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| | MEMORANDUM FOR: THROUGH: SUBJECT: | Office of Planning, Budgeting Executive Officer, OXCART/BLACK SHIELD | DD/S&T | |
| | DODGECT. | Oxoniti', Benek Billed | | |
| | | • | ou requested concern- ntal funding require- | |
| | , | Brigadier (| . LEDFORD General, USAF ecial Activities | |
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| BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DESCRIPTION SUBJECT: OXCART/BLACK | IRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE |
| I. Background | |
| concern with the increase reconnaissance coverage | Mr. John A. McCone expressed Agency sing difficulties in obtaining photo-of China, with special emphasis on |
| ference with Secretaries 1965. This conference of activities and related techniques against U-2s sidered the complex propoperations. The require coverage were clearly evand Secretaries McNamara be taken to establish the Kadena AB, Okinawa included a construction at Kadena, as a part of the Agency team preparate | and South Viet Nam. He held a consider McNamara and Vance on March 18, examined the increased SEA military threat of SAMs and MIG 21 attack and drone operations. It also congramming and targeting of satellite ements for high quality, current photo vident. As a consequence, Mr. McCone a and Vance agreed that steps should the capability to operate OXCART from This decision program to improve the facilities the Air Force support program and tion of equipment, personnel and opercilities. |
| ference with Secretaries 1965. This conference of activities and related techniques against U-2s sidered the complex propoperations. The require coverage were clearly evand Secretaries McNamara be taken to establish to Kadena AB, Okinawa included a construction at Kadena, as a part of | s McNamara and Vance on March 18, examined the increased SEA military threat of SAMs and MIG 21 attack and drone operations. It also congramming and targeting of satellite ements for high quality, current photo vident. As a consequence, Mr. McCone a and Vance agreed that steps should he capability to operate OXCART from This decision program to improve the facilities the Air Force support program and tion of equipment, personnel and oper- |
| ference with Secretaries 1965. This conference activities and related techniques against U-2s sidered the complex propoperations. The require coverage were clearly evand Secretaries McNamara be taken to establish the Kadena AB, Okinawa included a construction at Kadena, as a part of the Agency team preparating procedures and factured fication of existing has establishing necessary new POL facilities, warehouse sprity fencing and runway | s McNamara and Vance on March 18, examined the increased SEA military threat of SAMs and MIG 21 attack and drone operations. It also congramming and targeting of satellite ements for high quality, current photo vident. As a consequence, Mr. McCone a and Vance agreed that steps should he capability to operate OXCART from This decision program to improve the facilities the Air Force support program and tion of equipment, personnel and oper- |

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Agency project responsibilities were absorbed within programmed FY 1966 OXCART project funding, and it was decided the additional costs in personnel, travel and communications would be collected and to treat them as an unprogrammed requirement.

By the first of December 1965 we qualified the systems and accomplished the majority of the associated operational and logistic arrangements. (See Attachment II)

III. Present Status

The 303 Committee reviewed the deployment of the OXCART capability to the Far East on 3 December 1965. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, on 2 December 1965, had proposed that the 303 Committee consider the appropriateness of implementing the OXCART deployment in early January 1966. The 303 Committee took the position that an early January 1966 date was not the propitious time, as it would conflict with certain complex national and international problems and solutions to those problems which were to be sought during this time frame. The Committee did direct that all necessary steps be taken to prepare the operating base and that the OXCART project should posture itself to have an in place capability within a relatively short time, i.e., 21 days from the execution date. intelligence requirement for the use of OXCART in the Far East was enunciated in , dated 30 November 1965.

The 303 Committee, in its 20 January 1966 meeting, was informed that the OXCART Project had established a quick reaction capability (QRC) and was prepared to deploy at the direction of higher authority. On this occasion the 303 Committee asked that this state of readiness be maintained pending direction from higher authority. This is the current state of Project OXCART.

In the 303 meeting on 28 March 1966 we again reviewed the Southeast Asia situation and the need for deployment of OXCART. It was decided that current opinions on use of OXCART should be brought to the attention of higher authority at an early date.

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| At the 303 Committee meeting on 3 December 1965 at was decided the Agency should replenish its resources to have a backup team in being, ready to replace the decloyed (Kadena) team, or alternatively, to conduct secondary operations against denied territory. This was an entargement of the basic (QRC) capability, and necessitated a re-examination of our personnel, travel and communication equipment requirements in FY 1966. This resulted in the recent Agency request for release of FY 1966 funds in the amount of . (See Attachment III) | | | | | | d ion | | |
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