


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CIA Investigators

Found Spies In U.N.

Specific cases of espionage agents of Soviet Russia and Red satellite countries who cloaked themselves with U.N. diplomatic immunity while operating against the United States are the subject of an arresting new book, *Red Spies in the U. N.*, by Pierre Huss and George Carpozi, Jr.

The Ledger continues today an exclusive newspaper serialization of the book as a matter of public interest. The authors reveal in this installment the dramatic story of the spy link between 40 Americans in the U. N. and the chief assistant to the Secretary General, the Russian Konstantin Zinchenko.

CHAPTER TWO

By PIERRE HUSS
and GEORGE CARPOZI JR.

The United Nations was only three years old when individuals in the United States Senate and House of Representatives raised the question if the U. N. had been made a cover for organized espionage against the United States. They were denounced by emotional defenders of the U. N. as "incredibly irresponsible and hysterical."

Nevertheless, a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee opened an investigation. Three subordinates in the State Department, William McGrath Harlow, Robert G. Alexander and R. Clyde Larkin, gave testimony. The general effect that the UN headquarters was being used by Communist countries as a "gateway" to slip hundreds of subversive agents into the United States, under diplomatic immunity. Mr. Harlow, chief of the Department's Diplomatic Visa Section, expressed the belief that "every representative of an Iron Curtain country" attached to the UN "is a threat to the security of the United States."

There was angry denial from the staff committee of the UN, which unanimously passed a resolution in behalf of their more than 3,000 employees. The resolution stated that the "unsubstantiated charges which have been made, and the manner in which they were publicized, unjustly cause damage to the United Nations in general and the Secretariat in particular."

The ten U. S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall formed a committee of private citizens to look into the matter.

The committee consisted of Benjamin M. McKelway, James H. Rowe, Jr., and Marcellus C. Sheild. They eventually reported back that they did not find several hundred persons, or even one person, abusing America's hospitality under UN auspices by spying or conspiring in espionage. The committee declared itself "shocked by the manner in which these serious charges were made." It pointed out that the "irresponsible" statements "produced serious repercussions on the foreign policy of the United States."

Although the committee failed to find any documentation of the three State Department officials' charges, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted its own investigation and reported back to the Senate Judiciary Committee, headed by Senator Pat McCarran (D.-Nev.), that Communist terrorists, wholesale killers, spies and subversive agents did, in fact, hold jobs with the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations.

Findings Revealed

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, director of the CIA, who had investigated a list of one hundred names of UN employees, submitted these findings:

✓ Thirty-two of the employees were engaged in active work for the intelligence agencies of their respective countries.

✓ Twenty-nine others were high-ranking Communist Party officials.

✓ Twenty-one more were engaged in active Communist organization work of an underground or subversive nature outside their native homelands.

✓ Fifteen others were not in the CIA's "derogatory information file."

✓ The remaining three had definite pro-American sympathies or had shown disaffection with Communist ideology.

Another part of Hillenkoetter's letter to the senators described the pattern of Communist espionage and subversive group operations:

✓ Placing agents in strategic U. S. installations.

✓ Establishing communications facilities for agents to transmit material, one facet of which is the system of seamen couriers.

✓ Checking on Soviet personnel in this country to guard against defection.

✓ Dissemination of Communist propaganda and gathering of adverse facts about the United States.

✓ Through U. S. immigrant remittances of U. S. currency to kin in Russia, where it aggre-

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gates a considerable income for Russian intelligence operations abroad.

✓ Maintenance of liaison between Communists in the United States and Russian headquarters.

✓ Organization of pressure groups to oppose American legislation adverse to Communists.

The concern over Red spies in the UN eventually diminished, but with the Valentin Gubitchev case in 1949-50 there was specific ground for apprehensions about the world organization.

Valentin Gubitchev was convicted in a Federal Court of espionage for Russia, suspended by the U. N. Secretary-General, and declared by the Federal Judge who presided over the trial to have violated "Your oath of office to the Secretariat of the United Nations. ———

Have by your acts attempted to destroy the hopes of the millions who would avoid war and establish peace ———"

The Senate Internal Security Committee in Washington touched off a full drive against subversives and Communists in the Secretariat in mid-summer 1952. An investigation linked at least forty Americans in the UN to espionage. The probe led to the

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al Americans and the suspension of eleven others. Several of the latter group turned in their resignations before they could be given hearings.

Woman Testifies

The highlight of the Senate Internal Security Committee hearing came in early December when Evelyn Thaler, secretary to the Russian Konstantin E. Zinchenko, head of the UN's Department of Security Council Affairs, testified.

Miss Thaler told the probers that she had been a Communist at one time, but quit of boredom. Miss Thaler's testimony helped focus attention on a strange vacancy that had developed in the august councils of the United Nations. Her own boss had suddenly dropped out of sight.

Actually, Zinchenko had been conspicuous by his absence and it was a matter that had concerned Secretary General Trygve Lie. Around mid-September of 1952, Lie decided to make it his business to find out what had become of Zinchenko.

As Assistant Secretary General of the UN Zinchenko was the highest ranking Russian in Lie's Secretariat and the official who sat in for the Secretary General when he was away from the UN. Zinchenko had gone back to Moscow in June, then vanished into silence.

Lie asked a Soviet Delegation member, Arkady A. Sobolov, "What has happened to Konstantin?"

Sobolov was evasive. "I have been wondering myself why Konstantin has not come back. I had heard he was ill, poor fellow. Maybe he is still indisposed."

Stock Reply

This is practically the stock reply one gets from Russian government officials at the UN after one of their number drops out of sight suddenly.

Lie had heard rumors that Zinchenko was ill in Moscow, but like other diplomats wise in the ways of reported Soviet ailments, the Secretary General concluded the illness was mostly diplomatic, and that Zinchenko had seen the last of his days in the service of the UN.

If anyone should have known what became of Zinchenko, it was Sobolov. Sobolov himself had held Zinchenko's \$22,000-a-

until late 1949 when the Gouchev case had exposed Russia's espionage activity in the UN and brought widespread criticism of the Soviets. Sobolov was then recalled to Moscow, and from there had sent word back that "illness" prevented his return. Zinchenko had been assigned to Sobolov's job when he returned to the UN with a reduced rank in the Soviet Delegation.

Another element of mystery cloaked the case because, along with Zinchenko, one of his chief aides, Nicolai Skvortsov, also was among the missing. He had taken home leave in April and returned to Moscow. Skvortsov then applied for an extension of leave on the plea his wife was sick. The request was granted and he was continued on the payroll, drawing a tax-free \$8,000-a-year salary with full retirement benefits.

The fact was the two Russian diplomats had left the scene just when the congressional investigation had linked the forty Americans in the UN to espionage. The UN's Department of Security Council Affairs, where the accused Americans had worked, was headed by Zinchenko.

Action Significant

There was significance to the action Lie had taken against Zinchenko, early in 1952, denying him access to any reports coming in from the Korean war front. Zinchenko had been caught making unauthorized diversions of documents dealing with strategy, troop movements and other military matters concerning UN forces in Korea. There can be little doubt that Zinchenko was feeding the information to those in Moscow who were directing the Red forces fighting against the UN divisions on the battle lines.

Zinchenko had come into his post in 1949 as one of the UN's eight Assistant Secretaries General. When the Korean War came in effect the UN Minister of War, Communication and Information. That put him in charge of all legal, military and judicial affairs relating to the subsequent UN operations in Korea. This prize position had been delegated to the Russians at the 1945 San Francisco Char-

ter threats to withdraw from further participation in the world body. Molotov then named Sobolov for the job.

Even before Secretary General Lie suspected what was happening in his own Secretariat, General Douglas MacArthur, who headed the U. S. forces as well as those of other nations under the UN banner on the Korean front, had begun to realize what was going on. The North Koreans seemed to have an almost uncanny ability to anticipate MacArthur's battle plans.

The General began to limit his reports to the UN to information on general matters of a non-military nature.

MacArthur had a secondary reason for holding back. On more than one occasion he had found the UN Security Council had censored his reports on the course of the war in the Far East.

It was an unfortunate position for MacArthur. But it soon made trouble for Zinchenko who, as the UN's Minister of War, Communication and Information, notified MacArthur that he was failing in his obligation to the UN. Zinchenko was no longer able to transmit accurate warfront information to the Kremlin because of MacArthur's holdout. In anger over Zinchenko's abuse, MacArthur whipped off a blistering complaint to Secretary General Lie. The General did not accuse Zinchenko of espionage; he merely charged that his reports were being censored by the Security Council.

Reports Go Direct

Not long afterward Lie began holding closed door conferences with the Security Council — without Zinchenko. It was apparent that Lie, too, had become aware of Zinchenko's real aims in demanding full battlefield reports. Within a few short weeks the Secretary General directed that henceforth reports from MacArthur must not cross Zinchenko's desk; they were to go directly to Lie.

Thus Zinchenko was reduced, for all intents and purposes, to the level of a liaison or courier between the Secretariat and the Soviet UN Mission. In subsequent months Zinchenko was seen more and more in the company of his aide, Nicolai

and goings together could not go unnoticed.

Eventually Secretary General Lie was informed by the State Department that Skvortsov had been trying to subvert a number of Americans into obtaining secrets about America's Eastern Seaboard defenses.

It was evident then why Zinchenko and Skvortsov had taken their leaves so suddenly without explanation and why both were delaying their return to the UN.

Naturally, the Soviet Union was aware of the probe into the activities of the forty Americans in the UN suspected as Communist sympathizers or spies. They could anticipate the involvement of Zinchenko and Skvortsov in the inquiry of the Senate Internal Security Committee. The Committee had already been told in private hearings that the two Soviet emissaries were behind the whole plot.

Plot Fails

But the plot never got far. Alerted by Skvortsov's and Zinchenko's unusual comings and goings, the FBI put a tail on them. They already had reason for suspicions. Skvortsov had been stationed with the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa at the time the notorious Sergei M. Kudryavtsev operated in Canada as head of the spy ring which stole atomic secrets.

Before long, the FBI's surmises regarding the two received validating support. Trailing Skvortsov, agents had witnessed his surreptitious meetings with various American UN employees. When these meetings began to attract Zinchenko also, the FBI moved in quickly and grabbed off the Americans, one by one, questioned them, and learned what the Russians were after.

The FBI said Zinchenko and Skvortsov were out to get any information dealing with military and seaport facilities on our Atlantic Coast: the capacity of our naval shipyards in Brooklyn, Norfolk and Portsmouth; data on the Electric Boat Company yards at Groton, Connecticut, where the United States was about to launch its nuclear sub construction program; statistics about Air Force landing strips at Mitchell Field, Long Island; Andover, Massachusetts; and Maguire Air Force

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Base in New Jersey; and numerous other top-secret data. As suspected, Zinchenko had fallen out of the good graces of the Stalinist regime and had been shipped off to a prison camp in one of the last purges before Stalin's death. He remained a political prisoner until the post-Stalin rehabilitation procedures enacted by the new government.

Of course, there was little Lie could do then against Skvortsov and Zinchenko. The FBI wanted Lie to do nothing. Both Skvortsov and Zinchenko had notified the Secretary General of their intentions to return as soon as they had conquered their respective bouts with "illness."

The United States wanted them again to pick up the strings of their espionage activities with the hope they would lead the authorities to other spy contacts. So Lie went along with the plan.

But when months passed and Skvortsov and Zinchenko both continued to stall about their return, Lie was convinced the Soviet Government had gotten wind of what was suspected of the two diplomats.

'Incident' Avoided

Early in November, Lie finally sent a note to Skvortsov in Moscow, informing him he had been dismissed. No note was sent to Zinchenko. Inasmuch as he enjoyed high diplomatic status, Lie wanted to avoid an "incident."

It wasn't until Dec. 13 that an announcement of the UN spy scandal was made to the public. The United States Delegation at the UN broke the news with this statement: "The United States Government has notified the United Nations that Mr. Nicolai Skvortsov has attempted espionage activities. The United States has also indicated to the United Nations that such conduct is in its opinion a clear violation of his status as an international civil servant. Pending UN action, the U. S. Government has taken steps to deny a visa to Mr. Skvortsov, who is now on home leave."

The public was never told until our book was published that there was a direct tie between Zinchenko and Skvortsov and the forty Americans in espionage.

TOMORROW: The Ledger publishes the story of the hero-ism of a patriotic American engineer who served as a counter-spy to prevent the theft by Russian agents of one of America's top secrets — details of the revolutionary Sperry bombsight. Read it exclusively in tomorrow's instalment of "Red Spies in the U. N."