nti-Hitler Plot Still

 ${\it Many Able Democrats Eliminated}$ **CPYRGHT**

By Ernest S. Pisko

Staff Writer of The Christian Science Monitor

The 11th anniversary of the unsuccessful to bomb attempt on Hitler, as the result of the unsuccessful to bomb attempt on Hitler, as the result of the unsuccessful to bomb attempt on Hitler, as the result of the summer of the summer of the summer of the summer of the three summers of the summer of the three summers of the bomb lot; former Chief of the Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck! Col. Claus Chair, 1 Staff Col. Claus Chair, 1 S

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Crest and Trial Sought

There was, for instance, that young officer to whom Colonel Stauffenberg spoke of the necessity whom Colonel Stauffenberg spoke of the necessity of the internal with reacted sharply with: of the sound, you carnot solve a deep historical crisis mouth a bullet."

To Coerclere himself, who had done more than the coercie in building up the German anti-layer the solve and provide the coercie in keeping it solve and provide the coercie in the coercie of th

cattlete minself, who had done more than anticattlete see in building up the German anticattletes in building up the German anticattletes in building up the German poolcattletes assassination. He wanted him the German people would get a first, and the german tender of the control of the german tender of the general tender of the

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under the excuse that he had to take a telephone call from his Berlin office.
But while he waited outside the bunker for the explosion, one of the officers inside the bunker shifted the bire case so that was now at a point farther removed from Hitler. This accidental shift, together with the thirtenss of the coaken table top and the fact that the wooden walls of the coniernee bunker are hurled away under the force of the explosion and thus reduced the biast impact, saved Hitler and most of the others present.

The brief case shifting was only the last in a series of moves that contributed to the thwarting of the bomb attempt. Perhaps equally, if not more, decisive was that the type of conference took place at the lightly built Rastenburg bunker instead, as originally planned Hitler's concrete bunker at Berchtesgaden, where the blast effect would have been enormously greater. Transfer of the Eighert's headquarters from Berchtesgaden to Rastenburh had taken place unexpectedly a few days before July 20 on account of the Soviet advance toward East Prussia. Soviet forces, on July 20, stood only 100 miles from Rastenburg.

*Valkyrie' Orders Delayed

'Valkyrie' Orders Delayed

Earlier in July, Coionel Stauffenberg had twice gone to Berchtesgaden with the bomb in his brief case. Both times he had to return with the bomb unused. On July 11, Himmler had failed to attend the conference, and since the intention was to kill Hiller, Himmler, and Göring at the same time, Colonel Stauffenberg, did not activate the fuse. On July 18, Himmler, and Göring were present, but Hitler eff the conference room almost immediately after he had entered it.

Mere mechanical factors, however, cannot be held solely responsible for the failure of the attempt.

It also is evident that despite Hiller's escaping almost unscathed from the attempt, the pict still might have succeeded. Even if unable to cirruit on the held solely responsible for the could have caused of much internal unrest that front-line resistance, at least on the western front, would have ceased and the war have ended much earlier and with much less of Germany destroyed.

Far more decisive for the outcome than the handical mishaps at Hitler's headquarters was the strange mental atmosphere in the former war Ministry building at Berlin's Bendlerstrasses.



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Officer Shifted Brief Case

Correction mechanical side there was the shifting of Colonel Stauffenberg's brief case in which the same was hidden. Colonel Stauffenberg, attendance of the same was the same form, was niggen. Colonel Stauttenberg, attending the Fuhrer Conference, July 20, had placed that the covered with ministry maps over which Hitler was leaning. Evaluation the colonel full full was to touch off the explosion, the colonel left the room



Colonel General Beck



Dr. Goerdeler

Barlier in July, Colonel Stauffenberg had twice gone to Berchtesgaden with the bomb in his brief case. Both times he had to return with the bomb, musad. On July 11, Himmler had failed to attend the conference, and since the intended of the state of the

For the conspirators, assembled there around Colonel General Beck, first believed that Hitler had been killed. According to their plans they should have immediately issued the so-called "Valkyrie" orders, the prear anged signal for arresting government members, disarming SS units, and seizing radio stations and other com-

resting government members, disarming SS units, and seizing radio stations and other communication centers.

Yet instead of prompt action there was hesitation. Dispatch of the "valkyrie" orders was heid up for three hours.

Why did this happen?

Why did the group of determined, brilliant, and highly trained Prussian officers fail to act?

All the documents that had been drawn up for "the day" remained locked in desk drawers and safes—Colonel General Beck's "Appeal to the German Nation"; the Cabinet list; the program of the new government to replace the Nazl regime; the indictment against the Nazl criminals; the order to open the concentration camps; the bill for indemnification of the Jews; the pledge for restoration of justice and cvic rights.

At the critical moment courage deserted the conspirators—not the courage to act boldly.

Frof. Gerhard Ritter, in his recently published book, "Carl Goordeler and the German Resistants, and the Cerman Resistants, and the courage of the cour

plots. The state of the third Years War and Count Wallenstein to find a German Army leader who was killed by his own subordinates, and to the Napoleonic wars and York von Wartenburg to find a German general who disobeyed the orders of his chief of state. Consciously the conspirators had freed themselves from the ingrained habit of obedience. But it is safe to assume that in many of them there still were voices that whispered and warned—and slowed them down.

Conspirators in a Vacuum

Another inhibition must have come from the oath they had taken to Hitler after President oath they had taken to Hitler after President Hindenburg's passing in 1934. Again, rationally they had explained away the validity of the oeth. As Capt. Axel yon dem Bussche declared, the oath was no longer binding since it had been broken "a thousand times" by Hitler's criminal actions. Yet it is known from testimonies that many of the conspirators grappled until the end



Colonel von Stauffenberg



Documents Remained Locked will their consciences about the right to break for the conspirators, assembled there around Colonel General Beck, first believed that Hitler themselves.

themselves on these moral scruples, the conspirators were far too intelligent not to sense the reavy odds against the containing them, and them of the containing them, including fiery Count Studfenberg, among them, including fiery Count Studfenberg, among them, including fiery Count Studfenberg, and the containing the c

People Deluded by Goebbels

This applied in equal measure to soldiers and civilians. Though a handful of marshals and a score of generals were resolved to overthrow the Nazi regime, more marshals and many more gen-erals took a wait-and-see attitude, ready to

Nazi regime, more marshals and many more generals took a wait-and-see attitude, ready to join with the winner, while a considerable number remained loyal to Hitler. And the farther down one went in the ranks—to the majors, captains, lieutenants—the more unconditional supporters of Hitler one found.

Among the civilian' population there was hardly anyone—outside, the concentration camps—who thought of revolution. The mass of the German people were ignorant of the precarious military situation, still deeply impressed by the successes of the first three years of the war, deluded by the Goebbeis propaganda and unshaken in their belief in Hitler's "genius." The chief agues in orteider, and Staufenberg, the chief figures in orteider, and staufenberg, the chief agues in orteider, and staufenberg were then the word of the factor of the control of the staufenberg were the compatitions away from the "Piede Piper" in the brown shirt.

Another thought must have been even more disturbing to them. This was the problem how the Allies would react to an overthrow of the Hitler regime; whether it would enable the new German government to liquidate the war under terms more favorable than "unconditional surrender." Both Dr. Goerdeler and Colonel Stauffenberg were optimistic about the outcome. But all the evidence indicates that their optimism was unfounded.

The Missing Echo

Documentary evidence makes this one of the saddest chapters in the history of the German resistance movement. It is a chapter that ought, to be headed "The Echo That Was Not There"—

resistance movement. It is a chapter that ought, to be headed "The Echo That Was Not There"—the echo, that is from across the Channel and across the Atlantic.

From the beginning of a serious anti-Hitter opposition, in the spring of 1938, until July 1944, resistance members risked their lives and took the odium of committing "Landesversit" (treason against the country) in order o keep Britain and later on the United States informed of their plans, their aims, and their citivities.


They made superhuman efforts to show that "Nazi" and "German" were not identical terms that there were no issues outstanding between Germany and the rest of the world that could not be settled in a civilized miner once the Nazis had been eliminated. Time and again, the leaders of the conspirecy pleaded with London and Washington for an encouraging statement—not for their own sake but for what they firmly believed would be its electrifying effect on the German people. The word never came.

Allies Sure of Winning

It can be argued that Washington and London were justified in their attitude. Neither in Britain nor in the United States was popular opinion in favor of negotiating with the "better" Germans because it was difficult to believe that "better" Germans existed after what had happened in Germany (and in Austria, Czechoslovici, Poland, and so on) between 1933 and

Besides, ever since the middle of 1943 the

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Hitler Shows Mussolini Wreckage Resulting From Bomb Attempt

Allies knew they were to win the war. They knew they would soon be in a position to dictate the peace terms; so, why should they tie their hands and risk creating a grave crisis in Anglo-American relations with the Soviet Union?

Added to these reservations must be the Allied mistrust, hard to overcome, of the word of any German. The Allied war leaders were from their personal experiences familiar with German behavior after 1918 and how some of the clauses of the Versailles Treaty were circumvented no sooner than they had been signed.

A dispassionate study of the documents suggests that there was only one case, in which outside reaction—or rather the lack of it prevented an anti-Hitler putsch from succeeding. That was in September, 1938, when Britains participation in the Munich Conference virtually crushed a conspiracy in which the Army, solice, and the Foreign Office had joined. This was the only conspiracy that had a reasonable chance of success and the only one that would have met with overwhelming support from the German population.

Subsequent Attempts Doomed

All the attempts and conspiracies that came later—and there were many o. them between Munich and July, 1944—were doomed from the outset. Under the fire of the war, the German nation was inextricably welded to Hitler's charlot. There was nothing the Becks, Goerdelers, Stauffenbergs, and thousands of other nobly thinking Germans could do but to sacrifice themselves in an inspiring testimonial to human honor. honor.
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One may even say that the testimonial to human honor was overpaid a hundredfold. For the nearly 5,000 men and women whom Hitler had executed between July 20, 1944, and as late as April 23, 1945—one week before the collapse of the Third Reich—and the tens of thousands who perished in concentration camps or were sentenced to capital punishment for individual acts of defiance; were in a sense the cilie of the German nation.

They were not the only anti-Nazis in Germany Actually, several of the conspirators had originally been sincere supporters of Hitler—among them Beck, Stauffenberg, and Goerdeler. But as soon as they discovered the true nature on action their conviction. Others may have been action their conviction. Others may have been action their conviction. Others may have been action and passing but they remained silent and passing the true for the company, through Hitler's last reverse campaign, was deprived of many of the very people who should have become the architects of its post-Hitler reconstruction.

City to Honor Count

By Reuters

Bendler Street in Berlin, site of the German Army supreme headquarters during the war, is to be renamed Stauffenberg Street after the man who tried to kill Hitler on July 20, 1944, the West Berlin City Parliament has decided unanimously. Col. Claus Count Schenk von Stauffenberg placed the brief case bomb which exploded but failed to kill Hitler