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Danger! Spies at Work in Pitiless Struggle

Ethics, Morals Don't Mix With Espionage

(Second of Three-Part Series, "Eyes in the Dark," on Pages 10C, 11C)

Eyes in the Dark

Part One—Soldiers of the Cold War

While talk continues of disarmament and peace, the major nations of the world continue to wage a silent, secret, life-and-death war of secret agents, espionage and counter-espionage. To the men involved, it is war. The penalty for mistakes is death, or long prison terms and, sometimes, denunciation by the very nation they serve.

By Bob Rhodes

There's no such word as peace in the vocabulary of a spy.

To a spy, peace is war—a deadly war which surrounds him 24 hours a day. It's a war without bullets, a war which knows no truce, a war which leaves no margin for error.

Even today, with the world quietly balanced on a tightrope of cautious peace, the spies go stealthily about their business. They're the invisible men used as pieces in the gigantic chess game they call espionage.

Invisible they are because they look like the guy next door, because they're just another fellow who works in the plant. The only way they can succeed is if nobody notices them.

Events of the past month point out two things: One, they don't always succeed. Two, and probably most important, the espionage business is at its peak today.

In the past month the Russians discovered one of the wiliest post-war pieces of espionage when they uncovered a tunnel between East and West Berlin. The tunnel apparently was being used for wiretapping purposes against the Russians.

Then, there was the celebrated frogman case in Portsmouth Harbor during the visit to England of Russia's Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Leader Nikita Khrushchev. All anyone can do is guess what the British skin-diver was doing in the water underneath the cruiser which brought B. and K. to England. The skin-diver can't tell—he hasn't been found yet and is "presumed" to be dead.

Those are two of the cases which failed. But the failures run a poor second to the successes. Intelligence agencies of practically every country have their spies spread throughout the world, searching out secrets the other side has and protecting the secrets their own side owns.

Pulling the strings in this cloak-and-dagger world are the top-level intelligence authorities from each country. They manipulate their spies as deftly as generals deploying their troops in wartime. They have to be careful. The safety of their nation depends on their success.

In the Cold War strategy, everybody knows the spies are there—someplace. In the military, in government, in manufacturing plants. Wherever they are they're picking up the things their country wants to know, and they're sending that information back to be added to the files.

Only Hear the Failures

Although everybody knows the spies are there, nobody knows who or how effective they are. The only time a country can find out is when one of the espionage agents is caught, or a spy ring is broken up, or somebody gets fed up and decides to spill what's going on to the authorities.

Those are the intangibles. Espionage circles work on a policy of perfection. When there's one slip-up, that part of the game is over. The spy has lost his usefulness, indeed perhaps he has lost his life or been put in prison, and the country for which he was working has some explaining to do.

Take the frogman case, for instance. Bulganin and Khrushchev were on a "good will" mission to Great Britain. They arrived aboard the Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze, which pulled into a pier in Portsmouth Harbor.

A retired British naval diver, Lionel Crabb, twice-decorated for his exploits in World War II, and a mysterious "Mr. Smith" registered in a small Portsmouth Harbor hotel the day before B. and K. arrived. The early morning after the two Soviets arrived Crabb and Smith left their hotel. This was April 19.

Later that morning, according to the Russian embassy, a frogman was spotted diving and surfacing in the vicinity of the Soviet cruiser, one of the newest in the Russian fleet. The next day Smith returned to the hotel alone, paid the bill for both men and left. No one



(AP Photo)

RUSSIANS examine elaborate wire-tapping equipment discovered in a secret tunnel which had been built under their sector in Berlin from the nearby American sector.

along with others, be discreet, agile, rugged, daring, have a good memory, be able to bluff.

Those are only some of the qualities. If a candidate lacks any of them he's turned down as a poor risk. It's a calculated business, spying is.

Once the spy gets to work he's on his own and can dream up his own variations. No two spies work exactly the same. It's like asking a group of chefs how they make spaghetti sauce.

The spying world isn't made up only of the professionals. The amateurs do a devastating job besides. These are the shills put to work by the professionals. These are the ones who display the tendencies lumped under the overall title of "security risks."

The amateurs are amateurs only because they have had no formal spy training. But they know how to get their information. They work on the inside, where they have easy access to top secret material.

There are many reasons why they turn to committing espionage. Sometimes the professional spy will blackmail a worker into divulging secrets. Sex perverts are considered easy targets. Often it's merely a case of money—if the price is right some people don't mind selling their souls.

There are other reasons—and the professional spy knows all the weak points. Any employe is vulnerable who holds a position where the information to which he has access is desired by the enemy. Some of the most famous cases in spy history center around just such amateurs.

Photography, however, is an essential. Agents "borrow" secret papers, photograph them, then return the papers. If the papers were found to be stolen, their value then would be lessened. The object is to get the information without anyone knowing it has been gotten.

Photographic negatives can be reduced to the size of a pin, pasted on a postcard in a pre-arranged spot, carried in the sole of a shoe, hidden almost anyplace. Any practical device is used to get the information from its source back to headquarters.

The Second Largest

The U.S. spy system is considered to be the second largest in the world. First is Russia. Allen W. Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, credited Russia with the largest last Oct. 10, but he said the Soviets don't always use their information wisely.

He did say, however, that despite the expanded U.S. system which has grown up since 1940, the Soviet barriers make it "almost more difficult" to get intelligence information from the Communists than it was to get data on the Germans during World War II.

Just last February a Russian intelligence officer testified the Reds have two spy networks operating in the U.S., one working out of Washington, the other out of the United Nations. And he said that 85-90 per cent of the Tass news agency reporters around the world were Soviet espionage agents.

When Sen. William E. Jenner (R-Ind.) was chairman of the Senate Internal Subcommittee, his committee issued a report charging that thousands of diplomatic, political, military, scientific and economic secrets of the U.S. have been stolen by Soviet agents in our government.

"Policies and programs laid down by members of the Soviet conspiracy are still in effect within our government and constitute a continuing hazard to our national security," the report said.

The report said Soviet agents work themselves into important posts within the U.S. government. Once they get a foothold they make it easier for other agents to slip through. They use each others names for references, hire each other, promote each other, raise the pay of each other, transfer each other from bureau to bureau and department to department.

Once inside, the Communist agents help to guide the research on which American policies are set, write speeches for Cabinet officers, influence Congressional investigations, help draft laws and manipulate administrative reorganizations.

Some Do Get Caught

Every once in a while, fortunately, somebody gets caught. Six years ago one of the biggest cases of espionage was uncovered and two of the Soviet agents involved were executed—Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. It was their crime against the U.S. government which was called "worse than murder" by Judge Irving Kaufman.

The Rosenberg case was filled with now-familiar names. Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the physicist; Harry Gold, the 28-year-old bio-chemistry student who had worked 10 years as a Soviet spy in the U.S.; David Greenglass, the 19-year-old brother of Ethel Rosenberg who testified against his sister and her husband.

They were all in it together. Greenglass was in the Army and had been sent first to Oak Ridge, Tenn., then to Los Alamos, N.M., as an assistant foreman. He testified at the Rosenberg trial that in spite of the

(AP Photo)

DEATH was the price Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, above, paid for their part in a Red spy ring aimed at the Los Alamos atomic center. Breaking the ring was considered a major victory for U.S. counter-espionage forces.

elaborate security regulations at the Los Alamos bomb proving ground spying was no trouble at all for one on the inside "with the run of the area" as he had. He said he simply walked around, observed, asked questions and remembered.

Greenglass got his orders from Julius Rosenberg while the 19-year-old was home on furlough in 1945. Rosenberg told him what to look for at Los Alamos so he would know what information to bring back. Later that year Greenglass gave Julius 12 pages of atom description. Ethel typed it into form.

Gold, meanwhile, was sent to Los Alamos to see Fuchs and Greenglass. Greenglass turned over information to both Gold and Fuchs. When Gold submitted the information to the Soviet vice counsul, the vice consul is supposed to have commented: "Excellent."

Both Rosenbergs denied everything when they went on trial after their arrests in 1950. But Greenglass turned state's evidence and brought out the whole story. For doing so, Greenglass got off with a 15-year sentence. The Rosenbergs were given the death sentence and died in the electric chair on June 19, 1953.

Gold is now serving a 30-year prison term while Fuchs, arrested and tried in Great Britain, got off with only 14 years.

The Rosenberg case was a major victory for the U.S. counterspy program. But what could have turned into another major victory ended up in a jangle of frustration for U.S. officials when the convictions of two spies were thrown out of court.

That was in the case of Judith Coplon and her fellow conspirator, Valentine A. Gubitchev. They were convicted twice on two separate indictments—one for the deliberate theft of government secrets and the other for conspiracy to commit espionage.

On the first charge they were sentenced to 40 months to 10 years and on the second they were sentenced to a flat 15 years. And although the U.S. Court of Appeals called both convictions just, the convictions were thrown out of court because of technicalities. The theft convictions were thrown out because the government had used wiretaps in obtaining evidence and wiretaps at that time were illegal. The conspiracy conviction was thrown out because the FBI had failed to get an arrest warrant before seizing the two convicted spies.

Gubitchev was permitted to accept deportation to escape his prison term—this was before the convictions were thrown out. But Miss Coplon has since gone free, gotten married and had a baby. The Justice Department said there probably will be no further attempts to bring the convictions against Miss Coplon back in—it would be too hard to make them stick, officials figure.

There are other famous cases, such as the celebrated Alger Hiss instance in which he was convicted in 1950. But the government didn't get him on a treason charge. He was convicted of perjury in denying he passed government information to Whittaker Chambers, a Soviet espionage agent.

And the case of Harry Dexter White, former assistant secretary of the treasury who played a major role in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. He was named as the one who gave information to a Communist spy ring during World War II. But three days after he testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee that he was not and never had been a Communist he died of a heart attack.

Then there was Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet diplomat in Australia, who denounced Communism and sought political asylum in Australia. He brought papers with him which were said to expose a Soviet spy ring. The Russians broke off diplomatic relations with Australia over the incident.

The methods of espionage and spying and spies have come a long way from sex-baiting as employed by perhaps the most famous spy of all time—Mata Hari. A dancer—they'd call her an exotic today—she sold herself for war secrets during World War I and was paid off by the Germans for her efforts.

Her biggest coup was when she was able to find out about the British tanks—a highly-kept secret at that time. The Englishman who told her about them took the easy way out when he found what she had done—he committed suicide.

No Raving Beauty

The legend that she was a raving beauty while she was doing her cloak and dagger work is strictly legend. She was well past 40, and those who remember her say she looked almost common.

The stories about her death are as fascinating as her exploits as a spy. One story has it that she was told there would be nothing but blanks in the guns on the firing squad. The volley would be fired, then she would be whisked away. But her execution went off without incident.

Another story, equally as unfounded, credits her with standing in front of the firing squad in a heavy fur coat. Just as the men on the firing line raised their guns, the story goes, Mata Hari stripped off her coat to let the soldiers fire at her naked body.

The stories are typical, mainly because the workings of espionage, spying, cloak-and-dagger—call it what you will—never fully are brought to the surface. They're kept in the shadows, just like the people who make their living in the business keep in the shadows.

It's part of the game. They play to win. In espionage, it's too expensive to lose.

Klaus Fuchs, British atomic scientist involved in the Rosenberg spy ring, drew a 14-year prison sentence for his actions.

Judith Coplon, twice convicted of stealing U.S. secrets, was freed on technicalities and probably never will be tried again.

Alger Hiss, a former top U.S. official, was convicted of lying when he denied ever passing government information to a Red agent.

Whittaker Chambers, an admitted former Communist spy, is the man who said he received U.S. secrets from Alger Hiss.

Director of the FBI, through his forcefulness, initiative and managerial ability, to have developed his agency into a model organization of its kind," the report said. "We are confident that in the FBI we have a most effective counter-intelligence service."

The espionage system, as set up in the U.S., has been dealing effectively with intelligence and counter-intelligence matters. But, as the commission pointed out in its report, there still remains more to be done to bring intelligence and espionage activities in this country up to "an acceptable level."

For instance, the commission mentioned the security setup on employment within the intelligence agencies themselves: "One flaw in the present system seems to be the absence of a general plan for a periodic review of the security status of every person after employment in intelligence activities to guard against the possibility that some employe who was completely dependable and honorable when starting work might have changed character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien blandishments or some personal weakness such as strong drink or sexual perversion."

Daily Contact Enough

In other employment, the commission said a common practice is to remove security risks from classified jobs and put them on jobs—in the same plant—which aren't of a secret nature.

"Because he has daily personal contact with employes engaged in sensitive production and enjoys freedom of movement within the plant, such an employe still would have access to material and information of great value to a potential enemy of this country."

In both intelligence and counter-intelligence work, the basic factor is that those people involved must be of the highest character. But who knows when you can trust whom, and for how long? A supposed loyal government employe can be transferring all top secrets with which he is entrusted to agents of the enemy; an intelligence agent himself can decide to sell himself out to the enemy. The espionage system is only as efficient as the stability of those who operate it.

Take the fascinating Burgess-Maclean story, for instance. Here were two British foreign officers, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, who were veterans of diplomatic assignments in Washington. Burgess, who had been with the British Secret Service, was second secretary of the British Embassy in Washington and Maclean had been head of the American department of the British Foreign Office.

Yet in May, 1951, these two diplomats, apparently above the slightest tinge of suspicion, slipped across the English channel on a small steamer and disappeared. For five years it was only a guess where they could have gone—the guess was Moscow. And with them, the guess continued, went the secrets they knew.

Last February the pair turned up again—in Moscow. In Red Square there, they talked for a few brief moments with newspapermen, handed them a prepared statement, then returned to their retreat behind the Iron Curtain.

In their prepared statement they said they had been Communists for years and had fled to Russia "to make our contribution to a policy aimed at achieving greater mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the West." They criticized U.S. foreign policy, denied they were secret agents but would give no hint as to what they were doing now.

Nonetheless, they had defected, as the phrase goes, to the Communists. Trusted enough by the British government which sent them into important jobs in the U.S., they had become turncoats—and carried their classified information with them.

But Burgess and Maclean were only diplomats. Their case is far overshadowed by Otto John, the man whose job as chief of German Internal Security made him the J. Edgar Hoover of Western Germany. His main job was to safeguard Western Germany from Communist infiltration.

'Gone for a Quick Beer'

The world was shocked when, on July 20, 1954, the news came out: John had climbed in his car after announcing he was just "going down for a quick beer" and had driven quickly across the East-West boundary in Berlin to join forces with the Soviets. Shortly after, he began a series of Communistic broadcasts to his former countrymen.

John's previous exploits had earned him the plaudits and respect of many top authorities in the West. He had been a vigorous anti-Nazi during World War II, had even been involved in a bomb plot against Hitler in 1944, had helped to prepare evidence for the war trials of German generals. His anti-Nazi record helped him get his security job in West Germany—indeed, the U.S. even backed his appointment.

The noted columnist, Victor Riesel, who was blinded several weeks ago when an assailant threw acid in his eyes, called John "a man to whom the people of all free nations owe a vote of gratitude." In that column, which appeared in September, 1953, Riesel said John "made it possible for the German chancellor to roll up a powerful pro-American victory" and added that John had virtually wiped out both the Communist and Nazi undergrounds in Germany.

Ten months later John had done the turncoat act. And since then he has worked to undermine public confidence in the West Germany government. Only five weeks before he fled to the Russian zone, John had been to the United States where he had conferences with J. Edgar Hoover and Allan Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Just as surprising as his disappearance into the Soviet zone was his appearance last December. He surrendered himself to West German authorities, said he had been drugged and carried off to East Berlin.

But the court did not believe him. "There is strong suspicion that John not only had treasonable relations with the Communists but also actually betrayed state secrets," the court said as it ordered John to jail to await trial. He will face charges of treason.

That's what the U.S., and the other Western countries, are up against. That's why the espionage system of today has to be of the highest calibre. The commission, in its report last year to the government, made note of that:

"Security measures adopted by the Communists have been provokingly conceived and boldly employed," the report stated. "They have been quite effective in comparison with our security measures, which have permitted the collection of vital secrets in this country with relative ease.

"The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through concentration on the prime target we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get it.

"Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities."

That's the case for espionage.

Tomorrow: The Glamor Is Gone.



(AP Photos)

DR. OTTO JOHN, left, was West Germany's security chief until he defected to the Communists. He and a friend were stopped at Sandkrug Bridge, below, and warned by guard they were entering the Red sector but laughed and told the guard they were going to hospital at right, rear.

(AP Photos)

WHAT SECRETS British Diplomat Donald MacLean, shown above with his wife, Linda, took with him when he deserted to Russia can only be guessed. At right, Mrs. MacLean holds their daughter, Melinda.

DIPLOMAT Guy Francis Burgess, left, also deserted to the Reds with MacLean. Both were key men in British foreign service.



Eyes in the Dark

Last of a Series: The Big Gamble.

The stakes are high, both for the spy and the nations involved. But there's no set pattern of operation. Some are chosen because they're strong. Others are forced to spy because they're weak. They may be men high in government, your next-door neighbor or a fellow-worker in your plant or office.

By Bob Rhodes



RELATIONS between Russia and Australia were broken off after Vladimir Petrov, a Red diplomat, exposed a Communist spy ring.



MATA HARI, the legendary World War I spy who sold herself to get British secrets was one of the few "glamorous-type" spies.

What kind of spy would you make?

Supposing you were put into a bedroom and were told the room had been used several days ago by a man your government wanted to find.

The departed guest had left behind 26 items—articles of clothing, newspaper clippings; a timetable, several other objects. You're told to examine those objects carefully. Then you've got four minutes to tell what kind of a man your target is.

If that sounds like an obscure test, it's meant to. That's only one of the many examinations a candidate must take if he wants to be a spy for the U.S. government. At the end of three days of such tests in the special espionage school, the government has a pretty sound idea as to how the candidate would react to the conditions he would meet as a spy.

When the safety of the country may depend upon the efficiency of its espionage system, it is easy to understand why spies and the way they operate have to be handled with slide-rule precision on a mathematical formula.

The fundamental operating procedure of an espionage system was dramatically pointed out by a former intelligence worker, Ladislas Farago, in an absorbing book called "War of Wits." In the book Farago breaks the spying technique down into 9 basic stages. They are:

(1) Recruiting and selection—how to find good spy personnel. (2) Training and indoctrination—how to make him a good spy. (3) Establishment of cover and authentication—the spy gives up his former identity, becomes an entirely new person. (4) Routing—Getting him to the area where he will do his espionage work. (5) Establishment of cover on the spot—making local contacts, fitting into the target area without suspicion.

(6) Surreptitious acquisition of information—actually getting the information the spy is after. (7) Meetings with informants and couriers—lining up the people who will carry the information back to headquarters. (8) Communications—ways of keeping in touch with the office to receive assignments and relay information back. (9) Safety and security—making sure the spy doesn't get caught.

It's no hit or miss proposition. All nine points have been carefully studied, boiled down to where there is the least possible chance for error. If any one of the points has the most importance, it must be the first one—recruiting and selection. Because the spy represents the human element and no mathematical formula can cover that. If the spy is unreliable, if he's unstable, if there's a chance that he can't follow through, the whole system is put out of order.

Here are some of the qualities a spy must have, according to Author Farago: His morale must be high, he must be interested in the job ahead, he must be energetic, zealous, enterprising, resourceful, a good thinker emotionally stable, calm, quiet, healthy, be able to get

Newsday

Eyes in the Dark

Part Two: A Necessary, Dirty Business

The goal is preparedness, knowing a potential enemy's capabilities and plans in the hopes of preventing another Pearl Harbor. The spy operates with the idea that the end justifies the means. Lying, cheating, stealing, double-crossing, killing if necessary are all some of his tools. He has no room for ethics or morals.

By Bob Rhodes

Espionage is a dirty vicious business founded on the double-cross and nourished by squealers.

Yet a country which has no espionage system —or has only an inefficient one at best—might just as well haul down its flag and hand over its keys to the enemy.

Because no matter how dirty or how vicious espionage is, it's as vital to a world power as taxes.

Without espionage the United States would have little idea of what the Communists are doing, what war plans they have and what weapons they have to do it with.

Without espionage the U.S. would leave itself open to another Pearl Harbor.

Without espionage the U.S. would be unarmed against its most dangerous foe in the Cold War: The Soviet espionage system.

The importance of espionage in the present battle of nerves was pointed out in a simple warning by a special government commission. In a report on intelligence activities made last year, the commission said:

"The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc, as well as the difficulty of penetration of their security barriers, point up the fact that our intelligence effort must be the best in our history.

"This, added to the advent of nuclear weapons . . . has made adequate and timely intelligence imperative to our national security. It would be false economy to stint on some phase of the intelligence operation and thereby run the risk of another costly and tragic surprise like Pearl Harbor."

How extensive the U.S. espionage system is must remain guesswork. There is no way of determining how much is spent per year, how many are collecting their vital information, what kind of data is trickling back into our security coffers.

It is by necessity a top secret operation. The only time the average citizen knows such a system even exists is on those few occasions when one of the U.S. spies gets caught at it. Even then, because of the immoral nature of the whole spying idea and also because governments don't like to tip their hand, authorities will deny that the apprehended spies belong to them. Or, they'll cover up in some way.

A Complex System

But the system fortunately does exist. There are at least 12 major departments and agencies in the government which are engaged in some form of intelligence work. In addition to these, there are at least 10 minor agencies or activities which are given public funds to work with in their intelligence operations.

Overseeing everything is the National Security Council, made up of President Eisenhower, Vice-President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense Wilson and a small handful of other top governmental executives.

The council is the clearing house for everything in regards to national security, whether it be domestic, foreign or military. Its object is to get the military services and the other departments of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.

Right below the National Security Council is an organization which owes its present existence to Pearl Harbor. Congress had recognized that information necessary to anticipate the sneak Pearl Harbor attack actually was available to the U.S. But at that time there was no Central Intelligence Agency to get the information, evaluate it, and bring it to the attention of the president for action.

(AP Photo)

J. Edgar Hoover

So, in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was formed. It is the focal point for intelligence data affecting national security. Its findings go directly to the National Security Council. But the CIA handles only national intelligence. Departmental intelligence matters are handled by the departments themselves.

For instance, the Army has its own intelligence corps, dealing with information pertaining to the war potential, military forces and activities and even topography of foreign nations. The Navy and the Air Force also have their intelligence departments, all of whom report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Standing stalwartly in the background is perhaps the finest organization of its kind in the world—the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Headed by J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI deals primarily with counter-intelligence matters. Such things as espionage, sabotage, treason and other acts against the U.S. fall under the FBI's domain. It also gets loyalty reports on persons employed by the government.

The commission which made the report last year on intelligence activities made the expected remarks about Hoover and his organization. "We found the

has heard from him since — or even has acknowledged who he might be.

Crabb's fate? The British admiralty announced he was "missing and presumed dead." He had been testing "certain underwater apparatus," the admiralty announced. Finally the admiralty said Crabb was "in all probability" the diver seen by the Russian sailors. His presence, the admiralty added, "was without any permission whatsoever."

A formal protest was lodged with Britain by the Russian government less than two weeks ago. Britain apologized, red-facedly. Prime Minister Eden was questioned about it by his own House of Commons, but he refused to go into details. It would not be in the best public interest to say more, he said. Some observers felt that meant an American espionage agent might have been working with the frogman, but there has been no substantiation of this, and U.S. officials have denied it.

It was common knowledge, however, that the British were interested in the underwater design of the new Soviet cruiser. The ship has great speed, it has underwater equipment for detecting submarines and mines — a diver might be able to learn many secrets.

That Britain had been caught in a most embarrassing position was quickly apparent. The Russians, while certainly not naive enough to believe their ship wouldn't be looked over carefully while in the British port, at least had concrete evidence that spying had been done. And done during a supposed good-will visit to Great Britain. The fizzling of the mission put the Britains' back to the wall.

Eden himself pointed out the ramifications of the incident. In announcing to the House of Commons that he would comment no further on it, the prime minister declared:

"In this business I do not rest only on the national interest. There is also a very important international interest." He said it was his hope that the discussions with the Russian leaders would prove to be the "beginning of the beginning" and added:

"I intend to safeguard that possibility at all costs. It is for that reason that I deplore this debate and will say no more."

Can Affect Diplomacy

Whether the incident tended to chill the British-Soviet relations was not immediately apparent. But it was a lesson in how espionage can backfire to produce harmful diplomatic results.

The frogman incident was small potatoes compared to the straight-from-Hollywood type of tunnel which was burrowed between East and West Germany. How long it had been there, what secrets had been intercepted through it, even who dug it were questions nobody knew but everybody guessed at.

At one edge of the U.S. zone a radar post had been set up, right near the border separating the U.S. and Russian zones. Russians, who keep a good eye on all things they can see in the American zone, finally put their figures together and realized there was something out of order in the activities going on at the radar post.

At the beginning of this month they knew what it was. They called a press conference to announce it and offered newsmen from West Germany to see for themselves.

The newsmen were taken to a spot about 500 yards from the radar station. There they saw a huge hole dug 10 feet in the ground and at the bottom of the hole a cast-iron tube. The tube was about six feet in diameter and nearly 600 yards in length. A hole had been cut in the top of the tube by the Russians. The story was inside the tube.

It was loaded with cables, tape recorders, electronic equipment — an elaborate wiretapping setup. There was ventilating apparatus made by both American and British companies. The cables were traced to the point where they tied in with cables used by the Russians in East Germany.

At the borderline of East and West Germany the huge underground tube was sandbagged, blocked off. A sign, in both English and German, read simply: "You are now entering the American sector."

The Reds let out a loud scream and said the tunnel had been laid by the Americans so they could listen in on important Russian telephone calls. The United States would say nothing. And still hasn't. But the tunnel, built to last for years, has now outlived its usefulness.

Diplomatically, it was an embarrassing month for the Western world. The compensating factor is that the Communists have been caught in the past and are known currently to have their unseen fingers in many a free world confidential pie.

It's part of the game to get caught once in awhile. With espionage at its highest point since the start of World War II there have to be some slipups. The spies know that security forces are checking more closely now than ever before. Their jobs are harder, the penalties more severe.

For them the war goes on.

Tomorrow: Espionage Is a Dirty Business

(London Daily Express photos)

FROGMAN AND CRUISER. One of the most recent cases of supposed espionage involved British Cmdr. Lionel Crabb, shown above getting his equipment checked before a dive, and the Russian Cruiser Ordzhonikidze, right. Crabb "disappeared" while mysteriously diving near the Red ship.