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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Wednesday - 21 June 1967

25X1 1. [redacted] JSW) Mr. Howard Osborn alerted me that Representative Albert Watson had been in touch with the FBI on the WASHINGTON OBSERVER item of 15 May 1967. They had provided no information and suggested that Mr. Watson be in touch with the Agency.

25X1 25X1 2. [redacted] JSW) Senator Peter H. Dominick called to thank me for an [redacted] item which had been sent to him. He also wished to know how he could use this. I assured him he could use it in any way he saw fit and that it should be credited to [redacted]

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25X1 3. [redacted] SW) Talked to Mr. Robert Michaels, House Appropriations Committee staff, on the Craig Hosmer item in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of 19 June. I indicated that some of the dollar figures were inaccurate as were some of the other statements. I also mentioned some of the slight variations in the table of tests. This was enough for his purposes in responding to the Chairman's questions.

25X1 4. [redacted] JSW) Talked to Mr. Woodruff, Senate Appropriations Committee staff, about S. 1035 on which Senators Mundt and Milton Young are co-sponsors. Woodruff agreed with our current strategy and also agreed we should hold off requesting any action by Mundt and Young until Committee action has been taken.

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June 19, 1967

GOP Committee on Nuclear Affairs Statement re Red China H-Bomb

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. CRAIG HOSMER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 19, 1967

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, for the information of all Members of Congress, the following is today's special report of the chairman, GOP Committee on Nuclear Affairs, regarding the Red China H-bomb:

RED CHINA NUCLEAR PROGRESS
From: Rep. Craig Hosmer, Chairman, GOP Committee on Nuclear Affairs.
To: House GOP Conference.

continue Mao Tse-tung's line that "atom bombs are paper tigers" until its capabilities enlarge.

4.—Red China's haste to develop nuclear capability reflects its need for a "deterrent" against the US and USSR as well as a desire for greater influence in international affairs. It also wants to make military developments a springboard for general industrial and technological development, as did the USSR. It believes huge resources and sacrifices are justified on both military and industrial grounds.

5.—Red China's swiftly evolving nuclear capability constitutes a major threat to other nations. Many Kremlinologists believe it underlies deployment of the USSR anti-missile system to a greater extent than US power. Despite Secretary McNamara's obstinacy, it will dictate deployment of a US system. Already it is causing India to think in terms of a nuclear weapons arsenal and undoubtedly Japan soon must re-evaluate its non-nuclear defense posture.

6.—Some feel that, over the long term, Red Chinese technological and industrial progress stimulated by the nuclear effort may create a need for expanded foreign trade and thus a more relaxed attitude toward the world at large. However, the more likely result is that the Chinese concept of the "Middle Kingdom or Celestial Empire"—the idea that China is superior to any other nation and always is right—will inspire an increasingly blatant aggressiveness based on naked nuclear blackmail.

7.—It is clear that Red China aims at the same "nuclear superpower" status enjoyed by the US and USSR. It can be expected rather quickly to overtake and surpass British and French capabilities. Saturday's H-bomb demonstration can be expected to cause nations who "can be" nuclear powers to take a dimmer view of signing any treaty which would pledge them not to become so. On the other hand, the "can't be" powers—those without the scientific and other resources to go nuclear—may now regard such a treaty more favorably if it is accompanied by US guarantees against aggression.

TESTS CONDUCTED

Test No.	Date	Yield	Delivery	Remarks
1	Oct. 16, 1964	20 kt.....	Test tower.....	U ²³⁵ rather than Pu indicated greater sophistication than predicted.
2	May 14, 1965	"Around 40 kt.".....	Air drop.....	Signaled good yield-to-weight ratio (device small enough to be airborne).
3	May 9, 1966	"Over 200 kt.".....	Test tower.....	1st thermonuclear ingredients detected (H-bomb objective indicated).
4	Oct. 27, 1966	None announced.....	400- to 500-mile missile..	Excellent improvement in yield-to-weight ratio in U ²³⁵ bomb.
5	Dec. 27, 1966	"A few hundred kilotons".....	Test tower.....	2d evidence of TM ingredients (probably proof test of H-bomb "trigger").
6	June 17, 1967	2 to 7 mt.do.....	H-bomb proof test.

1 U.S. Minuteman warhead popularly tabbed at 1 mt. yield.

CONCLUSIONS

1.—Red China spends about \$½ billion annually on its nuclear weapons program and possibly an equal amount on development of delivery systems. This totals some 4% of GNP. The two efforts require at least 7½% of available scientific and technical personnel and seem not to have been interrupted or delayed by current disturbances within the country.

2.—Red China is anxious to achieve a flexible nuclear weapons capability, including solid fuel rockets. It has tested aircraft and intermediate range nuclear deliveries and is known to be able to fire medium-range missiles from submarines. Undoubtedly it will test successfully an ICBM prior to 1975, the date predicted by Defense Secretary McNamara. It can be expected to launch a satellite as soon as possible to prove its missile capabilities. This can be expected within 12-18 months.

3.—Red China may have an existing arsenal of around 30 A-bombs in yields of 200 KT and below—still small compared to US and USSR arsenals.