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unions and farmer co-ops in thousands more rural towns and villages, but these have not been enough!

Grange Community Progress Programs, involving hundreds of thousands of rural citizens and millions of dollars, have initiated community self-help projects in more than 5,000 communities annually. But, these have not been enough!

For the past one hundred years, the Grange has sponsored continuous social and cultural programs which have strengthened family and community ties. But, this has not been enough!

In short, local initiative, alone, has not been enough!

Today, more than 250 government technical, financial assistance programs are available to local communities for development or redevelopment. Each new session of Congress seems to create new federal programs to aid rural America. Billions of dollars have been appropriated for this purpose. Agricultural price support payments, while but a fraction of total monies spent in development programs, have accounted for billions more.

Obviously, government assistance programs alone have not been enough. Nor, has government assistance, coupled with local initiative, been enough!

In the past 35 years since the Depression 30s, a succession of government, business and community programs have been tried and failed to energize rural America.

At the same time, mechanization of farm and industry has displaced job opportunities in rural America, notably in mining, steel, etc. The visible deterioration of rural communities was generally in areas where coal, gold, silver, timber and oil resources have been depleted and/or industrial progress had outmoded river-port, railroad towns and marginal farming areas.

Agriculture, by far is, and has been America's largest industry. The reduction of farms in the past decades, due to mechanization and the disappearance of marginal farms, has now brought the loss of economic opportunity in rural America to crisis proportions.

More than three million farm job-opportunities have disappeared. These must be replaced!

Fortunately, Mr. Freeman's national challenge comes at a crucial moment when America is on the threshold of a population explosion which is predicted to double the number of Americans by the turn of the century.

The United States can look forward to an unprecedented era of expansion, productivity, opportunities and prosperity if we prepare now to meet it.

Clearly, we have no more time, no more alternatives and no more excuses. We must move now to meet the challenge!

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

Cons
CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the pending business, which the clerk will state.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th Cong., second sess.)

The Senate resumed the consideration of the convention.

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I very much doubt that there is anything new or different to be said either for or against the consular accord. The subject has been exhausted in congressional hearings, in statements made on the floor, in the editorial columns of the Nation's press and wherever concerned men gather. But like other Members of the Senate who must weigh and then vote on this important question, I want to make my position unmistakably clear.

I join with the President and all other men of good will in the hope that international tensions can be minimized. But, unlike the President, I do not consider the consular accord a step in that direction, and I will therefore oppose it.

The administration and several of my colleagues have undertaken to convince the American people that the accord is weighted heavily in favor of the United States, primarily because Americans traveling in the Soviet Union will be afforded greater protection. But I reject this argument. The consular accord, even if it were to safeguard the rights of Americans, must be viewed not in isolation, but as the first in a series of steps toward a detente with the Soviet Union, the total thrust of which is not at this time in our national interest. By the President's own admission, his bridge-building efforts soon will be extended to East-West trade, to the United Nations agreement on the peaceful use of outer space, and to mutual destruction of nuclear weapons.

At this time I shall read, from an article by the noted columnist, James J. Kilpatrick, his conclusions in regard to this consular pact.

He says it is more a moral than a political issue, and concludes his editorial as follows:

Thus the merits of the case. The towering questions rise above the merits. Do we want to build bridges at all just now? At a time when Soviet weapons are killing American troops, does the Congress wish to embark upon any new gestures of friendliness toward the Communist East? This is more a moral than a political issue. It strikes at the inherent hypocrisy involved in simultaneously sipping tea in Leningrad and spilling blood in Vietnam. Some of us on the anti-Communist Right may be "primitive" in the Fulbright-Kennan-Schlesinger view, but we would urge that the teadrinking be postponed to another and better day.

No one can argue with the point 18,000 Americans who each year travel to the Soviet Union need greater protection. But the protection they require—notification of arrest within a reasonable period of time and the right to visitation with American officials—should not have to be negotiated. It should be extended to all men as members of civilized society. But the Soviets, even until today, have demonstrated no sincere inclination to extend these ordinary laws of decency and good will. In fact, since the Consular Treaty was first signed in 1964, more than 20 arrests or detentions of American citizens have taken place, and not once did the Soviet Union notify U.S. diplomats within the agreed upon 3 days.

Therefore, how sincere can the Soviets be? Even though Congress had not approved the accord, as it has not done

even to this day, the President of the United States entered into the agreement in good faith, a term apparently unfamiliar to Soviet officials. If they were truly interested in establishing friendly relations with the West, it seems to me that they might have started by abiding with the terms of the agreement which was in force in spirit if not in law.

Without question, the consular accord promises greater protection for Americans traveling in the Soviet Union. In fact, it promises rights greater than those granted to Soviet citizens in Russia. But rights and protection are one thing, and the promise of them quite another. Given the Soviet Union's record of violating the terms of one treaty after another—including the 1933 Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, which guaranteed American officials the right of access to American citizens imprisoned in the Soviet Union—there is no assurance that the promised protection will be transferred from paper into practice. No, none whatever.

Even our ally Great Britain—a nation which time and again has been in the forefront of efforts to reduce East-West tensions—has not ratified the accord, and primarily because Members of Parliament, like many Senators, are unconvinced of the sincerity of the Soviet promises. And how could they be otherwise. Even though Britain signed a consular agreement with Russia in 1965, the Soviets have refused to allow British officials to visit regularly with Gerald Brooke, a British lecturer recently sentenced to 5 years in prison for allegedly smuggling anti-Soviet literature into Moscow. Once again the Soviet Union has demonstrated its contempt for the spirit, though not necessarily the letter, of such an agreement.

But even if we concede for the purpose of argument that the Soviet will honor their promise to give Americans greater protection than they give their own citizens—even if we concede that point, the agreement will not change the Russian system of justice, where, unlike in the United States, all men are not equal before the bar, nor are they necessarily innocent until proven otherwise. All too often the Soviet Union has regarded Americans on trial as little more than pawns in the cold war. No, the consular accord, whatever its merits, will not alter, cannot alter, Russian justice.

Surely it is unnecessary to remind my distinguished colleagues and the American people that any meaningful change in policies and practices must follow a change in heart. And I personally know of no evidence to indicate that the Soviets have had a change in heart in their attitude toward the rights and aspirations of man. And until such time as that change occurs, until such time as the rights of man are given a higher priority than the rights of states, the United States cannot hope to alter substantially the protection of its citizens in the hands of Communist justice.

In my opinion, therefore, the administration and other supporters of the accord have completely overstated its importance, its protection.

Another consideration is whether the agreement will lead to reciprocal consulates being opened in the Soviet Union and in the United States, as of course it will. The administration has exhausted considerable time and energy seeking to convince the American public that it already has the authority to enter into such agreements, a point I find little disputed. The President does possess such authority. Therefore, if additional consulates are required to protect Soviet and American citizens traveling in the other's country, why does the administration push for the new accord—particularly when, as I previously indicated, diplomatic immunity for representatives of both countries was established in the 1933 agreement.

Of course, the immunity provisions in the consular accord are far more absolute than those provided for in the Litvinov Agreement and in the Vienna Convention, which the United States and 31 other nations signed in 1963. In fact, by exempting from arrest or detention all consular officers or their employees, the new accord will extend protection to the Soviets heretofore not provided even to our closest allies.

The effects such a provision could have on our internal security at such time as the Soviets open a consulate in this country, already have been thoroughly explored, and I therefore will not comment at length on the point. But I want to state my belief that many of the Americans who join with me in opposing this accord are misdirecting their fire at the espionage issue—which, while important, seems to me to be not the most important reason for opposition. J. Edgar Hoover, a man whom I greatly admire, has stated that Russian consulates in this country would make the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation more difficult. And it doubtless would. But I personally have great faith in the ability of the FBI, given additional funds and more manpower, to deal effectively with the threat of expanded espionage activities.

Of greater importance to me, in addition to the fact that the consular accord is not a *quid pro quo* agreement, is the effect our ratification of the treaty will have on other nations of the world, especially those which have aligned themselves with the United States in the protracted struggle against communism. There are two possible reactions. Either they will interpret our action as a sign of weakness, in which case they will move from under America's protective wing, or they will themselves rush into a similar agreement with the Soviets, the end result of which would be disastrous. Most countries, lacking an internal security organization anywhere near as effective as our own, simply could not counteract Soviet espionage programs operating out of its embassies and consulates. Consequently, the very instrument by which nations seek to reduce tensions will be the catalyst for more subversion and revolution, and nowhere more so than in Latin America. I truly am concerned that our ratification of the treaty could affect the balance of power in the world greatly in favor of the Soviets.

Another question for which a satisfactory answer has not been provided is the possible effect the consular accord will have on U.S. policy regarding the status of the Baltic States. Many informed Americans, including the respected and knowledgeable Georgetown University professor, Lev Dobriansky, believe the move would be tantamount to recognizing the Soviet's illegal and immoral seizure of those countries. And I am inclined to accept their viewpoint.

Each of the aforementioned reasons is, to my way of thinking, justifiable grounds for not entering into the consular accord with the Soviet Union at this time. However, my primary reason for opposition is that the *détente*—of which, as I previously indicated, the treaty is only one part—comes at a time when the United States is engaged in a costly war in Vietnam which Soviet aid alone makes possible. Only this week, the administration requested and received from the Congress an additional \$4.5 billion appropriation to "block Communist aggression in Asia." Now, Congress is being asked to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union which could lead to better relations and to a relaxation of world tensions. This cold war rhetoric is difficult to understand, much less to justify. There is no factual difference between the Soviet Union desiring peace on the one hand and the Communist aggression killing American boys on the other. They are one in the same.

If the U.S.S.R. truly is interested in better relations with the West, let it begin by demonstrating that interest on other than the rhetorical front. Let it begin by withholding support from the war which is costing thousands of lives, Americans and Vietnamese, and consuming our resources.

Personally, I know of no responsible American who does not fervently pray for better relations among all nations, in the hope that men everywhere someday can live in a peaceful world. But a meaningful peace requires more than words, more than diplomatic agreements; it requires application of the principle of "live and let live," and that principle the Soviet Union has neither applied nor practiced, nor is there reason to suspect it will.

Congress must make certain that any bridges built to the east carry two-way traffic. That is, that they will serve the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union to the same approximate degree. It does not appear to me, for the reasons I have mentioned, that the consular accord meets this basic requirement, and I will therefore oppose it when it comes to a vote.

Further, in support of my position, I would like to refer to the testimony given by Warren McDonald in behalf of the American Legion. Concerning the treaty, Mr. McDonald had this to say:

What is the purpose of this Consular Convention from the viewpoint of the Kremlin? It seems obvious to us that the purpose of this treaty from the Soviet side is exactly the opposite from that expressed by its U.S. proponents. To the Soviets, we think the main purpose of this treaty definitely is to re-establish their consulates in this country, with a new and unusual rule to apply to all

of its agents posted to those consulates; that is, absolute protection against prosecution by the United States for any crimes committed by them, including the crime of espionage against the United States! This is the intent of Article 19, section 2, to the Soviets.

The treaty's provisions regarding "notification and access" in arrest cases (i.e., Article 12) is hardly the "purpose" of the treaty from the Soviet viewpoint. Those are simply what they gave up—on paper, at least—to gain new islands of diplomatic immunity in America's industrial and transportation heartland.

If this were not true, the Soviet negotiators would have had no interest in the treaty. They definitely would not have troubled themselves if the document were to have been restricted to the provisions of its Article 12 and the protocol related thereto. They had nothing to gain in that regard; we have always given them prompt notification about and unrestricted access to any of their nationals whom we might arrest here. To them, the extension of full and absolute diplomatic immunity to their consular officers is the *quid pro quo* which outweighs the concession they made, on notification and access, as to our nationals arrested in their country. Communists have never been known to enter into an agreement with non-Communists which they did not expect to be of greater advantage to them.

We infer from the available public record that it was the Soviet negotiators who initially raised the matter of full diplomatic immunity for purposes of this Consular Convention. (See Committee's print of Hearing July 30, 1965, pg. 30). The provisions of full diplomatic immunity for all consular officers has not been a part of our general practice. It was not a feature of our Consular Convention with Japan, which entered into force on August 1, 1964, and which, we assume, was negotiated at about the same time as the pending Convention with the Soviet Union. More significantly, it was not made a feature of the *multilateral* Vienna Convention on Consular Relations which was signed by a U.S. representative, and by the representatives of 31 other nations, on April 24, 1963. Representatives of 20 additional nations have since added their signatures, making a total of 52 signatories.

I will refer further to the Vienna *multilateral* convention on consular relations in another connection. At this point, I only wish to stress the point that its immunity provisions, set forth in Article 41 thereof, follow the usual and traditional rule; that is, consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention (in the receiving State) "except in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by the competent judicial authority." Consulates have long demonstrated that they can perform their proper functions without the cloak of full diplomatic immunity for their employees.

Article 19(2) of the pending treaty with the Soviet Union provides, on the other hand, as follows:

"Consular officers and employees of the consular establishment who are nationals of the sending state shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state."

Thus, under this rule, if a Soviet consular officer, posted in Chicago for instance, commits or attempts to commit a serious crime, our only recourse is to demand his expulsion. This is true no matter how monstrous the offense, and no matter how vital its bearing on our national security. And, however often we declare a Soviet official persona non grata, we may be sure the Soviet government will soon thereafter demand the recall from that country of a comparable U.S. official. Under this treaty, reasons for such action need not be given; but, in previous cases of this nature, it has been Soviet practice to make, and to publicize widely, false spy charges against the U.S. official concerned. (This game of diplomatic tit-for-tat can

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have, temporarily at least, a disruptive influence on a mission's efficiency. We should not unnecessarily take steps that would surely serve to increase its incidence).

With regard to the immunity provisions of the treaty, Senator Cotton of New Hampshire has observed that the Soviets negotiated this Consular Convention, "not as a bilateral pact for improving Soviet-American relations, but as a cold war maneuver to enhance and expand the intelligence gathering network of the U.S.S.R." We, too, are satisfied that the Soviets have every intention of utilizing any consulates they establish here as centers for espionage and subversion.

The Soviet intelligence services have regularly used that government's diplomatic and other establishments in this country as bases from which to carry on their espionage activities. These activities are known to increase in proportion to the number of Soviet representatives here.

Those who recall the previous abuse by the Soviets of their consular privileges in this country fear that this treaty will provide Soviet agents with increased opportunities for the intimidation, extortion, bribery, blackmail, or even the kidnapping or murder, of persons living here but who have relatives or property in the Soviet Union.

At a minimum, new Soviet consulates in any of our major cities will facilitate the securing, by Communist "consular officers," of all manner of technological data which could serve to promote the Soviet Union's war-making potential. Also, these consulates would doubtless be used as centers for the distribution of Communist propaganda, aimed primarily we feel sure at the more receptive elements on our college campuses.

The counter-argument to much of the foregoing is that we would be enabled, through our new consulates outside of Moscow, to gain equivalent benefits in terms of information about their society. This is unconvincing. The Soviets are still operating a closed society in which it remains extremely difficult for an American official to make any contacts or secure any information not previously sanctioned by Soviet officials. Furthermore, we could be sure that whatever "premisses" the Soviets helped us acquire for our consulates, in accordance with Article 5, these would be thoroughly "bugged" with the latest in electronic listening devices, just as has been the case in all offices we occupy in Communist countries.

We stated earlier that we believe the diplomatic immunity provisions of this treaty establish, for the U.S. at least, an unwelcome precedent. We may soon find that other countries, with which we have a consular treaty that contains the so-called "most-favored-nation" clause, will request extension of the greater immunity protection to their consular employees in this country. While this would be reciprocal in its application, the spread of this new rule on a haphazard, bilateral basis could well work to our detriment.

It is our understanding that as many as 33 existing consular treaties between the U.S. and other countries include "most-favored-nation" provisions. The State Department has estimated that if all of these countries exercised their option, we would be extending criminal immunity in this country to an additional 400 or more foreign nationals!

The countries involved include Communist Rumania and Yugoslavia. While Rumania now has no consulates in this country (other than its consular section in its Washington embassy), it might—following the lead of the Soviet Union—seek to establish one or more, with full diplomatic immunity as would be Rumania's privilege under the "most-favored-nation" rule. Also,

Yugoslavia now operates a number of consulates in this country, as was dramatically brought to our attention last Sunday morning. These are in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Pittsburgh, in addition to their combined consular staff in Washington. We may soon find that we will have a great deal more than only "10 or 15" new Communist agents in this country with full diplomatic immunity!

Poland already has a consulate in Chicago. Following the model of our treaty with the Soviet Union, that country could be expected to seek to complete negotiations on a similar consular convention with us. And, considering our "bridge-building" advances to the other Communist countries of Eastern Europe, all of them may shortly be seeking consulates here, with the same immunity provisions.

But where the "most-favored-nation" clause is applied, we will not necessarily gain back the *quid pro quo* we received in our negotiations with the Soviet Union! Whereas, we there exchanged the "diplomatic immunity" provisions for the "notification and access" provisions, the same exchange would not be applicable in the case of a third country asking for the "diplomatic immunity" privileges for its consular officials. All we would get back then is reciprocity on that score alone. This is an important consideration in the case of the Communist countries of Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The same disadvantageous development might occur in the case of several non-Communist countries which do not provide our consular officers with ready access to our nationals when they have been arrested. Italy and a number of other countries, the laws of which have been derived from the Roman Code, hold their prisoners incommunicado until completion of investigation. In Mexico this can go on for as long as 18 months. Our consular officials are barred from seeing imprisoned Americans under such circumstances, just as they have been in the Soviet Union and most other Communist countries.

The U.S. has been unable to secure "notification and access" rights from Italy and several others with similar laws. Yet, we have a consular treaty with Italy that includes a "most-favored-nation" clause. Thus, if this Consular Convention with the Soviet Union is ratified, we may be asked by Italy to extend to its consular officers here the diplomatic immunity provisions of Article 19, but we will not get the "notification and access" provisions of Article 12 in return. Should these new immunity provisions spread generally, due to the precedent of this Consular Convention, they will eventually facilitate the spread of the Soviet Union's subversive influence almost everywhere. Others have pointed out with logic that our friends in Latin America would have difficulty in resisting the establishment of Soviet Consulates in their cities, once the barrier to their re-establishment in this Hemisphere is broken, through ratification of this treaty.

It is not difficult to imagine how the Communists would turn this to their advantage, especially when armed with full diplomatic protection for all their agents in Latin America. Surely the establishment of Soviet consulates there would result in intensified political warfare throughout that continent. Castro would get a large boost in his plans to export his (and the Soviets') brand of revolution.

While our government may well be enabled to cope with a small to moderate increase in Communist agents here, are we certain that the intelligence services of the developing countries can do so? It is questions such as this that have caused so many opponents of the Consular Convention, and its special immunity provisions, to wonder if we are not about to open a door which we will not be able to close.

For the reasons I have enumerated, I will oppose the Consular Convention.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I look upon this Consular Convention between the United States and Russia as a way of bringing about closer contacts between the Russian and American peoples. Those familiar with my record should know that this is a view that I have long entertained. While I abhor the evils of communism as much as anyone in this body, or in the Nation for that matter, I have long felt that our country should be doing everything possible to stimulate a closer relationship between us and the Russian people.

For those not familiar with my record, I might say here that this belief is based on four extensive tours that I had the privilege of making through the U.S.S.R. These tours were made in 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1961. The first of these took place only 2 years after Stalin's death and I daresay that I have seen as much or more of the vast Russian territory as any American citizen. My travels and observations inside Russia, as well as other parts of the world, have made it obvious to me that our then current foreign policy—the so-called policy of containment—has not worked as well as its proponents hoped that it would.

Since the end of World War II, we have spent in excess of \$120 billion in foreign economic and military assistance, justified primarily as a means of containing the threat of spreading communism. Today, Russia is internally stronger than ever before and external communism has also gained in strength in several important areas. I will not dwell on this point at length here, except to say that in the recent national elections in France, the Communist Party did far better than expected and seems to be on the rise. In Italy, a country where we have poured in billions of dollars of economic and military assistance, we find the largest single Communist Party outside the Soviet Union.

Under the policy of containment, we have worked for 20 years to construct a ring of steel around Russia. This has provided meager results, at a considerable cost to our Treasury. The ring of steel, however, has resulted in fomenting hatred, fear, and suspicion among the Russian people toward the United States. Our policy may be said to be similar to that of the British attempt to encircle and contain Germany, by treaty, prior to World War I. The Russian attitude, at least in 1961, was marked by the suspicions and resentments displayed by Germany against the British.

For the last 12 years, I have advocated changes that would, in my opinion, put our policy toward the U.S.S.R. on a more realistic basis. All of these changes were aimed first at bringing the Russian and American people closer together. Secondly, they were aimed at dispelling the suspicion and fear that exists between our countries, at least where those fears are groundless. For instance, I have long advocated a realistic exchange of persons program between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

It has always seemed very strange to me that we are willing to spend millions

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of dollars to bring citizens from our so-called Western allies to our shores but are unwilling to make the same effort to bring citizens from Russia or the Eastern bloc over here. This is strange to me because France, Britain, Italy, and other Western European countries are supposedly our friends and do not need to be persuaded to follow our way of life. On the other hand, citizens of Russia and the Eastern bloc nations know little of our way of life and cannot honestly say whether they should feel friendly or unfriendly toward our Government. All they know and all they have heard is that our system of government should be as abhorrent to them as theirs is to us.

There is presently great intellectual and economic change taking place in the Soviet Union, and if a policy of enlightenment had been started and enthusiastically carried out years ago, we could be reaping great rewards.

Tied in with a realistic exchange of persons program would be a realistic information program carried out by our Government and aimed at presenting the accomplishments of Americans to the Iron Curtain peoples. It would do no good for this program to place emphasis on any negative aspects of the Communist way of life. The Russian people are much better off today than they ever have been before and they attribute this to their own hard work. To a certain degree, they also attribute it to the socialistic form of government under which they live. If we do not realize this and attempt to criticize their accomplishments, we might as well spend our time shouting into the wind.

The policies which I have advocated are based on bringing better understanding between the two great powers of the world, while at the same time protecting our own interest and maintaining a strong system of defense. I am convinced that if ways and means can be found to bring more and more Russians in contact with the American way of life, we will not come out the losers in any comparisons which may be made. In other words, I would not be frightened to open our society to Russian visitors. I am confident we will come out ahead and that the Russian yearning for a better way of life would be fed and nourished.

I spoke a moment ago of great changes which have taken place in the Russian way of life since the death of Stalin. These have been documented by me in each of my reports submitted to the Senate in past years. Briefly put, the changes can be broken down into two categories—intellectual and economic. Since the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, the entire Russian society has been bubbling and simmering. In 1956, based on a visit made to Russia, 2 years after Stalin's death, I reported as follows:

I found that, as a whole, the educated Russians I spoke with were extremely curious about our mode of life in the United States, and, even more important, demonstrated a desire if not a compelling urge to go behind catchy Red slogans, and to do their own thinking. I have no doubt that the Russians of today are better off than they have ever been. Most of them seem satisfied, for the reason that they know no

better way of life than that which they are now enjoying.

As more Russians become educated, they will become less and less prone to accept at face value the propaganda-loaded description of life in the United States which the Red propaganda system dings insistently into their ears. The Russian people are curious by nature; they are becoming increasingly more curious about Americans, about life in America, and about the freedoms we enjoy.

In 1957, I reported that the process of intellectual ferment was picking up steam. My report of 1957 states:

The Soviet Union is undergoing a process of evolution—not revolution but evolution * * * The people are demanding more and more autonomy in the hope of gaining more voice in their local affairs * * * Having placed their people in a position where they are more and more able to think for themselves, the Soviet leadership is gambling with its own future. The time is now ripe for free world action designed to properly capitalize upon this new advent within the Soviet's borders * * * They will doubtless become dissatisfied when they learn there is a better way of life than that which they are now enjoying, and, as a result, will develop an urge to imitate ours.

I felt then and I feel now that our primary objective should be to assist that development.

The second great change that has occurred in Soviet society has been economic. It is universally recognized that tremendous economic progress has been made in the U.S.S.R., but it takes a series of visits spanning 5 or 6 years to appreciate the magnitude of this progress. The extent of the economic changes made between the mid-1950's and 1961 is documented extensively throughout my 1961 report. Huge hydroelectric dams, surpassing those in our own country, have been constructed. Entire new cities have grown up in areas once barren wasteland. Industry has marched forward and a reasonable amount of progress has been made in agricultural production.

This progress has been brought about primarily because of a decentralization which came into existence after the death of Stalin. The Russian leaders with whom I spoke on my various tours admitted this fact. My 1961 report points out that the Russian people themselves felt "that this tremendous surge in industry has come about because they have been able to force the central Government to give them more autonomy in determining their own needs and in carrying out the plans for increasing production."

Mr. President, I interpolate here to state that when I first went to Russia in 1955, all production and all distribution was centralized in Moscow. In the meantime, between the visit I made in 1955 and the one I made in 1961, there was a great decentralization of that authority to the peoples in the various so-called subdivisions or states of Russia. This change did not come about because the leaders desired it, but because the people demanded it. That is the reason, as I pointed out in my report in 1961, this great progress has occurred.

With the progress made through decentralization, we now see the profit motive becoming more and more accepted

as a principle of industrial production. A story in the March 8, 1967, issue of the Washington Post is headlined as follows: "All Soviet Industry To Use Profit System." The story carries a Moscow dateline and indicates that the Soviet Union intends to bring all of the country's industry under the profit system by the end of 1968. Twenty-five percent of the nation's industry was already operating on a profit motive in 1966. Under this system, if a factory is profitmaking, the manager on the local level may reward employees with raises and bonuses. If that is not a form of capitalism, I do not know what it is. We should encourage such a trend.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, the article to which I have just referred.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Moscow, March 7.—The Soviet Union intends to bring all of the country's industry under the profit system by the end of 1968, a leading economist said today.

Alexei Rumyantsev, editor of the weekly newspaper Economic Gazette, said that industries already under the system showed a 25 per cent profit in 1966. By contrast, Soviet industry as a whole produced only a 10 per cent profit.

Under the Soviet profit system, introduced last year by Premier Koygin, managers make day-to-day decisions on ordering materials, assigning workers and other matters which formerly needed Communist Party approval.

If a factory makes a profit, the manager may reward employees with raises and bonuses.

Rumyantsev said 10 per cent of the labor force operated under the profit system at the end of 1966, and that 50 per cent will work under the new system by the end of this year.

In a related development, a government labor planning official said about 20 per cent of the products turned out by Soviet heavy industry were sold at a loss at present wholesale prices.

Boris Sukharevsky, deputy chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, told reporters the extension of new wholesale prices to all Soviet industry, planned for later this year, would help to wipe out the loss.

The average increase on existing wholesale prices when the new ones come in will be around 12 per cent, Sukharevsky said.

Mr. ELLENDER. Now, Mr. President, any consideration of the Consular Convention now before the Senate for approval must make mention of the fact that a consulate is fundamentally a business office. A consulate is designed to assist foreign nationals in solving day-to-day problems which they may run into while on foreign soil. In recent years, the number of Americans visiting the U.S.S.R. has increased to about 18,000 per year, as against 1,000 Russians who annually visit our shores. It is clear to me that if advantages are to be gained from the Senate approval of this treaty, most of the advantages will be on the side of our people.

Foreign visitors not uncommonly get into trouble of one kind or another, both in the United States and Russia. This convention sets forth avenues whereby State Department officials will be able to have access to American nationals arrested on Soviet soil. This is a commitment not presently in force today, as too many Americans can testify. The argu-

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ment can be made, of course, that the Russian Government will not honor this commitment, and will not allow our officials to visit and provide assistance to any Americans arrested on their soil. That, of course, is always a possibility, but the answer to the problem is simple. If the commitment were not honored, our President could take the steps necessary to shut down any Russian consulates which might be doing business over here. This is of course, no guarantee that the access will be provided, but it does provide a powerful lever that can be used to retaliate against any breach of the treaty.

Concerning the question of diplomatic immunity which the Convention provides for consulate officials and employees, here again we have a decided advantage. Such immunity represents no great danger to this Nation, for any Russian thought to be committing crimes against our people or subversion against our Nation can be packed up and sent home without further ado. On the other hand, we in this country are not prone to arresting people and holding them incommunicado for weeks or months on end. We have always maintained the policy, when any abuse of diplomatic immunity was discovered, of naming the official as persona non grata and sending him home. This procedure is not necessarily followed by the Soviet Union and the immunity granted to our people serving in the U.S.S.R. is an important and necessary protection.

This whole question must be considered in light of the fact that we have an open society, whereas the Russian society still remains closed. In other words, we have very little to hide. If secrets are to be discovered, I would think it obvious that we could learn much more about current developments in Russia by opening consulates than they could learn about us. I daresay that Russian agents can learn as much by reading our daily newspapers as they could gain by opening a consulate in any of our cities.

In conclusion, it seems to me that here we have a chance to take steps which might ease somewhat the cold war tension now affecting the world. Even if this convention does not prove to be a step in that direction, its ratification would at least prove to be advantageous to our own national interest. I personally would have advocated such an agreement years ago, and I support Senate approval of the convention now. In these short remarks, I have listed several of my reasons for supporting this action. Many of these are already contained in my 1956, 1957, and 1961 reports to the Senate. To set forth the record more fully, I ask that a few short passages from these reports, pertinent to this issue, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. President, these passages were taken from my reports of 1956, 1957, and 1961.

In my report of 1961, in the fourth paragraph of the part I am asking to be put in the Record at this time, I set out that:

I have summed up my observations of these three earlier visits, and they can be found in the appendix marked Exhibit 14, p. 333.

I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in full at this point in the Record, together with the passages from the reports.

There being no objection, the extracts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

EXCERPT FROM ELLENDER REPORT OF 1956

*** I was not in Russia during the school months. However, I did have occasion to talk to Russians in almost all walks of life. The Soviets are placing great emphasis upon educational training. A modified form of merit system is in effect, with students selected for certain training on the basis of ability and aptitude; they attend college at Government expense; subsidies are paid to scholars, particularly in the technological fields and in both theoretical and applied sciences, I was informed.

Too, Russian children are being exposed to a universal educational system. In cities of 10,000 and more, from the 1st to the 10th grades is a must and in all other areas, from the 1st to the 7th is compulsory. While the Russian school curriculum is spiced heavily with Communist doctrine, the Soviet leadership has not yet found a way to communize such basic principles as the chemical composition of water, or the Pythagorean theorem in geometry. I am firmly convinced that it is the Russian educational system that offers the greatest hope for ultimate Russian freedom. The people are beginning to think for themselves and as time goes on, it will be more and more difficult for the leaders to keep them in line.

I found that, as a whole, the educated Russians I spoke with were extremely curious about our mode of life in the United States, and, even more important, demonstrated a desire if not a compelling urge to go behind catchy Red slogans, and to do their own thinking. I have no doubt that the Russians of today are better off than they have ever been. Most of them seem satisfied for the reason that they know no better way of life than that which they are now enjoying.

Joseph Stalin grew to power in the midst of ignorance and poverty. I am convinced that because of the changed conditions in Russia the people will not permit another despot to assume such powers as those exercised by Stalin.

As more Russians become educated, they will become less and less prone to accept at face value the propaganda-loaded description of life in the United States which the Red propaganda system dings insistently into their ears. The Russian people are curious by nature; they are becoming increasingly more curious about Americans, about life in America, and about the freedoms we enjoy.

During my stay in Russia, I visited the Crimea, where former royal palaces have been turned into worker hotels and resorts. People gathered around me in the street, at the hotels, and on the boardwalks, eager to feel the quality of my clothing, to see the kind of leather from which my shoes were made, and to hear me speak (through our interpreter) of life in America. They were astounded to learn that American workers are not starving in the streets of New York, and that Negroes are not lynched by the hundreds in the Deep South. They thought it unbelievable that almost every American family has its own automobile, and that the people of the United States do not want war with the people of Russia.

They were extremely curious about the prices of food and goods in the United States. They displayed doubt when I told them my

shoes cost \$17.50, compared with \$65 to \$75 in the Soviet Union. The cheapness in price and abundant availability of goods in America created amazement and disbelief among these people, who are charged \$220 for an 8-inch television set and \$500 for a small electric refrigerator, and to whom owning an automobile is an almost unheard of luxury for the average worker.

This curiosity, it strikes me, offers the free world a fertile area in which can be planted the seeds of freedom for Russia. I therefore recommend that, subject to reasonable security regulations, we broaden our exchange-of-persons program with the Soviet Union, and that we bring more of the Russian people into the United States, to see at first hand how our people live. I recommend, too, that our Information Service increase its efforts to reach behind the Iron Curtain with the message of freedom. In this connection, it is of vital importance that our magazine, our broadcasts, and so forth, to the people of Russia contain no criticism of their way of life. Although we abhor communism, instead of disparaging it we must stress the positive aspects of our own system. We should say, in effect: "We give you credit for believing in communism as an economic system; that is your right. But, here is what a free people, living under a democratic system of government, have both in physical and spiritual things." A better plan would be to extoll the virtues of democracy and completely ignore their system.

I do not pretend to be a psychologist, but I do know that the surest way to shut the ears of the Russian people to the story of our way of life is to criticize their existing form of government. As the old saying goes, "You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar."

I am sincere in my belief that by bringing more Russian farmers, more Russian industrial workers, doctors, teachers, more Russian housewives and children and others, to our country, permitting them to see at first hand how we live and the benefits available to us under a free system, we can demonstrate that communism cannot hold a candle of democracy in furthering the cause of individual freedom or bringing a better way of life. This exchange of persons, coupled with objective reporting of our American way of life, will—I believe—create a mighty force for peace with its genesis among the Russian people, a force which the leaders of Russia could ignore only at their personal peril.

As a matter of fact, the Russian leadership has done much to make any effort on its part to generate a warlike spirit extremely difficult. Throughout the countryside were posters bearing the legend: "Peace." The Russian radio repeated the message that Russia desires only peace. The Russian people have been conditioned to expect peace, and I feel it will be extremely difficult for Soviet leaders to plunge them into a major conflict without creating fearsome conditions within the U.S.S.R., conditions which could perhaps result in a violent reaction among the Russian people.

The Russian people with whom I spoke believe that the United States fears Russia, and that present American policy is designed with one ultimate objective—the forcible destruction of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they fear us. As patriots (and the Russian people love their land if not their present government), the people of Russia would be willing to fight for their existence. Soviet leadership has capitalized upon this fear; through this medium, they have been able to keep living standards low in order to forge a military machine. If it were possible (and I think it is) to dispel this fear, to eliminate the distrust of American motives among the Russian people, then rela-

tions between our two countries would improve overnight. We must make every effort to convince them that our preparations are not for war or aggression, but for defense.

To illustrate what I am driving at, while visiting the great dam at Stalingrad, I asked the engineer in charge, if it were not true that the dam was started in 1950 or 1951 and that suddenly orders came from Russian leaders to stop building the dam, I asked why that was done. He said because the money was needed for other purposes. "And what were those purposes?" I asked. He said it was political and he did not care to answer. I chided him and said "I suppose you spent the money to make weapons of war to fight us." He smiled, but insisted that the question was political and he would not discuss it further. I then asked "When did you resume work?" He said, "After the Geneva Conference, when your President indicated to the world that America wanted peace and not war."

The older Russian citizens with whom I spoke, people who had lived under and could recall the rule of the Czars, were unanimous in their belief that "things are better now than then." They have more food, more clothing, and a greater sense of their individual worth, as I indicated earlier in my remarks. However, there is much discontent within Russia—discontent that, nourished by exposure to America and Americans, could blossom into such a powerful force that communism could receive a telling blow.

These factors—increased education, natural curiosity, and a desire for self-improvement—are available to the United States for intelligent use as the foundation for an ultimate rejection by the Russian people of communism as both a way of life and an economic system.

I therefore regard as most unwise our Government's recent shutdown of exchange of persons between Russia and the United States. I think it was stupid. The reaction of the Russian people, fostered by the Communist propaganda machine, will be: "America fears us—she fears that we will see her poverty and her ignorance—she does not want us to see how weak she is and how her people are oppressed." In addition, this action will lend credence to the repetitive pronouncements of Moscow propaganda mediums that the United States wants war, while Russia wants peace. This, of course, will create an atmosphere which could ignite like tinder should even a tiny spark fall.

Since my return to the United States, I have been referred to by some mediums as having been "brainwashed" by Khrushchev. This I most vehemently deny. I believe I have noted basic factors which, if only capitalized upon by our country, can result in the destruction of dictatorial rule in Russia. The people of Russia bear within their great masses the seed of American victory in the cold war—a victory which can result not only in benefiting the free world, but in rekindling the light of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. It is now time for us to begin nourishing this seed, to the end that fear will be replaced with trust, ignorance with knowledge, and, ultimately, cold war with warm friendship between the people of Russia and the people of the United States.

EXCERPT FROM ELLENBER REPORT OF 1957
CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union today is undergoing a process of evolution—not revolution, but evolution. There is a great surge of decentralization taking place. The people are demanding more and more autonomy in the hope of attaining more voice in their local affairs. Sparked by increased emphasis upon universal education—an emphasis which carries with it a growing desire for individual leadership, an eagerness for information,

and an abundant curiosity regarding events, developments, and peoples outside the Soviet borders—the present Russian leadership is taking a calculated, but evidently necessary, risk.

Having placed their people in a position where they are more and more able to think for themselves, the Soviet leadership is gambling with its own future. The time is now ripe for free world action, designed to properly capitalize upon this new advent within the Soviet's borders.

If, by increased exchanges of delegations in every walk of life—such as engineers, farmers, legislators, scientists, students, teachers, to name but a few—of motion pictures, of television programs, of radio broadcasts; if, by increasing the points of contact between East and West, particularly, the United States and Russia, we can lay the full picture of western culture, development, and individual freedoms before the masses of Russia, as well as other peoples of the world closely associated with Russia, there is no doubt in my mind that they will become envious of our way of life. They will doubtless become dissatisfied when they learn there is a better way of life than that which they are now enjoying and as a result, will develop an urge to imitate ours.

This should be our primary objective. The free world, particularly the United States, secure in the absolute belief that our economic and political systems have nothing to fear from a fair comparison with Soviet-style communism, must leave no stone unturned in placing before the people of Russia and the world an unbiased picture of the way we live. We should—yes, we must—open the way for peaceful competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., with the understanding that all peoples will be free to choose the form of government under which they prefer to live.

This is a competition which the free world would most certainly win. It would bring a tremendous victory to us, for either the Soviet leadership would be compelled to give its people a more abundant way of life, or the Soviet people would compel a change in their leadership.

Either of these alternatives would represent a basic step forward in the winning of the cold war.

In the past, the tendency in the United States has been to be somewhat apologetic about the abundance we enjoy—to regard our blessings as the result of more good fortune than anything else. The Soviet Union on the other hand, has consistently credited the progress it has made since 1917 as the result of two things: First, the alleged superiority of the Socialist system, and, second, the constant hard work of the Soviet people.

Concerning the latter, no effort is spared in Russia to acquaint the people with the progress being made, and to heap praise and credit upon the workers. Propaganda within Russia is one of the chief weapons of the Communist leaders in maintaining the Communist way of life. Radios are installed in all public places, including factories and farms, and they constantly blare out the accomplishments of Russia's economy and its people.

Awards are made for workers excellence. Competition between areas producing the same commodities, or manufacturing the same goods, is fostered. Region vies against region in an endless productivity contest.

Specific projects—such as the construction of a power dam, for example—are recorded step by step on motion-picture film. First the ground breaking, where thousands assemble, then the river closure, then the installation of the first generator and so on. Awards are made to the best workers at each function.

These films are then exhibited across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union, with abundant praise heaped upon the "workers"

who made such projects possible and with added emphasis that they are the beneficiaries.

In the so-called neutralist or other nations experiencing a Soviet economic and political offensive, the progress achieved within the Soviet Union since the advent of communism is constantly cited as an example of what can be accomplished in an underdeveloped area under the socialist system.

Instead of, in effect, apologizing for our abundance, instead of fostering and following a philosophy dedicated to the proposition that because America has so much it must be shared with those who have so little, the United States should point out that our present national wealth was created and obtained through the hard work and ingenuity of Americans, laboring under a free-enterprise system, to tame a wilderness and devote its resources to the betterment of all our people.

Indeed, it must be remembered that the United States as we know it today is only 5 years older than the Soviet Union as it now exists.

Only with the admission of Arizona as the 48th State in 1912 did the United States really begin its great rise and progressively forge to the forefront of the world's nations. Russia began its climb with the deposing of the czars in 1917.

Yet in this relatively short space of time, the United States has achieved a much greater advance than the U.S.S.R. in all fields—without subjecting our people or our economy to the iron rule and inflexible discipline that communism imposes.

In other words, if it were possible—as I believe it is—for the United States to place its record of achievement beside that of the Soviet Union for the people of Russia to observe, there can be no doubt which would prove the more attractive.

It is necessary for us as leader of the free nations to realize and understand that the Russians have progressed under their present form of government, and that we must recognize that progress—no disparage it—in our dealings with the Russian people.

It has become increasingly obvious during recent years that a new approach to the problems plaguing East-West relationships is not only desirable, but urgently necessary—particularly to the United States, upon whom rests the greatest burdens of present policies.

Since 1948, the year the Marshall plan began, our Nation has spent over \$50 billion ostensibly to roll back the Red tide of communism. Initially, these expenditures were designed to restore the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe, in order to place them in a position to be of aid to the free world should the Soviet Union attempt an armed aggression. Later, when proposed goals were reached and even surpassed, the program was transformed from one of rehabilitation into one of development and mutual defense. Huge amounts were supplied to a host of countries to help build armies, for capital development, for technical aid.

Viewed in the light of these vast expenditures, the record of achievement thus far is a dismal one.

Europe, fully restored to economic health, and enjoying unprecedented prosperity, still leans on the United States for participation in her home defenses—still refuses to bear her fair share of the free world's burdens, particularly in the Middle East, southeast Asia, Formosa, and South Korea.

Many other nations which we have assisted lavishly in the past are either actively practicing or moving in the direction of neutralism if not outright alignment with the Soviet Union.

A few make no bones of the fact that they pursue a policy of pitting the United States against the Soviet Union in order to obtain the maximum aid from both countries.

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Russia, and her satellites—who are avowed opponents in the global cold war—are not weakening, nor do their policies seem to suffer defeat or even frustration as a result of the heavy-spending approach we have used in the past. On the contrary, some of our advisers contend that the Russians are making gains in the Middle East, in southeast Asia, in Africa, and even Latin America.

They are increasing their domestic agricultural and industrial bases, as my report amply demonstrates.

Their technology is constantly improving. Sputniks I and II offer abundant proof of this.

In almost every imaginable way, by almost any comparison that might be made, the United States today is in a much less favorable position in its international relationships—and particularly in its competitive position with the Soviet Union—than it was in 1948, despite the expenditure of over \$50 billion of our dwindling national wealth.

As I have often stated, our country cannot continue on its present course without inviting not only ultimate international defeat, but national disaster.

Our present policy involves the continued expenditure of gigantic sums for foreign aid purposes (over and above funds appropriated for the maintenance and modernization of our own Armed Forces); large appropriations for an Information Service; continuation of an almost unbearable and destructive tax rate that threatens to destroy initiative; the constant threat of near stagnation in the proper protection and preservation of our precious natural resources; and the promise of continued neglect of other vital areas of our national economic progress, particularly public power, housing, commerce and others.

The recommendation I have advanced for the past 3 years is reemphasized at this time; that is, the time has come—in fact, it may even have already passed—for us to take stock and to take a new look at our foreign policy.

Given a continued or heightened cold war of indefinite duration, the pursuance of our present policies must eventually result in the strangulation of our free-enterprise system, either by a continued decline of individual initiative and increasing reliance upon Government control and regulation of the economy, or eventual collapse of our total economy under the pressures of constantly-growing Government spending and a swelling debt load.

Either of these alternatives would be disastrous.

The first would represent an easy default victory by state socialism over the forces of free enterprise, the second would carry with it the full realization of a basic tenet of Marxist communism; namely, that given a long-term crisis to face, the free enterprise (capitalistic) nations must fall of their weight.

The three visits I have made to the Soviet Union, the impressions I have gained during them, and the information I have gathered, have resulted in the following suggestions, which I offer for the consideration of the committee—indeed, for the consideration of all our people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that the United States reexamine its approach to the waging of cold war. Recognizing that our actual adversary in this conflict is the Soviet Union, I recommend that this reexamination be undertaken in the light of the following, the implementation of which will help to dispel the fear of each other prevailing among the peoples of the East and the West, and restore mutual confidence, which is necessary if we are to achieve a lasting world peace.

1. Our information program directed to the Iron Curtain and particularly to the Soviet peoples should be expanded. In this expansion, all propaganda in its traditional

forms should be abandoned. Instead, a positive approach should be applied uniformly. No reference to communism per se should be permitted. Accurate, factual, reporting of the news and conditions in the free world must be stressed. Every effort should be made to objectively depict the enormous advantages of our way of life, without disparaging the system presently in effect in the Soviet Union or behind the Iron Curtain.

2. An expanded and realistic exchange of persons program between the Soviet Union and the United States should be inaugurated at once. This expansion can be achieved with no additional cost, by simply discontinuing many so-called information programs operated elsewhere that are unnecessary. As detailed in the body of my report, I am convinced that most of the peoples of the Soviet Union are sincere in their belief that the form of government and the economic system under which they live are second to none. This conviction flows from their inability to compare their present-day living standards, industrial and agricultural techniques, cultural progress and technological development with anything other than those existing within the Soviet Union's borders in prior times. By exchanging delegations, from every walk of life—scientists, technicians, workers, farmers, students, legislators—the people of Russia would have the opportunity to see at firsthand the boundless advantages which a free-enterprise system, founded on the bedrock of representative government, has to offer. In this program, however, extreme care must be exercised. Under no circumstances should a bona fide exchange program be permitted to become a means for infiltration of our borders by Soviet agents.

3. With the change of emphasis in our cold war policy toward the Soviet Union outlined in recommendations 1 and 2, designed to dispel the fear which exists between the peoples of the United States and the U.S.S.R., and to create a climate of confidence, should also come increased willingness upon our part to meet as often as possible with leaders of Iron Curtain countries, or the Soviet Union. Despite the record of broken promises which prior Soviet leaders have left in the wake of prior talks, our failure to join and participate in top-level conferences—even summit conferences—provides powerful ammunition for the Soviet propaganda machine. It eases the task of Red information agencies to picture the United States to the people of the Soviet Union—along with other lands throughout the world—as unwilling to discuss peaceful solutions of world problems.

The committee is well acquainted with the desire of all Americans to attain and maintaining a lasting world peace, a peace secured in dignity and made lasting through mutual trust. However, our Government's failure to show a willingness to confer with Soviet leaders on the peaceful solution of world tensions is being broadcast throughout the length and breadth of the world as indicative of our aggressive intentions. With a weapon such as this at the command of expert Communist propagandists, we are constantly losing ground in our effort to maintain sympathy for and understanding of our international objectives.

4. I recommend that our policy of attempting to create full-fledged modern armies in small underdeveloped countries be terminated, and that our assistance be confined to a realistic technical-aid effort. This move would be designed to create a broad base of trained native peoples, a base which would attract private investment capital, or which—at the very least—could properly utilize any government-to-government capital which might later be made available for development purposes. An approach of this type would strengthen the economic stability of the country, while at the same

time allowing the country to maintain its prestige and self-respect by standing on its own feet.

By encouraging underdeveloped countries to main military forces far beyond their capabilities to support, we are actually creating conditions tailor made for the advance of communism.

As the Comptroller General noted in his report to Congress on an examination of the military assistance program on March 31, 1957, the extension of arms aid to a number of nations has not always been motivated by purely military considerations, nor has the impact of this aid been properly evaluated in advance, or in conjunction with, its availability:

"The military force objectives presently approved for United States support in certain allied countries are not always realistic in terms of recipient country manpower and financial capabilities, are not always mutually acceptable to the countries concerned, and are not always motivated by military considerations (Report, supra, p. 2).

"In a number of countries the United States has programed and is delivering military equipment in excess of that which can be effectively absorbed and utilized by the recipients at their existing stage of development. The recipients either have not been able to use the aid furnished because of their financial and economic incapacity and their manpower limitations or they have not desired to use the assistance for the purposes intended by the United States (Report, supra, p. 3)."

As it now stands the hasty application of great amounts of economic and military aid to newly independent, underdeveloped nations is often working to our extreme disadvantage.

First, in those nations whose economies are not sufficiently developed to maintain a military force of the capabilities desired by United States advisers, the gap in national income created by heavy military expenditures is sought to be filled by America extending so-called defense-support assistance.

As administered in the past, this type of economic aid has frequently failed to trickle down to the masses. In a number of countries, particularly in the Middle East, and southeast Asia, living standards remain visibly unchanged for the great majority of people despite large United States expenditures there. There are, in these countries, two economic strata—the very rich, and the miserably poor.

The latter are, without exception, the object of constant Soviet propagandizing. United States policies, requiring the maintenance of large standing military forces, are blamed for low living standards. "Capitalistic" America is also blamed for lining the pockets of the rich while caring little for the poor.

In these same countries, as the body of my report demonstrates, the wealthy pay little or nothing in the way of income taxes, or, for that matter, all taxes as compared to us. Thus, as the whole burden of defense and economic growth in a given nation may be ours, so is the blame for that nation's poverty heaped upon our shoulders.

5. I again recommend, as I have for the past 3 successive years, that immediate steps be taken to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Unless and until this is done, the Middle East will remain an open, festering wound—one which poses a constant threat of infection to the entire world.

Our attempts in the past through military and economic assistance, to appease both sides in the hope that the problems will solve themselves have not worked and will never work. That part of the world offers the U.S.S.R. a great opportunity to keep its propaganda machine almost certainly

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at work in its efforts to keep the world in turmoil.

While I am convinced that the implementation of these recommendations would result in a much higher degree of success than a continuation of our present policies, it is not my view that they will work miracles overnight. On the contrary, the "new look" I have advocated should take place concurrently with the maintenance of a strong defense by the United States. We must not lower our guard. A modern, efficient Defense Establishment is the best guaranty we have against any attempt on the part of would-be world conquerors to follow the path of aggression instead of peaceful international competition.

In essence, the burden of my recommendations involves the maximum use of the single greatest resource our Nation possesses—not dollars, but the tremendous abundance of both material and spiritual advantages which freedom has to offer.

America is the world's greatest showplace for the accomplishments of a free economy dedicated to providing a free people with the highest standard of living in the world.

With such an exhibit of the fruits of our labors, it should be readily apparent that, in comparison with our growth over the relatively same period of time, Russia's advance has been accomplished despite, rather than because of, the dictates of socialist theories, and perhaps owes its success more to the hard work of her people than to any tenet or theory set forth by Lenin, Marx, or Stalin.

Let us open wide the doors to our showplace; let us welcome all who would come to see—to compare—to imitate.

Let us lay the foundation for trade and a restoration of commercial contacts between the East and the West.

Let us not apologize for our abundance, but, rather, let us display it to the peoples of the world as an example of what hard work can achieve for all who are willing to work.

Let us be honest enough to caution those who are to choose between socialism and freedom that such miracles are not wrought overnight, but must come gradually and through self-help.

Above all other things, let us not fear an honest competition with Soviet communism.

The approach I have outlined involves only the realization that it is time for our country to choose a more advantageous ground upon which to wage this most crucial battle of the cold war.

We have been confronted in recent years by what amounts to nothing more than an all-out effort on the part of the Soviets to defeat the democratic nations by peaceful means. Rather than see victory go to them by default, I urge our Government to pour its full effort into a massive fight for the minds of men—all men, everywhere.

EXCERPT FROM ELLENDER REPORT OF 1961

This was my fourth trip to the Soviet Union since 1955. I visited this vast country on three successive years—1955, 1956, and 1957. Thus, my most recent trip came after a lapse of 4 years.

Following my return to Washington, I reviewed the reports I had made to the Senate following my three previous visits to the U.S.S.R. I found that the observations and recommendations I had made following these trips are still applicable. What I recommended at that time bears repetition and reemphasis today.

The conclusions I reached in 1955, 1956, and 1957 were criticized quite freely by some. In fact, there were some who accused me of being brainwashed, yet I find that today, more and more people are in agreement with my thinking. I have summed up my observations of these three earlier visits, and they can be found in the appendix marked "Exhibit 14," p. 333.

I was very much impressed with the industrial expansion which has obviously taken place in 4 years in the areas I had visited before. As to those areas I had not seen before, I was surprised at what I found in the way of old cities being modernized, new cities springing up, housing being constructed at phenomenal speed, and all sorts of industries being fostered where formerly there had been little if any industrial development. Particularly is this true in what I would classify as the most backward areas of this vast country known as the U.S.S.R.—I have reference to places like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, and Armenia, to name only a few. As a matter of fact, the industrial expansion throughout the Soviet Union, as evidenced by what I saw with my own eyes at all the places I have visited, is nothing short of amazing. True, there is still a long way to go before Soviet industry can approach our own industrial facilities and capabilities, but when one considers that only a few years ago the new areas I visited were of the most backward in Russia, it is a revelation to find there thriving industries which are for the most part being operated and managed by local people.

In some areas of southern European and Asiatic Russia, I found that the people seem to consider that their provinces or republics are peculiarly their own, even though a part of the U.S.S.R., and they show what I would term strongly nationalistic tendencies in the pride they exhibit in the accomplishments of their regions since the revolution. They appear satisfied with their progress thus far, but they seem to look forward to still greater accomplishments through their own efforts rather than those of the Central Government. They give the impression that this tremendous surge in industry has come about because they have been able to force the Central Government to give them more autonomy in determining their own needs and in carrying out the plans for industrial production.

EXHIBIT 14

PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

This might be a good time to review some of the comments I made following my previous visits to the Soviet Union. Following my 1955 trip I submitted a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee, which included a résumé of my meeting with Anastas Mikoyan. The report read as follows:

"... I stated that I believed a more cordial relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was desirable and that this goal was obtainable through the medium of increased exchanges of visit involving industrial, agricultural, and similar delegations. I pointed out that I had been in the U.S. Legislature for nearly 19 years, during which time I had voted billions of dollars to help defeat Hitler in the common cause with U.S. wartime allies.

"I told Mr. Mikoyan that the American people find the mutual suspicions which characterize U.S.-Soviet relations strange and not in keeping with wartime relations. I said that I felt that these suspicions and strained relations were due in large measure to misunderstanding. I expressed the belief that frequent exchanges of visits would do much to eliminate these misunderstandings and that while the United States would not expect the Soviet Government to open its arsenals to American inspection, nevertheless I felt that if there was an increase in the movement of Soviet citizens visiting the United States the Soviet people would be able to clear away their suspicions about U.S. intentions. I stated that I came as a humble American citizen to express my thoughts to Mr. Mikoyan in the hope that something good would come of my visit. I added that if Mr. Mikoyan cared to make any

comments on my statements I would be glad to hear them.

"Mr. Mikoyan replied that he fully concurred in my statements and that he felt that the American and Soviet peoples had no differences on points of view expressed by me. He stated that the type of system pertaining in individual countries was a matter of choice of the people involved.

"I replied that so far as I knew, the American people as a whole don't care about the system prevailing in the Soviet Union and regarded that as the business of the Soviet people. I did state, however, that somehow the American people have the idea and are concerned that the U.S.S.R. is spreading a doctrine which is harmful to American interests, and that I felt that relations between the two countries would be much more cordial if this fear could be dispelled. I stated that the American people may be wrong in this assumption but that there was, nevertheless, much evidence that the assumption was correct."

"... Mr. Mikoyan asserted the belief that if 100 Americans came to study in the U.S.S.R. and returned to the United States that this would not result in the establishment of a Communist regime in the United States. He said that the question of communism versus capitalism is a matter for peoples and not for governments. He said that governments cannot impose doctrines and asked what the Soviet Union can do if people read Communist literature. He said that he thought the differences of opinion and strained relations were the fault of the United States and asserted that the more you attempt to prevent the spreading of a doctrine the more you actually contribute to the propagation of it.

"I explained that in America the rank and file of Communists are not molested, but that the Government is protected by law against those who attempt the violent overthrow of our governmental system. I told him that the views expressed by the imprisoned American Communist leaders to which our Government objected had been obtained from the U.S.S.R.; that these Communists had certainly had a fair trial which lasted 8 months, but that the evidence was clearly against them.

"Mr. Mikoyan rejoined that he did not wish to approve or disapprove of the actions of the U.S. Government versus the American Communists. He stated this was not his concern but that of the United States. He added that it was extremely possible that there was a connection between the ideas expressed by the American Communists and the Soviet Union, but that he could not control this. He said there can be no frontiers to ideas. I stated that the American people and our Government do not object to the idea of communism in a country, but do object to any attempt by a country to impose these ideas on others by force. Mr. Mikoyan repeated that this entire affair did not concern the U.S.S.R. I remarked that many Americans had been informed, through various sources, that the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Hungary frequently referred to as satellite states, were not free and that communism had been imposed on them by the U.S.S.R. I stated that if this were true, that if the U.S.S.R. had anything to do with the establishment of the governments in Eastern Europe, that this was the type of thing which caused concern and fear in the minds of American people, and that anything that could be done to dispel this fear would lead to improved relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

"Mr. Mikoyan said that if the U.S. people have this fear they need to be educated properly. He said the Soviet troops completely withdrew from Czechoslovakia at the end of the war. He said that United States

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has many bases abroad, whereas the Soviet Union has not and that he believed there were more U.S. troops stationed abroad than Soviet."

In 1956 I traveled extensively through the agricultural areas of the Soviet Union. I also visited many industrial centers. I made numerous comments then which I still believe hold true. I criticized at that time certain agricultural practices being undertaken by the U.S.S.R. as being impractical. I also pointed out industrial shortcomings. The gist of my comments on the Soviet Union are as follows:

"Russian agriculture suffers tremendously from the concentration of production in either collective or state farms. Many of the Russian farmers have no desire to increase production or become more efficient, since they have lost their identity as individual entrepreneurs. The old saying 'What's everybody's business is nobody's business' can be successfully applied to the collective farms.

"As to Russian industry, I saw some modern processes (such as a most unique shoe production line), along with great evidence of expansion, but for the most part, Russian industry seems to be crude and backward when compared with our own. I saw only five different models of passenger cars, two models of passenger buses, one for short and the other long haul, two models of refrigerators, one standard model of trucks. I do not desire to leave the impression that this status may long remain, for great efforts are being made to modernize Russian industry, and to expand production—particularly in the area of heavy industry. Dams, both for navigation and power generation, are being constructed. More factories are rising. The industrial base is being widened, and within the next 5 to 10 years, Russia will undoubtedly become a mighty industrial power. That will come about by the increasing demand for more and more consumer goods.

"* * * I am firmly convinced that it is the Russian educational system that offers the greatest hope for ultimate Russian freedom. The people are beginning to think for themselves and as time goes on, it will be more and more difficult for the leaders to keep them in line.

"Joseph Stalin grew to power in the midst of ignorance and poverty. I am convinced that because of the changed conditions in Russia the people will not permit another despot to assume such powers as those exercised by Stalin.

"As more Russians become educated, they will become less and less prone to accept at face value the propaganda-loaded description of life in the United States which the Red propaganda system dins insistently into their ears. The Russian people are curious by nature; they are becoming increasingly more curious about Americans, about life in America, and about the freedoms we enjoy.

"I therefore recommend that, subject to reasonable security regulations, we broaden our exchange-of-persons program with the Soviet Union, and that we bring more of the Russian people into the United States, to see at first hand how our people live. I recommend, too, that our Information Service increase its efforts to reach behind the Iron Curtain with the message of freedom. In this connection, it is of vital importance that our magazine, our broadcasts, and so forth, to the people of Russia contain no criticism of their way of life. Although we abhor communism, instead of disparaging it we must stress the positive aspects of our own system. We should say, in effect: 'We give you credit for believing in communism as an economic system; that is your right. But, here is what a free people, living under a democratic system of government, have both in physical and spiritual things.' A better plan would be to extoll the virtues of democracy and completely ignore their system.

"I do not pretend to be a psychologist, but I do know that the surest way to shut the ears of the Russian people to the story of our way of life is to criticize their existing form of government. As the old saying goes, 'You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar.'

"I am sincere in my belief that by bringing more Russian farmers, more Russian industrial workers, doctors, teachers, more Russian housewives and children and others, to our country, permitting them to see at first hand how we live and the benefits available to us under a free system, we can demonstrate that communism cannot hold a candle to democracy in furthering the cause of individual freedom or bringing a better way of life. This exchange of persons, coupled with objective reporting of our American way of life, will—I believe—create a mighty force for peace with its genesis among the Russian people, a force which the leaders of Russia could ignore only at their personal peril.

"As a matter of fact, the Russian leadership has done much to make any effort on its part to generate a warlike spirit extremely difficult. Throughout the countryside were posters bearing the legend: 'Peace.' The Russian radio repeated the message that Russia desires only peace. The Russian people have been conditioned to expect peace, and I feel it will be extremely difficult for Soviet leaders to plunge them into a major conflict without creating fearsome conditions within the U.S.S.R., conditions which could perhaps result in a violent reaction among the Russian people.

"The Russian people with whom I spoke believe that the United States fears Russia, and that present American policy is designed with one ultimate objective—the forcible destruction of the Soviet Union. Therefore, they fear us. As patriots (and the Russian people love their land if not their present government), the people of Russia would be willing to fight for their existence. Soviet leadership has capitalized upon this fear; through this medium, they have been able to keep living standards low in order to forge a military machine. If it were possible (and I think it is) to dispel this fear, to eliminate the distrust of American motives among the Russian people, then relations between our two countries would improve overnight. We must make every effort to convince them that our preparations are not for war or aggression, but for defense.

"To illustrate what I am driving at, while visiting the great dam at Stalingrad, I asked the engineer in charge, if it were not true that the dam was started in 1950 or 1951 and that suddenly orders came from Russian leaders to stop building the dam. I asked why that was done. He said because the money was needed for other purposes. 'And what were those purposes?' I asked. He said it was political and he did not care to answer. I chided him and said 'I suppose you spent the money to make weapons of war to fight us.' He smiled, but insisted that the question was political and he would not discuss it further. I then asked 'When did you resume work?' He said, 'After the Geneva Conference, when your President indicated to the world that America wanted peace and not war.'

"The older Russian citizens with whom I spoke, people who had lived under and could recall the rule of the czars, were unanimous in their belief that 'things are better now than then.' They have more food, more clothing, and a greater sense of their individual worth, as I indicated earlier in my remarks. However, there is much discontent within Russia—discontent that, nourished by exposure to America and Americans, could blossom into such a powerful force that communism could receive a telling blow.

"These factors—increased education, natural curiosity, and a desire for self-improvement—are available to the United States

for intelligent use as the foundation for an ultimate rejection by the Russian people of communism as both a way of life and an economic system.

"I therefore regard as most unwise our Government's recent shutdown of exchange of persons between Russia and the United States. I think it was stupid. The reaction of the Russian people, fostered by the Communist propaganda machine, will be: 'America fears us—she fears that we will see her poverty and her ignorance—she does not want us to see how weak she is and how her people are oppressed.' In addition, this action will lend credence to the repetitive pronouncements of Moscow propaganda mediums that the United States wants war, while Russia wants peace. This of course, will create an atmosphere which could ignite like tinder should even a tiny spark fall.

"Since my return to the United States, I have been referred to by some mediums as having been 'brainwashed' by Khrushchev. This I most vehemently deny. I believe I have noted basic factors which, if only capitalized upon by our country, can result in the destruction of dictatorial rule in Russia. The people of Russia bear within their great masses the seed of American victory in the cold war—a victory which can result not only in benefiting the free world, but in rekindling the light of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. It is now time for us to begin nourishing this seed, to the end that fear will be replaced with trust, ignorance with knowledge, and, ultimately, cold war with warm friendship between the people of Russia and the people of the United States."

Following my 1957 trip I filed another report with the Senate Appropriations Committee. My general impressions of the Soviet Union were as follows:

"Perhaps the most significant aspect of my findings on this visit was change, and, with respect to the various goods and services available to the Russian consumer, the change was invariably for the better. Also, people are more talkative—they were more prone to assert themselves. Generally speaking, I found a much higher degree of contentment among the peoples of Russia than on my previous visits. In addition, I found considerable national pride—a pride which was visibly increased when the people learned of the successful firing of the first space satellite. I was in Russia when the event occurred and the news was made public, and there was much jubilation among the Russian masses.

"Thus, in preface any account of my journeys through the Soviet Union, I feel it important to impress upon the committee my three major impressions of postsatellite Russia.

First, there is an atmosphere of confidence. Second, there is apparent domestic contentment, but a rising curiosity about America and an urge to forge ahead of us.

Third, there is a growing belief among the Russian people that their system is superior in all respect to ours in the West.

"These three factors must certainly receive primary consideration in any policy our Government undertakes vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. But, in considering these factors, they must be read against a background of Russia as it stands today compared with the pre-Bolshevik Russia of the czars.

"Only by measuring present-day conditions in Russia by the comparative yardstick of conditions as they existed a quarter century ago can any proper perspective concerning this vast nation be attained. In addition, the conditions existing in the Soviet Union under communism and the Government's abolition of private property are important circumstances to be weighed before reaching any conclusion concerning future policies toward that country.

"In Russia, the Government is supreme. Nothing else matters—only the Government.

Every square inch of land belongs to the Government. All commerce and industry are Government controlled. Under no circumstances is an individual able to go into business for himself, not even as a barbershop owner or a taxi operator.

"Instead, all crafts, in fact, all businesses, are incorporated into state-managed entities where everyone works together for what Soviet leaders declare to be the common good of the state. Revenue-producing investments by the individual of any of his surplus funds are limited primarily to state institutions that lend money. The money deposited by the individual bears a small rate of interest, depending on the length of time it is left on deposit. This type of social and economic organization exists through all strata of Russia.

"Under such a controlled system, in which the welfare of the individual is evidently sacrificed to the good of the state, Russia has been able, within a short span of years, to pull itself up from a weary, downtrodden nation, wracked by internal strife and bearing the heavy burden of a hungry, desperate class of peasant serfs under the old czarist system, to its present leadership of obviously high technological development.

"Many Russian people today may have only black bread, cabbages, beets, potatoes, and a pot of tea—but today it is enough to fill their stomachs. To a hungry population, the mere advance of a crust of bread is an accomplishment—and one, which whether or not we agree with the manner in which it is done, must be recognized as a form of progress.

"From the days of 1916, when almost all of Russia hovered together in abject poverty, in hunger, in a state of serfdom, and serving a fantastically rich nobility, the older people of Russia today can see visible signs of their march forward—toward national pride, better living standards, and industrial development—a march which today places them among the vanguard of the world's nations.

"The younger people, who have known nothing but communism in their lifetime, and who have had no opportunity to observe any other form of government, glory in their country's progress—and in the corresponding rise in the welfare of their fellow countrymen.

"This, above all, we must recognize. And in that recognition we must, I believe, abandon the approach of some who, because they dislike or perhaps fear communism—indeed, I am sure they abhor this system of government as I do—will not hear or even listen to the spoken words of its accomplishments.

"The mark of an intelligent soldier is to recognize the capabilities of his opponent. To mock a foe is to mock yourself.

"Communism will not vanish because we ignore it. Neither will it disappear because we vilify it. It exists. It is functioning.

"It has brought a new way of life to a people once left far beyond progress in the wallow of inner conflict. It has provided a better standard of living—no matter if we care to dismiss it as still far below our own—for an entire nation of people.

"Of course, in the U.S.S.R. there is nothing remotely resembling the freedom of individual choice, action, and enterprise which we in the United States enjoy today. However, it must be recognized that in the Soviet Union, such freedom has never existed. Russian history bears ample witness to the lack of what we regard as basic principles of freedom. Under the czars, which is the period with which the typical elder or middle-aged Russian compares his life today, there was no freedom of the press, no freedom of expression, no freedom of economic choice for the average Russian. Opposition to the then-existing Government was ruthlessly ferreted out by a secret police whose methods were not basically different from those used by the Communists.

"Perhaps the most astonishing accomplishment of the Russia of today is its rapid transformation into an industrial empire. That the tremendous growth of Russia's industrial economy has been reached in the short span of one generation testifies to the hard work done by the Russian people. To those who would dismiss, or soften the impact of this achievement by merely pointing out that it was accomplished by a ruthless leadership holding the combined noses of an entire people to the Marxist grindstone, it again must be remembered that compulsion is nothing new to the average Russian. Under the Communists, he exchanged the compulsion of the czarist aristocracy for the compulsion of a totalitarian state. The only change in the picture, insofar as Ivan is concerned, is that at least part of the nation's increased wealth has trickled down to him instead of all of it remaining in the pockets of a very few persons of supreme social status.

"In other words, in assessing the present temper of the Russian people, not their present leadership, but their people, we must always bear in mind that there are no shades of gray in the picture of Russian development since 1917. Instead, there is only absolute contrast between the days prior to the October Revolution and those now upon the colossus of Europe and Asia. The term 'capitalism,' as applied by the Communist leadership in describing the United States, does not reflect the system which our country actually enjoys today, but instead is used as a synonym for the system prevalent in Russia during czarist times. By insisting that all economic systems are either capitalistic (i.e., czarist) or socialist (i.e., that now in effect in the Soviet Union) the Soviet leaders have been able to keep their people convinced that the Russian system today is the ultimate of perfection.

"The Western World is now at a great disadvantage in waging a positive campaign to change this unbalanced and untrue picture laid before the Russian people, because there are not words available to convince them of the progress we have made, of the abundance we enjoy. To the average Russian, a system which would prove more beneficial than the one under which he now lives is inconceivable, simply, because he has no knowledge of anything other than absolute exploitation under the czars compared with a much better way of life under communism.

"As it stands, then, we must realize that the Russian people—as of this day, at least—are apparently well content with their way of life. The individual may not have progressed much, by our standards, but he has progressed—he is much better off than he has ever been."

In my 1957 report I also included a formalized presentation of conclusions and recommendations. I think that these, too, are worth repeating in the light of today's events.

They are as follows:

"CONCLUSION

"The Soviet Union today is undergoing a process of evolution—not revolution, but evolution. There is a great surge of decentralization taking place. The people are demanding more and more autonomy in the hope of attaining more voice in their local affairs. Sparked by increased emphasis upon universal education—an emphasis which carries with it a growing desire for individual leadership, an eagerness for information, and an abundant curiosity regarding events, developments, and peoples outside the Soviet borders—the present Russian leadership is taking a calculated, but evidently necessary, risk.

"Having placed their people in a position where they are more and more able to think for themselves, the Soviet leadership is gambling with its own future. The time is now

ripe for free world action, designed to properly capitalize upon this new advent within the Soviet's borders.

"If, by increased exchanges of delegations in every walk of life—such as engineers, farmers, legislators, scientists, students, teachers, to name but a few—of motion pictures, of television programs, of radio broadcasts; if, by increasing the points of contact between East and West, particularly, the United States and Russia, we can lay the full picture of western culture, development, and individual freedoms before the masses of Russia, as well as other peoples of the world closely associated with Russia, there is no doubt in my mind that they will become envious of our way of life. They will doubtless become dissatisfied when they learn there is a better way of life than that which they now are enjoying, and, as a result, will develop an urge to imitate ours.

"This should be our primary objective.

"The free world, particularly the United States, secure in the absolute belief that our economic and political systems have nothing to fear from a fair comparison with Soviet-style communism, must leave no stone unturned in placing before the people of Russia and the world an unbiased picture of the way we live. We should—yes, we must—open the way for peaceful competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., with the understanding that all peoples will be free to choose the form of government under which they prefer to live.

"This is a competition which the free world would most certainly win. It would bring a tremendous victory to us, for either the Soviet leadership would be compelled to give its people a more abundant way of life, or the Soviet people would compel a change in their leadership.

"Either of these alternatives would represent a basic step forward in the winning of the cold war.

"In the past, the tendency in the United States has been to be somewhat apologetic about the abundance we enjoy—to regard our blessings as the result of more good fortune than anything else. The Soviet Union on the other hand, has consistently credited the progress it has made since 1917 as the result of two things: First, the alleged superiority of the Socialist system, and, second, the constant hard work of the Soviet people.

"Concerning the latter, no effort is spared in Russia to acquaint the people with the progress being made, and to heap praise and credit upon the workers. Propaganda within Russia is one of the chief weapons of the Communist leaders in maintaining the Communist way of life. Radics are installed in all public places, including factories and farms, and they constantly blare out the accomplishments of Russia's economy and its people.

"Awards are made for worker excellence.

"Competition between areas producing the same commodities or manufacturing the same goods, is fostered. Region vies against region in an endless productivity contest.

"Specific projects—such as the construction of a power dam, for example—are recorded step by step on motion-picture film. First the ground breaking, where thousands assemble, then the river closure, then the installation of the first generator and so on. Awards are made to the best workers at each function.

"These films are then exhibited across the length and breadth of the Soviet Union, with abundant praise heaped upon the "workers" who made such projects possible and with added emphasis that they are the beneficiaries.

"In the so-called neutralist or other nations experiencing a Soviet economic and political offensive, the progress achieved within the Soviet Union since the advent of communism is constantly cited as an example of what can be accomplished in an underdeveloped area under the socialist system.

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"Instead of, in effect, apologizing for our abundance, instead of fostering and following a philosophy dedicated to the proportion that because America has so much it must be shared with those who have so little, the United States should point out that our present national wealth was created and obtained through the hard work and ingenuity of Americans, laboring under a free-enterprise system, to tame a wilderness and devote its resources to the betterment of all our people.

"Indeed, it must be remembered that the United States as we know it today is only 5 years older than the Soviet Union as it now exists.

"Only with the admission of Arizona as the 48th State in 1912 did the United States really begin its great rise and progressively forge to the forefront of the world's nations. Russia began its climb with the deposing of the czars in 1917.

"Yet in this relatively short space of time, the United States has achieved a much greater advance than the U.S.S.R. in all fields—without subjecting our people or our economy to the iron rule and inflexible discipline that communism imposes.

"In other words, if it were possible—as I believe it is—for the United States to place its record of achievement beside that of the Soviet Union for the people of Russia to observe, there can be no doubt which would prove the more attractive.

"It is necessary for us as leader of the free nations to realize and understand that the Russians have progressed under their present form of government, and that we must recognize that progress—not disparage it—in our dealings with the Russian people.

"It has become increasingly obvious during recent years that a new approach to the problems plaguing East-West relationships is not only desirable, but urgently necessary—particularly to the United States, upon whom rests the greatest burdens of present policies.

"Since 1948, the year the Marshall plan began, our Nation has spent over \$50 billion ostensibly to roll back the Red tide of communism. Initially, these expenditures were designed to restore the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe, in order to place them in a position to be of aid to the free world should the Soviet Union attempt an armed aggression. Later, when proposed goals were reached and even surpassed, the program was transformed from one of rehabilitation into one of development and mutual defense. Huge amounts were supplied to a host of countries to help build armies, for capital development, for technical aid.

"Viewed in the light of these vast expenditures, the record of achievement thus far is a dismal one.

"Europe, fully restored to economic health, and enjoying unprecedented prosperity, still leans on the United States for participation in her home defenses—still refuses to bear her fair share of the free world's burdens, particularly in the Middle East, southeast Asia, Formosa, and South Korea.

"Many other nations which we have assisted lavishly in the past are either actively practicing or moving in the direction of neutralism if not outright alignment with the Soviet Union.

"A few make no bones of the fact that they pursue a policy of pitting the United States against the Soviet Union in order to obtain the maximum aid from both countries.

"Russia, and her satellites—who are our avowed opponents in the global cold war—are not weakening, nor do their policies seem to suffer defeat or even frustration as a result of the heavy-spending approach we have used in the past. On the contrary, some of our advisers contend that the Russians are

making gains in the Middle East, in south-east Asia, in Africa, and even Latin America.

"They are increasing their domestic agricultural and industrial bases, as my report amply demonstrates.

"Their technology is constantly improving. Sputniks I and II offer abundant proof of this.

"In almost every imaginable way, by almost any comparison that might be made, the United States today is in a much less favorable position in its international relationships—and particularly in its competitive position with the Soviet Union—than it was in 1948, despite the expenditure of over \$50 billion of our dwindling national wealth.

"As I have often stated, our country cannot continue on its present course without inviting not only ultimate international defeat, but national disaster.

"Our present policy involves the continued expenditure of gigantic sums for foreign aid purposes (over and above funds appropriated for the maintenance and modernization of our own Armed Forces); large appropriations for an Information Service; continuation of an almost unbearable and destructive tax rate that threatens to destroy initiative; the constant threat of near stagnation in the proper protection and preservation of our precious natural resources; and the promise of continued neglect of other vital areas of our national economic progress, particularly public power, housing, commerce and others.

"The recommendation I have advanced for the past 3 years is reemphasized at this time; that is, the time has come—in fact, it may even have already passed—for us to take stock and to take a new look at our foreign policy.

"Given a continued or heightened cold war of indefinite duration, the pursuance of our present policies must eventually result in the strangulation of our free-enterprise system, either by a continued decline of individual initiative and increasing reliance upon Government control and regulation of the economy, or eventual collapse of our total economy under the pressures of constantly-growing Government spending and a swelling debt load.

"Either of these alternatives would be disastrous.

"The first would represent an easy default victory by state socialism over the forces of free enterprise, the second would carry with it the full realization of a basic tenet of Marxist communism; namely, that given a long-term crisis to face, the free enterprise (capitalistic) nations must fall of their weight.

"The three visits I have made to the Soviet Union, the impressions I have gained during them, and the information I have gathered, have resulted in the following suggestions, which I offer for the consideration of the committee—indeed, for the consideration of all our people.

"RECOMMENDATIONS

"I recommend that the United States reexamine its approach to the waging of cold war. Recognizing that our actual adversary in this conflict is the Soviet Union, I recommend that this reexamination be undertaken in the light of the following, the implementation of which will help to dispel the fear of each other prevailing among the peoples of the East and the West, and restore mutual confidence, which is necessary if we are to achieve a lasting world peace.

"1. Our information program directed to the Iron Curtain and particularly to the Soviet peoples should be expanded. In this expansion, all propaganda in its traditional forms should be abandoned. Instead, a positive approach should be applied uniformly. No reference to communism per se should be permitted. Accurate, factual reporting of the news and conditions in the

free world must be stressed. Every effort should be made to objectively depict the enormous advantages of our way of life, without disparaging the system presently in effect in the Soviet Union or behind the Iron Curtain.

"2. An expanded and realistic exchange of persons program between the Soviet Union and the United States should be inaugurated at once. This expansion can be achieved with no additional cost, by simply discontinuing many so-called information programs operated elsewhere that are unnecessary. As detailed in the body of my report, I am convinced that most of the peoples of the Soviet Union are sincere in their belief that the form of government and the economic system under which they live are second to none. This conviction flows from their inability to compare their present-day living standards, industrial and agricultural techniques, cultural progress and technological development with anything other than those existing within the Soviet Union's borders in prior times. By exchanging delegations, from every walk of life—scientists, technicians, workers, farmers, students, legislators—the people of Russia would have the opportunity to see at firsthand the boundless advantages which a free-enterprise system, founded on the bedrock of representative government, has to offer. In this program, however, extreme care must be exercised. Under no circumstances should a bona fide exchange program be permitted to become a means for infiltration of our borders by Soviet agents.

"3. With the change of our emphasis in cold war policy toward the Soviet Union outlined in recommendations 1 and 2, designed to dispel the fear which exists between the peoples of the United States and the U.S.S.R., and to create a climate of confidence, should also come increased willingness upon our part to meet as often as possible with leaders of Iron Curtain countries, or the Soviet Union. Despite the record of broken promises which prior Soviet leaders have left in the wake of prior talks, our failure to join and participate in top-level conferences—even summit conferences—provides powerful ammunition for the Soviet propaganda machine. It eases the task of Red information agencies to picture the United States to the people of the Soviet Union—along with other lands throughout the world—as unwilling to discuss peaceful solutions of world problems.

"The committee is well acquainted with the desire of all Americans to attain and maintain a lasting world peace, a peace secured in dignity and made lasting through mutual trust. However, our Government's failure to show a willingness to confer with Soviet leaders on the peaceful solution of world tensions is being broadcast throughout the length and breadth of the world as indicative of our aggressive intentions. With a weapon such as this at the command of expert Communist propagandists, we are constantly losing ground in our effort to maintain sympathy for and understanding of our international objectives.

"4. I recommend that our policy of attempting to create full-fledged modern armies in small underdeveloped countries be terminated, and that our assistance be confined to a realistic technical-aid effort. This move would be designed to create a broad base of trained native peoples, a base which would attract private investment capital, or which—at the very least—could properly utilize any government-to-government capital which might later be made available for development purposes. An approach of this type would strengthen the economic stability of the country, while at the same time allowing the country to maintain its prestige and self-respect by standing on its own feet.

"By encouraging underdeveloped countries to maintain military forces far beyond their

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capabilities to support, we are actually creating conditions tailor made for the advance of communism.

"As the Comptroller General noted in his report to Congress on an examination of the military assistance program on March 31, 1957, the extensions of arms aid to a number of nations has not always been motivated by purely military considerations, nor has the impact of this aid been properly evaluated in advance, or in conjunction with, its availability.

"The military force objectives presently approved for United States support in certain allied countries are not always realistic in terms of recipient country manpower and financial capabilities, are not always mutually acceptable to the countries concerned, and are not always motivated by military considerations (report, supra, p. 2)."

"In a number of countries the United States has programed and is delivering military equipment in excess of that which can be effectively absorbed and utilized by the recipients, at their existing stage of development. The recipients either have not been able to use the aid furnished because of their financial and economic incapacity and their manpower limitations or they have not desired to use the assistance for the purposes intended by the United States (report, supra, p. 3)."

"As it now stands the hasty application of great amounts of economic and military aid to newly independent, underdeveloped nations is often working to our extreme disadvantage.

"First, in those nations whose economies are not sufficiently developed to maintain a military force of the capabilities desired by United States advisers, the gap in national income created by heavy military expenditures is sought to be filled by America extending so-called defense-support assistance.

"As administered in the past, this type of economic aid has frequently failed to trickle down to the masses. In a number of countries, particularly in the Middle East, and southeast Asia, living standards remain visibly unchanged for the great majority of people despite large United States expenditures there. There are in these countries, two economic strata—the very rich, and the miserably poor.

"The latter are, without exception, the object of constant Soviet propagandizing. United States policies, requiring the maintenance of large standing military forces, are blamed for low living standards. 'Capitalistic' America is also blamed for lining the pockets of the rich while caring little for the poor.

"In these same countries, as the body of my report demonstrates, the wealthy pay little or nothing in the way of income taxes, or, for that matter, all taxes as compared to us. Thus, as the whole burden of defense and economic growth in a given nation may be ours, so is the blame for that nation's poverty heaped upon our shoulders."

"While I am convinced that the implementation of these recommendations would result in a much higher degree of success than a continuation of our present policies, it is not my view that they will work miracles overnight. On the contrary, the 'new look' I have advocated should take place concurrently with the maintenance of a strong defense by the United States. We must not lower our guard. A modern, efficient Defense Establishment is the best guarantee we have against any attempt on the part of would-be world conquerors to follow the path of aggression instead of peaceful international competition.

"In essence, the burden of my recommendations involves the maximum use of

the single greatest resource our Nation possesses—not dollars, but the tremendous abundance of both material and spiritual advantages which freedom has to offer.

"America is the world's greatest showplace for the accomplishments of a free economy dedicated to providing a free people with the highest standard of living in the world.

"With such an exhibit of the fruits of our labors, it should be readily apparent that, in comparison with our growth over the relatively same period of time, Russia's advance has been accomplished despite, rather than because of, the dictates of socialist theories, and perhaps owes its success more to the hard work of her people than to any tenet or theory set forth by Lenin, Marx, or Stalin.

"Let us open wide the doors to our showplace; let us welcome all who would come to see—to compare—to imitate.

"Let us lay the foundation for trade and a restoration of commercial contacts between the East and the West.

"Let us not apologize for our abundance, but, rather, let us display it to the peoples of the world as an example of what hard work can achieve for all who are willing to work.

"Let us be honest enough to caution those who are to choose between socialism and freedom that such miracles are not wrought overnight, but must come gradually and through self-help.

"Above all other things, let us not fear an honest competition with Soviet communism.

"The approach I have outlined involves only the realization that it is time for our country to choose a more advantageous ground upon which to wage this most critical battle of the cold war.

"We have been confronted in recent years by what amounts to nothing more than an all-out effort on the part of the Soviets to defeat the democratic nations by peaceful means. Rather than see victory go to them by default, I urge our Government to pour its full effort into a massive fight for the minds of men—all men, everywhere."

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, for the past few weeks I have carefully studied all aspects of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating to that convention.

I have read with great care the extensive testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Committee's reports both in 1965 and 1967. I have studied the President's messages and have followed the speeches Senators have made, together with the floor debate, on this extremely important matter.

I have withheld final judgment until I have had the opportunity to study thoroughly all the evidence and all the views of our Nation's most knowledgeable persons.

In arriving at my decision, I have been impelled by one paramount consideration, and one consideration only: Is this convention in the best interests of America?

Many factors—diplomatic, military, political, historic, judicial, and others—enter into the decision as to what constitutes the best interests of America. After evaluating all these factors, and after weighing their relative importance, I have concluded that, in balance, ratification of this Consular Convention and its protocol is in the best interests of our country. For this reason, and for reasons which I will subsequently outline, I have decided to vote for ratification.

HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION

Mr. President, when the United States first established relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1933, an exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov stated that it had been agreed that a consular convention would be negotiated "immediately following the establishment of relations between our two countries."

Soviet consulates were then opened in New York and San Francisco in 1934 and in Los Angeles in 1937. In 1941 we opened a consulate in Vladivostok. But in 1948, the Soviet Government closed its consulates in the United States and shortly after that we closed our consulate in Vladivostok. Before these consulates were closed, we had requested and received permission to open a consulate in Leningrad, but we have never done so.

Although there have been these consulates in the Soviet Union and the United States, there has never been negotiated a consular convention between the two countries. It was only many years later that negotiations were started.

At the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference, President Eisenhower's proposal for "concrete steps" to lower "the barriers which now impede the opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world" led to a relaxation by the Bulganin-Khrushchev regime of tight Stalinist controls. This in turn led to greatly increased American travel to the U.S.S.R.

As more and more American travelers went to the Soviet Union, we began to realize that we needed to protect American citizens by negotiating an explicit consular convention with the U.S.S.R. At the Camp David talks in 1959, Secretary of State Christian Herter proposed such a treaty to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Drafts were exchanged in early 1960, but there was little further activity, because of subsequent strains in United States-Soviet relations, until September 1963, when formal negotiations began in Moscow.

After 8 months of hard negotiations, the convention and the protocol were signed on June 1, 1964, and submitted to the Senate by the President on June 12, 1964.

PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL

The convention regulates the consular affairs of each country in the territory of the other and the treatment to be accorded to consular officials and employees. The convention covers such matters as the status of a consular establishment, the duties and functions of consular officers, and the rights, privileges, and immunities of the consular personnel of each country stationed in the territory of the other country.

As such, the convention, in effect establishes the ground rules for the two countries—ground rules on setting up a kind of business office in each other's country.

However, the convention does not itself authorize the opening of consulates or specify the number which may be opened. It merely provides the legal framework for the activity of the accredited consular officers, whether attached to an Embassy

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or to consulates which might be opened as a result of separate negotiations.

The convention follows the pattern of other bilateral consular conventions to which the United States is a party, formalizing what is normally a routine bilateral exchange of officials. But this particular convention and protocol is distinctive in several ways.

It contains two provisions relating to the protection of American citizens, which would be operative immediately, as follows:

First. It requires the receiving state to notify consular officers of the sending state of the arrest or detention of a national of the sending state within 1 to 3 days from the time of arrest or detention depending on conditions of communication.

Second. It provides that consular officers of the sending state may visit and communicate with a national of the sending state who is under arrest or detained in custody by the receiving state within 2 to 4 days of the arrest or detention, depending on his location, and on a continuing basis thereafter.

The convention also states, for the first time in any consular agreement to which the United States is a party, that consular officers and employees of the sending state will be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. This provision extends to consular officers and personnel the same unrestricted immunity from criminal prosecution that embassy officers and employees now enjoy. In other consular conventions to which the United States is a party, the immunity granted consular officers and employees has generally been limited to misdemeanors. The proposed convention extends the immunity to felonies.

These immunity provisions do not go into effect automatically. They only become effective when consulates are agreed upon as a result of separate negotiations and are subsequently established.

The proposed convention contains provisions designed to guard against possible abuse of this criminal immunity. The receiving state has the explicit right to declare consular officers *persona non grata* and consular employees unacceptable. Moreover, all persons enjoying immunity from criminal jurisdiction are obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving states, including traffic regulations.

The convention also contains a number of measures to safeguard against the danger of subversion. If, after ratification of the convention, the United States agrees to the opening of a Soviet consulate here, the officers and employees of the consulate will be subject to the same screening and entry controls as officers and employees of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. They will also be subject to the same travel restrictions as those which apply to diplomatic personnel.

Finally, the convention may be terminated on 6 months' notice by either party.

From this brief sketch of the provisions of the convention and protocol, it

is evident that this is an unusual treaty, rather than a routine agreement relating to consulates.

This treaty represents the first bilateral agreement we have ever negotiated with the Soviet Union. It is the first between the world's two superpowers.

The proposed Consular Convention is the first between our country and a country which has been our adversary in the tense, trying, and costly cold war of some 20 long years—a country which has been supplying arms, aircraft, missiles, oil, and other weapons and material to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong—the same weapons and material used against American troops in our effort to stem Communist aggression in southeast Asia.

It is no wonder, then, that so much concern and objections have been expressed over the question of the treaty's ratification.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Many Americans are opposed to the timing of this treaty. They feel it should be deferred until settlement of the Vietnam war. They point out that the United States is now engaged in a bloody conflict in Vietnam with an enemy which is being substantially equipped and aided by the Soviet Union.

They question the wisdom of our making any kind of conciliatory gesture—or any gesture that may be so interpreted—toward the Soviet Union, as long as American blood continues to be shed in that conflict. Why should we render any degree of respectability to a regime which continues to mobilize world opinion against us, to send massive infusions of military aid to our enemies, and which has called us "worldwide public enemy No. 1?" they ask.

These points are indeed well worth considering. For while it may be pointed out that the monolithic international Communist partnership is a thing of the past as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, they are nevertheless firmly united against all Western forms of democracy and are actively abetting Hanoi's aggression.

Moreover, there are absolutely no indications that ratification of this treaty will halt the flow of Soviet war material to Hanoi; nor is there any evidence that ratification will bring an end to the cold war.

As valid as these points may be, the real question is: Should Soviet aid to North Vietnam and her various differences with us blind us and prevent our two nations from arriving at agreements on any and all matters, especially those more beneficial to us—and at the same time affording a relaxation of tensions between our two nations, no matter how slight? Are the best interests of our country served by adamant and stubborn refusal to meet on common grounds whenever such is possible?

We have learned, and learned well, since World War II, that grave crises between the U.S.S.R. and the nations of the West occur with grievous and calculated regularity. At the same time, we have also learned that the road to the mitigation of these tensions and, eventually, world peace, cannot be built by

prolonging and deepening the cold war, but rather by painstakingly and patiently searching for areas on which we might find mutual agreement.

The pending convention and protocol is, to me, a symbol—admittedly a small one—of the willingness of the two countries to separate emotion and ideological differences from interests which are basic and compatible to both. The treaty is not so much a gesture of conciliation, as it is an agreement that the mutual interests of both countries will be advanced, however slightly, by the establishment of missions designed to serve nondiplomatic interests.

Like the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Civil Air Agreement, and the Treaty on Outer Space, the convention represents another small, tentative step to reduction of world tensions, an experiment in cooperation between our two countries.

INTERRELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO OTHER PROPOSALS

Arguments have been advanced that ratification of the Consular Convention would be used as an opening wedge and prelude to proposals relaxing East-West trade relations.

Mr. President, I fully appreciate this argument. But I am not convinced that ratification of this pending treaty will create an irresistible momentum leading to the hasty consideration and adoption of the East-West trade bill. It is tantamount to saying that because we did ratify the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Civil Air Agreement, we will be forced to pass the East-West trade bill. This is absurd.

Proposals such as the East-West trade bill, while affecting our overall relations with the Communist bloc, deal with a completely different subject.

I am fully aware of the fact that passage of the East-West trade bill might result in the transshipment of strategic war supplies to North Vietnam via Soviet Russia—material that would be used directly against American troops. It might also result in the shipment of so-called nonstrategic goods to the Soviet Union, thus enabling her to free her manufacturing potential to produce war supplies for use in the Vietnam war. I am confident that this East-West trade proposal will be carefully and thoroughly considered on its individual merits.

I am equally confident that each new measure proposing some degree of relaxation of East-West tensions will be done with a long memory and a healthy skepticism about Communist intentions, and a determined vigilance to maintain all safeguards essential to America's long-term security interests.

SOVIET TRUSTWORTHINESS

Mr. President, I am well aware of the long record of treaty violations by the Soviet Union. The catalog of such violations is far too long to repeat here. They may be found in a study prepared by the Department of State in 1961, entitled "Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations."

Because of this background of untrustworthiness, many Americans rightfully raise the question, Can the Soviets

be relied upon to observe the terms of the proposed Consular Convention and protocol?

A careful analysis of the history of United States-Soviet relations shows that Soviet violations of international agreements and treaties took place largely during the Stalin period. Despite its earlier record of repeated violations of international obligations, the Soviet Government—particularly in recent years—has increasingly found it to be in its interest to live up to its commitments.

It has been found that the Soviet Union is a party to a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements which it has not violated. Among the most important of these agreements are the Austrian State Treaty, 1955; the Antarctic Treaty, 1959; and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963.

Treaties between sovereign governments are negotiated on the basis of mutual self-interest, not as rewards for good conduct or as evidence of good faith. According to the most knowledgeable persons in this field, there are a number of areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union coincide; the problem is to carefully delineate and thoroughly explore them before even embarking on exploratory talks.

Examples of such areas of mutual self-interest are those embodied in the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on Outer Space, and the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons—which is still under discussion. Each of these agreements either has built-in safeguards or is self-enforcing.

Similarly, the proposed Consular Convention was carefully drafted to provide protections against abuse. As I pointed out earlier, if the Soviet Union should violate its terms, the United States could suspend it or, with 6 months' notice, terminate it. If a Soviet consulate should be opened later on in this country and its personnel violate our laws or the standards of behavior we would expect, we could expel them or close the consulate.

THE THREAT OF ESPIONAGE

Mr. President, every American is rightly concerned about the increased opportunity for espionage on the part of Soviet agents if a Soviet consulate is eventually opened here. Consequently, the convention could present a threat to the security of America.

Without a doubt, the Communists are most adept and vigorous at using their diplomatic posts as centers of espionage activities. I am equally certain that they would not hesitate to use their American consular offices in the same way.

However, as I mentioned earlier, the treaty neither authorized the opening of consulates nor specifies their number, so that Senate ratification will not automatically result in the establishment of even one Soviet consulate. The proposed convention merely provides the legal framework for their operation if and when they are established as a result of new negotiations after ratification.

It is my understanding that there are presently no formal proposals or plans pending for the opening of consular offices in either country. If, at a later date, such negotiations were initiated, we have the assurance of the Department of State that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and other concerned Senators would be fully consulted, along with the municipal authorities of any American city under consideration as a consular site.

We are also assured that, in the event a Soviet consulate were established in this country, the United States would insist that the number of Soviet consular personnel enjoying immunities under the convention be strictly limited, and in no case, would it exceed the number of Americans to receive identical immunities in the consulate we would open in the U.S.S.R.

According to the Department of State, the total number of Soviet citizens now enjoying full diplomatic immunity in the United States is 452. If a consular office were opened, his would add another 10 or 15. Thus, the small scale of the threat is readily apparent. Indeed, as Mr. Hoover himself has said on this point a few weeks ago:

The F.B.I. can definitely handle any additional responsibilities brought about by the approval of the treaty. . . . The (extra) expenditure in funds . . . could be absorbed within our current appropriation.

In addition the United States would also be authorized by the treaty to screen the personnel of a Soviet consulate before agreeing to their assignment here. The screening process makes it much easier to scrutinize the activities of political agents who enter the country as registered representatives of a foreign government than when they enter clandestinely.

We are also authorized by the treaty to prevent them from travelling to sensitive areas in the country and to expel them if they prove to be undesirable. We could close a Soviet consulate in the United States whenever we wished, and we could cancel the Consular Convention—as I said earlier—on 6 months' notice.

All of the treaty's provisions, of course, cut both ways. If Soviet consular personnel are eventually allowed into the United States, we would, reciprocally, send to the Soviet Union an equal number of such personnel.

Given the closed character of Soviet society, however, it seems evident that the United States stands to gain far more information from consular surveillance than does the Soviet Union. As conditions stand today, our sources of information within the U.S.S.R. are very limited. I believe that the more openings we have into the Soviet Union to shed light on the operations and dealings of the Soviet Government, the better.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOR CONSULAR PERSONNEL

Mr. President, besides the fear of the increased threat to our internal security, many of our citizens have expressed a deep concern about the treaty provisions granting full diplomatic immunity from

criminal prosecution to the consular staffs of both countries. They consider this a dangerous carte blanche for Soviet espionage and other forms of subversion.

The United States has consular conventions with many other countries, they point out. None of them includes a provision granting full diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution to consular staffs. Why, then, should such a provision be included in this proposed convention with the Soviet Union?

As I have already noted, in terms of the number of additional personnel involved, the screening of Soviet personnel, and travel restrictions we could impose on them, the risks involved in this grant of diplomatic immunity appear to be few.

Equally important, we favor the diplomatic immunity clause because we feel that it is important to have the same protection for American consular officers and employees in the Soviet Union.

Since 1946, 31 Americans at our Embassy in Moscow have been expelled by the Soviets, most often on allegations of espionage. Without diplomatic immunity from criminal prosecution, our consular employees could be jailed or suffer even harsher punishment on similar trumped-up charges.

Furthermore, whenever a Soviet citizen is arrested in this country for espionage, Soviet authorities might be tempted to take retaliatory action against an American consular employee who is not accorded full diplomatic immunity.

Other governments similarly protect their consular officials and employees serving in the U.S.S.R.: for example, the British and the Japanese recently negotiated consular conventions with the Soviet Union containing immunity provisions modeled after those in the U.S.S.R. agreement.

While this immunity provision would prevent our taking punitive action against a Soviet official caught spying, we can expel him from the country, suspend or close the consulate altogether as countermeasures.

EXTENSION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY TO CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Mr. President, even those who concur with the diplomatic immunity provisions of the pending convention are concerned about its portent for the future.

The United States now has 35 agreements in force with other countries which require us to extend most-favored-nation treatment to consular officers, and in some cases to consular employees. Twenty-seven of these countries—including Yugoslavia and Rumania—now have consular offices here, with a total of about 577 personnel.

Under the most-favored-nation clauses of the treaties we have with these countries, if those nations agree to grant immunity from criminal jurisdiction to the 424 American consular personnel stationed there, the United States would have to extend the same treatment to their people here.

The Department of State recently asked our embassies in these 27 countries to estimate whether their host nation would ask for most-favored-nation treatment. The replies indicated that, at most, 11 might make such requests; 290

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people would be involved and, of this number, only a few are from Communist nations. The 290 figure also represents a very small proportion of the estimated total of 9,400 foreign diplomatic officers, members of their families, and employees, who now enjoy full diplomatic immunity in the United States.

PROTECTION OF AMERICANS TRAVELING IN THE U.S.S.R.

Among the most important and significant provisos in the Soviet Consular Convention are those which permit the United States promptly to protect and assist its citizens when they are arrested and detained in the Soviet Union. These provisions, which I cited earlier, require that American consular officials be given immediate notification and access to Americans who are accused of wrongdoing and arrested by Soviet officials.

These requirements would go into effect immediately upon ratification, even if no consulates were ever to be opened by the two countries.

Under the proposed treaty, the Russians would have to notify us within 48 hours of an arrest, and we would have continuing access after a period not to exceed 2 to 4 days. We now have no such rights.

The significance of these provisions is underscored by the fact that under Soviet law a person can be held, incommunicado, for months—without the right to notify his embassy, without charges being lodged against him, and without the right to counsel.

Thus, under the terms of the treaty, the Soviet Union would be giving to American citizens rights far in excess of those provided under their own law to their own citizens. Moreover, the Soviet Union acquires no rights under these provisions in the United States which they do not already enjoy—rights which we could not, even if we wanted to do so, withdraw, because our Constitution requires the extension of these rights to noncitizens as well as citizens.

It is true that these rights of access, continuous communication, notification of the charge, and of counsel do not bulk large when compared to the extremely high standards of individual liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. But in the context of the totalitarian Soviet legal system, under which even Soviet citizens are not granted such elementary procedural due process rights, they are, indeed, of great importance.

These rights assume even greater significance when one considers the fact that American visitors to the Soviet Union outnumber Soviet visitors to the United States by a ratio of about 18 to 1. It has been estimated that some 18,000 Americans visit the U.S.S.R. annually, and this number is expected to grow. Soviet visitors to this country, on the other hand, have remained at the 900-per-annum level in the past 5 years.

To most Americans who are accustomed to the vigilance of our courts in protecting the rights of arrested persons, it is rather difficult to accept the fact that under Soviet law access to an arrested person can be refused while the case is under investigation—for a period of weeks, months, even years.

To recall some of the more recent cases, in 1961 American student Martin Makinen was held from July 21 to September 4 before the U.S. Embassy was even notified of his detention. A more famous case involved the U-2 pilot Gary Powers, who was held incommunicado by Soviet authorities for 21 months.

Another case was that of Yale Professor Barghoorn, whose arrest in 1963 the United States learned about only after 12 days, and whom Americans officials were never permitted to see in prison. Another was the tragic case of Newcomb Mott in 1965. Nine days elapsed before any American official was allowed access to him, and then for only 1 hour. Only three other consular meetings were allowed in the next 10 weeks prior to trial. Mott was sentenced to 18 months in prison; apparently, he was in a very despondent state because of the isolation in which he had been held. He died shortly afterward in circumstances that have not yet been fully explained.

Peace Corpsman Thomas Dawson was apprehended by Soviet border guards on September 11, 1966, while gathering seashells barefoot near the Soviet-Iranian border. Our Embassy was never notified of his arrest, and it was not until September 20 that consular access was accorded.

In just the 32 months since the pending convention was signed, we know of at least 20 cases where Americans have been arrested and detained by the Soviet police. In none of these cases have we been notified of the incident or allowed to visit the American within a reasonable period of time—and certainly not within the time limits specified by the terms of the treaty.

Probably, if the pending Consular Convention and protocol had been in force, the United States could not have prevented any of these Americans from being jailed in Soviet prisons. But the standards provided by the treaty would have greatly assisted American officials in their efforts to assure them significantly more protection.

It is also important that if the convention had been in effect, it would have rendered unnecessary the repeated representations by the United States at very high political levels, in order to secure even late and limited access to our citizens. The rights of international due process which the treaty would provide should be available without question, without delay, and without the need for continuous and insistent high-level diplomacy. They should be accorded as a matter of course.

It is this very minimal standard, but nonetheless a very important one, which is sought by the provisions of the treaty.

These protections are not the only ones which would be available to all American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union. Any American who has traveled abroad will realize that there are many occasions in which they might require the assistance of a consular office.

Under the terms of the convention, consular officials would be allowed to look after the nondiplomatic transactions of their citizens. This assistance, for example, would extend to such mat-

ters as notary rights, birth and marriage certificates, wills, and travel documents.

Consular service would also provide Americans with translation help, advice about domestic laws, and assistance in personal and professional dealings with the Soviet Government or Soviet citizens.

CONVENTION IS SMALL STEP TO PEACE

Mr. President, the sole, relevant question to be asked, after thoroughly and carefully studying all of the considerations I have outlined, is: Does the proposed Consular Convention and the protocol with the Soviet Union serve the best interests of the United States? After thoughtful study of the implications of the pending treaty, I have concluded that it does.

I am satisfied that America's defense posture, military strength, and firm vigilance will be maintained and our security safeguarded.

I support the treaty, because although the treaty alone will not eliminate all the differences which separate the Soviet Union and the United States, it will help bring more understanding to them.

Although it will not eliminate the political harassment of American citizens by the Soviet Union, it will help reduce its incidence.

Although its ratification represents a risk, I believe that the risk is manageable.

Although the treaty is not a panacea, it does provide for the faint beginnings of increased protection of American citizens abroad. Moreover, along with the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the convention, and protocol may represent another tentative step toward the easing of tensions, and perhaps even the improvement of relations between the world's two superpowers.

This treaty is in a sense an experiment in trust which might produce sufficient mutual confidence to lead eventually to other steps toward increasing the prospect of a lasting world peace.

I do hope that the Senate will ratify the treaty.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MONDALE in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I would like to address myself for a while today to the two "good faith" reservations which I introduced in the Senate yesterday. Both of these reservations call upon the parties to the Consular Convention between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to exhibit and exemplify good faith as a condition precedent to the treaty and as a continuing condition if the treaty is to be ratified and kept in operation.

The pending reservation which will be voted on Tuesday stipulates that there will be no exchange of instruments of ratification of the convention until the Soviet Union has agreed to two conditions. It is before us, identified as "Executive Reservation No. 1." We are,

therefore, calling for good faith in this instance on the part of Russia. I shall also discuss today, later in my speech, some of the reasons why I believe my second good-faith resolution should be approved, calling upon the President to notify Congress that Russian supplies of weapons and petroleum are no longer prolonging the war in Vietnam as a condition precedent to the implementation of this Consular Treaty.

The two conditions are, first, that we be allowed to distribute to the Soviet press announcements of U.S. public policy, both foreign and domestic, and answers to any criticism of such policy contained in the Soviet press; and, second, that the Soviet Union remove restrictions on the number of U.S. press representatives permitted in that country so long as that number does not exceed the number of Soviet press representatives entering the United States, and provides that no restriction of expression or movement be imposed upon our American press corps representatives in Russia which do not prevail for Russian press representatives in the United States.

Mr. President, through an inadvertence, the resolution identified as Executive Reservation No. 1, as printed in the RECORD yesterday, and as lying on the desk of Senators, is incomplete because one clause was omitted in the printing through no fault of anybody except the present speaker.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the reservation, as it will be reprinted and appear on the desks of Senators on Monday, and as proposed by its coauthors, be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the reservation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXECUTIVE RESERVATION 1

Reservation intended to be proposed by Mr. MUNDT, DOMINICK, and Hruska to the resolution of ratification of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a protocol relating thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1964: Before the period at the end of the resolution of ratification insert a comma and the following: "subject to the reservation that no exchange of instruments of ratification of the convention shall be entered into on behalf of the United States until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have agreed (1) to permit the distribution to the Soviet press or any segment thereof by United States diplomatic and consular officers of announcements of United States public policy, both foreign and domestic, and answers to any criticism of such policy contained in the Soviet press, and (2) not to impose or enforce any limitation on the number of United States citizens permitted to be in the Soviet Union at any time as representatives of the United States press which would effectively reduce them below the number of Soviet press representatives entering the United States, or to impose upon them any conditions of travel or objective reporting which do not prevail for Soviet press representatives within the United States."

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, before I go into the particulars of these two points, I would like to comment on the atmosphere in which they are offered. During the hearings before the Foreign

Relations Committee in which this Consular Convention was considered and also in the hearings on China and southeast Asia, witness after witness testified to the theory that Russia had mellowed, that it was no longer the totalitarian police state it once was. What was true, they said, in Stalin's time is no longer true under the present regime. The is indeed, encouraging news—if true. I know one way to find out. That is to allow representatives of our press, for whom I have the highest regard for factual reporting, to examine and report on the programs of freedom throughout the Soviet Union and to permit our diplomatic officials in Russia the same opportunities to be heard and read that are enjoyed and exercised by Russia's diplomatic officials here in the United States. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic has mellowed, then it would seem to me that they would be willing, even desirous, to observe this reservation as a quid pro quo. For few would deny that a truthful press is the bulwark of freedom and that an unencumbered and uncensored press is the enemy of totalitarianism. Has communism in Moscow mellowed, then, or has it not? Is this a new Russia or the old one in new raiment? Are they willing to accept a free press and a free discussion of public affairs or are they not? Now is the time to answer all these questions and to utilize this Consular Treaty as a proving ground to measure theory against fact.

In this regard, as a start, I propose that our press corps, and more particularly our diplomatic officers, be allowed to function within their boundaries as their Russian representatives are allowed to operate within ours. Let both sides be allowed to tell their side of the story to the people of both sides without interference. What is the opportunity for one should be the opportunity for the other. Reciprocity—full reciprocity—should be the basic characteristic of any realistic treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

If a situation should arise in which one party believes it should speak out, they should say so—as the Soviet Union did here in the United States in August of 1965 when it characterized the situation in Watts as follows—and I read the statement made by the Soviet diplomatic mission in Washington:

There are moments when one cannot keep silent. Shocked to the depth of the soul by the monstrous massacre of the population of the Negro ghetto in Los Angeles, we are addressing these words to express our indignation, sorrow, and pain. . . .

We say this because we feel and see that the carnage in Los Angeles is no isolated event. The disgraceful trail of violence against the Negro population is growing longer from year to year. And the main thing is: There is no end in sight. How long will this go on? What "Great Society" is this where people are brought to despair and then in full daylight, before the eyes of the whole world, shot by automatic rifles and machine guns. . . .

The events in Los Angeles cannot but be associated in the minds of the people with the barbarous actions of the American soldiers in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, I think I should repeat that comment made by Russian diplo-

matic officials in the United States because I want everyone to know just what they are saying, as part of the evidence of this "detente" about which the State Department talks so much but which it is never able to define.

Here is what the Russian diplomatic officials put out:

The events in Los Angeles cannot but be associated in the minds of the people with the barbarous actions of the American soldiers in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, they describe our heroic American Armed Forces in Vietnam as barbarians. I think we should note that and remember it and recall the statement was made in the United States by diplomatic personnel attached to the Russian Embassy on 16th Street, Washington, D.C.

I read on now from their statement:

In the rumble of the blocks tumbling down in Los Angeles we hear the echo of the walls of the ancient town of Santo Domingo crumbling under the pressure of tanks. The flames flaring up over the Negro ghetto reminded us of the burning towns and villages of Vietnam. . . .

That is the end of the quotation from the statement of the diplomatic mission in the United States from Moscow.

Should the United States be equally entitled to "report" the recent riots on Red Square between the Chinese and the Russians as a "slaughter," "bloodbath," and so forth, and relate it to the innocent murders of thousands of South Vietnamese by the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese? No, not really, because we have been raised in the tradition of integrity of the press as much as freedom of the press. But it is not out of line to expect our press representatives and diplomatic officers to tell the true story of what happened at Watts or in Moscow or Peking and have it printed—that is, of course, if there really is to be reciprocity between our two countries, if there really is a detent, if there really is going to be a continuing condition of armity. In other words, what is sauce for the Russian goose must not become only stop for the American gander.

Mr. President, unless we correct this treaty and plug up this deficiency, we will bow low and appease the men in Moscow without getting a quid pro quo to which we are rightfully entitled in a treaty of this kind.

If this is actually a two-way street between openminded nations, surely the Russians should exercise no objections, as we did not, to the publication in their newspapers of our interpretations of what happens in this world, as we permitted them to publish in our newspapers their heavily slanted and almost obscene observations. Furthermore, the Russians should have no objections, as we do not, to clarifications in their newspapers of what we consider inaccuracies in the reported news.

That is, if the Government of the U.S.S.R. has mellowed—if communism has changed—if we are near a detente, or have one now—certainly, Russia should be willing to accept this condition precedent—this treaty reservation. If Russia should prove unwilling to do so, the one-sided nature of this treaty's

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benefits should be made evident to all. We should know it now, if we are to ratify the treaty, whether this is a one-way street or not. Is this another case of allowing the Communist side every advantage while we fail to press for what is rightfully ours? For the life of me, I cannot understand it. In this peril-filled world, I can understand, but cannot accept, "Nervous Nellies"; but I can neither understand nor accept "Half-way Hannahs," when they approve policies beneficial only to the Communist half of the ideological struggle now prevailing in this world.

But there is another and more important reason for expecting and hoping for "good faith" on the part of the Soviet Union in allowing American representatives of the press, freedom of access and movement in their country—and that is my undying faith in mankind to reach agreements once they know each other.

To achieve this end, I have probably been the leading exponent of people-to-people exchanges of ideas with the longest record of support for such programs, dating back more than two decades.

I believe that our Government should encourage such activity. I backed this belief with legislation; it is on the books, known as the Smith-Mundt Act of the 80th Congress, sometimes identified as Public Law 402 of the 80th Congress. It remains on the books today. I still think it is the most lasting foundation for peace. I think that men have an inclination not to like people they do not know. I am also the author of the legislation enacted by the 80th Congress which led to the formation of UNESCO—the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

I am likewise the author of legislation which gave a permanent status, adequate appropriations, and continuing power to the Voice of America, as well as other legislation which established libraries in foreign countries, mobile motion picture programs, and low-cost books, as well as the exchange-of-people programs. Under the terms of my legislation, a great many Russians have had the privilege of coming to the United States as visitors to look around, and to return to their homeland.

But, Mr. President, I am not an advocate, and never will be, of making treaties with the U.S.S.R. which work to their advantage without providing an equal advantage to my country and the citizens of America. When we talk about the press, when we talk about what a consular officer is going to be permitted to see and hear and do in Russia, and examine the fine print of the treaty, it will be seen that we are making a very poor horse trade by failing to crank into this treaty what should be put into it concerning freedom of action of press, of observation, and of speech.

This reservation will help us accomplish the needed and necessary goal. It will help us improve relations with the people—note that I say "the people," and not necessarily the government, because I still feel we should aim toward the people in totalitarian states since their rulers and commissars give them

only one side of the story—the Communist slant. It will also enable our own citizens to better understand the complexities of today's world.

To improve relations between countries we must first increase the area of agreement. To accomplish this we must first dissipate any ill will and misconceptions that exist toward us today in the Soviet Union and then build up a realistic understanding of our country. Under the present circumstances this is impossible. The constant war by the Soviet press which daily poisons Russian minds against us is probably the biggest stumbling block we encounter in our effort to prove our peaceful intentions. Access to the Russian people through their press could counteract and hopefully someday overcome this.

I deplore the fact that this consular treaty remains so completely and eloquently silent on these important matters. The reservation introduced by Senators MUNDT, HRUSKA, and DOMINICK would correct this deficiency, plug that gap, and provide a test of the sincerity which must be present if any portion of the treaty is to work successfully and in the interests of the United States.

Conversely, the American people must have the truth as to what the Soviet Union is really like. Not propaganda furnished by their government or by acquiescent or unrealistic journalists. We need the good and the bad, just as they need the facts.

We need an opportunity for American representatives of the press to function over there as responsible members of the free press function anywhere in order that they may be enabled to get the facts on which to base their reports.

To do this it is necessary that we open up all lines of communication including all shades of political opinion. No more blackballing of certain publications in Russia which dare truthfully to report unpleasant or unpopular Russian facts. No more denial of the right for any interested and legitimate correspondent to have a "permanent office" in Russia. No more 30-day visas with quick cancellations to those who may be unflattering, even though journalistically truthful, in their analysis of the Soviet Government and its leaders, its policies, and programs. A free press and truthful representation on both sides of the Iron Curtain—that is all we ask for in the proposed reservation. This we already offer them here. This, I repeat again, must be the cornerstone of understanding and eventual brotherhood of man.

Under the proposed reservation, on which we shall vote next Tuesday, we would tell the Russians, our Government, and the world whether we really believe in opening up the bridges of understanding or whether we are simply interested in a Consular Treaty to build a materialistic bridge over which increase the exportation of profitable goods to Russia, so it can further expand its exportation of arms to increase the casualty lists in Vietnam. We will vote on that reservation Tuesday, and I think it is important that we consider these facts carefully before the vote.

Under the proposed reservation our consular officers—our diplomats—our

American press—radio and TV correspondents—would no longer be subject to the curious Russian description of Pravda which says:

There is no news in the truth and no truth in the news.

It would provide, for the first time in history, that those liberties, freedom of movement, and rights of expression enjoyed now by Russian officials in the United States would be enjoyed, after ratification, by Americans in Russia. What is wrong with such a procedure?

I wish the negotiators that we sent there to write these treaties would have brought back the intention to correct the prevailing evils while yielding to the Russian Communist demands that the treaty should provide for complete immunity which they demand for their consular officers in this country, when American history records that never before in the history of this Republic have we granted any such immunity to such personnel of any country in the world.

I regret that the Senate rejected the Talmadge amendment yesterday. It would have corrected this curious concession to the Communist demands.

Mr. President, are the Russians really willing now to grant us reciprocal treatment? We shall see. Are we willing to demand it? That is the question of the hour. That is the decision we shall make when we vote on this reservation next Tuesday afternoon.

Will Senators demand the reciprocity that our State Department negotiators failed to insist upon? Or, if they did insist upon it, they did so with such a lack of competent persuasion that they brought home an empty sack.

Incidentally, this is not merely the question for next Tuesday or the question for today. This is the question of the decades since the recognition of Red Russia by Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. We never seem to demand anything in exchange for our diplomatic concession. Clothed with the power to advise and consent, is it too much to ask that the U.S. Senate demand such a concession now? Or have we so far slipped in our independent functions as the Senate of the United States that when treaties come down the trail, all we do is to consent? As Senators, we take an oath to defend the Constitution and to protect the Republic; and in that connection, in treaty-making, we should understand our function is to advise and consent—not merely recklessly and regularly to give our automatic consent.

The very fact that the Senate is spending a week or 10 days to discuss this treaty is a shocking but gratifying departure from the usual procedure, because ordinarily we are so quick to consent that we never even seem to consider our function of advising. The Constitution provides that the Senate shall advise and consent on questions of foreign policy. So on Tuesday we shall write some advice in a yea-and-nay vote. Each Senator can offer his advice as his conscience dictates; but, at least, it will be a rare occasion because Senators will be advising the State Department and

the world of what they want to have happen.

I submit that this is not too much to ask. If we are to accept the major premise of the Department of State that this is the time for building bridges because we are in a detente with the Soviet Union, here is an opportunity for Russia to give evidence of its acceptance of that concept.

If it be demanded that we tell the true story of our country to our people, it seems to me to be rather imperative that we have the right of expression in Russia, and I believe that now is the time to take our case and our cause to the people of Russia as well as to the world.

If we muffle the ball now, if we muffle the American trumpet now, when we have a chance to express ourselves strictly within the terms, the philosophies, and the policies of the people who wrote the treaty and who now propagandize us to accept it, then we are to blame, because the restrictions will continue to be imposed, unless we exercise our responsibilities to advise by the adoption of this reservation.

Let me turn now to my second proposed good-faith resolution—the one we have agreed to vote on after 6 hours' debate on Wednesday next.

My second good-faith resolution is jointly introduced by Senators MUNDT, MILLER, MURPHY, TOWER, COTTON, HRUSKA, and CURTIS. It reads as follows:

Before the period at the end of the resolution of ratification insert a comma and the following: "subject to the reservation that no exchange of instruments of ratification of this Convention should be entered into on behalf of the United States, and the Convention shall not enter into force, until the President determines and reports to the Congress that (1) it is no longer necessary to assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to perform combat duties in the defense of South Vietnam or (2) the removal of members of the Armed Forces of the United States from South Vietnam is not being prevented or delayed because of military assistance furnished North Vietnam by the Soviet Union."

Mr. President, in my opinion, this resolution, in the nature of a reservation establishing as a condition precedent to the activation and operation of this treaty the simple but important fact that the President of the United States must first notify Congress in writing that the sending of Soviet arms and military supplies to their Communist comrades in North Vietnam is not prolonging the war and delaying or preventing the return to the United States the members of the American Armed Forces serving in Vietnam, is the most important and significant reservation upon which we shall vote, and I believe that students of history, looking backward from the vantage point of a distant tomorrow, will say that this resolution of reservation is the most significant and far-reaching one upon which the U.S. Senate has ever in American history been permitted to vote; and that in this rollcall, we will be writing history, and will be setting precedent; and when it is concluded, we shall have taken a big step toward shortening or lengthening the war in Vietnam by the manner in which we vote and by which we express or withhold our advice.

Our decision on that resolution, Mr. President, so directly tied as it is to the prospects for peace in Vietnam and the size of our American casualty lists of the future, will be voted upon in a Senate rollcall, as I say, late on Wednesday afternoon, following 6 hours of debate, so that Senators may have an opportunity to discuss it, to debate it, to speak on it, and to give their reasons for opposing or supporting the resolution.

I submit that this is in fact a good-faith resolution, because it gives us in the U.S. Senate a chance to demonstrate, by our votes and our voices, our desire to keep faith with 500,000 American boys now fighting freedom's war in far-off Vietnam.

Mr. President, taking every argument of this administration, and every plea by the State Department at face value, this Consular Treaty, if ratified, is presumed to give some extra degree of comfort and convenience or safety to those among the 18,000 Americans traveling for pleasure or for profit in Russia every year who get in difficulty with the law.

The hard, demonstrable fact—not contrived out of the imagination of the senior Senator from South Dakota, but as reported by the testimony of the State Department—is that an average of nine Americans out of the 18,000 each year get in trouble with the police in Russia.

I would like to help those nine Americans. I think that if they have the financial means to visit Russia, whether they go there to gain information or pleasure, or to seek profit—there is nothing wrong with those motives—if they get in trouble with the law, that it would be a good idea if we could do something to be helpful.

I must say I am disappointed at the kind of assistance the State Department would provide. All the proposed treaty says is, if one of those nine gets in trouble, he shall have a right to notify the consular office that he is in jail. The only other thing it says is that after the consular officer learns he is in jail, he shall have a right to visit with him in his Russian jail, a chance to talk. It may be through the screen of a prison cage, it may be under the hot light of one of those torturous inventions they have over there for blazing out the truth, that they may confer by themselves; but that is all. Nothing in the treaty says they are going to get him out of jail. Nothing in the treaty says he shall have a fair trial. Nothing in the treaty says he can present his case to the public and the press, to try to mobilize public opinion behind him. He can talk with his consular officer. Only that and nothing more.

Well, for what it is worth, there it is. The treaty sponsors do not claim anything more than that. That is all they have written into these so-called safety features.

It is on that flimsy evidence that they build their case to adopt this unprecedented treaty, with unlimited immunity extended to nationals of every country establishing a consular office in the United States.

I want to help these nine troubled and traveling American tourists, Mr. President, but I cannot escape the conviction

that somebody around here ought to be paying a little more attention to the problems and perils of 500,000 Americans in uniform, risking their lives in Vietnam. I think that is important, too; and their problems are genuine. Their problems are real. There are problems of survival.

Mr. President, the weapons supplied by the Soviet Union to North Vietnam are killing more than nine Americans every week—probably every day—as against the nine American tourists per year in Russia for whom we would like to do something. Because they have the wherewithal to travel overseas, we would fix it up so they can have a conversation with their consular officer.

I think we should get this thing into proportion. I think we ought to look behind the letters written to us by the Assistant Secretary of State—which some Senators are sending out to their constituents and saying, "This is Biblical truth."

I have read those letters, Mr. President. I would be ashamed to send them to my constituents, because I think my constituents are astute enough to see that that letter itself evades the basic issues and is an incomplete and inadequate report. The evidence pounded into this CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the last week and for the next week and perhaps longer will demonstrate the nature of the inadequacy and the deficiencies of these State Department letters they send out to defend the treaty.

Mr. President, the proposed consular treaty, we should all keep in mind—and an increasingly large number of private citizens in this country, I am happy to say, are learning to understand the issues and to discuss them with their Senators—is with the specific country, Communist Russia, that today is supplying every sophisticated weapon being used by our enemy in Vietnam to do three things.

First. To prolong the war. I have challenged the supporters of this treaty since the beginning of the hearing to point to any piece of evidence, however small, no matter how illusory, which would show that this treaty could shorten the war.

We can prove the opposite hypothesis on the record. It is going to increase the availability of Soviet arms to the North Vietnamese; and I have not been able to convince myself that, by increasing the capacity of the enemy to fight, we are ever going to be able to shorten the war.

Second. Communist Russia is supplying the North Vietnamese with every sophisticated weapon and virtually all of the petroleum used by our enemy in Vietnam—materiel without which they cannot fight a modern war. They are supplying them with all of those supplies needed to kill our brave American boys who are fighting your battle and mine over there, for whom I think we should pay more consideration in our zest to help nine traveling Americans in Russia every year.

We take chances with their likelihood of getting back alive and well and whole.

Third. It is expanding our rapidly increasing casualty lists which already have reached appalling or alarming fig-

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ures of over 8,000 dead and total casualties of over 50,000 men and boys who were sent there by the very Government now pleading with the U.S. Senators to embrace the Russians with this treaty.

Mr. President, this kind of kill and kiss policy, it seems to me, is not compatible with the Christian concepts of this Republic.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Is the Senator aware of the new casualty figures which were published this morning?

Mr. MUNDT. I am sorry to say that I am not.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. During the past week the American casualties in Vietnam totaled 1,617.

That would mean on that basis if the war were to continue throughout this year that the American casualties in Vietnam would be double or more than double the 35,000 casualties which this Nation suffered last year.

Mr. MUNDT. I am certainly happy to have the Senator provide the up-to-date facts for the Record, because he serves on a committee which has access to those facts. It seems to me that it simply underscores the severity of the problems we confront.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, the Senator mentioned a moment ago that a multitude of sophisticated weapons which are being supplied by the Russians to the North Vietnamese is lengthening the war.

Mr. MUNDT. That is my sincere conviction.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Does the Senator concur with the view of the Senator from Virginia that a long war is to the distinct advantage of Russia?

Mr. MUNDT. Of course it is, because they recognize that they have us involved in a war which is not only expensive and costly but is also a war concerning which there is a growing division of American support. As they listen to divisive debates about our part in this war, as they watch the protests on the street, and as they read about the meetings on campuses, I am convinced that these Communist warlords can delude themselves into the belief that if they continue the war for a long time, enough American opinion in opposition to the war will develop to convince the President that he must quit the war effort, even by defeat.

I think this is their hope and their expectation.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Is it not correct to say that while the Americans are suffering casualties—as they did last week to the extent of 1,617 casualties—the Soviet Union is not suffering one single casualty in North Vietnam?

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is precisely correct. They take the supplies which we send them so freely now and fabricate them into whatever their industrial economy requires. This releases their big industrial complex to manufacture the war goods which they send to Vietnam.

They do not lose men, and they certainly do not lose prestige.

The United States must be losing something prestigewise when, after 5 long years of war, we stand before the world unable to win a contest against half a country—not a whole country, but against divided Vietnam, against an agrarian country, not an industrial country.

We stand as presumably the strongest country in the world which, after 5 years, has not been able to move forward to victory in a country which lacks a single industrial complex. They cannot build a plane. They cannot build a tank. They cannot build a modern antiaircraft gun, and they cannot build a missile.

What must the rest of the world wonder about the military power of this great giant of freedom which, after 5 years, stands there frustrated in despair and unable to defeat such a country?

I think I can answer the question of the Senator, and give the reason why this startling new casualty statistic has been provided.

In the last 4 weeks, while the State Department and the administration have been trying to sell us the idea that we should sit down and make love to the Russians in this Consular Treaty, two things have happened in Vietnam which have increased these casualties.

First, the Communists have added to the supplies that they are already shipping to their Communist comrades in Vietnam their most modern, up-to-date, effective helicopters. They had not sent them there previously. They are sending them there now because the helicopter activity that we have waged against the North Vietnamese has been among the most spectacular and effective activities in our entire conduct of the war.

The Russians therefore are now helping them by providing helicopters, and our casualty lists are beginning to show the results.

Mr. President, another reason is that within the same period of time the Russians, for the first time, have shipped out from their industrial complex in Russia to their Communist comrades in North Vietnam their new 140-millimeter ground-to-ground missiles which, within the last 10 days or 2 weeks, were flung at us by surprise and killed so many of our boys in South Vietnam, and also killed our allies among the South Vietnamese civilians and soldiers. It is a devastating new weapon employed by the North Vietnamese for the first time. They get it exclusively from Russia.

So, we should have the facts in the record. We should not just be deluded by the sweetness and light comments of the State Department that tell us: "What is wrong with the Consular Treaty?"

Mr. President, we could debate that. It has its merits and its demerits in a period of peace. We could debate that dispassionately at a time when we are not losing American lives every day in a foreign country from weapons supplied by a country with which we are expected to make this consular concession. However, we must face up to the facts as they are and consider this treaty in the world in which we live and in relationship with the war in which we are engaged.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the Senator has been making a splendid statement. As I understand it, the idea and the tenor of the reservation which he is discussing now is that there should be some reciprocity in this business of ratifying, advising, and consenting to this treaty.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HRUSKA. It is thought by the Senator from South Dakota, and also by the Senator from Nebraska, who is a cosponsor of that reservation, that if we are doing something for the other side, the other side ought to be doing something for us.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HRUSKA. And it would not be at all dishonorable to see to it that there is some reciprocity.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. HRUSKA. I have listened with interest to the latest statement of the Senator. It is one of my indications that it is not an open door, as was described by the speaker at the Fulton, Mo., College, Westminster College, on March 6, when it was said:

It is my belief that we stand today upon the threshold of a new era in our relations with the people of Europe, a period of new engagements, and I believe this period can see the replacement of the Iron Curtain by the open door.

But what the Senator from South Dakota has said does not describe a period of open door or any period of transition.

The state of the Union message has similar language relating to this mellow business.

Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are also in transition. Our objective is not to continue the cold war but to end it.

Those are the words of the Chief Executive of this country. He also said:

We are shaping a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic and technical cooperation and treaty negotiations and political consultations and in working together with the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In still another speech not too long ago, before the Editorial Writers Association, the President said:

We do not intend to let our differences on Vietnam or elsewhere prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies will go step by step with them as far as they are willing to advance.

Based on what the Senator from South Dakota has said, there is no indication that the Soviet Union wishes to advance, nor has it advanced except in a way to attempt to bring about our military and psychological defeat in Vietnam; and that certainly is true of their beefing up of the military supplies, the armament, and the materiel, and more recently the helicopters.

I call the attention of the Senator from South Dakota to language contained in the New York Times on Octo-

ber 16, 1966, referring to the President's speech, in New York, to the National Conference of Editorial Writers, on October 7, 1966. Nine days later, the New York Times reported, in a dispatch written by Raymond H. Anderson, from Moscow:

Leonard S. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party leader, rebuffed today, as a strange and persistent delusion, the hope expressed by President Johnson that closer Soviet-United States cooperation was possible despite tensions over the war in Vietnam. The United States must stop bombing North Vietnam and end its aggression before relations can be improved, this Soviet leader declared.

Does language such as that, unqualified in nature, lead the Senator from South Dakota to waver in any way from his idea that there is no mellowing of the Soviet Union?

Mr. MUNDT. Of course not. It is difficult to make apparent to the American public the hard, blunt, bloody fact that the Soviets, by their very utterances, are telling us what they propose to do to our Christian civilization, to our freedoms, and to our soldiers in Vietnam with the same direct approach that Hitler wrote in his "Mein Kampf."

We now have a new generation of spokesmen on the other end of the Avenue who are making the same mistake that Chamberlain made with his umbrella. Having read the book, they said, "It sounds awful bad. He can't mean it."

But take the words of the Communists themselves. Just yesterday, Kosygin, in his latest attack on our country so far as I am aware—something else may have come over the wires today—pointed out that he believes that peace negotiations are not making progress in Vietnam because of the U.S. bombing. He also charged us with violating the truce period by moving our equipment into place.

Mr. HRUSKA. In his declaration last October, Brezhnev was not bashful about saying what he would do by way of quid pro quo.

The Senator from South Dakota is far too modest in his original reservation, when all he asks for is reciprocity in the matter of representatives of the press. Yet, a leader of the other great power in the world says, "Let's not fool ourselves into thinking that our relationships can improve until you do as we say—to wit, get out of Vietnam, stop your bombing in North Vietnam."

Mr. MUNDT. Precisely.

Mr. HRUSKA. It seems to me that we should get it out of our heads. There are many other evidences that the Russians have not mellowed—and I shall go into that matter in detail on Monday or Tuesday next—that show they have, on the contrary, become more vicious, more demanding, and more unyielding, rather than having mellowed.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator for his contribution. As usual, he has utilized his precise capacity to point up the facts which bear so vitally on this tremendously important decision.

Mr. President, we must remember a few aspects of this matter as we proceed to the voting period, as we face up to the

moment of truth, which in my opinion represents the most serious, far-reaching vote that Senators will cast in any Senate rollcall this year. I have been in the Congress 28 years, and I cannot think of very many more important matters that have been considered in that time compared with our votes on the proposed resolutions of reservation and on the treaty itself.

I wish to point out that this treaty condones the complete and totally unprecedented immunity provisions because the Communists insisted on putting them in. Without the inclusion of those immunity provisions, the Russians would not sign the treaty.

But even then—and even now—Russia has not ratified this treaty. The State Department came to our Committee on Foreign Relations and expressed the hope that they could get the treaty through the committee and through the Senate in a single week. The chairman stated, according to the newspapers, that he believed it would pass in a few days. This occurred last January. Those of us who raised some question, those of us who have some doubts, those of us who really believe that the advice function of our senatorial responsibilities in foreign relations is fully as significant as the consent function, refused to be stampeded. So, from January we are moving to this period in March, when the treaty is finally before the Senate. And the facts are getting out to the public, and that is what we wanted to have happen.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MUNDT. I am happy to yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. MURPHY. I have heard reference made on many occasions in the last few days to the immunity clause. Would the Senator spell out for me exactly what that means?

Mr. MUNDT. I shall be happy to do that, because it has been a source of great concern. It was the subject of a brief debate—altogether too brief debate—on the Senate floor yesterday, when four or five Senators were seeking to be heard on the subject, and we had run out of the generous allocation of 30 minutes of time for discussing whether or not, for the first time in American history, we were going to grant diplomatic immunity to consular officers.

It would be bad enough and I would find many things wrong with this immunity provision if we were talking about such a provision with respect to great friendly allies like England or Canada or West Germany. I cannot convince myself that consular officials from any country should have a right to come here and commit murder and rape and espionage and sabotage, and be immune. Why should they have so many more privileges and immunities and protections than American citizens?

But it is worse when you single out for this unprecedented gesture, this spectacular concession, the Communists in Russia, at the very time their efforts and their supplies and their military support in the direction of continuing the war in Vietnam are the only things that keep the war continuing there. It would also

mean the establishment of a precedent to be followed by others under the most favored nations clause. How is the world going to interpret the granting of that concession to the Russian arsenal for equipping our fighting enemy?

I sometimes wake up in the night shuddering about what the ratification of this treaty, without a reservation, will do psychologically to our friends who are fighting with us in this war—and there are not very many of them. But we applaud every nation which has sent us a soldier or a nurse or a doctor.

I am thinking now, for example, about the little country of Thailand. We think we are making a sacrifice in this war—and we are. Thailand has, however, bet its all on an American victory in Vietnam.

Have you ever stopped to think what will happen to Thailand if we pull out? If the doves in this country have their way, and we come fluttering home and permit the situation in South Vietnam to develop in its own way, who will be the first total and complete casualty? Thailand. Surrounded by Communist enemies; weak but brave; but not big enough to protect itself. What must the people and the leaders of Thailand think when they read about our signing a treaty with a country, without any stipulations or reservations at all, saying even "Please, Russia, do not send so many guns; do not send your best missiles; do not send your best Mig's. Please, sir, if we concede to you, will not you cut down on the war supplies killing our American troops?"

What is their reaction in Thailand going to be, Mr. President, when they know if Russia succeeds and the Communists succeed Thailand is gone. I salute a country that bets its everything on our capacity to win, on our resolution of the fact that we mean business when we say, as the President has said perhaps a hundred times, "We are not going to permit armed aggressive communism to drive us into retreat in the world."

This means immunity for everything. There is no crime that could be committed by man or animal from the top consular official to the lowest which would be punishable once this treaty is enacted.

Mr. President, the Communists place our country now in a curious position because, as I have pointed out, the Russians have not ratified it. They have a Presidium that can sit at any time. When Moscow says to ratify they ratify. It is a body that does not consent and advise. It acquiesces. We are getting that way ourselves on this advising situation on foreign treaties, but I hope that we never reach it on consent.

Did anybody ever ask why the Soviets did not ratify? Why do they insist that we ratify first? One does not have to study communism very long or know much about communism in this world, as the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. MURPHY] so well knows, because he learned about communism the hard way, to understand why they take this approach.

They want to place the United States before the world as a supplicant on its

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knees seeking to appease the mighty Russian state by ratifying a treaty, with the immunity provision upon which they insist. Russia arrogantly insists that we meekly ratify the treaty first as a demonstration that once again their commissars can outmaneuver and outwit the leaders of the free world.

That is why they want it to be ratified by our country in the first instance.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that the condition of the smaller countries in all of southeast Asia was worsening considerably because of fear of Russia and because of Russian propaganda that America was a paper tiger and would never come to their aid and would never save them if they got into trouble?

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct, because the Russians are the most skillful and the best propagandists in the world. They invented the Pavlov dog experiment and have been using that conditioning process ever since. They use every little free debate that we have in the Senate between those who believe that we should support the policies of the administration of standing firm and those who are in favor of running out. They make of it that a great, divisive nation, America, is going to run out on its international commitments because of a divided nation and a breakdown of support for the President and his handling of the war.

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that from the day President Kennedy sent American troops into South Vietnam the entire character of all nations involved changed?

Mr. MUNDT. Of course; the Senator is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the Pakistanians, who are our friends, who were afraid that we would not come to their assistance, suddenly said, "Maybe we do not have to make a deal with Russia; maybe America will protect us."

Is it not true that in Indonesia, this great chain of islands that stretches within 14 miles of the Philippines, they said, "We do not have to accept this great show of force, this imposition of will by an atheistic, communistic government, because our friends, the Americans, will protect us"?

Is it not true that the President of the Philippines came before a joint session of Congress and told us how pleased, how happy, how assured they were since they knew that America was going to stand firm on its stated policy to protect and guarantee self-determination to smaller nations?

Is it not true that he said that the nations of Asia and southeast Asia would be very, very happy if we would give that guarantee and they could work out their salvation and prosper and prosperously, with our help, achieve the kind of world we want?

Is it not true that the one thing that made this possible was the guarantee by America that we would stand for no further aggression in southeast Asia?

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct. I have no question in the world in my

mind that Sukarno would still be riding high in Indonesia, perhaps with Chinese Communist members in his ruling clique by now, except for the fact that we did indicate for a while to the world that we were serious about stopping aggression in Vietnam.

I have been one of those who has consistently supported the President's firm position in this war. I have been one of those who ran for reelection in the campaign last year as a Republican in South Dakota, supporting the President at a time when the Democratic candidate was attacking me on my support of the President as being a warmonger, while he joined the doves and wanted to flutter out.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for some of us who have supported the President through this entire disgusting debate between those who would stand firm and those who would run out on our war effort to rationalize in our conscience supporting a war effort which this country prolongs by its irrational and contradictory policy of insisting that we ship more and more supplies to the Russians so that they can ship more and more guns to the North Vietnamese to kill more and more American boys who are being drafted by a government that says it wants to win the war.

Somebody owes this country an explanation of that, Mr. President. They are going to get it soon or late. I will guarantee they will get an explanation during the course of the next political campaign when the President comes up for reelection, if he does not come back to his good judgment of an earlier time and provides a consistent and constructive program which gives some chance of victory to our American war effort and discontinues aiding those who combine to prolong the war.

America is getting tired of a war that is 5 years old, which we have the capacity to win, and we can win it without escalation, without bombing; we can win it by shutting off the supplies of the Russian arms that keep the Communist warship afloat in Hanoi.

I believe that this war would have long since been over if it had not been for our self-defeating diplomatic and trade policies. Later on I am going to document what I have said. I am going to place in the Record a hair-raising list of exports we are shipping to Russia now by Executive order issued by President Johnson last October 12 in open defiance of the recommendations of Congress.

Any President serving as a wartime Commander in Chief who says we ought to shorten the war and makes his countrymen content when he moves in the direction of sending supplies to the enemy who is providing guns to prolong the war, makes of himself a greater political Houdini than I ever believed him to be—and I respect him very much for his political dexterity.

Unhappily—and now we are getting close to the meat of the coconut—the illusory, euphoric atmosphere in which the State Department and a few Senators would like to discuss the merits and demerits of the consular treaty simply and demonstrably does not exist today.

Closing our eyes and our minds to the fact that we are today at war in Vietnam, a war in which our enemy is supported by the Russians, does not make the war go away. The casualty lists printed in the hometowns of the States of Senators serving here are getting a little too long to persuade people to believe that a happy detente has come about. This week's casualties in the war, as pointed out this afternoon by the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], are the heaviest of any like period in the entire war—and the number will grow because we are giving to the Russians the capacity to develop their industrial complex and build their strength so as to provide additional arms to the North Vietnamese, to make certain that they too will grow in military strength.

I wonder how many Senators have asked themselves why it is, in the whole course of the wonderful history of this Republic, that no President has ever before authorized, to say nothing of encouraged, shipments of supplies to the enemy with which to provide guns to kill our boys?

Whatever other things historians write about concerning this administration and the era in which we live, they are going to write about that, because it is new, it is unprecedented. To me, it is as incomprehensible as it is inadvisable; but there are the blunt and awful facts.

I can remember as a young Member of the House of Representatives going up and down the highways and byways and on the platforms of the country, and even on the radio, because we did not have much television then, and in my humble manner joining those who were debating the issue whether President Roosevelt ought to stop American junk peddlers from selling scrap iron to Japan in 1939, 1940, and 1941. We had some interesting discussions then. We pointed out that some of us believed that perhaps the war lords of Japan would some day shoot that scrap iron back and kill American boys.

What were we told? We were told then what they say now—the editorial writers, the commentators, the columnists, and the State Department crowd: "Oh, those people who talk about the loss of American lives are using an emotional approach." Mr. President, I plead guilty to the charge. Death is an emotional institution. Patriotism is an emotional process. I think the time has come for someone to show a little more practical emotion for the boys who are being killed in Vietnam.

I plead guilty to the charge of being emotional, let me say to the liberal newspaper writers of this country. I wish some of them would show the same emotion. I see nothing wrong with it.

The mothers and fathers who write me about their boys who do not come home from the war feel some emotion, as well as those who write worrying about their youngsters now in college who, some day, will have to go out to this bloody foreign battlefield the year after next, the year after that, and no one knows how many more years after that, if we continue to feed and fight the enemy at the same time.

I was emotional in my desire to protect the lives of American fighting men against the trade practices of war profiteers in 1939, 1940, and 1941, and I am emotional in that desire today. I guess I am just an emotional country boy from South Dakota.

At any rate, at that time, we pleaded and we pleaded and we pleaded with President Roosevelt to place an embargo on scrap iron being sent to Japan, but he did not do it. It made a lot of millionaires out of scrap iron peddlers in this country exporting it to Japan. Some of them got filthy rich in their traffic in blood.

But on the morning of Pearl Harbor, they picked out of the bodies of 3,000 American boys—for whom someone should show some little emotion, if the people pounding their typewriters from the safety of their editorial sanctums do not have any—the scrap iron which our junk peddlers had sent to Japan.

While I never supported Franklin D. Roosevelt—and the more I read American history the happier I am to reiterate that fact—I do applaud him for one thing:

Pearl Harbor came on a Sunday. We declared war in Congress on Japan shortly after noon the next day, on Monday. I voted for the declaration. But President Roosevelt issued an Executive order, even earlier, prohibiting the further sale of scrap iron to Japan, saying the obvious thing, that since they were using it to kill American boys we did not think it was justified American business practice to continue to sell scrap iron to Japan.

That was great going F.D.R. on that particular statement. That one was right—but it was terribly late in coming.

I wish our present President, who admires F.D.R., and who supported him, and still supports his policies, had emulated the F.D.R. statement on embargoing scrap iron to include today's shipment of supplies to the enemy.

Because, on the record—and I am going to put it in the book today—on the record, I want Senators to read it, I want our constituents to read it, I want historians to read it, I want the whole world to know the facts on the record—3 bloody years—more than that—after the casualty lists started coming in and American boys were being killed in steadily expanding serious numbers, and the war was really tough, an Executive order was issued on October 12, 1966, by President Lyndon Johnson which opened up vast new floodgates of exports of supplies, including iron, to Russia—the sole supplier of the modern weapons being shipped to the Communists in Vietnam for use in prolonging the war and in expanding our casualties.

The President did that despite the fact that the Senate a number of years before had voted overwhelmingly against such a policy—and the House so expressed itself as recently as just last year.

The sophists in the State Department induced the members of the House conference committee to take all the teeth out of that Senate amendment which I sponsored then and weakened it to read, providing that if the President finds it in the national interest to ship them over,

he can ship over these supplies to Russia in contradiction of the expressed policy of the Senate as stated in a rollcall vote.

Then, last year, the Findley resolution came up in the closing days of Congress, and that fine Representative came up with a resolution against stopping these kinds of sales to the Communist enemy. The House this time overwhelmingly approved it in a rollcall vote.

The same people now soliciting Senators in their offices, over the telephone, and by letter, to support this treaty, who broke down the support on the part of the House for my anti-Communist trade amendment a few years earlier, tried again last year to break down the support of Senators for this House measure—the Findley resolution—and they succeeded, to a large extent, in breaking down support of enough Senators so they again wrote in an escape hatch, and the President blew the top off that escape hatch by his Executive order of October 12, 1966. In effect that order said, "Let American exporters profit. Let international bankers have their pound of flesh. Let those who are making big profits from selling to Russia sell at war-inflated profits, even though the record shows the weapons being made by the Russians are being sent to Vietnam to kill our boys."

Mr. President, we are at war. It is as impossible to divorce this Consular Treaty from the facts of war as it is to try to prove that the Communist Bear in Russia has become a household pet. Facts have a rude habit of intruding themselves into the world of make-believe.

Since we are at war, we should ask ourselves occasionally, Who are we fighting against? Who is on the other side? Who is the enemy?

We are at war with communism. Does anyone doubt that?

Does anyone question that 500,000 American boys in uniform are facing death in the Vietnam war theater because we are at war with communism, and more men are being drafted every month for that same reason.

The bloody, ugly shooting aspects of this major war have now been continuing for at least 5 years. President Johnson told us yesterday in his televised press interview that the end is not in sight.

How could it be? Because the end of the stream of war materiel from Communist Russia to Communist North Vietnam being given our enemy is not in sight and the end of our export programs and the profiteering peddlers of war materiel to the enemy in Russia is not in sight? So, of course, the war drags on.

Mr. President, were this ugly war to end tomorrow, I firmly believe it has gone on many months—perhaps even extra years—longer than necessary and longer than it would had not Russia so generously supplied the North Vietnamese with every modern weapon and all of the petroleum they have needed to prolong the war. Surely at this date in the war we should discourage rather than encourage trade policies and practices which help the Russian war economy to continue and even to expand

these shipments of war supplies to Hanoi.

There is nothing in sight to indicate that the Russians will discontinue sending North Vietnam, in increasing numbers, better and more modern war machines such as helicopters, as the days go on unless we change our policies here in the United States.

How many more years must this war continue? It seems to me that these are some of the demonstrable facts of life that we should consider as we confront our decision and our votes on this Consular Treaty, and on the reservation deferring its operative date, until either the war is over or until at least the immense war supplies and the modern and effective killer-weapons being given to our enemy each day by Communist Russia is discontinued.

I wonder, Mr. President, how many Senators share my curiosity as to why treaty negotiators these past 3 years failed us so utterly in working into this proposed treaty some memorandum of understanding or some quid pro quo agreement directed at stopping or curtailing the Russians from supplying this flood of modern weapons to Vietnam?

Did not our negotiators know a war was going on? Did not they know that Russia was the principal source of supply of warmaking weapons of modern design being supplied to North Vietnam? Could not they count on their fingers the 3 long years this war had by then been under way?

I wonder, Mr. President, how many Senators share my curiosity as to why treaty negotiators these past 3 years failed so utterly in working into this proposed treaty some memorandum of understanding or some quid pro quo agreement directed at stopping the Russians from supplying this flood of modern weapons to Vietnam—a supply so large and so effective that without it, I for one am convinced, we would have had peace in Vietnam at least 6 months or perhaps more than a year ago.

Does anyone deny the modern war weapons being supplied to North Vietnam come from the Russians? Does anybody deny that 95.6 percent of the petroleum being supplied to North Vietnam for use in the war comes from Russia?

Want to stop the war, Mr. President? Turn off the gas. Shut down on the petroleum. When you are in a war, try to write a treaty or approve a treaty reservation to protect 500,000 Americans in uniform in Vietnam, rather than one trying to alleviate the troubles of nine out of 18,000 roving Americans visiting Russia in a year.

How many Senators, I wonder, agree with the senior Senator from South Dakota that the major business of this Government and this Senate should not be the torturous consideration of a treaty which will enhance the capacity of the mighty Russian industrial complex to supply arms, petroleum, migs, ground-to-ground missiles, trucks, ships, anti-aircraft weapons, SAM missiles, big artillery, and a host of other death-dealing devices to our enemy in North Vietnam, but rather to concentrate on steps to shorten the war and to bring it to a successful conclusion?

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I wonder if we will have a giddy optimist among us who sometime will say on the Senate floor, "Do we want to end the war? Simple. Sign a consular treaty expanding trade to the country supplying arms to prolong to war in Vietnam." I am eager to join in that debate if, unexpectedly, one should ensue.

By what curious line of reasoning can any Senator or executive officer of this great land convince either himself or his constituents that any step making it easier, and more acceptable, for Russia to utilize our American exports to her industrial complex in the expansion of her flood of war supplies to Vietnam will either move in the direction of shortening or winning this tragic war? Can we feed and fight communism at the same time and look forward to anything resembling a successful end of the war?

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska, who has been around here a long time and who, I am sure, recalls the days when another Democratic administration permitted war supplies to go to Japan in order to make buckets of money for a few, which resulted in our boys being killed at Pearl Harbor later.

Mr. CURTIS. I commend the Senator from South Dakota for his excellent statement. He is a member of the committee that heard testimony which gives timeliness to his statement, which is of interest and concern to the entire Nation. I commend him for it.

Can the Senator conceive of any reason why this treaty, which has been languishing since the summer of 1964, should be rushed to ratification at this time? Is there any particular advantage to the United States at this time?

Mr. MUNDT. I cannot think of any, and I must say I have explored that question very diligently. I spent over two and a half hours one day last week at a briefing in the CIA headquarters in Virginia, trying to find out if, somewhere along the line, something was known that had not been brought to our attention. I attended diligently the meetings of the Foreign Relations Committee. I have had pleasant and persuasive State Department people come to my office talking to me about the treaty. I have asked many questions. I can honestly say at this late hour I know of no scintilla of defensible reason why there should be any cause for the rush. Oh, they have given so-called reasons. They have talked fast. But no one has given a reason that makes realistic sense in the war-torn world in which we live.

No wonder the treaty supporters have become so desperate and, I regret to say, devious in their efforts to divorce this treaty ratification debate and consideration—based upon letters that willing Members send to their constituents, that shoot all around the target and miss the bull's eye—from the cruel American policy advocated by the Johnson administration favorable to an even greater expansion of trade with Russia. But, Mr. President, here again the facts on the record demolish the rhetoric of those who would have Senators close their eyes

to the basic issues involved in this Consular Treaty.

Mr. President, I shall have much more evidence to submit as the debate continues about the close tie-in, the demonstrable relationship, the consequences in terms of a longer and costlier war and greater casualties which are irrevocably related to this Consular Treaty, but let me today point out just two facts from the public record which completely prove the point.

Let me point briefly, because I have already taken far more time than I had intended, to two facts—I wonder sometimes if the President has had these facts called to his attention—that every Senator should want to reflect upon and ponder over before he casts his vote.

Happily, Senators who earlier had announced their support of the treaty as a result of the one-sided arguments presented by the State Department now have an opportunity, by voting for reservation 2, to vote for the treaty and still prevent the treaty from becoming operative until the President himself can make the statement that the Soviet Union is no longer prolonging the war in Vietnam and the treaty should not be effective until Russia does stop prolonging the war. That is fair enough. The President is the Commander in Chief. He can pick the time. He can consider the evidence. So Senators who want to vote for ratification of the treaty have a chance to vote for ratification of a treaty with a reservation which provides a tool, a bargaining device, a diplomatic weapon to employ in winning a concession from the Russians, rather than simply bowing before the walls of the Kremlin and saying, "So be it as you requested, Mr. Commissar. Your war supplies to North Vietnam continue."

The first fact is found in the President's state of the Union address at the opening of Congress this year. This is what the President himself said in simple, direct, and cogent terms:

Tonight I now ask and urge this Congress to help our foreign and commercial trade policies by passing an East-West trade bill and by approving the consular convention with the Soviet Union.

Those are the exact words of President Johnson. You will find them in the text of his state of the Union address. They are there for all to read. He tied these objectives together with a Gordian knot that is so precise that not even a comma or a break in the sentence can be found to indicate that he did not mean what the words themselves so tragically express. Do you still need additional proof?

Are you still reluctant to accept the facts? The President was not trying to delude the country. He was not trying to deceive the country. He put those words together carefully to demonstrate the close connection and the interrelationship of this Consular Treaty and stepped up exports to Russia in this time of war.

I rather think the President would like to have the Senate ratify this treaty as another sort of Tonkin Gulf resolution. That resolution, you will recall, passed the Senate almost unanimously. We were all upset and excited, and under-

standably and properly so, about the serious incidents in the Tonkin Gulf, after which there was trumped up, hastily, a resolution. All but one or two Senators voted for it. Since then, we have heard five or six, eight or 12 Senators stand up and say, "I did not quite understand what was in it. I did not quite understand its implications." The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who himself presented it to us, said, "Looking back now, I think I made a mistake, because it has been changed, through its interpretation, from what I thought it said."

Mr. President, this convention, when we pass it, will be an economic Tonkin Gulf resolution, because the President is going to say when we have passed it, "I told you in my state of the Union message it was tied up with East-West trade. You approved it when you voted, for this economic Tonkin Gulf resolution, to approve the Consular Treaty, tied in as I tied it in, in my state of the Union address, with expanded East-West trade." This time we are forewarned and those seeking alibis for their actions will confront a much more difficult task.

That is point No. 1. The other point, Mr. President, is this: If further proof is needed by those who might be inclined to listen to the soothing words of the State Department rather than to consult the basic facts, Mr. President, I suggest that, as a novel experiment, they try reading the treaty itself, from beginning to end.

It is long, involved, sometimes ambiguous, and it includes 30 specific articles of agreement, concession, or stipulated purposes. Senators who are inclined to sign their names to the contract, by voting to advise and consent to its provisions, before doing so, should try reading article 7 for example. It is headed "Consular Functions." Let me quote from the treaty itself that, in this period of a tragic war, we are asked to ratify without amendment, and without needed reservations, and what in fact could be and will be another Tonkin Gulf type of wholesale approval of policies we vaguely understand, which will be, in the economic sense, what that one has proved to be, to the embarrassment of some of our fellow Senators, in the military sense.

I read you now a statement from article 7, quoting exactly. The treaty states, among other things:

A consular officer shall be entitled within his consular district to perform the following functions: To further the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State.

Mr. President, let each Senator answer this question for himself and for his own constituency. Does "To further the development of commercial and economic relations" mean expanded trade purpose or does it not?

Since by his Executive order of October 12, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson opened up for trade without license or restriction the exportation of 400 additional items, products, raw materials, machines, chemicals, iron and steel products, and like aids and items to assist the Russian industrial war machine, it stands as plain and clear as the path to

the country schoolhouse that this treaty by its very language and as properly and purposefully defined by the President in his state of the Union address is part of the formula for expanding our exports to Russia at the very tragic hour when she has become the sole support of the enemy we are fighting in providing her the modern weapons and virtually all of the petroleum she requires to prolong the war and to increase our casualties.

Mr. President, I can only try to influence the decisions of other Senators. I can only try to induce them all to be sure that before they vote, they read the treaty, and that they understand the implications and the atmosphere in which it is presented to us, with the urgency to vote now and study what we have done a few weeks later.

For myself, I shall never vote to make less likely the return of the American boys who have been drafted to fight freedom's battles in Vietnam. Any act which strengthens the power of the enemy to continue the war and to expand the killing will not have my support. Basically, it is for this reason I oppose this Consular Treaty so vigorously.

Mr. President, for those still diligently trying to make up their minds how to vote on the treaty, and for those who intend to vote for the treaty—and I imagine there will be quite a number of them—but who still believe that we ought to put this reservation on the treaty, so that it does not become operative until they quit shooting at us, anyway, I wish to call attention to another important document, which is a little bit hard to come by, but the international bankers have it, the junk peddlers have it, the big corporation presidents have it, and those profiteering from traffic with Moscow have it, so why should we not have it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? It is going to be put into public view right now, Mr. President.

It is Current Export Bulletin No. 941, dated October 12, 1966, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, John M. Connor, Secretary, by his Bureau of International Commerce, the Office of Export Control. Senators should send down and get a copy of this astonishing document, especially the original version of bulletin No. 941.

Mr. President, I have here two versions of this bulletin. I am tempted to put in the RECORD the one they first sent me, before it was censored, changed, and modified. But I wish to be fair. After they sent it to me, and I had made a few comments of shock and despair as to what I found in it, they said, "There are some little footnotes in here that indicate some of these proposals for exports to Communist countries have not yet been completely finalized."

"Well," I said, "I do not want anything that has not been finalized; just send me a new list, then." I said, "What you send me, I intend to use." If other Senators wish to see the original copy, they will have to send for it; I intend to keep mine for future reference.

Some day I shall find out for sure whether these things are finalized, but for the moment, I will take their explanations at face value. I give you now the

expurgated version, which has been sanitized, corrected, and approved. It has three sets of exhibits. One is "Analysis of the Decontrol Action for Exports to Eastern European Communist Countries." For those who have not looked at a geography book lately, Mr. President, that includes Russia.

Second, "Commodities Decontrolled for Exports to Eastern European Communist Countries Including East Germany." And exhibit No. 3, "Commodities Decontrolled for Exports to Eastern European Countries Excluding East Germany."

The only Communist country in East Europe they exclude is East Germany. It took a mighty intelligent bureaucrat to figure that one out, Mr. President. It is certainly going to keep a lot of critical machines and tools out of East Germany if we ship them to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. This administration surely has an airtight export control there, has it not? Conceivably it might take as long as an extra day to transport these critical supplies from any other Communist country directly into East Germany. We will not send certain critical supplies to East Germany, but we will ship and sell them all around East Germany. Except for East Germany we can sell these Communist governments anything any American profiteer desires, at any profitable price tag he can put on his export items.

One reason we have shortages in this country is because Americans like to sell to the highest bidder; and any country as desperate as Russia is today for materials of this kind will bid pretty high.

While reading on the subject, for Senators who might wish to go completely into this question of East-West trade, here is a document put out by the House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency, issued in 1967. Senators and others can get it from that House committee. It is entitled "The Fiat Soviet Automobile Plant and Communist Economic Reports," a report pursuant to House Resolution 1043, 89th Congress, second session, by the Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, dated March 1, 1967—this month.

It is interesting, because it tells us exactly why the parents of the boys who are fighting in Vietnam are now subject to higher taxes and greater inflationary pressures, because we have guaranteed, by executive action, \$50 million worth of credit to the Soviet Union to build in Russia itself, not a library, not a hospital, not a school, but an automobile plant, in conjunction with the Italians, the Fiat Co., of Italy, together with machine tools and all the other things they need to help bolster and salvage a fumbling economy in an area in which they are collapsing so completely because they concentrate so much on military hardware that in the entire city of Moscow there are only eight garages and eight filling stations to handle the few automobiles available in that vast city. We have that many on almost any street in Washington.

That desperately begging Soviet economy needs these supplies, and you and I and every other American stands a likelihood of paying higher taxes if the Rus-

slans do not repay the credit which we are guaranteeing them by our American Export-Import Bank to build an automobile factory which will be complete in 1969.

Are any of us so naive as to believe an automobile factory in Russia cannot be transformed into a weapons factory almost overnight? We know the answer. And—of course—any automobile company we help finance in Russia relieves its consumer industry proportionately so it can be utilized in building military hardware for Vietnam.

We are living in a strange world. We should debate an issue of this kind for 6 months, instead of 2 weeks, so that the facts get out to all our fellow citizens.

Mr. President, I commend this House report to your careful study. This may be expensive for the taxpayers, but I am trying to find a way—and I may possibly succeed—to give the Senate a chance to vote on this before it is over. On the Appropriations Committee we do have ways of trying to turn off the gas, even though this administration will not voluntarily reduce the exports to Russia.

At the moment, because there is an American guarantee of Russian credits by executive action, we have no opportunity at hand to stop it; but they will come to us in due course for money to help provide the credit.

I return to our sanitized report from the Department of Commerce. The current sanitized report—booklet No. 941—carried over the signature of Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director of the Division, who sent it to me.

If they thought the original 941 report ought to be censored, it is up to them. I am not giving up the original copy. I am keeping it for future reference. But I shall now make available for all to see, their new and sanitized version of it.

I ask unanimous consent to have the entire report printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE,
OFFICE OF EXPORT CONTROL.

Washington, D.C., October 18, 1966.

To: All field offices; all customs offices.

From: Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director, Operations Division.

Subject: Current Export Bulletin No. 941, dated October 12, 1966.

Current Export Bulletin No. 941 revised the Commodity Control List in many different respects, including the decontrol action for exports to Eastern European communist countries (Country Group Y). However, the Eastern European communist countries decontrol created a great deal of public interest in view of its relationship to the President's speech of October 7.

Attached is the following information which should be helpful in answering questions regarding the Eastern European communist countries decontrol action:

Exhibit No. 1: Analysis of the Decontrol Action for Exports to Eastern European Communist Countries.

Exhibit No. 2: Commodities Decontrolled for Exports to Eastern European Communist Countries Including East Germany.

Exhibit No. 3: Commodities Decontrolled for Exports to Eastern European Communist Countries Excluding East Germany.

(Attachments.)

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EXHIBIT 1

ANALYSIS OF THE DECONTROL ACTION FOR EXPORTS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Current Export Bulletin No. 941, dated October 12, 1966, announced a decontrol action for United States exports to Eastern European Communist countries. This action was taken to implement the President's speech of October 7, in which he stated in part: "We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of non-strategic items."

A proper evaluation of the decontrol action requires an examination into two aspects:

- (1) What countries were affected by the decontrol action
- (2) What commodities were decontrolled for each of the affected countries?

COUNTRIES AFFECTED

The form of the decontrol action announced decontrols for two country groupings:

- (1) Exports to all Eastern European Communist countries and
- (2) Exports to all such countries except East Germany.

As used in the announcement, the term "Eastern European Communist countries" comprises: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin), Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Export Regulations refer to these Eastern European Communist countries as "Country Group Y."

CLASSES OF COMMODITIES DECONTROLLED

As indicated below, only ten commodity items spread over six commodity classes were decontrolled for exports to East Germany. The bulk of the decontrol action centered on

the decontrol of commodities for export to Eastern European Communist countries other than East Germany. The affected commodity classes and the extent of decontrol for each commodity class is shown below.

Number of commodity items decontrolled by commodity class and country grouping

Commodity class	All Eastern European Communist countries	Eastern European Communist countries except East Germany
Food:		
Cereals and cereal preparations.....	2	1
Fruits and vegetables.....	1	
Sugar and sugar preparations.....		2
Feeding stuff for animals.....	3	
Miscellaneous food preparations.....	2	1
Crude materials, inedible:		
Leather scrap.....		1
Crude rubber.....		2
Textile fibers.....		20
Metal scrap.....		4
Crude animal material.....		1
Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials:		
Petroleum and petroleum products.....		6
Gas, natural and manufactured.....		2
Chemicals:		
Chemical elements and compounds.....	1	23
Crude chemicals from coal and petroleum.....		2
Dyeing, tanning, and coloring material.....		7
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products.....		6
Polishing and cleansing preparations.....		3
Fertilizers.....		1
Nonmilitary pyrotechnical articles.....		1

Number of commodity items decontrolled by commodity class and country grouping—Con.

Commodity class	All Eastern European Communist countries	Eastern European Communist countries except East Germany
Chemicals—Continued		
Cellulose and artificial resins.....		4
Chemical materials and products, n.e.c.....		15
Manufactured goods:		
Rubber manufactures.....		5
Wood and cork manufactures.....		6
Paper, paperboard, and manufactures thereof.....		5
Textile yarn fabrics.....		44
Nonmetallic mineral manufactures.....		14
Nonferrous metals manufactures.....		1
Manufactures of metals, n.e.c.....	1	27
Heating and lighting fixtures.....		3
Furniture.....		2
Travel goods and handbags.....		1
Clothing and accessories.....		23
Footwear.....		1
Professional, scientific, and controlling instruments; photographic and optical goods, and watches and clocks.....		13
Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.c.....		18
Coin, other than gold coin, not being legal tender.....		1
Machinery and transport equipment:		
Machinery, other than electric.....		41
Electrical apparatus and appliances.....		14
Transport equipment.....		5

EXHIBIT 2

Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, including East Germany

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
04811	Breakfast cereals prepared for cooking.
04812	Breakfast cereals prepared for serving.
05420	Beans, peas and other leguminous vegetables, dried.
08110	Other vegetable products for animal feed, n.e.c.
08195	Other food wastes, n.e.c.
08199	Other prepared animal feed, including feather meal and alfalfa meal.
09100	Margarine and shortening.
09910	Canned hominy; corn chips and similar chips and sticks; and other grain food preparations and dairy food preparations.
51206	Soil conditioners.
69524	Drill bits, core bits, and reamers, under 4 inches o.d., containing diamonds.

EXHIBIT 3

Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
04840	Other bakery products.
06130	Sugar, beet and cane, raw or refined.
06180	Sugar, invert, liquid, and powdered; lactose, crude and refined; malt sugar (maltose); maple sugar; refined milk sugar; and crude sugar of milk. (Report medicinal grades of malt sugar (maltose) in export control commodity No. 51203.)
06201	Sugar-coated cereal foods and candied or sweetened popped corn.
09904	Mayonnaise; and other salad dressings. Grain food preparations and dairy food preparations.
21180	Leather scrap and chrome shavings for fertilizer manufacture.
23110	Compounds of natural rubber, balata, gutta parcha and other allied gums.
23120	Neoprene (polymers of chloroprene).
26201	Recovered fibers, noils, and waste, n.e.c., wholly or in chief weight wool.
26230	Mohair and other wool-like specialty hair.
26240	Sheep's and lamb's wool, not carded or combed.
26270	Wool or other animal hair, carded or combed, excluding tops.
26280	Tops of wool and other animal hair, except horsehair.
264	Jute, including jute cuttings and waste.
26500	Vegetable fibers and waste of sisal, henequen, manila or abaca.
26621	Other manmade staple fibers, noncellulosic, not carded or combed.
26622	Other continuous filament tow, noncellulosic.
26623	Manmade fibers or waste, noncellulosic, carded or combed or otherwise processed but not spun.
26631	Acetate or rayon (viscose and cuprammonium) staple, not carded or combed.
26632	Acetate or rayon (viscose and cuprammonium) continuous filament tow.
26633	Other man made fibers or waste, cellulosic, carded or combed or otherwise processed but not spun.

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EXHIBIT 3

Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany—Continued

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
2660	Waste of other manmade fibers, not carded or combed.
2670	Other used civilian clothing, used textile articles, n.e.c., and new or used rags.
2720	Iron pyrites, unroasted.
2761	Mullite grains and pellets.
27610	Asbestos, unmanufactured.
2765	Natural cryolite, and natural chlofite.
2768	Arsenic bisulfide, natural; arsenic sulfide, natural; calcium silicate; kieserite, natural; magnesium chloride, natural, anhydrous; magnesium sulphate, natural sodium sulphate, natural; soil; strontianite; strontium carbonate; and trona.
2810	Iron ore mass.
2820	Tin-plated scrap; and tin-plated scrap which has not been detinned.
2840	Other aluminum alloy waste and scrap.
28405	Other magnesium or magnesium alloy waste and scrap.
2910	Biological supplies, animal origin; glands, crude, hoof meal, horn meal; and pancreas.
3222	Paraffin wax, crystalline.
3221	Other nonlubricating and nonfuel petroleum oils (bbl. of 42 gal.).
3222	Pitch of tar coke.
3223	Pitch coke.
3225	Petroleum bitumen and other petroleum and shale oil residues.
3226	Bituminous mixtures, based on asphalt, petroleum, etc.
34110	Natural gas liquids, including liquefied petroleum gas (L.P.G.) (bbl. of 42 gals.).
34120	Gas, manufactured (artificial).
5122	Ortho-aminonitro-benzene; para-hydroxy-chlorobenzene; and paratoluenesulfonylechloride. (18) 211
5122	Paradow. (16) 2
5123	Methionine hydroxy analogue.
5124	6-ethoxy-1,2-dihydro-2,2,4-trimethyl-quinoline.
5125	Methyl stearate, and triethyl phosphate.
5126	Sodium pentachlorophenol; 2,3-dichloroallyl diisopropylthiocarbamate, and 2,3,3-trichloroallyl diisopropylthiocarbamate.
5127	Nerol and phenyl nerol.
5127	Other chemicals for flavor and perfumery use, natural origin.
5127	Other enzymes.
5128	Cadmium sulfate.
5129	Organic chemicals, the following only: A, B-dibromopropionic acid; adenyllic acid; camphoric acid; campho-sulfuric acid; corn protein denaturant; crotonaldehyde; cyanacetamide; digecone alcohol; diethyl malonate; dimethyl glyoxime; dipentaerythritol acetate; dipentaerythritol hexaacetate; ethyl alcohol; ethyl butyrate; ethyl chloride; ethyl chloroacetate; ethyl chloro-carbonate; ethyl formate; ethyl hydrogen sulfate; ethyl lactate; ethyl malonate; ethyl mercaptan; glutaroutrite; glyceryl monostearate; methyl glutamate; methyl hydroxy acetate (methyl glycolate); methylacetylaldehyde; monoisopropanolamine; monopentaerythritol diacetate dihydrate; monopentaerythritol tetrabutrylate; pentaerithrone 2-4 (acetylacetone); and perphenyl acetate.
5129	Miscellaneous organic chemicals, excluding cyclic, n.e.c., the following only: aluminum acetate; aluminum dihydroxyaminoacetate; aluminum formate solutions; aluminum isopropylate; aluminum lactate; aluminum octoate; aluminum oxiquinolate; ammonium acetate; ammonium bitartrate; ammonium ferric oxalate; ammonium oxalate; ammonium thioglycolate; antimony lactate; cadmium acetate; cadmium octoate; calcium acetate; calcium formate; calcium linoleate, except paint and varnish dryers; calcium tartrate; chlorophyll, dry; chlorophyll solution (in oil); iron protoxalate; iron sodium oxalate; magnesium oxypentyl arsenate; manganese acetate; potassium acetate; potassium bitartrate; potassium oxalate; potassium oxibolinol sulfonate; potassium salt ylate; sodium allyl arsenate; sodium bitartrate acid sodium tartrate; sodium formate; sodium gluconate; sodium methylete; sodium oxalate; sodium potassium tartrate; sodium salicylate; sodium stearate; tartar emetic; zinc acetate; and zinc stearate.
5129	Arsenic powder; pyrographite (deposited carbon); and toline (U.S.P. resublimed).
5133	Sulfuric acid; and oleum.
5133	Hydrochloric or muriatic acid.
5135	Iron hydroxide; zinc hydroxide; and zinc peroxide.
5136	Ammonia, anhydrous or in aqueous solution.
5136	Sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), solid and liquid.
5136	Potassium hydroxide; potassium peroxide; and sodium peroxide.
5138	Tin oxides.
5140	Other inorganic pigments, n.e.c.
5140	Sodium compounds and potassium compounds, the following only: potash-magnesia carbonate; potassium arsenic; potassium bicarbonate; potassium bisulfate; potassium meta-bisulfite; potassium phosphate, monobasic; potassium silicate; potassium sulfate; potassium sulfide; rochelle salts; sodium ammonium phosphate; sodium arsenate; sodium bisulfite; sodium chlorite; sodium orthosulfate; sodium sesquicarbonate; sodium silicate or water glass; sodium sulfate; and sodium thiosulfate.
5147	Industrial chemicals, as follows: cadmium sulfate; calcium carbide; calcium polysulfide; calcium silicate; carbide cake; carbide carbide; carbide powder, except abrasive powders; chalk, precipitated; dielenium phosphate, epsom salt; ferrous carbonate; ferrous sulfate; iron chloride; iron phosphate; iron sulfite; iron sulfide, artificial; lead arsenite; lime bisulfate; lime phosphate; magnesium arsenite; magnesium phosphate; magnesium silicate; magnesium silicochloride; magnesium sulfate; magnesium trisulfate; monocalcium phosphate; monocalcium sulphate; palladium chloride; palladium salts and compounds; pea carbide; silver chlorides; silver cyanide, industrial; silver nitrate; silver sulfate; silver sulfide; sodium chlorite; sodium silico aluminate; zinc carbonate; zinc cyanide; zinc hydroxysulfite; zinc nitrate; zinc phosphate; and zinc sulfate.
52130	Anomalous gas liquors and spent oxide produced in coal gas purification.
52140	Cresote or dead oil; cresote oil distillates; and resinous oil X-1.
53101	Alizarin sulfonic; indigo, natural and synthetic; and phenosafroune.
53230	Chromium tanning mixtures.
53230	Tannins; and tanning and dyeing extracts of vegetable or animal origin. (Report natural indigo in export control commodity No. 53101.)
53310	Luminescent zinc pigments, not radioactive.
53320	Printing inks.
53331	Prepared ceramic colors, including liquid lusters.
53332	Laquers, except aluminum, gold, pearl, and silver, and paperbacked gold stamping foil.
54162	Beef glands, and inedible dried pancreas, bulk.
54162	Animal products used for medicinal purposes, bulk, the following only: beef brain powder; beef heart extract; bone marrow; bone marrow concentrate; brain substance powder; fibrin muscle; glycerine extract of brain and muscle; and glycerin extract, red bone marrow.
54163	Ferments, other than yeast, except potato flour ferment.
54170	Pharmaceutical preparations for veterinary use, dosage or packed for retail sale, except antibiotics, sulfonamides, hormones, vitamins and minerals.
54191	Bandages and surgical dressings, not impregnated or coated with pharmaceutical products, put up for retail sale.
54199	Dental rubber.
55300	Deodorants, non-personal.
55420	Detergents, the following only: Ethomid HT 15; Intramin WK and Y; and Permalene A 100, A-120, and A-150.
55430	Rifle cleaning compounds; abrasive pastes, compounds, and cake, except chemical; and steel burnishing mixtures.
56100	Urea fertilizer.
57130	Nonmilitary pyrotechnical articles.
58132	Other regenerated cellulose and chemical derivatives of cellulose.
58191	Hardened proteins.
58192	Modified natural resins (including ester gum), and chemical derivatives of natural rubber, all in unfinished or semi-finished form.
58199	Ammonium alginate.
59220	0,0-dimethyl 0-P-nitro phenyl phosphorothiate; 0,0-dimethyl 0-P-nitro phenyl phosphorothiate; 3,4-dichloropropionanilide; 3-amino-2,5-dichlorobenzole acid; 2-chloro-4-ethylamino-6-isopropylamino-8-triazine; 3-3,4-dichlorophenyl-4-methoxy-1-methylurea; 2-chloro-N-isopropylacetanilide; alpha-chloro-N,N-dialkylacetanilide; 2-chloro-4,6-bis(ethylamino)-8-triazine; a,a,a-trifluoro-2,6-dinitro-N,N-dipropyl-p-toluidine; 2-chloroallyl diethylthiocarbamate; 2,3,5,6-tetrachloroterephthalic acid; 2,3-dichloroallyl diisopropylthiocarbamate; 2,3,3-trichloroallyl diisopropylthiocarbamate; and 4-chloro-2-butylthyl-N-chloro-carbamilate.
5951	Inulin.
5952	Gluten and gluten flour.
5958	Casein hydrolysate; casein lactalbumin; lactalbumin, lactalbumin hydrolysate; lactarene (casein); and inedible soybean protein.
5958	Dextrins (e.g., British gum).
5961	Other tall oil.
5963	Pine oil, except pine-needle oil; terpene solvents, n.e.c. gum turpentine; and wood turpentine.
5965	Wood tar; wood tar oils; wood creosote; wood naphtha; and acetone oil.
5966	Wood pitch and products based thereon or on rosin.

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Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany—Continued

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
59973	Other animal black, except activated.
59977	Prepared culture media.
59978	Charges for fire extinguishers.
59994	Pickling preparations for metal surfaces; auxiliary preparations for soldering, brazing or welding (fluxes, powders, pastes), containing metal and other constituents.
59995	Composite solvents, paint removers, thinners, and other similar products.
59999	Water softeners, water purifiers, and boiler feed water compounds.
61230	Rubber heels, soles, soles, top lifts, and top lift sheets.
62102	Other rubber cements.
62103	Rubber thread and cord, covered or bare.
62930	Other hygienic and pharmaceutical articles of unhardened rubber.
62988	Other articles of unhardened vulcanized rubber, n.e.c.
63120	Other plywood and wood panels, including wood-veneer and cellular panels.
63141	Improved wood (densified and/or impregnated with resin of resinlike materials).
63142	Reconstituted wood (particle board).
63183	Hoopwood, chipwood, wood chips; and poles, piles, posts, pickets, stakes, and similar products which are split, pointed or both, but not sawn lengthwise.
63240	Windmill towers.
63289	Wood manufactures, the following only: bee hives; boat parts, small, machined to shape; bridges; Fibrisir laminates of melaminophenol formaldehyde resins, sawdust, or ground wood and paper; hog troughs; patterns; propeller blades; propellers; and trestles.
64122	Fine paper.
64130	Kraft paper, in rolls or sheets, uncoated, as follows: abrasive base stock; acid proof; ammunition; antiaid manila; base wad stock; buffing; cable base stock; cable filling, electrical; cartridge stock; coil winding; document manila, file folder; dynamite; electrical insulating; emery, base stock; expanding envelope stock; flat wallet stock; flint backing; frisket; garnet; gasket; graphite; guide stock; insulating, electrical patch base stock; pattern stock; polishing; red foiling (cartridge paper); red patch base stock; sandpaper backing; shell stock; silk wrap stock; tissue; tympan; voice coil stock; wallet stock; and washer stock.
64180	Machine-made paper and paperboard, simply finished, in rolls or sheets, n.e.c., and hand made paper, the following only: ammunition; guide stock; antiaid manila stock; armature; beaming; cable base stock; calendar roll stock; cartridge stock; coil winding; cone, yarn, designers pattern stock (except tissue); document manila file folder; dynamite; electrical; expanding envelope stock; flat wallet stock; flint backing stock; frisket; gasket; graphite base stock; gun wadding; insulating electrical; interleaving for film; jute tag stock; patch base stock; polishing base stock; portmanteau; red foiling (cartridge paper); red patch base stock; rope, for sand paper backing; sandpaper backing; shell stock; shot shell stock; silk wrap stock; slot insulation; steaming; stencil (18 lbs and over); stencil stock for oiling; tabulating-machine card stock; tape, rope stock for electrical insulating; time card stock; tympan; voice coil stock; wad base stock; wallet stock; washer stock; pattern stock; stencil blanks tabulating machine card stock; absorbent paper for matrix; interleaving; tissue paper under 18 pounds, except sanitary; ground-wood base stock for carbonizing; fine paper (uncoated for printing, writing); bible; check paper; mimeotype stencil; body stock for carbonizing, free from ground wood; box covering; carbonizing base stock; duplicating tissue; electrical insulating tissue; heat sealable tissue; imitation Japanese, India, lens, matrix tissue; pencil carbon stock; pottery tissue; press copy; rotogramme tissue; stencil tissue; stereotype tissue; tea bags; fibrilise; tissue for duplex decalomania; transfer stamping; and book lining.
64191	Kleerview (lacquer-coated glassine paper).
64199	Asphalt and tar saturated paper, heavy construction type.
65126	Yarn of wool or of fine animal hair.
65130	Cotton yarn, gray (unbleached); and unfinished cotton thread.
65140	Cotton yarn, carded, combed, finished; sewing, crochet, darning, and embroidery cotton thread.
65172	Rayon or acetate monofil.
65177	Rayon or acetate spun yarn, including singles and plied.
65190	Other yarns of textile fibers, n.e.c., including yarns of vegetable fibers, n.e.c.
65211	Gauze, tobacco cloth, and cheese cloth, unbleached, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65212	Terry woven fabrics, unbleached, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65213	Broadwoven fabrics, unbleached, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65221	Gauze, tobacco cloth, and cheese cloth, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65222	Other terrywoven fabrics, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65223	Pile and chenille broad woven fabrics and corduroy, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65229	Other broad woven fabrics, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65230	Other broad woven remnants less than 10 yards in length, and fabrics, n.e.c., wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65301	Broad woven fabrics wholly or in chief weight flax (linen) or jute.
65321	Other broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight of wool and/or fine animal hair, excluding pile or chenille.
65322	Pile and chenille broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight of wool and/or fine animal hair.
65370	Knit or crocheted fabrics, not elastic or rubberized, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
65390	Other broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight jute or
65401	Narrow woven fabrics, nonelastic, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, flax, or wool.
65402	Woven labels, badges, emblems, and insignia, excluding embroidered, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, flax, or wool.
65403	Hat braid, all fibers, and other trimmings, nonelastic, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, wool, or metal.
65406	Embroideries, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, or wool.
65407	Lace machine fabrics, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, or wool.
65510	Other coated or impregnated felt fabrics; and felts and felt articles wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, wool and/or wool-like specialty hairs.
65541	Bonded fabrics and articles wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool. (1) ²
65542	Other textile fabrics coated with gum or amylaceous substances.
65543	Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated with resin or other plastic materials.
65544	Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated with oil.
65546	Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated.
65550	Elastic fabrics and trimmings, woven or braided.
65560	Other cordage, cable, rope, and twine, and manufactures thereof, wholly or in chief weight other textile fibers, n.e.c.
65570	Other hat bodies.
65581	Wadding and articles of wadding (excluding cellulose wadding), n.e.c., textile flock, and dust and mill neps, wholly or chief weight of other textile fibers.
65610	Bags, wholly or in chief weight of cotton, jute, or wool.
65620	Sails of canvas; and tarpaulins, tents, awnings, and other made-up canvas goods, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65662	Blankets, wholly or in chief weight cotton. (Report electric blankets in export control commodity No. 65663.)
65663	Blankets, wholly or in chief weight wool, except electric.
65691	Linens and other furnishing articles, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool, excluding knit, bonded, felt, quilted or stuffed articles.
65692	Other made-up textile articles, n.e.c.
65730	Carpets and rugs, wholly or in chief weight cotton, wool, or jute.
65740	Vinyl asbestos tiles.
65770	Tapestries, hand woven or needle-worked, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
65780	Mats, matting, screens, and other items, n.e.c., of cotton or jute plaiting materials.
66181	Asphalt and tar roofing and siding.
66246	Nonrefractory ceramic hollow tubes.
66312	Hand polishing stones and similar stones of natural abrasives.
66320	Other abrasive paper and cloth, coated with natural abrasives, except dental abrasives.
66361	Packing, gaskets, textiles, yarns, and other manufactures of asbestos, other than friction materials, n.e.c.
66361	Other laboratory and industrial ceramic wares, not refractory.
66420	Other optical glass and elements thereof, not optically worked.
66470	Other laminated glass or toughened safety glass.
66480	Mirrors for automotive vehicles.
66494	Other articles of glass fiber, n.e.c. (Report glass fiber yarn, roving, and strand in export control commodity No. 66180, and tape in No. 66380.)
66512	Glass liners for vacuum vessels.
66581	Laboratory, hygienic, or pharmaceutical glassware.
66585	Articles of glass, n.e.c., the following only: floaters; glass valves, and ballentini reflective material.
66700	Diamonds, rubies and sapphires, natural and synthetic, suitable for gem stones. (Report industrial diamonds, natural, in export control commodity No. 27515; and report stones, mounted or unmounted, worked so as to be recognizable as parts of meters, measuring instruments, clocks, watches, etc., in the appropriate classification provided for parts of the specific item.)
68111	Silver, leaf.
69110	Finished structural parts and structures, iron or steel, as follows: architectural and ornamental work; anchors and fittings for reinforcing refractory walls; bulkhead (water gates); gangways; sluice gates; guardrails; platforms; portholes not specially designed for military watercraft; prayer rails; loading ramps (nonmechanical); and turnstiles, not electric or coin operated.

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EXHIBIT 3

Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany—Continued

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
6920	Aluminum structural parts as follows: fencing and rolling, ornamental; gangways; portholes; prayer rails; scaffolding equipment; tower sections; and turnstiles.
6921	Septic tanks, iron or steel.
6923	Septic tanks, aluminum.
6922	Other shipping containers, iron or steel.
69222	Other shipping containers, aluminum, including barrels, boxes, chests and collapsible tubes.
69510	Hand tools mainly used in agriculture or forestry, and parts, n.e.c., as follows: cant hooks; digging bars; digging spuds; gardeners' trowels; mattocks; picks; pike poles; wheel-type cultivators; and wheel-type seeders.
6952	Power saw blades, woodworking; and hand-operated saws, hand saw frames, and saw blades, except hacksaw blades; and parts, n.e.c.
69522	Metal-cutting shears and thumb's snips, not power-operated; wrenches; pliers, pliers and other similar hand tools, and parts, n.e.c.; and files, rasps, and file accessories.
69523	Other hand tools, n.e.c., and parts.
69524	Other cutting tools, dies, and parts.
69525	Other machine knives and blades.
6959	Knife blanks.
6979	Steel wool, pot scourers, and other polishing pads, iron or steel.
69794	Figures, flower racks, mirrors, trays, and photograph or picture frames of base metals, n.e.c.
6981	Motor vehicle locks; ignition locks; and tire locks.
69811	Window locks and safety hasps, nonferrous metal; and key blanks, all metals.
69812	Hardware and parts of base metal, as follows: transportation hardware, all metals; furniture heading, nickel-plate 1 steel; edgings, all metals; furniture hardware, stainless steel; builders' hardware, nonferrous metal; hand rails, all metals; and other hardware, stainless steel, except hinges and butts.
69830	Other chains and parts, iron and steel, n.e.c.
69840	Anchors, grapnels, and parts, iron or steel.
69854	Buckles with die-cut inserts, and belt hooks, all metals; belt buckles (other than buckles), clasps, grommets, and similar articles of stainless steel.
69861	Other wire springs, iron or steel.
69885	Commercial closures of metal, n.e.c.
69891	Iron or steel cargo hooks; and malleable iron manhole covers.
69899	Other aluminum or aluminum alloy castings and forgings.
69899	Articles of nonferrous metals, n.e.c., other than copper or copper alloy, the following only: boat spikes, wire nails, wire staples, and wire spikes; bolts, screws, rivets, washers and similar articles, except screw eyes and screw hooks; brackets for mounting outboard motors; bulletin boards; cans, n.e.c. made or cut from nonferrous base metals; caskets; clothes-line (dryer) reels; log horns, nonelectric, for ships; hinge chaplets; lids for boxes; link chains; mooring swivels; car locks; pipe hangers; rig tile; tool boxes and tool chests, empty; and utility boxes.
71189	Windmills and parts, n.e.c.
7171	Cotton gins.
7172	Looms other than cotton looms.
7173	Parts, accessories, and attachments for: (a) cotton gins, and (b) looms other than cotton looms.
7173	Other parts, accessories and attachments for machines for extruding man-made fibers, and for other machines for preparing and processing natural or man-made fibers into yarns, and for winding.
7174	Milinery dies (hat blocks), nonferrous metal.
7175	Silk screen printing equipment: plating (folding) machines; and parts and attachments, n.e.c.
7181	Laminators, electric, for restoring manuscripts and documents; and parts and attachments.
71811	Other machinery for making or finishing cellulosic pulp, paper or paperboard; and parts and attachments.
71812	Other papercutting machines and machines, n.e.c., for the manufacture of articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard; and parts and attachments, n.e.c.
7182	Bookbinding machines, and parts.
71829	Price marking machines, and plane-o-plate rotary shavers, and parts.
71831	Grain cleaning machines, and corn husking machines, and parts.
71839	Chocolate homogenizers, and parts.
71842	Snow plows, farm-type; and parts, accessories, and attachments.
71915	Other airconditioning and refrigerating equipment; and parts, n.e.c., including parts for self-contained air conditioning machines. (Report compressors in export control commodity No. 71922.)
71919	Other machines and equipment, other than domestic, for treatment of material by a process involving a change in temperature; and parts, n.e.c.
71922	Compressors, refrigeration and airconditioning type, 1.5 horsepower and under; and parts, n.e.c.
71923	Laboratory centrifuges, n.e.c., and parts, n.e.c.
71931	Automobile lifts; jacks for automotive vehicles or aircraft; and parts, n.e.c.
71933	Other hand-operated, mechanical and hydraulic jacks; and parts, n.e.c.
71931	Ferry elevators; and parts, n.e.c.
71931	Elevators and moving stairways; and parts, n.e.c.
71941	Butter churns, farm type; and parts.
71942	Condensers and evaporators for nonelectric domestic refrigerators; and parts.
71951	Cutting machines for ceramics and similar nonmetallic materials, except quartz, crystal, masonry, or stone.
71951	Other machines, n.e.c., for working asbestos-cement, ceramics, concrete, quartz crystals, masonry, stone (including artificial, precious and semiprecious stones), and similar mineral materials. (Report parts in export control commodity No. 71954.)
71952	Other machines, n.e.c., for working bone, ebonite, hard plastics, and other hard carving materials. (Report parts in export control commodity No. 71954.)
71954	Parts, accessories, and attachments for cutting machines for ceramics and similar nonmetallic materials, except ebonite, quartz crystal, masonry or stone.
71954	Parts, accessories, and attachments for other machines for working asbestos-cement, ceramics, concrete, quartz crystals, masonry, stone (including artificial, precious, and semiprecious stones), and similar mineral materials.
71954	Parts, accessories, and attachments for other machines for working bone, ebonite, hard plastic, and other hard carving materials.
71961	Other calendaring machines and similar rolling machines, n.e.c., and parts.
71963	Lead scale weights for weighing machines.
71964	Hydra-blast parts cleaners, and parts therefor; and windshield washer sets.
71964	Sprayers and dusters, agricultural and pesticial, except lawn sprinklers; and parts, n.e.c., except nozzles.
71964	Other spray nozzles of metal; and hand-operated spray guns; and parts, n.e.c.
71964	Other sprayers and spraying equipment, n.e.c.; and parts, n.e.c.
71980	Concrete and bituminous pavers, finishers, and spreaders; and parts and accessories, n.e.c.
71980	Windshield wipers, nonelectric, and parts, n.e.c.
71980	Shock absorbers, mechanical or hydraulic.
71992	Other taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, n.e.c., and parts.
71994	Other gaskets (joints), laminated metal and nonmetal material, or set of gaskets of two or more materials.
72320	Other electrical insulators and fittings of insulating materials, n.e.c.
72410	Color television broadcast receivers, whether or not combined with radio or phonograph; and unassembled color television kits.
72499	Automobile radio receiver antennas; and parts and accessories, n.e.c., specially designed for home-type radio and television receivers and automobile receivers, except communications receivers.
72505	Galleys, buffet servers, ovens, and other equipment specially designed for aircraft; electric heaters for automotive vehicles; and parts.
72620	Other medical and dental X-ray and gamma ray equipment; and medical and dental apparatus based on the use of radiations from radioactive substances; and parts, n.e.c.
72912	Battery separators and blanks, wood; and battery parts made of rubber.
72941	Spark plugs, aircraft and automotive types, and parts. (Report insulators in export control commodity No. 72320.)
72941	Other electrical starting and ignition equipment for other internal combustion engines; and parts.
72942	Other motor vehicle lighting equipment, signaling equipment, horns, electrical windshield wipers, and defrosters; and parts therefor.
72951	Other electricity supply meters. (Report parts in export control commodity No. 86199.)
72952	Test benches, electrical, for automotive engines, brakes, pumps and speedometers.
72960	Electromechanical hand tools; and parts.
72966	Other lighting carbons, brush stock, and carbon brushes.
73280	Heaters for nonmilitary vehicles; and parts.
73291	Other motorcycles, motor bikes, and motor scooters.
73292	Parts and accessories for other motorcycles, motor bikes, and motor scooters.
73300	Logging wagons; and parts. (Report off-highway trucks and trailers in export control commodity No. 73293.)
73393	Buoys, all metals; pontoons for pipe lines, iron or steel; and fiberglass swimming pools, floating.
81210	Central heating apparatus, n.e.c., and parts, n.e.c.
81241	Vapor-proof electric light fixtures.
81242	Explosion-proof lighting fixtures; and vapor-proof lighting fixtures.
82103	Mattresses, mattress supports, and similar stuffed furnishings, n.e.c., cotton.

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EXHIBIT 3

Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany—Continued

Export control commodity No.	Commodity description
82108	Plastic furniture; and laboratory furniture, metal; and parts, n.e.c.
83100	Travel goods, handbags, and other personal goods of cotton.
84111	Men's and boys' outer garments (excludes shirts), not knit or crocheted: (a) wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool, or (b) safety apparel and raincoats, all materials.
84112	Women's, misses', girls', children's and infants' outer garments, including blouses, waists, and blouse shirts, not knit or crocheted: (a) wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool, or (b) safety apparel and raincoats, all materials.
84113	Men's and boys' undergarments, including outer shirts, not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84114	Women's, girls' and infants' undergarments (excludes blouse shirts), not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84121	Handkerchiefs, wholly or in chief weight of cotton.
84125	Corsets, brassieres, and girdles of cotton or other textile fibers, n.e.c., except rubberized.
84126	Gloves and mittens, not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84127	Cuffs and collars, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84128	Clothing accessories, not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool, n.e.c.
84130	Safety apparel and clothing accessories of leather.
84141	Gloves, knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84142	Hosiery, not elastic or rubberized, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84143	Undergarments, including shirts, knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84145	Knitted or crocheted elastic fabric and articles thereof, except ankle supports, knee-pads, and wristlets.
84146	Men's and boys' outer garments (excludes shirts), knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) neckties, cravats, mufflers, and scarves, all fibers, and (c) other outer garments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84147	Women's and misses' outer garments, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) mufflers and scarves, all fibers, and (c) other outer garments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84148	Girls', children's, and infants' outer garments, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) mufflers and scarves, all fibers, and (c) other outer garments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
84149	Other non-apparel articles, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized.
84154	Hat and cap materials, except hat bodies, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, wool or textile manufactures, n.e.c. (Report hat bodies in export control commodity No. 65570.)
84155	Other millinery, hats, caps, and other headgear, n.e.c., including helmets.
84160	Other apparel and clothing accessories, including surgeons gloves, rubber or rubberized.
84202	Artificial fur and articles thereof, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
85100	Nonmilitary spats, leggings, and gaiters, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
86120	Protective spectacles and goggles (safety equipment).
86134	Other microscopes, excluding electron and proton; microprojectors; and photomicrographic equipment; and parts and accessories.
86135	Telescopes, including astronomical telescopes.
86171	Dental hand instruments and tools for use with hand pieces, n.e.c., and parts.
86172	Whirlpool baths.
86182	Other revolution counters, production counters, and similar counting devices, n.e.c.
86183	Optical measuring and checking instruments; and parts.
86189	Other measuring and checking instruments, appliances and machines; and parts.
86198	Laboratory type hydrometers and similar instruments; and thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers, psychrometers, and any combination of these.
86243	Paper, paperboard and cloth, sensitized, not developed.
86248	Exposed sensitized plates, and exposed and developed plates, except lantern slides.
86401	Other clocks, electric and nonelectric; and time recording and time stamp machines.
86402	Other clock parts.
89111	Magnetic recording and/or reproducing equipment for voice and music only.
89112	Parts and accessories for magnetic recording and/or reproducing equipment for voice and music only.
89300	Other finished articles, n.e.c., of artificial plastic materials, except articles wholly or partially made of polyimides, polybenzimidazole, polyimidazo-pyrrolone, aromatic polyamide, polyparaxylene, polytetrafluoroethylene, or polychlorotrifluoroethylene; or items wholly made of other fluorocarbon polymers of copolymers.
89425	Artificial Christmas trees, metal; and tinsel of metal.
89442	Base metal wire wickets, and safety apparel and equipment for recreational purposes.
89512	Stapling wire (all metals), and nonferrous metal staples for hand-stapling devices.
89711	Jewelry and related items of cast gold, platinum, and platinum group metals, except rosaries.
89714	Other articles of other than precious metals, incorporating pearls or precious or semi-precious stones.
89715	Hollow ware, solid or plated, of precious metals; and silver leaf.
89927	Hand sieves and hand riddles, laboratory types.
89927	Other wire cloth sieves.
89928	Hat braids of natural or man-made fibers.
89934	Cigarette and cigar lighters of precious metals.
89952	Leatherette buttons.
89955	Corset stays, and similar supports for apparel.
89994	Wool-like specialty hair prepared for making wigs and similar articles.
89995	Wigs, false beards, and other articles, n.e.c., of wool-like specialty hair.
89997	Vacuum bottles, jugs, and chests, complete (assembled or unassembled), usable only for hot or cold food or drinks.
96100	Coin, other than gold coin, not being legal tender. (Report numismatic and collectors coins in export control commodity No. 89600; coins mounted in objects of personal adornment in Nos. 89711-89720; coins for legal tender in Nos. 89070 and 89080.)

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I call attention to a few items. I want to intrigue the curiosity, if I can, of Senators and students, who will read it carefully in its entirety, because some of the things are extremely interesting.

One of the items we are exporting to Russia is crude rubber. We are exporting crude rubber to a country that desperately needs it, I presume, for the tanks and trucks they send to Vietnam.

They are not using it to build automobiles. They are borrowing money with credits guaranteed by our American Government with which to build automobiles so that they can have them for somebody besides bureaucrats and politicians. Whatever they are using it for, the rubber is available.

Scrap metal is also available here.

If any junk dealer in the area wants to make a profit, Russia will buy that material from him. We will not restrict it. We hope that they will not use it to kill American boys, but I think it is a

futile hope. Clearly we guessed wrong with the Japanese some 15 years ago.

Let us go to the next page. There we find listed machinery and transport equipment, machinery other than electric, electrical apparatus and appliances, and transport equipment. Interspersed here and there are some agricultural commodities, a great many other products and raw materials, and a few medicinal supplies.

I would not send them any of it, if I had a right to say anything about it, except the medicine and the things that deal with humanitarian purposes.

I would not send them anything that leads to inhumanity or anything which can be fabricated into something that will kill American boys now serving in Vietnam.

I refer now to the items listed on exhibit 3. They talked about iron back at the time of Pearl Harbor. However, this time we forget about that and open up the floodgates. We kept them closed for

the first three years of this war until on October 12, 1966, the President said it is okay to sell it.

They list asbestos, aluminum, natural gas, and other kinds of gas available for exportation to Russia.

I suspect that they are running out of gas. They are selling so much of their petroleum to Vietnam to keep them fighting, they now have to buy some of it from us.

More than 100 different kinds of chemicals are listed here for unlimited, unlicensed export and sale to Russia.

I will let the list speak for itself, but I want to point out that when they talk about nonstrategic material, even in this sanitized listing, we have to be more gullible than I believe any Senator can ever become and stay in these halls to read that list of things we are exporting, and believe that stuff is not being used in the war and not being used to shore up the industrial complex of Russia so

that she can step up the war supplies she ships to Vietnam.

Mr. President, if this were a cleaner list, if they censored it again and sanitized it with greater degrees of purity, I would still submit the argument then that sending to the Russian industrial complex and its economy today anything beyond the requirements of humanity for food, if starvation is involved, and for medicine for people who are ill in times of pestilence and serious disease should be prevented so long as Russia is the factory fortress prolonging the capacity of the North Vietnamese to continue this war.

One does not have to be a Harvard professor to figure that if we were just going to ship them bicycles and irons for pressing clothes and washing machines and the so-called consumer goods items it would not make any substantial difference. We step up their war productive capacity that much every time we relieve a Russian worker, machine, or stock of raw materials from the essentially of manufacturing consumer goods that they have to have in order to keep the people from revolting and to meet the people's creature comforts. Any time we Americans take care of those consumer items, we release men, material, and machines for them to use in making weapons and missiles, and thereby make possible bigger shipments of better weapons to Hanoi to be used in building bigger American casualty lists in that faroff battle area.

And where are the Russians sending them, on the record from the State Department, the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the press? The military stuff they fabricate is going in big volume to Vietnam to kill American boys.

It is that atmosphere in which we should think about the responsibility of even those who intend to vote for the treaty to put in it a reservation which will prevent that kind of war shipment from continuing. If that kind of shipment does continue, we should defer the treaty until such time as we can bring about a cessation of this traffic in blood.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MUNDT. I yield.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I hope that every Senator will take the occasion to read the magnificent address delivered today by the distinguished Senator from South Dakota. This address is illuminating and should be very convincing to any man who is open minded on this question of the Consular Treaty.

It seems to me, and I have been around Washington for 12 years, now going on the 13th year, that the moment the administration takes a position, approximately 40 to 50 percent of the Senate goes right along with the administration.

It seems that in the minority party there are a number of Senators who go along.

Mr. President, I feel that America is today really facing a crisis. I have felt for a number of years that we have helped to support communism by aid in trade, as the distinguished Senator from South Dakota has brought out today.

We furnished them wheat a few years ago.

Mr. MUNDT. Yes; and the Senator approved at that time my amendment to prevent that type of aid to Communist Russia.

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct. We also guaranteed repayment of the money to the bankers who loaned the money to the Communists with which to buy the wheat.

What are we up to? What obligation have we to a conspiracy that says: "We are going to stab you in the back. We are going to take over the world. We are going to make slaves out of you and your children."

Why should we furnish money to support the Communist governments? Why do we now wish to enter into a treaty with a Communist government that has as its goal the domination and enslavement of the world?

Why do we wish to help support and to make friends with a government that is today furnishing practically all of its goods to be used in the war against South Vietnam to kill American men?

Every vital machine and every weapon in use in the war in Vietnam today is furnished by Russia with the exception of some rifles, ammunition, and a few trucks.

Mr. MUNDT. Which in turn come from Communist China.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct, they come from Communist China.

I read an article today by Henry J. Taylor, in which he stated that we are furnishing equipment to Czechoslovakia which they use in turn to make war equipment to send to Vietnam to kill our men.

We sell material, as the distinguished Senator from South Dakota has said, to other countries. Rumania was mentioned, Poland was mentioned, and other countries were mentioned. We furnish the basic resource, the materials. We furnish machine parts, and we furnish chemicals, and we furnish the things they need. Because of that, they are able to support the war effort in Vietnam to a great extent.

The same situation prevailed when we sold wheat to the Russians. They were able to keep in their gun plants and their missile plants the men they would have had to take out of the plants and put on the farms to grow more food.

Mr. President, the Senator from South Dakota has rendered our country a great service by his address. I hope that not only Senators but also all the American people will read this address. When the American people get the truth, they will rise and demand that Congress take the right stand on this question.

We have gone along and played with communism. We have compromised with communism. We have accommodated communism. We have done everything to placate the Communists.

We did not win the war against the Communists in Korea when we could have and should have won it. General MacArthur said that we could have won the war at one point in 10 days, but we did not do so. We did not win the war in Korea, and as a consequence we

are having trouble in Vietnam; and if we do not win the war in Vietnam, we will have to fight again—and possibly closer to home the next time.

I hope the people of this country will awake before it is too late. I hope they will rise up and demand that their representatives in Congress—who are their representatives and do represent them—will take the right stand on this vital issue before the American people. There is no question in my mind that this is the issue. It means the very survival of this country. This communistic issue is the important issue before America today. No other question is more important. Russia is part of an international conspiracy whose purpose is to take over the world.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. THURMOND. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from South Carolina is a longtime student of American history, especially in its military annals, because he was promoted to the rank of general in the Armed Forces of this country. He is one of the few members of the Armed Forces of such high rank in either body of Congress. Does he believe that we would be at war in Vietnam today, or would have become involved at any stage in the war in Vietnam, if it were not for the existence of aggressive international communism, if it were just a question of Ho Chi Minh possibly being an irritable fellow or having some malicious ideas. Does the Senator believe that we would have been dragged into the war or would have been kept in it except for the demonstrable fact that there we are at war with aggressive, militaristic communism?

Mr. THURMOND. In reply to the question of the Senator from South Dakota, I will state, as I have stated heretofore on numerous occasions, that the war in Vietnam today is not a war between the north and the south. It is not a civil war, as some liberal news media in this country would lead the people to believe. It does not involve a difference of opinion between the people of one part of the country and the people of another. This is a war on the part of the Communists to take over the world. They just happened to use Vietnam this time in which to fight the war. They chose to fight in Korea a few years ago. They will choose some other place in the future.

The war in Vietnam is simply another battle by the Communists in their overall goal and overall desire to take over the world. I hope the American people will realize that, and I hope they will realize that what we are fighting for in Vietnam is not simply to help the people of South Vietnam maintain their freedom, as the President has said, because we would have no justification for sending American soldiers there, much as we may sympathize with the people of South Vietnam, to maintain their freedom. The only justification we have for sending soldiers to South Vietnam is for the national interest of the United States. If it is to our national interest, then we have a right to send soldiers there, and

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should send them there, and we have sent them there for that purpose—although this Government has never admitted that in so many words, as I have just attempted to state it.

Our national interest is at stake in Vietnam today; and if we do not win this war, I repeat that we will have to fight again, and it appears that every generation will have to fight. Men who fought in Korea are now fighting in Vietnam, or their sons are fighting there. There will be no end to this problem unless we fight this war to win it.

This war would fold up tomorrow, so far as the real practical effect of it is concerned, if Soviet Russia withdrew the support she is giving there—the anti-aircraft artillery, the surface-to-air missiles, the Mig planes, the furnishing of 25,000 metric tons of oil a month. The complex radar equipment that is being used in Vietnam and the trucks that are sent there are mostly Soviet. Any facet of the war one can think of is being provided by Soviet Russia. If Soviet Russia were taken out of this war, the war would fold up immediately.

Red China is furnishing some of the ammunition and small arms, but that is about all. Soviet Russia is furnishing 90 percent or more of the armaments and equipment and ammunition and the logistic support to fight this war.

Mr. MUNDT. I agree with the Senator from South Carolina. If we could get the administration to realize the nature of the enemy and the source of the problem, I believe we could begin making some headway in steps designed to shorten the war and to bring it to a successful end.

Certainly, if what the Senator has said is true—and I believe it is—that the thing that holds us in Vietnam and took us there is a consideration of our national interests, that it would be detrimental to our national interests to be defeated there and to be driven out, and that if we were thereby demonstrated to be a paper tiger, I believe it could lead to nuclear war and set back the possibilities of an enduring peace by many generations.

If our being in Vietnam is in our national interest, can the Senator conceivably find any reason why it is in our national interest at this time to ratify a consular treaty, tied in by its major exponents with expanded trade to Russia, to bolster a machine with which we are at war? Could that conceivably be in our national interest?

Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has explained this matter so simply today, that I do not see how any fifth grade child could fail to understand the true situation.

I should like to ask the Senator this question: Is it not true that if we ratify this Consular Treaty, the world will be led to believe that we are now very friendly with communism, and would it not cause people behind the Iron Curtain—the captive nations—to lose hope in America and to lose their hope of some day being liberated?

Mr. MUNDT. I can see no other possible reaction. And that is made increasingly true because of the deliberate and purposeful policy of the President in

linking the Consular Treaty to East-West trade. The State Department witnesses did the same thing. Its major newspaper support, the New York Times, which either always echoes the ideas of the State Department or thinks them up for the State Department—I am never sure which; but they are always together. The New York Times advocates the two together.

The people around the world can read and hear. What will be the reaction to a country which in the fifth year of a war is taking steps to expand the capacity of the enemy to do us in? What can be their reaction? They think as human beings and react to the logic of events the same as we do.

Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that if we ratify the Consular Treaty, it will tend to raise the prestige of the Soviet Union, whose goal is to dominate the rest of the world, because the United States has recognized Russia in a treaty, indicating that it can trust the Russians and have faith in them and do business with them?

Mr. MUNDT. Unless we enact one or both of these reservations which we are going to vote on next week, the Senator's statement is demonstrably true. Add to that the fact that they have seduced us into acting on the treaty first. The Russians have not ratified it. They may never ratify it, but they can wave it around the capitals of the world, demonstrating how they made Uncle Sam creep and crawl, saying, "Please, Mother Russia, won't you please let us have a treaty with you? We will forget about your espionage, we will forget about your sabotage, we will forget about your propaganda, and we will forget about the fact that you are supplying Hanoi with the weapons which are killing our boys and prolonging the war. Won't you please ratify this treaty with us?"

What a propaganda tool to hand the Communists. Why do we not have at least the prudence to insist that if there is going to be a treaty let them ratify it first? Why hand them this great propaganda document? It is beyond me to comprehend.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

(At this point, Mr. KENNEDY of New York assumed the chair.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, when history records these years I have served in this body I assume it will report the period as that time in which our prime effort has been to seek equality of treatment for all our citizens,

At no other period of our history have we been so dedicated to the achievement of this equality. We are unstinting in this total effort to afford all Americans equality in education, in environment, in the marketplace.

At no other time in this world's history has a nation bestowed such a full measure of rights, of benefits, of full recognition of individual dignity upon the citizen as inheres in America today.

And we are generous in sharing our gifts, blessings, and good fortunes with those who come here from other nations to visit, to trade, to learn and to witness our artistic splendor or our scientific skills or to contest our athletes.

Those who come share equally with us

this great life in America. They also stand equal to our own in the interpretation of laws by our tribunals.

We have acquitted ourselves by keeping faith with those noble documents written by our first citizens—we have interpreted those documents in the spirit and to the letter of their making.

But today the Senate is being asked to approve another document setting standards of human conduct. We are being asked to ratify an agreement with another large and powerful nation about the treatment of our citizens when within the jurisdiction of the other nation.

We are asked to ratify an agreement signed more than 2 years ago because a similar agreement, identical in purpose, made 34 years ago, has not been honored by our cosignatory. We are asked to reaffirm a 34-year course of our respectable conduct because that cosignatory has, for 34 years, disregarded its pledge of respectable conduct.

We must reaffirm our good treatment of Russian nationals because we seek, but have not yet achieved, good treatment for American nationals.

We are now being asked to ratify an agreement binding our citizens to inequality, to abuse, to degradation and to a standard of conduct far below the norms of this Nation.

We are exhorted to give faith where experience and judgment fail to support that faith.

We are asked to abandon that high principle of equality of treatment for our citizens in order to propitiate those who recognize no such principle.

This I will not ask Americans to do. I will demand for them as good as they give. I will not accept less.

We have suffered this inequality for 34 years. We are told that "things have changed" in Russia. We are told that the Russian heart has warmed—that the Russian smile is sincere, not sinister.

But I can make my case for demanding equality of treatment on circumstances of recent date. I can make my case on the record which has been built since this Consular Convention was formally signed by representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. a little more than 2½ years ago.

It was more than 2½ years ago that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Soviet-American Consular Treaty in Moscow. For reasons we need not go into now, the administration first submitted the treaty for ratification by the Senate but then withdrew it before it came to the floor.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nebraska yield at that point?

Mr. CURTIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I think I heard the Senator say earlier in his remarks that we were now trying to revive or reconstitute an agreement or treaty which was signed 34 years ago; is that what I heard the Senator say?

Mr. CURTIS. I said that 34 years ago we entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union, wherein each country pledged equal and fair treatment of the other.

Mr. MUNDT. In other words, a recognition treaty?

Mr. CURTIS. Yes, a recognition treaty, one to the other. We have consistently lived up to it but the Soviet Union has not. Yet, we are being asked to sign the same kind of agreement again.

Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that the Senator is also aware that as a condition precedent, and as an attendant and associate circumstance of our signing that treaty of recognition, there was an exchange of letters between Litvinov and President Roosevelt in which, Litvinov, speaking for the head of state, stated that Russia would, from that point on, grant us virtually the same kind of consular concessions which we are now talking about in the pending treaty, absent only the complete immunity clause; is that not correct?

Mr. CURTIS. I think that is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. We have had some decisions recognized by both parties in that communication, earlier in the days of association between Russia and the United States, which were disposed of in conformity with that agreement. That agreement was precise and definite.

Well, earlier in the hearings, there was brought out, I believe by the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HICKENLOOPER), that this agreement did exist. As a distinguished lawyer, he said that it was still operative. At that time, the State Department said it had been abrogated, it no longer holds, it no longer is binding, it no longer prevails.

This question kept cropping up in meeting after meeting of the group considering it, so that finally, on February 25, Carl Marcy, the very able and dedicated chief of staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations, at my specific request, which was incorporated in the printed testimony, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, stating:

During the hearings of February 17 on the proposed consular convention with the Soviet Union, Senator Mundt stated that he would like to know on what date the Russians abrogated the Litvinov agreement, and for the text of the communication by which it was abrogated. . .

Because I doubt very much that it was done by long distance telephone.

. . . Senator Sparkman, acting chairman of the committee, replied, "We will make that inquiry and get that information for the record."

We would appreciate having the information Senator Mundt requests as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours, Carl Marcy.

On February 25, 1967, there was transmitted to me, with a letter from Carl Marcy, the answer which was received to his letter to the Department of State, and the letter is on the same date as the one which he addressed to me, incorporating in that letter to Carl Marcy some rather interesting statements.

The Senator may recall that in defining the kind of consular considerations which would prevail as the result of the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement, the condition precedent to the agreement on the recognition treaty, Litvinov stated that:

We will provide for you the same kind of consular considerations which prevail in a consular treaty which we have already worked out with the German government.

That is on German-Russian relations.

He added one sentence, which can be found in the documentary evidence from the big book which contains the exchange of papers—

We think it would be well to try to negotiate a specific consular convention between the two countries, but once we are recognized, we will extend immediately all the considerations of the German-Soviet treaty to the Americans.

As everyone knows, Russia has violated that agreement time after time after time. We had to withdraw our consular offices in Vladivostok. We had trouble with their consular offices on the west coast. It got so bad that we took our consular officers out of Russia and they took theirs out of the United States in protest against our protest against them.

The question is: Was it abrogated?

This is a question which the Senator is raising in his remarks, as to the record of good faith of the Communists in making these treaties.

Is their record of adherence to these agreements good enough so that we want to sign another one with them?

Well, what is their performance record?

It is very bad.

Thus, we wanted to know from the State Department if the 1934 agreement had been abrogated, because it certainly took the action of someone to bring abrogation about, either by letter or communication of some kind, by some official of the Russian government.

The letter of February 25, to Mr. Marcy, is the result, and I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, D.C., February 25, 1967.

HON. CARL MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MARCY: Thank you for your letter of February 23, 1967, in which you pass on the Foreign Relations Committee's inquiry as to when and by what communication the "Litvinoff agreement" of 1933 was abrogated by the Soviet Union. Your reference presumably is to Foreign Minister Litvinoff's letter to President Roosevelt of November 18, 1933, in which the Soviet Union promised unilaterally to extend to American nationals the provisions for consular notification and access contained in the Soviet-German Agreement Concerning Conditions of Residence and Business and Legal Protection of October 12, 1925. I am attaching a copy of Mr. Litvinoff's letter which included the pertinent extracts from the Soviet-German Agreement of 1925.

The Soviet-German Agreement was never, to our knowledge, formally abrogated. It ceased to have effect, however, upon the outbreak of armed hostilities between the two countries during World War II, when each country withdrew its diplomatic and consular personnel. After the war, and the occupation and division of Germany, the pre-war Soviet-German Agreement was not revived. Instead the Soviet Union negotiated new Consular Treaties with both the Federal Republic of Germany and the so-called "German Democratic Republic"—neither of which contain any guarantees of consular notification or access to arrested nationals. I am attaching a copy of Article 17 of the Soviet Agreement of 1958 with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The post-war legal situation with respect to consular protection of American citizens in the Soviet Union, prior to the 1964 signature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular convention now pending before the Senate, may thus be summarized as one in which there were no Soviet treaties in force to which the Litvinoff most-favored-nation pledge could attach. This was one of the reasons that persuaded the Department to negotiate the 1964 Convention, containing as it does clear and explicit guarantees of consular notification and access.

The Litvinoff pledge itself, for what it was worth, has also never been formally withdrawn. However Mr. Litvinoff's letter linked the Soviet pledge to the stated expectation that the two countries would "immediately" negotiate a consular convention on the same subject. As you know, this expectation was not fulfilled since no convention was negotiated to agreement until more than thirty years later. The Soviets have long been in the position plausibly to maintain that the Litvinoff pledge was merely an interim undertaking which lapsed upon the failure of the parties "immediately" to negotiate a consular convention.

The legal deficiencies of the "Litvinoff agreement" were among the reasons persuading the Department that the time had come to conclude a treaty containing clear and unequivocal provisions giving us the rights of notification and access in cases of Americans arrested in the Soviet Union. These provisions are essential if American citizens traveling in the Soviet Union are to be afforded the consular protection they deserve. The 1964 Consular Convention and its Protocol achieve this purpose by making it unambiguously clear that notification and access must be granted within four days from the time of arrest or detention of an American national and on a continuing basis thereafter.

If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR JR. II,

Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, it will be noted that this letter states categorically "this treaty has never, to our knowledge, been formally abrogated. The Litvinov pledge itself, for what it was worth, has also never been formally withdrawn." Thus, we now have it on the record, from the Department of State itself, that there has been no abrogation of the Litvinov agreement, that what we have had is a series of violations of the understanding and the treaty and, unhappily for the relationships between our two countries, there have been violations of like kind in so many treaties that the Department of State itself has published a report of treaty violations with the Soviet Union containing all the treaties and specific instances of Soviet violations.

This report is available. They do not like to circulate it very much these days, but they are obliged to make it available to anyone who asks for it from our State Department.

This is all rather basic as we start to think about other treaties with the Soviet Union. What I have stated, I believe, will affirm what the Senator from Nebraska has properly alluded to in the understanding reached 34 years ago, which has been violated and violated and violated time and time again.

Mr. CURTIS. I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

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I ask the Senate to delay action on it until President Johnson and his Secretary of State provide us with some solid assurances that the United States will, in fact, achieve equality in treatment for its citizens once the treaty goes into effect.

I will not now go into the long history of American disappointments with the Soviet Union in its manner of carrying out its treaty obligations.

It appears to be curious timing, however, for the United States to be ratifying this Consular Treaty, long coveted by the Soviet Union, at this particular time. Let us look back over the past 2½ years since Ambassador Kohler and Foreign Minister Gromyko signed the Consular Treaty in Moscow on June 1, 1964.

Since that time the Soviet Union has increased sharply its material support, in warplanes, anti-aircraft missiles, and other arms, for the North Vietnamese nation which this Senate has frequently condemned for its aggression against South Vietnam.

Would we not be rewarding the Soviet Union for arming the aggressors in North Vietnam, the forces waging war against American boys in southeast Asia? How does the consular treaty fit into the broader context of overall Soviet-American relations?

The President, in his state of the Union message, tells us that—

Our relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe are . . . in transition. We have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of the cold war. When we have differed with the Soviet Union, or other nations for that matter, I tried to differ quietly with courtesy and without venom. Our objective is not to continue the cold war, but to end it.

Are we not entitled to learn from the President how he expects to continue this so-called transition out of the difficult period of the cold war when at the same time the United States is engaged in a hot war against a nation whose principal ally is the Soviet Union?

I am aware that I am raising broader questions than those that deal with the Consular Treaty alone. But this need not make them any less valid. The Consular Treaty does not come before us in a vacuum, but in the real world of today.

Let us also consider the Consular Treaty, however, in the narrower context of treatment of American nationals in the Soviet Union. The history of the last 2½ years, since Foreign Minister Gromyko signed his name to the Consular Treaty, is no less disconcerting.

We learned, only a few days ago, of the diligent and commendable pressures exerted by the administration to effect the release of Vladimir Kazan-Komarek, the American of Czech origin convicted of treason by a Communist court in Prague and sentenced to 8 years in jail. Have we already forgotten how he fell into the hands of the Czech authorities? The Soviet Union is widely believed to have taken the trouble to divert one of its Moscow-to-Paris international flights to set down in Prague, an unscheduled stop, so that Kazan-Komarek could be plucked out of the plane. Does this Soviet apparent breach of normal international conduct reassure the President, or any of us, enough to expect honest

compliance with the provisions of the Consular Treaty? Will our nationals get the same treatment Soviet citizens get here?

Only a few months ago we learned of the conviction of young Buel Wortham, who was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor by a Leningrad court for having participated with an American companion in a small blackmarketing deal and for pilfering a statue of a bear. Knowing the severity of life in Soviet labor camps and aware of other nations' less severe attitude toward such minor offenses, does this episode bolster our confidence that the Soviet Union can be counted upon to observe faithfully the provisions of the Consular Treaty to give American citizens greater attention and protection? Equality of treatment?

In this Wortham case we have a comment from Secretary of State Rusk that is far from reassuring. In December he told newsmen at a press conference:

We did feel that, although these two young men acknowledged the offenses . . . with which they were charged, the punishment was more harsh than the violations themselves would seem to warrant . . .

I do not myself wish to condone these particular actions, but I think, as the Soviet Union moves into a period in which they are trying to encourage tourism and have maximum contacts with other countries, that they might recognize that on occasion minor incidents of this sort may occur and that it will be in their interests to resolve them in accordance with the general practice of most governments when temporary foreign guests pull pranks of this sort—or whatever you want to call it—that would be a violation of local law.

I would hope that the Soviet authorities would take cognizance of this sort of thing and take action to mitigate the punishment that has been meted out to these two men.

Speaking, we must assume, for the executive branch, the Secretary of State thus takes a dim view of this Soviet action against an American citizen. How can he be encouraged to hope for better treatment of Americans once a Consular Treaty is ratified? Foreign Minister Gromyko's signature on the Consular Treaty was long dry when the Wortham sentence was pronounced.

And then there is the tragic, sordid case of Newcomb Mott, the 27-year-old textbook salesman convicted in November 1965, of illegally crossing the Norwegian border into the Soviet Union. He died on his way to a labor camp under extremely suspicious circumstances. The Soviet Union claimed he had committed suicide. When his body was returned to this country many competent authorities concluded he had been murdered.

American Embassy officials were permitted to see Mott while he was in custody, and before he was packed off on a train bound for the Soviet labor camp he did not reach alive. The effectiveness of American Embassy officials in protecting an American citizen in this case could hardly be described as impressive. Three months after his death on January 20, 1966, the U.S. Embassy registered complaints which must raise serious questions about the worth of the provisions in the Consular Treaty for access to Americans arrested in the Soviet Union. The American Embassy sent

this message to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Certain physical evidence which would have permitted an objective evaluation on the Soviet report (of his alleged suicide) was not made available, such as the instrument with which Mr. Mott is said to have accomplished his alleged suicide and the clothing he wore when he died . . . the report was silent on the following key elements: It does not tell why Mr. Mott was being transported to the place where he was to serve his sentence when, so far as the United States Government is informed, his appeal for clemency had not been decided on . . . there is no description of his alleged act of inflicting wounds on his arms, body and neck prior to the discovery of the guards that Mr. Mott had blood on his body . . . the obscurities and omissions of the Soviet report were called to the attention of the Ministry with the request that the missing items of information be supplied, along with the photographs which were confiscated from Captain James W. Bizzel, the Embassy doctor at the time of the autopsy . . . the Soviet Government's refusal to provide those vital elements of information . . . is scarcely responsive to the Ambassador's request.

A former New York City police commissioner, who examined Mott's body when it was eventually returned, concluded "beyond question" that Mott had been murdered.

Certainly this dreary episode cannot inspire confidence that the Soviet Union intends to honor the commitment implied in its signature on the Consular Treaty to help American officials give protections to their nationals in the Soviet Union. Ought not the Soviet Union be on its good behavior during the period between signature and ratification of the treaty?

What assurances can the President and Secretary of State give the Senate that the Soviet Union will report arrests of American citizens at all, let alone promptly? On the basis of past experience, how do we dare hope they will?

As for the increased dangers of Soviet espionage in this country as a consequence of opening an additional consulate, it is perhaps supercautious to contemplate opposing ratification of the treaty on the grounds it will present the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other American authorities with extraordinary surveillance chores. It appears to be a little facile, on the other hand, to suggest that since the present 452 Soviet diplomats and consular officials will be augmented by only 15, the surveillance problem is insignificant. If President Johnson intends to pursue his "transition" toward an end of the cold war, is it not reasonable to expect that other consular offices will be quick to follow? Besides several more Soviet consulates, may we not expect to see many more East Communist consulates cropping up in other American cities? Will the surveillance problem not have a potential for rather spectacular growth?

If I read the various letters of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover correctly, however, I do not believe he has said his Bureau could not handle the added security problem. He has merely said what is obvious, that the problem will be made more difficult.

There has been so much emphasis on the espionage potential of these pro-

posed consulates that many of us have lost sight of the principal purpose of a consulate: To increase trade. Why is it that the administration proposes to set up these focal points for increasing Soviet-American trade before there is any evidence that a significant increase in trade is either possible or likely? Since the passing of Stalin, and before, the Soviet Union has sought to expand its trade with the United States, but always with the proviso that the United States advance the Soviet Union substantial loans with which to buy on the American market. It has been the American position, in return, that the Soviet Union must first settle its World War II lend-lease debt, which started at \$11 billion and was cut subsequently by the United States first to some \$2 billion and later to less than \$1 billion.

Does the administration, perhaps, intend to relent on this longstanding policy and begin financing Soviet purchases in this country?

I have enumerated today only some of the fundamental questions to which I believe the Senate deserves clear answers before it is asked to consent to the Soviet consular treaty.

For the past 34 years, since we opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, we have sought in vain to achieve equality of treatment in our dealings with the Soviet Union. Is it not time now that we insist on clearcut, positive assurances that the United States will get the same treatment which the United States provides for the Soviet Union?

Let me therefore propose that the Senate receive from the President a message acknowledging the long history of disparity of treatment and the methods which will be used to receive equality of treatment for American nationals prior to consideration of this treaty with the Soviet Union. We should not be satisfied with a simple generality from the President that the Soviet Union has promised to provide the United States equal treatment. The Senate deserves to know, before it gives its consent to the Consular Treaty, the specific earnestness it has received from the Soviet Union which reasonable men can consider adequate from a nation which has failed in the past so frequently to measure up to the norms of civilized behavior.

I would invite my colleagues to ponder whether it befits the dignity of a great power like the United States to accept once again empty assurances of Soviet good intentions without first obtaining the most convincing evidence that the Soviet Union intends to honor fully its commitments. We have already waited 34 years for equality of treatment for American nationals. The initial assurances 34 years ago were just as clear as those in this treaty.

For the 2½ years since the signing of this treaty the same course of inequity and abuse has continued. Certainly we can delay enough longer to assure ourselves this consular treaty will achieve equality. We must look forward with confidence to an end of the Mott, Wortham and Kazan-Komarek types of episodes. We must not be beguiled by the

repeated cliché that 18,000 Americans visited the Soviet Union last year. By comparison, one million Americans visited Western Europe last year.

Should one American, let alone 18,000, travel in the U.S.S.R. if we cannot assure him treatment by the Soviets equal to the treatment Soviet nationals receive in these United States?

Should American students in our educational exchange be asked to study under adverse limitations, under a denial of promised access to scholars and materials, whereas we give Russian students the fullest of opportunity, of freedom of access, of comfort and of dignity?

Should American diplomats in the U.S.S.R. continue to live in totally supplied quarters under the harassment of totally supplied custodial and service employees whereas Russians select freely their housing here and bring a total staff of Russian personnel to the United States?

I need not give answers. Rather, I suggest a firm and formal action which, in clear and unequivocal terms, will achieve equality of treatment for American nationals, or will state apt and ample remedies for incidents of inequality. I am sure this can be accomplished by a message from the President.

To do less than this, at this time, would subscribe this body, so diligent in its pursuit of equality of treatment for our citizens, to an agreement whereunder we give that equality of treatment to nationals of the U.S.S.R., and assign our citizens to an inequality which is so predictably one of harassment, of abuse, of degradation, even of risk of life itself.

The President desires ratification of this treaty immediately. Many Members on both sides of the aisle are in an unseemly hurry to confirm, by action here, an agreement which was vested 34 years ago, which was reaffirmed by signatories of the two nations almost 3 years ago, and which has been ignored all these years by the other contracting party.

Before we come to a vote cannot we ask from the President, from the Secretary of State, and from other officials upon whom the responsibility rests an absolute assurance in the form of a message to this body that we take notice of 34 years of inequality of treatment for American nationals, that we will employ apt measures to secure equality, and that the President in this message state the means whereby we will seek redress for acts of inequality of treatment of Americans within the actual or effective jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R.?

I yield the floor.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I was just called up to the press lobby, and in passing through the Senator's private lobby, looked at the teletype machines which type out the news for the immediate information of Senators each day.

I was pleased to note an Associated Press dispatch coming off the ticker, headed "Consular, Tops." I do not know exactly what that "Tops" means. It may be some Associated Press lingo indicating that it is important news; but at least it was gratifying news to me, and I think important, and I shall read a part of

the statement, and ask unanimous consent that the rest of it be printed in the body of the Record. It says:

WASHINGTON (AP).—Barry Goldwater, who previously said he supports the U.S.-Soviet consular treaty, came out today for an amendment which the pact's supporters say would kill it.

Goldwater, in a statement issued through Karl Hess, speech writer in the former Senator's unsuccessful 1964 campaign for the Presidency, said he supports a proposed amendment by Senator Karl E. Mundt, R-SD.

The Mundt proposal would postpone effectiveness of the treaty until the President is able to notify Congress that U.S. troops are no longer needed in Vietnam or until he certifies that Soviet aid to North Vietnam is not delaying the return of such troops.

I interpolate at that point that I do not know just where the Associated Press got its information that the pact's supporters say that the adoption of this amendment would kill the treaty, because it seems to me that would be a complete confession of the fact that the Soviets are prolonging the war in Vietnam, and delaying the return of American troops to the United States. If it is in fact a confession of that situation, which I believe to be a valid one, it would seem to me that supporters of the pact should welcome an opportunity to have it ratified in such a way that it could not be used for the purpose of prolonging the war, but that the ratification, with the resolution, could in fact be used as a diplomatic tool, to try to induce the Soviets to discontinue this act of infamy, which is so disastrous to our American troops.

I read on from the Associated Press news dispatch:

Backers of the pact, now before the Senate, contend Russia would accept no such amendment and the agreement on guidelines for the opening of new consulates in each country would be torpedoed.

That distresses me, Mr. President, because the supporters of the pact are, in the main, the ardent supporters of administration policy. If—and I hope this is not the case—they are speaking for the administration, it seems to me that to confess failure before we even try is to indicate we are marking out the working formula for a war which may last, not only another 5 years, but longer than that; because there is no indication of any kind that important punishment is being inflicted upon Hanoi today which they cannot offset by the fact that they get free oil, free guns, free food, free clothing, and free supplies either from their Communist partners in China, if it is unsophisticated material, or, if it is important weaponry of the modern age, they get it free of charge from Russia.

Continuing Mr. Goldwater's statement, he says:

To oppose the amendment would be the same as saying that Soviet support of the killing of our soldiers is of no consequence in the relations between America and the Soviet Union.

He said:

I know that the American people feel that it is of great consequence.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the news item be printed in

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full in the RECORD and that with it there be printed again—although it is in the RECORD previously, but it is brief and gives the meaning and purport of the Goldwater statement in the resolution to which it is directed—the very brief reservation I have proposed which is scheduled for a vote late in the afternoon of Wednesday next week, known as Executive Reservation No. 2. It is to that reservation that the Associated Press story just off the wire alludes.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON (AP).—Barry Goldwater, who previously said he supports the U.S.-Soviet Consular Treaty, came out today for an amendment which the pact's supporters say would kill it.

Goldwater, in a statement issued through Karl Hess, speechwriter in the former Senator's unsuccessful 1964 campaign for the presidency, said he supports a proposed amendment by Sen. Karl E. Mundt, R-S.D.

The Mundt proposal would postpone effectiveness of the treaty until the President is able to notify Congress that U.S. troops are no longer needed in Vietnam or until he certifies that Soviet aid to North Vietnam is not delaying the return of such troops.

Backers of the pact, now before the Sen-

ate, contend Russia would accept no such amendment and the agreement on guidelines for the opening of new consulates in each country would be torpedoed.

"To oppose the amendment would be the same as saying that Soviet support of the killing of our soldiers is of no consequence in the relations between America and the Soviet Union," Goldwater said. "I know that the American people feel that it is of great consequence. They would, given the opportunity to vote on it, support Sen. Mundt's amendment enthusiastically, as I do.

"Recently, I said that I would, if still in the Senate, support Sen. (Everett M.) Dirksen's position in over-all support of the consular treaty. As I publicly explained, my reasons for taking that position, after originally opposing the treaty, involve matters of highest national security which I am not free to disclose."

RESERVATION

Before the period at the end of the resolution of ratification insert a comma and the following: "Subject to the reservation that no exchange of instruments of ratification of this Convention shall be entered into on behalf of the United States, and the Convention shall not enter into force, until the President determines and reports to the Congress that (1) it is no longer necessary to assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to perform combat duties

in the defense of South Vietnam or (2) the removal of members of the Armed Forces of the United States from South Vietnam is not being prevented or delayed because of military assistance furnished North Vietnam by the Soviet Union."

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order of March 9, 1967, that the Senate, in executive session, stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon Monday.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 51 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, March 13, 1967, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate March 10, 1967:

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

George M. Stafford, of Kansas, to be an Interstate Commerce Commissioner for the term of 7 years expiring December 31, 1973, vice Howard G. Freas, term expired.