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## CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

August 10, 1965.—Ordered to be printed

### MINORITY VIEWS

We do not concur with the recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Relations that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Consular Convention With the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We believe that the disadvantages of the convention for the United States are sufficiently grave to outweigh the advantages which are claimed for it.

Our concern relates principally to the provisions in the convention under which consular officers and employees of the sending state are given immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. This convention is the first to which the United States has been a party which provides for unlimited exemption from criminal jurisdiction for consular personnel. Previous consular conventions have provided for immunity from criminal jurisdiction for consular personnel with respect only to misdemeanors but not to felonies. We believe that if the provisions regarding immunity had not been included in the convention, the Soviet Union would not have agreed to it and that, in fact, these provisions were a principal Soviet objective. The testimony of witnesses from the Department of State has been contradictory on the question of whether the Soviet Union or the United States first proposed including these immunity provisions in the convention.

In any case, we believe that the extension of immunity to include felonies would open the way to espionage and other forms of subversion on the part of Soviet consular personnel. If this convention is ratified, and if the Soviet Union then establishes a consulate or consulates in the United States, the officers and employees of these consulates would be able to engage in espionage and subversion

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knowing that they will not be liable to prosecution but only to expulsion.

It is true that the establishment of a Soviet consulate or consulates would mean only a small increase in the number of Soviet officials with immunity from criminal jurisdiction (as of July 1, 1965, there were 249 Soviet officials and 150 dependents who enjoyed diplomatic immunity). We are convinced, however, that there is a predisposition on the part of Soviet officials to engage in espionage and subversive activities, a predisposition which is an important consideration regardless of the numbers involved. In this connection, it is important to recall the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives on March 4, 1965. In a statement inserted in the record justifying the appropriations being requested for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Mr. Hoover said:

In regard to the Communist-bloc espionage attack against this country, there has been no letup whatsoever. Historically, the Soviet intelligence services have appropriated the great bulk of official representation and diplomatic establishments in other countries as bases from which to carry on their espionage operations. Over the years, the number of such official personnel assigned to the United States has steadily increased.

In testimony relating to this statement during the March 4 hearing Mr. Hoover stated that "our Government is about to allow them [the Soviet Union] to establish consulates in many parts of the country which, of course, will make our work more difficult." Mr. Hoover then inserted in the record of the hearing several other brief statements. The first read, in part, as follows:

The methods used to collect the data sought by the Communist-bloc intelligence services are almost as varied as the types of data which they endeavor to collect. One of their mainstays is the collection of information—classified and otherwise—through espionage operations involving personnel legally assigned to official Soviet and satellite establishments in the United States. The focal points of these operations continue to be the United Nations and the Communist embassies, legations, consulates, and news or commercial agencies in our country. Such gathering of information is conducted by the Communist representatives using the legal cover of their diplomatic or other official status to cloak their spying activities.

Historically, the Soviet intelligence services have appropriated the great bulk of official positions abroad, primarily using their official representatives and diplomatic establishments in other countries as bases from which to carry on their espionage operations.

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A second statement related specifically to the question of new Soviet consulates. It read as follows:

Long seeking greater official representation in the United States which would be more widely spread over the country, a cherished goal of the Soviet intelligence services was realized when the United States signed an agreement with the Soviet Union on June 1, 1964, providing for the reciprocal establishment of consulates in our respective countries.

One Soviet intelligence officer in commenting on the agreement spoke of the wonderful opportunity this presented his service and that it would enable the Soviets to enhance their intelligence operations.

In involving the great bulk of their official personnel in intelligence activity in one way or another, the Soviets utilize to the fullest extent possible any and all official means such as the United Nations, trade delegations, and the like, as transmission belts to carry additional intelligence personnel into this country.

More recently, on July 14, 1965, Mr. Hoover, reviewing the major phases of the operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the past fiscal year, stated:

The great majority of the 800 Communist-bloc official personnel stationed in the United States, protected by the privilege of diplomatic immunity, have engaged in intelligence assignments and are a dangerous threat to the security of the United States.

We believe that these statements of the chief investigative officer of the United States should be given serious consideration. It is also worth looking at the record of the activities of Soviet officials in the United States. According to information supplied by the Department of State, since 1946, 27 Soviet Embassy and consular officers and personnel in the United States have been arrested or expelled for intelligence activity. These 27 included personnel assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the Soviet consulate general in New York (which was closed in 1948), the Soviet mission to the United Nations, and the United Nations Secretariat. In the same period, 13 diplomatic, consular, and international organization officials from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania were expelled from the United States for intelligence activities.

There is another grave aspect to these immunity provisions and that is the chain reaction that will be set off if this convention is ratified. The provisions regarding immunity will then apply not only to Soviet consular personnel but may also apply to consular personnel of the 27 other countries with which the United States has consular conventions or agreements which contain a most-favored-nation clause. These 27 countries include 2 other Communist countries: Rumania and Yugoslavia. As a practical matter, as there are no Rumanian consulates in the United States at present, there would not be any immediate increase in the number of Rumanian official personnel enjoying complete immunity from criminal prosecution. If any Rumanian consulates were established in the United States in the future, however, their consular personnel would enjoy such immunity.

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We are thus opposed to the convention because we consider the provisions granting unrestricted immunity from criminal jurisdiction to Soviet consular personnel to be unwise. We believe that these immunity provisions will encourage Soviet subversion by placing Soviet consular personnel outside the criminal jurisdiction of the United States. We also believe that it is not in the interests of the United States to extend this immunity to several hundred, perhaps as many as 400, persons which would be the case given the fact that most-favored-nation clauses are found in consular conventions and agreements the United States has with 27 other countries.

FRANK J. LAUSCHE.  
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER.  
JOHN J. WILLIAMS.  
KARL E. MUNDT.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD (DEMOCRAT, CONNECTICUT) ON THE PROPOSED RATIFICATION OF THE CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

I wish to express my opposition to the ratification of the Consular Convention With the Soviet Union.

I am opposed to it not because this clause or that clause has been poorly drawn, but on grounds of basic principle.

The signing of the consular convention will in no way serve to improve communications between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States, because it is not the function of consulates to communicate or to participate in diplomatic conversations.

Nor is there any reason to believe that the opening of several American consulates in the Soviet Union and several Soviet consulates in the United States will encourage the development of friendlier relations between the Soviet and American peoples, or that it will persuade the Soviet leaders to call off the cold war.

On the contrary, it is my conviction that the establishment of Soviet consulates in this country will only serve to provide the Kremlin with an enhanced cold war capability and that it will, in the long run, only fan popular hostility toward the Soviet Union because of the incurable addiction for espionage of all Soviet diplomats.

The record of Soviet diplomatic espionage is so massive and consistent that I think it can properly be taken for granted that every Soviet diplomat and diplomatic employee must be considered a member of the Soviet espionage apparatus and a recruiter for this apparatus.

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has underscored the seriousness of this problem in repeated statements over the years.

In a speech which I made on the floor of the Senate in October of 1962, I listed 17 Soviet nationals who had used their positions at the United Nations for purposes of espionage and who had been obliged to leave the United States when their activities had been exposed. Since that time the number of such cases has grown to 21. In addition to these Soviet nationals who had used their diplomatic status at the United Nations as a cover for espionage against the United States, a total of 12 Soviet nationals attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington have similarly been obliged to leave the country when their espionage activities were exposed.

I am appending to this statement a summary list of Soviet nationals at the United Nations and Soviet nationals attached to the U.S.S.R. Embassy who have engaged in espionage against the United States.

It has been argued that the Consular Convention With the Soviet Union is in no sense exceptional because it is similar in substance to our consular conventions with other nations.

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This statement is not entirely accurate because the provision in the convention which gives consular officers and employees immunity from criminal jurisdiction makes this the first convention which grants such unlimited exemptions to all consular personnel. Senators Lausche, Williams of Delaware, Hickenlooper, and Mundt in the minority views which they jointly presented, have dealt with this matter in considerable detail.

But even if it were true that the convention with the Soviet Union is similar in substance to our consular conventions with other nations, this argument would still ignore the fact that the other nations with whom we have consular conventions are not committed to our destruction, are not seeking to subvert friendly governments all over the world, and are not waging cold war against us.

More than one administration spokesman has made the point that those who oppose our policy in Vietnam for some strange reason fail to comprehend the fundamental nature of Communist tyranny and the nature of Communist aggression.

I, too, feel that the anti-Vietnam demonstrations that have taken place on our campuses reveal an appalling lack of comprehension of the basic facts about communism.

But the fault for this does not lie entirely with our educational system or with the indifference of our citizens to the facts of history.

To a very large degree, I believe that the lack of comprehension displayed by the many honest critics of our Vietnam policy stems from the persistent efforts, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, to gloss over the tyranny of communism, to ignore the Kremlin's persistent anti-American tirades, to minimize its subversive activity in other countries, to grant the Soviet regime respectability, and to encourage the illusory belief that the Soviet regime is just another civilized government whose philosophy happens to be different from ours.

To a large degree, this lack of comprehension has been encouraged by things like Khrushchev's invitation to visit this country, by our willingness to sweep the issue of Hungary under the rug at the United Nations, by muting the criticism of communism on Voice of America programs.

The consular convention which we are now being called upon to ratify is, in my opinion, an error of the same order—an error that blurs the differences between freedom and communism and that makes it easier for the Communist cadres on our campuses to incite the academic community against our policy in Vietnam.

I believe that we have nothing to gain from this consular convention, that it will not, by any stretch of the imagination, serve to bring about a true abatement of tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that it will contribute significantly to the spread of popular befuddlement on the issue of Vietnam and on the cold war in general.

I am loath to oppose the administration on an issue such as this at so critical a period in history. But I would be untrue to my conscience and undeserving of any popular confidence if I were to mute my criticism on this issue in deference to the administration's attitude.

I, therefore, wish to go on record against the ratification of the consular convention and I would urge my colleagues to examine the record closely before they cast their final vote.

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LIST OF U.S.S.R. EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN DECLARED  
PERSONA NON GRATA BECAUSE OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY*Yuri Vasilyevich Novikov*

Novikov entered the United States April 24, 1948, as an attaché of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. He subsequently held the position of second secretary and from 1950 through July 1952 acted as editor of the official publication of the Soviet Embassy, the Information Bulletin.

In April 12, 1951, Novikov, by meeting a source in Washington, D.C., was identified as the new Soviet principal in an espionage operation which had its origin in Austria in 1949. Novikov, on April 12, 1951, appeared at the designated place on the proper date, at the designated time, and gave the password previously agreed upon between the source and his Soviet espionage superiors in Austria.

The original principals in this operation in Austria were two naturalized citizens, Otto Verber and Kurt L. Ponger, who were brought back to the United States and upon entering guilty pleas, were, on June 8, 1953, sentenced for violation of the espionage statute.

Novikov operated the controlled source in the United States until April 22, 1952, and on 10 occasions sought classified material.

On January 14, 1953, Novikov was declared persona non grata by the Department of State in connection with his espionage activity. He departed the United States on January 19, 1953.

*Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov*

Amosov entered the United States February 17, 1952, as assistant Soviet naval attaché.

Amosov was the third Soviet principal in an intelligence operation directed by the Soviets from their naval attaché's office. He served in this capacity from June 7, 1952, until his departure in February 1954. Targets assigned by Amosov to the controlled source included radar developments, details of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting details of the latest electronic developments, and bombsight data. He paid the source a total of \$2,000 for his services.

While the operation functioned under Amosov's control, he did not accept any material directly from the source. Amosov furnished instructions to the source in Washington, D.C., and the material was passed in the New York City area with the source following a set procedure of obtaining acknowledgment signals and, thereafter, delivering the material to a designated drop area. Amosov was declared persona non grata by the State Department on February 3, 1954, as a result of his activities in this case and he left the United States on February 7, 1954.

*Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev*

Kovalev arrived in the United States October 8, 1950, as a second secretary of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations.

For approximately 2 years as assistant Soviet naval attaché in Washington, D.C., he had been operating a controlled source, obtaining from him material of intelligence significance. On April 19, 1952, the assistant Soviet naval attaché told the source that in the future, material obtained was to be microfilmed and the undeveloped film was to be delivered to the Soviets by means of a dead drop located in the New York area rather than through direct delivery to the assistant naval attaché. The source was told to park his car in a designated

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area in New York City at a designated time and to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it could be seen through the rear window in the event material was to be passed. An additional signal by way of marking a telephone directory in a New York restaurant was perfected to indicate to the source that the material delivered to the dead drop was picked up.

A trial run of this arrangement occurred in New York City on April 23, 1952, on which date Kovalev was observed in the immediate vicinity of source's car, which was parked in the designated area and in which was placed a package wrapped in red paper. Thereafter, the source deposited material in the dead drop and on April 24, 1952, Kovalev was observed making the predesignated mark in the telephone directory in the New York restaurant.

Material of intelligence significance was left by the controlled source in the New York dead drop area on October 1 and December 3, 1952, which material was retrieved by the Soviets. On June 7, 1952, the source was given by his Soviet principal in Washington \$500 to purchase an electronic device for delivery to the Soviets and an additional \$500 in payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions of a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships. The controlled source last heard from his Soviet principal on April 1, 1953, on which date he was told that a meeting scheduled for April 3, 1953, would not be held.

Kovalev was declared persona non grata by the Department of State for his actions in this case on February 3, 1954, and he departed the United States February 10, 1954.

*Leonid Igorovich Pivnev*

Pivnev entered the United States on March 17, 1950, as assistant Soviet air attaché.

On November 2 and 3, 1953, while on a tour throughout the Southwest, Pivnev purchased aerial maps of Tulsa, Okla., and vicinity and Dallas, Tex., and vicinity. Pivnev did not identify himself as a Soviet official when purchasing these maps.

In the spring of 1953, through a Washington businessman, he endeavored to utilize the businessman's address as a mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would have mail delivered to him at the businessman's address, which mail was to be addressed to a fictitious person and which, upon receipt, was to be delivered by the businessman to him.

On March 24, 1954, he inquired at a Virginia aerial photographic concern as to the possibility of purchasing aerial maps of Chicago, Ill. He instructed the firm to seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately \$8,000 for them. On that date he purchased 33 aerial photographs of Washington, D.C., and vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identified himself as one "George." He did not indicate his official connection with the Soviet Embassy.

On May 3, 1954, he contacted a Washington, D.C., photographer, introducing himself as a Mr. George Tinney, a representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing aerial photographs of New York City at a scale of 1:20,000 to 1:40,000 feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available. On May 13, 1954, he agreed to pay the photographer \$700 to obtain the photographs. He advanced on that date the sum of \$400 as partial payment.



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On May 20, 1954, when meeting with the photographer for the purpose of obtaining the photographs, he was accosted by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which occasion he identified himself. On May 29, 1954, the Department of State declared Pivnev persona non grata for his action, and he departed June 6, 1954.

*Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov*

Bubchikov entered the United States December 1, 1954, as an assistant Soviet military attaché.

From July 1955 through May 1956, Bubchikov maintained contact with a naturalized American citizen of Russian origin who was employed as a sales engineer. In July 1955 he appeared at the sales engineer's residence late in the evening and sought his cooperation in securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical developments. Bubchikov promised the engineer large sums of money; however, even though seemingly important information was furnished to him, he did not fulfill his promise of large payments. During the course of this operation it was featured by clandestine meetings, complex recognition signals, and a variety of "drop areas" in which the source deposited material for the Soviet.

In view of his activities in connection with the engineer, the Department of State, on June 14, 1956, declared Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging "in espionage activities incompatible with his continued presence in this country." He departed the United States June 24, 1956.

*Yuri Pavlovich Krylov*

Krylov entered the United States May 4, 1955, as assistant Soviet military attaché, Washington, D.C.

In April 1956, Krylov was introduced to the manager of a Washington electronics supply house. Through the Washingtonian, who cooperated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Krylov purchased hard-to-get electronic equipment.

In August of 1955, Krylov contacted an employee of the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from him information concerning the technical aspects of nuclear power. In December 1955, he contacted a former commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission in an effort to develop information concerning atomic energy for space heating. In February 1956, he attempted to purchase 26 unclassified films on peacetime atomic energy.

In February 1956, he endeavored to join the Society of American Military Engineers and to subscribe to the publication "The Military Engineer," which contained information concerning U.S. fortifications.

On January 14, 1957, the Department of State declared Krylov persona non grata as a result of his activities. He departed the United States January 26, 1957.

*Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev*

Mashkantsev served as an employee of the consulate division of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., handling repatriation matters. He arrived in the United States October 25, 1956.

On March 12, 1957, he appeared at the home of Petr Pirogov, Russian flyer who, with Anatoli Barsov, defected to the United States in Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected to Russia in 1949 and,

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according to Vladimir Petrov, the former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Australia, after lengthy interrogation was executed.

Upon visiting Pirogov, Mashkantsev delivered to him a lengthy handwritten letter purportedly from Barsov. The letter petitioned Pirogov to return to the U.S.S.R. Examination of the letter established that it was not in the handwriting of Barsov but was a carefully prepared simulation. As a result, on April 17, 1957, Mashkantsev was declared persona non grata for "improper activities directed toward inducing return to the Soviet Union of persons who have sought asylum in the United States." Mashkantsev departed April 25, 1957.

*Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin*

Kurochkin entered the United States, April 4, 1956, as a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.

In the fall of 1956, Charles T. Beaumet, a professional writer, contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking statistics as to hosiery production in the Soviet Union. He met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and, after a series of meetings, informed Beaumet that if he would obtain military information to be incorporated in articles Kurochkin was writing for Russian military journals, he would share with him his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter, Beaumet, utilizing the entree he enjoyed as a reporter, obtained training and field manuals of the U.S. Army which he turned over to Kurochkin. For the various manuals delivered to Kurochkin, Beaumet was paid approximately \$450. Included among the manuals sought by Kurochkin were two which were classified. The classified manuals were not delivered to the Soviet.

On June 6, 1958, Kurochkin was declared persona non grata for engaging in highly improper activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. He departed from the United States on June 11, 1958.

*Evgeni Alekseevich Zaostrvtsev*

Zaostrvtsev entered the United States August 2, 1957, as a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.

On February 23, 1958, Zaostrvtsev met a State Department Foreign Service officer in training, at a social function. There followed intensive efforts on the part of Zaostrvtsev to cultivate the State Department employee for intelligence purposes. Between February, 1958, and February 6, 1959, he met with the State Department employee on 15 occasions. He obtained from the State Department employee material concerning the training program of Foreign Service officers and endeavored, without success, to obtain classified documents from State Department files concerning the political and economic affairs in the area of the Government employee's future foreign assignment. He paid the Government employee \$150 for information furnished to him.

As a result of his dealings with the State Department employee, the Department of State on May 13, 1959, made an informal request of the Soviet Embassy for Zaostrvtsev's recall. Zaostrvtsev departed the United States on May 15, 1959.

*Gennadiy G. Sevastyanov*

Gennadiy Sevastyanov arrived in the United States in March 1959 to serve as an attaché in the cultural division of the Soviet Embassy

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in Washington, D.C. On April 6, 1963, an individual whom the Russians identified as "Vladimir Gridnev" arrived in the United States as a temporary employee of the Soviet Embassy. Actually, "Gridnev" was not the man's true name. He had been brought to the United States under this pseudonym to assist in the attempted recruitment of his brother, a Soviet defector now employed by the Federal Government, as a Russian spy.

Under the eye of Sevastyanov, "Gridnev" approached his brother outside his brother's home in a suburb of Washington on the night of April 28, 1963. Sevastyanov also stood by while meetings were held between the brothers on April 30 and May 2, 1963; and he attempted to obtain details of the work which "Gridnev's" brother was performing for the Federal Government as well as to recruit him as an espionage agent.

"Gridnev" left the United States early in May 1963. His brother held one other meeting with Sevastyanov—on the night of June 13, 1963. "Gridnev's" brother cooperated fully with the FBI following his initial contact by the Soviets on April 28, and FBI agents made motion pictures, as well as still photographs, of the meetings between the three men on April 30 and May 2.

Sevastyanov was declared persona non grata by the U.S. State Department on July 1, 1963.

*Boris V. Karpovich*

On January 7, 1965, Boris V. Karpovich was declared persona non grata by the U.S. Government for conduct incompatible with his diplomatic duties and he departed the United States on January 12, 1965. (See p. 72 of Mr. Hoover's testimony, March 4, 1965, copy attached.)

*Stefan M. Kirsanov*

On June 2, 1965, Kirsanov was declared persona non grata by the U.S. Department of State for "activities incompatible with his diplomatic status." Kirsanov and his wife departed the United States June 10, 1965, for Russia.

LIST OF SOVIET U.N. REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET U.N. EMPLOYEES  
WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES*Vassili Molev*

While attached to the Soviet delegation to the United Nations, in 1953 (handling maintenance, purchase of supplies and similar matters) Vassili Molev met Boris Morros on a date and at a time and place previously designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence superiors in Austria. Molev accepted from Morros a report prepared in New York by Jack Soble and given by Soble to Morros in accordance with instructions from their Soviet superiors. Photographs, both still shots and motion pictures, of this meeting were taken by FBI personnel. Immediately following the arrest of Jack Soble on espionage charges on January 25, 1957, the U.S. Department of State declared Molev persona non grata. Molev at that time was employed (in a similar capacity) by the Soviet Embassy. He left the United States on January 28, 1957, en route to Russia.

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*Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin*

Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin, a Soviet assigned to the Soviet U.N. delegation from August 1952 to April 1954, was identified by Yuri A. Rastvorov, a former Soviet intelligence officer, as a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and a very experienced intelligence officer. Svirin was also identified by Reino Hayhanen a former Soviet intelligence agent. On two occasions in January and February 1953, Svirin was observed in the area where Boris Morros was scheduled to meet with his Soviet superior. Morros subsequently met Vassili Molev on March 3, 1953, at the scheduled meeting place.

*Maksim Grigorievich Martynov*

Maksim Grigorievich Martynov last entered the United States on November 3, 1954, as a member of the Soviet representation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee. In August 1954 a highly placed Army officer in Germany was introduced to a Soviet under clandestine circumstances in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The officer did not discourage the Soviet's approach and meetings in New York were arranged. A code phrase was established for recognition purposes. The New York contact turned out to be Martynov. On two occasions, a special agent of the FBI, made up to resemble the Army officer, met with Martynov. On the second occasion January 15, 1955, FBI agents, with State Department permission, accosted Martynov, who identified himself, but claimed diplomatic immunity. On February 21, 1955, the Department of State declared Martynov persona non grata for the above activity and he departed the United States February 26, 1955.

*Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov*

Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov entered the United States March 26, 1955, as an employee of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. On April 25, 1956, he was declared persona non grata by the U.S. Department of State as a result of his implication in the improper repatriation to the U.S.S.R. of five Soviet seamen who left the United States on April 7, 1956. The seamen were members of the crew of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse* who previously defected to the United States. The Department of State informed the Soviet Government that Guryanov's activities made his presence in the United States no longer desirable and he departed May 9, 1956.

*Boris Fedorovich Gladkov*

Boris Fedorovich Gladkov entered the United States December 15, 1953, as naval adviser to the Soviet representation in the Military Staff Committee of the UN. In January 1955, Gladkov, at a cocktail party, met a sales engineer for a New York marine engineering firm. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of clandestine meetings with him. Through the engineer, on June 14, 1955, he received two unclassified publications dealing with marine boilers. During his meetings with the sales engineer which continued on a regular basis through June 1956, Gladkov furnished the engineer \$1,550 for services rendered. On June 22, 1956, the Department of State declared Gladkov persona non grata. He departed July 12, 1956.

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*Rostislav E. Shapovalov*

Rostislav E. Shapovalov entered the United States September 27, 1955, as a second secretary of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. On May 7, 14, 17, and 21, 1956, he contacted a Russian emigree in New York and urged him to return to Russia. The emigree, Michael Schatoff, a former officer in the Russian Army, was a classmate of Shapovalov at a New York university. On August 20, 1956, the Department of State declared Shapovalov persona non grata for his activities in attempting to induce Schatoff to return to the Soviet Union. Shapovalov departed the United States September 12, 1956.

*Viktor Ivanovich Petrov*

Victor Ivanovich Petrov arrived in the United States February 17, 1953, as a translator employed at the U.N. Secretariat. According to the FBI, Petrov, during 1955-56, established contact with an aviation draftsman for the purpose of seeking classified information concerning U.S. military aircraft development. On August 20, 1956, the U.S. representative to the U.N. brought the matter to the attention of the Secretary General, who agreed to dismiss Petrov. Petrov departed the United States on August 23, 1956.

*Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov*

Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov entered the United States October 17, 1955, as second secretary of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. Ekimov was accused before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of participating in the abduction of Tanya Chwastov, aged 2, an American-born daughter of a Russian refugee. He took part in dockside arrangements which enabled Alexei Chawastov to leave the United States with his infant daughter. This move was against the wishes of the child's mother who remained in the United States. Ekimov was declared persona non grata by the Department of State on October 29, 1956, and he departed the United States on November 30, 1956.

*Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha*

Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha was formerly assigned as first secretary of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. On March 5, 1957, Grusha had a rendezvous with a Ceylonese employee of the U.N. Secretariat, Mr. Dhanapala Samarasekara, in the latter's automobile, after Mr. Samarasekara had been observed entering the offices of the Ceylonese delegation and extracting certain papers from a file cabinet. Based on information developed by the FBI, the Department of State declared Grusha persona non grata on March 25, 1957, and he departed from the United States on April 10, 1957.

*Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin*

Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin arrived in the United States March 12, 1956, to serve as film editor, radio and visual division of the Department of Public Information, U.N. Secretariat. In October 1958 special agents of the FBI observed a clandestine meeting between Doronkin and a source that had been recruited for the specific purpose of obtaining aerial photographs of the Chicago area. The source reported to the FBI that the package which he turned over to Doronkin at this meeting contained the requested aerial photographs. The U.S. mission to the U.N. delivered a note to the Secretary General of the U.N. on January 15, 1959, requesting Doronkin's dismissal from

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the U.N. Doronkin's contracted term of employment terminated March 3, 1959, and he was not reemployed by the U.N. He departed from the United States March 11, 1959.

*Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk*

Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk arrived in the United States September 11, 1958, as a political affairs officer employed by the Department of Trusteeship and Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories, U.N. Secretariat. During the period from June through September 1959, Kirilyuk met with an American citizen in a clandestine manner on five occasions. On these occasions he requested data concerning cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek employment with a vital U.S. Government agency. Kirilyuk's meetings with the source on August 28, 1959, and on September 18, 1959, were observed by special agents of the FBI. The Secretary General of the U.N. was informed of Kirilyuk's espionage activity on December 17, 1959. On January 7, 1960, the Soviet delegation to the U.N. was advised of Kirilyuk's activities, whereupon Kirilyuk and his family left the United States on January 10, 1960.

*Igor Y. Melekh*

Igor Y. Melekh, a Soviet national, was assigned to the U.N. Secretariat in October 1958. According to the FBI, Melekh asked a New York freelance medical illustrator, Willie Hirsch, to provide intelligence data such as a map of Chicago showing military installations. Melekh and Hirsch were indicted by the Federal grand jury in Chicago on October 27, 1960, and both were placed under arrest by the FBI on the same day. They were charged with three counts including espionage and conspiracy. Melekh claimed diplomatic immunity; however, this was denied by the courts and he was released under \$50,000 bond. On March 24, 1961, a U.S. district court ruled that, if Melekh departed from the United States by April 17 and if the Attorney General moved for dismissal of the indictment, the court would dismiss as to both defendants. Melekh left the United States for the Soviet Union on April 8, and the indictments against both Melekh and Hirsch were dismissed on April 11, 1961.

*Yuri A. Mishukov and Yuri V. Zaitsev*

Yuri A. Mishukov was employed as a translator by the U.N. on November 11, 1957. Yuri V. Zaitsev was employed on August 9, 1961, as a U.N. political and security council affairs officer. On September 15, 1962, the FBI disclosed that Mishukov and Zaitsev had established an espionage arrangement with an American citizen and between June and August of this year had paid him \$3,000. Two days after the Justice Department made its announcement, the U.N. announced that Mishukov had left for Moscow last July 5 and Zaitsev had done so August 7.

*Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Ivan Y. Vyrodov*

Both Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Ivan Y. Vyrodov were members of the permanent mission of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N. On September 28, Prokhorov and Vyrodov were apprehended by FBI agents in the act of receiving classified information concerning the U.S. Navy from Ylc Nelson Cornelius Drummond. They were released after establishing their identity. On September 29 the U.S. delegation

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to the U.N. demanded that the Soviet delegation expel Prokhorov and Vyrodov.

*Ivan D. Egorov*

On July 2, 1963, FBI agents arrested two persons in New York City and two persons in Washington, D.C., on charges of conspiring to spy for Russia. The pair arrested in New York City were Ivan D. Egorov, an employee of the Office of Personnel, United Nations Secretariat, and his wife, Aleksandra I. Egorova. Charges against these two were dismissed on October 11, 1963, contingent upon their immediate departure from the United States. At the same time, the Soviets released the Reverend Walter Ciszek, a Catholic priest, and Marvin Makinen, a college student, both of whom had been in prison in Russia.

The pair arrested in Washington, D.C., on July 2, 1963, were identified as Robert K. Baltch and Joy Ann Baltch. Actually, these were not their true names.

*Gleb Pavlov, Yuri Romashin, and Vladimir Olenev*

On the night of October 29, 1963, John W. Butenko, an American engineer, was arrested by FBI agents in New Jersey after delivery to Gleb Pavlov of an attaché's case containing detailed documents of military interest. Also arrested was Igor A. Ivanov, an employee of Amtorg Trading Corp., who was accompanying Pavlov.

Yuri Romashin had served in countersurveillance capacity during the clandestine meeting between Pavlov and Butenko on the night of October 29, 1963. Vladimir Olenev had previously accompanied Pavlov during meetings with Butenko. These three men were members of the Soviet mission to the United Nations and were declared persona non grata by the U.S. State Department on October 30, 1963. They departed from the United States on November 1, 1963.

Butenko and Ivanov were convicted on December 2, 1964, on charges stemming from this espionage plot.

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