIS, was initiated in response to frequent congressional complaints against undue concentration of defense research in a few institutions of higher learning. Defense participation will at first be directed to participating in about 50 new centers of excellence in science and technology, with each center receiving support of not less than about \$200,000 per year from the Department.

A detailed discussion of the major research and development that will be prosecuted next year would detain the Senate unreasonably. For those Senators who wish more information, there is some elaboration in the committee report and more in the hearings to which I invite your attention. I should point out, though, that for its part in maintaining four specific safeguards relating to the test ban treaty, the Department of Defense has budgeted \$255 million in fiscal year 1968, compared with \$224 million in fiscal year 1967 and about \$238 million in fiscal year 1966.

Earlier in my remarks I commented that the size of this authorization and the amount of the whole Defense Department budget are substantially enlarged by our efforts in South Vietnam. But if we had never tried to help there, we would still need a large authorization of this type and in my judgment the defense budget would be in the 50 billions, at least.

In presenting the 1967 supplemental authorization and appropriations to the Senate, I tried to make clear my strong conviction that so long as our forces are committed in southeast Asia there is no alternative to unstinting support of those forces. Yet, we should not allow ourselves to become so preoccupied with events in that part of the world that we do not safeguard our even more vital interests elsewhere. The bill before the Senate is directed more toward general and varied military power than to a specialized capability without utility when the war in Vietnam is over.

Among the nations of the earth, each attaches an importance to defense that is proportionate to its valuation of its institutions, resources, traditions, and individual rights. The United States has more that is worth protecting than has any other nation, and I am thankful that our citizens are willing to pay the price of its defense. I trust this will always be true.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator for Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL. The distinguished Senator from Maine, who is the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, desires to make a statement. When she has finished, I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I am glad to join the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in urging the approval of the bill.

I hope the authorization and appropriations requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1968 are enough to do what needs to be done. The Secretary of Defense informed the committee he had reduced the requests of the military departments and the Defense agencies for 1968 by \$17.6 billion.

I suppose it is standard procedure to request a little more than you expect to receive in Defense, as elsewhere, but it is hard for me to believe that all the programs this \$17.6 billion would have funded were recommended by responsible officials only in the expectation that there would be some reductions.

I think the committee has done the right thing in disapproving the initiation of what could be a costly new program for the construction of logistics ships that would be constantly deployed throughout the world.

Perhaps a few new ships of this type can be justified, but apparently the profit on the construction of a small number of ships would be inadequate to subsidize the construction of new shipbuilding facilities the Department of Defense considers necessary.

I would hope the Department might make further efforts to modernize existing shipbuilding facilities and that the existing shipbuilding industry could find a way to produce the needed ships at a reasonable cost.

The committee report contains an explanation of the reasons for including military assistance to South Vietnam, other free-world forces there, Laos, and Thailand in the budget of the Department of Defense. For some time I have thought the relationship between military assistance and functions of the Department of Defense is so close that authorizations for both should be considered by the same committee.

The action proposed this year is, in my opinion, a large step toward this objective. I am concerned, though, about what could be the very open-ended nature of this authorization.

The level of assistance provided to Laos and Thailand could affect the safety of U.S. forces in southeast Asia. For this reason I have not insisted on adopting a ceiling on the amount that may be furnished as military assistance.

It was with considerable reluctance that I joined in the committee's approval of the authorization with respect to the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile defense system. I can give no assurance that I will do so again next year.

I am becoming more and more inclined to believe that the Secretary of Defense is right—but for the wrong reason—on this issue. I am not convinced that the state of the art on an anti-ballistic-missile defense system has reached a relatively static status.

I am not convinced that the state of the art has leveled off on a plateau to the extent that we can safely make the assumption that Russia is on such a plateau of development and does not have a potential—if not actual—capability of a completely different and more effective defense system than that on which present thinking is based.

I am not convinced that the ground placements of what may appear to be Russia's anti-ballistic-missile defense system are what they seem; but that rather they may be decoys of classic deception designed to motivate us to a very costly defense system that may be obsolete or become obsolete in the near future.

Consequently, I am becoming more and more inclined to believe that the Secretary of Defense is right—but for the wrong reason—on this issue.

Obviously, this authorization and appropriations based on it are not all that the military departments and the Defense agencies would like. But I believe the programs this bill would authorize will add significantly to our military strength.

In supporting the bill, I want to acknowledge the great leadership and fairness of the chairman on this bill and the very admirable manner in which he conducts the work of the committee in a strictly nonpartisan character.

I also want to commend Mr. William Darden, the chief of staff of the committee, and the staff members who did such an excellent job on this legislation and on whom we are so dependent.

Mr. RUSSELL, I thank the distinguished Senator from Maine. She is one of the best informed and most valuable members of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending bill.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order now to request the yeas and nays on the treaty, which has already been discussed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the treaty.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the pending business, the military authorization bill, be taken at 3:30 p.m.; that if any amendments are to be offered in the meantime, there be a limitation of debate on each amendment of 1 hour, the time to be equally divided between the proposer of the amendment and the manager of the bill, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and that rule XII be waived. I should have said that the vote will be held not later than 3:30 p.m., but I assume it will be around that time. I also ask that the vote on the treaty come immediately after the vote on the pending bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE GUAM WAR COUNCIL

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, we Americans have always claimed with pride that we are the most revolutionary people in the world. In the past that was true. Unfortunately our policy in this administration has come to the sad situation where we are now regarded as the most unrevolutionary nation in the entire world.

The winds of freedom have been blowing throughout the world, especially in southeast Asia during the entire time from immediately following the end of World War II. They have been blowing in a manner and to an extent almost beyond belief.

The Guam War Council was supposedly for President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and other top administration officials to review with our military and naval leaders in Vietnam and our newly nominated Ambassador to Vietnam and his associates the progress of the war and to discuss future plans for the war. Unfortunately, our President included, or perhaps considered that he was blackjacked into including, Prime Minister Ky and the South Vietnamese chief of state of the militarist regime in Saigon. In our Revolutionary War when we wrenched our freedom by force from the oppression of England, there were thousands of American colonists in all of the Thirteen Colonies who opposed their fellow Americans who were asking liberation from Great Britain. The patriots who fought and won the Revolutionary War looked down upon and held in utmost contempt and termed "Tories" those who opposed their efforts of liberation.

Unfortunately in the miserable civil war in Vietnam in which we had been involved to a small degree by President Eisenhower and now in a gigantic way under President Johnson, we are supporting and upholding the "Tories" of South Vietnam against the forces of the National Liberation Front. At the Guam Conference, Ky, the flamboyant Prime Minister of the Saigon regime who was a pilot in the French colonial army at the time the French were oppressing his fellow countrymen, has been strength-