

Interview

with ALLEN W. DULLES

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

"WE TELL RUSSIA TOO MUCH"

CPYRGHT

EDITOR'S NOTE: *How does Russia go about getting most of its U. S. secrets? Is laxity by Americans responsible for "leaking" critical information?*

Conversely, how good is U. S. intelligence about Russia? Is reliable information being gotten through the Iron Curtain? If so, how?

To get the real story of just how each side collects its information about the other, on which vital decisions often are based, U. S. News & World Report invited to its conference room the country's top intelligence expert—Allen W. Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The interview with Mr. Dulles follows.

ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, has been ferreting out information on this country's enemies and their plans since World War I, when he handled U. S. intelligence work in Switzerland. In World War II, he returned to Switzerland for the Office of Strategic Services and directed a network of agents within Germany. There, he also was responsible for negotiating the surrender of German troops in Italy. Mr. Dulles, a lawyer in private life, is the brother of John Foster Dulles, U. S. Secretary of State. He has headed the CIA since February, 1953.

Q *Do the Soviets have an advantage over us in collecting intelligence, Mr. Dulles?*

A Many advantages. In the first place, they have far greater facilities for operating in the United States than we have behind the Iron Curtain. Also we Americans publish a great deal in our scientific and technical journals and in congressional hearings. And, of course, in our free system of government, what we do in the field of legislation for national defense is open to the public. I would give a good deal if I could know as much about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can learn about us by merely reading the press.

Sometimes I think we go too far in what our Government gives out officially and in what is published in the scientific and technical field. We tell Russia too much. Under our system it is hard to control it.

Q *Are members of the press in any way utilized as intelligence agents, do you think, by any of the governments of the world?*

A We keep out of that. Frankly, the press is a great source of information for all agencies of the Government. We don't enroll on our staff any newspaper people that are still active in the business. If you start that you run the danger of throwing a shadow over all the legitimate press.

Q *The Soviet Government uses them, of course—*

A Well, in the Soviet case everybody is a servant of the Government. A Tass representative works for the Government almost as much as an ambassador. As you know, it's a bit different in the United States in this respect.

Q *Would you develop your statement that the legit-*

imate press is one of the best sources of information? Do you mean by what is printed or by word of mouth?

A What is printed mainly but also by radio.

Q *Are there many agents running around the world in the various countries today or just a handful?*

A Undoubtedly the intelligence services of many countries have widespread agent networks. Certainly the Soviet intelligence leads the field in this respect. They recruit and run agents in all important countries of the world, and through their "front organizations" they control a great many more.

Q *How would you evaluate what we are learning about what's going on behind the Iron Curtain? Do you feel reasonably assured that we are well informed about what is happening behind the Iron Curtain?*

A One has to distinguish between various fields. We know a good deal more in certain fields than we do in others. Naturally, for security reasons, I am not going to disclose just what they are. It's the toughest job intelligence has ever faced—getting good information from behind the Iron Curtain. It is, of course, very important for our Government that we all succeed in that. We are not satisfied with the coverage at the present time, and are trying constantly to improve it.

Q *What was your background in intelligence work before you came into the Government for this particular job?*

A In World War I, I was in the Foreign Service. I was in Vienna in 1916 and into 1917. When the United States declared a state of war with Germany, we were given our passports in Vienna as the Germans

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forced the Austrians to break with us at the time we entered the war in April, 1917. Then I went to Bern, Switzerland, and worked in our legation there. I was not an intelligence officer—I was a Foreign Service officer—but my job there was really a political-intelligence job. So, I've been interested in intelligence since World War I.

Q You were in the Office of Strategic Services, weren't you?

A Yes, in World War II, I was in the Office of Strategic Services. Working with Bill Donovan [William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, Director of OSS], I organized the OSS office in New York, and then went again to Switzerland. That was a good place to follow what was going on in Germany, Austria and the occupied countries of Europe.

Q Were you in contact with agents who worked behind the enemy lines?

A A great many.

Q Therefore you became familiar with these techniques in those days—

A Correct.

Q Did you learn quite a lot in that period?

A There couldn't have been a better school for intelligence. At that time, during World War II, I was in direct contact with one of the right-hand men of Admiral Canaris, who was the head of the Military Counterintelligence Service for the Wehrmacht [German Army]. He, like quite a number of Canaris's men, was anti-Hitler and joined the plot against him. The fact that there were these anti-Nazis greatly facilitated our intelligence work.

For example, there were several men in the German Foreign Office who worked against Hitler and Ribbentrop [Nazi Foreign Minister], and I was in touch with them. Then toward the end of the war a German S. S. General in North Italy named Karl Wolff got in touch with me with regard to the surrender of the German armies there, and for several months we had hectic negotiations which finally ended in the German capitulation in Italy.

All in all, this World War II experience was intelligence by the "case" method and, as a lawyer, I find this the most practical way of getting an education.

Q Would you say we are as successful in penetrating the satellite countries as we were in penetrating Germany during the last war?

A Germany was a pipe dream compared with what we have to meet now.

Q The satellites as well as Soviet Russia?

A Yes. The intelligence service in Germany during the war, you see, was split. There was great rivalry between Canaris and Himmler [Nazi Minister of Interior]. Also there was in Germany an active, fairly aggressive anti-Hitler underground. Of course, there is a situation in the U.S.S.R. today which is somewhat similar.

Q Was this among the military?

A It included both military and civilians. It was the Goerdeler-Beck group [Dr. Karl Goerdeler and Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck, involved in a plot against Hitler's life in 1944], with ramifications down into the trade unions. It was even penetrated by the Communists—and partly betrayed by the Communists, too, at the end.

STIRRING UP REVOLTS?—

Q Since you can't tell us what you do, could you tell us some of the things that you don't do? For instance, it is often reported in the papers that you send in provocateurs to stir up revolutions in satellite countries. What truth is there in that?

A I only wish we had accomplished all that the Soviets attribute to us. I'm not going to deny all the compliments they give us in reporting on our activities. I think it's better for them to be left a little in the dark as to how much they say is true and how much is false.

Q Is that part of your function—to stir up revolutions in these countries?

A Let me answer in this way: The Soviet Union is mounting a "cold war" on the free world, and is using all the techniques that Communist inventiveness can supply. They have built up a whole series of "front organizations"—associations of youth, lawyers, women, and Cominform. They penetrate and control the major labor unions in France, Italy, Indonesia, and many other countries of the world—

Q And some of ours—

A In many countries of the world they have very vigorous political parties spearheaded by a hard core of Communists, and they use those political parties for their own ends in order to try to bring about Communist revolutions. That whole movement constitutes a threat to the stability of the free world. It constitutes a threat behind our North Atlantic Treaty Organization lines. We would be foolish if we did not co-operate with our friends abroad to help them to

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... "Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East"

do everything they can to expose and counter this Communist subversive movement.

Q *Could you tell us in a general way whether the intelligence you gather indicates that Communism is growing any stronger or weaker in the satellite countries?*

A Two or three years ago I was rather discouraged about the situation in the satellite countries from our point of view. I had a feeling that the period of domination was getting so long that the younger elements wouldn't know anything about freedom. That, however, has not proven to be true. People who have never known freedom as we know it still have an inherent love and desire for freedom and that is shown by the defectors and political refugees who come over.

Q *Is there real evidence of that?*

A Oh, yes, and it is very encouraging. Take the Polish fliers who flew those MIG's out. They were young men. They had known nothing but slavery. And there are many others from all walks of life.

Q *But they realize the difference—*

A Yes.

Q *Do you have your own system of interviewing people who escape from behind the Iron Curtain, or do you depend upon the other Government agencies?*

A It's a common enterprise.

Q *It's a vast enterprise, isn't it?*

A Very important and very large.

Q *Aren't hundreds of thousands interviewed every year?*

A No, it wouldn't be as large as that. You have to be selective. To do a good job of interviewing requires great skill, a good knowledge of languages, and takes a long while. What you do is select those who, because of their background and native intelligence, are likely to be persons of knowledge. You have to do that because the field is so vast. Take the situation when there were thousands and thousands of East Germans fleeing into West Germany—you couldn't possibly interview all of them.

AID FOR REFUGEES—

Q *What is done to aid the refugees who escape to the West to get freedom and a better life?*

A If they are bona fide political refugees and they come over to us, we grant them asylum and do not turn them back. This is in keeping with our declared policy. Most of them arrive in Germany, Austria, Turkey, or in the Far East at Hong Kong, for example. Here several agencies, both Government and private, help in providing assistance to these refugees.

The refugees are, of course, initially housed and fed and provided with clothes and other necessities. In addition, there is a large effort directed at preparing these people for a new life in the Western world.

Q *Do you think these defectors have an innate*

sense of freedom which causes them to come over, or do you think the propaganda we disseminate influences them?

A I think it's both. Some come out from ideological motives. Our propaganda, particularly in the satellites, has had a real effect.

Q *Is Russian propaganda having much effect on Europe today?*

A I don't think it's having as much effect today as formerly. It is having substantial effect in Southeast Asia.

Q *What about the Middle East?*

A To some slight extent, but not too much. The Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East. But when they play the nationalist theme, which they do a great deal, of course, that's more effective.

Q *How about parties, like the Tudeh, in Iran, which are openly Communist parties, and yet the members are all Moslems? It used to be said that the Communists could make no inroads on the Moslems because the religion was contrary—*

A The Communists make inroads in all the religions. It is quite true that the tenets of the Moslem religion are not compatible with Marxism, but neither are those of Christianity or Judaism.

POLICY ROLE FOR CIA—

Q *Can you evaluate the use to which you put your information in the matter of guidance, policy making, and so on? Is this information being utilized every day, for instance? Is it used in policy making?*

A I think it is becoming more and more so. The estimates that we make are used as the intelligence basis of the policy papers. Each week at the meeting of the National Security Council I have the opportunity to brief the Council on any new developments during the past week and to give the intelligence background for papers that may be on the agenda for discussion. In doing that, I co-ordinate with the other intelligence services of the Government to see if they have any intelligence that they would like to have me give, and so I try to represent not just the CIA but the intelligence community as a whole.

Q *Do you present a positive interpretation, or do you present two views?*

A I would present my views as Director of Central Intelligence. If there is a dissent from that view, I would indicate it.

Q *Do you present many papers that way?*

A Quite a number. I'm inclined to encourage split papers rather than a wishy-washy product that comes when people who don't really agree try to find vague expressions to bridge a disagreement. I think that's the worst thing in intelligence. Let's have a clear-cut statement. If there is a clear-cut difference, then let the policy makers consider that fact.

... "Much of our work is related to analysis of intelligence"

Q How would you divide your attention on the globe? Isn't Latin America getting a lot of attention right now?

A Well, the State Department gathers the bulk of the information in the political and economic field.

Q But in intelligence you are the only one authorized—

A There's nothing esoteric about the word "intelligence." A cable from the State Department regarding political developments in a country is intelligence. Normally they would do most of the reporting on the political side, and in many countries on the economic side.

Q Do your estimates have any influence on the changes in the military budget?

A We do not prepare estimates directed to budgetary matters. We just go along about our business reporting the facts as we see them, and when a situation comes up that requires an estimate, we make one.

Q Might it not be a guidance in deciding whether it is safe or not to make certain cuts?

A Those who prepare the budget would have to answer that. We have given our estimate of what we think the capabilities and intentions of the various powers are. Just how that enters into the budget discussions around the table. I wouldn't be told.

HOW THE CIA OPERATES—

Q Do your operations today in co-ordinating this information differ from what was done under the preceding Administration?

A Then it was the custom for the Director of CIA to brief the President alone, but he also attended the meetings of the National Security Council in the same capacity as I now do, as adviser.

Q Is the CIA connected with any other department of the Government, or is it an independent agency of its own?

A The CIA is under the National Security Council and, hence, is under the President directly. It is an independent agency. My relations with the State Department are exactly the same as my relations with the Department of Defense. Those are the two departments, naturally, with which I have the most business to transact. I also work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q But you operate completely independent of them—

A Yes, except that I often look to them for policy guidance and support, and where we are operating in a zone of U. S. military occupation or operations we have special responsibilities to the theater commander.

Q What are you occupied with mostly in your work—with analysis of information that is available to everybody?

A Many agencies collect intelligence. Then the processing of this intelligence is divided among the agencies by National Security Council directives—for example, the Army handles its intelligence; Navy, naval, etc. This processed intelligence is then used on a joint co-operative basis to prepare estimates—which are analyses of the sum total of all intelligence and a projection into the future of what may develop.

A great deal of our work is related to the analysis of intelligence. It is not so much analysis of information that we get from the public as of information that we get from all the intelligence sources of Government.

Q Including the military?

A Oh, yes, including the military. We also get information from the State Department. We get information from our own sources.

Economic Information: 20% of Total

Q What proportion of that information would you say could be regarded as economic information?

A I should say that 20 per cent would be economic, possibly more.

Q And the rest of it would be political?

A Political, military, psychological—information on the attitudes of other people—what are they thinking about in a certain country—and also technological and scientific information.

Q It is your function to evaluate that information for the benefit of our own Government?

A That's correct—but not to do it all by ourselves.

Q And your job is to disseminate information, too, when you get finished evaluating it?

A That's right, but we have a check on our own evaluation. Once a week I sit down with the heads of the other intelligence agencies of the Government, that is, the intelligence officer of the State Department, the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, an intelligence officer from the Joint Chiefs and the Atomic Energy Commission, and a representative of J. Edgar Hoover. We sit around, just about like this, around a table—

Q To get information?

A No. It is largely to go over the finished product.

Q Your finished product?

A No, the finished product of a joint effort by all the intelligence agencies. You can divide the information that we disseminate into various categories. We get some raw intelligence. We disseminate that, but always with a good deal of caution. We haven't evaluated it, but it might fit in with what some other department knew and, therefore, would be important. If you waited to evaluate it, it might lose some of its value.

Then we have intelligence which we process in our own shop and disseminate. Finally we have intelligence

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... "We don't talk much about some of our duties"

which goes through the mill of evaluation with the other intelligence agencies. That we call "national estimates." We have a high-level board in CIA which includes distinguished military men, economists, professional and technical people. This is our Board of National Estimates. It generally prepares the first drafts of the "national estimates," and then we get contributions from the other intelligence agencies.

LESSON OF PEARL HARBOR—

Q Why is all of this necessary all of a sudden—or have we been doing it for many, many years?

A You've heard the story of Pearl Harbor. It seems to me that here was a typical instance where intelligence was available to the Government, but where there was not sufficient machinery set up to pull together the people best able to evaluate it—to get the information to the proper intelligence officers.

Q Each one had his own interpretation then, is that it?

A That was one of the troubles. But also the machinery wasn't sufficient to get the intelligence fast enough to the appropriate people.

Q Some of us in the press knew that war with Japan was coming. The Secretary of State gave out a great deal of information. It is puzzling that Washington newspapermen should know war was coming, but the military services didn't know—

A Did you know where it was coming?

Q No. We expected it in Southeast Asia. Was this machinery of yours available when the Chinese in 1950 decided to come down south of the Yalu?

A That was before I was with the CIA, so I can't give you the exact date. The particular machinery I refer to was organized by Gen. Bedell Smith, after he became Director late in 1950. It was based, in part, on a report made by a group, including myself, that the National Security Council had called to Washington about a year before. We were called down to make a report on the working of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we submitted a classified report to the NSC. Later Bedell Smith came in and carried out the general recommendations of that report.

Q So that your machinery was really set up after the Yalu incident?

A It didn't really start functioning until after the Yalu affair.

Q Well, are we organized now to prevent another Pearl Harbor?

A We have an organization now to which the intelligence that was neglected at the time of Pearl Harbor would be submitted, and where it would be processed quickly. It works on a 24-hour basis. Anything coming in would go to our watch officer, and to comparable officers in the Pentagon. If these officers felt that this

intelligence showed up a critical situation, we would immediately call a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This is the Committee I mentioned before which includes the heads of the various intelligence agencies.

At any time of the day or night this Committee would sit down and go over any critical intelligence and make an immediate report to the President and the National Security Council. The machinery is there to function, and unless there was a "human" failure it would function.

Q You assume that you would have enough advance warning so that you could meet and evaluate?

A All we can do is provide the machinery to assure that, if we do get information that gives us a warning, we will act on it.

Q Have you ever made a post-mortem of the Pearl Harbor situation in so far as it relates to messages that were going back and forth between Honolulu and Japan in the days preceding the attack, so that you might have machinery now that would be aware of that kind of transmission?

A We have machinery to which that kind of information would be submitted. Error might creep in in the handling of this information, but, in my opinion, we have machinery to which information of that critical type would now be sent on an urgent basis.

DUTIES ASSIGNED TO CIA—

Q There is a good deal of confusion as to the exact duties of the Central Intelligence Agency and its relation to the service intelligence agencies. Can you set us straight on this point?

A CIA's duties are spelled out in the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949. The 1947 law provided for the unification of the armed services. It also set up the CIA. Under the law we have these duties:

We advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters that relate to our nation's security; we help to co-ordinate intelligence activities throughout the Government and evaluate intelligence reports. That includes intelligence received by everybody, not merely what we collect ourselves.

In addition the CIA under this law of 1947 carries out certain intelligence services, which the law describes as services of common concern, assigned to it by the National Security Council.

These are the type of activities which intelligence services throughout the world traditionally carry out. We don't talk much about some of these duties. Others are quite open. For example, we monitor daily millions of words of open broadcasts and in this way pick up the propaganda line which other countries are putting out over the air.

Q How big an agency do you have?

... "I see that the President is kept informed"

A We don't publish our figures.

Q *Has it ever been published how much appropriations you have?*

A No, but I have seen some speculation in the press with figures which were several times exaggerated.

Q *What committees of Congress do you have to deal with regularly?*

A We deal with the armed services committees of the Senate and the House, and we deal with both appropriations committees. Also we make periodic reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Q *Don't they show in the budget some lump sum that you use?*

A No.

Q *Don't you have to appear before committees in executive session and explain your operations?*

A I appear before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and talk with them and give them a picture of the nature of the work we are doing, tell about our personnel, and where the money goes.

Q *So that there is a check on the Agency—*

A Oh, yes, and not only by Congress. We work closely with the Bureau of the Budget and operate within policies established by the National Security Council. We consult on an almost daily basis with other agencies of the Government, particularly the State and Defense departments. Further, we make periodic reports on our activities to the National Security Council, and I see that the President is kept informed of all important developments. CIA is not a policy-making agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in the formulation of policy.

THREAT IN INVESTIGATION—

Q *What can you tell us about the rumors that CIA is to be investigated by committees of Congress?*

A I have no way to judge about that, and, as I just mentioned, we are already in close touch with the armed services and appropriations committees. I would like to say this about investigations. Any investigation, whether by a congressional committee or any other body, which results in a disclosure of our secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel would help a potential enemy just as if the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right into our shop.

If it were necessary to go into the details of operations before any committees anywhere—the security of your operations would quickly be broken. You couldn't run an intelligence agency on that basis. No intelligence agency in the world is run on that basis.

In intelligence you have to take certain things on faith. You have to look to the man who is directing the organization and the result he achieves. If you haven't someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get

results, you'd better throw him out and get somebody else.

Q *I understand a bill has been introduced into Congress to set up a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence which would do in the intelligence field what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does in the atomic field. Can you tell us anything about this?*

A I have studied these bills. They have been put in, I believe, by good friends of the Agency who are interested in finding a way to reconcile the exercise of congressional authority with the special need for security in an operation like that of CIA.

However, I don't know whether it would add anything very much to the present system of congressional control exercised through the armed services and appropriations committees. I naturally wish to respect the prerogatives of Congress and recognize that their confidence is essential if the Agency is to receive appropriations necessary to carry on its work efficiently.

Certainly I shall co-operate with the Congress in every way compatible with the need for security. When the 80th Congress set up the CIA they recognized this problem and wrote into the law that as Director I should be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Any disclosure which leads to publicity and gets information into the hands of potential enemies would to my mind be "unauthorized."

Q *How do you get around the fact that the Accounting Office must have a list of your employes and vouchers of the money you have spent?*

A That is not the case. That is not required of our Agency. We couldn't operate with security if it were.

Q *So that it wouldn't be possible for a foreign government to get a list of your employes and their salaries—*

A No, by golly. It would be highly dangerous if they could.

RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS—

Q *Do you have any trouble getting well-qualified people for intelligence work?*

A That's the greatest problem we have, because intelligence, more than anything else, depends upon the quality of your personnel. We built the Agency with a nucleus of those who had worked in intelligence during the war, with OSS and other intelligence agencies. We try to recruit on the basis of a careful study of the background of a person, if he's a mature person. Or we take our people after graduation from college or professional schools, put them in professional training in our own shop, and then try them out. I have wide powers of hiring and firing, because you have to have that.

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... "We have been using the lie detector for several years"

Q *Is your pay scale high enough and your job tenure secure enough so that when you get good people who do a job well you can keep them?*

A The hold on the people is their interest in the work. That, more than the salary, holds them. I'm holding some people in CIA at great sacrifice to themselves. The interest in the work makes them want to stick with it.

Q *How long does it take to clear your employees for security?*

A That depends on the nature of the case. If a man or woman is just out of college, we ought to be able to clear security in six weeks or so. If the candidate has had quite a career, served in various parts of the world, in various agencies of the Government, it takes longer. It may then take anywhere from six or eight weeks to three or four months.

Q *Do you find security risks from time to time?*

A Oh, certainly.

Weeding Out Security Risks

Q *Didn't a great many security risks turn up in the OSS?*

A Proportionately it was not high. The OSS had thousands of employees. Bill Donovan was told that he had to organize an intelligence service practically overnight. That was at a time when there was a tremendous call on man power throughout the country. Well, you couldn't pull together thousands of people under those conditions without getting some bad apples. I think, however, that the percentage was very low.

Q *It was a natural place to infiltrate, certainly—*

A Undoubtedly the enemy was trying to infiltrate.

Q *Didn't you inherit some security risks from the OSS?*

A If we did, I believe they have been weeded out. Everybody that carried over has been carefully investigated in recent years. Further, we keep constantly checking on our people.

Q *What about the report that there are Soviet agents even in the Central Intelligence Agency?*

A I naturally assume that the Soviets will attempt to penetrate the CIA and all the other intelligence services of the United States. I have in CIA a security service of which I have reason to be proud, and I don't think that the Soviets are going to find it easy to penetrate us; however, we have to keep on our guard all the time.

Q *I saw a story the other day about the use of the lie detector by your security people in CIA with some criticism of your Agency. Have you any comment on that?*

A We have been using the lie detector for several years, and on the whole have found it helpful. We don't force people to take the test, but almost everybody chooses to do it.

Also you should remember that we never use lie-detector results as conclusive. It merely gives clues to be followed up in other ways, particularly the ordinary methods of questioning. No one has any access to the readings of the lie detector except our own security office. Since we have been using the lie detector it has saved us a good many headaches and has also helped establish the innocence of some people who were falsely accused. Of course, you need to have experienced operators to get the real benefit from the tests.

Q *We understand that the FBI is not permitted to operate overseas. Does that leave you the only operating agency overseas?*

A The State Department, of course, operates overseas.

Q *I mean strictly in the field of security?*

A We operate overseas in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence rather than in security. This security problem doesn't come up directly, except in so far as we would co-operate with J. Edgar Hoover in connection with any suspicious characters we might learn about who were trying to get to the United States. Also we make our facilities available to the State Department to help check visa applications.

Q *Do we exchange intelligence information with allied governments?*

A We have cordial and co-operative relationships with certain services in the free world.

Q *Could they be improved?*

A Well, you can always improve everything.

CIA: HERE TO STAY?—

Q *Now that the CIA has had a trial run of about seven years, how would you sum up its accomplishments? Is it here to stay, is it doing a good job?*

A I am probably a prejudiced witness. The real test will be whether the CIA properly serves its customers—those who formulate our policy in national-security matters. Today's world is a very complicated one. Policy, whether in the field of diplomacy or defense, must be based on the best estimate of the facts which can be put together. That estimate in turn should be given by some agency which has no axes to grind or backs to scratch, and which itself is not wedded to any particular policy. That is our job in CIA. If we can carry it out honestly and fearlessly we can fill a real need in Government. And we can't do the job by living in an ivory tower. We need the help of all the other intelligence agencies in the Government.

Whether CIA is doing a good job I must leave to others to answer. In intelligence work one should never be satisfied and always seek to improve. Personally I think we are improving. I am proud of the personnel that we have got together and of their loyalty and dedication to their work. I consider CIA an efficient organization.