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FIVE YEAR CLIMB

When it is recalled that the great authority on sea power, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, had dismissed Russia's merchant navy with the observation that "Russia has little maritime commerce . . . her merchant flag is rarely seen," the Soviet climb in but five years (1963-1967) from number twelve to number six rank in world merchant tonnage is hard evidence of Soviet capabilities and intentions alike.

Equally significant is the fact that the Soviet merchant fleet, unlike the merchant shipping of non-Communist countries, is a totally controlled instrument of state power and is habitually used as a political-diplomatic weapon. The relationship of the Soviet merchant marine to Soviet naval forces and the developing countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East is, therefore, related to the over-all mix of maritime power: bases, facilities-agreements, industrial-technological assets, merchant shipping, and naval (including naval-air) forces.

Soviet ambitions on the oceans are underscored by current Soviet efforts directed towards the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex, a vast strategic area of the world's seas and an area quite new to the hammer and sickle flag of the U.S.S.R.

AFRICAN-INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY

The Soviet maritime thrust in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex is, like Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean, an attempt to gain maximum exploitation from three increasingly related factors:

(1) The Soviet goal of attaining military-technological superiority over the United States.

(2) Soviet exploitation of tensions, political instability, and ethnic or other rivalries in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and the Middle East through the technique which the Soviets call "national liberation movements."

(3) The power vacuum created through the British withdrawal East of Suez.

As the military-technological power of Russia continues to rise, the Soviet leadership believes that this power can be used to support—psychologically and diplomatically—the revolutionary process in the new and developing nations. This strategy is stated frankly as follows in the May, 1968 issue of *Kommunist*, the authoritative official journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

"The growth of the political influence and the economic and military might of the world socialist system exerts a powerful influence on the course of the struggle between labor and capital on the international scene; it ties the hands of the imperialists and creates increasingly favorable conditions for the development of the world revolutionary process."

These are not idle words. They are being put into practice through Soviet politico-economic support for socialist-revolutionary forces in Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Yemen and other countries in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex.

SOVIETS ACQUIRE BASES

The Soviet Union is acquiring base facilities in Hodeida in the Yemen and is also using Port Sudan on the Red Sea. A guerrilla campaign has been organized against Mozambique (on the Indian Ocean across from the strategic island of Madagascar) from Soviet-sympathizing Tanzania and these guerrillas have both Soviet and Chinese Communist equipment. In this regard it should be noted that however sharp the propaganda attacks the Soviets and Chinese Communists mount against one another, they seem to be able to cooperate on the tactical level in East Africa when they face what they regard as the common enemy.

Soviet "national liberation warfare" techniques are being employed wherever possible throughout Africa, but it would appear that

the Red Sea-Indian Ocean coast of Africa has been given major attention because of its strategic role in developing Soviet strategy. The Soviets are also attempting to link the African and Middle Eastern liberation warfare movement to their exploitation of Arab national feeling.

Thus when two Soviet warships paid an eight-day visit—for the first time in Soviet naval history—to the Persian Gulf in May 1968, they were greeted in the Iraq port of Umm Qasr with a gun salute and with thanks "for supporting the Arab cause." Not without interest is the fact that Iraq has now been equipped with Soviet-type Styx missiles such as was used to sink the Israeli destroyer *ELATH*.

It may not have been accidental that about the time of this Soviet naval visit in the Persian Gulf leading Soviet newspapers devoted a good deal of attention to the national liberation movement in Africa. The official Communist Party newspaper *Pravda* stated on May 25:

"The formation of a world system of socialism, which stands as a mighty stronghold of all anti-imperialist struggles in the world, the growth of the revolutionary struggle of the international working class and the rapid upsurge of the liberation movement of (the) African peoples . . . predetermined the collapse of the gigantic colonial prison in Africa."

"The present national liberation movement of the peoples of that continent has become an organic integral part of the world revolutionary process," said *Pravda*.

Equally important was a statement the same day in the official government newspaper, *Izvestia*. This emphasized Russia's "consistent policy" for supporting national liberation movements. "It went on to say that the Soviets had "accumulated rich experience in the defense of revolutionary movements," and that the Soviet solidarity Committee of Asian and African Countries was giving practical, physical support to the revolutionary forces of "Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)."

EFFORTS IN INDIA AND CEYLON

On the other side of the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex, the Soviet Union has been most active in both India and the great island of Ceylon. A Soviet naval squadron visited the Indian sub-continent in the spring of 1968, another first in Soviet naval history. Calls were made in Pakistan and in India and later on in Ceylon.

The visit to India is especially significant since that the Soviet Union has said it will supply the Indian Navy with "F" class submarines, escorts of the *PETYA* class, *MTB's* of the *POLUCHAT* I class, a submarine support-ship, and additional auxiliary craft. Press reports say one submarine and some other craft have been delivered. This may be in order to lay the groundwork for a Soviet naval air presence in that part of the world since the Soviets have had talks with India looking towards an Andaman Island base. These islands are in the Bay of Bengal, strategically located not only with reference to the Indian Ocean generally, but also in relation to the seacoast of Burma, Malaysia, and Thailand.

They would be advantageous bases for the new Soviet helicopter and/or VTOL carriers and for Soviet land based aircraft, many of which come under the control of the Soviet Navy. It is also not without interest that *Pravda* announced June 1, 1968, that the scientific research ship *OGON* was "carrying out hydrographic work in the Pacific and Indian oceans." The Soviets understand quite well that the search for strategic superiority is not military alone, but military, scientific, technological and psycho-political.

The psycho-political element of the overall strategic effort blending with the military is well illustrated by the Soviet naval visit to Ceylon. A Soviet naval squadron cruising in the Indian Ocean paid a five-day visit to the

Ceylonese port of Colombo, July 7-11, 1968. Just prior to this Soviet naval visit, *Moscow Radio* announced on July 3 that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had sent a congratulatory telegram to the "Communists of Ceylon, who are celebrating the 25th anniversary of their party." The telegram hailed "the Communist Party of Ceylon, the fraternal solidarity of the two parties, and the friendship of the Soviet and Ceylonese peoples."

Conjointly, *Moscow Radio* reported that a Soviet news agency representative had interviewed Pieter Keuneman, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Ceylon. He said that the Communist Party of Ceylon "was the first to demand the elimination of the British military bases on the island and the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with the socialist [that is, the Communist-block] countries." Keuneman went on to say that the Ceylonese Communist Party "fully supports the convening of the international conference of Communist and workers parties in November in Moscow."

THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL

For almost a century the vast Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean complex was an area of relative stability. This was so because Great Britain—and associated friendly powers—controlled the perimeter boundaries. Whether it was the East African coast (Kenya, Tanganyika); key bases (Aden, Mombasa, Colombo, Singapore); or important islands (Mauritius, Andaman, Nicobar), British forces were on hand throughout these sea spaces and able to respond quickly for any needed police actions.

What of today? The British have announced that they will complete their withdrawal East of Suez by 1971. That this will likely be irreversible is shown by the fact that early in 1968 the withdrawal from Aden became a finality.

The power vacuum already exists. The potential, strategically, is alarming.

Australia, that great and good friend of the United States, is vitally dependent on the Indian Ocean. In the 1965-1966 period, for example, more than half of all Australian imports and almost half of all exports came by way of the Indian Ocean.

India, Pakistan, and the countries of East Africa depend on Indian Ocean routes for all but a little of their imports and exports. South Africa, at the Cape of Good Hope (more significant than ever with the closure of the Suez Canal), is vitally interested in the Indian Ocean. And the Red Sea-Persian Gulf oil routes are so well known as to require but passing mention.

Writing in the *New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1963, C. L. Sulzberger perceptively forecast the strategy stakes in this oceanic complex. "In the vast area extending from the Red Sea across the Indian Ocean to the Pacific inlets one finds today's main thrusts of both Russian and Chinese dynamism," he said. "They frequently compete with each other but ultimately work in tandem to weaken Western influence."

Looking ahead to 1969-1970, it can be seen that the Soviets will try to continue the forward momentum they have begun in 1967-1968. Will theirs be the power that fills the vacuum left by the British withdrawal? Or will the United States build up its naval forces so as to be able to deploy real strength for peace and stability in the Indian Ocean rimland?

EDNA F. KELLY

HON. WM. JENNINGS BRYAN DORN

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, 19 years of devoted service to the people of this

Nation and to her constituents in the 12th Congressional District of New York will come to an end for Congresswoman EDNA F. KELLY when we adjourn this session of the 90th Congress.

It has been my great pleasure to work with this great American during these years. I have witnessed her devotion and loyalty to the best principles of Democracy. Her long service on the Foreign Affairs Committee of this House has been outstanding. Her contributions to the preservation of our Nation and the growth of this country into the world's leading power are innumerable.

Mrs. KELLY's many years of hard work in behalf of the Democratic Party, even before she became a U.S. Representative, stand out in the best traditions of concern and involvement in our important political system.

It is with regret that I say goodbye to Congresswoman KELLY, and the outstanding leadership she has exhibited will be missed here in the Halls of Congress.

ME

THE THREAT OF RESUMED MILITARY AID TO GREECE

HON. DONALD M. FRASER

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, the other day Elias P. Demetracopoulos, a Greek political editor in exile, made a detailed and informative statement expressing his concern about a possible change in U.S. policy toward Greece.

Specifically, he set out his concern that the United States may be on the verge of enlarging the restricted flow of military aid to the ruling junta in Greece.

The junta has sought to legitimize itself through a plebiscite which would do credit to a Soviet-style election. The day on which the Greek people will return to a free system of government seems no closer.

Because a change in U.S. policy toward Greece has been rumored, I want to place Mr. Demetracopoulos' statement in the RECORD, as follows:

I have asked you to come here today to hear some information which I consider important for my country, Greece, which can have great repercussions on the present tension in Eastern Europe, and U.S. policy towards that area. Further, what I have to state may affect the prospects for the early restoration of Greece as a western style democracy.

According to reliable information, the U.S. Government, at the highest levels of responsibility, is considering at this very moment, at least a partial resumption of heavy military arms shipments to the Greek Junta. This decision, I understand, will be announced shortly after tomorrow's "plebiscite" in Athens, and will represent a fundamental change in official U.S. policy towards the totalitarian regime in Greece, a change which is directly related to recent developments in Czechoslovakia, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. A decision to resume such shipments at this time would be a major foreign policy mistake for a number of reasons.

In the first place, the heavy equipment in question would take some time to arrive in Greece, even if shipped on an emergency

basis for purely logistical reasons. It would be further technically very difficult to assimilate this equipment into the Greek Armed Forces and make it operational before a further considerable period of time has passed. Accordingly, the immediate military impact of shipping arms will count for almost nothing during the present tension in Southeast Europe.

The psychological impact, on the other hand, could be serious for the NATO alliance, as well as for Rumania and Yugoslavia, who are now directly threatened with a repetition of the Czech rape. By overtly strengthening the military regime in Athens, the U.S. would likely enable Moscow to move from a defensive to an offensive position in terms of world opinion. It will give the Soviets a pretext, if they ever needed one, for a possible massive strengthening of their forces in Bulgaria, in order to offset an alleged U.S. inspired threat from Greece.

What of the defense of Greece itself? Here I would make reference to a top secret report of an official meeting between the then U.S. Secretary of Defense Mr. McNamara and the then Greek Defense Secretary Mr. Garoufalias in December 1964 in Washington, D.C. As this document makes clear, the defense of Greece against Soviet Block aggression relies basically on the presence of the 6th Fleet. The absence or presence of more heavy and modern equipment would not affect the capability of the Greek Armed Forces to maintain internal order, and would be of marginal significance externally.

Finally, even a partial resumption of any kind of heavy military equipment at this time would be counterproductive, in that such a move would also throw away the main leverage left to the U.S. Government to pressure the junta to move towards a real restoration of constitutional democracy and basic human rights.

The timing of such a decision by the U.S. Administration, however, would be of significance if it is finalized.

Tomorrow as you know, a "plebiscite" is being held in Greece on a new draft constitution prepared by the ruling junta. According to the statement of the official spokesman of the military regime, this constitution embodies the principles of the "revolution", and therefore its acceptance by the majority of the electorate would signify approval of the "revolution" by the Greek people.

There are some aspects of this operation which are particularly disquieting. The text itself can hardly be considered democratic by any standards. Two illustrations, I believe, are sufficient in this respect. First, the army is set up as an autonomous organization not subject to the control of the elected government.

Furthermore, in addition to protecting the country from its external enemies, the armed forces are assigned the mission of defending it also against its domestic "enemies". The text significantly omits any obligation of allegiance on the part of the armed forces to the constitution or the democratic form of government. Finally, the Chief of Staff sits on the new "Council of the Nation," which has the power, among other things, to dismiss the Prime-Minister and dissolve Parliament. Thus the armed forces are, in effect, a self-perpetuating clique of officers, and becomes the undisputed controller of the political life of the country.

The second illustration is the treatment of the freedom of the press. Printed matter can be confiscated for nine different reasons, ranging from offense against any recognized religion, to advocating the overthrow of the social order or the system, whatever that may mean.

As if all the amputations of individual rights and freedoms and the statutory introduction of military control over political life were not enough, a final article provides that the provisions pertaining to individual free-

doms of the press, parliament and elections, as well as to guarantees against arbitrary arrest and judicial due process, are not to be applied except as and when the military government decides.

Thus, the purpose of tomorrow's "plebiscite" is clearly to bring the Greek people to accept the indefinite abolition of democratic government, individual freedom, and the rule of law.

In order to achieve its purpose, the junta has to obtain a large favorable vote for its constitution and for some months now it has adopted the following strategy. It has published two drafts of the text for the purposes of what it has called public discussion, but has withheld its final position until a few days ago. On this final text there is going to be no discussion. Martial law has been maintained throughout and no campaign in opposition to the constitution has been permitted. In this connection I would like to refer you to a New York Times dispatch from Athens printed yesterday describing the ordeal of an American family, The Tenenbaums, who were indiscrete enough to place a "no" sign on their car while travelling as tourists in Greece. All Athens newspapers have been carrying, by order of the censors, comments praising the "truly democratic" character of the constitution, and radio and television, aided by posters and luminous signs, have been engaged in a saturation campaign in favor of the constitution.

It would appear, however, that the junta is so sure of the feelings of the Greek people that it has considered it necessary to take some additional steps to discourage the opponents of dictatorship from voting against the draft constitution in the voting booth.

It has been the established practice in Greece for lawyers appointed by the courts to supervise voting in all polling stations. This required the services at each election of about 6,000 lawyers. For tomorrow's "plebiscite" only 500 lawyers will be employed—all of them "passed" by the security police. The participation of local notables in the bureaus responsible for conducting the elections at each polling station have been reduced from three to one and, instead of being drawn by lots from among those eligible for jury service, they will be appointed by the junta-appointed local mayors, so as to ensure that they are government men.

I would like to stress that voting procedure is of crucial significance in view of the prevailing conditions of fear in Greece today. The fact, however, that the junta has had to resort to these means in order to obtain the results it wants proves that even the colonels have no illusions about their popularity. Fully aware of this fact the junta despite all their precautions announced that if tomorrow's vote is negative they will not relinquish power but that they will simply repeat the exercise. What a travesty!

In these circumstances, the resumption of shipments of heavy military equipment by the U.S. can have only one meaning, namely, to give, in effect, the official approval of the U.S. government to a fraud the only purpose of which is to perpetuate military dictatorship in the face of mounting popular opposition. I leave it up to you whether this is in the interests of the U.S.

I would like to make an eleventh hour public appeal to the President of the United States on behalf of all freedom loving people, including the Greek people, to avoid taking a disastrous decision which in the long run will also greatly injure basic U.S. interests and may very well represent a long step forward in creating the conditions for the emergence of a new Viet Nam in South East Europe. I am asking President Johnson not to sacrifice the long term interests and objectives of the United States as proclaimed in The Truman Doctrine of 1947 for which Greece will be eternally grateful and which kept Greece from becoming another satellite

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of the Soviet Bloc, to whatever short term expediences may be advanced by some of his advisers.

It must always be remembered that Greece fought a hard and dirty war against a foreign dominated and supported Communist aggression at the peak of the "Cold War" in Europe. The victory although assisted greatly by U.S. material help and advice was finally wrested with Greek, and only Greek, blood. It was a victory also won under a parliamentary government with democratic institutions functioning and certainly without resorting to a military dictatorship as is the case today.

Finally, I would like to refer briefly to the astounding statement and subsequent clarifying statement made by Governor Agnew at and after yesterday's National Press Club luncheon. His remarks indicated a surprising ignorance of the Greek situation and showed that he would deny to the Greek people the same right to fight for their freedom which was at the core of the American Revolution and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Indeed another illustration is the ill-fated armed attempt to overthrow the junta by King Constantine of last December.

A TRIBUTE TO SIR ANDREW COHEN

HON. JOHN BRADEMÁS

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Mr. BRADEMÁS. Mr. Speaker, a number of us in the House and Senate of both parties are privileged to be members of the Anglo-American Parliamentary Conference on Africa, a group which meets from time to time with our British counterparts in the House of Commons to discuss African affairs.

One of the pleasures of our conferences was the opportunity to become acquainted with Sir Andrew Cohen, a British civil servant who played a key role in preparing the countries of Africa for independence.

Earlier this summer Sir Andrew Cohen died.

I know that those of my colleagues who have had the opportunity to know Sir Andrew realize that he was an extraordinary human being who made great contributions not only to his own country but to the development of Africa and to the broader understanding on the part of Americans of the problems of Africa.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the Record the text of an obituary paying tribute to Sir Andrew Cohen as well as the text of an address delivered by Sir Robert Birley at St. Paul's Cathedral in London on July 17, 1968 at a memorial service.

OBITUARY: SIR ANDREW COHEN, OUTSTANDING CIVIL SERVANT WHO HELPED PREPARE AFRICA FOR INDEPENDENCE

Sir Andrew Cohen, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., O.B.E., died on Monday at the age of 58. He had been Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas Development since its creation in October, 1964.

He was previously, from July, 1961, Director-General of the Department of Technical Co-operation, and before that, from the beginning of 1957 until May, 1961, he was permanent United Kingdom representative at the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Cohen's earlier career was in the Colonial Office and from 1962 until 1957 he was Governor of Uganda.

Andrew Benjamin Cohen was born in October, 1909, the son of Walter Cohen, sometime director of the Economic Board for Palestine, and of his wife, Mattie Cobb, sometime headmistress of Roedean and later principal of Newnham College, Cambridge. He was educated on the classical side of Malvern College, and proceeded to Trinity College, Cambridge.

In 1932 he passed into the Civil Service and was assigned to the department of Inland Revenue. It was the late R. V. Vernon, then serving in the Colonial Office, who suggested to Sir Charles Jeffries, then establishment officer, that it would be a good idea to try to get young Cohen transferred there. The transfer was arranged and Cohen's real career began in 1933.

He went through the usual training including a spell as Private Secretary to Lord Rugby (then, as Sir John Maffey, Permanent Under-Secretary), and a visit to Central Africa as Secretary to a financial commission. He was selected for a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship to visit America, but his programme was cut short by the outbreak of war in 1939. In 1940 he was seconded to Malta, where he remained until 1943 organizing with great efficiency the supply of food and necessities to the beleaguered island.

His return to the Colonial Office as head of one of the African departments was an important milestone in his life and indeed in the history of the African colonies. In 1947 he was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary of State in charge of the African Division of the Office. As such he was in a position to wield great influence, and his strong personality, high intellectual ability, and progressive outlook ensured that that influence would be felt, not only on the African territories but in the higher reaches of Whitehall and Westminster.

Many observers have been justly impressed by Cohen's dynamism and administrative efficiency; but his character had many sides, and at least as important was his passion for digging out the essential questions of principle on which administrative action should be based and for encouraging the free play of ideas.

The turning point of post-war British Colonial policy is to be found outside Africa. It was the grant of independence to Ceylon in 1948 which made it only a matter of time before the African and other Colonial dependencies would follow the same road. But how much time? Many people regarded the matter as outside the "foreseeable future." Not so Cohen. He realized that the drive for independence was imminent and gave all his energies to helping the African colonies and protectorates to prepare themselves for it, so that, when political advance became inescapable, economic and social advance would not lag too far behind. In pursuing this line, he was fully in accord with the approach of his Secretaries of State, Mr. Creech-Jones and, later, Mr. James Griffiths. The latter was so strongly impressed with Cohen's ability and outlook that he decided, in 1951, to transfer him to the field, and recommended his appointment as Governor of Uganda.

At first the new Governor was very successful. Drastic reforms were introduced and swift progress made on both the political and economic fronts. Unhappily his conception of a unitary State of Uganda conflicted with the aspirations of Buganda political leaders, headed by the hereditary Kabaka, for separate independence. A clash of wills developed, as a result of which the British Government, on Cohen's advice, withdrew its recognition of the Kabaka and removed him from the country at the end of 1953.

Cohen came under strong criticism from many quarters for this action, but he continued to serve as Governor and gradually regained much of the confidence he had lost. Reforms went forward, and the wisdom of

Cohen's aims was increasingly recognized by the local public. With a change of Colonial Secretaries, it became possible for the Kabaka to return on mutually acceptable conditions, and when Cohen eventually left Uganda in January, 1957, the foundations of future independence were firmly laid.

Cohen's next assignment was the diplomatic post of permanent United Kingdom representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Here, as in the Colonial Office and in Africa, his personality made itself powerfully felt, but undoubtedly a better use of his abilities was offered by the creation in 1961 of the new Department of Technical Cooperation to take over most of the non-political functions of the old Colonial Office and to develop the organization of technical and financial assistance to countries in need of it, irrespective of their political status.

Appointed as Director-General of the new Department, Cohen set about organizing it with his customary "whirlwind" enthusiasm, and substantial practical progress was made even during the early years when the arrangements were necessarily makeshift and the staff, gathered from a number of sources, was learning to settle down as a team. It was not until the Department was able to move into its present accommodation in Eland House that it could begin to work out its own tradition and corporate outlook. Transformed into the Ministry of Overseas Development, the new organization rapidly established itself, especially during a partnership between Minister and Permanent Secretary irreverently described as "the Elephant and Castle" phase, as a very efficient and effective machine for carrying out an extremely important aspect of the British Government's overseas policy in the post-colonial period.

A man so "big" in all sense as Andrew Cohen was bound to become a legend. Many years ago a journalist recorded a vision of him rushing down the Colonial Office stairs two or three at a time, with a bundle of files under each arm and his hatbrim held between his teeth. It was his habit to pace the room while dictating, and an endearing recollection is of an occasion when he quite unconsciously strode out of the room whose door had been inadvertently left open, and was last seen disappearing round the corner of a long corridor still talking and followed by an anxious secretary feverishly taking his words, down on her pad as she strove to keep up with him.

It is said that on one occasion in Malta, when a delegation had called to complain about the bread, Cohen was found, during the conversation, to have eaten the sample which had been produced as a basis for discussion.

In 1949 he married Mrs. Helen Donington, by whom he had one son. He was a warm and affectionate father to his child and to his three step-children, and an immense favorite with their many friends.

TRIBUTE TO SIR ANDREW COHEN DELIVERED BY SIR ROBERT BIRLEY

I do not think that Andrew Cohen is a difficult man to talk about. He was too big a man for that and much too interesting. But I find it difficult to start to do so. In a way I suppose I am intimidated. He was a man who would have had no patience with oratorical flourishes or with the usual phrases of conventional tributes and if he had felt that one was indulging in them, though he would probably not have said anything, one would have been very well aware of what he was feeling. But many of his friends would wish me to express my admiration for him and I shall do so, feeling myself as representing them, in the most fitting words I can muster.

Like all distinguished men of affairs—and he was a man who dealt with very important affairs indeed—one might try to look at him

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in two ways. It is right that we should now remember him in his official role. This is not the time for any kind of obituary notice, for a list of the offices he held. I should like to sum up his work as a statesman—and I use the word advisedly for, if ever a civil servant was a statesman, he was—to sum up his work as a statesman in this way. We in our generation (his and mine) have lived through several revolutions. One of these has been the end of the British Empire. It seems to me that it is at least very possible—it is too soon to be certain that this may go down to History as one of the greatest achievements of the British people. Perhaps for the first time in History the ending of a great Empire will be looked on by the ages of the future not as something merely destructive and melancholy, but as something creative. And among all the men who have made this possible Andrew Cohen stands out among the foremost. He did this particularly when holding two positions. First as Governor of Uganda. How can I describe what he did for that country? Perhaps this one episode will suffice. I have been told by someone, who was then a student, of the first occasion that he spoke to the students at Makerere University College, very soon after he became Governor and how in a very few words he immediately convinced them that he was looking forward to the time, as something entirely natural and to be taken for granted, when they would be the leaders and rulers in their own country. This was a voice they had not heard before.

We have been told of something that happened a few days ago. The Uganda Assembly had met to hear the budget speech; the floor of the house and the galleries were crowded; and then the Speaker rose and made the announcement that Sir Andrew Cohen had died. Then, we have been told, "an extraordinary groan ran through the House, from the galleries as well as from the floor". Dr. Zake, the Minister of Education, rose to speak for the Government. "Sir Andrew," he said, "brought dignity to the people of Uganda." I think it is right that I should mention this, for this spontaneous tribute echoed so many expressions of personal affection by so many different people of Uganda during his visits to that country since he ceased to be Governor, tributes that meant a very great deal to him. It is good to think that exactly at this moment another service is being held in his memory in another St. Paul's Cathedral at Namirembe, Kampala, in Uganda.

And let it be said—and this is to express it mildly—that it was not as though during his five years there he had tried to gain popularity by not doing unpopular things or by being careful not to create trouble. His work at the United Nations and in this country since then will, of course, be part of History. He was a very remarkable Civil Servant, combining a quite staggering capacity for work with equally remarkable powers of imagination. He saw endless opportunities for creative work—perhaps I might refer especially to his enthusiastic support for education in the developing countries—he inspired those with whom he worked to see these opportunities too. I believe his imprint is already on the generations to come in many parts of the Commonwealth. My mind goes across the three thousand miles to that other service in St. Paul's Cathedral. It was not just the administrative ability and the great intellectual energy he showed that make us feel now that we are at one with that concretion in Kampala. To understand this we must look at him also in another way; we must glance at his personality which was by no means a simple one.

He certainly did not ride easily over the difficulties which faced him, quite inevitable difficulties because he had to deal with in-

tractable problems and many very contrasting individuals. He could be depressed by these difficulties; he could find them almost overwhelming. There was an element of deep passion in his nature and this was no doubt largely the cause of this. It was also perhaps his greatest source of strength. For the problems were to him human problems, affecting always in the last analysis real men and women. It is not given to all great administrators to feel like this.

And, of course, he was impatient. Perhaps it would not be quite fair to say that he was not able to suffer fools gladly, but he certainly was not able to suffer them for very long.

And, when we think of him as a person, we may remember one particular tribute which is paid to him by many. All I can do is to attempt to express it. His eccentricities, which were never trivial but had something grand about them, were lovable and he was loved for them. Stories will be told about him for a long time and men and women will be happy when they recall them.

I spoke of looking at him in two ways. This is, of course, absurd. The administrator, the companion, the civil servant dictating at his desk or presiding with immense enthusiasm over a conference, the man with his family in the country, were all one. And let us remember that like the giant in classical mythology who had only to touch the ground when engaged in an encounter to receive new strength, so Andrew had a home he had only to touch to come back into the struggle revived. History will pay him her tribute in ways which we cannot do, recording mistakes as well as his achievements and his moments of inspiration. We think of him as a friend and we can say that our lives would have been less interesting and less enjoyable and lacking in some inspiration—to some a profound inspiration—and in memories which we shall treasure, if we had not known him.

THE LATE HONORABLE ELMER J.
HOLLAND

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 8, 1968

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, I join with the members of the Pennsylvania delegation and other in expressing my deep sorrow over the untimely passing of our colleague, the Honorable ELMER J. HOLLAND.

ELMER HOLLAND was one of our most distinguished colleagues, a man whose service and devotion to his State and the Nation were repeatedly evidenced through six full consecutive terms and parts of two other terms. The noble fruits of his dedication have long commanded our respect, and his accomplishments in the areas of education and manpower shall stand as beacons for those who follow him here in this Chamber.

On many occasions I sat next to ELMER HOLLAND in the first row of the House Chamber. I found him to be possessed of a keen sense of humor, despite the physical handicap of his last few years. I have lost a friend.

To the members of his bereaved family, I extend my profound condolences, and hope that they will find some measure of comfort in the fullness of his life's services to his fellowmen.

NE JET PLANES FOR ISRAEL

HON. JAMES H. SCHEUER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to hear President Johnson's announcement yesterday that he had directed the State Department to begin negotiations with Israel for the sale of supersonic jet fighter-bombers, presumably the Phantom F-4.

The precarious situation in the Middle East caused by Soviet rearming of Egypt requires that these negotiations be conducted as expeditiously as possible so as to permit rapid delivery of the planes.

A recent article in Near East Report very thoroughly discusses the discouraging events in the Middle East. I think that anyone reading this analysis will agree that it is imperative for Israel to acquire sufficient planes and achieve a deterrent capability sufficient to meet the threat caused by Russian shipments to Egypt. The article follows.

THE IMPOSED "PEACE"

The Russians have resumed pressure on the United States to abandon Israel and to force her to surrender to the Arabs without a negotiated peace settlement.

The Russian plan calls for:

Israel withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 1967 armistice lines.

Renunciation of Arab belligerence.

A strong UN presence in the area.

A four-power guarantee by the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France.

Other issues—freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, the Arab refugees and Jerusalem—would be left to the future.

The proposal is not new. It recalls the Yugoslav initiative which both Israel and the United States rejected a year ago.

In Paris, Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban declared that it was identical with a plan presented by the Soviet Union to the Security Council last fall, which Israel, together with a majority of governments, had rejected. He said that "under the Soviet plan Israel is called on to renounce its security without obtaining peace. This is why we rejected it."

WHERE DOES THE UNITED STATES STAND?

But the Department of State was slow to react to the Soviet proposal. This occasioned some surprise.

And it was not until this afternoon that the Department finally made public comment. The Department let it be known that it had replied to the Soviet Union by stressing U.S. support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts "to promote agreements among the parties on a peaceful settlement" based on the Nov. 22 UN Security Council resolution. In effect, it discouraged bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks.

Three weeks ago, in his speech to the B'nai B'rith, President Johnson called for a "real peace of justice and reconciliation—not a cease-fire, not a temporary truce, not a renewal of the fragile armistice."

The President once again called for "secure and recognized borders" and for lines which "must be agreed by the parties involved as part of the transition from armistice to peace."

In our last issue, the *Near East Report* anticipated the new Soviet initiative and welcomed the President's reassurances as sig-

nificant when viewed in relation to any future U.S.-Soviet talks on the Near East.

Accordingly, difficult questions came to the fore: Had there been a change in U.S. policy? Had there been some erosion?

Several theories were offered to explain the U.S. readiness to take the Soviet proposal seriously.

Since the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the United States has feared a new confrontation with an unpredictable Russia either in Europe or in the Near East. Accordingly, the Administration is anxious to reach some kind of detente with the Russians in the Near East if that is possible.

The United States fears that Arabs and Russians will enjoy a propaganda advantage in the UN General Assembly and that it will be increasingly difficult for the United States to support Israel's insistence on peace treaties in the international forum.

Some diplomats may be using the Soviet proposal for leverage on Israel in connection with the Jarring mission. While the United States has accepted Israel's view that any withdrawal must be in the context of an overall settlement, the United States has not agreed with Israel that there must be direct Arab-Israel talks. For many months, Washington has been urging Israel to agree to indirect talks and to offer Jarring a map or a peace prospectus.

Israel finally agreed but it wanted some assurances that such talks would lead to concrete results. Israel then asked Jarring to find out from the Egyptians what they meant by their concept of peace and how they envisaged the relations of the parties.

To this, it has been reported, there has been no satisfactory reply.

Eban will offer Israel's proposals for a peace settlement at the UN General Assembly on Oct. 8. He met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk in New York yesterday.

The United States wants the Jarring mission to continue. In Washington, there is apprehension that if the Jarring mission is stalemated the Soviet Union and the Arabs may try to force a new UN resolution serving an ultimatum on Israel and demanding the imposition of sanctions.

All this Soviet pressure recalls the 1957 debacle when the Soviet Union and the United States joined pressures to force Israel's withdrawal without a firm and lasting settlement.

ADVICE FROM THE PRESS

Significantly, two Washington newspapers which frequently reflect State Department views both urged Israel to consider the Russian initiative.

In an editorial on Sept. 28, the *Washington Post* states that the four-power guarantee "is not an acceptable substitute for what the parties themselves must agree to guarantee. That approach was tried and found unworkable." Nevertheless, the *Post* continues, "the Soviet bid should not be dismissed out of hand." It contends that the Russian plan will provide a "focus" for UN efforts in the search for peace.

"A policy switch from keeping the pot boiling to one of allowing the broth to chill ought to be greeted with hope. So tense and dangerous is the Middle East now that the slightest hint of relief should not be ignored," the paper says.

The *Evening Star*, on the same day, notes "that with tension in the area still at fever pitch, the Israelis will do well not to dismiss the proposal out of hand."

It concedes that the Soviet Union's motives are "suspect" and it speculates that one motive might be "to throw up a smokescreen of phony peace prospects to dissuade the U.S. from furnishing Phantom jets and other arms to Israel and to buy time while the Arab armies complete their retraining and re-equipping."

Another motive, the editorial continues, "might be to draw public attention away from Czechoslovakia."

Moreover, the *Star* says, the Soviet plan "falls considerably short of a solid guarantee" . . . The Israelis have reason to doubt the UN's staying power as a peacekeeping force and the ability of the four powers to work in concert in the Middle East, given a divergence of their views about the region.

Nevertheless, having given the major reasons why Israel is justified in rejecting the Soviet proposal, the *Star* argues that "if the Israel government maintains an unresponsive attitude to the Soviet proposal, it runs the risk of weakening its case in the eyes of the world. Moreover, there is just that outside chance that the Soviet Union's opening gambit could develop into full-fledged negotiations."

This seems very strange.

Israel is being pressed to consider a proposal which is prejudicial to the prospect of peace and security on the pretext that one might win world opinion by appeasing a power which has always been so contemptuous of world opinion.

The Soviet proposal would defeat Israel's major objective, the attainment of treaties which obligate the parties themselves to preserve the peace.

On the other hand, it would help the Arabs win their major objective: a "political solution" which forces Israel to retreat and exempts the Arab states from any responsibility to meet with Israel, to recognize her, to work with her to curb terrorism, to limit arms and to cooperate with her in trade and development for the mutual benefit of all the peoples of the area.

AN UNREALISTIC PLAN

Close examination of the Soviet plan suggests that it raises many more problems than it solves.

Does the Soviet Union really mean that Israel should withdraw completely to the June 4, 1967 lines?

Would Jerusalem again be divided and Israel barred from access to the Old City and the Western Wall?

Would the Syrians return to the bunkers of the Golan Heights?

Would an Egyptian Governor General resume the rule of Gaza?

Would Egyptian tanks and jets return to Sinai?

And what kind of UN force do the Russians envisage?

Would the Russians themselves or East European satellites provide soldiers?

Would Bulgarian jeeps patrol the environs of the Holy Places?

Does Jerusalem become another Berlin, with four guaranteeing powers controlling their own zones, with their own military headquarters?

Do Egyptian guns return to Sharm el-Sheikh to resume the blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the situation which prevailed on June 4 and which precipitated the war?

And who would be responsible for curbing terrorism in the absence of treaty obligations?

How would the four powers enforce their guarantees?

Would the UN Security Council be the final arbiter in the case of dispute and would the Soviet Union feel free, as always in the past, to veto any Israel complaint or protest?

In the light of these questions, it is obvious that the Soviet proposal as a substitute for a peace treaty should be emphatically rejected. Any equivocal response suggests weakness and encourages the Arab states to believe that they can persist in their negative position: They may feel free to continue to demand Israel's withdrawal and to spurn moves toward negotiations, recognition and peace.

There is irony in the coincidence that the new push for appeasement in the Near East comes just 30 years to the week of the shameful and ignominious sellout at Munich which led to World War II.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LEFT— A GOSPEL OF NIHILISM

HON. JOHN M. ASHBROOK

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, in August, 1967, the magazine, *Christianity Today*, published an article by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on a recent development in this country, the New Left. As usual, Director Hoover goes right to the heart of the matter and recommends a reaffirmation of the basic spiritual and moral values which have been our heritage. As a large percentage of college-age New Leftists comes from affluent surroundings, one cannot blame their individual discontent on poverty, nor can large Federal aid programs cajole them into assuming constructive roles as citizens.

Of clergymen and concerned laymen, Mr. Hoover asks:

Are they involved in a dialogue—a heart-to-heart conversation—with these young people, endeavoring to answer some of their probing questions about human existence, such as: Who am I? Why am I here? What is the purpose of life? What values have meaning?

All of us, clergymen and laymen, need to look deeper into our hearts to answer these questions.

To be sure, excesses by the New Left must be dealt with firmly and forcefully, and they must be given to understand that we do not intend to stand idly by while our society and its institutions are rent asunder by malcontents and anarchists, be they foreign or home grown.

The above-mentioned article by Mr. Hoover should be required reading for all citizens concerned about this recent phenomenon in American life. To give it wider dissemination, I insert it in the RECORD at this point:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LEFT: A GOSPEL OF NIHILISM

(By J. Edgar Hoover)

The time has come for Americans to focus on a new kind of conspiracy in our country—a movement called the New Left. In recent months the effects of the New Left have been seen in many places: In demonstrations against American policy in Viet Nam, in civil disobedience, in calls for young men to resist the draft, in campus turmoil, in attacks against law and order, in desecrations of the American flag.

What is the New Left?

Actually, the New Left as a movement is difficult to define. If you visit a New Left meeting, you will find some of the participants smartly dressed, others with dirty T-shirts and baggy trousers. A high percentage are Beatniks—wearing long hair and beards, unkempt clothes, and sandals. A few are Hippies, experimenting with drugs and enamored with esoteric rituals such as "love-ins," "be-ins," and "happenings." If you listen to their conversation, you will hear a steady flow of obscene and foul language. Sexual promiscuity is not considered in bad taste.

Most of the participants are students. The New Left is predominantly a college-age movement found in the college and university community—but not exclusively. Besides undergraduates, the New Left contains a wide assortment of other participants: college faculty members (mostly young), graduate students, guitarists, writers, intel-

lectuals of various types, ex-students still "hanging around" the campus, curiosity-seekers, Communists, Trotskyites.

"We have within our ranks," comments the national vice-president of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the largest and best known of New Left groups, "Communists of both varieties, socialists of all sorts, three or four different kinds of anarchists, anarcho-syndicalists, syndicalists, social democrats, humanist liberals, a growing number of libertarian laissez-faire capitalists, and of course, the articulate vanguard of the psychedelic liberation front."

In this amalgam is found much nonsensical chatter but also serious conversation by some highly motivated and articulate young people seeking to understand vital problems facing our nation today, such as poverty, civil rights, world peace, automation, the student's role on the university campus, human dignity in a rapidly developing urban and industrial economy. Here is the paradox of the New Left: Many of the New Leftists are mere intellectual tramps who seek the exotic and eccentric as emotional outlets; but some, in one way or another, are seriously searching—not only for answers to society's problems but for values of human existence in a world of great uncertainty.

To equate the New Left with a political party or a tightly disciplined organization is to miss its true identity. It is not an organization. It does not have a constitution, bylaws, or an official membership.

Rather the New Left is a mood, a philosophy of life, a *Weltanschauung*, a way of looking at self, country, and the universe. And in this mood lies its tragedy—and its danger!

For the New Left's mood—and philosophy of life—is not one of support for America and its traditions, of upholding moral and democratic values. Rather, it is one of defiance, hostility, and opposition to our free society. It seeks to destroy, not to build. Its whole approach is one of negativism—to criticize, belittle, denigrate the principles on which this nation was built. Cynicism, pessimism, and callousness are its mottoes. At its heart, the New Left is nihilistic and anarchistic.

Hence, to dismiss the New Left, as some do, as a collection of simpletons, eccentrics, and jocular fools is to commit a grave mistake. Its adherents should not, as so often happens, be judged strictly by their Beatnik dress and ways (repugnant as they may be to most Americans). New Leftism poses today challenging and provocative questions for the nation—questions that each thoughtful citizen should carefully analyze, study, and understand. Who are these young people? Why have they chosen to disparage the society and institutions that gave them birth? Why is their gospel one of nihilism? Why have they rejected the values of our Judaic-Christian civilization?

The imperative need for knowledge is shown by the rapid growth of the movement. Just a few months ago the SDS's national vice-president enthusiastically reported that his group had some 30,000 adherents. "Starting from almost zero," he said, "we have achieved that number in seven years; we have grown ten-fold in only two years." More and more the New Left is reaching into the high-school age group. *New Left Notes*, organ of SDS, comments:

"The 600 members of SDS who are in high schools are the most underrepresented group in our organization. . . . A high school organizer would be able to make high school members more than peripherally involved in the affairs of SDS. Moreover, he could begin to help build a more solid high school movement. This would not be difficult."

To analyze the New Left is to become suddenly aware of the nihilistic wasteland it presents.

Basic to the New Left's mood is the idea that contemporary American society (contemptuously called the "Establishment") is corrupt, evil, and malignant—and must be destroyed. To reform it, to change it for the better, is impossible. It must—along with its Judaic-Christian values—be liquidated. "Let's face it. It is, to use the crudest psychological terminology, a sick, sick, sick society in which we live. It is, finally, a society which approaches collective insanity—a system of authority-dependency relationships which destroys life and health and strength and creates debility, dependency, and deathliness."

paraging American history. They contemptuously hiss and boo officials of our government and show scornful disdain for opinions with which they disagree (the New Left at heart is extremely totalitarian, intolerant, and opinionated in nature). They urge resistance to the draft (even on occasions try to interfere physically with the legitimate activities of armed-services personnel on college campuses present for the purpose of recruiting), burn or mutilate draft cards, endeavor to dictate to university administrative officials how these institutions should be run.

In this spirit of nihilism, the New Left manifests a nauseating air of self-righteousness. As if it alone knows how to solve the problems of twentieth-century society and alone can be trusted to carry out these solutions. There is almost a hysterical repudiation of the older generation (defined as any person over the age of thirty—though this age minimum is rapidly decreasing). The older generation (our "impotent, neurotic elders") is characterized as having sold out to "imperialistic monopoly capitalism" (note the use of Marxist terminology) and having "betrayed" the youth. Hence, it is not to be trusted—and no wisdom and advice can be expected from it.

Therefore, the New Left has little appreciation of and respect for history ("we have little or no sense of history") or for the accumulated heritage and wisdom of former years. By rejecting the past, they lack a clear view of the future and fail to understand the nature of man as a human being. They are anarchistic iconoclasts, breaking and destroying, whose eschatological vision has no practical or even idealistic idea of what the future should be. Their chief aim, despite their protestations to the contrary, is to destroy, annihilate, tear down.

Their heroes are Castro, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, Ho Chi Minh, or whoever they ebulliently believe is a fighter (preferably the romantic guerrilla type) against a "status quo" capitalist nation.

Ideologically, the ideas of existentialism, especially as reflected in the writings of the French authors Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, have been influential. But a major influence has been Marxism. Karl Marx is frequently quoted in their writings. They talk much about the concept of "alienation," which derives in large part from Marx. By "alienation," they mean their separation from, and lack of allegiance to, the institutions of contemporary society. These institutions (such as our educational system, private industry, the government, the military services), they claim, are "choking," "stifling," and "stunting" young people, creating in them a "slave psychology." As one New Leftist put it: "From the moment he enters school, the student is subjected to innumerable procedures designed to humiliate him and remind him that he is worthless and that adults are omnipotent."

In part, the New Left's Beatnik style, their use of obscene language, their inclination towards drugs, is an attempt to shock their elders, a way of ostentatiously declaring their "freedom" from what they call the "old," the "decadent," the "bourgeois." All too frequently, the hallucinatory world of drugs not

only leads to permanent physical addiction but also makes even more difficult any transition to the world of reality. For many young people the use of drugs is a retreat, a withdrawal into a psychedelic world where they can evade making the basic decisions of life. This problem of drugs should not be taken lightly by our society.

How should this 'decadent' society be destroyed? New Leftists are not sure. Their talk is vague but violent. "The only overtly political power we have," says one New Leftist, "is the power to disrupt. But even this limited power can be significant. . . . We need to develop techniques of creative disruption." To "radicalize" the youth, to build a "radical or revolutionary consciousness," to create a "sense of radical self-identity"—these are constant New Left phrases.

This mood of "creative disruption" in the past has been reflected in various tactics of protest, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, petition campaigns. But the mood of New Left protest, unfortunately, is now giving way to one of resistance. This is one of the tragedies of any movement of protest that refuses to find an outlet through legitimate channels of society and in cooperation with other groups—it moves to more radical, extreme, and bitter positions. Many New Left leaders, making judgments from increasing feelings of personal frustration and hatred, are talking in terms of resistance (a word frequently used by them) to the society they detest.

One SDS leader says: "We have to build a movement out of people's guts, out of their so-far internalized rejection of American society, and present people with a revolutionary alternative to the American way of life."

"Many of us in SDS share a conviction that this is what has to happen. That we must resist, and that people must break free. None of us is sure we can win. All we can say is that there are other ways to lead our lives in the face of the obscenity of what American life is—and that we intend to live them that way."

Still another New Leftist talks about the movement's future:

"There is a continuing need for serious discussion of alternative scenarios for an American revolution. I do not believe advocates of electoral activity have offered one. . . . I feel the formation of counter-communities of struggle and the creation of local pockets of power is the way to begin to find a strategy of revolution."

After favorably quoting Karl Marx, an SDS writer says:

"It is important that we begin to talk in terms of five, ten, fifteen years because that is the time and energy it will take to build a Revolutionary movement and socialist political party able to take power in America. At this point, we in SDS must begin to write about and talk about socialist theory, so that we will be prepared to play a major role in developments, creating larger numbers of socialists, and developing socialist consciousness in all institutions in which we organize."

The news media not long ago quoted a top New Leftist as saying: "We are working to build a guerrilla force in an urban environment." "We are actively organizing sedition." Another stated: "I think violence is necessary, and it frightens me."

What does all this mean? That there are young people who disagree with society, who are willing to protest and make their views known—this is all to the good. America needs a questioning generation. It needs young people who will speak up frankly and firmly. The spirit of protest and dissent is inextricably interwoven in the fabric of American society. We want no silent generation. In a dangerous nuclear world, beset with uncertainty and fear, the human spirit will—and must—seek answers.