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on station, to outmaneuver weather and to make fast transits.

A recent speech by Navy Secretary Paul R. Ignatius, saying that the Navy would ask the Defense Department for a mix of conventional and nuclear escorts, has led some Navy men to conclude that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara is now more receptive.

Their reasoning: McNamara would have censored it out of the speech if he didn't agree.

The Defense Department, however is now deep in its pre-budget weighing of military systems. It could hop either way on the nuclear ship issue.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I am delighted to yield to the distinguished gentleman from California, a member of the committee.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for the excellent report he has brought to us from the special committee which has traveled to Southeast Asia.

I think that in addition to the importance of the subcommittee interim report which he has made, the remarks that he has made in connection with the failure of the Department of Defense to proceed with the nuclear ships that have been requested by the Committee on Armed Services are most important.

It is not necessary to receive briefings in connection with what Russia is doing in the Mediterranean in their buildup of their navy. We can read in our weekly news magazines about the large nuclear navy that they are developing. This is a matter of concern to our Navy and to our military people and to those of us who serve on the Committee on Armed Services.

I think it is a most important contribution that the chairman of the committee has made this afternoon. I certainly agree that you are making a most modest request, Mr. Chairman, when you ask for only two nuclear frigates and that from here on out we proceed to give the Navy what they need and we demand that this be given to them.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

I want to say this—this Russian threat is not kidding. They are determined to take over the Middle East. Just today they flew missions in Yemen of Soviet pilots and Soviet planes, I am informed. We have long, long drawn-out lines in far away Asia and we need nuclear surface ships.

I cannot, to save me, understand why the Secretary of Defense is holding up construction of these two ships. It may be pride—I do not know what it is. But here the Congress has spoken. We have written this in the strongest language of which we are capable. But he continues to thwart the will of the Congress. What are you going to do next year? I am willing to go ahead with the future, but I cannot forget the past.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. HAGAN. I appreciate very much the remarks made by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services this afternoon.

I think it is wonderful that he has brought this report from this excellent subcommittee which has toured Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia.

As was pointed out by my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California, and in the remarks made by our chairman this afternoon, it is great for the people of this country to hear the facts. I wish I knew why the orders of the people's Representatives have not been carried out.

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for making this information available to the people of this country this afternoon.

Mr. RIVERS. I appreciate what the gentleman has said.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIRNIE. I wish to join in this expression of appreciation for the gentleman's interim report. I know the serious intent behind the naming of this committee, and I am convinced that their efforts have been most objective and that we will do well to heed their recommendations.

With respect to the development of nuclear propulsion in our fleet, I have been concerned for a long time that we were not sufficiently progressive with regard to the development of a nuclear task force so that they could proceed as a unit with respect to carrying out the many assignments of which they would be capable.

I hope that the remarks which the gentleman made this afternoon will serve to bring into such clear perspective the will of Congress that immediate steps will be taken to assure us that the wishes of the people will be respected.

I thank you for your efforts.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the chairman very much. I wish to say to the gentleman that I recognize we should not have two reports, one on top of the other, but this is the only opportunity I shall have to speak before this session will have adjourned. That is the reason I bring these reports. Mr. HARDY's report is timely and needed. Second, the nuclear propulsion matter is something I wanted to bring to you before we leave.

FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. PASSMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. PASSMAN. I thank the gentleman very much.

In my candid opinion, every member of the conference on foreign aid of the other body and of this House should sign the report twice. This is the most marvelous victory that the House conferees have ever won on foreign aid. After a somewhat disagreeable conference, you cannot satisfy all the people all the time. The Senate yielded on \$424,754,000. Your House conferees yielded on only \$119,080,000. It is the greatest victory for the House since the inception of foreign aid, percentagewise, on cuts. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RIVERS. So you have finished your report; we can adjourn this week.

Mr. PASSMAN. So far as I am concerned, we shall. We have a marvelous report to bring in.

Mr. RIVERS. Now that you have finished, you can go home. Thank you very much.

Mr. BOW. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. BOW. In response to the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana, three members of the conference did not sign the report because it is \$119 million over the House figure. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri, a member of the committee.

Mr. HALL. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and in an attempt to get back into orbit, I would like to associate myself with the remarks made in the well of the House by the gentleman from South Carolina and to compliment him for bringing this bivalent report not only to Members of the Congress but to the people of the Nation. It is most timely. Coming from him, after his distinguished leadership, it will mean much.

Having often called for the resignation of the instant Secretary of Defense, I shall not comment more about his repeated errors of judgment or his usurpation of the executive privilege. But I do think it is important that we reemphasize what the distinguished chairman has brought back to the people today, namely, that we must eliminate sanctuaries as his subcommittee has reported; and, second, the national scandal of allowing any aircraft flak to build up to the point at which it forces those who would interdict supplies to our men fighting against aggression in South Vietnam up to the place where the surface-to-air missiles can shoot them down.

Insofar as the nuclear frigates are concerned, it has often been proved to every member of the Committee on Armed Services, as the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina has so well said, that a nuclear-powered task force can train as it deploys. This is all that needs to be said.

Mr. RIVERS. It is so simple, people do not talk about it.

They can train at full speed. Speed is no anchor, and energy is no anchor.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, this has been demonstrated. But I want to point out that had it not been for this Congress and its Committee on Armed Services, under the leadership of the distinguished gentleman through the years even before he became chairman of the committee, we would not have the strategic military airlift that could do as was done yesterday, deploy a division in less than 21 days 12,000 miles halfway around the world.

Mr. RIVERS. I take no credit for that. I will say the gentleman is entitled to as much credit for this as I am. This very exercise was discussed in our committee in 1960, the deployment in Southeast Asia should these 141's ever be built. The 141's are built.

The last came off the line. I saw it roll off. We have over 160 of them, and they can deploy troops very fast.

Mr. HALL. If the gentleman will yield further, I will make one further observation. It is also true we would have neither an undersea nuclear-propelled Navy nor a surface nuclear capability if it were not for the Congress of the United States passing mandatory authorization law and mandatory usage of appropriations; and, had the Secretary of Defense accepted the advice of the committee, under the distinguished chairman, we would not be defenseless against the FOBS—that is, the fractional orbital bombing system.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from California.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and suggest to the House that the very distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in my judgment, has performed a magnificent service, not only to the House of Representatives, but to the people of this country, of the United States. In many ways his comments here today are somewhat reminiscent of comments of a very distinguished American a few years ago, Billy Mitchell, when he tried to alert the Nation to the fact that airpower and the use of aircraft would serve in the interest of the security of this Nation.

As one of the pilots who served on aircraft carriers under operational circumstances during World War II, I want to testify to the accuracy of the comments made by the gentleman and compliment him for bringing this very important matter, relating to nuclear aircraft carriers, to the Congress today.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I have been deeply interested in the outstanding speech made by the distinguished leader of the Armed Services Committee today. He touched upon some very crucial matters, both in presenting the report of the fine committee that has been sent to the Far East and also in pinpointing and emphasizing the importance of the nuclear development of naval craft.

It is a field to which the gentleman from South Carolina has given his constant attention, as he has given it to other fields connected with the armed services. The interpretations he has made not only in this area but in every other area related to this country have been preeminent and outstanding in every respect. I think that fact is recognized not only by members of his committee, but also by Members of the House, who are familiar with the constant attention and diligence and expertise the gentleman from South Carolina has exercised in all his close attention and work with respect to these matters.

I think it is very important that the Members of the House should have the benefit of the excellent report that has

been forwarded here from the Far East in respect to the findings and recommendations of the subcommittee that has been sent there by the chairman to make these very important evaluations.

I also think that of the greatest importance perhaps to the defense and security of this country is that the Committee on Armed Services, both in the House and in the other body, and the Members of this Congress should become vitally aware, as the distinguished chairman had urged they should become, concerning the paramount importance and paramount urgency of developing and pressing forward nuclear development of our Navy, so that the dreams that were experienced some years ago by those who first projected this important subject—including Admiral Rickover and the chairman himself as well as others who are affiliated and associated with this great work—shall be carried forward.

As the gentleman has implied, considering the dangers which surround us not only in the Middle East but elsewhere throughout the world, it is of utmost importance that we should have the best in this jet-powered age of speed, of speedy communication and of speedy movement, the day of the rocket and the day of the jet aircraft. It is to my mind very important that we should not fall behind in the development of naval craft. In that respect, the modernization and the fullest possible implementation of a nuclear navy certainly must be, as the chairman so appropriately recommend here today, one of the major objectives of this Congress.

I commend the chairman for his excellent speech, and I want to assure him of my continued support of his objectives and in regard to what he has spoken of this afternoon so thoughtfully and in such a timely manner.

Again I commend the chairman for the splendid remarks he has made. I know the House will heed his warnings and will follow the prescriptions he has laid down for the nuclear development of a modern navy.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman.

There will be those who will say, "RIVERS and his committee know more than the Department of Defense of what is good for the Navy."

The recent Chief of Naval Operations testified to the need for this DLGN. The former Secretary of the Navy then asked his boss to give him these two DLGN's of the past. He is now Deputy Secretary of Defense. Every military man who is "in the know" has recommended it. We even brought one in from the faraway Pacific, from the Tonkin Gulf, to testify. The Committee on Appropriations recommended it. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, through the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD] has written one of the finest treatises I have ever read on nuclear surface propulsion for our Navy.

So we are in company with everybody who is supposed to know. Everybody who is supposed to know has recommended it, and then one man stops it.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIVERS. I yield to a distinguished

Member of the committee, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. RANDALL].

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman.

I happened on the floor not knowing of the gentleman's speech, but the more the gentleman talked the better it sounded. The gentleman has made a great contribution.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. RANDALL. I am pleased that I had the chance to hear him.

The chairman of our committee is to be commended. I want to associate myself with this remarks. More than that, I want to say that when the committee meets, as a member of the committee, I am sure the gentleman is going to have most of the members of his committee back of him, perhaps the entire committee. Many of us feel like the chairman of our committee.

There is no excuse for some of the things that are going on about which the gentleman spoke. Executive privilege is all right. Rather it is all right in its place. But the language the gentleman spoke about was mandatory language. The very plain facts are that the Department of Defense has made no compliance with our mandatory language and no effort to comply.

Mr. RIVERS. There is no effort. There has been complete and total ignoring of the Congress, ignoring of the law, ignoring of the security of the United States. What can be more intolerable? I just do not know.

Mr. RANDALL. I want to take this one moment to say again the gentleman has performed a service to this country. Our distinguished chairman has performed a real service today in calling attention once more to something the Defense Department has omitted, to do to something that has not been done, to some thing which somehow in some way must be done.

Mr. RIVERS. We will find a way to force this issue and to force this decision.

I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requirement for time.

SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF LOURDES ACADEMY IN CLEVELAND

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, Lourdes Academy has stood as a monument to education in my congressional district in Cleveland for 75 years. Its registration has increased yearly. The words of its alma mater "Light of Lourdes, be as a flame; make us worthy of your name" symbolizes the spirit of those who have been fortunate enough to attend this excellent school. In 1896 the first graduating class consisted of three young women; since that time more than 4,000 young ladies have graduated from Lourdes Academy. Both of my sisters, Cecelia and Ann, are alumnae of Lourdes; Cecelia returned as Sister Ann Cecile to join the faculty and has taught there for a number of years.

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officers had seen the possibilities of using nuclear power for naval propulsion.

Following a period of intensive debate within the Government, as it not unusual in the face of revolutionary change, the Atomic Energy Commission, in April 1948, authorized a Submarine Thermal Reactor project proposed by the Navy. The first research and conceptual design work on the reactor was done here in Chicago, at the Argonne National Laboratory.

A naval officer from Chicago, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, has played the central role. He was the leading advocate of nuclear power for naval use and he has been in charge of the program responsible for the application of nuclear power to naval ships.

We are still reaping the benefits of the foresight and energy of this great American. In a moment, I will describe the extent to which the U.S. Navy has made the transition to nuclear propulsion. That background is important because we face decisions that will determine the role of the nuclear-powered surface escort in the Navy. I refer to the application of nuclear power to ship types which are outgrowths of the World War II destroyer—the guided missile frigates and destroyers. It is this issue of nuclear power which I will address tonight.

In January 1955, USS *Nautilus*, the first nuclear-powered submarine, put to sea. Other nuclear-powered attack submarines followed, and will total 68 when those authorized complete construction. The operational accomplishments of these ships are well known to you:

Voyages under the polar ice cap by *Nautilus* and *Skate*,

Surfacing at the North Pole by *Skate*.

Circumnavigation of the globe, while submerged, by *Triton*.

Steaming on nuclear power for more than 60,000 miles, without refueling, by *Nautilus*.

It was these early phenomenal successes with submarines that led to the strategic concept of relatively invulnerable underwater platforms for ballistic missiles.

Largely through the leadership of Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the Navy and private industry joined the capabilities of nuclear-powered submarines to an underwater-launched ballistic missile system and produced our country's most nearly survivable deterrent system, commonly referred to as Polaris.

In November 1960, the first Polaris submarine, USS *George Washington*, deployed on patrol. Today, only 7 years later all 41 of the authorized fleet ballistic missile submarines have entered the Fleet.

At the same time, work on applying the advantages of nuclear power to the surface Navy went ahead with the result that USS *Enterprise*, the largest attack aircraft carrier ever built, and the guided missile cruiser, USS *Long Beach*, were commissioned in 1961.

USS *Bainbridge*, a nuclear-powered guided missile frigate, was commissioned in 1962, and her sister ship, USS *Truxtun*, joined the Fleet in June of this year.

Enterprise, *Long Beach*, and *Bainbridge* have completed recent deployments to the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific. With these ships and *Truxtun*, the Navy is gaining operational experience with nuclear-powered surface ships.

Enterprise and *Long Beach* have shown the ease with which nuclear-powered ships can steam at speeds of more than 30 knots for indefinite periods, permitting the prompt deployment of naval offensive power to any point of need. Last June, when it was possible that naval forces would be required in the Red Sea, *Enterprise* and *Long Beach*, then in the South China Sea, could have been placed on station in the Suez Canal area within a period of about one week. Conventionally powered ships that were available, including supporting fleet oilers, would have taken almost twice that time.

While in the Seventh Fleet, *Long Beach* was assigned to a task in support of air operations against North Vietnam. This task required *Long Beach's* maintaining an independent station in a relatively small area. Since *Long Beach* did not have to withdraw from station to refuel periodically, and since she could steam at higher speed than conventional ships while in transit to station, she was able to be on the line almost a month longer than a conventional ship.

Thus, from such experience, we are establishing firm evidence of just some of the operational advantages that can be derived from nuclear-powered surface ships.

Throughout the Seventh Fleet deployment of these nuclear-powered ships, their operations were characterized by high reliability of the engineering plants and an instant readiness to move from one assignment to another without the time delay involved in dependence on fleet oilers.

In the sustained type of operations being conducted in Southeast Asia, nuclear power minimizes the periods these ships are off station or in transit from one task assignment to another. In terms of utilization, experience in that area shows that three nuclear ships can do what four conventionally powered ships do in a similar six to seventh month deployment. This factor is particularly significant in extended combat situations, like Vietnam, where rotation of ships on and off the line and from one task group to another is required to sustain the level of pressure desired.

The future course of Naval nuclear-powered ship construction will be judged and decided against this background of 12 years' experience.

We have moved aggressively to develop a force of nuclear-powered attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines, and attack carriers. Many of these ships are already at sea. Their operational experience, in diverse missions, has been beyond anything we could have imagined 20 years ago.

The Navy is planning a construction program for nuclear-powered attack carriers in alternate years. Construction of USS *Nimitz* will commence soon and the Secretary of Defense has approved two additional nuclear-powered carriers, programmed to start in fiscal year 1969 and 1971.

The unresolved issue before the Navy is how many and what kind of nuclear-powered escort ships we should build, such as *Long Beach*, *Bainbridge*, and *Truxtun*, in order to escort and support our attack carriers, both nuclear and conventionally-powered, and to give added operational flexibility to all types of naval task forces.

The question involves a complex analysis of whether the greater cost of nuclear-powered surface escort ships is offset by their greater effectiveness. The best course of action is less clear than nuclear power for submarines and attack carriers. Escort ships will have to perform multiple combat tasks, similar in scope to the missions assigned to the work-horse World War II destroyer with which many of you are familiar.

Our present-day surface escort fleet—the destroyers, destroyer escorts, frigates and cruisers that give protection to our carrier task forces, underway replenishment groups, and amphibious task forces—contains many ships that were built in World War II. These are rapidly approaching the point where the combat capability they represent must be supplemented and improved by new ships.

The Navy is embarked on an analysis to define the type and number of escorts required in the future. We are looking at all the traditional destroyer tasks—detection and killing of submarines; defense against aircraft and, in the modern combat environment against missiles; shore bombardment; and a capability for self-defense when operating independently or at long distances from the task force which the escort is assigned to support.

We will want whatever freedom from base or mobile logistical support that is attainable, and some proportion of our escorts should be capable of steaming at high speeds with our large attack carriers in all sorts of sea conditions.

The combat capabilities these ships will have are determined by the various kinds and levels of enemy threats we foresee in the 1970s. We must be ready to defeat forces available to the enemy in order to defend our own offensive naval task forces. Much technological progress is being made to design new sonars of high capability to detect submarines and advanced radars to permit early warning of hostile aircraft and missiles. Similar developmental efforts are leading to modern weapons and countermeasures of markedly increased capability to meet the anticipated threat on, under, and over the seas.

It is not a simple matter, however, to relate the various enemy threats we must be capable of deterring, or defeating, in the 1970s to a requirement for nuclear power in our escort ships. The operational advantage it affords is clear, but other considerations influence the decision both for and against nuclear power. Accordingly, I would like to review with you some of the issues involved.

There is no question that if the costs were the same, a nuclear ship would be superior to a conventionally-powered ship because of the advantages of being free from the requirement to refuel. However, the costs are not equal. A nuclear-powered escort ship costs about twice as much to build as a conventionally-powered ship.

The initial costs are greater for a number of reasons. However, initial investment is not a full indication of true cost. The costs of operating the ship over its service life must also be considered in order to determine its lifetime or true cost.

For example, though the power plant of the nuclear ship costs more in the beginning, it operates without refueling for a period of years. A conventionally-powered ship requires large amounts of fuel oil every few days under normal operating conditions. The cost of the millions of gallons of fuel oil used by the conventionally-powered ship over a period of years would be included in its lifetime cost, but not in its initial cost. The cost of supplying this fuel also must be charged to the operating cost of the conventionally-powered ship. In the same vein, the cost of replacement of reactor cores must be charged to the operating costs of nuclear-powered ships.

These and other calculations indicate that the lifetime cost ratio of nuclear and conventionally-powered ships is not approximately two-to-one, as in the case of investment cost, but more like 1.5-to-one.

Thus, even taking account of all the relevant lifetime costs, the nuclear ship costs more. We must, therefore, be selective in determining the proper mix between nuclear and non-nuclear powered ships for our new construction and modernization programs.

With amphibious and logistic forces, for example, the advantages of the nuclear-propelled escort are not particularly great, because of the slower speed and limited endurance of the other ships involved.

On the other hand, nuclear-propelled escorts would be most useful when accompanying our high-speed carriers and when the escorts are on independent missions that require endurance and flexible response not limited by the necessity to refuel.

I referred earlier to the analytical studies we are conducting to gain insights on these complex matters. These studies include strategic and tactical war scenarios that permit many variations in the interaction between friendly and enemy forces.

Let me illustrate what I mean. We have looked in detail at combat situations which could be encountered both in the Western Pacific and North Atlantic. In each of these

areas, our own capabilities and those of an enemy vary in response to proximity of bases, logistical requirements, local forces, the mobility of main forces, and a host of other factors that are not fixed. By exhaustive examination of combinations of these factors, it is possible to see more clearly the escort force level and capabilities that the Navy should have in the 1970s for a proper balance between offensive and defensive capabilities.

First, it becomes clear that we need more destroyers to deal with an enemy submarine threat than to deal with the air threat, because submarines are harder to detect and destroy than aircraft. This confirms the essential wisdom of the present configuration of our destroyer force.

All our ships are equipped to deal with the submarine threat but only some are also equipped to deal with the complete spectrum of the air threat.

Second, our studies show that, in the event of a war involving our naval task forces and enemy submarines, aircraft and missiles, we would need so many destroyers for such diverse tasks that it would not be economical to have all of them nuclear powered.

Third, the analyses show that there is a strong case to be made for having some *conventionally*-propelled destroyers exclusively equipped to sink submarines and additional *conventionally*-propelled destroyers equipped to counter aircraft, missiles, and submarines, and to provide gunfire support.

The studies, therefore, make it clear that the combination of these two categories of *conventionally*-powered destroyers can escort most efficiently all of our naval forces and convoys *except* our fast carriers.

There are, however, *substantial* advantages in having nuclear power in ships which must escort nuclear powered carriers.

If the escorts must refuel or replenish more frequently than the *nuclear*-powered carriers they escort, then the operational advantage of these carriers is diminished. The entire task force can take fuller advantage of these benefits if the escorts are nuclear powered.

At the same time, the endurance of nuclear-powered escorts also provides a flexibility for stationing and for independent tasks when in company with *conventionally*-powered carriers.

While all the benefits of nuclear propulsion for surface ships are not easily quantifiable in the context of studies, they are readily apparent to tactical commanders.

First, there is the increased tactical flexibility made possible by unlimited endurance at high speed. We can deploy a nuclear-powered ship from the West Coast to the South China Sea in nine days while a normal transit for conventionally-powered ships is close to 15 days.

Second, nuclear power makes possible longer, round-about routes to avoid storms.

Third, in wartime, high-speed endurance would enhance the ability of carrier task forces to attack enemy shores along a greater perimeter of coastline. It would also enhance their ability to evade and outrun submarine attack.

Fourth, they could make high-speed transits for the aviation fuel and ammunition needed to continue in action, if this were necessary. They could postpone such replenishment if the dangers of carrying it out at a given moment were very high. They would not be concerned with a loss of fuel oil facilities or with the problems of a refueling rendez-vous enroute to destination.

These factors, and others like them, are important to the tactical commander, but difficult to quantify in economic terms. We believe they are of sufficient weight, however, to offset the increased costs of nuclear power and to justify a force of both nuclear and conventionally powered escorts.

Apart from cost, there are other factors that tend to limit the number of nuclear

ships the Navy can usefully employ. One such factor is personnel. The rate at which the Navy would be able to train officers and men to operate and maintain a substantial increase in nuclear power plants would be limited, in view of the length and depth of the training involved. Moreover, retention in the Navy of such highly skilled technicians will always be a continuing problem. We have already cut into the available cadre of highly technical personnel in manning the 114 nuclear submarines and ships now in the Fleet or authorized. To the extent this is done, the calibre and skill of men left to man non-nuclear ships becomes progressively lower.

A second limitation is the industrial base for making nuclear propulsion equipment. While this base has expanded as a result of the naval reactors program, much of it is currently committed to commercial and industrial power programs and thus not readily available for meeting Navy needs. Although the industrial base can and undoubtedly will be expanded, it will take time and could add to the current costs for nuclear-powered ships.

We in the Navy have made a detailed review of these complex considerations, keeping in perspective the anticipated threat to our forces in the 1970s. The calculations on force requirements should leave no room for unnecessary risk. If we are to deter aggression, the forces we develop must be capable of defeating that aggression should it nevertheless occur.

But we should bear in mind that the Navy offers the decision-maker a unique choice of options to control and limit conventional warfare once initiated. If we are to preserve this flexibility and advantage of sea power, we must maintain our ability to defend our offensive striking forces against a variety of threats. It is through a strong defense that the options to commit various levels of naval offensive power are preserved.

If the United States were challenged at sea, it might be in our interest to confine conflict to the areas of the sea. But to do so, we would require a flexible and effective defense against enemy forces that operated from safe bases. Obviously, there would be an equal premium on offensive task forces of our own that could engage and defeat the enemy at sea, but these task forces must be defended until victory is won.

The same sort of balance between the offense and the defensive forces that give our task forces freedom of operation applies to options available to the decision-maker to counter a limited war initiated by an aggressor on land.

In judging these many factors, the Navy believes it should go forward with a long-range program to construct both nuclear-powered and conventionally-powered escorts.

It is clear that *all* escort ships should *not* be nuclear powered because their additional costs are not offset by operational advantages in some of the missions to be performed. It is equally clear to the Navy, however, that *some* of its escort ships should be nuclear-powered.

The Navy will propose to the Secretary of Defense, within the next few weeks, a construction program for fleet escorts that will include both nuclear and conventionally powered ships. This program looks to an expansion of the numbers of our nuclear powered ships over the next five years. With the construction of these ships, and the construction of additional conventionally-powered escorts, the surface escort forces will be modernized to meet the anticipated threat of the 1970s.

The pay-off in a Navy properly balanced with nuclear power is high. All of the traditional characteristics of naval power are enhanced. An offensive striking force may be placed quickly anywhere in the world where the oceans and seas allow. The naval options available to the nation in time of crisis will be more responsive to demand

than ever before. And, as I have suggested, these options include deployment to the area of threat without commitment until the political decision is made.

I appreciate this opportunity to review with you a matter of great importance to the Navy. The officers and men of the Navy appreciate the support they have always received from Chicago and the Middle West, and in their behalf I express thanks to all of you.

PRESS RELEASE

(By Donald H. May)

WASHINGTON.—The Navy is preparing to build three new nuclear-powered surface escort ships even though it doesn't quite have the \$420 million cash in hand to pay for them.

Beyond this, the Navy also is angling for authority to build a lot more nuclear-powered ships for use in the mid 1970s. First of them are three guided missile frigates, similar to the atom-powered Bainbridge, commissioned in 1962, and the Truxton, commissioned last May.

Shipbuilders submitted construction proposals, similar to bids, to the Navy last month for the proposed new frigates. These are now being studied and the Navy will negotiate with the firm making the best offer.

The Navy could wind up making contracts contingent on its getting the money.

This is the result of a complex debate waged for years in Washington over how fast the Navy should switch from oil to nuclear vessels—a change as hard as from sail to coal and coal to oil.

The major congressional committees dealing with military and atomic affairs have generally urged speedy progress toward a nuclear Navy.

The Navy itself has crusaders such as Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, who pioneered nuclear submarines, and others who could be called moderates.

The Defense Department, which controls the Navy's purse strings, has been the most reluctant.

Over the past three years Congress has appropriated \$150.5 million for the first of the three nuclear frigates, \$134.8 million for the second and \$20 million to buy "long lead time" equipment for the third. This totals \$305.3 million in appropriations.

So far, the Defense Department has released to the Navy only \$150.5 million for the first ship. But the Navy believes it has a strong congressional mandate.

In its last authorization bill, Congress denied a request for two conventionally powered guided missile ships, substituted nuclear ships, and goaded the Pentagon to build them "as fast as practicable," unless the President found it would not be in the "national interest."

There has been no presidential veto.

The Navy now has one nuclear aircraft carrier, the Enterprise and is scheduled to have three more built by 1974. The current debate is over how many nuclear-powered escort ships these carriers should have.

A Navy project called the Major Fleet Escort study, conducted between January and July, came to the conclusion that there should be three kinds of escorts—antisubmarine warfare destroyers, anti-aircraft missile ships, and a smaller number of nuclear-powered missile ships.

The report said there would be strong advantages to having a capability to assign one nuclear escort ship to each of the Navy's 15 attack carriers or alternatively to assign all-nuclear escort groups (traditionally four ships to each of the four planned nuclear carriers).

The 14 months the Enterprise and Bainbridge have spent in waters off Vietnam, along with eight months for the nuclear cruiser Long Beach, have provided Navy men with new arguments for nuclear power. They cite the ability of the ships to stay longer

One of the most encouraging aspects of the war, to date, is the increasing confidence and admiration expressed by American commanders for the ARVN forces. However, more ARVN troops are required, for eventually these forces must achieve and maintain the security of their own nation.

Mr. Speaker, this subcommittee is still hard at work in the Far East. I have been very much impressed with the interim report which they have submitted to me. From my own knowledge, I am able to say that I concur in their observations. I hope it will be possible for me to make a further report to this House in the not-to-distant future.

NUCLEAR-POWERED NAVY

Mr. Speaker, I would like to discuss another vital matter and that is the very important issue of providing nuclear propulsion for the new major fleet escorts the Navy must build for our naval striking forces.

Some of you may have seen the recent press releases which reported on a speech given by the new Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Paul R. Ignatius, in which he announced that the Navy will propose to the Secretary of Defense, within the next few weeks, a construction program for fleet escorts that will include both nuclear and conventionally powered ships. In his speech, Mr. Ignatius cites the many important advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface warships and the superior performance of the nuclear carrier *Enterprise*, the nuclear cruiser *Long Beach*, and the nuclear frigate *Bainbridge* during deployment with the 7th Fleet off Vietnam. He points out that—

The Navy is planning a construction program for nuclear-powered attack carriers in alternate years. Construction of USS *Nimitz* will commence soon and the Secretary of Defense has approved two additional nuclear-powered carriers, programmed to start in fiscal year 1969 and 1971.

The unresolved issue before the Navy is how many and what kind of nuclear-powered escort ships we should build, such as *Long Beach*, *Bainbridge*, and *Truxtun*, in order to escort and support our attack carriers, both nuclear and conventionally-powered, and to give added operational flexibility to all types of naval task forces.

Nuclear-propelled escorts would be most useful when accompanying our high-speed carriers and when the escorts are on independent missions that require endurance and flexible response not limited by the necessity to refuel.

Secretary Ignatius says that there are "substantial advantages in having nuclear power in ships which must escort nuclear powered carriers. He continues:

If the escorts must refuel or replenish more frequently than the nuclear-powered carriers they escort, then the operational advantage of these carriers is diminished. The entire task force can take full advantage of these benefits if the escorts are nuclear-powered.

At the same time the endurance of nuclear powered escorts also provide a flexibility for stationing and for independent tasks when in company with conventionally powered carriers.

While all the benefits of nuclear propulsion for surface ships are not easily quantifiable in the context of studies, they are readily apparent to tactical commanders.

In his speech the Secretary of the Navy tabulated a number of the major advantages of nuclear surface warships.

However, most of the rest of the speech is devoted to discussing the fact that the Navy is carrying on a "complex analysis of whether the greater cost of nuclear-powered escort ships is offset by their greater effectiveness."

This "complex analysis" apparently does not consider many of the major advantages of nuclear propulsion since in his speech the Secretary said these advantages are "not easily quantifiable in the context of studies."

I recently wrote a letter to Mr. Ignatius in which I said:

Now that the Defense Appropriations for fiscal year 1968 have been signed into law by the President, it is appropriate to inquire when the Department of the Navy is going to contract for building the two nuclear propelled frigates for which funds have been authorized and appropriated this year?

I trust that the answer will not be to point to studies being made for there have been too many studies already. This is why the authorization statute carries mandatory language.

I received an answer on October 24 stating:

The overall escort shipbuilding program is currently under intensive discussion within the Department of Defense. As a result, the funds for the nuclear-powered frigates have not yet been released by the Secretary of Defense.

I infer from the Secretary of the Navy's letter that the DLGN program already authorized is now being confused by the DX/DXGN program being studied by the DOD for the future. I am not so naive as to fail to realize that the "overall escort shipbuilding program," which includes the Navy's current studies of future major fleet escort requirements involving DX's, DXG's, and DXGN's could be used as an excuse to delay for several years the construction of the two nuclear-powered frigates authorized this year.

What we need is to build more nuclear powered surface warships now, and not waste time making some more useless studies. The Congress has made its position on this matter crystal clear. For the last 2 years the Congress has refused to appropriate funds for the non-nuclear guided missile ships requested by the Department of Defense and has substituted nuclear-powered guided missile ships for the non-nuclear guided missile ships. The authorization acts for the last 2 years have contained mandatory language that the contracts for the construction of the nuclear powered guided missile ships authorized by the Congress "shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that their construction is not in the national interest."

Despite this language the Department of Defense is apparently still "studying" whether or not to build these nuclear powered escorts when they should be complying with the law enacted by Congress and signed by the President that requires that they be built as soon as practicable.

I hope the Department of Defense is not confusing the DXGN's of the future with the DLGN's of the present. The Committee on Armed Services and the Congress want two more nuclear-powered frigates started this year.

Further, the conference report of the Senate-House Armed Services Committees of May 22, 1967, on the fiscal year 1968 defense authorization stated categorically that the money authorized for contract definition of new destroyer types—called the DX/DXG—shall not be used to study or design new guided missile ships (DXG) not powered with a naval nuclear propulsion plant. Frankly, I do not know how Congress can make its position on this matter any more clear. We are bound and determined that we shall provide our Navy with nuclear powered surface warships. We must build a modern nuclear Navy without delay.

The Secretary's speech says that some missions for destroyer types do not require the advantages of nuclear propulsion and that we therefore need both nuclear and conventional escort ships. But he does not point out that we already have a lot of conventional escorts and only three nuclear escorts in operation. Clearly the urgent need now is to get on with building more nuclear escorts for the striking forces—these must take priority over any increases in conventional escorts that may also be required for the less severe requirements of the nonstriking forces.

I repeat: the three nuclear frigates that have already been authorized by Congress in the last 3 years must be contracted for now. That is the law. If the Department of Defense and the Navy think that the Congress will retreat from its insistence on the steady and progressive conversion of our naval striking forces to nuclear power they simply are not facing reality.

Endless "studies" have been used as an excuse to procrastinate on this issue far too long. It is time that everybody recognize that phase is over. I assure you I speak for the entire Armed Services Committee on this matter. The use of "studies" to delay the utilization of nuclear power in warships has been so obvious and so flagrant an abuse that I think we must look more carefully at how the Department of Defense is increasing its expenditures for studies of all types. If we are not getting more for our money out of other Defense studies than we have in the case of nuclear power, we should stop allowing money to be spent on them.

Congress will meet its constitutional responsibility to "provide and maintain a Navy." In these days of rapidly increasing Soviet naval strength including both missile launching and attack nuclear submarines, rapidly declining access to overseas bases, and the increasing importance of flexibility in the deployment of our naval striking forces, nuclear powered warships are a vital requirement for our national security. Congress has made it clear that it can, must, and will provide them.

Mr. Speaker, unless contract awards are made for the two nuclear powered

frigates, to which I have referred, by January of 1968, I am contemplating asking the Committee on Armed Services that no authorization of any major items be approved by the Congress next year, unless the President makes a finding as is required by law.

I am sick and tired of having the Committee on Armed Services and the Congress of the United States treated like little children. We represent the people of the United States.

Not a single member of the Department of Defense has been elected by the people. The people I represent, the people the members of the Committee on Armed Services represent, and the people the House represent want two more nuclear powered frigates in our fleet. They want them started now.

I will not tolerate any further delay by the arrogance of one man who seeks to thwart the will of Congress and I herewith and hereby serve notice.

Mr. Speaker, if there is no objection I will insert in the RECORD at this point the press statements, the speech by the Secretary of the Navy, and my recent exchange of correspondence on this subject with the Secretary, to which I referred:

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., October 5, 1967.

HON. PAUL R. IGNATIUS,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Now that the Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1968 have been signed into law by the President, it is appropriate to inquire when the Department of the Navy is going to contract for building the two nuclear propelled frigates for which funds have been authorized and appropriated this year?

I trust that the answer will not be to point to studies being made for there have been too many studies already. This is why the authorization statute carries mandatory language.

Sincerely,

L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D.C., October 24, 1967.

HON. L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter is in reply to your 5 October query concerning building nuclear-powered frigates.

The overall escort ship building program is currently under intensive discussion within the Department of Defense. As a result, the funds for the nuclear-powered frigates have not yet been released by the Secretary of Defense. The current fiscal uncertainty is a complicating factor. The Department of the Navy is therefore not in a position to negotiate with interested contractors for the construction of the ships. I expect a decision on this subject in the near future.

Please be assured that I will keep you advised of decisions in this regard as soon as they are made.

Sincerely,

PAUL R. IGNATIUS.

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., November 28, 1967.

HON. PAUL R. IGNATIUS,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Earlier this year, your predecessor and the Chief of Naval Opera-

tions informed the Congress that the Navy was conducting a Major Fleet Escort Study and a DX/DXG Concept Formulation which "will have a significant impact on future Navy proposals concerning a long range building program for Major Fleet Escorts, including the question of nuclear power."

A recent United Press release indicates that at least some of these studies have been completed. The release said:

"A Navy project called the Major Fleet Escort Study conducted between January and July, came to the conclusion that there should be three kinds of escorts—antisubmarine warfare destroyers, antiaircraft missile ships, and as smaller number of nuclear-powered missile ships.

"The report said there would be strong advantages to having a capability to assign one nuclear escort ship to each of the Navy's 15 attack carriers or alternatively to assign all-nuclear escort ships (traditionally four ships) to each of the four planned nuclear carriers."

In view of my repeated requests for all Department of Defense and Navy studies on this subject, it seems to me that our Committee should be able to expect to receive copies of such studies as soon as they are completed, and certainly before they are available for comment in the press.

Would you please forward to the Committee as soon as possible the studies or parts of studies of the major fleet escort issue that are complete. Please also inform the Committee of the status of any studies of this subject still being pursued.

Sincerely,

L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., December 8, 1967.

HON. L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of November 28, 1967 and am forwarding herewith Volumes 1 and 2 of the Navy's Major Fleet Escort Force Level (MFE) Study and the Supplement on Endurance (and Addendum Analysis thereto), together with my 16 November 1967 forwarding endorsement to the Secretary of Defense. Volume 3 of the Study is still in printing but it will be forwarded as soon as possible upon completion.

I wish to reassure you, Mr. Chairman, that your interest in these studies is understood and appreciated. The Navy was reluctant, however, to forward to you portions of the study prior to the completion of the entire study.

As to the status of any studies on escorts still being pursued, an additional major study effort is now underway. This is the recently initiated ASW Force Level Study which addresses the overall ASW efforts toward providing additional insights as to our force structure in 1975. The study is expected to be completed next August and it will be forwarded to you as soon as possible thereafter.

If you desire, I shall be happy to arrange a briefing for you at your convenience on the studies forwarded herewith and the status of the Navy's study efforts with respect to Major Fleet Escorts.

Your continuing interest and understanding of the Navy's concerns in this area are most appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL R. IGNATIUS.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1967]

NAVY TO REQUEST NUCLEAR ESCORTS

CHICAGO, October 27.—Navy Secretary Paul R. Ignatius announced plans tonight to bolster the Navy's escort fleet with new ships,

some nuclear and some conventionally powered.

In a speech prepared for delivery at a Navy League banquet, Ignatius struck a compromise between arguments for nuclear versus conventional power in escort ships.

He said that in the next few weeks the Navy will propose to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara a five-year shipbuilding program to provide both types of vessels for the 1970s. McNamara has questioned the need for nuclear vessels when conventionally powered ones will do.

Ignatius said nuclear-powered escorts would be best able to keep up in speed and endurance with the four nuclear-powered aircraft carriers the Navy expects to have by that time.

But he also cited factors of cost, limitations in training nuclear ship personnel and limits on nuclear shipbuilding facilities, which he said weighed in favor of some conventional escort ships.

He did not say how many or what percentage of each type the Navy proposed to build or what size escort ships should have nuclear or conventional power.

The House Armed Services Committee has long been urging faster development of nuclear surface ships.

[In Long Beach, Calif., Associated Press reported, Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D.S.C.) said in a Navy Day speech that "I serve notice on the Department of Defense here and now that Congress is not going to retreat from its insistence on the steady and progressive conversion to nuclear power." By progressive, he said, he meant a greater number of nuclear ships each year and development of small nuclear engines "as fast as possible."]

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE PAUL R. IGNATIUS,
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, NAVY LEAGUE NAVY
DAY BANQUET, CHICAGO, ILL., OCTOBER 27,
1967

Ladies and gentlemen: I can think of no more appropriate place for the Secretary of the Navy to be on Navy Day. Chicago's people are hospitable to our personnel, and your industry and technology contribute to our effectiveness. Your city has always been known as a good Navy town.

We are grateful for this, particularly at a time when Naval and Marine Corps personnel are engaged in combat, as they are so courageously today in Vietnam. These fine men are demonstrating each day, by their valor and dedication, that the Naval Service is indeed the Mark of a Man. Your Navy Day theme was well chosen.

Tonight I want to review with you a matter of current and continuing importance to the Navy—the use of nuclear power to propel our ships. We look on Chicago as the place of birth of this greatest advance in naval technology of this century.

Nuclear power was harnessed in Chicago on a cold, windy day in December 1942, when the first chain reaction was achieved on the University of Chicago campus.

Enrico Fermi, the Italian scientist who guided the experiment, proposed to Dr. Arthur H. Compton that the test should take place without delay in the now famous squash court under the west stands of the Stagg Athletic Field.

Dr. Compton has written of the doubts that surrounded that event:

"The experiment would be performed in the midst of a great city. We did not see how a true nuclear explosion, such as that of an atomic bomb, could possibly occur. [But] the outcome of the experiment might... greatly affect the city."

The experiment was a success and, for the first time, the power of the atom was liberated and controlled.

Even before the first test of a fission bomb in the Summer of 1945, far-sighted naval

violators with positive approaches to bring them into the neighborhood community. He said because the churches have a broad outreach they have an important responsibility in seeking solutions to problems. Among the programs Reverend Frey outlined as undertaken by his church and others in Columbus are: a detached ministry, one minister who is supported by three different churches and who works in a particular neighborhood as a trained, accredited friend-at-large; a coffee house ministry, a place where young people of student age can go to discuss the problems of the world and of their souls, away from the sometimes inhibiting atmosphere of the church.

C. L. DUMAREE

C. L. Dumaree, assistant superintendent of the Columbus city schools, discussed the role of education in juvenile delinquency. He noted that such virtues as honesty, integrity, truth, respect, and loyalty must be ingrained into youth and that responsibility is largely in the home, for from birth to age 18 the schools have supervision over the child only 9 percent of the time. A series of slides were presented showing how disadvantaged youth were given special attention by the school system.

WILLIAM D. CLARKE

William D. Clarke, president of Hilscher-Clark Electric Co., of Canton, discussed the businessman's role in the fight against crime:

We can't eliminate crime by eliminating the people. We must do something to alleviate the pressures that cause people to commit crimes.

He described Operation Positive which seeks to solve the root causes of crime. Three things are needed, he said, communication, recreation, and employment:

This program seeks to communicate with the people by meeting with them in their neighborhoods, establishes recreation programs for juveniles, helps children in need with educational problems, has job placement programs, and does many other things to help people and thus combat crime.

ED MASON

The concluding speaker was Ed Mason, former FBI official and now public relations director of the Columbus, Ohio, Dispatch. Mr. Mason stated:

The "Let George do it" theme went out in 1776 when Washington turned over the reigns of government to the people. Each individual must get involved and set a good example in law enforcement and effective government. You will have the kind of government you choose—the kind you deserve. . . . Pride in oneself, one's community, and in the nation is the attitude of a free society. Freedom is the highest form of personal discipline and unless one exercises it, freedom is lost.

Mr. Mason said he was pleased with the good intentions indicated by many present and the large attendance but warned—

The real test is in the actions you take. Crime boils down to being anti-social or immoral activity which offends the sensitivities of the public.

Some of the things of deep concern to all of us should be these—

Mason stated—

1. Our fellow Americans will spend huge sums for roads and recreation but cast convicts into facilities where there is no hope of rehabilitation.

2. Some garbage collectors are paid more than some police officials.

3. We are willing to call police officers trained with a few hours of instructions and no testing of their learned knowledge.

4. Hypocrites preach good deeds then speed like demons on the highways.

5. Adults purchase pornographic literature and then criticize children for reading it.

6. Citizens do not exercise their right and responsibility to vote.

CONCLUSION

The Eighth District Conference on Crime and Law Enforcement was an experiment, to see if the people of my area would join in a frank districtwide meeting on the problems of combating crime and what the citizen can do about it. I am pleased to report to my colleagues in the House that it was a most successful and inspiring event. I believe that taken from this program were many ideas which will be implemented by the church groups, city councils, civic organizations, and individuals themselves. I heartily encourage other Members of Congress to help provide a forum where citizens may gather to plan positive action against our No. 1 internal menace—crime.

LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR TRAVEL IN VIOLATION OF PASSPORT RESTRICTIONS

(Mr. GURNEY (at the request of Mr. ZWACH) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing legislation making it a criminal offense to travel in violation of passport restrictions. The bill would provide for imprisonment of up to 2 years and fines of up to \$10,000.

The time has long passed for giving some bite to toothless travel bans. The State Department is now given authority to prohibit travel of U.S. citizens in certain "restricted" areas. Yet, in the case of the Stokely Carmichaels, who defy these bans, the only action taken is passport revocation, a gentle pat on the wrist.

This year Carmichael went to Cuba in direct breach of this Government's laws. His purpose was to attend a worldwide Communist rally. As a featured speaker at that affair, he spent his allotted time in a tirade of hate against the United States, its President, and its leaders.

He then toured European nations to give them the benefit of his show.

His actions can be called nothing less than traitorous.

Yet, when Carmichael returned yesterday, the State Department people met him to pick up his passport and to give him a receipt for it.

He should have been handed a warrant for his arrest. And my bill would do just that.

When we say Cuba is off limits to the Carmichaels and others or that trips to

chit-chat with Ho Chi Minh may not be made, we should mean just that. My bill would enforce these bans.

Faced with 2 years in jail and a \$10,000 fine, these pals of Communists will think twice before undertaking a junket of hate mongering against their own country.

(Mr. GURNEY (at the request of Mr. ZWACH) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GURNEY'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

LET US STOP CREATING FINANCIAL CHAOS

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD (at the request of Mr. ZWACH) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, the National Republican Coordinating Committee, representing a broad cross section of my party's leadership, met earlier this week in Washington for its final session of 1967. I believe Members on both sides of the aisle who are concerned and even alarmed over the course of fiscal policy in this country will be interested in the full text of a statement which was unanimously approved by the National Republican Coordinating Committee on December 11, 1967. The text of the statement follows:

LET'S STOP CREATING FINANCIAL CHAOS

(Statement by Republican Coordinating Committee, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1967)

The United States is at the brink of a fiscal crisis, the full dimensions of which are not yet clear. International confidence in the dollar is being severely tested. Our dwindling gold supply continues to flow out of the country. Inflation is a grim reality. Interest rates are higher than during last year's serious "credit crunch." They are the highest in some fifty years, for government, for business, for the home builder and the home buyer.

In short, the powerful United States economy has been undermined and weakened by an Administration whose fiscal policies are marked by wild extravagance on the one hand, and by delay, expediency and cover-up on the other.

Our gold supply of \$12.4 billion is the lowest since 1937—down from \$19.4 billion at the end of 1960. More gold is being shipped out of our country in the wake of the 14.3 percent devaluation of the pound and the subsequent challenge to the dollar. Potential foreign claims against our remaining gold supply have risen to over \$30 billion. And these claims will continue to increase as our balance of payments deficit this year will soar more than 50 percent higher than in 1966. We deplore that the Johnson Administration may soon find it necessary to request removal of the remaining gold backing behind our currency, now 25 percent, thus turning it wholly into "paper money."

In spite of the Administration's boast of unrivaled prosperity, employment among America's workers is increasing. From a low of 3.6 percent in March, the unemployment rate climbed to 4.3 percent in October.

Inflation is rampant and will get worse. Due to the failures of the Administration's policies, the cost of living is escalating. Prices went up 3.3 percent in 1966, are now

rising at about a 4 percent annual rate, and some observers predict a 5 percent increase in 1968. The purchasing power of the Nation's wage earners has declined and those who must live on a fixed income are having more and more trouble making ends meet.

Repeatedly the Republican Coordinating Committee has warned that the reckless fiscal policies of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration have been leading the Nation toward fiscal and economic chaos.

Repeatedly, our specific remedies have been rejected.

On April 30, 1965, we recommended a nine-point program to prevent the serious economic problems that were then fast approaching. Our proposals were ignored by the Johnson-Humphrey Administration.

On March 28, 1966, we warned of increasing inflation and recommended a thirteen-point program to stabilize the value of the dollar. Our pleas fell on deaf Administration ears.

For the fiscal year 1967, the President estimated a budget deficit of \$1.8 billion; the actual deficit was \$9.9 billion even after much fiscal hocus pocus by the Administration to improve its appearance.

For the fiscal year 1968, the Administration proposed a budget deficit of \$8.1 billion.

We challenged that figure on April 3, 1967, and predicted "an actual deficit in 1968 of from \$25 to \$30 billion or more." We repeated our recommendation to avoid a deficit of that magnitude.

On July 24, 1967, we reiterated our program to restore fiscal responsibility to government. Again no action was taken by the Administration.

On November 17, 1967, the President created near panic in the world financial markets by mentioning that the deficit might go as high as \$35 billion.

The Democrats have consistently sponsored and encouraged vast rises in Federal spending—which has gone up 97 percent for non-defense purposes since they took office in 1961. By July 1, 1968, the cumulative Democratic deficits for its eight years of office will total over \$60 billion.

Eight years of deficits and irresponsible spending have brought the Nation to the brink of financial crisis.

Irresponsibility always exacts its price. Democratic irresponsibility is now taxing Americans heavily through inflation and the Administration's solution is to add to that burden a ten percent surtax and to raise the possibility of wage and price controls.

We call for new fiscal policies for the government of the United States—policies that will put an end to chronic budget deficits and inflation by eliminating waste in public spending and by establishing a rational order of priorities among Federal programs.

Credibility and confidence must be restored to this Nation's economic affairs.

CORRECTION OF VOTE

Mr. WYDLER. Mr. Speaker, on roll-call No. 347 I am recorded as not voting. I was present and voted "nay." I ask unanimous consent that the permanent RECORD and Journal be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.
H Armed Services

OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE:
NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR NEW
MAJOR FLEET ESCORTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TUNNEY). Under previous order of the House,

the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, in August I appointed a Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture under the chairmanship of the gentleman from Virginia, PORTER HARDY. Its other members are the gentleman from Indiana, CHARLES HALLECK; the gentleman from Louisiana, F. EDWARD HÉBERT; the gentleman from New York, SAMUEL STRATTON; and the gentleman from Alabama, WILLIAM DICKINSON. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES] and I serve as ex officio members.

This has been a hard-working subcommittee and has been meeting constantly since the time it was appointed. Its mission is a challenging and difficult one. I have asked that it determine whether or not there are military plans and objectives now in existence to win the war in Vietnam and whether there is a time schedule for doing so. What is our military ability to meet concurrent emergencies that may arise in other parts of the world which we are committed to meet? What is the state of readiness of our military forces?

If you have not heard about the subcommittee's activities it is because it has purposely carried out its assignment in a manner which would avoid publicity. All of its hearings have been in executive session and the testimony will not be released. This latter decision was made to encourage the witnesses to express themselves freely and fully.

It is a grinding, factfinding task—but also a vital one for the Armed Services Committee and for the Congress.

Since November 24, the subcommittee has been traveling throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asian area. From the day of their departure, they have had in-depth briefings and discussions with CINCPAC in Honolulu; in the Philippines they met with the commanders of the 7th Fleet and the 13th Air Force; they had a full session with General Westmoreland and his staff at Saigon and then traveled throughout Vietnam for on-the-spot meetings with field commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, which included the scene of the recent 3 weeks' battle at Dak To. From Vietnam they went to Thailand and made trips to our bases at Takhli, Udorn, Ubon, Sattahip and U-Tapao. Then they moved to Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, Singapore, Djakarta, Hong Kong, and the CMZ in Korea. They will next visit Tokyo and Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa.

I have been in communication with the subcommittee, and am sure that you would like to hear about some of their impressions and observations during this extensive trip. Let me say that their final report on the still uncompleted study will not be made probably for some months. But I would like to share with you some key portions of the interim, informal report which I have just received from the subcommittee. I am quoting now from that report:

The Members of the Subcommittee are convinced that our military effort in Vietnam is making progress, but we believe that that progress is much too slow. Especially have we been impressed with the superb pro-

fessional performance and profound dedication of all our men in uniform to what is an incredibly difficult task. We believe that in these circumstances the American people owe these brave men complete and unflagging support.

At the same time the Subcommittee feels very strongly that the attention of the Congress and the American people should be called to several specific matters which in our judgment need prompt action if we are to speed the day of victory in Vietnam.

It is the overwhelming judgment of our military Commanders throughout the Pacific area that any pause in the bombing of North Vietnam will serve only to prolong the war and increase American and Allied casualties. The Subcommittee fully shares this view that any temporary cessation of the bombing campaign can be only to our disadvantage.

There is no question that Cambodia is being used by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong as a sanctuary and for regrouping and staging areas in carrying out offensive actions.

Not only are enemy supplies being delivered overland from the North, but there is convincing evidence that supplies are coming into South Vietnam through Cambodia via two major waterborne sources: The Seaport of Sihanoukville and up the Mekong River the lower reaches of which are completely within South Vietnam. This must be known to Prince Sihanouk who refuses publicly to recognize it. It is the firm view of the Subcommittee that adequate search and surveillance measures are not being carried out.

Immediate steps should be taken to correct these intolerable situations.

With respect to the air war in North Vietnam it is the Subcommittee's judgment that this campaign is and has been a tremendous factor in holding down our military casualties in the South. But to carry it out, our pilots are encountering the heaviest and most effective air defenses in history. These consist of numerous highly sophisticated anti-aircraft batteries and Soviet supplied surface-to-air missiles, both of which are taking a costly toll of our pilots and aircraft. In addition the enemy has deliberately positioned these air defenses in heavily populated areas being convinced that they will thus escape attack.

This is an unacceptable condition. The military should be permitted to designate the defenses as primary targets. The present procedure makes flak and SAM (surface-to-air) suppression a very limited part of most attack missions and the Subcommittee learned that no strikes are specifically flown for the primary purpose of destroying flak and SAM installations. The Subcommittee also learned that because of the growing intensity of the SAM missiles and flak, pilots operating over North Vietnam strongly favor the scheduling of such suppression missions and we emphatically urge that their views be carried out. Not only would such missions help to reduce our losses of aircraft and pilots but they would raise pilot morale even more.

As to the port of Haiphong, it is perfectly obvious that North Vietnam and the Viet Cong could not carry on this war without getting their weapons and other war materials from external sources. On the basis of careful study of intelligence reports and military estimates, the Subcommittee is convinced that the principal point of entry is Haiphong.

This port must not be permitted to continue to be a source of their war supply.

Finally, the Subcommittee wishes to emphasize a highly significant requirement that must be met if we are to successfully conclude this war. Additional ARVN forces (South Vietnamese troops) must be expeditiously trained and equipped.