

Intelligence Chief Sees—**SIGNS OF WEAKNESS
IN SOVIET DICTATORSHIP**

CPYRGHT

Can the Kremlin, cracking down, now hold Russia's Red empire together by force?

Allen Dulles, America's Intelligence chief, indicates here that the answer may be "No."

Russia's present dictators, he says, find themselves facing this basic quandary:

- **Clamp down tight and, history shows,**

revolt is inevitable, from pressure generated by people's "instinctive urge for freedom."

● **Let up a little bit—say, 20 per cent—and people get a chance to blow off steam. But this, too, turns to revolt under dictatorship.**

Moscow, Mr. Dulles says, is up against a dilemma without an answer in history.

by Allen W. Dulles*Director of Central Intelligence*

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The task of an Intelligence officer during these days is no easy one. To say that the world is in ferment is to put it mildly.

The free world—and in particular the countries we include among the Western democracies—face, on almost a world-wide basis, problems such as these: (1) Revolt against the last vestiges of colonialism, (2) uprising within the satellite states of Europe against Moscow domination, (3) the all-out attempt by the Communist bloc to sell its theories and its wares throughout what we call the uncommitted areas of the world, and (4) the conflict between the free world and its program of building up a society based on the principles of freedom and the attempt by the Communist bloc to make over the world in its image.

These and other issues have deepened into acute crises in Poland and Hungary; in Egypt and other Arab states.

It is probably inevitable but unfortunate that in the public mind the name "intelligence" should become linked with the story-book concept of the cloak and dagger. Frankly, I regret that such sensationalism should ever becloud the main and vital function of this Agency. This function is to co-ordinate the work of finding the facts in the international situation without bias or prejudice, and to make those facts available to others in our Government that have the infinitely difficult task of charting a policy which will make for peace among nations, help to build prosperity at home and abroad, and raise the standards of living and the levels of understanding among peoples.

When I mention that it is our duty to try to find the facts of the international situation, this statement may seem clear and simple. In fact, it is infinitely complex in execution.

Facts have many facets.

One type of facts, for example, relates to what we colloquially call "hardware." By "hardware" we mean the physical assets a particular country may have. For example, as applied to the Soviet Union, it would mean the size of the armed forces, their equipment, particularly in modern strategic weapons such as aircraft, guided missiles, atomic stockpile and the like. To know what this constitutes and its disposition within the Communist bloc is one type of fact.

Closely related to this, and another important fact, is the over-all industrial potential of a country like the Soviet Union.

Then, alongside the hardware, comes the more difficult assessment of technical competence of the leadership and of manpower. How good are Soviet aviators? How able are Soviet scientists? How well organized is the Soviet Government machinery?

Then we come to an assessment of another and more difficult type of fact to analyze, namely: What are the basic intentions of a particular country, how is it likely to react in a given situation? To our policy makers the intentions of a country in a crisis may be more important, and always more difficult to ascertain, than the amount of its hardware and its over-all military might.

Let me illustrate what I mean from a fairly recent and greatly debated issue of about six years ago—namely, the intervention of the Chinese Communists in the Korean war in October of 1950. I can speak about this from an entirely detached viewpoint, since at the time I was in private life and an outside observer of events.

At that time it was well known to American Intelligence and to our policy makers approximately how many troops and how much equipment the Chinese Communists had close at hand north of the Yalu River on the borders of Korea. Thus, we knew about the "hardware" element. We could also judge within a reasonable margin of error how long it would take these particular troops to intervene in the North Korean struggle.

What we did not know with any assurance was whether or not the Chinese Communists would risk actual intervention and war with the United States. Under these circumstances the Intelligence officer has to weigh the pros and cons, to cite all indications of physical preparations and of probable courses of action and to reach an over-all estimate of intentions. In fact, in retrospect I think that my predecessors presented a competent analysis of the situation—though they did not call all the shots.

In the various crises which face us today we have many problems of the same nature. Again we know with reasonable accuracy the hardware which the various contestants in the

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Middle East have available to put into the struggle if the uneasy cease-fire should be broken. In the case, for example, of Hungary, we knew what forces the Soviet had available and approximately where they were located to throw into that country to put down the spontaneous uprising of those brave people if the Soviet finally elected, as they did, to take the course of ruthless repression.

What we, in Intelligence, are constantly seeking to learn are the motivations and the ambitions and the pressures affecting each country whose actions might threaten our own national security and what these pressures may impel a particular country to do.

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An Intelligence officer has no business to be either a prophet of gloom or a congenital optimist. It is all too easy to be overimpressed with Soviet strength and military might if we look only at their war machine and become bemused with a supposed infallibility because the Kremlin can act more swiftly than countries with representative forms of government.

Certainly it is as important to know the weaknesses of an adversary as it is to point up its power and strength.

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Often, when we, in the Intelligence community, are about to produce a paper showing that the Communists in Moscow are working to carry out some imposing blueprint for foreign or military policy, they pull off a bureaucratic bungle or make some fantastic move that would put in the shade the mistakes made by governments in the free world.

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Limits on a Dictatorship

The military might of a dictatorship as we learned both from Hitler and Stalin is a formidable thing, but, if we take the same test of long-range political acumen, their power has definite limitations.

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. . . Dictatorships have a rigidity which gives the false effect of strength. The democracies have a flexibility which sometimes appears a source of weakness but which can stand blows and react in a way that is impossible in dictatorships.

The Soviet Union, over the past year and more, apparently started some moves to temper the rigidity of the Stalinist type of dictatorship.

When the history of this period is written, I imagine that historians will agree that the most important document to see the light of day in the year 1956 was the famous secret speech of Khrushchev delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress on Feb. 25, 1956. The text was published in the free world some three months later. The people in the Soviet Union have never had this text given them over the Soviet radio or in the Soviet press. They have had little bits and pieces here and there about Stalin's crimes and misdemeanors, but have been largely kept in the dark while millions of people throughout the free world have had the full story.

Here is one of the weaknesses of dictatorship. They dare not tell their own people the truth. In the modern age, even with the millions of dollars the Soviets spend on jamming foreign radio broadcasts, they cannot keep the truth out. Some, but unfortunately not all, of the facts banned by the Soviet Government eventually reach the Soviet people.

Also, when they send their people abroad, even though generally under careful control, these travelers nevertheless bring back information to others.

When a people begin to discover that their leaders are not telling them the truth, the seeds of mistrust and lack of confidence are sown. These may breed slowly, but they do breed surely. Similarly the Russian people have been told none of the real facts of the Soviet ruthless repression of Hun-

gary. Some day, too, the real truth of this situation will seep over the borders to them.

It was a great gamble that Nikita Khrushchev took when he denounced Stalin and the crimes of the Stalin era. His own fulsome praise of Stalin must have been in the minds of the Soviet people. What can one think of a leader who for years was the trusted lieutenant and the recipient of the favor of the Stalin whom he later denounced as a deviationist and murderer? When a dictatorship deliberately turns upon and degrades its former dictator, it is by that very fact undermining itself.

In essence, the Soviet leaders, frightened at the consequences of Stalin's policy at home and abroad, tried to ease the iron grip of the Stalinist police dictatorship and to give to Communism some of the surface attributes of a decent way of life.

They hoped in this way to win for the Communist system a greater degree of willing consent of the governed at home and a degree of political respectability to attract new supporters abroad. This is in a nutshell what the latest "new look" and "de-Stalinization" policy is all about. Superficially, this seems to be an astute policy. There is no doubt that it has constituted a subtler threat to innocents abroad who like to think that Communists are solely interested in the welfare of people whose friendship they cultivate.

I say this is a great gamble, however, because Khrushchev and his colleagues are trying to repudiate Stalin and the unpopular characteristics of Stalinist rule without relinquishing the monopoly of power enjoyed by Stalin's heirs in Moscow or abandoning control of the great neocolonial empire built up on the European border of the U.S.S.R.

This points up the real dilemma which dictatorships are always facing. A dictatorship, as the term implies, means that you tell people what they are to do and you enforce the doing of it. Khrushchev proposed to relax that a little bit at home—to have an 80 per cent dictatorship but, in that 20 per cent margin, to allow the people some liberty of action and thought. This raises the basic question as to whether you can have a partial dictatorship.

True, we have heard of benevolent dictatorships, but there the authority of the Führer or leader remains complete but he only exercises that authority in such a benevolent way so as to keep his people temporarily satisfied.

Less Harshness, More Trouble

Any relaxation of the iron authority, and that is what in effect may have been contemplated under the so-called "new look" in the Soviet Union, raises great problems.

These problems are even more serious in the satellite area, where, in effect, an alien rule was foisted upon brave, proud peoples with long traditions of Western culture and with an intense yearning for freedom. A little relaxation of freedom in the Soviet Union—where, after all, Russians were ruling Russians—was a very different thing from Eastern Europe, where Russians were ruling peoples who were once free and came to be dominated and controlled by a hated foreign power.

The consequences of the relaxation of Soviet dictatorship in Hungary has been poignantly pointed up these last few days. The Hungarian people were not content with half liberties, qualified freedom. The prospects frightened the Kremlin and caused an abrupt reversal of policy, with consequences that it is hard to estimate.

In crushing the Hungarian revolution, the Kremlin in effect repudiated an official declaration which the Moscow Government had made on the 30th of October. This followed Hungary's first bold bid for freedom, which Moscow apparently accepted.

The Soviet Government said that it was necessary to make

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a statement in connection with events in Hungary. It admitted serious shortcomings, expressed deep regret that development of events in Hungary had led to bloodshed. It admitted that the further presence of the Soviet Army elements in Hungary could serve as a cause for even further deterioration and stated that the Soviet Government had instructed its military command to withdraw the Soviet Army units from Budapest as soon as this was recognized as necessary by the Hungarian Government. It agreed to negotiate the whole question of the presence of Soviet troops in the territory of Hungary.

It seemed that a miracle had happened, that what the pessimists had always predicted was impossible had occurred. It seemed that an uprising of people largely unarmed could prevail even over tanks and modern implements of war, not because the revolting people were strong but because no butcher could be found who would dare use all the might of modern weapons to crush a people rising in wrath and seizing freedom with both hands.

When dictatorship was thus put to the test, undoubtedly the men in the Kremlin who debated the issue reached the conclusion that their control not only in Hungary but throughout the whole Soviet domain was at stake. There was a complete reversal of their short-lived policy of tolerance. All promises made were broken. The dictatorship became a dictatorship again, not benevolent but ruthless. If this is any guide to what may happen in the U.S.S.R., we may be back again to the days of ruthless Stalinism.

But it is not alone in the satellites that dictatorship is put to its harsh test. In the Soviet Union itself they have a long-range problem which goes to the very heart of their ability to keep dictatorial control in the hands of a few men in the Kremlin.

Education: Danger to Soviets

In order to compete with the Western world in the field of science and industry, which was vitally important for their economic growth and their rearmament program, it was essential for the Soviet to speed up the education of their people, especially in the scientific and technical field. After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more objectivity in scientific inquiry, and put on the shelf some pseudo scientists such as Lysenko [who said that changes in an organism that are due to its environment can be inherited by its offspring]. After all, they had found out early in the game that in the present nuclear age one could not fool around with scientists who tailored their art to the whims of Marxism.

Here we immediately see that the Communists, in escaping one difficulty, were necessarily running into another that may be of even greater dimensions in the long run.

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit their educational processes to the scientific fields, and more and more young men and women are graduating from schools which correspond to our high schools and colleges, and are taking advanced degrees comparable to our degrees of master of arts and doctor of philosophy. Even with all the indoctrination in Communist teaching which they give to their young students, it is impossible to prevent education from developing the critical faculties which every thinking human being possesses.

Education is a most dangerous drug for dictators, and Soviet leaders may be creating a situation in the U.S.S.R. which eventually—not tomorrow but sometime—will cause pressures for further liberalization of political life, still less police coercion, greater economic benefits for the Russian

people, and more effective consultation of the wishes of the governed.

As we review the events in Hungary and Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet orbit, we find another weakness of a dictatorship which many even in the free world did not anticipate.

I suspect that the leaders in the Kremlin felt that the relatively long period during which they had held and indoctrinated their people had inured them to follow and obey without question the dictates from Moscow. For almost 40 years now the Soviet system has controlled the U.S.S.R., and for 10 years or more they have held the satellites under iron discipline.

During all this time the new generations have been indoctrinated year by year in Marxism and Leninism with an overdose of Stalinism. Their bibles have been the writings of Marx, Lenin and, until recently, Stalin. They have been largely cut off from the outside world. Under these circumstances, how could the younger generation—and it is among the youth especially that revolt appears—have known anything about freedom and liberty? How could they aspire to new and different and better things when they never had tasted and enjoyed them?

But, in fact, by their ardent pursuit of freedom, youths in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere are disproving the Kremlin's confident expectation that, as Dostoevski had written, "Tyranny is a habit capable of being developed, and at last becomes a disease. The man and the citizen disappear forever in the tyrant."

"Youth Against Tyranny"

We now find and can take infinite encouragement from the fact that this theory is false. Over recent years it has been the youth who have defected from tyranny to freedom. It has been the youth who have risked their lives and sacrificed them in order to achieve a freedom that they never have enjoyed but which instinctively they yearn for and are ready to die for. You will recall the young Polish aviators who have flown their planes to freedom in the West. There was a group of young men who recently seized a Hungarian plane and brought it to safety in Germany. It was youth and those who toiled with their hands who sparked the movements in Poland and in Hungary, and it was youth and the workers who manned the barricades in the streets of Budapest, as well as soldiers who would no longer serve an alien master.

The gravest danger which a Communist dictatorship faces today is the uprising of youth against tyranny. No amount of Communist indoctrination and Marxist education has served to alter the basic urge to assert the right of free expression.

A few human beings, it is true, can be brain-washed and lose for a time any sense of right and wrong, and the desire to assert themselves. One thing you cannot do is to brain-wash a whole nation.

If we go back through history to the earliest times, we will find that the most distinguishing feature of man is the instinctive revolt against tyranny, the instinctive longing for liberty.

If a dictator fails to recognize and yield to these forces, in time he will fall. And yet if he does answer this call, in the long run the liberties he may grudgingly have given will prove his undoing.

Foregoing are excerpts from an address by Mr. Dulles before the American Association of Land Grant Colleges and State Universities in Washington, D. C., on Nov. 14, 1956.