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## Swearing Off Communism at Caracas

Despite the almost complete lack of enthusiasm for the United States' resolution on communism at Caracas, the chances of securing at least a majority for it are now considered better than when Mr. Dulles has made a strong and persuasive case for the aggressive character of international communism and by boldly defining its objective as the "invention of a foreign imperialism" in domestic affairs of this hemisphere, has made it difficult for the Latin American countries to oppose common ground to counteract it. Behind the scenes, a great deal of skillful politicking has been going on no doubt, and as one Latin American diplomat remarked ruefully, the United States could get a resolution through the conference that two plus two equals five if it used enough pressure.

When it must be confessed that the recommendations for common action con-

tained in the resolution seem almost ludicrously innocuous. Aside from a vague and—it may seem to many Latin Americans—vaguely ominous proviso that the two specific recommendations for action are "without prejudice to such other measures as they may consider desirable," the resolution has no teeth whatever in it.

It seems to have been drafted in the belief that if the Latin American republics could be induced to swear off communism, there would be time enough later to decide what is to be done with backsliders. Assuredly, no one believes that a mere recommendation to "disclose" the identities of Communist agents and the sources of their funds would be effective, while any confidential exchange of information between governments is hardly practicable. The United States' own Central Intelligence Agency would be the last to agree to the opening of its secret files on the international Communist movement to other Latin American republics, and to argue that it could do so safely is in fact to argue that there is no important infiltration of Communists and fellow-travelers in Latin American governments. John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State, may be a trusting soul, but Allan Dulles, as head of the CIA, trusts nobody.

Actually, every delegation at Caracas understands that acceptance of this resolution implies a great deal more than the disclosure and exchange of information on the activities of Communist agents. They know that what Secretary Dulles is trying to do is to secure their consent beforehand to any action that the United States might feel called upon to take if a satellite state is openly set up in Guatemala or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. None of them wants to give us any such blanket authority, but some of them are realistic enough to know that in the event a satellite Communist state is openly established in the Western Hemisphere, the United States would crack down on it, with or without

The question we must seriously ask ourselves is whether a resolution, agreed to by a reluctant majority on these cynical terms, will be worth the paper it is written on. Insofar as the Dulles Doctrine requires the American republics to renounce their sovereign right to change their form of government to communism, it will not, for clearly no such renunciation would be binding on anyone but the governments presently in power. There are, let us hope, many ways of preventing the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere, but an unenforceable resolution is surely not one of the most certain and dependable ones.