

3 May 1966

NEW YORK TIMES SERIES

25 April 1966

1. Page 1, column 4, paragraph beginning "Even when control is tight"

Comment: This is a clear reflection of McCarthy-Fulbright thinking. McCarthy, over the years, has exhibited firm accusations of intelligence failure, policy making, and uncontrolled activities to a theme of information supplied by the Agency affects policy decisions.

2. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "Senator Eugene J. McCarthy"

Comment: This paragraph is slanted in that the article picks up charges of years ago by McCarthy which are not being made today and combines it with McCarthy's current attack of a proposal to study the effects of CIA on foreign relations.

CRC, 3/6/2003

FOIAB3B

3. Page 2, column 4, paragraph headed "Senator Stephen M. Young"

Comment: Senator Young's current proposal is a select Senate committee composed of members of Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations.

4. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "Mayor Lindsay of New York. . . ."

Comment: Somewhat as in the case of McCarthy, Lindsay's earlier barrages referred to fiascoes but lately, while not giving up the joint committee thought, toned down considerably the wild and reckless charges of failures and uncontrolled operations.

5. Page 3, column 1, two paragraphs beginning "If the establishment of a. . . ."

Comment: Looking to Congress for a remedy is a thought shared by many people. In fact, roughly half of the current sponsors of joint committee resolutions have done so not with the thought of controlling CIA but with the thought of helping it.

6. Page 3, column 1, paragraph beginning "In the 19 years that the"

Comment: Giving statistics for the last 19 years to support how little is known about the Agency today, could be considered slanted reporting.

Further, of the 150 resolutions these in fact represent a corps of about 30 individual members who are repeaters over the years and, as indicated, about half of the 15 resolutions in the current Congress are from people who believe this would help the Agency.

7. Page 3, column 1, paragraph beginning "A former chairman of the"

Comment: In the first place there is no reason for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to know the size of the CIA budget. The second sentence about a Senator experiencing foreign affairs knowing little about but fearing CIA operations, proves little since he was not on our Subcommittee, and it is doubted that he knows much more about the details of the Atomic Energy program. This could well be a McCarthy view but could be views of a few other Senators.

26 April 1966

1. Page 2, column 2, two paragraphs beginning "In the early nineteen-fifties...."

25X1A Comment: This statement is totally incorrect in its implications.

25X1A

However, it was not knocked out because of Congressional befuddlement but because at that time the Agency did not have a building site, plans, or any other detail necessary to justify the appropriation.

2. Page 4, column 1, paragraph beginning "Almost without exception...."

Comment: Praise of CIA people overseas has been stated publicly by Symington, Milton Young, Stennis and privately by many people including the fact that they were better than those in the State Department.

Special article by E. W. Kenworthy on 26 April 1966

a. Page 1, column 4, paragraph beginning "A small group of Senators...."

Comment: The paragraph concludes that the CIA Subcommittee was meeting/to discuss whether the committee should be enlarged and surveillance tightened. This is inaccurate since the Subcommittee was meeting to consider Senator Fulbright's written proposal that Senate Foreign Relations Committee members be permitted to sit with the CIA Subcommittee.

b. Page 1, column 4, paragraph beginning "(For many years also a large...."

Comment: This is a distortion of the joint committee proposals over the years and it is only very recently that the twist has been put on expanding existing Subcommittees to include Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs members.

c. Page 1, column 4, paragraph beginning "Although Senator Richard B."

Comment: As indicated above, calling of the meeting by Russell was to consider how to respond to Fulbright's letter.

d. Page 5, column 1, paragraph beginning "These sources said also that"

Comment: This was a gross distortion of the purpose of the Russell meeting and also conveniently ignores Saltonstall's statement of the facts on the NSU matter which was published on 18 APRIL 1966, 8 days before this article itself. It is noted that a few paragraphs down the column Kenworthy refers to a letter from Fulbright.

e. Page 5, column 1, paragraph beginning "Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. . . ."

Comment: This is practically a verbatim paragraph which appeared in the April 25 article. See comment under item 2 of that date.

f. Page 5, column 2, paragraph beginning "The resolution had 34 co-sponsors. . . ."

Comment: It is stated that support for the Mansfield resolution evaporated under the opposition of Russell and Saltonstall who agreed with Dulles that the joint committee might jeopardize security. This ignores Senator Hayden's expressed opposition including a dissenting view on the Rules Committee report of this resolution and implies that Dulles actively campaigned against the joint committee which he did not.

27 April 1966

1. Page 1, column 3, paragraph beginning "Overlooking the rights of territorial...."

Comment: This is regarded as a slanted statement conveniently ignoring Russian trawlers off the U. S. coast, Guam, and Soviet satellites. An impression is created that CIA and the United States are immoral in the technological field.

2. Page 4, column 4, beginning with the sentence "... And it can quietly lobby for support inside the Government and among influential members of Congress and with the President...."

Comment: As to lobby with the Congress, the most frequently heard criticism is that CIA does not keep the Congress informed. If actively working to brief the CIA Subcommittees is lobbying, then we are guilty.

28 April 1966

1. Page 1, column 2, paragraph beginning "First, there is the pre-eminent...."

Comment: This is a clear reflection of McCarthy-Fulbright thinking. As they have become educated, they recognize that CIA is not in fact uncontrolled but have stated that by its very capabilities and knowledge will on occasion fill a vacuum of policy.

2. Page 1, column 3, paragraph beginning "One Senator has said that the U-2...."

Comment:

3. Page 2, column 2, paragraph beginning "Allen Dulles, who was completely...."

Comment: Here specifically is the charge that Dulles cut away 14 of Mansfield's co-sponsors. This is completely inaccurate. Dulles took no active position.

[4. Page 2, column 2, paragraph beginning "A year later the second Hoover Commission...."

Comment: This is inaccurate. It was a year prior to the Mansfield resolution that the Hoover Commission recommended a congressional joint committee.]

5. Page 4, column 3, paragraph beginning "While the Ambassador may...."

Comment: This is a distortion of the Jackson Subcommittee report which incidentally was published in 1963 not 1962 as stated in the New York Times. The report specifically says, "To a degree the primacy of the Ambassador is a polite fiction especially where budgetary and programming decisions are concerned. Most elements of the country team do not, in other words, regard themselves as parts of the Ambassador's staff -- rather they look outside the country, to intermediate headquarters or Washington for guidance and support and their loyalties tend to run in the same direction. Nevertheless, it is apparent that a strong Ambassador can pull them together and exert great influence."

6. Page 4, column 4, paragraph beginning "In secret testimony before the"

Comment: This leak of secret testimony before Senate Foreign Relations has been in the press before with other quotations from the transcript. Certain sources have attributed this leak to Senator McCarthy.

7. Page 5, column 1, paragraph beginning "The Times survey indicated. . . ."

Comment: The view that a joint committee would do the Agency more harm than good is in fact the predominant view on the Hill and it is interesting that on this key issue the TIMES verified the feeling generally.

29 April 1966

1. Page 1, column 2, paragraph beginning "Nevertheless, because of his...."

Comment: This is a gross distortion of a simple request by Senator Saltonstall to the Agency asking if we could suggest a knowledgeable individual who could assist the Subcommittee in developing facts. [redacted] was made available and during the six months or so he was there it was a complete arm's length relationship [redacted] functioning purely as an employee of the Subcommittee.

2. Page 1, column 3, paragraph beginning "Mr. Dulles kept personal control...."

Comment: This is a serious charge and wholly inaccurate. Rather than impune Dulles, however, it seems to me it impunes the integrity of the four Subcommittee Chairmen involved. Note: In the TIMES editorial of the same day, this point is put as follows: "Choice of members of these Subcommittees extraordinarily enough has been substantially influenced by the CIA itself." This is completely inaccurate.

3. Page 1, column 4, paragraph beginning "Like Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone...."

Comment: The point made is that McCone resisted a formal watch dog committee and courted senior members of Armed Services and Appropriations. Mr. McCone devoted no energy to resisting a joint committee. He took the position that this was a matter for the Congress to determine. As to courting senior members, he devoted considerable energy to keeping our Subcommittee members currently informed of Agency activities and intelligence matters. The continuing charge, of course, is that we did not inform them and by informing them the TIMES turns this into courting them.

4. Page 2, column 1, paragraph beginning "When the President and his"

Comment: This again is the Dominican Republic issue and relates to the leak from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The position asserted by the TIMES is one which Fulbright and McCarthy appear to believe.

5. Page 2, column 2, paragraph beginning "The far more general belief...."

Comment: The charge that the Agency tells our Subcommittees only what it wishes to tell is simply untrue. There have been many statements by CIA Subcommittee members including Russell, Mahon, and Rivers that the Agency has always responded candidly.

6. Page 2, column 3, paragraph beginning "Mr. McCone met about once a month...."

Comment: This paragraph is substantially true. In 1965 we met with our Subcommittees as follows:

| | |
|--|----|
| CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services | 10 |
| CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations | 13 |
| Combined CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations | 11 |

7. Page 2, column 3, paragraph beginning "There are conflicting opinions...."

Comment: The statement of no precise information on budget or number of employees and that the Director reveals only as much as he wants to probably refers to some public statements by Congressman Norblad who served on the Subcommittee for only two years and attended only a few meetings. These statements are inaccurate since we furnished the type of information specified in whatever detail is requested.

8. Page 2, column 3, paragraph beginning "These conflicting views...."

Comment: As to the Senate being "lackadaisical" and "apathetic" and Senators not wanting to know too much, this probably refers to a public statement at one point by Senator Saltonstall who was trying to assert the sensitivity of certain Agency activities and used an unfortunate choice of words to the effect that he did not wish to know too much because he might slip and endanger lives.

9. Page 2, column 3, paragraph beginning "Representative George H. Mahon...."

Comment: The use of the word "warned" is a distortion since Mahon has stated that we control our funds far more stringently than any other agency. Mahon's real point was the Agency's work was so important that it should have the types of controls which in fact do exist.

10. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "As a result of this and other...."

Comment: The implication of the statement was that the Congress has slashed the "slush fund". This is totally inaccurate. The reserve fund has never been cut by the Congress and there have been only two reductions by the Congress to my knowledge in the operating budget and these were very small.

11. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "One is that the subcommittee...."

Comment: The statement is inaccurate in that they are informed of certain operations before and during the progress and the limiting factor is simply interest and time.

12. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "The second point regarding...."

Comment: As to shielding CIA from its critics, examination of the record will show little public shielding until very recently and to the same extent that committee members are relied upon by other members in other fields or Subcommittee members are relied upon by most of the other members of Congress.

13. Page 2, column 4, paragraph beginning "Finally, even these establishment watchdogs...."

Comment: As to their being told what the Director thinks they should know, this is false. As stated before, many of our Subcommittee members and the Chairmen have repeatedly stated that the Agency Directors have been frank and candid and respond fully. The reference to members shying away from too much secret information probably stems from Senator Saltonstall's public statement. See point number ____ of ____ April 1966.

14. Page 3, column 1, the entire section entitled "A Fountain of Leaks."

Comment: The concensus as stated by the TIMES in supporting the idea the Congress should control the CIA, I regard as remarkable frankness on the TIMES' part since this does jibe with our own opinions certainly of the congressional view of this. They then proceed to discuss some of the very real issues involved in a joint committee. On security, they mention that Congress is a fountain of leaks which, in private, the Congress itself has been the greatest critic. In discussing the joint committee as not being a desirable model they are picking up a widespread feeling that the joint committee has gone too far.

15. Page 3, column 2, paragraph beginning "Other recommendations for...."

Comment: The inference to be drawn is that in Congress there has been a serious move to legislate separation of intelligence and operations. There has never been such a legislative proposal introduced.

16. Page 3, column 3, paragraph beginning "Along this line is the idea...."

Comment: This is slightly inaccurate in that McCarthy has not proposed a subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations should be added but only that one or two members be permitted to attend meetings.

17. Page 3, column 3, paragraph beginning "Most of those interviewed...."

Comment: This again is completely inaccurate in indicating that CIA has influenced the selection of Subcommittee members.

18. Page 4, column 1, paragraph beginning "Those who know of this exchange...."

Comment: Here again is the Dominican Republic matter which includes, as was indicated, the McCarthy-Fulbright view.

19. Page 4, column 1, paragraph beginning "One reason the Admiral was chosen...."

Comment: Undoubtedly one attribute of Admiral Raburn was his ability to work with Congressmen but it is slanted reporting to refer to this as "molify."

20. Page 4, column 4, paragraph beginning "In sum, is the government of...."

Comment: The thrust of this is that questioning "dirty tricks" and force leaves the United States Government with no honor. Undoubtedly, this is focusing on the Fulbright view that force per se is immoral.

21. Page 5, quote from Bissell.

Comment: This point that when the Government resorts to force should not cause an attack on CIA which is the instrument, undoubtedly along with other expressions of control of CIA have been a significant factor in the shifting views of at least McCarthy and Fulbright and few of the others who have attacked the Agency in the past. There is increasing recognition that the Agency is responsive to our Government and is not making policy. Thus, the attack has veered away from the Agency directly to less extreme lines of a joint committee, participation by members of Foreign Relations, and other approaches.