

G. USE OF THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

4. PLEASE PROVIDE SPECIFIC INSTANCES IN WHICH THE AGENCY'S INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AFFECTED U.S. POLICY OR, TOGETHER WITH THE PRODUCT OF OTHER AGENCIES, CONTRIBUTED TO IT.

Early in July DIA started reporting increased Soviet activities in Cuba and emphasized the increased shipping of military materiel and personnel and efforts to expand Soviet civil air activities. On 18 August, DIA reported that the USSR appeared to be equipping Cuba with electronic countermeasures equipment. In commenting on the increased numbers of Soviet personnel arriving, it was noted that Cuba had no need for Bloc troop units since Havana could control internal security, but that the increased delivery of Soviet materiel would require greatly increased numbers of Soviet personnel to train Cubans in its use. On 8 September, DIA published the view that "the scope of Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests strongly that basic Soviet objectives do go beyond support of Castro. The Soviets probably see their actions as a means not only of extending their influence into a predominantly U.S. sphere, but of compounding Washington's international problems."

In collaboration with CIA the confirmed presence of MIG 21s was reported by DIA on 8 September; and reports of references to "volunteers" for Cuba in Soviet military traffic was first reported on 21 September. DIA on the basis of its analysis reported on 24 September that there were indications of Cuban pilot training in IL-29s in the USSR.

In the meantime, the continued arrival of Bloc specialists and technicians and additional military materiel including tanks, artillery, and guided missile patrol boats, was reported as information became available. Increased and more sophisticated Cuban military training and the participation of Soviet or other Bloc personnel in such training was also reported. DIA emphasized on several occasions that the Cubans would not be able to take over the SA-2 sites for some 9 to 12 months and thus these would continue to be controlled by Soviet personnel. DIA did not detect the presence of any tank battalions, although a careful re-reading of numerous low-level reports gives clues to such a development, as well as to the probable presence of some specialized Soviet units.

On 5 September DIA presented the following evaluation for inclusion in a Joint Chiefs of Staff principal plan titled "The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan."

"The Communist Bloc stronghold in Cuba increasingly poses a serious threat to the US. The Soviets continue to build up Communist Premier Castro's military forces at an unprecedented crash rate: strengthening the Cuban ground forces with additional and substantial quantities of modern weapons, including amphibious

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carriers, tanks and self-propelled guns; establishing a comprehensive surface-to-air missile defense network (SA-2's); providing missile-firing KOMAR-class naval patrol craft; and expanding Cuban Air Force capabilities (60 MIG's) with the addition of MIG-21's. The Sino-Soviet Bloc's step-by-step development of a military beachhead in Latin America has reached a critical-decision threshold: under the cover of this augmented military potential, depending on US reaction to the crash buildup, the Bloc may now be willing to consider the deployment to Cuba of advanced offensive weapons systems (SSM's) under Soviet control and the establishment of an advanced submarine-base counterpart to our base at Holy Loch, Scotland. Regardless, the Soviet Union will continue to strengthen its showplace stronghold in Cuba and to exploit it to promote Communist revolution throughout Latin America, employing the spectrum of tactics to suit the varied situations of instability in the different countries. At the same time, the Soviets will seek to avoid provoking US intervention in Cuba or a US-USSR military confrontation. Underlying the Soviet threat in Latin America is a well-organized subversive movement, centered in Castro's Cuba, to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of fulfilling the aspirations of the masses, Bloc-backed Castro has actually accomplished a radical, militarily secure social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the US with the support of an apparently more powerful patron."

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H. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY COORDINATION

1. OTHER THAN AS STATED UNDER G, ABOVE, IN WHAT COMMUNITY PUBLICATION PANELS OR COMMITTEES DOES THE AGENCY PARTICIPATE?

For DIA response to this question, see reply to questions G 2, and Section F.

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