

**SECRET****E. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION - PROCESSING**

Within DIA, all reports received from the various collection facilities discussed in Section B are processed from three particular points of view; namely, warning and indications of hostilities; significance of current trends or new developments; and, finally, impact on estimates. The primary responsibility for the processing of information to meet each of these objectives is assigned to separate organizational entities. Clear lines of administrative and operational coordination have been established to insure that each function is not performed in isolation and does not retard processing to accomplish the other objectives.

Processing to meet the requirements of warning and indications of hostilities is performed by the Alert Branch of the Indications Division of CIIC, which reviews the total intelligence flow on a 24-hour and world-wide basis. Reduced to its simplest form -- especially trained and qualified alert officers continuously scan all incoming documents with respect to the basic USIB Indicator List, as augmented by special instructions provided daily by participation in the Current Intelligence publication editorial panel and by special directives from responsible authorities. Moreover, the Alert Watch Teams include analyst representation from the Current Intelligence Division production resources, and the Alert Team Chief has the authority to activate at any time any additional analytical resources as required. In effect, then, the Alert Branch does perform an initial analytical function. Although this function is keyed primarily to the initiation of emergency action and involves tactical level reporting, it does require a rapid application of all processing functions in order to produce reports which, while fragmentary or unevaluated at times, may be delivered to the highest policy level by the most rapid means the contents warrant. Coordination with all other components of the Agency is accomplished as time and circumstances permit, and new collection requirements may be generated during the process.

Concurrently, processing of the same reports is begun by analysts of the Current Intelligence Division, CIIC, to determine the significance of new information in the light of current trends or developments. Although this processing involves the same analytical steps performed by the Alert Branch, i.e., collation, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, and synthesis, there are distinct differences in the product. This processing is performed by specially trained and experienced area or functional analysts; more intelligence tools are available, i.e., extensive desk files, other intelligence agency products, current estimates, special studies and memoranda; coordination with estimators and other intelligence analysts is more detailed, and the final product is subject to closer supervision and review. In this process the analyst, through his accumulated knowledge of the area and through direct coordination with estimators and other intelligence agency

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analysts, develops a more comprehensive and reliable assessment which is prepared in a formal fashion for dissemination. Again, at any time in this processing the requirements for new coordination or further collection efforts may be immediately implemented. During this analytical process, the analyst's effort to clarify the significance of the available information and to provide for the introduction of new supporting evidence are energized by the prime requirement for the timely production of current intelligence for the immediate use of the policy-planning and decision-level consumers. Upon completion of each assessment, it is forwarded to the publication review panel, consisting of specially qualified personnel who review the product's significance, comprehensiveness, clarity, and consistency with other information available to the Agency with a view to determining the suitable medium of dissemination.

Whenever appropriate during this panel review, new vitality is given the analytical process through the direction of additional coordination (with the estimators or other intelligence agencies) or, if necessary, the generation of new collection requirements to provide additional evidence and support for the analytical conclusions.

The primary responsibility for processing collated information for impact or existing estimates or existing plans of military forces is assigned to the Estimates Office (DIAAP-2). Achievement of this objective requires even more thorough application of the processing functions, in close coordination with all components of the Agency and the other agencies in the intelligence community. Although keyed primarily to long-range impact and broader strategic implications, it frequently generates new collection requirements and reports of current significance which in turn further stimulate the production of new intelligence and reactivate the process discussed above.

At the estimative level, the refined intelligence forwarded through the DIA levels of authority is placed into the USIB processes for the development of a community position. Throughout the entire three-way concurrent processing, each responsible analyst or estimator must maintain the closest personal liaison with his opposite numbers in other Agencies and with the technical and basic resources of the Services to meet whatever his requirements may be.

Since at this time the DIA lacks a production base, DIA called for support upon the technical analysis facilities and upon the research staffs of the service intelligence organizations and of other Washington agencies. For photo interpretation DIA depended upon the analysis of NPIC and Navy PIC. The services provided considerable assistance in matters of order of battle and of technical details of weapons. CIA and, to a lesser extent, State,

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
provided support in political and economic analysis. AFIC and ACSI furnished air defense intelligence. ONI provided analysis of the rash of submarine contacts and furnished merchant shipping data. In addition, the various intelligence agencies were called upon constantly for confirmation and for details in various matters dealing with the buildup. Particularly effective coordination was achieved in the frequent interchange of information and view between the military service intelligence staffs and the DIA Cuban Situation Room described below.

Although the foregoing procedures and the attached flow chart are applicable and were exercised to the highest degree throughout the Cuban arms build-up, significant temporary adjustments to the organizational structure were made to increase analytical capability, to improve coordination, and to speed the timeliness of intelligence support to the planning, policy and decision-level consumers during the period under review. From 14 April 1962 through early August 1962 the system outlined was operated using normal command lines. Subsequently, the increased volume of reports and the obvious expansion of Soviet attention to Cuba required certain changes. The Latin American Section of the Current Intelligence Division and the Latin American Division of the Estimates Office increased their coverage of the Cuban situation. Simultaneously with this action the Current Intelligence Indications Center, together with the Estimates Office, developed a concept for the implementation of a special task grouping and the operation of a Situation Room devoted exclusively to Cuba. During September, plans were formulated for the establishment of a Cuban Situation Room within the physical area of CIIC. The implementation of this concept was delayed until the end of September because of the DOD world-wide exercise "Exercise High Heels". At that time the Cuban Situation Room assumed responsibility for the analytical processes on Cuba. On the weekend of 20 October, because of the speed, sophistication, and volume of Soviet equipment introduced into Cuba and the need for augmented 24-hour coverage, a realignment of personnel was made. This entailed the development of three teams under Colonel/Captain level supervision, working round-the-clock shifts of 12 hours on, 24 hours off. This re-direction of the analytical effort involved in one way or another the entire human resources of CIIC. At the same time as this re-direction of CIIC effort, the Estimates Office established a Task Group, within the limits of its resources, to study the sophisticated equipment introduced into Cuba. This Task Group speeded the cross-fertilization coordination between Indications and Warning Analysis Division, Current Intelligence Division and Estimates Office. Additionally, it facilitated the dissemination and coordination of special technical intelligence normally derived from USIB sub-committees i.e., GMAIC/JAEIC, and hastened the coordination and dissemination of photographic read-outs from the National Photographic Interpretation Center received through the DIA Special

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
Activities Office. It is worthwhile to note that as a result of this special task grouping combined with the findings of the USIB Subcommittees and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIIC was able to provide coordinated intelligence on the Soviet Bloc equipment and troops in Cuba at all hours of the day. This intelligence was disseminated through special code word intelligence summaries every 8 hours, daily briefings, daily Defense Intelligence Agency Summaries, special studies, and memoranda to consumers (see Section F for details).

A review of the analytical processes within DIA in the light of known developments respecting Cuba shows no significant defects in the normal procedures for processing indications and warning, current, and estimative intelligence. However, in the case of DIA, the entire problem was complicated by the lack of direct command control over the production base components of the Services, with the net result being that unusually heavy production requirements had to be accomplished by the personnel of the Current Intelligence Division and the Estimates Office. These increased requirements were met only by reducing current and estimative analytical effort on other areas on a calculated risk basis.




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Attachment E3

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## F. THE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT

1.a. PLEASE SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING: CONSECUTIVE DATED VERBATIM EXTRACTS, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP, FROM ALL OF THE AGENCY'S FORMAL INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

Consecutive dated verbatim extracts from the DIA's formal intelligence publications which deal with the Cuban situation, during the period 14 April through 14 October are attached as attachment (F1). These publications are the DIA Intelligence Summary, Intelligence Bulletin, Summary Cable, and Bulletin Cable. Since items appearing in the hard copies generally appear also in the cables, only those items from the cables which did not appear in the hard copies are included. Attachment (F2) gives distribution for these four publications.

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