Approved For Release 2000/05/04 : CIA-RDP69B00596R000100160016-2

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1 1 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Reconnaissance/CIA

SUBJECT: Identification of NRP Information

that May be Handled in Other than

25X1A Control Channels

25X1A REFERENCES : 56927/66 (attached) 56929/66 (attached)

1. The attached proposal from the Special Security Center, prepared in recent months in cooperation with security representatives of OSA and OSP, now has the full endorsement of senior officials of these two Offices. With your concurrence it will be forwarded for the approval of the D/NRO and ultimate publication as policy via a COMOR Directive.

25X1A

2. Historically, the proposal stems from a DIA suggestion that certain information of particular importance to requirements programmers, end product exploiters, and administrative types be parcelled out and protected under a new security compartmentation system to operate concomitantly with the compartmentation systems. While the DIA suggestion was totally unpopular with the CIA representatives who met to discuss it, the underlying problem was also recognized. Simply stated the problem appeared to be that too many people, largely from DIA and MPIC, had been and are being processed for tional approvals whose information needs are modest, static, and mainly related to the basic vital statistics of an operational

tional approvals whose information needs are modest, static, and mainly related to the basic vital statistics of an operational capability. The CIA group countered the DIA suggestion with the idea that the kinds of information involved be enumerated and, in an appropriate policy paper, be programmed for immediate or

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Identification of NRP Information that May be Handled in Other than Control Channels 25X1A System into the TALENT Security eventual release from the Control System. The DIA representatives came to share the CIA group's view that avoidance of another system was desirable and that protection under TALENT with its strikingly similar security standards to would afford the information in-25X1A volved proper safekeeping. To protect the interests of project managers of the MRP, the task force built into the paper several checks and balance safeguards: a) A dichotomy is presented under which some items information are automatically releaseable into 25X1A TALENT but all others (noted by asteriaks) may be released into TALENT only with D/NRO approval following coordination with Directors of Program Offices. The Director of Security, CIA, will generally 25X1A monitor all to TALENT transitions for aircraft/drone 25X1A to TALENT/KEYHOLE transitions information and all for satellite information. With one modification, this Directorate recommends 25X1A your concurrence with the policy presented in 56927. It is suggested that the Director of Security/CIA be requested to provide your Office with reports following publication of the COMOR Directive which, on a semiannual basis, will summarize the to TALENT flow over the period and provide re-25X1A operational assurance, based on these reviews, that security has not suffered setbacks because of it. 25X1A 25X1A Executive Officer Directorate of Science and Technology 25X1A Attachments: unium 1 Excluded from actamatin 25X1A 56929/66 cy #1 daya roding aau 56927/66 cy #6 dostadilite (in) 0186/66

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
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