

31 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone

The attached memorandum and maps spell out in detail the answers to some of your questions relating to the chronology on Cuban overflights.

Of particular importance are the following factors:

I. After the Pines were first discovered and immediately on the heels of a U-2 which violated the Soviet Far East (7 September) and the loss of the Chinese U-2 (8 September) a meeting was held in Bundy's office on 10 September to discuss the question of Cuban reconnaissance. We wanted to overfly all SAM sites not believed to be then operational and all areas of Cuba which had not been covered in the recent past. Because of growing concern for the safety of U-2 operations, however, it was the sense of the meeting (particularly Secretary Rusk) that CIA would be permitted to make four flights against Cuba; two peripheral and two overflights. The overflights were limited to Banes, a coastal defense level site in Eastern Cuba and the area around Guantanamo. We were given permission to overfly the Isle of Pines in the course of one of the two peripherals.

II. The Agency made the operational determination that none of these flights would be made unless weather along the flight routes was less than 25 per cent overcast. The first of the four flights was made on 26 September; the last one on 7 October. You will note that weather was sometimes satisfactory during this interval and that flights were not made. This is explained by the fact that as each of the four approved flights was made we were looking for specific delimited weather breaks in areas to be covered by the approved flights not yet flown.

III. SAC became responsible for U-2 operations over Cuba on 12 October. Its first mission on 14 October was planned to fly over two SAM sites in the hope of triggering the SAM system to permit ELINT collection from offshore. Included in the planned track was an area west of Havana which COMOR suspected to be an area of possible missile activity. In the course of the flight, the SAC pilot (the pilot was not the one later killed) photographed this suspect area and turned up the first MRBM.

IV. There never was a stand down of Cuban operations. It is true that we were inhibited by the guidelines set down at the 10 September meeting, but the only stand down was on Taiwan, where all reconnaissance operations have been grounded since the China incident on 8 September.

V. The peripheral flights did turn up additional SAM sites and coastal defense cruise-missile sites, but that's about all.

Be sure to see the map attached at the very back of this package. It shows the kind of coverage CIA wanted at the meeting on 10 September as compared with what we were actually permitted to do.

[Redacted]


H. Knoche

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- I. RE-CAP OF SAM AND CRUISE MISSILE SITE PHOTOGRAPHY AND REPORTING
  - II. NOTES ON AUGMENTED SPECIAL GROUP MEETING ON 10 SEPTEMBER 1962
  - III. WEATHER CHARTS RELATIVE TO U-2 OPERATIONS, 5 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962 (23 MAPS)
  - IV. SEPARATE MAPS DEPICTING TRACKS OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 1962 (4 MAPS TOTAL) MISSIONS 3086, 3088, 3089, 3093, 3095, 3098, 3100, AND 3101
  - V. MAP SHOWING COMOR TARGET AREA FOR MISSION 3101 AND DEPICTING CIA PLANNED ROUTE AND SAC ROUTE FLOWN ON 14 OCTOBER 1962

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28 October 1962

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Factors Bearing on Reconnaissance of Cuba

1. As a result of the Soviet protest of a SAC U-2 overflying Sakhalin Island on 7 September [redacted] the initial discovery of SA-2 sites on 29 August and additional SA-2 sites in Western Cuba on the 5 September mission, a meeting was held in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office on 14 September 1962. Among those present were Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Robert Kennedy, Attorney General; General Carter, DDCI; General Lansdale, JCS; Mr. Ed Martin, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Tom Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group; Dr. Scoville, DD/R; Mr. Reber, Chairman, COMOR; and Mr. Cunningham, DAD/OSA, et al. Operations had submitted proposed tracks for additional coverage of Cuba. These tracks were reviewed by those present and the following was approved at this meeting:

- a. Four flights to be flown against Cuba: two peripheral and two overflights.
  - b. The overflights were limited to Eastern Cuba east of 77° West.
  - c. Overflights to be designated to minimize time over denied territory.
  - d. Isle de Pines could be overflowed as an individual mission.
  - e. All four flights to be designed to maximize safety.
2. Four missions were planned and approved at this meeting. A phone call at a later date between Mr. McCone and

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State Department authorized overflight of Isle de Pines and the Zapata Swamps on a single mission. (See Mission 3095 flown 29 September 1962.) The other three routes were mission 3093 on 26 September covering Guantanamo area and the suspected SSM site at Banes; mission 3098 on 5 October to cover peripherally the Southern coast of Eastern Cuba and mission 3100 on 7 October to cover the Northern coast of Eastern Cuba to search for additional SA-2 sites. Both peripheral flights were designed essentially to remain outside the three-mile limit around Cuba. (See attached maps.)

3. These missions--3095, 3093, 3100, and 3098--were planned to enter the Cuban radar net at the latest time commensurate with shortest route from radar penetration to target. As an additional safety factor the overflight and peripheral missions were carried out at 73,000 feet plus, instead of the normal 70,000 foot altitude. This necessitated air-to-air refueling before entering or after exiting the radar perimeter and automatically limited the amount of coverage due to range-fuel problems.

4. As was stated earlier, permission was given to commence planning and flying four missions on 10 September. Normally, the earliest date a mission could have gone would be 13 September. However, in anticipation the Operations Division had been studying the weather daily commencing 6 September through 26 September. The Isle of Pines mission was flown on 17 September, but the weather was worse than briefed and the target completely cloud-covered (Mission 3091). Hurricane Celia was approaching the vicinity of the Caribbean at this time which accounts for much of the poor weather forecast and encountered in mid- and late September. The first successful flight of the four flights approved, flew over Banes and Guantanamo on 26 September. The weather was studied continuously, and flights were to be launched only when the weather was forecast to be less than 25 percent overcast. The fourth mission was flown on 7 October 1962, a time span for the four missions of almost a month. Upon completion of the analysis of all missions through 7 October 1962, it was concluded that virtually the whole island of Cuba was now almost completely protected (potentially) by Soviet type SA-2 sites. As a result of this analysis, it had to be assumed that any further overflight of Cuba was or would be in the near future subject to intercept by an SA-2 when the sites became operational.

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5. Shortly after 7 October, a proposal was made by CIA to quick-fix a Ryan Q2C drone with special ELINT collection equipment. The concept of the operation as planned was to overfly an SA-2 site most likely to be operational. The drone, if tracked by the SA-2 associated FRUIT SET radar, would be so designed that it would initially receive the FRUIT SET radar impulses, convert the electronic impulses to another frequency and re-broadcast the data to ground and air-borne receivers stationed well offshore Cuba. The drone if fired on by the SA-2 site would also possibly acquire the SAM fusing electronic signals and similarly broadcast the signal to the offshore collectors before the drone was hit and destroyed, or before it exhausted its fuel providing it escaped destruction. This proposal was made by CIA to NRO and action was initiated to implement the electronic components for the drone and modification of the drone to whatever extent necessary to perform the planned flight and operation. The minimum time frame for implementation of this operation was estimated to be about six weeks which would have put the drone on its first flight in late November or early December.

6. It was soon decided that the time element involved was unacceptable and another plan evolved wherein the J-75 powered Agency U-2 would be used to overfly the SAM site and by stationing specifically equipped ELINT aircraft in the vicinity, but at a legal distance from the Cuban coast, the FRUIT SET signals would be acquired from a safe distance. It was clearly understood that the risk of sending the U-2 over one or more operational SA-2 sites would be high, but the risk was considered to be valid relative to the importance of the FRUIT SET signal acquisition.

7. The results of SAC mission 3101 (14 October) over the planned route and target gave us our first look at a MRBM site under construction in Cuba. The FRUIT SET radar signal was not recorded at this time presumably because the SA-2 sites were not yet operational. The film from mission 3101 was flown by jet transport to Andrews Air Force Base for processing [redacted] [redacted] at about 6 a.m. on Monday, 14 October. During the photo interpretation phase at the [redacted] [redacted] the first MRBM site was located and the information passed to Secretary MacNamara. Tuesday, 16 October, Secretary MacNamara presented the photographic evidence to the President. It is interesting at this point to re-cap the frequency of U-2 flights during this period. One mission (3101) was flown on Sunday, 14 October; two missions on Monday; none on Tuesday. After the President viewed the evidence on Tuesday and

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
a limited number of people in the intelligence community apprised of the results of mission 3101, SAC apparently received permission to fly maximum effort over Cuba. A total of six U-2 missions overflew Cuba on Wednesday, 17 October. A total of 17 missions were flown by SAC in their first week of operations.

<u>For the Record:</u>	<u>Date of Photography</u>	<u>Previous Coverage</u>
First MIG-15/17 discovered in Cuba	15 Jun 61	N. A.
First MIG-21 discovered in Cuba	05 Sept 62	N. A.
First MRBM discovered in Cuba	14 Oct 62	29 Aug 62
First IRBM discovered in Cuba	15 Oct 62	29 Aug 62
First IL-28 discovered in Cuba	15 Oct 62	29 Aug 62

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
ALERT BRIEFING: 06/0900Z SEPT '62 : VLD 07/1200-1500Z SEPT '62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 07/0900Z SEPT '62 : VLD 08/1200-1500Z SEPT '62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 08/0900Z SEPT '62 : VLD 09/1200-1500Z SEPT '62

NOTE: REMAINDER OF ISLAND CAT III TO IV,  
 ONLY CAT II AREAS INDICATED (HATCHED)  
 SINCE OPERATIONAL DECISIONS BASED  
 PRIMARILY ON CAT II OR BETTER CONDITIONS  
 OVER DESIGNATED TARGETS.

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
ALERT BRIEFING: 09/0900L SEPT '62: VAD 10/1200-1500Z SEPT '62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 10/0900L SEPT '62: VAD 11/1200-1500Z SEPT '62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 11/0900L SEPT '62: VAD 12/1200-1500Z SEPT '62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 12/0900L SEPT '62: VAD 1/1200-1500Z OCT '62

NOTE: ONLY CAT II AREAS INDICATED SINCE OPERATIONAL DECISIONS BASED PRIMARILY ON CAT II OR BETTER CONDITIONS OVER DESIGNATED TARGETS. (MATCHED) REMAINDER OF ISLAND - CAT III TO IV

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ALERT BRIEFING: 14/1700L SEPT '62 & V.S. 10/0700-1900Z SEPT '62  
 MISSION PLAN BRIEFING: 15/1400L SEPT '62 & V.S. 14/0840-1315Z SEPT '62  
 Go No Go BRIEFING: 15/2230L SEPT '62 & V.S. 14/0830-1330Z SEPT '62

MISSION 3090


Delay 24 hrs (WEATHER)

NOTE: INTEREST NE COASTAL 75W TO 77W.  
 MISSION PLAN SHOWED NO SIG CHANGE FROM ALERT  
 Go No Go SHOWED DETERMINATION IN AREA OF INTEREST.

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MISSION PLAN BRIEFING: 16/1400L (Wed) 17/0830-1830Z SEOT


MISSION 3090 BACK-UP

CANCELLED - (WEATHER)

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
ALERT PERIODS: 16/1700L - 18/0830 - 18300 SEPT '62  
 ALERT PERIODS: 17/1700L - 19/0830 - 19300 SEPT '62 (CAT III TO IV ENTIRE ISLAND)  
 ALERT PERIODS: 18/1700L - 20/0830 - 19300 SEPT '62 (CAT III TO IV ENTIRE ISLAND)  
 ALERT PERIODS: 19/1700L - 21/0830 - 19300 SEPT '62 (CAT III TO IV ENTIRE ISLAND)

NOTE: ONLY CAT II (HATCHED) INDICATED.  
 RMA CAT III TO IV

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
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ALERT BROADCAST 20/1700L: Vol 22/0030-13300 SEP 62  
 MIA: PLAN BROADCAST 21/1400L: Vol 22/0030-13300  
 CP: 21/2230Z: Vol 22/0830-13300

MISSION 3092  
 No 62 (Weather)

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ALERT BRIEFING: 21/7006: V/L 23/0830-19308 Sept 62  
 (NO ALERT BRIEFING REQUIRED 22 SEPT)  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 23/17006: V/L 24/0830-19308 Sept 62  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 25/17006: V/L 25/0830-19308 Sept 62  
 (CAT III TO IV ENTERING RANGE)

NOTE: ONLY CAT II (ANTENNA) INDICATED.  
 RADAR CAT III TO IV


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1. Briefing: 24/1700Ls Val 25/0930-1030Z Sp 72  
 2. Plan Briefing: 27/1400Ls Val 28/0930-1030Z  
 3. Go Briefing: 27/0930L: Val 28/0930-1030Z

MISSION 3094  
AS (24/115 DEPT)

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*ALERT BRIEFING: 29/2230L: VLL 30/2830-1230Z Sep '62*  
*FURTHER ALERT BRIEFING 29/1700L for 01/2830-1230Z Oct '62*

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PREPARED BY ACIC, USAF, ST LOUIS 18, MO., JAN. 1962

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CUBA JPC-12a

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


AUSTIN BRIEFING: 30/1700L : Vol 02/0830-1830Z Oct 62  
 MIAMI PLAN BRIEFING: 01/1400L : Vol 02/0730-1900Z

MISSIONS 3096 and 3097  
cancelled (Weather)

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MEXICO

Havana

Miami

CUBA

CAT

NAS Guantanamo Bay

HAITI


JAMAICA

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CAT Briefings: 01/1700L: Vol 03/0230-18302 Oct 62  
 CAT Briefings: 02/1700L: Vol 04/0230-10302 Oct 62

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
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ALERT BRIEFING: 10/1700L: VAL 12/12000 OUT  
 ALERT BRIEFING: 11/1700L: VAL 13/12000

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SEPARATE MAPS DEPICTING TRACKS OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS FOR  
AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 1962 --

MISSIONS

3086  
3088  
3089  
3093  
3095  
3098  
3100  
3101

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/19/62

Returned to Mr. Knoche in accordance  
with Knoche/Parrott telephone  
conversation Monday, 19 Nov. 1962



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Weather Relative to U-2 Operations  
5 September through 14 October 1962

The following criteria should be considered in any operational evaluation of the attached weather briefing charts:

1. CAT II - clear to 2/8's total cloud cover  
CAT III - 3/8-4/8's total cloud cover  
CAT IV - 5/8-7/8's total cloud cover  
CAT V - 8/8's total cloud cover

2. Since operational decisions were based on no worse than CAT II conditions being forecast over the desired area of coverage, CATS III and IV are not separated on Alert briefing charts where no Alert was passed to flying unit. (CAT II area is hatched for rapid identification, and depicted in color code of the day as indicated on each chart.)

3. For a critical meteorological interpretation of any particular chart, please contact:


  
Chief, Weather Staff, OSA/DDR

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CAT II

Miami

Havana

CAT II

MEXICO

20°N

20°N

HAITI

JAMAICA

NAS Guantanamo Bay

11:00 AM BAHAMA AFT III ALERT  
 MIAMI PAID BRIEFING: 04/1500L SEPT 62  
 GUANO GO BRIEFING: 05/0000L SEPT 62  
 [FORECASTS VALID: 05/1000Z TO 1700Z SEPT 62]


MISSION 3089  
SUCCESSFUL

NOTE: BAHAMA MISSION PLAN BRIEFING 05/1500Z  
 NOT REQUIRED DUE TO SUCCESS OF 3089

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


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PREPARED BY ACIC, USAF, ST LOUIS 18, MO., JAN. 1962

CUBA JPC-12a

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
1st Lt. B...: 24/1700L : V... 24/0330-1330z Sp...  
 2nd Lt. P...: 25/1700L : V... 25/0330-1330z  
 3rd Lt. G...: 25/1700L : V... 25/0330-1330z

MISSION 3093

SUCCESSFUL

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MISSION BRIEFING: 27/1700L: VDL 29/0830-1830Z Sep 62  
 Mission Plan Briefing: 28/1700L: VPL 29/0830-1830Z  
 E-11-60 Briefing: 23/0830L: VDL 24/0945-1730Z

MISSION 3095 (BARBARA SWAIN & BOB OF FINE)


NOTE: MISSION PLAN ALSO FOR 3094, WHICH WAS CONDUCTED

Successful

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5  
"Daisy"  
FCJF




Alert Bases: 03/1700L: Val 05/0530-1800 0062  
Miami Base: 04/1400L: Val 05/0730-1900  
Cuba Co Bases: 04/2300L: Val 05/0730-1900

Mission 3098 (Sovietian Perimeter)  
Successful

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"DAISY" FOST

CAT III TO IV

CAT II

CAT III TO IV

CAT III TO IV

CAT II

CAT II

CAT III TO IV

ALBAT BUREAU: 04/1962: Vol 06/0730-1900 Oct 62  
 MIBER PLAN BUREAU: 05/1962: Vol 06/0730-1900  
 Co 11-60 BUREAU: 09/1962: Vol 06/0730-1900

MISSION 3029 (Northern Periphery)

Very Successful (Fuel problems)

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
85°W

80°W

75°W

Approved For Release 2008/07/10 : CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7

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
ALBATROSS: 05/17/00-06/24/07  
 MISSION PLAN: 06/14/00-06/27/07  
 GO NO GO: 08/22/00-07/07/07

MISSION 3100 (Operation Penetration)  
 Successful

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ALERT BRIEFING/MIAMI VAL 14/0700-1500 OCT 62

MISSION PLAN AND GO NO GO BRIEFINGS WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THIS BRIEFING SINCE CAT II. CONDITIONS WERE FORECAST OVER AREA OF DESIRED COVERAGE (WESTERN TIP). ]

MISSION 3101 (TENTATIVE)

FLIGHT TRACK PREPARED [DID NOT FLY-SAC]


85°W

80°W

75°W

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WJ



IDEALIST Missions from  
5 August 1962 to  
14 October 1962

TOP SECRET IDEALIST