

CBS REPORTS

"The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles"

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ANNOUNCER:

Tonight, on CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles.
Reporter - Eric Sevareid.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, we all know about the failures
 of American Intelligence. Are there any
 successes we don't know about?

DULLES: Yes, there are a good many. As the President
 said when he came out to say goodbye to me out
 at the new building a few months ago -- he
 remarked: "That your failures are always
 advertised and your successes are unsung."
 There's also a quote, as I remember, I can't
 remember the exact quote, but in a different
 connection. He said something like this.
 I think it was after Cuba. "That success
 has a thousand parents and failure is an orphan."
 Sometimes, you know, I feel a little like an
 orphan, but there have been successes too.
 (MUSIC) ---

ANNOUNCER:

CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles. Here is
CBS NEWS Correspondent Eric Sevareid.

SEVAREID:

Allen Wel^h Dulles is an original in American political history. He, more than any one else, put the United States into the business of massive, peacetime intelligence -- a role forced upon us by the world-wide communist drive, but a role that is still alien in spirit to our open society and alien in practice to the traditional public accountability of our government. Many Americans dislike this role. They have called Mr. Dulles our "master spy." They have accused the Central Intelligence Agency of murder, incitement to revolution, of protecting dictators, of undermining official foreign policy, even, in the case of the U-2 and the Cuban invasion, of usurping presidential powers. In Washington, Mr. Dulles has as many warm admirers, perhaps, more than he has hot opponents. He has known many triumphs - and many tragedies. The Korean War crippled his only son. The Cuban invasion disaster clouded his last year in office. But when he recently retired, President Kennedy awarded him the National Security Medal. Allen Dulles, one-part cloak and dagger expert, two parts elder statesman, has not yet written his C.I.A. autobiography, but he has agreed to share with CBS REPORTS a few electronic memoirs.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you get a chance to talk with him at all?

DULLES: Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him, but I had a very - quite an amusing encounter with him. It took place at the dinner that President Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev, and the President introduced me, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles. You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his reporters, kind of a twinkle in his eye, because he's got a keen -- you must admit, he's got a good sense of humor, and he said: "Oh, yes, I know you. I read your reports."

SEVAREID: Really?

DULLES: Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them legally." And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we get them. We all pay the same agents and we all get the same reports." And, "Well," I said, "That's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?" And then we had a laugh and that ended it.

SEVAREID: Did he mean your public or your private reports?

DULLES: Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind that he read agent reports.

SEVAREID: Do you think it's possible that he has?

DULLES: Every once in a while somebody gets caught, but that game goes both ways.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, the Russian writer and propagandist Ehrenburg once wrote: "That if the master spy, Mr. Dulles, ever got to heaven by anybody's absent-mindedness, you would mine the cloudes and begin to slaughter the angels."

DULLES: Shoot the stars and slaughter the angels.

SEVAREID: Have you ever committed any act of violence in your life?

DULLES: No. Too much emphasis is put by the general public on what they believe is sort of traditional espionage. People rushing around and stealing peoples' papers and getting information in that way. Not very much information is got in that way.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, before we talk about the Central Intelligence Agency directly, I'd like to ask you a little bit about your World War II experiences in Switzerland for the O.S.S. How did you go about setting up that European espionage network?

DULLES:

Eric, I think in a sense, I was lucky in that I had to scrape around myself, and I couldn't call on great corps to come and join me from the United States. Maybe that is a little ambiguous, but I didn't get cluttered up with the bureaucracy of a large organization, because until the frontier opened up two years later, no American could join me there and work there, because no American could come legally into Switzerland. Some would come in by parachuting into France, and then moving over, but they could not work with me, so I had to use my ingenuity as best I could, and try to find people with whom I could work. There was, from the beginning, a group of Germans who never cowed to Hitler, who were opposed to him from the beginning, for ideological and other motives, and working through them, it was very helpful.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that because of your work in World War II, in Switzerland, Washington kept informed on those plots against Hitler's life?

DULLES:

They knew about the last plot. I did have the details of the last and most serious plot that

almost succeeded on the 20th of July, 1944, and a German who was working with Canaris, kept me informed of the details, and he went up, at the risk of his life, because he then was suspect to the Himmler people, and took part in the plot. Before he left, he left me a long memorandum about it, which I reported to Washington a week before the plot took place. It came very close to succeeding. If Hitler, as he went by, he was having -- Hitler was having a briefing at the time. He was up on the East Front in East Prussia, and he was having his regular morning briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had the bomb, was in the room. He was -- had a special message for Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It was a -- you know, one of those long tables that are in barracks with legs at various intervals. He put it down on the leg nearest to where Hitler was. Here was a long map, twenty feet or more long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front, and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being briefed there, and just before the bomb went off,

Hitler went off here to see how the front was, let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him ten feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and he was blown out of the building, but he wasn't seriously wounded. It was a shack -- it was just a barracks there.

SEVAREID: Well, nobody could predict his movements to that fine degree?

DULLES: Not to twenty feet - no.

SEVAREID: It must have been a great disappointment to you and every one else?

DULLES: Well, it was. I was waiting to see whether they'd get hold of the radio that day, and they never got hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the modern revolutions -- one of the great things to note is, have they got control of the radio, and again and again as I've sat back, either when revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you as to whether one side or the other is winning, is who has got control of the air? Who's got control of the radio? I don't know whether you as an expert in this field realize how important that is. Generally, you know, the Intelligence business, I know it well -- generally, you can scoop us.

SEVAREID: It's a terrible thought, you know.

DULLES: Well, our messages have to be coded and decoded, and so forth, and so on, and so that the flash that you get, that you get on the air comes first.

SEVAREID: You apparently knew very early in '45, Mr. Dulles, that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How did you know that?

DULLES: Eric, at that time, I had access to information that was reaching the German Foreign Office, which was smuggled out to me in Switzerland, in the form of certain cables that the German Foreign Office was receiving from various parts of the world. Among those cables were messages from the German Ambassador in Tokyo, the German Air Attache and the German Army Attache. Those cables showed, very clearly, the plight of the Japanese Air Force, and the plight of the Japanese Navy. By the end of '44 and early '45, their position, both air and sea, was becoming almost untenable, far more than the public realized. Word came through to me from certain Japanese sources with whom I was in contact, that the Japanese would like to find a way of negotiating for a surrender. By this time, the negotiations in Italy for the German surrender, were somewhat public property.

SEVAREID: You mean the surrender of those twenty-two German divisions in Italy that you negotiated a week or so before the collapse of the rest of the German Army?

DULLES: Yes - because by that time, the surrender had gone through and the armistice had been signed and put into effect. So the Japanese said: "Well, this is the channel for us." So they turned to me on that. They made quite interesting proposals, and as result of these proposals, I was asked to go up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam Conference, when President Truman met there with Stalin you remember and Churchill. I took to Stimson, at that time, the proposals that had come through this channel with regard to an early Japanese surrender.

SEVAREID: Do you think that the dropping of those first atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary in terms of bringing about the Japanese surrender?

DULLES: Well, that's an awful hard question to answer. I have the deepest respect for the men who made that decision. I do feel that there was a failure to interpret available intelligence as to the extent of the Japanese collapse, and their inability really effectively to carry on the war.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, during the last war when you were in Switzerland, isn't it true that you used to meet with Dr. Carl Jung, the psychiatrist, to try to figure out how Hitler and the Germans would act and react to certain situations?

DULLES: I did go to him very often, and I found his judgments as to what a man like Hitler, who was an introvert, I believe. I'm not a psychologist, but I -- would do, as compared to what Mussolini, who was an extra-extrovert would do. At that time, when I was talking with him and we were getting toward the end of the war, and one of the questions I was interested in was, "Would Hitler hole up in the mountains?" You know, in the famous but non-existent redoubt - and carry on the war indefinitely? Or would he commit suicide, or what he would do? Jung was very, very good on that, and also very good on many other matters.

SEVAREID: Do we make any progress or even any attempts to do that with a man like Khrushchev? Any long-range psychoanalysis?

DULLES: Yes, there's quite a lot of study being made of Khrushchev's actions and reactions. I'm, myself, somewhat of a disciple of Pavlov, as an interpreter

of what Khrushchev does. You remember the theory of Pavlov is that if you train a dog to respond to three bells -- you open the door and you ring three bells, and you give him sugar, and then you do that for a month, and then all of a sudden, you open the door and the three bells, instead of sugar, you beat him over the back with a stick. The dog's puzzled. The dog doesn't know what's happened, and you vary this business, and so forth, and pretty soon, the dog's gone pretty well crazy.

SEVAREID: Eventually, it reduces the animal and perhaps the human being too?

DULLES: Well, does a human being react? We spend all our time trying to decide what does Khrushchev mean? Today, it's co-existence and everything, and then the next day, there's something else. Take the breaking of the test ban and starting to test. What day does he choose for that? He can choose among days -- he chooses the day of the opening of the unaligned nations conference in Belgrade. Khrushchev thinks, this is the thing. This shows I'm strong. This shows I don't worry about what you unaligned nations are going to decide here, or do here. I'm going to test. I know you're going to protest, so protest.

SEVAREID: Well, in the Pavlovian theory, the animal, and we think now of human beings reacting to communist propaganda instead of the animals, is reduced, eventually, to confusion and finally to apathy.

DULLES: Apathy or insanity -- whatever you like of it, yes. For example, in May of 1960, you recall that Khrushchev brutally broke off the conference in Paris with President Eisenhower and Macmillan and the French, at a time when he had known for years that the U-2 was flying, and yet he used this as an excuss in truly Pavlovian manner, so that all this rage and so forth, and so on -- that was fabricated. He wanted to destroy the conference and he took that method of doing it. His actions at the U.N., when he took off his shoe and beat the table, and certain of his other actions there.

SEVAREID: Can you say anything about the effectiveness of those U-2 flights over Russia? Were they worth it?

DULLES:

Well, I would like on that, refer to the statement that the Secretary of Defense made in the hearings that was published at the time, in which he indicated that -- I don't remember his exact words, but generally, that most valuable information had been obtained with regard to missiles, aircraft, other military installations, which were obtainable by no other means, is that some statement of record that he made at that time.

SEVARIED:

Is there not a real possibility that satellites could not get this kind of information in spite of Russian secrecy?

DULLES:

That I'll have to leave to the Department of Defense to answer. It's perfectly true that the Soviets consider that their ability to maintain great zones of security and secrecy is considered by them as a major asset. They've said this very frankly. They've said, "We're not going to let you get in there, because that is of vital importance to our national security and we're going to keep it. That's the attitude they're now showing at the Geneva Conference and there we are -- I mean -- we're up against that -- and that is why, when the U-2 can come along, they felt so sensitive about it, because a method had

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been found for overcoming the restrictions they had placed and the security they felt they had.

SEVAREID: Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Dulles, about the Pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?

DULLES: I never shared some of the public and maybe of the press criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell and---until after we---the agency had talked with him and had made their report how well he had done, I think on the whole, he handled himself properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the aviation-navigation side and to expect of him---to make of him a great undercover agent was impossible, one of these two professions, or a fine aviator---one of these two professions took all a man's time---all a man's concentration and thought and I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot, Mr. Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there any way you can have a man sign a contract to commit suicide?

DULLES: No---no---you couldn't---first place, it would be ineffective of course. In the second place, I think

it would be immoral and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into a situation where you think that death is better than what awaits you, use it."

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, about the foulup on all the explanations of the U-2 affair when it first happened. The government went through a lot of agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it necessary that we go through all that? Do we have to explain? I remember the British had a frogman who disappeared in a British harbor near a Russian ship. There were great accusations and suspicions of espionage on their part, but the British government---as far as I remember, said nothing about it at all and the matter finally died away. Much as it would harm the interests of a man looking for news, can't Washington operate the same way?

DULLES:

I doubt whether, in the two situations to which you probably refer, one the U-2 and the other Cuba probably, too --one could have ever rested on the answer "NO COMMENT".

SEVAREID:

You could not?

DULLES: I doubt whether you could have. It seems to me it would have raised an even more serious problem ~~that~~ the problem of disclosing intelligence operations, namely the problem of responsibility in government.

SEVAREID: How do you mean?

DULLES: Well, I mean this. Do we have a kind of a government here that would let---say, me as then Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane, even seventy thousand feet high over Russia? Is that a responsible kind of government? Or mount an expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority and ~~the~~ American people or the world began to think that we had a government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval by the highest authority. There might be a feeling of uneasiness, ~~that~~ there are some people here who could do things that might lead to serious international complications without knowledge at the highest level. So could the President have ---have declined knowledge of these situations, or said, "I won't say anything about them."

SEVAREID: Well, doesn't this bring up the question then, as to whether there ought to be a formal watchdog committee in Congress to look at the C.I.A. constantly and what it does?

DULLES: We have had from ---for many years a Sub-Committee of the appropriations committee of the House and the Senate, that went over our entire budget, to whom we disclosed any information they wanted.

SEVAREID: Would you inform those men in advance of any consequential operation?

DULLES: Certainly.

SEVAREID: You would feel obliged to?

DULLES: Have you forgotten, Eric, have you forgotten that after the U-2 incident, Clarence Cannon, got up and I'll send that to you---Clarence Cannon got up in the House ---May 15, I think it was, or thereabouts when this thing broke and he said, "I knew all about this. We appropriated the money for this. Our Committee was told about this." Well, I don't want to quote all his words, but it was a---it was quite a thrilling speech and when he got through, he---the house rang with applause. Now, you ought to look at that, and

that's an answer and if we told the House Committee about the U-2, which was the most secret thing we had and the best kept secret for five years of any other operation that I've ever known, obviously we told these committees of other things. We told them everything they wanted to know.

SEVAREID: At any time, have any of those Congressmen so informed, of highly secret operations, broken secrecy?

DULLES: Never sir. Never.

ANNOUNCER:

CBS REPORTS - The Hot And Cold Wars Of Allen Dulles - will continue, immediately after this message.

COMMERCIAL:

ANNOUNCER:

CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Cars Of Allen Dulles - continues.
Here, again, is Eric Sevareid.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, there's been much criticism that we took much too long to recognize the danger of Castro and tried to do something about it?

DULLES: Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly, we got disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but what were you going to do about it? Castro was in there, with the great support of the majority of the people, and if we had planned any expedition at an earlier date, that might not have been of any more success than the one that we did after rather mature preparations.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you think the central basic mistake was?

DULLES: The President has said that he assumed responsibility for the action taken. That was his own initiative. In matters of that kind, where they wish the director of Central Intelligence Agency to assume responsibility, he's always prepared to do it and I have never discussed the Cuban operation. I think

I'd rather limit my remarks to pointing out that

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there were certain factors which bore upon the timing of any operation if it was carried out, namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, that MIG's were in crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if these trained pilots got back and these MIG's became operative, the possibility of any invasion by a Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be greatly -- the dangers and the problems would be greatly increased.

SEVAREID:

But what about the philosophical and the legal argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral and illegal?

DULLES:

Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a question. Here, you had a group of fine young men -- these Cubans -- formed the brigade that went into Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity to try to restore a free government in their country, who were ready to risk their lives and have done so, whether they should have been told that they would get no sympathy, no support, no aid from the United States: That's the question -- I just pose that question. I don't ask you to answer it, but I'll answer your question with another question.

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SEVAREID: Is it true, that we did not inform the Cuban underground in Cuba of the date -- the place and the timing of that landing?

DULLES: Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we informed very few people when we started the invasion of France in June of '44. You can't do that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of the time and place of the invasion. To do so would have been informing Castro and it would have been catastrophe for the invading force.

SEVAREID: We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?

DULLES: Complete surprise was achieved as regards the place of landing.

SEVAREID: But not timing, because that was published...

DULLES: No, they did not know the exact timing. They had been crying invasion for weeks and months before, and as you note, they're even now crying that invasions are being planned.

SEVAREID: It's been said in one of these books about the C.I.A., Mr. Dulles, that the C.I.A. people refused to put into effect the Presidential order to keep out all former Batista supporters from that

DULLES: Well, it's not true at all, Eric. It was an absolute rule that no Bastistianas were to be accepted. Now, there may have been, in fifteen hundred people, there's always a possibility you make one or two mistakes, a few mistakes, but nobody was knowingly selected by the Cuban selectors of the members of the brigade who favored Batista.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, after the failure of the Cuban invasion, there were predictions and requests that inside the C.I.A., operations and intelligence be separated as functions. What has happened in that area?

DULLES: There was a committee set up by the President to look into all phases of the operation. I won't deny that the conclusion was reached and it was unanimous, that this operation took on a character that -- particularly in its latter phases, which exceeded the scope of the normal activities of the C.I.A., and I agreed with that -- I agreed with that.

SEVAREID: You think the C.I.A. got too deeply into that affair?

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DULLES:

Well, I feel that operations of the C.I.A. should be of a character if they get into operations, and that is up to the Executive, if they get into operations, those operations should be of a nature that could be kept quiet and be of the concealed type.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, what about this whole problem of briefing Presidential candidates on very secret matters? How, this came up in Mr. Nixon's book recently, when he said that "Mr. Kennedy, having been briefed during the campaign by you on the Cuban operation, took advantage of that and took a very strong line against Castro in his campaign speeches, while he -- Mr. Nixon -- also knowing what was going on, felt he was obliged to take a different line -- that he was put in a bad position." In your public statement, at the time, you said that your briefings of Kennedy did not cover and actual Cuban operation.

DULLES:

As far as this last incident you've mentioned, I don't think there's any use going into that any further. The statements have been made -- there is an honest misunderstanding and I don't propose to go into that any further. I think,

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get the briefing of candidates a little better organized.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if I could change the subject somewhat -- Walter Lippmann, who's not uninformed about Washington, said on one of these programs in fact, "That your brother Secretary of State Dulles paid rather little attention as such, because he had his own State Department or foreign service," namely your Intelligence service. What would be your reaction to that statement.

DULLES: Well, I don't know. I know you're a very accurate quoter of others, but I wouldn't agree with that.

SEVAREID: Well, wouldn't it be a fair inference that since you were his brother -- after all, he would give an undue importance to your information, or be prejudiced in favor of it over that of his own State Department.

DULLES: I don't know. It might be just the opposite. You can't tell. I do not think that he did so. And we didn't always agree. He had strong feelings and sometimes I had strong feelings. On our busy philosophy of life and approach to the world, yes, we agreed, but every once in a while, we would have disagreements, too.

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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, I have found, personally, that overseas, a good many of our ambassadors and ministers express some irritation about the activities of C.I.A. people in their area?

DULLES: That's correct. There have been cases where a diplomat in a foreign country has looked at the picture somewhat differently than it has been looked at in Washington.

SEVAREID: Are you saying, Mr. Dulles, there have been no cases abroad where the activities of C.I.A. have conflicted with our official State Department foreign policy in those countries?

DULLES: There have been none.

SEVAREID: None at all?

DULLES: None at all.

SEVAREID: One of the new books about the C.I.A., Mr. Dulles, makes a claim that in Iran a few years ago, at the time of Mossadegh, the C.I.A. people spend literally millions of dollars, hiring people to riot in the streets and do other things, to get rid of Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about that?

DULLES: Well, I can say that the statement that we spent many dollars doing that is utterly false.

SEVAREID: There's been a general argument in the Left, or liberal press writers in this country...

DULLES: Yes.

SEVAREID: That the C.I.A. people have sort of automatically tended to support very extreme right wing groups in foreign countries because of an obsession with communism, and have therefore set back progressive democratic possibilities in foreign countries.

DULLES: I think just the opposite is the case. If you go over a situation like the situation in Korea and many others I could cite, I would say that by and large we were quicker than others to recognize the dangers in these situations. Because I have often felt in many countries that the strongest antagonists of the communists, and those who knew them best were often -- not always -- but often, some of the socialist leaders.

SEVAREID: The story of C.I.A. agents supposedly encouraging the revolting French generals was apparently

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encouraged, or at least believed, by some French government officials at fairly high level. How do you account for that?

DULLES:

Well, I don't know whether they really believed it, but it might have been convenient at that time not to deny it. But any time a revolution happens anywhere, the Soviet will begin by saying the C.I.A. did it. Now, if that's believed, that's bad. I have collected -- over the years I was there as director, I collected literally thousands of items of Soviet propaganda, just along these lines, and now books are being published that say that we got rid of Farouk in Egypt - probably that was a good thing if one had done it. We didn't -- we -- put in Nasser too, which we didn't do. That we've done all kinds of things in various parts of the world and it's hard to deal with it. You just say it's not true, but here it appears. It's repeated in books that seem to come from reputable sources. I don't know. I think maybe you can give me some good advice as to what I could do as an individual, because I know these things aren't true.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, on this whole question of dealing with communist tactics around the world, there are those, as you know, who think we would be stronger and more effective if we followed the so-called "passive," or "soft line." That is, never try anything like an invasion of Cuba, or an undeclared war in Vietnam and not test the bombs, whatever the Russians do, a kind of leadership by moral example. If this were followed, what do you think would happen?

DULLES: Disaster. I don't think you can meet this form of evil by merely passive resistance. You recall well the days of the Thirties? What happened when Hitler first denounced the Treaty of Versailles? Withdrew from the disarmament conference? Invaded the Rhineland? Took over Austria? Invaded Czechoslovakia? A lot of cheeks were turned to Hitler then, and look what happened -- almost happened to the world? Do we want to repeat that sort of thing again? I don't think we do. I think you must meet aggression, open or covert, and you must meet it where it appears, whether in Berlin or Laos, or South Vietnam.

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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some Europeans, Jean Monnet, for example, say that Americans are much too obsessed about Russian communism. Do you think this is true?

DULLES: I think that is true, in a sense, and not true in another sense. I think that the one grave peril that we face is the communist peril. That is the only peril to our freedoms, to our institutions, to everything that we hold dear. Now, I think that it is true that the communists practice on us and on other countries towards which they're directing their attack, they try on us what I would call the overload theory. They will start a lot of petty annoyances in various parts of the world, without knowing whether they are going to seriously push them ahead, in order to divert our attention, maybe, from the major points of their attack.

SEVAREID: Could you give any concrete examples of what has turned out to be minor or major?

DULLES: Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let's say in the Congo. They went in there

with great fanfare. They supported Gizenga. They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow, and it looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at take-over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn't work out that way at all. Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat a pretty hasty retreat.

SEVAREID: Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or just a tactical operation?

DULLES: No, I think that's a serious threat. I consider South Vietnam of a major importance, and not just one of the overload theory type of operations.

ANNOUNCER:

CBS REPORTS continues in just a moment with Mr. Dulles on the subject of communist aims and communist conflicts.

COMMERCIAL

ANNOUNCER

CBS REPORTS - The Hot And Cold Wars Of Allen Dulles - continues.
Here, again, is Eric Sevareid.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, when you and others talk about a Russian wish to dominate the world, what exactly do you mean? Is it in terms of Russian national power over the world, the Communist philosophy and system over the world--- exactly what?

DULLES: They have several facets to their policy. They believe, and some of them believe it fanatically, that Communism is the wave of the future, is the form of economic life that is best adapted to push a country forward. They believe that inevitably, through economic pressures, and the like, more and more countries will adopt Communism. But they also believe that governments don't generally fall. They---you get along better if you push them.

SEVAREID: How could they dominate the world in which this country, with all its power, existed?

DULLES: Well, they would believe that if they could take over enough of the rest of the world, then they could encircle us, and then, eventually, we would have to either adopt their system, or face an eventual war possibly. They don't believe that

the United States is going communist in the next decade or two, anything of that kind, obviously.

I think they feel that there is a strong tide in the world, today, to get the rascals out. I mean, take Latin America, no matter what the government is, there are a lot of disaffected people, and where you do not have, as you do not have in many countries of the world, sort of organized party system, all of the disaffected tend to gather together under the communist banner, or led by the communists, because they're the best organized, to lead a movement, get the rascals out. Now, maybe on some cases, they are rascals. In a good many cases, they're not rascals. They are just in and have power, and from the communist point of view, become the rascals.

SEVAREID:

Don't they already have perhaps too much on their plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia, or China--- all Communist systems and states. May it not be that a pluralistic Communism around the world would be anti-Moscow?

DULLES:

That's quite true, but difficulties at home have rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure, sometimes has pushed them on. I believe that the splits, the fissures, the differences between various communist countries, is today one of the greatest pre-occupations that Khrushchev has. After all, he said what he calls the Socialist world, if the world becomes all Socialist, they'll all live -- lie down in peace, and live together. Well, that isn't what's happened, and when you see little Albania, practically throwing out the Russian representation there, both civil and military, that is really something. Why they went, hard to tell, obviously, at that time they felt that they would have to use force to stay, and they didn't want another Hungary on their hands at that moment. Hungary - in a country which was not contiguous to their own. But anyway, they got out. The Chinese thing is, obviously, very serious. And it was they, I believe, although the experts differ on this, I rather believe it was they that did the acts that resulted in the withdrawal of the Russian technicians. Now, I don't look forward to revolution in the -- in the communist world.

A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I have a feeling that some of the younger generation of Russians, as they learn more about what goes on in the rest of the world, are going to bring great pressure to get more freedom. They'll want to hear your radio and see your television. They'll want to learn what goes on in the rest of the world. They'll begin to see the---the basic falsity of the whole history of Russia. They're having a terrible time now in getting out their histories. What do you say about Stalin? Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956, came out the great speech of Khrushchev's--- denegrating Stalin, but they never dared let that speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little parts of it and they had to go back to the attack now--- that was at the Twentieth Party Congress---but the Twenty-second Party Congress, they had to go back to the attack, because they hadn't gotten over to the people.

SEVAREID:

Wasn't it your agency that got a hold of that speech originally?

DULLES: I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev charged me with it at one time. You'll find it in---in one of his statements back two or three years ago.

SEVAREID: Well, you have to rank that rather high among the accomplishments.

DULLES: I think it was one of the really important--- accomplishments.

SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of Communism inside the United States is not---has not been under your jurisdiction, but the F.B.I., but what are your feelings about it? Is it a serious matter?

DULLES: Well, I think that due to the vigilance of the F.B.I. and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's probably much less of an internal menace here with us than it is with many other countries. I think that the frustration of the American citizen and of the citizens of other countries who are told, "Here's this great menace. You must do something to meet this menace." And yet the ordinary man, the man in the street, the man and woman, he doesn't know how he can contribute. He agrees as to the judgment that there is a menace, that our society is menaced by commuism, but what's he

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to do, and that has resulted in certain aberrations that I don't need to define, because you and those who are listening and hearing and seeing will probably know what I have in mind, to these aberrations and I think a great many innocent people without realizing the harm they are doing; they get led astray by this. Well, now, there's certain things one can do. In the first place, we ought to learn what we can about it. We can do it by understanding that our great strength is showing that our system, our free system is more efficient and more effective than the communist system, and we all, on these issues, we all rally together in support of the actions our government has taken strongly to defend our positions where they may be threatened by communism and the positions of the free world, whether it's Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may be.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of your recipe for the average American? Be informed. Believe in your country, and as the late Elmer Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."

DULLES:

I'd like to leave it at that.

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