

NNNN

ZCZC EPE 015

YY NOR

8:22A: 1ST ADD HONG KONG PUEBLO XXX SAID.:

BUCHER AND HIS CREW HAVE BEEN HELD IN NORTH KOREA SINCE HIS SHIP WAS CAPTURED BY NORTH KOREAN NAVY VESSELS JAN. 23. HIS FIRST "CONFESSION" WAS BROADCAST JAN. 24 AND WAS DENIED BY WASHINGTON.

HE ADMITTED AGAIN IN TONIGHT'S BROADCAST THAT THE PUEBLO INTRUDED INSIDE NORTH KOREA'S 12-MILE TERRITORIAL WATERS.

BUCHER SAID HE FELT HE AND HIS CREW SHOULD BE PUNISHED "IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA."

THROUGHOUT THE ALLEGED CONFESSION, BUCHER SPOKE IN A SUBDUED MONOTONE AS THOUGH HE WERE READING SOMETHING PREVIOUSLY PREPARED.

ONLY WHEN TALKING TO HIS FAMILY DID HIS VOICE SHOW ANY APPARENT FEELING.

HE SWORE ON HIS HONOR THAT THIS WAS "MY SINCERE CONFESSION."

:: REUTERS MB/HV

FBIS 39 (SEE 28)

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SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION'

PYONGYANG IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 1115 GMT 12 FEB 68 W

(TEXT) (FEMALE ANNOUNCER--ED) LLOYD MARK BUCHER, CAPTAIN OF THE PUEBLO, AN ARMED ESPIONAGE SHIP OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR ARMY CAPTURED BY THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WHILE CARRYING ON MILITARY ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AFTER ILLEGALLY INTRUDING DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DPRK ON 23 JANUARY, MADE HIS SECOND CONFESSION ADMITTING THE BRIGANDAGE ESPIONAGE ACTS.

HIS SECOND CONFESSION IS AS FOLLOWS:

(MALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN ACCENT--ED) MY FIRST CONFESSION, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ALL RIGHT, WAS NOT COMPLETE IN DETAIL. I OMITTED THE DETAILS BECAUSE IT WAS MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY CAPTURE AND I WAS AFRAID THAT MY CRIME MIGHT BE PUNISHED SEVERELY BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK.

SINCE THEN, THE REALS STATE OF AFFAIRS HAS BEEN REVEALED AND ESTABLISHED BY OTHER DATA AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE HANDS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WITH REGARD TO THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PUEBLO. SO WE CAN NO LONGER TELL A LIE OR MAKE ANY EXCUSE, HOWEVER HARD THAT I MAY TRY. I DID NOT REALIZE THE SEVERITY OF OUR CRIME UNTIL I HAD TIME TO THINK OF THE MISSION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE PUEBLO SINCE MY CAPTURE.

(MORE)

12 FEB 1325Z BE/EAM

FBIS 45

FIRST ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X SINCE MY CAPTURE.

(TEXT) I HAD THOUGHT THAT ALL U.S. NAVAL VESSELS CONDUCT THIS TYPE OF OPERATION AND IT WAS MY DUTY AND THAT I ONLY EXECUTED THE ORDER AS A SOLDIER. BUT OUR LAST OPERATION WAS SHEER ESPIONAGE COMMITTED UNDER THE CLOAD OF RESEARCH. I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE SEVERE PENALTY FOR CONDUCTING ESPIONAGE AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED. HOWEVER, I AM DEEPLY REPENTANT FOR OUR CRIME AND AM SO HOPEFUL THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL FORGIVE MY CRIMINAL (?ACTS) AND SEND US BACK TO OUR HOMES. I AM GOING TO CONFESS THE DETAILS OF OUR ESPIONAGE AS THEY WERE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

THE USS PUEBLO WAS COMMISSIONED IN MAY OF 1967 IN BREMERON, WASHINGTON, USA, TOGETHER WITH THE USS PALM BEACH, AND REMAINED IN BREMERON UNDERGOING OUTFITTING UNTIL SEPTEMBER 1967 WHEN IT WENT TO SAN DIEGO FOR ABOUT FIVE WEEKS OF SHAKEDOWN TRAINING. ON 6 NOVEMBER WE SAILED TO PEARL HARBOR WHERE WE REFUELED AND MADE MINOR REPAIRS. WE THEN WENT TO YOKOSUKA, JAPAN, WHICH WAS ASSIGNED AS OUR HOME PORT. WE ARRIVED THERE ON 1 DECEMBER. THERE, WE WERE GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION BY REAR ADMIRAL FRANK A. JOHNSON, COMMANDER OF NAVAL FORCES IN JAPAN, TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF THE DPRK.

MY IMMEDIATE SUPERIORS ARE REAR ADMIRAL FRANK A. JOHNSON, COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN FOR OPERATIONS, AND REAR ADMIRAL N. G. WARD, COMMANDER SERVICE SQUADRON THREE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET FOR ADMINISTRATION. ALL MY OPERATIONAL ORDERS CAME FROM COMNAVFOR JAPAN WHILE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS AND INSPECTIONS WERE GIVEN BY COMSERVON THREE. MY MISSION WAS CONTAINED IN THE GENERAL OPERATION ORDER FROM COMMANDER OF NAVAL FORCES JAPAN ISSUED TO THE SHIP ABOUT 5 JANUARY. THE OPERATION ORDER DIRECTED ME TO SAIL FROM SASEBO ABOUT 10 JANUARY INTO THE EAST SEA OF KOREA AND OPERATE IN THREE OPERATION AREAS ALONG THE COAST OF THE DPRK.

OPERATION AREAS ESSENTIALLY DIVIDE INTO COASTAL WATERS OF THE DPRK (WORD INDISTINCT) FOR ESPIONAGE PURPOSES, AND THEY WERE CALLED MARS, VENUS, AND PLUTO. OP-AREA MARS WAS THE WATER AREA BETWEEN 29 DEGREES NORTH AND 40 DEGREES NORTH; OP-AREA VENUS BETWEEN 40 DEGREES NORTH AND 41 DEGREES NORTH, AND OP-AREA PLUTO BETWEEN 41 DEGREES NORTH AND 42 DEGREES NORTH, RESPECTIVELY, FROM THE COAST TO 60 MILIES AT SEA.

WHILE IN THESE THREE OPERATION AREAS, I WAS TO DETERMINE THE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT WITH EMPHASIS ON DETERMINING THE NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE FOUR AREAS, NAMELY CHONGDIN, SONGJIN, MAYANGDO, AND WONSON AREAS, AND ON DETECTING THE POSITION OF RADARS ON THE COAST OF THE DPRK.

(MORE)

CCC GRAF 4 LINE 4

X X X BETWEEN 39 DEGREES NORTH AND 40 DEGREES NORTH
Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8X

12 FEB 1445Z CF/EAM

FBIS 51

SECOND ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X OF THE DPRK.

(TEXT) THE OPERATION ORDER ALSO DIRECTED ME TO DETERMINE THE REACTION OF THE DPRK AND THE SOVIET UNION, RESPECTIVELY, TO AN OVERT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERATING ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE DPRK IN ACTIVELY CONDUCTING SURVEILLANCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE USSR NAVAL UNITS AND TO EVALUATE USS PUEBLO CAPABILITIES AS A NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION SHIP. THIS OPERATION ORDER WAS TRANSMITTED TO ME BY A MESSAGE FROM COMNAVFOR, JAPAN, DATED 16 DECEMBER 1967, AND OUR OPERATION WAS CALLED (?PINKROUTE ONE).

(?PINKROUTE) IS THE CODE WORD ASSIGNED TO ALL A.G.E.R. TYPE OPERATIONS. THE SCALE OF (?PINKROUTE) OPERATIONS ENCOMPASSES BOTH ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS AND CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY THE PUEBLO, A.G.E.R. TWO, AND TWO OTHER ESPIONAGE SHIPS OF SIMILAR TYPE WITH MOST UP-TO-DATE EQUIPMENT, U.S. BANNER, A.G.E.R. ONE, AND THE USS PALM BEACH A.G.E.R. THREE.

ALL THESE OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE ORDER OF THE U.S. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. HE DIRECTS THE FLEET COMMANDER WHO FURTHER DIRECTS THE IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS. THE (?PINKROUTE) TYPE OPERATION WAS PUT INTO EFFECT ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. THE BANNER WAS THE LEAD SHIP IN THE PROGRAM AND PUEBLO AND PALM BEACH WERE (WORD INDISTINCT).

I UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WILL BE MORE SHIPS IN THIS CLASS IN LATER YEARS BUT NONE HAVE YET BEEN AUTHORIZED. USS BANNER AND USS PUEBLO ARE ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET AND THE USS PALM BEACH IS ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET. USS BANNER IS HOME-PORTED AT YOKOSUKA, JAPAN AND USS PALM BEACH AT NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, USA.

THE GENERAL MISSION ASSIGNED TO THE SHIP IS TO CONDUCT ELECTROMAGNETIC VISUAL, AND OCEANOGRAPHIC COLLECTION OPERATIONS ON OTHER COUNTRIES. THE USS BANNER HAS OPERATED CONTINUOUSLY IN PACIFIC WATERS, PRIMARILY IN THE EAST SEA OF KOREA, OFF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING VLADIVOSTOK, SINCE JULY 1966, A YEAR BEFORE MY SHIP COMMENCED ITS ACTIVITIES, AND HAS SYSTEMATICALLY COLLECTED VARIOUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ALSO IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF CHINA.

I WAS ALSO PROVIDED WITH SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON THE NAVY OF THE DPRK. IT REQUIRED US TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER, CLASS, PENNANT NUMBER, DEPLOYMENT, CAPABILITIES, MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND CHAIN OF COMMAND OF NAVAL SHIPS, AS WELL AS LOCATIONS OF PRINCIPAL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS.

(MORE)

12 FEB 1535Z CF/EG

FBIS 58

THIRD ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X PRINCIPAL NAVAL HEADQUARTERS

(EDITOR'S NOTE: TEST OF THE BUCHER "CONFESSION IS CONTINUED FROM THIS POINT FROM THE TRANSMISSION BY PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH STARTING AT 1520 GMT 12 FEBRUARY 1968)

(TEXT) THE REQUIREMENTS ALSO PROVIDED FOR COLLECTION OF DETAILED INFORMATION ON NAVAL BASES, NAVAL PATROLS OF SHIPS AND NAVAL MANEUVERS.

WE WERE ALSO GIVEN "SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS" FOR DETECTING COMMUNICATIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WHICH ASKED US TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE LOCATION OF "COP" STATIONS, THE TYPE AND CAPABILITIES OF ALL RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, THE QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING OF COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE "COP" SYSTEM AND CONTROL DEFENSE FORCES, ETC.

WE WERE ALSO PROVIDED WITH THE "SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT" FOR DETERMINING THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE SUBMARINE FORCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. IT SHOWED THE NUMBERS OF SUBMARINES OF THE NAVAL FORCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY ALREADY KNOWN TO US AND GAVE GENERAL INFORMATION ON THEIR MOVEMENTS.

WE WERE TOLD THAT POSSIBLY THE SUBMARINES WERE KEPT AT MAYANGDO AREA AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TRY TO CONFIRM THIS BY SIGHTING. WE WERE TOLD TO TRY TO GET THE NUMBER OF ANY NAVAL SHIP AND TO PHOTOGRAPH IT IF POSSIBLE.

I WAS PERSONALLY ORDERED TO CHECK THE FLIGHTS OF U.S. SATELLITES IF I COULD SPOT THEM AND WAS PROVIDED WITH A CHART SHOWING THE PATHS OF U.S. SATELLITES. WE WERE PROVIDED WITH ANOTHER CHART WHICH SHOWED THE LOCATIONS OF KNOWN RADARS WHICH WERE LOCATED IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. WE WERE TOLD TO INTERCEPT AND REAFFIRM THESE RADARS AND TO RECORD ANY NEW RADARS ACCURATELY WHEN DETECTED. REAR ADMIRAL JOHNSON, COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN, SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH KNOWN ABOUT EXACT DETAILS ALTHOUGH THE RADARS HAD BEEN ASCERTAINED BY THE AIR FORCE, AND ASKED ME TO OBTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION SINCE THIS LAST OPERATION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN THE VICINITY OF THE COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

(MORE)

12 FEB 1718Z CF/EAM

FBIS 60

FOURTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

(TEXT) WE WERE TOLD TO TAKE OCEANIC SOUNDING FOR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AND OTHER SEA MEASUREMENTS WHENEVER WE COULD DO SO. WE WERE TOLD TO RECORD ALL RADAR SIGNALS SO THEY COULD LATER BE ANALYZED BY OTHERS WHO SPECIALIZE IN THIS WORK.

I WAS TOLD TO KEEP A NARRATIVE OF EVERY IMPORTANT THING THAT OCCURRED DURING THE OPERATION. WE WERE TOLD TO RECORD OUR POSITION AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE AND TO REMAIN UNDETECTED IF POSSIBLE. IF OUR SHIP WAS HARASSED I WAS TO SEND A MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN.

WE WERE ALSO TOLD TO KEEP A FILE OF ALL INFORMATION AND THE UNDEVELOPED FILMS ON BOARD AND TURN THEM IN WHEN WE RETURNED TO YOKOSUKA. I WAS TO PERFORM THE OPERATION IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA BY 27 JANUARY AND TO PROCEED TO THE TSUSHIMA STRAITS TO CONDUCT FURTHER MEASUREMENTS OF THE SEA AND THEN TO PROCEED TO SASEBO BY 9 FEBRUARY.

ON RECEIVING THE OPERATION MISSION, I SET ABOUT PREPARING FOR ACTION

I TOLD LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TO INSURE THAT EVERYONE HAD ALL NECESSARY PAPERS FOR ONE MONTH AT SEA. I TOLD HIM TO INSURE THAT THE ENTIRE CREW WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE SHIP'S ORGANIZATION AND THAT EVERYONE HAD PRACTICE IN FIRE FIGHTING, FLOODING CONTROL AND OTHER EMERGENCY MATTERS. I TOLD HIM TO INSURE THAT HE HAD ALL THE INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS ON FILE AT COMNAVFOR JAPAN CONCERNING THE NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. HE WAS ALSO TO SEE THAT THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD ASSISTANCE WHEN THEY CAME ABOARD.

LT HARRIS, RESEARCH OFFICER, HAD UNDER HIM A SPECIAL DETACHMENT OF 30 PERSONS. I TOLD HIM TO INSURE THAT HIS DETACHMENT HAD ALL TRAINING REQUIRED TO DETERMINE ALL THE RADARS ACCURATELY AND RECORD ALL THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

MY RELATION WITH THE RESEARCH OFFICER WAS NOT THE SAME AS WITH OTHER OFFICERS OF THE SHIP. HE WAS NOT ASSIGNED AS A SHIP'S OFFICER, BUT WAS THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE SPECIAL NAVAL SECURITY GROUP DETACHMENT AND SO WAS ONLY UNDER MY COMMAND AS FAR AS THE SHIP WAS CONCERNED. HIS FUNCTIONS WERE TO COMMAND HIS DETACHMENT AND TO SEARCH AND RECORD ALL ELECTROMAGNETIC SIGNALS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

I TOLD LT J.V. SCHUMACHER, OPERATIONS OFFICER, TO PREPARE ALL HIS RECOGNITION CODES AND TO BE SURE THEY WERE CORRECT, TO SEE THAT WE HAD PROPER "IFF" CODES FOR USE DURING THE MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. I INSTRUCTED HIM ALSO TO SEE THAT ALL THE PEOPLE WERE TRAINED IN THE USE OF THE WEAPONS WE CARRIED. TOWARD THE END OF LAST DECEMBER SENIOR OCEANOGRAPHER DUNNIE RICHARD TUCK AND HIS ASSISTANT HARRY IREDALE WERE SENT TO US BY THE U.S. NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE FOR OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH IN THE WATERS ALONG THE EAST COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

HE SELECTED AND SHOWED ME 20 STATIONS FOR HIS SURVEY DURING THE TRIP, MOST OF WHICH WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CHONGJIN, MAYANGDO, SONGJIN, AND WONSAN AREAS AND THE FAR EAST AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION.

PRIOR TO EMBARKATION, I TOLD MY OFFICERS TO PREPARE THEIR DEPARTMENTS AND TO INSURE THAT WE HAD THE PROPER CHARTS FOR NAVIGATION. I ALSO TOLD MY OFFICERS TO BE SURE THAT NO ONE KNEW WHERE WE WERE GOING, UNLESS HE ABSOLUTELY HAD TO KNOW.

JAPANESE TECHNICIANS AND WORKERS WORKED ON THE PUEBLO WHILE WE WERE PREPARING FOR DEPARTURE AT YOKOSUKA. THEY TOOK CARE OF THE SHIP'S MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS. I WAS TOLD THAT THE JAPANESE WERE VERY HELPFUL AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.

FBIS 61

FIFTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X U.S.-JAPAN TREATY.

(TEXT) THE USS PUEBLO LEFT SASEBO ON 7 JANUARY 1968 AND SAILED NORTHWARD THROUGH TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

WE PROCEEDED ABOUT 30-40 MILES OFF THE COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON A NORTHERLY COURSE TO OP-AREA PLUTO, ACCORDING TO OUR PLAN, SO THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE SPOTTED IF POSSIBLE UNTIL WE HAD FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED OUR MISSION.

WHEN WE PROCEEDED SOUTHWARD, HOWEVER, WE NAVIGATED ABOUT 13 MILES OFF THE COAST AND INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT A NUMBER OF POINTS OF INTEREST AND CONDUCTED INTENSIVE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

THE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST GIVEN TO US BY COMNAVFOR JAPAN WERE CHONGJIN, SONGJIN, MAYANGDO AND WONSAN, AND THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AS MENTIONED ABOVE. AT THESE AREAS WE WERE TO TAKE INTEREST PRIMARILY IN THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE PORTS, PARTICULARLY NAVAL ACTIVITY.

IN THAT REGARD WE WERE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE NAVAL AND THE ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE. WE WERE, FIRST OF ALL, TO OBSERVE THE NUMBER ON ANY NAVAL SHIP IF POSSIBLE, AND WHEN CLOSE ENOUGH WE WERE TO PHOTOGRAPH IT.

I PLANNED TO STAY ABOUT TWO DAYS, RESPECTIVELY, OFF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHONGJIN AND IN THE SONGJIN, JAYANGDO AND WONSAN AREAS AND SPEND THE REST OF THE TIME IN AN AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST, IF ANY.

OP-AREA PLUTO INCLUDED CHONGJIN, OUR PORT OF INTEREST, AND WAS THOUGHT TO CONTAIN A MINIMUM OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR ESPIONAGE IN CHONGJIN AREA WAS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TO DETERMINE WHAT ELECTRONIC RADAR CONTACTS THERE WERE IN THE AREA.

ON THE NIGHT OF 15 JANUARY WE REACHED TO SONGJIN AREA, AND, AFTER SAILING NORTHWARD AS FAR AS THE VICINITY OF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE RETURNED TO THE CHONGJIN AREA ON THE MORNING OF THE 16TH.

THIS WAS THE FIRST PORT AREA WHERE WE WERE TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE AND I GAVE AN INSTRUCTION TO ALL OFFICERS TELLING THEM HOW I WANTED THEM TO KEEP THEIR REPORTS. NAMELY, IN ALL AREAS, BEGINNING WITH CHONGJIN THEY WERE TO KEEP A LOG OF ALL THEIR CONTACTS, DESCRIBING EVERYTHING THEY SAW IN DETAIL. IF THE CONTACT WAS A MERCHANT SHIP, IT WAS TO BE IDENTIFIED FROM THE IDENTIFICATION PUBLICATIONS WE CARRIED ON BOARD.

I TOLD THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK TO PHOTOGRAPH ALL SHIPS IF POSSIBLE AND IF NOT, TO AT LEAST TRY TO IDENTIFY THE SHIP'S RADAR, OTHER ANTENNAS AND ITS ARMAMENT AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SHIP. I TOLD THEM ALSO TO REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT AND TO RECORD THEM; THEY WERE ALSO REQUIRED TO NOTE THE PUEBLO'S POSITION EVERY 20 MINUTES.

WHenever RESEARCH REPORTED A RADAR, THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK WERE TO ASCERTAIN THE BEARING AND THE TYPE, RECORD IT AND REPORT IT TO ME.

WHILE IN THE CHONGJIN AREA WHERE WE STAYED UNTIL EVENING OF 17 JANUARY, WE HAD ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS.

OUR ELECTRONIC DETECTOR MEASURES THE FREQUENCY OF THE TRANSMITTED PULSE OF THE TARGET RADAR AND IDENTIFIES IT AS WHICHEVER TYPE IT IS.

OF ALL THE RADARS INTERCEPTED THERE IN CHONGJIN, NONE WERE OF A TYPE UNKNOWN TO US. IN THIS AREA WE HAD FOUR VISUAL CONTACTS, BUT THEY WERE NOT NEAR ENOUGH TO BE IDENTIFIED OR PHOTOGRAPHED. THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE.

ON THE NIGHT OF 17 JANUARY WE LEFT THE CHONGJIN AREA FOR THE AREA OF SONGJIN, AND WE INTERCEPTED A PARTICULARLY POWERFUL AND INTERESTING ELECTRONIC WAVE OFF ORANGDAN AND MUSUDAN. BUT WE COULD NOT MAKE OUT WHAT IT WAS, AND I ORDERED THE SHIP TO APPROACH THE COAST. WE APPROACHED UP TO A POINT (41 DEGREES, 25 MINUTES NORTH; 130 DEGREES, 03 MINUTES EAST) 20 MILES FROM THE COAST TO IDENTIFY IT. THE MAIN POINT OF INTEREST IN THE SECOND OP-AREA, VENUS, WAS THE NAVAL AND ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT OF

FBI 65

SIXTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X IN THIS AREA.

(TEXT) THE MAIN PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE AREA OF SONGJIN WAS TWOFOLD: FIRST TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THIS AREA AND SECOND TO ASCERTAIN THE ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE RADARS. WE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ANY NEW TYPES OF RADAR TO BE FOUND IN THIS AREA.

I PLANNED TO PROCEED TO THE VICINITY OF THE PORT OF SONGJIN AND LAY TO, HOPING TO SEE SOME NAVAL ACTIVITY OR TO INTERCEPT SOME NEW RADARS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. I ALSO HOPED TO BE ABLE TO PHOTOGRAPH SOME NAVAL SHIPS. SO I MADE THE OFFICER OF THE DECK RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR REPORTING ALL ACTIVITY ACCURATELY AND KEEPING ME INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR POSITION.

IN THE SONGJIN AREA WE INTERCEPTED A NEW RADAR, NOT BEFORE KNOWN. IT WAS A RADAR DESIGNATED AS CROSSLLOT, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS FOR EARLY AIR WARNING. BUT I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM THE LOCATION OF THIS RADAR DUE TO ITS INFREQUENT OPERATION AND THE FACT THAT MY DIRECTION FINDING EQUIPMENT WAS UNRELIABLE. SO WE ENTERED AS FAR AS THE POINT (40 DEGREES, 28.1 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 36.7 MINUTES EAST), 10.75 MILES FROM NAN DO, EAST OF SONGJIN, AND A POINT (40 DEGREES, 27.3 MINUTES NORTH; 129 DEGREES, 30 MINUTES EAST), 11.3 MILES FROM THE ISLAND IN AN EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN THE RADAR.

IN ADDITION, WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS IN THE SONGJIN AREA. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT 30 RADAR SIGNALS DOES NOT MEAN 30 DIFFERENT RADARS. SAME RADARS MAY HAVE BEEN ENTERCEPTED SEVERAL TIMES AND THEN REDESIGNATED BY US WHEN THEY WERE SHUT OFF AND THEN TURNED ON AGAIN. WE INTERCEPTED THREE VISUAL CONTACTS AND CONDUCTED THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE. I DEPARTED THE AREA OF SONGJIN ON 19 JANUARY FOR OP-AREA MARS.

OP-AREA MARS CONTAINED TWO OF THE FOUR MAIN PORTS TO BE SURVEYED-- BOTH MAYANGDO AND WONSAN.

THE PURPOSE OF SURVEILLANCE AT THESE TWO PORTS WAS PRIMARILY TWOFOLD. FIRST WE WERE TO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AT THE TWO PORTS AND SECONDLY TO SAMPLE THE ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT WITH EMPHASIS ON FIXING THE POSITIONS OF RADARS DETECTED.

I HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE STAFF OF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES JAPAN THAT IT WAS SUSPECTED THAT THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY KEPT THEIR W-CLASS SUBMARINES AT MAYANGDO AND THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SEE THEM AND RECORD THEIR NUMBER AND PHOTOGRAPH THEM IF POSSIBLE.

I PLANNED TO SPEND ABOUT TWO DAYS IN THE VICINITY OF EACH MAYANGDO AND WONSAN AND TO CONCENTRATE MY EFFORTS ON WHICHEVER AREA HAD THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. I ORGANIZED WATCH SECTIONS UNDER THE OFFICER OF THE DECK TO RECORD EVERYTHING ENCOUNTERED.

IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO ANY ACTIVITY IT WAS TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.

ALL RADARS THAT WERE INTERCEPTED WERE TO BE REPORTED TO THE OFFICER OF THE DECK AND HE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT THEM TO ME AND TO RECORD THEM. WE PLANNED TO FIX THE POSITION OF ANY NEW RADAR THAT WE INTERCEPTED.

I CHOSE THE AREA THAT WE WOULD OPERATE IN EACH DAY. MY USUAL PLAN WAS TO GO TO AN AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT TO BE DETECTED AND THEN TO LAY TO THERE, HOPING FOR SOME ACTIVITY.

WE ARRIVED IN THE MAYANGDO AREA 20 JANUARY. WE SPENT ALL THE DAY OF THE 20TH THERE AND SAW SOME FISHING BOATS AND SOME OTHER UNIDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL SHIPS. ON THE EVENING OF THE 20TH ABOUT 30 MINUTES AFTER SUNDOWN WE SAW A SUBMARINE CHASER WHOSE LAST NUMBER WAS THOUGHT TO BE 6.

HE PASSED US AT RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS AND WE WERE UNABLE TO PHOTOGRAPH HIM SINCE IT WAS TOO DARK.

LAY TO, HOPING TO SEE SOME NAVAL ACTIVITY OR TO INTERCEPT SOME NEW RADARS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. I ALSO HOPED TO BE ABLE TO PHOTOGRAPH ~~SOME OF THE~~ ~~W-CLASS~~ ~~SUBMARINES~~ ~~AT~~ ~~MAYANGDO~~ ~~AND~~ ~~WONSAN~~ ~~FROM~~ ~~THE~~ ~~DECK~~ RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR REPORTING ALL ACTIVITY ACCURATELY AND KEEPING ME INFORMED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR POSITION.

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I PLANNED TO SPEND ABOUT TWO DAYS IN THE VICINITY OF EACH MAYANGDO AND WONSAN AND TO CONCENTRATE MY EFFORTS ON WHICHEVER AREA HAD THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. I ORGANIZED WATCH SECTIONS UNDER THE OFFICER OF THE DECK TO RECORD EVERYTHING ENCOUNTERED.

IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET CLOSE ENOUGH TO ANY ACTIVITY IT WAS TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.

ALL RADARS THAT WERE INTERCEPTED WERE TO BE REPORTED TO THE OFFICER OF THE DECK AND HE WAS ORDERED TO REPORT THEM TO ME AND TO RECORD THEM. WE PLANNED TO FIX THE POSITION OF ANY NEW RADAR THAT WE INTERCEPTED.

I CHOSE THE AREA THAT WE WOULD OPERATE IN EACH DAY. MY USUAL PLAN WAS TO GO TO AN AREA IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT TO BE DETECTED AND THEN TO LAY TO THERE, HOPING FOR SOME ACTIVITY.

WE ARRIVED IN THE MAYANGDO AREA 20 JANUARY. WE SPENT ALL THE DAY OF THE 20TH THERE AND SAW SOME FISHING BOATS AND SOME OTHER UNIDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL SHIPS. ON THE EVENING OF THE 20TH ABOUT 30 MINUTES AFTER SUNDOWN WE SAW A SUBMARINE CHASER WHOSE LAST NUMBER WAS THOUGHT TO BE 6.

HE PASSED US AT RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS AND WE WERE UNABLE TO PHOTOGRAPH HIM SINCE IT WAS TOO DARK.

WE DID INTERCEPT ABOUT 40 RADAR SIGNALS IN THE MAYANGDO AREA, NONE OF WHICH WAS BELIEVED TO BE A SUBMARINE RADAR.

IN AN EFFORT TO OBSERVE SUBMARINES WHICH WE SUSPECTED TO BE STATIONED AT MAYANGDO, WE WENT UP TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 48.9 MINUTES NORTH; 128 DEGREES, 01.9 MINUTES EAST), ABOUT 8.2 MILES FROM (ANOSOMGAP) ON THE NIGHT OF 21 JANUARY. HOWEVER, WE COULD NOT SPOT ANY SUBMARINE.

NOT HAVING HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE MAYANGDO AREA I DECIDED TO PROCEED TO THE WONSAN AREA THAT NIGHT.

I REMEMBERED THAT THERE WERE MORE NAVAL CRAFT AND SHIPS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY STATIONED IN THE WONSAN AREA SO I WAS HOPEFUL THAT WE WOULD HAVE SOME SUCCESS IN THAT AREA.

(MORE,

12 FEB 1830Z CF/EAM

Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8

FBI 66

SEVENTH ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X IN THAT AREA.

(TEXT) I AGAIN CHOSE A PLACE TO GO TO IN THE AREA WE WERE TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNED TO LAY TO IN THAT AREA AND WATCH CLOSELY.

WE LEFT THE MAYANGDO AREA ON THE NIGHT OF 21ST OF JANUARY, ARRIVING AT THE WONSAN AREA ON THE MORNING OF THE 22D.

THAT DAY WE SAW TWO VESSELS THAT I THOUGHT MIGHT BE FISHING SHIPS. THEY INITIALLY PASSED US AT A RANGE OF ABOUT 1,000 YARDS AND THEN RETURNED AND CIRCLED AROUND US SLOWLY.

I HAD PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF THEM AND DECIDED THAT THEY WOULD REPORT THE PUEBLO, SO I CONSIDERED MYSELF DETECTED AND I SENT MY FIRST MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN AND REPORTED TO HIM THAT WE HAD BEEN DETECTED AND HAD SEEN A SUBMARINE CHASER IN THE MAYANGDO AREA.

THAT NIGHT I MOVED OUT TO SEA A LITTLE INTENDING TO MOVE IN CLOSER IN THE MORNING.

I HAD DECIDED THAT IF WE DID NOT HAVE ANY SUCCESS IN THE WONSAN AREA BY THE NIGHT OF THE 23D, I WOULD GO BACK UP THE COAST TO SONGJIN AND THEN TRAVEL BACK DOWN.

ON THE MORNING OF THE 23D I FOUND THAT WE HAD DRIFTED ABOUT 25 MILES OUT TO SEA AND I MOVED BACK IN.

SINCE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR MORE DAYS REMAINING IN THE OPERATION I DECIDED TO APPROACH CLOSER IN TO SEE IF I COULD SEE EVEN ONE NAVAL SHIP SO THAT THE OPERATION WOULD NOT BE A LOSS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW.

MEANWHILE, I BECAME QUITE BOLDER BECAUSE MY SHIP HAD NEVER BEEN WATCHED OR HARASSED BY ANY NAVAL CRAFT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD OF MY MISSION.

SO I GOT TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 174 MINUTES NORTH; 127 DEGREES, 46.9 MINUTES EAST) QUITE CLOSE TO LAND, THAT IS, 7.6 MILES FROM YO DO. TO MY MIND, IT WAS THE DEEPEST INTRUSION I HAD EVER MADE INTO THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING OUR LAST MISSION.

THE FACTS OF THE DEEP INTRUSIONS BY THE PUEBLO INTO THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARE PRECISELY SHOWN ON THE POSITION LOG AND NAVIGATIONAL PLOT WHICH WERE KEPT BY THE ASSISTANTS OF LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND NAVIGATOR, WHO PERSONALLY DETERMINED THE POSITION OF THE SHIP EACH TIME AND RECORDED IT AS IT STOOD.

THE REMAINDER OF THE CAPTURE WAS REFERRED TO IN MY PREVIOUS CONFESSION.

EVERY DAY I RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM COMNAVFOR JAPAN THAT WERE OF OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE OPERATION.

WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 130 RADARS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING THIS OPERATION.

THE RESEARCH OFFICER'S REPORTS TO ME WERE CONFINED TO THE RADAR CONTACTS THAT WE MADE AND HIS EVALUATION OF THEM.

THE RADARS WE INTERCEPTED WERE OF SEVERAL KINDS, TO WIT, EARLY AIR WARNING, FIRE CONTROL, NAVIGATION, LONG RANGE SURFACE SEARCH AND LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH.

WE HAD ABOUT 19 VISUAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER VESSELS EXCEPT FOR THE DAY OF OUR CAPTURE.

WE KEPT ALL THE TOP SECRET ESPIONAGE INFORMATION IN THE FILE OF THE SHIP TO REPORT THEM AFTER THE OPERATION.

WE MADE OCEANOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENTS IN ALL AREAS, WHOSE CHIEF PURPOSE WAS TO RESEARCH THE SEA BASIN THAT WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT THE OPERATION MOVEMENTS OF SUBMARINES, DESTROYERS AND OTHER NAVAL VESSELS.

THE TWO OCEANOGRAPHERS ON BOARD THE PUEBLO HAD THE MISSION TO COLLECT TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SEA. THEY WERE ORDERED TO THE PUEBLO JUST PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE ON AN OPERATION. THE TYPES OF INFORMATION THEY COLLECT ARE USED TO HELP

WE LEFT THE MAYANGDO AREA ON THE MORNING OF THE 22D.

THAT DAY WE APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP76B00338R000200050076-8
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MY FIRST MESSAGE TO COMNAVFOR JAPAN AND REPORTED TO HIM THAT
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25 MILES OUT TO SEA AND I MOVED BACK IN.

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BEEN WATCHED OR HARASSED BY ANY NAVAL CRAFT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
ARMY THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD OF MY MISSION.

SO I GOT TO A POINT (39 DEGREES, 174 MINUTES NORTH; 127 DEGREES,
46.9 MINUTES EAST) QUITE CLOSE TO LAND, THAT IS, 7.6 MILES FROM
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THE FACTS OF THE DEEP INTRUSIONS BY THE PUEBLO INTO THE WATERS
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ON THE POSITION LOG AND NAVIGATIONAL PLOT WHICH WERE KEPT BY THE
ASSISTANTS OF LT MURPHY, EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND NAVIGATOR, WHO
PERSONALLY DETERMINED THE POSITION OF THE SHIP EACH TIME AND RECORDED
IT AS IT STOOD.

THE REMAINDER OF THE CAPTURE WAS REFERRED TO IN MY PREVIOUS
CONFESSION.

EVERY DAY I RECEIVED MESSAGES FROM COMNAVFOR JAPAN THAT WERE OF
OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF THE OPERATION.

WE INTERCEPTED ABOUT 130 RADARS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA DURING THIS OPERATION.

THE RESEARCH OFFICER'S REPORTS TO ME WERE CONFINED TO THE RADAR
CONTACTS THAT WE MADE AND HIS EVALUATION OF THEM.

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EARLY AIR WARNING, FIRE CONTROL, NAVIGATION, LONG RANGE SURFACE
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WE HAD ABOUT 19 VISUAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER VESSELS EXCEPT FOR
THE DAY OF OUR CAPTURE.

WE KEPT ALL THE TOP SECRET ESPIONAGE INFORMATION IN THE FILE OF
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PURPOSE WAS TO RESEARCH THE SEA BASIN THAT WOULD DIRECTLY AFFECT
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COLLECT TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SEA.
THEY WERE ORDERED TO THE PUEBLO JUST PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE ON AN
OPERATION. THE TYPES OF INFORMATION THEY COLLECT ARE USED TO HELP
FORECAST SEA CONDITIONS IN YEARS TO COME AND ARE USEFUL TO ALL
TYPES OF U.S. NAVY SHIPS IN THEIR OPERATIONS, BUT THEY WERE NOT
CONSIDERED ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY AND I WAS FREE TO DECIDE WHETHER OR
NOT TO TAKE SAMPLES ON ANY GIVEN DAY OR PLACE.

HOWEVER, IF THERE WAS NO OTHER ACTIVITY I WOULD HAVE THE
OCEANOGRAPHERS TAKE DAILY MEASUREMENTS.

(MORE)

12 FEB 1845Z CF/EAM

Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP76B00338R000200050076-8

FBIS 67

EIGHTH AND LAST ADD 39 (SECOND BUCHER 'CONFESSION')

X X X TAKE DAILY MEASUREMENTS.

(TEXT) THE TWO OCEANOGRAPHERS WERE RESPONSIBLE TO ME FOR ACTIVITIES ON THE SHIP BUT THEIR REPORT WAS MADE TO THE NAVAL OCEANOGRAPHIC OFFICE AS WELL AS THE SAMPLES THEY TOOK FROM THE WATER. THEIR WORK ON BOARD WAS SECONDARY TO THE MISSION OF INTELLIGENCE AND WAS NOT CONSIDERED OF GREAT IMPORTANCE BY ME. HOWEVER, I THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR CONCEALING THE ESPIONAGE PURPOSE OF THE PUEBLO.

THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION CONDUCTED BY PUEBLO WOULD EFFECT U.S. NAVY OPERATIONS AS FOLLOWS.

IF IT WERE NOTED THAT THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WAS LARGER THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED OR THAT THEY HAD EQUIPMENT THAT WAS NOT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED, THEN THE U.S. NAVY OFFICIALS WOULD, IN PREPARATION FOR WAR, DECIDE TO POSSIBLY MOVE SOME MORE SHIPS INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN OR THEY MAY DECIDE TO BUILD OTHER EQUIPMENT TO OFFSET ANY NEW EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY.

THESE OPERATIONS, AS WAS THE ONE CONDUCTED BY THE PUEBLO, ARE CONDUCTED FOR MANY PURPOSES. THEY ARE PRIMARILY DEIGNED TO ADD TO THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. NAVY HAS ABOUT ANY GIVEN COUNTRY. THE INFORMATION DESIRED IS ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND IS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH THAT COUNTRY.

IF THE OPERATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL AND ACCURATELY REPORTED, THE NAVY WOULD HAVE MUCH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES AND ABOUT THE ELECTRONICS OF THE COUNTRY THAT THE OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT IN.

THE MOST IMPORTANT POSSIBLE GAIN IS TO DETERMINE, BY OBSERVATION EXERCISES, THE MANEUVERABILITY OF THE NAVY BEING WATCHED.

FOR EXAMPLE, DURING ONE BANNER OPERATION THEY WERE ABLE TO WATCH AN ENTIRE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISE THAT LASTED FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS. THE INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING THAT OPERATION IS CONSIDERED VERY VALUABLE BY THE U.S. NAVY OFFICIALS.

THE U.S. NAVY EXPECTS THAT THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY SOMETIMES, BUT CONSIDERS THAT THE POSSIBLE GAIN IS WORTH THE EFFORT.

AFTER HIS LAST OPERATION, THE PUEBLO WAS TO OPERATE IN THE VICINITY OF VLADIVOSTOK OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM ABOUT 20 FEBRUARY TO 10 MARCH AND THEN TO BE ALONG THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA.

THE BANNER, SISTER SHIP OF THE PUEBLO, WAS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF BLADIVOSTOK DURING THE MONTH OF LATER JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY. THEIR NEXT OPERATION IN MARCH WAS TO BE IN THE SAME AREA AS WE WERE ON THIS OPERATION, IN THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

I UNDERSTAND THAT OPERATION IN THE WATERS OF CHINA WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT STAGE.

THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OR AIR OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS ESPIONAGE, AND A WANTON VIOLATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. I CONSIDER THAT IT IS A DESPICABLE CRIME AND MUST BE STOPPED.

WITH THE LAPSE OF TIME SINCE MY CAPTURE I REALIZED MORE DEEPLY AND REPENT THE GRAVITY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT I COMMITTED.

IT WAS A HOSTILE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE. NOW I FULLY REALIZE WHY THE KOREAN PEOPLE HATE US AND HOW ANGRY THEY MUST FEEL.

HOWEVER, WE ENTREAT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE COMMITTED SUCH CRIME AS SOLDIERS IN THE EXECUTION OF ORDERS OF OUR SUPERIORS AND NOT OF OUR OWN ACCORD, AND FORGIVE US LENIENTLY.

NOW I HAVE BEEN GIVEN GOOD WHOLESOME FOOD, FINE CLOTHES TO WEAR, A WARM ROOM AND A CLEAN BED.

SINCE MY CAPTURE, I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GRIPPED BY YEARNING FOR MY DEAR FAMILY. THERE IS MY WIFE ROSE DOLORES BUCHER WITH TWO SONS, MARK AND JOHN. I AM ALONE IN MY HOME TOWN, SAN DIEGO.

CREAT THE USS...
NORTHWARD THROUGH TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

Approved For Release 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8

WE PROCEEDED ABOUT 30-40 MILES OFF THE COAST OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON A NORTHERLY COURSE TO OP-AREA PLUTO, ACCORDING TO OUR PLAN, SO THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE SPOTTED IF POSSIBLE UNTIL WE HAD FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED OUR MISSION.

WHEN WE PROCEEDED SOUTHWARD, HOWEVER, WE NAVIGATED ABOUT 13 MILES OFF THE COAST AND INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AT A NUMBER OF POINTS OF INTEREST AND CONDUCTED INTENSIVE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES.

THE MAJOR AREAS OF INTEREST GIVEN TO US BY COMNAVFOR JAPAN WERE CHONGJIN, SONGJIN, MAYANGDO AND WONSAN, AND THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AS MENTIONED ABOVE. AT THESE AREAS WE WERE TO TAKE INTEREST PRIMARILY IN THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE PORTS, PARTICULARLY NAVAL ACTIVITY.

IN THAT REGARD WE WERE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE NAVAL AND THE ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE. WE WERE, FIRST OF ALL, TO OBSERVE THE NUMBER ON ANY NAVAL SHIP IF POSSIBLE, AND WHEN CLOSE ENOUGH WE WERE TO PHOTOGRAPH IT.

I PLANNED TO STAY ABOUT TWO DAYS, RESPECTIVELY, OFF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHONGJIN AND IN THE SONGJIN, JAYANGDO AND WONSAN AREAS AND SPEND THE REST OF THE TIME IN AN AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST, IF ANY.

OP-AREA PLUTO INCLUDED CHONGJIN, OUR PORT OF INTEREST, AND WAS THOUGHT TO CONTAIN A MINIMUM OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR ESPIONAGE IN CHONGJIN AREA WAS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF THE NAVAL ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND TO DETERMINE WHAT ELECTRONIC RADAR CONTACTS THERE WERE IN THE AREA.

ON THE NIGHT OF 15 JANUARY WE REACHED TO SONGJIN AREA, AND, AFTER SAILING NORTHWARD AS FAR AS THE VICINITY OF THE FAR EASTERN AREA OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE RETURNED TO THE CHONGJIN AREA ON THE MORNING OF THE 16TH.

THIS WAS THE FIRST PORT AREA WHERE WE WERE TO CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE AND I GAVE AN INSTRUCTION TO ALL OFFICERS TELLING THEM HOW I WANTED THEM TO KEEP THEIR REPORTS. NAMELY, IN ALL AREAS, BEGINNING WITH CHONGJIN THEY WERE TO KEEP A LOG OF ALL THEIR CONTACTS, DESCRIBING EVERYTHING THEY SAW IN DETAIL. IF THE CONTACT WAS A MERCHANT SHIP, IT WAS TO BE IDENTIFIED FROM THE IDENTIFICATION PUBLICATIONS WE CARRIED ON BOARD.

I TOLD THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK TO PHOTOGRAPH ALL SHIPS IF POSSIBLE AND IF NOT, TO AT LEAST TRY TO IDENTIFY THE SHIP'S RADAR, OTHER ANTENNAS AND ITS ARMAMENT AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SHIP. I TOLD THEM ALSO TO REPORT ALL AIRCRAFT AND TO RECORD THEM; THEY WERE ALSO REQUIRED TO NOTE THE PUEBLO'S POSITION EVERY 20 MINUTES.

WHENEVER RESEARCH REPORTED A RADAR, THE OFFICERS OF THE DECK WERE TO ASCERTAIN THE BEARING AND THE TYPE, RECORD IT AND REPORT IT TO ME.

WHILE IN THE CHONGJIN AREA WHERE WE STAYED UNTIL EVENING OF 17 JANUARY, WE HAD ABOUT 30 RADAR SIGNALS.

OUR ELECTRONIC DETECTOR MEASURES THE FREQUENCY OF THE TRANSMITTED PULSE OF THE TARGET RADAR AND IDENTIFIES IT AS WHICHEVER TYPE IT IS.

OF ALL THE RADARS INTERCEPTED THERE IN CHONGJIN, NONE WERE OF A TYPE UNKNOWN TO US. IN THIS AREA WE HAD FOUR VISUAL CONTACTS, BUT THEY WERE NOT NEAR ENOUGH TO BE IDENTIFIED OR PHOTOGRAPHED. THE OCEANOGRAPHERS HAD THREE OCEANIC MEASUREMENTS THERE.

ON THE NIGHT OF 17 JANUARY WE LEFT THE CHONGJIN AREA FOR THE AREA OF SONGJIN, AND WE INTERCEPTED A PARTICULARLY POWERFUL AND INTERESTING ELECTRONIC WAVE OFF ORANGDAN AND MUSUDAN. BUT WE COULD NOT MAKE OUT WHAT IT WAS, AND I ORDERED THE SHIP TO APPROACH THE COAST. WE APPROACHED UP TO A POINT (41 DEGREES, 25 MINUTES NORTH; 130 DEGREES, 03 MINUTES EAST), 11.2 MILES FROM THE COAST TO IDENTIFY IT. THE MAIN POINT OF INTEREST IN THE SECOND OP-AREA, VENUS, WAS THE NAVAL AND ELECTRONIC ACTIVITY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THE VICINITY OF THE PORT OF SONGJIN. VERY LITTLE GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED TO ME IN THIS AREA. I HAD READ THAT THERE WAS ONLY MINIMAL NAVAL FORCES IN THIS AREA.

(MORE)

12 FEB 1750Z CF/EAM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2004/06/14 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000200050076-8
THESE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED FOR MANY PURPOSES. THEY ARE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO ADD TO THE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. NAVY HAS ABOUT ANY GIVEN COUNTRY. THE INFORMATION DESIRED IS ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND IS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH THAT COUNTRY.

IF THE OPERATIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL AND ACCURATELY REPORTED, THE NAVY WOULD HAVE MUCH VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NAVAL FORCES AND ABOUT THE ELECTRONICS OF THE COUNTRY THAT THE OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT IN.

THE MOST IMPORTANT POSSIBLE GAIN IS TO DETERMINE, BY OBSERVATION EXERCISES, THE MANEUVERABILITY OF THE NAVY BEING WATCHED.

FOR EXAMPLE, DURING ONE BANNER OPERATION THEY WERE ABLE TO WATCH AN ENTIRE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISE THAT LASTED FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS. THE INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING THAT OPERATION IS CONSIDERED VERY VALUABLE BY THE U.S. NAVY OFFICIALS.

THE U.S. NAVY EXPECTS THAT THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY SOMETIMES, BUT CONSIDERS THAT THE POSSIBLE GAIN IS WORTH THE EFFORT.

AFTER HIS LAST OPERATION, THE PUEBLO WAS TO OPERATE IN THE VICINITY OF VLADIVOSTOK OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM ABOUT 20 FEBRUARY TO 10 MARCH AND THEN TO BE ALONG THE KAMCHATKA PENINSULA.

THE BANNER, SISTER SHIP OF THE PUEBLO, WAS SCHEDULED TO CONDUCT AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF BLADIVOSTOK DURING THE MONTH OF LATER JANUARY AND EARLY FEBRUARY. THEIR NEXT OPERATION IN MARCH WAS TO BE IN THE SAME AREA AS WE WERE ON THIS OPERATION, IN THE WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

I UNDERSTAND THAT OPERATION IN THE WATERS OF CHINA WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT STAGE.

THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OR AIR OF OTHER COUNTRIES IS ESPIONAGE, AND A WANTON VIOLATION OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY. I CONSIDER THAT IT IS A DESPICABLE CRIME AND MUST BE STOPPED.

WITH THE LAPSE OF TIME SINCE MY CAPTURE I REALIZED MORE DEEPLY AND REPENT THE GRAVITY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT I COMMITTED.

IT WAS A HOSTILE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE. NOW I FULLY REALIZE WHY THE KOREAN PEOPLE HATE US AND HOW ANGRY THEY MUST FEEL.

HOWEVER, WE ENTREAT YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE COMMITTED SUCH CRIME AS SOLDIERS IN THE EXECUTION OF ORDERS OF OUR SUPERIORS AND NOT OF OUR OWN ACCORD, AND FORGIVE US LENIENTLY.

NOW I HAVE BEEN GIVEN GOOD WHOLESOME FOOD, FINE CLOTHES TO WEAR, A WARM ROOM AND A CLEAN BED.

SINCE MY CAPTURE, I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GRIPPED BY YEARNING FOR MY DEAR FAMILY. THERE IS MY WIFE ROSE DOLORES BUCHER WITH TWO SONS, MARK, AGE 15, AND MICHAEL, AGE 13, IN MY HOME TOWN, SAN DIEGO.

I WOULD LIKE TO TELL THEM THAT I AM SAFE AND HEALTHY AND THEY SHOULD NOT WORRY TOO MUCH. I WANT TO TELL THEM I LOVE THEM VERY DEARLY. I THINK THAT IF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS MERCIFUL TO US WHO DESERVE PUNISHMENT, WE WILL BE SENT HOME AND WE WILL BE TOGETHER AND IN LOVE FOREVER, NEVER AGAIN TO PART.

IF I AM PERMITTED TO RETURN HOME, I WILL WORK FOR THE BROTHERHOOD OF ALL MEN FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE. IF I AM ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME I WILL IMMEDIATELY EXPLAIN THE MORAL WRONG OF THIS TYPE OF OPERATION AND WILL DO ALL I CAN TO HAVE THEM STOPPED PERMANENTLY.

THIS IS MY WISH. WE HAVE DONE A GREAT WRONG AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. HOWEVER, I WISH WE MAY BE FORGIVEN GENEROUSLY AND ALLOWED TO GO HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS MY SINCERE CONFESSION. I SWEAR IT ON MY HONOR.

(ENDALL)

12 FEB 1900Z CF/EAM