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THE DEVELOPMENT OF US STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

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In American literature dealing with the history of intelligence in the US there is a legend that spying activity is not in keeping with the national character of Americans. Many authors have referred to the fact that when the US entered World War I the opinion was widely entertained that "America never had any spies." In almost all or at least in many research works there is related with unconcealed satisfaction the story of how Henry Stimson, US Secretary of State in 1929, abruptly cut off the official who was reporting to him about the measures being taken in the State Department to break the codes of other countries. He declared: "Gentlemen do not read other people's mail," and he pushed away a pile of telegrams which had been decoded. It seemed in this way that the "black cabinet" had been disbanded. By citing such examples, apologists for US intelligence try to divest American "gentlemen" of their predilection for "dirty" operations.

At the same time an analysis of historical facts shows convincingly that as early as the end of the 19th century, US intelligence was developing into one of the most important elements in the US imperialist government apparatus. It is another matter that in comparison with British and French intelligence services, it came into being much later. In his book, The Craft of Intelligence, which was published in New York at the end of 1963, the former director of CIA, Allen Dulles, describes the development of a professional, peacetime, military intelligence service in the US in the following way: "The first permanent army and navy peacetime intelligence organizations were created in the US in the 1880's. (As far as US Air Force intelligence is concerned, American authors claim that its history dates back to 1907, when in the Office of the Army Chief of Signal Communications a section for "air force" research was formed. However, in view of the fact that military air forces at that time and for a long time after that,

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i. e., up to September 1947, did not constitute an independent service in the armed forces but remained under the Army General Staff, air force intelligence was subordinate to G-2 (Army intelligence section)) The Army organization was known as the Military Information Division and was included in the Adjutant General's Office. The Intelligence office of the Navy was included in the Bureau of Personnel and Navigation. During the same decade, military and naval attaches were introduced for the first time in our embassies and diplomatic missions abroad where they were to act as observers and intelligence officers. In 1903, with the creation of the Army General Staff, the Military Information Division was incorporated in it as the 'Second Division.' Since then, intelligence sections in the American Army have traditionally been designated as G-2." (A. Dullos, The Craft of Intelligence, New York, 1963, pages 40-41)

Naturally, Americans did not remain satisfied with military intelligence alone. In the US, as in other countries which had entered the imperialist phase of development, "intelligence shifted to the political sphere -- espionage became entrenched in the secret cabinets of diplomats and secret intelligence became an integral part of politics." (W. Nicolai, Geheime Mächte, Leipzig, 1924, page 10)

As is known, the United States did not enter World War I until 1917. However, long before this, US intelligence was able to plant its agents in the general staff of the Kaiser's Germany, the staffs of several large military units, in certain ministries, in the Krupp plants, and in other places. The main US intelligence forces which were operating at that time against Germany were concentrated in neutral countries -- Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and primarily Switzerland. At the outbreak of war the US had at its disposal an extremely far-flung apparatus. An American intelligence officer, Thomas Johnson, stated in his book about World War I: "There are still some who think that the Americans did not have a 'secret service' in Europe but they are mistaken -- or at least they give the impression of being mistaken." (L'Intelligence Service americain pendant la guerre, Paris, 1938, page 17) He presents evidence showing that by the end of the war "espionage was more widespread and complex than during all previous wars." The US intelligence apparatus made wide use of the experience borrowed from the secret services of the US's political allies -- England and France. Americans attended special schools for training British and French agents. Denscy, a colonel in the British Army, was sent from England to Washington to instruct the supervisors of US intelligence. The influence of methods used by the British Secret Service can be found in many of the intelligence methods practiced by the Americans.

However, from the very beginning US intelligence differed from the intelligence services of England and France by the extent of the material resources available. According to Hans Holm, a German author, the huge amounts of available US funds were just as vital for the intelligence of the Entente as the new military equipment and masses of fresh manpower, not exhausted by the war, were for the military command. (H. Helm, USA in

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Fähigkeit, Dresden, o. D., page 85) A former chief of British intelligence, Basil Thompson, remarked with unconcealed envy: "The Americans could be guided by the following principle: Silence is golden but silence can be broken by gold which opens all doors. The US government was so generous that US intelligence could afford a luxury not available to any other intelligence service, i. e., that of paying for information about its own allies just as easily as for information about the enemy." (T. Johnson, op. cit., page 10.)

During the course of World War I, US military intelligence continued to grow. According to Walter Sweeney, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army, hundreds of officers and soldiers were transferred from combat units into the intelligence service and sent to various geographic areas. Many hundreds of others carried out missions for the intelligence service right in combat units. (W. Sweeney, Military Intelligence, USA, 1924, page 1.) After completing in a short time the education given them by their British teachers, the Americans joined the "secret struggle" of the Entente against Germany.

The development of international economic relations was the reason for the close union between the intelligence apparatus and monopolistic organizations. Many agents were recruited from among the employees of large American firms who took regular trips "on business" to the countries of Western Europe, especially to Germany. The Americans managed to penetrate the government apparatus of other imperialist powers. In the books written by American authors about the history of US intelligence (R. Rowan, T. Johnson, and others), there are many references to the fact that "if the names of people who worked for the US secret service were disclosed at this time, the amazement in many official circles would be great.... It will never be possible to reveal the complete truth. This would result in bringing down on our country, and many others, a storm of anger, hate, suspicion, and indignation." (T. Johnson, op. cit., page 57.)

As early as World War I, a characteristic feature of US intelligence was noted -- that of reliance on the most reactionary elements in forming an agent network. Thus, literally on the day following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution a refuge was created in the United States for many Tsarist intelligence officers whom the Americans then used in their own interests for conducting subversive activities against the young Soviet republic. There was another distinguishing feature of US intelligence -- along with a broad network of agents who were planted in other countries, a massive network of informers was organized among American Expeditionary Forces in the European theater of war. This network was designed to keep watch over the political attitudes of American soldiers and to determine their "reliability." Richard Rowan, an author of well-known books about intelligence, stated: "It is curious to note that the most successful branch of US counterintelligence in France was the surveillance of Americans. In every company, battalion, and division sent

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overseas there was an observer, who was responsible not to his own commander but to another officer charged with observing the morale and loyalty of soldiers." (R. Rowan, The Story of the Secret Service, New York, 1938 page 658.) The total number of such "silent observers" in the US Armed Forces amounted, in Thompson's [sic] estimation, to about 50,000 men. (T. Johnson, op. cit., page 10.)

After World War I, the activity of US military intelligence naturally subsided to the limits befitting a time of peace and, in the opinion of many authors, was considerably reduced. Of course, there is nothing surprising about this. A certain lag of the US behind other imperialist powers in the sphere of intelligence was associated with the particular disposition of political forces at that time in the imperialist camp and with the "isolationist" foreign policy of the US government. However, this did not mean that intelligence ceased to serve the needs of US monopolistic capital, which was carrying out a policy of economic and political expansion in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Here is just one of numerous examples. At the initiative of the US a naval conference was held in Washington in 1921, attended by nine countries, during which the Americans managed to split the British-Japanese alliance, achieve acceptance of the "open door" principle in China, conclude a treaty limiting naval armament, and win equal rights with England with respect to total tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers. This success was facilitated by the fact that, prior to the beginning of the conference, US intelligence broke the Japanese code and was able to read exchanges between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and its ambassador in Washington, and also between Tokyo and London.

During the period between the two wars, the US watched the course of events on the European continent very closely. As before, the principal organ of US intelligence was the Office of Army Intelligence, which benefited from experience acquired in World War I. This office managed to send agents to many European countries. One of the covers used in the major capitals of the world was law firms which provided favorable conditions for making contacts with broad circles of people from all classes of society. Many American agents posing as members of philanthropic missions, and later as employees of embassies and consulates, were sent by US military and political intelligence organs to carry out subversive activities in the Soviet Union. During the prewar years, a number of US intelligence centers were operating near the northern and western borders of the USSR. One of these centers in Riga, the capital of bourgeois Latvia, was particularly active.

The new conditions confronted ruling circles of the country with the need to select a definite type of intelligence organization. Since it was required to carry out aggressive plans aimed at forming an American "world empire" it became necessary to create an appropriate intelligence structure.

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It is generally considered that the historical development of the intelligence systems of imperialist governments resulted in the formation of two basic types of intelligence services. The first one of these found expression in the older intelligence services of England and France which strove to plan their work with long-range goals in mind, trying to achieve their purposes, so to speak, not by quantity but by skill and by concentrating compact intelligence forces in the most important directions. For this type of intelligence organization, not a mass approach but a "selective" approach to planting agents is characteristic.

The two young imperialist predatory powers -- Germany and Japan -- had a different type of intelligence system than England and France. It was distinguished first of all by the amount of resources used and the size of the agent network. They relied mainly on mass recruitment of spies and based their activity on the doctrine of "total espionage." The most characteristic features of this doctrine are maximum territorial scope of intelligence activities, an effort to create the broadest possible agent network abroad, and surveillance "by all over all" inside the country to ensure stability in their own rear areas. The implementation of a doctrine of "total espionage" under conditions such as existed in Germany, meant that espionage must become -- and did in fact become -- a common cause of the government and the fascist party, and that all departments and all establishments in the country were adapted to conducting espionage. But that is not all.

The doctrine of "total espionage" reshaped the very nature of actual intelligence operations. In making plans for espionage and sabotage activities in the USSR, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, chief of the German "Abwehr," formulated his principle as follows: "The more shots are fired, the more chances there are of hitting the target." It is not surprising, therefore, that during the war Cheka organs encountered many instances where the "Abwehr" sent two or even three groups of agents with one and the same mission against the same target in our country.

The birth of the doctrine of large-scale, "total espionage" and the rapid growth of "all-encompassing" and "all-penetrating" intelligence services in Germany and Japan were determined entirely by the needs of imperialistic expansion and the interests of the struggle for world hegemony.

In the beginning of World War II, US President Franklin Roosevelt, requested the formation of an intelligence service which would conform to the needs of modern war and the new course in US foreign policy. In the opinion of American experts, the experience acquired by US intelligence in the period between the wars was not sufficiently incorporated in the new organizational forms. The question arose: What type of intelligence organization should be set up? It seemed that an intelligence system of the British type would be more appropriate for the United States, the more so since the intelligence services of the US and England had cooperated closely as far back as World War I. According to Johnson, "the ideas and experience of the English and French helped us to a great extent in setting up an American intelligence system which satisfied the needs of a large-scale

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war." (T. Johnson, op. cit., page 76.) In many ways, the Americans depended on the English in matters of intelligence during the early part of World War II. In 1940-41 Roosevelt twice sent the chief of the future Office of Strategic Services, Colonel (later General) William Donovan, on secret missions to Europe and the Middle East. In carrying out his missions, Donovan was able to become thoroughly familiar with the British system of organizing espionage and sabotage.

Nevertheless, in selecting its type of intelligence organization, the monopolistic ruling clique in the US did not follow the example of their allies but were more inclined to the German-Japanese variation. During World War II, US military intelligence adopted as a model many of the structural peculiarities of the intelligence apparatus of the Wehrmacht. For example, the Americans did not create a single military intelligence organization but copied the fascist German system of three intelligence services, one for each branch of the armed forces. Furthermore, they showed preference for the German system of combining organs of intelligence and counterintelligence. Finally, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which was created during the war, obviously resembled Admiral Canaris' "Abwehr."

US intelligence entered World War II with well-established Army and Navy intelligence services. At that time the State Department was an important organ for collecting economic and political intelligence. Moreover, with the formation in 1942 of a joint committee of the chiefs of staff, there was attached to it a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC included representatives of intelligence organs of the Army, Navy, and State Department, as well as the Office of Strategic Services and the Commission for Studying the Economy of Foreign Countries. The JIC was to be a coordinating center for intelligence activities, i.e., for concentrating army and navy intelligence sources and combining all government intelligence services. In the opinion of American authors, the JIC played an important role in expanding the intelligence activity of the US. With its participation, many government measures were conceived and implemented which made it possible to improve the system for collecting strategic intelligence and coordinating intelligence work. In the military theaters there were combined intelligence groups made up of personnel from the Army and the Navy and a large number of civilians who were experts in various fields. Their tasks included the coordination of collection and processing of intelligence information and the maintenance of contacts with the JIC center in Washington. Such groups were active in the Mediterranean, African, Middle East, Indo-Burmese, and Chinese theaters of military operations.

Unquestionably, World War II gave great impetus to the development of US military intelligence, although it was not marked by any great success. When operations began in North Africa, intelligence support for

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these operations was provided mainly by British military intelligence. Whenever the Americans were required to act more or less independently, they often proved to be helpless. This was the case, for example, during the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944-45. This offensive took US troops by surprise. The same thing happened several times in the Far East. This is how American authors evaluate the oversights of the JIC: "The JIC committed many serious errors. Less than ten days had passed after the committee expressed its firm conviction that Japan would not carry out landings in the Aleutians, when in the summer of 1944 the Japanese seized Kiska and Attu, two of the most important islands in the Aleutians... Many other such errors could be cited." (W. McGovern, Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow. Chicago, 1961, page 7.)

The conduct of strategic intelligence in the real sense of the word was concentrated in 1942 in a government organ set up at that time --- the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As regards its functions, it closely resembled a Central Intelligence Service of the country. At the head of OSS, as mentioned above, was one of the most prominent US intelligence experts, Donovan ("Wild Bill"). His assistants were drawn from New York legal firms, financial establishments, and the so-called group of 100 professors. All during 1943 OSS units operated in all parts of the world with the exception of Latin America, which was covered by the FBI, and also several areas of the Far East Command which was covered by intelligence directly subordinate to General MacArthur. As pointed out by H. Ransom, "by creating the OSS, the United States for the first time undertook an intensive study of strategic intelligence, wide-scale intelligence operations, and political activities on a world-wide scale." (H. Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security. Cambridge, 1958, page 64.)

The OSS was involved in many problems -- from the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information concerning the capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign governments and dispatching agents and carrying out sabotage in enemy countries, to planning and carrying out special operations having far-reaching consequences. "It seems there was nothing," writes A. Dulles, "that the OSS did not attempt to do at one time or another during the period between 1942 and the end of the war." (A. Dulles, op. cit., page 46.) During the war years the OSS employed the services of about 22,000 workers. (L. Farago, Burn after Reading. New York, 1962, page 219.) The scale of OSS activities can easily be estimated if it is borne in mind that the 1945 budget for this agency amounted to \$57,000,000.

What was characteristic of US military intelligence during this period? Even at that time there was obviously extensive dispersion among different agencies. Parallel with the OSS there was army, air force, and naval intelligence as well as State Department intelligence. The War Department, Navy Department, and State Department competed openly with the OSS. Departmental intelligence agencies competed with the OSS and were

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constantly in conflict among themselves. This was an indirect reflection of the struggle which was characteristic for the US Armed Forces between separate monopolistic groups advocating one type of armed forces or another.

Immediately after the war strategic intelligence was taken away from the jurisdiction of military agencies and transferred to the State Department. This caused objections from government experts. The process of dispersing organs for strategic intelligence was practically stopped when General George Marshall came to the post of Secretary of State. What was left of the old OSS was combined in a separate organ in the State Department, and OSS units engaged in intelligence work were transferred to Army G-2, which was headed by General Donovan. Some of his closest associates went there with him. G-2 also absorbed a large part of the OSS agent network.

In 1947 the entire government apparatus of the US was reorganized. The military departments were subjected to complete overhaul. There was set up a Department of Defense to which were subordinated the departments of the three branches of the armed forces -- Army, Navy, and Air Force. The fairly well known James Forrestal became Secretary of Defense. At the same time the highest military-political organ of the United States was created -- the National Security Council (NSC) -- which included the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the chief of the Office for Defense Mobilization. The new, highly centralized organization was to advise the President concerning important political problems. "The purpose of the council," wrote Robert Cutler, special assistant to the President for national security, "was to combine the numerous aspects of national security (foreign policy, military, economic, financial, psychological, and internal security) so that the policy finally recommended to the President would be all-encompassing and 'unified.'" (Foreign Affairs, 1956, No 2.)

In the plans for reorganizing US military and political leadership prime importance was attached to the intelligence system, which was also to be reorganized and strengthened. The openly declared course toward establishing world hegemony was accompanied by the creation of a global intelligence organization on a scale unprecedented in the history of the country. In accordance with the 1947 National Security Act there was set up a permanently operating government agency of combined "political and strategic intelligence" -- the Central Intelligence Agency -- which was subordinated directly to the NSC. (C. Marriam and R. Marriam. The American Government. Boston, 1954, page 777.) As Harry Truman, former US President, stated in his memoirs, the creation of this centralized government intelligence service was a result of almost two years of study by US intelligence experts of the best possible organization for espionage and subversive activities.) (The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1, page 98.)

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Thus, the establishment of the CIA marked a new stage in the development of US intelligence. In reading the text of National Security Act, one finds that Paragraph 102, Chapter 1 of this law defines the functions of CIA as follows:

"d) To coordinate the intelligence activities of various government departments and agencies the CIA, under the direction of the National Security Council, must carry out the following functions:

1. To advise the National Security Council concerning such aspects of intelligence activities of government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
2. To make recommendations to the Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of government departments and agencies as relate to national security;
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence information relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence among government agencies, using for this purpose, if necessary, existing agencies and facilities...;
4. To perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies, such functions of a general nature which a central organ is able to carry out more effectively and which are determined by the National Security Council;
5. To perform such other intelligence functions related to National Security as may be assigned from time to time by the National Security Council." (National Security Act of 1947, Congressional Record, July 24, 1947, pages 10072-10078.)

Thus, the Central Intelligence Agency acquired great power, primarily of a coordinating nature. In a monograph concerning the CIA the well-known commentator, Joachim Joesten, wrote that this agency has "a unique quality which is a result of the large-scale capitalistic nature of the American system... The CIA is a huge business... Many CIA leaders come from the business world. The methods used are completely in keeping with the methods employed by a business concern." (J. Joesten. CIA, Munich, 1958, page 20.) Blending the intelligence apparatus with monopolistic capital imparted great weight to the new intelligence agency.

The creation of CIA did not involve the abolishment of military strategic intelligence as such. The CIA was able, for example, to advise the National Security Council how to divide responsibility among various intelligence agencies, although this problem was to be finally decided only by the Council itself. Included in the composition of the Council were the directors of agencies affected by CIA recommendations. At the

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same time CIA did not acquire the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other intelligence agencies.

In examining the situation of military intelligence in this complex system it should be noted that during this whole period it was making desperate attempts to come out in first place. For A. Dulles, who for many years was chief of the CIA and who came from OSS, it was characteristic that he tried to "politicize" all strategic intelligence and make the CIA not simply an organ for coordinating intelligence but for "making major policy." Officials in the Pentagon voiced dissatisfaction with such a course. They were afraid that "a passion for political intrigue" would make it difficult to solve military problems, diminish the importance of military intelligence, and deprive intelligence information of the needed accuracy and objectivity.

For some time the internal struggle among various agencies of US intelligence was concealed and conducted in the depths of the "intelligence jungles." But it soon came to the surface. The military circles, which strove for greater influence of Pentagon intelligence, once more gained the upper hand. The victory won by these circles was expressed and consolidated by the establishment in August 1961 of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), headed by Lt Gen Joseph Carroll, formerly a responsible official in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and later Inspector General of the Air Force.

The creation of DIA, according to American authors, was not simply a matter of morganing the intelligence efforts of the three branches of the Armed Forces into one organization. The main purpose of the new agency, which is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense and constitutes the key organization in military intelligence at the highest level -- its "brain trust" -- was an attempt to achieve maximum coordination and greatest possible effectiveness in the intelligence activities carried out by the Army, Air Force, and Navy. According to information from US sources, DIA is obliged: 1. To determine what intelligence information is needed at any given moment; 2. To establish priority of information; 3. To distribute among the three branches of the Armed Forces tasks involving the collection of intelligence information; and 4. To analyze and evaluate the information presented by various service intelligence branches. The creation of DIA has shed light on one of the problems which traditionally proved to be a stumbling block for the US intelligence apparatus. The nature of this problem is the constant behind-the-scenes struggle among various intelligence agencies. The government was inevitably faced with the fact that each military department gave its own evaluation of the potential capabilities of an enemy a certain slant which would enable it to obtain funds, moral support for its own needs and interests. The Department of the Air Force and air force intelligence have been particularly noted for this in recent years in their efforts to acquire greater appropriations to help them in their race for increased air armament.

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The creation of DIA was an effort to concentrate in the Pentagon the direction of all forms of warfare, beginning with military action itself and ending with the organization on foreign territory of subversion in the broadest meaning of this term. It was produced, as A. Dulles later wrote, by the need to expand the activities of armed forces intelligence to the point where it would be able to deal successfully with the ever-growing and ever more complicated tasks. (A. Dulles, op. cit., page 46.) It is commonly known that the tasks assigned to DIA and service intelligence branches include mainly the collection of information about the military-economic potential and the armed forces of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The interests of DIA go far beyond the limits of strictly military problems and also relate to military-political, economic, and scientific aspects of life in various countries -- the potential targets of US aggression and expansion. For the purpose of justifying expansion of the sphere of interests of military intelligence and its right to "crowd" CIA, a large number of noted specialists was called upon. They stated that the time has passed when it was possible to view the military aspects of intelligence operations apart from overall national problems. In their opinion, political or economic factors sometimes have a determining influence on the position of countries; in other cases, they are influenced by scientific inventions and technological improvements, or else by psychological advantages. On this basis, the conclusion has now been expressed in bourgeois military literature that "military intelligence must be viewed and evaluated only as part of the overall system of government and political intelligence and in no case must it be considered apart from these broader aspects of intelligence activity." (E. Kingston-McClory, Military Policy and Strategy. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, page 85.)

In its attempts to learn the military, political, economic, and scientific-technical secrets of the USSR and other socialist countries, US military intelligence is not restricted in its scope of activities or in the selection of means. Among these means, agent intelligence activities are of prime importance. "The clandestine collection of intelligence (espionage)," according to A. Dulles, "must remain an essential and basic type of intelligence activity." (A. Dulles, op. cit., page 58.) Great importance is also assigned to the legal apparatus for military intelligence abroad -- the system of military attaches who are accredited as US diplomatic representatives abroad.

As has long been known, US military intelligence which is a component part of the government machine, is responsible for protecting the army and the country against possible internal disorders. From a territorial viewpoint, function is broadly interpreted, i.e., it includes not only the United States itself (which, incidentally, explains the close ties existing between military intelligence and the FBI), but also the territory of other countries where the interests of US monopolies are represented. The

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counterintelligence functions of military intelligence in the US Armed Forces have a direct connection with this "policeman's role."

An idea of present-day US military intelligence would be incomplete if it did not include consideration of such an important and super-secret intelligence organization as the National Security Agency (NSA) which has been growing in importance from year to year. Under the supervision of the Pentagon, NSA collects information by radio intercept and by decoding secret communications of foreign governments. Although the principal efforts of this agency are directed toward penetrating the secrets of cipher systems and codes of socialist countries, the immediate allies of the US in its military-political blocs are no exception. The following data give an idea of the scope of NSA activity. The number of employees in the agency exceeds 10,000 people. In the building of its central offices, which is surpassed in size only by the Pentagon but which is larger than the CIA headquarters in Langley, there are many computers and special apparatuses. The operation of the central offices of the agency alone costs \$100,000,000 per year. NSA has at its disposal a far-flung network of outlying radio intercept stations which operate round-the-clock. Through the use of these stations, which include more than 2,000 special posts manned by 8,000 military operators, NSA intercepts both coded and open-text messages. Most of the intercept activity is done by US military radios located at US bases abroad. Moreover, monitoring is also done on aircraft and ships equipped with special devices. The expenses of operating the outlying intercept stations amount to about \$380,000,000 annually. If we add to this the cost of maintaining the central offices of the agency we find that the US government spends for communications intelligence alone almost half a billion dollars per year. The NSA is also charged with protecting the ciphers and codes of US government establishments. In addition, NSA "supervises and coordinates the activities of the US Army Security Agency and corresponding communication intelligence groups in the US Navy and Air Force. (N. Ransom, op. cit., page 117.)

The recent changes in the supervision of US intelligence have also affected the NSA. Army Lt Gen Marshall Carter, who for the last three years was deputy director of CIA, was put in charge of NSA. (Herald Tribune, May 16, 1965.)

Directly connected with the increased importance of military intelligence in the US is the appointment to the post of CIA director, in replacement of McCone, of William Raborn, a fellow-Texan and active supporter of President Johnson. (Rayborn was born in Texas in 1905. After completing the Naval Academy he was assigned to duty on a Navy ship. In 1934 he qualified as a Navy pilot and served in air units. From 1940 to 1942 he headed the air artillery school of Pearl Harbor. He took part in military action in the Far East. After the war, he occupied many command posts in the Navy, including those of commander of a battleship and

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Assistant Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Fleet. In 1956 he was promoted to rear admiral, and in 1960 to vice admiral. He retired in 1963.

The military career of Raborn was not only specifically naval. Being an artilleryman, he specialised after the war in the missile field. In 1952 he worked in the missile section of the Navy staff and after 1955 he headed the program for the development of Polaris type missiles. Prior to retiring, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy for Scientific Research. As indicated in the US press, Raborn played a considerable role in pushing the production of Polaris missiles which have been assigned an important place in US military doctrine. In the person of Raborn a representative of the most aggressive circles of the Pentagon was assigned to the post of CIA director. His assignment to that post was a very important victory for the "military-industrial complex" and further evidence of the increase in the role played by these forces in planning US foreign policy. The assignment of Raborn was indicative in another respect -- in a way it summed up the behind-the-scenes, interdepartmental squabbles which had been waged over the past few years between two members of the "intelligence community" -- the CIA and military intelligence. The miserable failures of CIA over the past few years, and especially the part it played in the intervention in Cuba, seriously undermined public confidence and forced the US government to remove A. Dulles from the post of directing intelligence activities. This all indicates that the scales have tipped in favor of the Pentagon.

The new director of CIA is not only a military man but like his predecessor, John McCono, an important business man (upon retirement he became vice president of the Aerojet General Corporation of California which, being an important producer of missile equipment, occupies a special place in US military industry). The ties between monopolies and intelligence are effected in many ways and the "personal union" of generals in intelligence with generals in big business, as personified earlier by Allen Dulles and John McCono and at the present time by William Raborn, is only one of these ways. It is much more convenient for powerful monopolists to operate through intelligence than through other organs in the US government. The fact of the matter is that the ties with intelligence guarantee a maximum of secrecy and a minimum of publicity. (It is well known what furor the US press, which represents the interests of monopolies, raises in those rare instances when information about the dirty collaboration between business and the government apparatus becomes known to the public.) Secondly, the large monopolies always considered it necessary to have their own intelligence system in order to be abreast of the affairs of their economic competitors and to guarantee for themselves superprofits for many years to come. In this sense CIA is a trusted instrument for monopolists. Thirdly, by acting through intelligence, the most reactionary monopolistic circles can engage in transactions which the government itself cannot

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conduct openly because of so-called prestige considerations. In the fourth place, among professional US intelligence agents, monopolies can most easily find people who are ready to do anything for the sake of carrying out well-paid orders.

The increase in the role of military intelligence is a symptomatic phenomenon reflecting the efforts of US military leaders and in keeping with their aims. In all stages of their strategic planning they have considered intelligence to be one of the most important elements. "During the present crisis," says L. Farago, author of the book War of Wits, which caused a sensation at one time in the US, "we shall be able to survive only under the definite condition that we have accurate and timely knowledge of what is going on in the world, anywhere in the world, and especially behind the walls of the Kremlin... We must know the secret intentions of the enemy, his vulnerable or weak spots, and those vitally important regions where he has concentrated his physical and spiritual resources." (L. Farago, War of Wits, New York, 1954, page 3.)

Information collected by US strategic intelligence serves as a basis for planning and carrying out military measures in peacetime as well as in time of war. In this connection intelligence agencies direct their main efforts toward defining and studying the potential capabilities and weak points of foreign countries. A prominent US intelligence expert, Professor Sherman Kent, wrote on this subject: "Our political leaders need a large amount of information concerning foreign governments. They need information which must be complete, accurate, and timely and can serve as a basis for action... For example, they must know: a. the physical-geographical conditions of these countries, i. o., their natural topography and environment and also the many different permanent installations added to the terrain (cities, agricultural and industrial enterprises, transport routes, etc.); b. their population including total number, density in various regions, types of occupation; c. state of the arts, science and technology in these countries (I would also add the condition of their armed forces); d. the nature of their political system, economy, social groups, moral principles, and the relationship among all these phenomena." (S. Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, Princeton, 1949, pages 5-6.) As we see, Kent tried to provide a theoretical foundation for the broad activities of strategic intelligence and to reinforce the practices of the US government and monopolies with reliable arguments which were intended to convince public opinion in the US of the need to strengthen the role of military intelligence and, consequently, of the inevitability of the huge expenditures associated with the intelligence program. The image of US military intelligence makes it altogether clear that it is an experienced and dangerous enemy which has great resources at its disposal, which does not hesitate to use any method whatsoever, and which is carrying out extensive intelligence and subversive activities against the socialist camp.