

TOP SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL  
SURVEY  
OF  
CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

12 July 1966

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1 Publications Survey Team:

25X1 Chairman - [Redacted]

25X1 [Redacted]

Dick Lehman (DDI)

[Redacted]

25X1 Typist: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

Distribution:	Copy	1	IG
	2		Exec Dir - Des.
	3		Destroyed 10-6-66
	4		[Redacted] SEC
	5		Destroyed 10-6-66
	6		"
	7		"
	8		"
	9		"
	10		"
	11		"
	12		"
	13		"
	14		"
	15		"

25X1

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

12 JUL 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Survey of CIA Intelligence Publications

1. In accordance with your instructions I have had a survey made of Agency intelligence publications. A detailed report of our findings is attached at Tab C. The report is summarized in the paragraphs that follow, and our recommendations appear in paragraph 17.

PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY

2. The purpose of this survey was to examine CIA intelligence publications with a view toward providing answers to the following questions posed by the Director:

- a. Is there unnecessary and avoidable duplication among Agency intelligence publications?
- b. Is there a demonstrated need for each publication and is each put to profitable use by its recipients?
- c. What means can be devised for readily informing the Director of the distribution made of each publication?
- d. What measures are taken to ensure the safekeeping of CIA publications disseminated outside the Agency; how frequently are the security systems tested; and how is this accomplished?

Copy 1 of 10.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY

3. This survey was undertaken by a working group under the chairmanship of the Chief, Inspection Staff, and with senior representation from the Directorates for Plans, Intelligence, Support, Science and Technology and the Office of National Estimates. The working group included in its survey reviews of policies, procedures, and actual intelligence publications produced by the Directorates for Plans, Intelligence, Science and Technology and the Office of National Estimates. Although the Deputy Director for Support was represented on the working group, his Directorate does not originate intelligence publications.

4. We required each of the producers of intelligence publications to furnish the following data concerning each publication:

"Brief description of the nature of the publication. Who originated the request for it? What has been done to determine if it is really needed and used by the recipients? To what extent is it duplicated in other Agency publications or vice versa? Is this duplication justified: Can it be merged with any other Agency publication or vice versa without loss of value? Is its production under the jurisdiction of a USIB committee?"

We reviewed current examples of DDI and DDS&T publications. All finished intelligence publications disseminated outside of CIA during the first three months of 1966 were examined by title, and these titles were compared for evidences of possible duplication. We found no instance of duplication. And, finally, the chairman drew

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

heavily upon the professional experiences of each of the members of his working group.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

5. The principal conclusions of this study are that each CIA intelligence publication serves a useful purpose and that there are no avoidable duplications among CIA publications resulting from CIA research. There is some duplication of content among daily, weekly, and special purpose studies, which we think unavoidable because of the varying purposes these particular publications serve or because of the differing security clearances held by the several groups of recipients.

6. The survey group is convinced that there is a constant effort in the Directorates to determine need, to limit distribution, and to avoid duplication. We might note that current budgetary and manpower limitations have reinforced these efforts. Immediately prior to the beginning of this survey the DDI made an internal study of his Directorate's publications and eliminated some, primarily by consolidation. A directive implementing these findings was issued during the course of this survey. The DDS&T completed a similar study during our survey and with similar results. In the following paragraphs we summarize our findings with regard to each of the four questions to which we sought answers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Duplication

7. There is conspicuous overlap of content among certain current intelligence periodicals, which is unavoidable, because each publication derives from the need to present essentially similar information keyed to the security clearances or particular interests of separate categories of recipients:

a. The sanitized editions of current intelligence periodicals repeat much of the material that appears in their respective codeword versions in order that noncodeword-cleared readers may have the benefit of much of the usable intelligence.

b. Weekly codeword and sanitized current intelligence publications, logically and by their very nature, repeat information that has previously appeared in the daily versions.

c. Special purpose studies providing current intelligence on particular situations, such as those on Vietnam, necessarily repeat material that may have been printed in whole or in part in daily or weekly publications. However, such repetition is essential to the in-depth treatment of these special situations.

8. At Tab A is a chart illustrating duplication of content among DDI publications.

9. With one exception, we found no significant duplication among nonperiodical publications. The exception involves DDI

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

preparation of handbooks for DDP's Special Operations Division.

Three independent studies have concluded that the duplication is necessary.

10. Quite apart from the matter of duplication of content is that of duplication of distribution. There appear to be cases in which the same recipient is on the distributions of both the codeword and the sanitized versions of daily and weekly current intelligence periodicals. We have a recommendation in paragraph 17.

Need

11. We find that each of the present intelligence publications has been produced to meet a specific need and usually has been initiated by direction of higher authority. Each publication appears well conceived to meet this previously established need. There have been repeated efforts to verify that a particular need continues, that distribution is sufficient but not excessive, and that contents continue to meet the requirements of the customers. Unfortunately, the continuing need for a particular publication is difficult to validate. Recipients are ordinarily unresponsive to surveys initiated to determine validity of need. There are several tests of validity that may be and are applied. The directorates find that discussions on the working level with their opposite numbers in other agencies are quite productive. Resistance to proposals that distribution lists be

~~TOP SECRET~~

reduced, on the one hand, or requests from customers that distribution lists be expanded, on the other, are excellent measures of validity of the need for a particular type of publication. Further, the analyst in a particular field is often an excellent judge of what is worth publishing and what is not, although it should be noted that an individual analyst may not initiate a publication without authentication by higher authority. We believe that the combination of such tests is an adequate measure of continuing worth.

Access to Distribution Data

12. One of the problems of concern to the Director is his inability to discover readily who has been included on the distribution of a particular publication. We believe we have a workable solution for this problem. If the distribution list is too long to be printed in the publication, and many of them are, we propose to have provided to the Director a looseleaf notebook setting forth the distributions for the massively disseminated publications. If the distribution list can be printed on a single page, we propose that the list be included in the publication. Often, however, the distribution that is to be made of a particular publication cannot be determined until after it has been printed and is ready for dissemination. In those cases, we propose that the final distribution list be attached to the Director's copy. The same system can be followed for the DDCI and the

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

[Redacted]

Executive Director - Comptroller if they so desire. We have a recommendation in paragraph 17.

Security

13. Recipients of COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE [Redacted] reports must have approved, secure storage areas or vaults; otherwise, such documents are not left with the recipients for storage. [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

14. There are inspection programs to enforce these regulations. Each USIB member is responsible for the security of COMINT documents it receives. The security control of COMINT material in the White House, the Executive Offices of the President, and in certain departments and agencies that are not members of USIB are assigned to designated USIB members. These assignments are as specified in Tab B.

15. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by Presidential Directive with administering the security programs associated with overhead reconnaissance. Under Chapter 2 of the TALENT manual, the DCI reserves the right to inspect any TALENT facility within any department, agency, or bureau of the government. In practice, this

**TOP SECRET**



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP68B00969R000100040001-5

Next 21 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP68B00969R000100040001-5