

To the second group of worriers we want to give our reasons for stating so solemnly that Soviet Russia will not enter into the arena:

1. Soviet Russia has no desire to strengthen the Chinese Communists as its arch rival for leadership in world communism, and the Chinese Communists will decline Russian help for fear of infiltration and subversion.

2. Hard pressed by the forces of liberation in Eastern Europe and the collective strength of the NATO countries, Soviet Russia is not in a position to open a second front in Asia.

3. Fully aware of the destructive nature of a nuclear war, she will not start one while the United States still possesses the nuclear advantage.

We Asians must realize that now is the hour for the free Nations in Asia to accept our responsibility of saving ourselves through unity. Now is the hour for the free Nations of Asia through the determination of the people, to safeguard freedom in Asia with the combined strength of all our countries. We, the Nations and peoples of Asia, must rally together to go to the aid of Vietnam and to pull down the Iron Curtain in Asia. It is high time for the countries most directly under Communist aggression and threat, for the Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam to establish an Asian Anti-Communist Alliance, for closer military, political, and economic cooperation.

We firmly believe this alliance will be able to contain Chinese Communist aggression and expansion, and will lead to the destruction of the Iron Curtain in Asia. We shall look forward to the United States to give timely support to the free Nations in Asia in our historic endeavor for self-help through unity.

THE DOMINICAN SITUATION: SEPARATING MYTHS FROM REALITIES

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I deeply regret the necessity for requesting this hour today to discuss certain aspects of the Dominican situation. But the current debate in the Senate has convinced me that it is imperative to set the record straight—to separate fact from fiction, myth from reality.

In July, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a document entitled "Background Information Relating to the Dominican Republic." Part A purports to be a chronology, 25 pages of which are devoted to events beginning with the April 24 uprising. This so-called chronology is crammed with grossly biased quotes, overwhelmingly gleaned from the New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Washington Post. A footnote on the first page states that the chronology was compiled primarily on the basis of "Deadline Data on World Affairs."

"Deadline Data" is a service for quick reference on world events. It is a brief digest, on cards, of a handful of newspapers, and makes no pretense of having checked for accuracy the reports which it quotes.

Mr. Speaker, the Senate document—bearing the imprimatur of the Committee on Foreign Relations—goes out to schools, universities, and private citizens

throughout the country. The fact that a footnote attributes the quotations used to "Deadline Data," which in turn attributes the quotations to the original sources, by no means exonerates the Committee on Foreign Relations from responsibility for the accuracy of the material selected. In fact, although official statements are inserted, the almost unanimous selection of quotations from articles critical of the administration's intervention in the Dominican Republic creates the impression that all the press of the Nation was critical.

In effect, the so-called chronology reads: "Official U. S. spokesmen said; but intrepid journalists, on the other hand, gave the lie to the official position."

Nowhere in the so-called chronology is there a quote from the eloquent phrases of Eric Sevareid, from Marguerite Higgins, from Hal Hendrix, Jules Dubois, Jerry O'Leary, or others whose views differed from those of the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Herald Tribune.

Nowhere in the so-called chronology is there mention of the report of the five-member OAS Special Committee which conducted an investigation on the scene, and on May 8 released the full text of their 4-hour testimony before the OAS Council.

Nowhere in the so-called chronology is there mention of the findings of former Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, friend and sympathizer of former President Juan Bosch.

One wonders why all reports which corroborated the administration's evaluation of the Dominican situation were excluded from the committee print.

When I first saw the grotesquely distorted "chronology" in August, I considered having the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs compile a point-by-point refutation. By that time, however, negotiations for a provisional government were well underway in the Dominican Republic. Bernard Collier of the New York Herald Tribune, Tad Szulc of the New York Times, and Dan Kurzman of the Washington Post were no longer covering the story. The reporting out of Santo Domingo had become less emotionally involved. The truth seemed to be catching up with the fictions which had emanated from the Dominican Republic. Hence, it seemed to me no longer necessary to have to take this action.

The reopening of debate in the Senate, resurrecting arguments corresponding to the highly colored reporting in the earlier stages of the Dominican Republic, substantially changes the picture. I noted in Monday's debate on House Resolution 560, that several Members alluded to the remarks of the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His remarks do indeed carry weight, since it is assumed that he is privy to information not generally available. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I can assure you that I too have had access to all the documentation. For that reason, I feel an obligation to clarify some of the points which have been raised.

Throughout the tragic turmoil in the Dominican Republic, I was frequently asked by worried colleagues about our policy in the Dominican Republic. Their concern invariably stemmed from something they had read in the newspaper that morning or had seen on television. This was evident because their remarks were usually prefaced with something like "The New York Times says," or "according to the Washington Post," or "the Trib reporter wrote."

The fact that three major morning newspapers, as well as several networks, all took the same critical position regarding U.S. policy in the Dominican situation lent credibility to their views.

In brief, the argument ran:

First, that there was doubt that American lives, or those of other foreigners, were ever in real danger;

Second, the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic only on a pretext of saving American lives, but really to block the return to power of former President Juan Bosch;

Third, the U.S. Embassy grossly exaggerated the danger of a Communist takeover and panicked;

Fourth, the United States collaborated with the corrupt Dominican military and the most retrograde elements in Dominican society, and against the legitimate aspirations of a long oppressed people for political freedom and social justice;

Fifth, the United States turned belatedly to the Organization of American States to provide a cover for its intervention;

Sixth, the intervention engendered widespread indignation and anti-Americanism in Latin America, and could wreck the OAS.

The quality of some of the reporting suffered from inexperience on the part of the reporters, some of whom knew little of the complex background of the situation unfolding around them. In justifying their speculations, they complained that they could not check with Embassy officials. The lack of contact between reporters and U.S. officials was, indeed, a drawback. But the beleaguered Embassy and military staffs could hardly have been expected to cope with the almost 200 foreign journalists who descended upon little Santo Domingo in the midst of anarchy. During the chaotic period when Dominicans fled in and out of asylum, when fortunes changed hourly, when thousands of troops were being deployed, and when delicate negotiations to end the turmoil were being conducted, is it not reasonable to assume that U.S. officials were too engaged in vital matters to keep several hundred reporters informed?

But not all the slanted reporting can be chalked up to inexperience or to the inability to clarify impressions and rumors. Bernard Collier stated categorically in the New York Herald Tribune that no diplomats in other missions in Santo Domingo agreed with the U.S. evaluation of the Dominican situation. From that statement, it must be assumed that Mr. Collier did indeed interview a goodly number of Western diplomats on the scene. Presumably, Mr. Collier's inexperience in Latin American affairs

September 22, 1965

would not be a limitation on his ability to report so clear-cut a matter which needs no interpretation.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I would prefer to complete my statement before yielding.

Mr. REID of New York. I ask the gentleman just one question before he proceeds. I have noticed a series of remarks impugning the integrity of the press, the accuracy of the reporting, and the quality of the reporting.

Is the gentleman trying to raise a series of questions as to the integrity of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Herald Tribune?

Mr. SELDEN. I stand on my statement. May I continue? I am in the middle of a quote, if the gentleman will allow me to continue.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield? The House should not have to sit here and listen to both the Times and the Herald Tribune being castigated in this way.

Mr. SELDEN. I might say to the gentleman he will have to listen unless I yield to him. I will be happy to yield to him, however.

Mr. REID of New York. Does the gentleman make a distinction between the straight news reports and the editorial page?

Mr. SELDEN. If the gentleman will let me finish my statement, I will be glad to attempt to answer his questions.

Yet, curiously, State Department records are replete with applause for the intervention from the diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo. Unfortunately, since it would be a breach of confidence and protocol to disclose names, I can only assure you that practically all of the heads of mission in Santo Domingo have expressed their belief that the intervention was timely and necessary. For instance, one Western European diplomat stated that presence of U.S. marines was "certainly the only solution to a serious situation." Another stated that he considered local events to be following the classic Communist pattern. Another believed Caamaño to be completely dominated by hard-core rebels. Another applauded the presence of U.S. marines as the only solution to a serious situation.

Peter Chew, writing in the May 17, 1965, edition of the National Observer, told of his conversation with a "high-ranking Western diplomat," as follows:

Many of the rebels, he said, sought visas from him in the past in order to make their way to Cuba and Iron Curtain countries, and he had refused to grant them. They had managed to get out anyway.

The Western diplomat, who fought as a high-ranking officer in the Second World War, said many of the street fighters of the rebel side had shown evidence of the most sophisticated urban guerrilla warfare training. It's not the sort of training that the ragtag Dominican armed forces, whence many of the rebels came, ever receive.

Now, it is possible to doubt the evaluation of the entire diplomatic corps in Santo Domingo as well as the same evaluation by the U.S. team. But to say, as Mr. Collier did, that no foreign diplomats agreed with the U.S. appraisal goes even beyond distortion of the truth.

The New York Times correspondent, Tad Szulc, makes no mention whatsoever of the opinions of the Western European and Latin American diplomatic corps regarding our intervention in the Dominican Republic. I find it hard to believe that so seasoned a reporter, with his own European background and his experience in Latin America, would not query the other ambassadors. Meanwhile, the New York Times castigated the United States for its action, leaving the impression that we stood alone in Santo Domingo on our evaluation of the situation. One wonders whether Szulc simply neglected to report views which ran counter to his own, or whether the editorial policy in New York was to censor such views.

Similarly, Dan Kurzman in the Washington Post—while ridiculing U.S. evidence of Communist influence in the rebel movement—left a vast silence with regard to the position of the diplomatic community on the degree of Communist infiltration.

All three—Collier, Szulc, and Kurzman—were also vociferous in their claims that the United States was helping the Imbert junta defeat the rebels in the northern sector. Said Collier in the Herald Tribune on May 20:

U.S. marines and paratroopers gave both direct and indirect help to Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras' junta forces yesterday as Imbert troops nearly completed a cleanup of "constitutionalist" rebels in northern Santo Domingo.

Said Szulc in the New York Times on May 21:

The U.S. policy was reported on high authority to be one of allowing the Imbert forces to complete the cleanup of the northern area, but to halt them at the security corridor.

At the time of the battle in the northern sector, both the Times and the Herald Tribune resorted to distorted editorializing by pictures. The New York Times printed a picture of two armed marines marching a file of seven or eight Dominicans with their hands folded behind their heads, with a caption which read: "U.S. Marines Arrest Rebels; United States Claims It Is Neutral in the Dominican Civil War." Under the picture, in small print, I noticed that the photo credit listed the U.S. Air Force. So I called to find out where the picture was taken, when, and what the Dominicans were arrested for. I learned—by now, not to my amazement—that the picture had been taken 8 days before, in the international security zone which had been established by the OAS, and that the Dominicans had been picked up for sniping. You will recall that the marines had an OAS mandate at that time to defend the international zone.

Clearly, the intent of the Times, in printing that picture with that caption, was to leave the impression that the arrests were connected with the then current battle in the northern sector, in which Timesman Szulc charged we were helping the junta forces.

The Tribune ran a photo with a similarly slanted caption. It showed a marine sitting on a fence firing his rifle. The caption to this one read: "On the

Fence in Santo Domingo, an American Marine, Under Orders To Stay Neutral, Fires at a Sniper." The fact that the marines were permitted to shoot back when shot at from outside the international zone somehow escaped the Tribune. The implication that the marines, by firing in self-defense and to maintain the international zone secure, were not being neutral, is obviously an intentional distortion.

The impression that the United States was aiding the Imbert forces in the battle in the northern sector was also fostered by a CBS news special, on May 31, entitled "Santo Domingo—Why Are We There?" Perhaps you recall seeing it. Films were shown purporting to show junta reinforcements moving through U.S. roadblocks in the security zone. They were followed on the program by a press conference with Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance and General Palmer, who both stated that to the best of their knowledge, there had been no deliberate U.S. violations of neutrality.

The viewer, having just seen the film clip of Dominican troops waved past the roadblocks by U.S. forces, naturally was skeptical of the statements by Secretary Vance and General Palmer. Next, CBS Correspondent Charles Kuralt said:

The very next day we watched dozens of trucks loaded with armed junta troops and policemen, both of them in battle against the rebels, roll through American checkpoints without even slowing down.

The viewer was shown pictures of this event.

The impression left upon the viewer was one of U.S. duplicity. Again, I checked to find out what really happened. I am informed that a full-scale investigation by the Department of Defense established that the first film clip dated from May 5, when the Imbert junta was not even in power, and not May 15 as charged, when the battle in the northern sector was taking place. The next pictures were not of Dominican Army troops, but of police who, according to the OAS's cease-fire agreement, had the right to move freely in and out of the security zone.

Clearly, the duplicity did not originate with U.S. officials.

I could go on for hours enumerating the incredible misrepresentations foisted upon the American people by certain sectors of the news media. Rather than trying to shoot down the many detailed distortions, I would prefer to establish for the Record certain general truths regarding our involvement in the Dominican imbroglio.

Myth No. 1: American lives were never really endangered. That was only an excuse to land troops to head off the return to power of former President Juan Bosch or an alleged Communist takeover.

Reality: On April 26, 2 days after the outbreak of the revolt, Americans began to ask for evacuation. Standby plans were put into operation. Both sides in the fighting gave the Embassy assurances that they would agree to a cease-fire to permit our evacuation program to be carried out.

At first, evacuees were gathered at the Hotel Embajador in Santo Domingo, taken by truck to the Haina port, and there boarded American Navy craft.

On April 27 armed rebel mobs, many of them teenagers, roamed the streets. Radio Santo Domingo was inciting the people to take reprisals against specific individuals. The radio announced that a well-known antirebel was at the Hotel Embajador. So were 1,000 Americans, who had collected there to await evacuation. A mob of rebels arrived and fired shots inside the hotel. That day, despite the terrifying incident at the hotel, the evacuation from Haina was completed.

By the night of April 27, various rebel leaders of the pro-Bosch faction—including Molina Urena, the "provisional president"—took asylum in foreign embassies.

At this point, the Embassy believed that the evacuation could still be effected. Gen. Wessin y Wessin, of the anti-rebel military forces, held overwhelming military force and it was believed that he could put an end to the anarchy in Santo Domingo.

On April 28, the police chief in Santo Domingo reported that law and order had broken down completely and he could no longer offer protection to foreigners. At the same time, the armed forces under command of Gen. Wessin y Wessin did not move. Colonel Benoit, head of the three-man military junta established at San Isidro that day, also informed our Embassy on the morning of April 28 that he believed American lives to be in danger in Santo Domingo, and that junta forces were unable to extend any protection. Meanwhile, many Americans began to gather at the Hotel Embajador for evacuation at Haina scheduled for 3 in the afternoon. But around 10 a.m. the Embassy was notified that the road to Haina was being fired upon by snipers.

The fact that the Haina road was closed, that the Dominican authorities could no longer safeguard foreigners in Santo Domingo, and that the Dominican Army was sitting out at San Isidro base doing nothing, finally convinced the Embassy that the time had come to protect our nationals. At that time, there were about 1,000 people waiting for evacuation, many of them women and children.

The Ambassador requested helicopter service from the aircraft carrier, *Boxer*, to evacuate the Americans at the Hotel Embajador and a small force to protect the chancery. Some 450 marines were landed to establish a safety perimeter around the hotel where the evacuees were boarded on helicopters. At the time the marines landed, Embassy guards and other Americans were under fire at the Hotel Embajador and the Embassy grounds. Eventually, more than 5,000 persons, Americans and citizens of 45 other different nationalities, were evacuated.

In the rapidly disintegrating situation in Santo Domingo on April 28, the U.S. Ambassador would have been derelict not to have requested protection for U.S.

citizens and anybody else asking for it. The argument that has been raised that no Americans were killed in Santo Domingo, hence no protection was needed, is specious. None was killed because of the swift decision to protect them. I cannot understand the reasoning that would have had us wait until some Americans were killed to prove that protection was necessary. How many deaths should we have waited for? Ten? Fifty? One hundred?

Expressions of thanks by people of other nationalities for evacuating them from the lawless, chaotic situation have been profuse. At the conclusion of my remarks, I shall put in the RECORD testimony to this effect.

The initial marine landings were intended solely to provide protection for U.S. citizens and others who requested it.

Myth No. 2: We intervened in support of the military, halting a social revolution. The danger of a Communist takeover was grossly exaggerated.

Reality: The fact that the President ordered the marines to land solely to protect innocent lives does not exclude the additional fact that we were aware of the growing Communist strength and influence on the rebel side.

Before proceeding, Mr. Speaker, it is essential to understand the background and nature of the Dominican revolt. After more than 30 years of one of the most brutal tyrannies in the hemisphere, the Dominican Republic is a country rent by suspicions and hatreds.

The triumvirate Government, ultimately headed by Reid Cabral, had come to power after a coup d'etat and was very narrowly based. Although efforts were made against graft and corruption in the military establishment, the military budget was cut in 1965, and a considerable number of the more unsavory military officers were removed from the scene, the armed forces continued to exercise an oppressive weight on the country and was a source of popular discontent. The same considerations applied to the police force.

Economically, the country had been much buffeted. The price of sugar had fallen from over 11 cents to around 2 cents a pound, a disastrous blow to a country more than 50 percent of whose foreign exchange earnings come from sugar. Cacao prices also were low, and there was overproduction of coffee. A severe drought affected other products. The U.S. shipping strike in January and February heavily depressed the Government's income through the lack of receipt of customs duties for imports and the lack of ships to carry away exports of sugar and other products. Payment of Government accounts was behind schedule, and laborers on public works and road projects were in many cases months behind in receiving their wages.

These developments intensified the strains on the fragile Dominican institutions. By late fall of 1964, it was apparent that the situation was declining. Broadcasts over the many Dominican radio stations grew more and more vio-

lent. The Embassy began to report plotted coups and intrigues.

Meanwhile, known Communists began to return, often secretly, from training in Iron Curtain countries and Cuba.

The April 24 revolt began with a variety of participants for a variety of motives. On that day, Reid sent his military chief of staff and a deputy to the 27th of February military camp outside Santo Domingo to cancel the commissions of four officers for plotting against the Government. Elements of the army, led by disaffected middle grade and junior officers, seized control of the 27th of February camp and made prisoners of General Rivera and his deputy. That sparked the revolt.

Word of these actions quickly spread to Santo Domingo and was broadcast over two radio stations. Shortly thereafter, a group of civilians seized the two radio stations and announced the overthrow of the Reid government.

While sentiment ran high against the Reid regime, there was no consensus of what or who should take its place. Some army officers supported Juan Bosch and wanted his return. They were joined by Bosch's PRD and by three Communist parties; the MPD—Peiping oriented; the PSP—Moscow oriented; and the 14th of June Movement—APJC—which had been taken over by Castro-Communist-trained leadership.

Some military officers favored the return of former President Balaguer. Still others were against Reid because of his efforts to reform the armed forces, but they were also opposed to Bosch. Others were merely opportunists looking for personal gain. Others wanted a military junta in order to oust some of the senior officers who blocked their promotions.

The struggle for power began. The following day truckloads of arms were sent into Santo Domingo from the 27th of February camp and distributed, largely by Communist leaders, among civilians. Armed mobs, urged on by the anti-Reid broadcasts, seized the national palace. Throughout the day, armed marauding bands of looters roamed the city, shooting at police and private citizens. MPD leaders were particularly active distributing bottles and gasoline to be used in making molotov cocktails.

With the distribution of machineguns and rifles to civilians, what had begun as an essentially military uprising changed to anarchic disorder. The superior organization and training of the Communists shortly found them in key positions among the rebels.

At the height of the rebel strength, early in the course of the revolt, there were no more than 1,000 officers and enlisted men. At that time, there were also between 2,500 and 5,500 armed civilians. Of these armed civilians, as many as 1,500 at the outset of the revolt were members of the three Dominican Communist-dominated parties under direct command of Communist leaders. From the very beginning of the revolt, then, armed Communist-led elements were greater in number than the organized military on the rebel side. There

were, in addition, several thousand more armed civilians who were not Communists, ranging from patriotic Dominicans who sincerely believed in what they were doing, to kids—some only 12 years old—who were in the fight for a thrill, to thugs who were out to kill policemen and to loot. Although many of these non-Communist civilians probably never came under Communist control and discipline, they were dependent in varying degrees upon the Communists for leadership and for arms and ammunition.

Mr. Speaker, at the conclusion of my remarks, I shall append the names and backgrounds of the principal Communist leaders in the Dominican revolt.

As John Bartlow Martin reminded us in his article in the May 28, 1965, issue of Life magazine, "Communists no longer make revolutions, they take them over." That is what happened in the Dominican Republic. The fact that the organized, trained Communist agents were few in number compared with the total Dominican population is no measure of their capability. It is not only the strength of the Communists that counts, but the weakness of those with whom they have allied. Where there is a weak non-Communist component and a strong Communist component, the Communists can seize the apparatus. In the Dominican revolt, the non-Communist rebels were in disarray. The Communist leadership, on the other hand, acted with purpose and calculation.

Here, the naïvete of some journalists merits mention. With the emergence of Caamaño Deno as rebel figurehead, some reporters leaped to paint him as the symbol of "constitutionalism," much as the New York Times had been instrumental in creating the image of Fidel Castro as the Robin Hood of the Sierra Maestra. Caamaño became leader of "the good guys," anybody who opposed him—and what loomed behind him—was automatically "a bad guy."

What, exactly, were Caamaño Deno's "constitutional" qualifications? His father had been a much-feared Trujillista; Caamaño had been bounced out of several branches of the armed services and the police. Several months before the revolt, he had become involved in an intrigue against a general and had been removed from his post by President Reid. He hated Reid. When the revolt began, Caamaño—now in the air force—joined it. But Caamaño's respect for the niceties of constitutional procedure had never been evident in the past. He made no objection to the overthrow of Bosch, in whose name he later rose to defend "constitutionalism."

Maybe Caamaño got religion, but the pretense that he was a "constitutional" descendant from the Bosch regime is a travesty. The constitution which Caamaño claimed as the source of his legitimacy does provide a line of command in case the President, Vice President, and so forth, are unable to exercise authority. The constitution provides that the Congress shall elect a provisional president from the ranks of the party of the absent President. The constitution also provides, however, that no military man can belong to a political party. Hence Ca-

maño—whom the Times, Tribune, and Post wanted us to accept as the "constitutional President" of the Dominican Republic—having been a military officer his entire adult life, was disqualified.

In brief, the disorganization and contrary motives of the non-Communist rebels facilitated the rise of hard-core Communists to key positions in the rebel forces. Some people now say that, had we thrown our support behind Molina Urena, Bosch's deputy, we would have struck a blow for freedom and democracy. But, how do they know what the Dominican people wanted, beyond an end to the state of affairs existing under Donald Reid Cabral? I would remind Members that there was not even a murmur from the Dominican people when Bosch was overthrown. Despite our protests, our break in relations and cutoff of aid, the Dominican people showed little regret at the loss of President Bosch. This is not to say that the overthrow of the first constitutionally elected President in the Dominican Republic after three decades of tyranny was not a tragic event for the establishment of democratic institutions in that troubled land. But it does indicate that in April 1965 we had no way of knowing whether the Dominican people wanted Bosch reimposed, with U.S. assistance, or Balaguer, or some other Dominican figure.

One thing is certain, however. When Molina Urena became "provisional president" on April 25, the rebel movement immediately broke into two camps. Many moderate political leaders and military officers resisted Bosch's return. The military officers, who had been reluctant to use their forces in support of Reid, immediately mobilized to prevent Bosch's return.

It is clear that Bosch could not have been brought back to power without violent civil strife. U.S. diplomatic efforts could hardly have overcome this opposition. Use of U.S. military force to reimpose Bosch would have meant U.S. marines fighting Dominicans. In sum, putting Humpty Dumpty together again would not have been a viable policy.

I shall comment later on the legal basis of the U.S. action. I want to note here, however, that some critics of U.S. action have not been notably consistent. On the one hand, the United States is criticized for not intervening in behalf of Juan Bosch; on the other hand, it is criticized for intervening to give the Dominican people a chance to elect their own leaders. I do not think we can be on both sides of the fence at once.

U.S. intervention not only prevented a Communist takeover, but there is every reason to believe it also will provide the Dominican people another chance to let their wills be known at the ballot box.

Myth No. 3: The United States collaborated with the corrupt Dominican military and the most retrograde elements in Dominican society and against the legitimate aspirations of a long oppressed people for political freedom and social justice.

Reality: From the voluminous documentation at the Department of State, it is clear that the United States never

wavered from a single goal: the establishment of some form of viable authority to prevent the complete breakdown of public order which in turn would create conditions conducive to a Communist takeover. The Embassy was bombarded with appeals to take one side or the other. Throughout, Ambassador Bennett urged a negotiated settlement. As stated above, to have intervened to impose Molina Urena would have been untenable. To have intervened to wipe out the Communist stronghold would have meant killing thousands of innocent Dominicans.

Contrary to rebel propaganda—echoed by a sector of the press—the United States did remain neutral throughout. The following paragraph from John Bartlow Martin's article in Life states:

If, as the rebels charged, our intention had been to defeat them, we would not have pressed for the cease-fire. For the cease-fire left the rebels in control of the city's center, the telephone company and the main radio station. Nor did we completely seal off the rebel stronghold in Ciudad Nueva—we permitted noncombatants to cross the corridor and, far from starving them out, we fed the rebels and gave them medicines and water. In short, the cease-fire benefited the rebels. We had promoted it to save lives.

Myth No. 4: The number of U.S. troops far exceeded the amount necessary for the declared purpose of protecting American lives. This is another variation of myth No. 2, that the danger to American lives was only a pretext for the intervention. The buildup of forces came later, with the recognition that a restoration of peace and order could halt a Communist takeover.

Reality: On May 4 there were some 20,000 U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic, deployed as follows: 2,013 guarding the Hotel Embajador area, 3,888 guarding the remainder of the safety zone, 4,416 securing the communications corridor, 4,416 guarding the road to San Isidro airfield and the approaches to the Duarte Bridge, and 4,416 stationed at the San Isidro airfield.

The number of troops was a military decision. It was by no means out of proportion to the necessity. On a normal day in Santo Domingo, a police force numbering over 6,000 men preserves the peace. Those were not "normal" days in Santo Domingo. Furthermore, it must be remembered that U.S. troops had several missions to perform; the 20,000 men were not all lined up, as the critics would have us believe, bayonets ready to charge the poor rebels. Troops in the safety zone protected that area from continual attacks and, at the same time, conducted the evacuation of some 5,000 people. Troops stationed in the communications corridor were charged with maintaining a safe route for evacuation and with distributing food and medical supplies to Dominicans of both factions. Moreover, these troops acted as a de facto buffer zone subject to frequent sniper fire and direct attack.

Myth No. 5: The United States turned belatedly to the Organization of American States to provide a cover for its illegal intervention.

Reality: At 5:14 p.m., April 28, 1965, when Ambassador Bennett called for Marines to protect American lives, there was no time for hesitation or debate. Of course, those who cling to myths Nos. 1 and 2—that there never was any real danger to American lives but that this was used solely as a pretext—must perforce follow their theory of diabolic machinations to its logical conclusions: to wit, that the whole exercise was pulled off intentionally behind the back of the OAS.

This is sheer nonsense. The initial intervention, as I have shown, was indeed humanitarian. The President of the United States knew the risks of intervening unilaterally in a Latin American Republic—knew the memories this would stir, and the propaganda advantage it would give the Communists. Nevertheless, in the swiftly disintegrating situation in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson could not wait for the OAS to intervene, to debate, and to await instructions from 18 different capitals.

As the depth of Communist penetration became apparent, the OAS was kept fully advised of the matter. Continued presence of U.S. troops in Santo Domingo was intended to permit the OAS to function in the manner intended by its charter.

Much has been made of articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter, which stress the obligation of member states not to intervene in the internal affairs of other member states. In conjunction with those two articles, standing alone out of context, it is essential to remember that the purpose for which the American Republics established the OAS, as set forth in article I of the charter is "to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and their independence." U.S. troops were fulfilling this role until such time as the OAS could assume responsibility.

I find it curious indeed that the very commentators who deplore our initially unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic as a breach of OAS agreements are the very same ones who studiously ignore the existence of the report to the OAS 10th Meeting of Consultation by its own five-member Special Committee. Interestingly, every one of the five Ambassadors had previously expressed—in speeches and comments in the OAS—doubts concerning the wisdom of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic. When the obviously shaken ambassadors returned from their on-the-spot investigation, they demonstrated understanding of the necessity of U.S. intervention, both to save lives and to prevent an extremist takeover.

The reaction of the members of the five-man Special Committee is recorded in the text of the minutes of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 10th Meeting of Consultation of the Organization of American States, which I am including in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The critics cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, they decry U.S. unilateral intervention; on the other hand,

they choose to disregard an official OAS committee sent to the Dominican Republic to ascertain the situation. As far as I have been able to ascertain, neither the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Herald Tribune, nor Senate critics have ever acknowledged the existence of the Special Committee's enlightening report. I venture to state that had the Special Committee come back from Santo Domingo damning U.S. intervention, the Post, the Times, and the Tribune would have headlined the news.

Myth No. 6: The intervention has caused widespread disaffection for the United States in Latin America.

Reality: Initially, as might be expected, editorial criticism in Latin America was widespread. But, as the facts began to filter out, a degree of understanding developed. Many acknowledged that this intervention was unrelated to the old-time protection of U.S. property interests; that, in fact, it was a tragic necessity in defense of the entire hemisphere.

Had all the major news media in the United States been telling the truth, it is likely that the message would have spread faster and further.

Myth No. 7: That our intervention in the Dominican Republic marks a turn of the goals of the Alliance for Progress toward a policy of military force to stem communism.

Reality: Support for reformist governments in Latin America continues unabated. We only wish there were more of them, backed by institutional structures sufficiently strong to undertake thoroughgoing reforms. But as the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs noted in its report in April 1964 on Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere:

Success of the Alliance for Progress and hemispheric plans for economic and social developments of Latin America will be endangered by continuing Castro Communist efforts to increase the political tensions and dangers of the region. Hence, long-range economic and political plans must be complemented by immediate steps to meet the threat of subversive aggression.

Mr. Speaker, I have spoken today in an effort to clarify the obfuscations in the Dominican situation brought about by the irresponsible reporting of some segments of the press and echoed by highly placed foreign policy spokesmen. I am not primarily interested in the motivation or reason behind the bias shown in connection with the Dominican situation by some of our news media—although that in itself should be of interest. But what I am interested in is that such misrepresentation of our Nation's foreign policy role be understood for what it is—not the responsible report of a free press, but the irresponsible propaganda of some who, under the protective cloak of journalistic rights, have sought to undercut and reshape our national policy to suit their own preconceived views of the story they have been assigned to cover.

Especially dangerous, however, is the practice by those in high positions of Government—highly placed foreign policy spokesmen—of embracing as the basis of their statements, the incredibly

slanted reports of some journalists. It is time that the pretensions of these spokesmen be recognized for what they are and what they are not.

To dissent out of what one believes to be the Nation's interests is an act of courage, but to dissent on the basis of grossly biased information undermines our Government's extremely difficult task of combating our Nation's enemies.

At the outset, I stated that my purpose today was to separate fact from fiction, myth from reality, regarding the events which occurred during the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic. In the past, some spokesmen have talked in terms of old myths and new realities regarding our Nation's foreign policy. I would recommend that some time be given by these spokesmen—and by the news media with whom they collaborate in criticism of U.S. policy—to reexamine some of their own precious myths, in the light of the violent realities of the world in which we live today.

APPENDIX 1

MAY 12, 1965.

PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH EVACUEES FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(NOTE.—Following are excerpts from personal interviews made with some of the evacuees by VOA staffers.)

Argentine engineer Lorenzo Dóttá, interviewed in Buenos Aires on May 8, 1965, said: "The reception (in San Juan) was unforgettable. Every possible facility was offered to the refugees. They helped us establish communication with our countries of origin and medical attention was given those who needed it." Senor Dóttá also said that those who criticize the action of the United States undoubtedly were ignorant of what was happening in the Dominican Republic. "There, there is no respect for the life of any human being," he declared, "and only the presence of the marines was a guarantee of security, a cause for tranquility for the foreigners."

In an interview at the Red Cross Center in San Juan (date not available), Argentine citizen Enrique Rodríguez voiced his gratitude to U.S. Marines "for having saved my family." He described the rescuing helicopters as being punctured with bullets from ground fire. "The U.S. participation has been marvelous. Some countries criticized the North Americans for their intervention, but it is more than intervention; it is a help. The U.S. forces are not concerned in being occupying forces, but only interested in saving lives." Senor Rodríguez left the Dominican Republic with his wife and two children. He had been a resident in Santo Domingo for 3 years.

A Peruvian university professor, Rafael Reategui, interviewed in San Juan (date not available), declared: "I do not have words to express how grateful we are to the North American authorities for having evacuated us. The evacuation could not have been more opportune, and thanks to that measure, we are here safe and sound. Really, one could not have asked for more, because from the moment we boarded the transport ship *Wood County* to leave Santo Domingo, we have received nothing but kindness."

A Haitian citizen who was evacuated from the Dominican Republic was interviewed in Puerto Rico on May 4. He requested that his name not be used for personal reasons. He said, "From the moment that I was under the protection of the U.S. flag I felt secure, not only for my life but in every way."

Thomas Paniagua, a Dominican refugee, was interviewed in Puerto Rico on May 8. He said the North Americans "with their skill and compassion * * * were helping the Dominican people [and] were providing

a water filter [system] * * *. We are grateful to the American people."

Brazilian Professor Joa Soares Veiga, director of the Institute of Zootchnics of Pernambuco in the state of Sao Paulo, and Brazilian delegate to the meeting in Santo Domingo of the Inter-American Society of Agricultural and Livestock Development, was interviewed in Sao Paulo on May 9, 1965. "The presence of the North American forces produced tranquility among the residents and foreign visitors, many of whom felt threatened, if not by the rebel forces themselves by elements foreign to the revolution who possessed arms. The treatment received by those who wanted to leave, before embarking and during their stay on the North American ship and arrival in San Juan, was of indescribable kindness, from the commander of the *Boxer* down to the last sailor. The desire to help the refugees, especially the women and children, was notable."

In an interview at the Red Cross Center in San Juan, Senora Maria Rosa Pinero de Barrera, an Argentine citizen whose husband had a photographic studio in Santo Domingo, declared that U.S. forces "very much saved lives, especially mine and those of my family." Senora de Barrera left the Dominican Republic with five members of her family. (Date of interview not available.)

In an interview on May 6 Alfredo Ballestas, a Colombian airplane mechanic, declared that "the arrival of U.S. forces was the salvation of all foreigners" in Santo Domingo. He noted that the evacuees were "royally" treated on the U.S.S. *Boxer* where the Marines treated the evacuees as their "guests." Medical treatment was provided children on the *Boxer*. "U.S. forces did not take sides in the conflict, their only role was to save lives."

Giovanni Constantino, an Italian musician who has been with the symphony orchestra of Santo Domingo for some years, was interviewed at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico on May 9. He recounted his desperate attempts to bring his family from the dangerous center of the city to the neutral zone. After arriving in the zone they were evacuated in the last American ship leaving Santo Domingo (from then on the evacuation has been carried out by air.) Mr. Constantino praised the work of the North American soldiers and recounted how from the first moment of their arrival in Santo Domingo they had started to distribute medicine and food regardless of which side the recipients were on. At the same time the soldiers were fulfilling the task of evacuation and protection of foreign residents. He ended by saying, "I am convinced that without the presence of the Marines the situation would have degenerated into irreparable chaos."

A young Italian singer, Antonio Sciortino, resident in Caracas but fulfilling a singing engagement in Santo Domingo, was caught by the revolution in the most dangerous part of the city. Finally, he persuaded one of the rebels to guide him to the refugee zone from which he was evacuated by the American forces. He said on May 10, "all of us who were evacuated feel grateful to the United States—in the first place for the protection which they gave us in the midst of the danger, and afterward for their treatment of us from the moment that we placed ourselves in their hands."

Mrs. Maria de Badelt, born in the Argentine but resident for some years in Santo Domingo where she was professor of Spanish at the university, was one of the first group of refugees to be evacuated from Santo Domingo. She is now in Puerto Rico serving as a volunteer with the Red Cross. She commented particularly on one of the Marine barbers. "I do not remember his name, but I shall never forget the untiring dedication that he showed in preparing hundreds of baby bottles when we were on board the *Boxer*." She added, "There is not enough money to pay those pilots of the helicopters.

Once on board we were overwhelmed with attention * * * from the officers down to the least of the sailors." Mrs. Badelt said that the thing that probably impressed the refugees most was to see the officers on board give up their staterooms to the women and children.

Guluseppe Bonasera of Sicily, who had been in Santo Domingo on business, was interviewed in San Juan on May 8. He said, "Because of the North Americans I am safe here in Puerto Rico."

In an interview in Miami on May 7, Roberto Garcia Serra, a Cuban, declared that, "If the U.S. officials had not exercised the proper authority, lives lost (in the Embajador Hotel) would have run into the thousands." Mr. Garcia had resided in the Dominican Republic for a year and a half and was employed in the public relations field.

In an interview in Miami on May 8, Juan Gonzalez Clemente, a Cuban journalist in exile and a resident of the Dominican Republic, declared that, "If President Johnson had not ordered the landing of the Marines it would have been disastrous to the Dominican people." In addition, Gonzalez noted the Communist danger. "If the Marines had not intervened I believe that within 3 or 4 days (of the beginning of the coup), Fidel Castro would have been speaking in the Parque de Independencia in Santo Domingo."

On May 5, a Dominican lady who had been evacuated from her country was interviewed in San Juan. She asked that her name not be mentioned. She said of the situation there when she left, "It was somewhat calmer due to the assistance which the North Americans were giving us. If it had not been for the aid which arrived from the United States the Dominican people already would have been taken over by communism." She said that "the evacuation was conducted very well and we received very great help from the American consul and others, and were treated well." She concluded that "without the food and medicines distributed by the Americans many Dominicans would have perished."

In an interview in Miami on May 6, Carlos Manuel Gutierrez, a Cuban exile businessman, observed that during the conflict "I saw much food and supplies being landed by U.S. vessels and helicopters. In addition I saw many medical aid men being landed."

Cuban Alfredo Rubio, general manager of the Hotel Embajador in Santo Domingo, interviewed on May 6 in Miami said: "For the Americans we were not foreigners, we were all Americans. We were treated as if—we were helped to evacuate in a manner as effective as if—we had been born on North American territory. In this evacuation all of us—all in general from Latin America, Europe, Canada, England, from wherever, who arrived at the Embassy office established in the Hotel Embajador—were immediately provided with the papers necessary for evacuation. I want to thank the United States for this in the name of all the persons who were evacuated. They have treated all of us as if we were sons of North America."

Mexican Performing Artist Fernando Baladez, was interviewed in Miami on May 6. "I am very grateful to the U.S. Government because I owe it my life. As soon as I get to Mexico I am going to publicize what happened—not what I was told, but what I saw, what I suffered, what I lived. I will be grateful for the rest of my life."

OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF APPRECIATION

(The following comes from a letter to the editor appearing in the Daily Gleaner of May 4): "I should very much appreciate it if, through the medium of your paper you would allow me to express my appreciation to the Government of the United States of America for my recent evacuation from Santo Domingo. I was with my husband and three other Jamaicans on a business trip to the

Dominican Republic when the revolution started at Saturday noon. Although the Embajador Hotel was not in the heart of the city where the fighting was concentrated, we were able to see the frequent aerial bombing of the town, army barracks, ammunition dumps, and also to hear regular bursts of machinegun fire nearby. The most welcome sight after 4 days of confinement was two ships of the U.S. Navy steaming in to take us to safety. Once aboard, every facility of the ship was ours. Sleeping quarters were turned over to us while the sailors and marines slept on deck. The comfort of the chaplain or the assistance of the doctor were ours for the asking. We were given a very sumptuous dinner and entertained by movies, but the greatest gift of all was the knowledge that we were out of danger. On arrival at the U.S. base in San Juan, we were offered accommodations, transport, medical attention, and money. Nothing had been forgotten for our care and comfort. I am sure I express thoughts of all the evacuees when I say thanks to God, America, and the gallant marines and sailors who, with confidence and speed, efficiently landed to rescue us from our plight.

"GLORIA KELLEY.

"KINGSTON, JAMAICA."

In an interview in Miami on May 7, Luis Roberto Flores, Salvadorean Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, expressed his "most sincere gratitude to the U.S. Government and people for having saved all the elements of the Salvadorean colony in the Dominican Republic."

In spite of her 102 years, Dona Victorina de la Cruz, director and moving spirit of the Santo Domingo orphanage Blessed Joseph of Cadiz, spent the first days of the revolution with all her 120 orphans isolated within the orphanage. After a few days the food supply was exhausted and Dona Victorina despaired of help. However, the news of her situation reached the U.S. soldiers of company 42 from Fort Gordon, Ga. They immediately delivered 300 pounds of rice to the orphanage and promised to continue supplying food. Dona Victorina said, "It was like manna from heaven * * *. These are my heroes."

Mr. Edgar Arias Chinchilla, a Costa Rican citizen, was interviewed by a reporter from the Costa Rican newspaper La Nacion on May 8. Mr. Arias had been in Santo Domingo on problems related to rural youth. He and others were taken from the dangerous center of Santo Domingo in trucks to the Hotel Embajador and from there by helicopter to the aircraft carrier *Boxer*. "What organization," he said. "We received marvelous, unbelievable attention. There were specialists in the care of children and even help for the women who were pregnant." When they reached San Juan, after being transferred to another ship, everything was ready to receive them, he said. "There were some who had no money, no passport, nothing. They were taken to the Red Cross for special attention to resolve their problem." He added that among the refugees of numerous nationalities their comment was unanimous: "How wonderful are these North Americans, and how many lives they have saved in Santo Domingo."

El Tiempo of Bogota published a front-page interview with Mr. Jaime Pradilla on May 5 entitled, "A Colombian in Santo Domingo." Mr. Pradilla said that "I and thousands more owe our lives to the North Americans." We were saved, he said, "by the opportune and necessary intervention of the American forces * * *. The rebels lost control of the situation and it degenerated into a massacre in which no one knew why he was fighting or killing." Mr. Pradilla escaped to the Colombia Embassy which at that time had neither electricity nor water. He added, "When the North Americans landed they

commenced immediately the rescue operation. Thousands of persons of all nationalities were evacuated without delay * * *. If the North Americans had not arrived in time and put an end to the killing, I believe that I would not have been alive today nor would many of those who were with me."

APPENDIX 2

COMMUNISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE DOMINICAN REBELLION

1. Abel Hasbun, Amin: Member of the executive committee of the APCJ and a leader of the Communist-controlled student union at the University of Santo Domingo. Attended the second meeting of the (Communist-front) International Union of Students in Hungary in 1964. Was active in organizing Communist activities in the Dominican revolt on April 24, 1965. He was seen at the National Palace on April 25.
2. Abreu, Fritz Antonio: APCJ member. In September 1963, left the Dominican Republic for Cuba, later going to the Soviet Union. He returned to the Dominican Republic in October 1964. Active Communist from the outset of the Dominican revolt on April 24, 1965. As of May 2, there was at his home a radio station which broadcast exhortations to shoot Americans on sight. Arms and ammunition were stored in his house.
3. Bernard Vasquez, Maximo: Former high-level member of the APCJ; was an APCJ liaison man with a subversive faction of the Dominican military in connection with the APCJ guerrilla uprising in December 1963. Early in 1965 plates and negatives for PSPD propaganda were made in his printshop. On April 25, 1965, was active in the distribution of arms to APCJ and PSPD members in the Dominican revolt. On April 26, was observed at a Communist strongpoint and garrison. As of May 3, was active in propaganda work.
4. Blanco Genao, Moises Augustin: APCJ member; observed with other Communists attending meetings at the National Palace on April 25.
5. Botello Fernandez, Norge Williams: APCJ member; in September 1963, went to Cuba where he received guerrilla training. Active among Communists from the beginning of the April 24, 1965 Dominican revolt. Was among those at one of the principal APCJ strongpoints and headquarters with Juan Miguel Roman Diaz.
6. Bujosa Mieses, Benjamin: PSPD member; identified on April 30, 1965, as active in the street fighting in the Dominican revolt.
7. Calventi Gavino, Jose Vinicio: APCJ member. In August 1961 he visited the Soviet Union with his brother, later visiting East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In August 1963 he left the Dominican Republic for Cuba. He took part in the seizure of the Prensa Libre plant on April 25, 1965.
8. Conde Sturla, Alfredo: PSPD member who received special training in Cuba during 1962. Identified as among Communists active in the Dominican revolt as of April 30, 1965.
9. Conde Sturla, Amadeo: APCJ member; active in subversive activities at the University of Santo Domingo. Among leaders of armed civilian group which seized Prensa Libre, anti-Communist newspaper, on April 25, 1965. He was one of the more active terrorists in the first days of the rebellion.
10. Conde Sturla, Pedro: PSPD member; active in Communist-front student group at the University of Santo Domingo. As of April 30, 1965, identified among Communists active in the Dominican revolt.
11. Cuello Hernandez, Jose Israel: PSPD member; student and editor of Communist-controlled newspaper at University of Santo Domingo. He was seen with other Communists who attended meetings at the National

Palace on April 25, 1965. On April 27, armed with automatic weapon, was part of group which seized Listin Diario newspaper and prepared to publish Communist propaganda. He was also seen distributing Communist flyers.

12. De la pena Santos, Julio: APCJ member. Was second in command of a rebel post early in Dominican revolt.
13. Deschamps Erickson, Miguel Angel: MPD member; traveled to Cuba and bloc countries in 1962-63 on a false passport. Received guerrilla training in Cuba. Among Communists active since outbreak of Dominican revolt on April 24, 1965; was captured by loyalist forces.
14. Despradel Roque, Fidelio: A founding member of the APCJ; adheres to Chinese Communist line. Received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1963. A leader of abortive APCJ uprising in late 1963. Was captured and deported to Europe in May 1964. Returned illegally to Dominican Republic in October 1964. Received large sum of money from Chinese Communists. Participated in April 25, 1965, distribution of arms to civilians in Dominican revolt. Commanded an APCJ post of armed Communists set up on April 26. One of top rebel leaders as of May 3.
15. Dominguez Guerrero, Asdrubal Ulises: PSPD propaganda chief and active student leader. Has received money from Castro regime. Received bloc training in 1962. Active in revolt from outset, and, as of April 25, 1965, led an armed group which seized offices of Listin Diario newspaper on April 27. As of May 3, one of top leaders of rebel movement.
16. Dore Cabral, Carlos: PSPD member and official of the pro-Communist student federation, FED. On April 26, 1965, was among those Communists in charge of the production of Molotov cocktails; was seen during the rebellion at a Communist-controlled strongpoint.
17. Ducoudray Mansfield, Juan: He and his family figure prominently in the top leadership of the PSPD. In 1962, was in Cuba working on the preparation of scripts for broadcasts by radio Havana beamed to the Dominican Republic. His foreign travel since 1957 includes the U.S.S.R., Communist China, Poland, and Cuba.
He has had contact with the Soviet Embassy in Havana. On April 25, 1965, was among those active in the distribution of arms to PSPD and APCJ members. As of May 3, was among the top leadership group of the rebel movement.
18. Ducoudray Mansfield, Felix Servio, Jr.: One of the directors of the PSPD; has lived in the Soviet Union; in Argentina in 1959, had close contact with leaders of Argentina Communist Party. In 1960 he was in Cuba where he was employed by the New China News Agency, and in October 1960, went to China, traveling under a Cuban passport. In April 1963 he returned to the Dominican Republic from Cuba. On April 25, 1965, participated in distribution of weapons to civilians in Dominican revolt. As of May 3, was identified as one of the top leadership group of the rebel movement.
19. Duran Hernando, Jamie: Important leader of the APCJ; in 1964 received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba; later went to Soviet Union with other trainees. He was arrested in Santo Domingo on April 24, the first day of the Dominican revolt, but was released on April 26. Immediately took over command of an armed Communist post.
20. Erickson Alvarez, Tomas Parmenio: Member of the MPD Central Committee who was secretary for rural affairs in 1963. He has gone to Cuba on at least three occasions in 1961, 1962, and 1964. On the last visit, he received guerrilla training. Identified as of April 30, 1965, as among the Communists active in the Dominican revolt.
21. Escobar Alfonso, Manuel: Prominent PSPD member; received bloc training in

1963; was in Czechoslovakia in 1963. In the first days of the Dominican revolt, was active in distributing weapons to civilians, and in moving arms into strongpoints in Ciudad Nueva. Associate of Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez in directing military activities of the Communists.

22. Estevez Weber, Gerardo Rafael: PSPD member, on the party's Central Committee. On April 25, 1965, was among those distributing arms to PSPD and APCJ members in the Dominican revolt. On April 26, was observed at Communist (PSPD) strongpoint. The PSPD Central Committee met in his home the night of April 27. As of May 3, was active in Communist propaganda work.
23. Evangelista Alejo, Rafael: PSPD member. Attended meetings at the National Palace on April 25, 1965, with other Communists.
24. Felix Rodriguez, Manuel Demostenes: APCJ member; fought in the guerrilla uprising in late 1963. He was deported to France and from France went to Mexico; later returned clandestinely to the Dominican Republic. Identified with the rebel forces in Ciudad Nueva during the Dominican revolt.
25. Franco Pichardo, Franklin Jose de Jesus: PSPD member; in 1963 he attended the 26th of July celebrations in Havana. In December 1964, was in the Soviet Union, and in January 1965 was in Czechoslovakia. On February 1, 1965, returned to the Dominican Republic. Identified among Communists active in the current fighting in Santo Domingo.
26. Garcia, Porfirio "Rabeche": PSPD member; on April 25, 1965, was among those Communists directing the production of molotov cocktails.
27. Garcia Castillo, Edmundo: PSPD member. On April 25, 1965, was seen distributing Communist propaganda. On May 2, made an anti-American speech to a crowd of people in Parque Independencia.
28. Genao Espallat, Luis Bernardo: APCJ leader; was in Cuba in 1962; participated in guerrilla uprisings in late 1963 and was subsequently arrested and deported. From 1963 to early 1965, sent books to Dominican Republic from Paris for use in APCJ training courses. Identified among Communists in current fighting in Santo Domingo. On May 3, he departed Santo Domingo for Santiago, and was later captured by loyalist forces.
29. Giro Alacantara, Luis Felipe Valentin: MPD leader; was in Cuba from September 1963 to March 1964. Identified on April 29, 1965, as among Communists active in current Dominican rebellion. On April 29, participated in the attack on Ozama Fortress.
30. Gomez, Facundo: PSPD member; part owner of the *Scarlet Woman*, a fishing boat which landed three MPD leaders, with arms and ammunition from Cuba, in the Dominican Republic during the 1963 guerrilla movement. On April 25, 1965, conferred with top leaders of the Dominican revolt at the National Palace.
31. Gomez, Perez Luis: Member of PSPD Central Committee and formerly a member of the APCJ; studied in the U.S.S.R. on a scholarship; known to have traveled to Cuba and in 1963 he received training in Czechoslovakia. Among those Communists attending meetings in the National Palace on April 25, 1965.
32. Gonzalez Gonzalez, Manuel: Member of PSPD Central Committee; Spanish national who participated in the Spanish Civil War; also reported to be a Cuban intelligence agent. A military leader of the Communist forces under PSPD control in the Dominican revolt. On April 25, was seen bearing arms at a PSPD gathering at Parque Independencia; later that day set up a Communist commando group. On April 26, was in charge of an arms depot, where he was issuing arms to civilians and instructing them in using these weapons. Was among those

attending the PSPD Central Committee meeting the night of April 27.

33. Guerra Nouel, Jose Bienvenido: APCJ member, active in Communist-controlled cultural group at the University of Santo Domingo. Was in Cuba in 1963 where he received guerrilla training. Identified as among prominent APCJ fighters in the current Santo Domingo revolt. On May 3, he set up a Communist command post in the Ciudad Nueva area.

34. Hernandez Vargas, Hector Homero: APCJ member; recently returned to the Dominican Republic secretly from Paris where he had been in exile since his deportation in May 1964 for participation in the guerrilla movement of late 1963. He received guerrilla training in Cuba in late 1964; a leader of the APCJ travel committee arranging for clandestine return of APCJ exiles to the Dominican Republic. In late March 1965 was one of group preparing propaganda for a possible armed uprising. Among active APCJ leaders in the present revolt in Santo Domingo. On April 29, participated in the attack on Ozama Fortress.

35. Houellemont Roques, Eduardo "Piti": APCJ member; student agitator in 1961, organizing disorders at University of Santo Domingo. Known as pro-Castro; was treasurer of the FED Student Federation. Was in Cuba in 1963. On April 25, 1965, was among the Communists participating in the distribution of arms to civilians in Dominican revolt. Was among armed mob which seized offices of anti-Communist newspaper Prensa Libre on April 25.

36. Isa Conde, Antonio Emilio Jose: PSPD member; pro-Castro student leader and agitator. He attended the 26th of July celebrations in Havana in 1963 and received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba the same year. He received financial assistance from the Czechs in Prague later in 1963. Was among PSPD group attending meetings at National Palace on April 25, 1965. Member of the PSPD-APCJ group that seized control of the plant of the anti-Communist newspaper Prensa Libre on April 25. Seen distributing Communist Party flyers calling on the people of Santo Domingo to arm themselves and fight for "workers' rights". As of May 3, was identified as one of the top leadership group of the rebel movement.

37. Isa Conde Narciso: Brother of Antonio. PSPD leader, central committee member. Among those Communists active on April 24, 1965; part of armed PSPD group at Parque Independencia on April 25, and later that day was among prominent Communists attending meetings at the National Palace. On April 26, was identified as one of armed PSPD members on the streets; one of the leaders of the armed group that seized the plant of the newspaper Prensa Libre. Was active on May 1, distributing propaganda.

38. Johnson Pimentel, Buenaventura: PSPD leader and a member of the party's central committee; also reported to be a member of the APCJ. On April 25, 1965, was active in the distribution of weapons to PSPD and APCJ members in Dominican revolt. Johnson's truck was used to distribute arms to civilians in the Ciudad Nueva area. His house on Espallat Street in Santo Domingo used as a rebel garrison in the present rebellion. Molotov cocktails stored there and machineguns mounted on roof. On May 1, 50 members (probably a high command group) of all three Communist parties—the PSPD, APCJ, and MPD—met at his house.

39. Lajara Gonzalez, Alejandro: AFCJ member, named deputy director of investigation during 2-day regime of Molina Ureia. Arranged for the supply of additional arms to the Communists during the morning of April 27.

40. Licairac Diaz, Alexis: Member of AFCJ youth section and a student at the University of Santo Domingo. He was a delegate to the Communist-dominated Latin

American Youth Congress held in Santiago, Chile, in March 1964. Active in fighting in Ciudad Nueva during the Dominican revolt and; on May 3, 1965, was stationed at a Communist command post in that area.

41. Lora Iglesias, Josefina: APCJ member, active in pro-Castro student group at the University of Santo Domingo. She participated in guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963 and was subsequently deported to Europe.

In October 1964 she was in Cuba, where she received political training. She returned to the Dominican Republic in March 1965. Among the Communists active in the April 24, 1965 rebellion in Santo Domingo and in rebel radio broadcasts.

42. Lora Vicente, Silvano: PSPD member; received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba from late 1963 to early 1964. Lora visited Moscow in late 1964. On April 25, 1965, was one of the leaders of an armed Communist group at the National Palace. Later that same day attended meetings between Communists and rebel leaders at National Palace. On May 3, was identified among rebel forces and was observed leading a group of PSPD members to collect ammunition for distribution among the armed mobs.

43. Macarrulla Reyes, Lisandro Antonio: PSPD and APCJ member; one of the organizers of the APCJ Communist cells in the Ozama section of Santo Domingo. Took a course in Marxism-Leninism in Havana in June 1962. On April 26, 1965, was observed armed with machinegun at PSPD stronghold and garrison.

44. Maldonado Belkis: PSPD member. Identified as of May 3, among active Communists taking part in the Dominican revolt.

45. Martinez Howley, Orlando: PSPD member and student leader; active in organizing street agitation and stirring up anti-U.S. sentiment.

46. Matos Rivera, Juan Jose: APCJ member who attended the 26th of July celebration in Havana in 1963. He participated in the APCJ guerrilla uprising in late 1963. He was deported to Europe and returned secretly to the Dominican Republic in January 1965. On May 3, 1965, he was active among Communists fighting in the Ciudad Nueva area.

47. Mejia Gomez, Juan Bautista: Leading APCJ member who served in 1964 on APCJ Central Committee; formerly in charge of legal matters for Agrupacion Patriotica 20 de Octubre, an APCJ front group.

Identified as an active Communist, participant in the Dominican revolt from the outset. On May 2, a telephone interview with him on the APCJ's role in the revolt appeared in the Havana newspaper Hoy.

48. Mejia Liuberes, Rafael de la Altagracia ("Baby"): APCJ member; secretary of youth affairs of the party; received political indoctrination and guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1963. Returned clandestinely to the Dominican Republic in January 1964. On April 30, 1965, was among Communists working closely with rebel officers in the Dominican revolt. On May 2, he was active in the Ciudad Nueva area, and was at one of the principal APCJ command posts with Juan Miguel Roman Diaz.

49. Mella Pena, Francisco Xavier ("Pichi"): APCJ member and a known Cuban intelligence agent in Santo Domingo. He received training in Cuba as a "frogman" for an unknown mission in the Dominican Republic. Active rebel fighter since the outbreak of the Dominican revolt and observed at APCJ command headquarters and at an APCJ supply center.

50. Mercedes Batista, Diomedes: PSPD member who traveled to Cuba in July 1963; attended the Communist-dominated Second Latin American Youth Congress in Chile in March 1964. Active from outset of revolt on April 24. Was seen haranguing civilian crowd at Parque Independencia on April 25, and later that day was operating a sound

truck urging the people to revolt. On April 25, was also among Communists attending meetings at National Palace. Was also identified at a PSPD stronghold leading an armed PSPD unit.

51. Mir Valentine, Pedro Julio: PSPD Central Committee member; close personal friend of Fidel Castro. A frequent traveler to Cuba (1961 through 1963). Traveled to Moscow in 1959. In 1961 he was sponsoring a daily radio program originating in Cuba, beamed to the Dominican Republic.

Mir brought large amounts of money to the Dominican Republic in 1963. Identified on April 30, 1965, as among the Communists actively participating in the Dominican revolt.

52. Montas Gonzalez, Luis Adolfo: Member of the APCJ Central Committee and political committee. He was a delegate to the Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress held in Santiago, Chile, in March 1964. Identified as among Communists active in the Dominican revolt.

53. del Orbe, Henry Wilson: PSPD member who received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1963. He had previously lived 13 years in Cuba, and has traveled to the U.S.S.R. On April 30, 1965, was identified among the Communists participating in the Dominican revolt.

54. Ortiz Desangeles, Manuel: PSPD member and pro-Castro student agitator; has conducted indoctrination courses for University of Santo Domingo students, seen on April 26, 1965, directing the production of molotov cocktails. Later captured by loyalist forces and held prisoner.

55. Ozuna Hernandez, Daniel: Prominent APCJ leader, who figured prominently in the 1963 APCJ guerrilla fighting; has given weapons familiarization instructions to APCJ members. On April 25, 1965, was among those distributing arms to civilians in Dominican revolt, and attended meetings with rebel leaders at National Palace later that day. Was captured by loyalist forces on May 2, and held prisoner.

56. Perez Mencia, Ignacio: PSPD member. On April 26, 1965, was observed directing the production of molotov cocktails. Later identified at a Communist stronghold during the fighting.

57. Perez Perez, Milvio: PSPD member; owns a bookstore specializing in Communist literature in Santo Domingo and has done photographic work for the PSPD. On April 25, 1965, was among a group of armed Communists at the National Palace. He has been observed distributing arms and molotov cocktails to civilians. As of May 5, was engaged in preparing false identity cards for Communist leaders.

58. Pichardo Veloso, Nicolas: PSPD member; an officer of the Movimiento Cultural Universitario (a Communist front group). He was a member of the group which seized anti-Communist newspaper Prensa Libre on April 25, 1965, preparing immediately to publish propaganda leaflets. Was engaged in the production of molotov cocktails on April 26, and was observed taking weapons to a PSPD center on Calle Espallat. On April 29, participated in the attack on Ozama Fortress.

59. Pinedo Mejia, Ramon Agustin: MPD leader who traveled from Czechoslovakia to Cuba in 1962. He was involved in APCJ guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963. During the Dominican revolt was MPD representative at a meeting with the APCJ on April 25, 1965, and later stationed at an MPD command post.

60. Pumarol Peguero, Catalina: APCJ member and student at the University of Santo Domingo; close friend of Ema Tavarez Justo. She has been active in organizing street agitation and stirring up anti-U.S. sentiment.

61. Ramos Alvarez, Benjamin: High-level member of the APCJ, and head of the District

Committee for Santo Domingo. All three Communist Party leadership groups met with him on April 29, 1965, to discuss future tactics.

62. Restituyo Apolinar: PSPD member and student agitator; active in organizing street agitation.

63. Ricart Ricart, Gustavo Federico: MPD Central Committee member, and the most prominent MPD leader in the Dominican Republic at the outbreak of the Dominican revolt. Was in Cuba 1962-63 and brought back approximately \$50,000 to fund MPD activities. Commanded a rebel stronghold as early as April 26, 1965.

64. Rodriguez Acosta, Jose Francisco: Member of PSPD Central Committee. Was trained in Cuba in 1962. Known to have been in Prague prior to February 1963; has also been in the Soviet Union. He was active in the party's military buildup early in the rebellion. One of the leaders of a PSPD armed group at a Communist stronghold on April 25, 1965.

65. Rodriguez del Prado, Carlos: PSPD member and cousin of Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado, one of the principal leaders of the MPD. On April 25, 1965, he met at his house with other armed Communists active in the Dominican revolt.

66. Rodriguez del Prado, Cayetano: Member of the MPD Central Committee and secretary of propaganda. Participated in Cuban attempt to cache arms and ammunition, as well as infiltrate three top level MPD members into the Dominican Republic during the APCJ guerrilla uprisings. Deported from the Dominican Republic in May 1964 and traveled to Communist China. Wrote a pamphlet outlining methods by which MPD could use Dominican students in the Chinese manner to carry out a successful revolution. Was in police custody when Dominican revolt broke out, but was released on April 25. Was known to be in contact with PSPD and other Communists during the course of the revolt, but did not participate in active fighting because of ill health.

67. Rodriguez Fernandez, Orlando: APCJ member; active among Communists in the Dominican revolt; working energetically to organize anti-U.S. sentiment.

68. Roman Diaz, Juan Miguel: Member of APCJ Central Committee; participated in guerrilla activities in the Dominican Republic in late 1963. Deported in May 1964 to Lisbon; returned clandestinely to the Dominican Republic in January 1965. One of the top rebel Communists from the outset of the revolt, and leading military figure of the APCJ. Commanded one of the largest rebel strongholds which served as a command post, arsenal, and prison. (Note: killed in rebel assault on National Palace on May 19, 1965.)

69. de la Rosa Cano, Jesus: PSPD member; former ensign in the Dominican Navy. On April 25, 1965, was inciting crowds to burn and destroy property.

70. Sanchez Cordoba, Luis Rene: MPD member; in 1964 was interim secretary general of MPD. Identified as among Communists actively participating in the Dominican revolt; was captured by loyalists on May 3.

71. Santamaria Demorizi, Miguel Angel: Communist agitator; involved in Dominican subversive activities since at least 1961. In 1963, was in charge of making hand grenades for Communist groups. Was deported from both the Dominican Republic and France; returned to the Dominican Republic in late 1963 from Venezuela. Identified among Communists active in the Dominican revolt. He was at the National Palace on April 25, with other Communists.

72. Sosa Valerio, Arlosto: PSPD member. On April 25, 1965, was with the armed Communist group at the National Palace, and later in the day attended meetings there.

73. Tavaréz Justo, Ema: APCJ member and student agitator; she is the sister of

Manuel Tavaréz Justo who was killed while leading the APCJ guerrilla movement in late 1963. She was among the Communists at the National Palace on April 25, 1965, and was active in Communist propaganda activities from the outset of the revolt.

74. Tavaras Rosario, Rafael Francisco "Fafa": Member of Central Executive Committee of APCJ; received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in late 1963 and early 1964. Returned to the Dominican Republic from Cuba in December 1964 using a false passport. As of April 30, 1965, was identified among those Communists working closely with rebel military leadership. On May 2, was at one of the main Communist command posts.

75. Tolentino Dipp, Hugo: PSPD member; chief of a Dominican guerrilla unit trained in Cuba. Was deported in February 1962 and received training in Soviet bloc countries. Returned clandestinely to Dominican Republic. Participated in distribution of arms to civilians in Dominican revolt on April 25, 1965. As of May 3, was one of the top leadership group of the rebel government.

76. Valdez Conde, Nicolas Quirico: PSPD member; in 1959 was member of the executive body of the PSPD. Employed in Cuba as Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro in June 1963. Lived in Moscow for 3 years. Identified among Communists active in the Dominican revolt.

77. Vicioso Gonzalez, Abelardo Sergio: PSPD member who has been active in student affairs. Was in Cuba in 1960, and again in 1962 and 1963; attended a student congress in Cuba in August 1961, and then went to Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. While in Cuba in 1962 was training for subversive activity in the Dominican Republic. Identified as of April 30, 1965, among Communists active in the Dominican revolt.

APPENDIX 3

MINUTES OF THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION (CLOSED)

(Document 46 (Provisional) May 7-8, 1965)

Chairman: His Excellency Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, special delegate from Nicaragua.

Secretary general of the meeting: Dr. William Sanders.

Present: Their Excellencies Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa (Colombia), Roque J. Yó dice (Paraguay), Alejandro Magnet (Chile), Ramón de Clairmont Dueñas (El Salvador), Rodrigo Jácome M. (Ecuador), Juan Bautista de Lavalle (Peru), Ricardo A. Midence (Honduras), Enrique Tejera Paris (Venezuela), José Antonio Bonilla Atilas (Dominican Republic), Humberto Calamarí G. (Panama), Raúl Díez de Medina (Bolivia), Ricardo M. Colombo (Argentina), Carlos García Bauer (Guatemala), Rafael de la Colina (Mexico), Gonzalo J. Facio (Costa Rica), Emilio N. Oribe (Uruguay), Ellsworth Bunker (United States), Fern D. Baguidy (Haiti), Iimar Penna Marinho (Brazil).

Also present at the meeting was Mr. Santiago Ortiz, assistant secretary general of the meeting of consultation.

Recording secretary: José F. Martínez.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

THE PRESIDENT. Your Excellencies, I have the honor of opening the 4th plenary session of the 10th meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs, which has been called for the principal purpose of receiving a confidential report from His Excellency, Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Representative of Argentina and Chairman of the Special Committee that went to the Dominican Republic, which has prepared a confidential report. Ambassador Colombo addressed the following note to me today:

"Your Excellency, I have the honor of transmitting to you the first report of the Special Committee of the 10th meeting of consultation of ministers of foreign affairs

of the member states of the Organization. I respectfully request you to direct that this report be distributed to the Special Delegates to this Meeting of Consultation. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Ricardo M. Colombo, Ambassador of Argentina, Chairman of the Special Committee."

First of all, I wish to express to His Excellency Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo and to his distinguished colleagues on the Committee, Their Excellencies Ambassador Iimar Penna Marinho, of Brazil, Ambassador Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, of Colombia, Ambassador Carlos García Bauer, of Guatemala, and Ambassador Frank Morrice, of Panama, the deep appreciation of the meeting, and especially of all of their colleagues, for the magnificent and efficient work they have done in carrying out the delicate mission entrusted to them by the Meeting. We have followed their work with a great deal of attention and interest, and feel proud of having appointed them; and we are sure that the Americas, our people and our governments, applaud that work, and this Meeting expresses its appreciation and praise for it. In accordance with the Regulations, plenary sessions are public. When I spoke this morning with our colleague Chairman of the Committee, it seemed to me appropriate that this meeting be closed, precisely because the report to be presented by Ambassador Colombo, in behalf of the Commission of which he is Chairman, is, precisely, of a confidential nature. This decision by the Chair, that this meeting be closed, I am sure will not be objected to by the Representatives. I am happy that everyone agrees that this meeting should be closed. This will be recorded in the minutes. I recognize the Ambassador of Argentina, His Excellency Ricardo Colombo, Chairman of the Special Committee, so that he may be good enough to present the report referred to in the note I had the honor of receiving this morning. The Ambassador has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO (the Special Delegate of Argentina). Thank you very much, Mr. President. I should like to make clear, before beginning to read the report, that it begins by referring to the very time of our arrival, or rather, to our departure from Washington, for which reason we do not record here the fact, which we do wish to point out, that at the time of our arrival, and in compliance with a resolution of the Council of the OAS, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Dr. Mora, was already there carrying out his duties, regarding which he will give his own report.

[Reads the first report of the Special Committee.]

Mr. COLOMBO. May the meeting consider the report to have been presented in behalf of the Committee duly appointed. Thank you very much, Mr. President; thank you very much, gentlemen.

THE PRESIDENT. I take note of what Ambassador Colombo has just said, and, clearly, we have been most pleased with the report. Your Excellencies will have noticed its fine quality.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (the Special Delegate of Guatemala). If the President will allow me, I should like to recommend to all the Delegates that they take the following note with respect to the documents that contains the report of the committee that has just been read, and has also just been distributed, pardon me. On page 9 there are certain errors that were made in transferring the text to the stencil. In the last line on that page, where it says "guardia de policia militar," the

¹ The first report of the Special Committee with the corrections indicated below by the Special Delegate of Guatemala and accepted by the other members of the Committee, has been published as Document 47 of the meeting.

word "mixta" should be added, so that it will say "una guardia de policia militar mixta." On page 12, in the next to the last line from the bottom, where it says "y de que éstra mantendria," it should say "y de que mantendria los contactos." On page 13, at the end of the second paragraph, it is necessary to add "En la ultima parte de la entrevista estuvo presente el General Wessin y Wessin a solicitud de la Comisión" at the end of the paragraph. And on page 26, second paragraph, where it says "la resolución del 30 de abril" it should be "resolución del 1.º de mayo." [These corrections were taken into account before the English text of the document was issued.]

The PRESIDENT. The Chairman asks the distinguished members of the Committee whether they accept and consider incorporated in the text of their valuable report the observations made by His Excellency the Ambassador of Guatemala. The Chairman of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. I fully accept them, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Undoubtedly we shall receive a second edition of this report containing precisely the amendments already accepted by the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Mr. President, they are not things to accept, but rather the question is that in the report of the Committee these points were omitted.

The PRESIDENT. That is just what I was referring to, that the Chairman of the Committee has precisely accepted the incorporation of the omitted matter, the clarifying of the points. He has accepted, as Chairman of the Committee, in behalf of all its members, that the observations should be taken into account in the new edition that is to be made of the report. In other words, they are corrections of form.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. No, Mr. President, those are not corrections of form, they are omissions made in copying the report of the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. Precisely, the Chair was mistaken, they are omissions of form, precisely. Gentlemen of the Special Committee, the report, which has just been read by your distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, of Argentina, reveals a job done that the Chair would describe as extraordinary, very worthy of the sense of responsibility and the personal capabilities of the distinguished Ambassadors who make up this historic Committee in the inter-American system. Being extraordinary, it is a job worthy of our appreciation, of the appreciation of this Meeting of Consultation and of those of us who are honored to call ourselves colleagues of the Ambassadors who make up the Special Committee. In saying this, I am honored to confirm to you what I said to His Excellency Ambassador Ricardo Colombo in the message that I had the honor to address to him today, which reads:

"The Honorable Ricardo M. Colombo, Chairman of the Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: I am pleased to express to you and to your colleagues on the Committee of the Organization of American States established by the 10th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the appreciation of the Meeting for the prompt and interesting information furnished in your two messages received on May 3 and 4. The Meeting has taken note of the messages and hopes that the important tasks being undertaken with such dedication and efficiency may soon be completed with full success. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sevilla-Sacasa, President of the 10th meeting."

I have the satisfaction of informing you regarding a communication the Chair has received from His Excellency Emanuel Clarizio, Papal Nunzio, dean of the diplo-

matic corps accredited to the Government of the Dominican Republic. It reads:

"Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, President of the Tenth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs"—this communication is dated May 5—"I thank you with deep emotion for message Your Excellency sent me on behalf of Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. I have sincere hopes that providential assistance by Organization of American States quickly begun in Santo Domingo by Secretary General Mora and happily assumed by Special Committee of worthy members headed by Ambassador Colombo will soon achieve for the beloved Dominican nation the humanitarian ideals of peace and well-being that inspire that high and noble institution." It is signed by Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nunzio of His Holiness.

I said at the beginning that naturally this meeting is of a closed nature, which indicates that, at the proper time, a public plenary session should be held, in order publicly to take cognizance once again of the text of the report and the opinions expressed regarding it. It seems logical for the first step to be to obtain the second edition, as I call it, of this report, in which the omitted matter so correctly mentioned by our colleague from Guatemala will appear: in order that the General Committee of the Meeting of Consultation may take cognizance of the report and then submit its decision on it to the plenary. This is what the Chair has to report on the matter for the present, but naturally, we would like in this closed meeting, in the private atmosphere in which we are now, to hear some expression by some distinguished Representative on the text of the report that was read by the distinguished Chairman of the General Committee. The representative of Mexico, Ambassador de la Colina, has asked for the floor, and I recognize him.

Mr. DE LA COLINA (the Special Delegate of Mexico). First of all I wish to express, or rather, join in the comments that you, Mr. Chairman, have made in appreciation and deep recognition of the distinguished members of the Committee we took the liberty to appoint, in recognition of not only this wonderful report they have presented us, but also the efforts they doubtlessly have made under most difficult conditions and with great efficiency and dignity. Now I would like to know, Mr. Chairman, whether it would be possible to ask some questions, especially since we are meeting in executive session, for clearly our governments surely are going to want to know the very learned opinion of our distinguished representatives regarding some aspects touched on only incidentally in this most interesting report, with the reservation, naturally, that perhaps in a later session, also secret, we could elaborate on some other aspects that, for the moment, escape us. Would that be possible, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT. I believe the question is very important. The President attaches great importance to the question put by the Ambassador of the Republic of Mexico regarding our taking advantage of this executive session to ask the distinguished Committee some questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I ask for the floor, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. You have the floor, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee is ready to answer, insofar as it can, any questions the representatives of the sister republics of the Americas wish to ask its members.

The PRESIDENT. Very well. Is the Ambassador of Mexico satisfied? You have the floor.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For the time being I would like to know whether it is possible, after having listened closely to everything our distin-

guished colleague, the Representative of Argentina, has told us. I have the perhaps mistaken impression from the technique as well as from the quick reading I was giving this document we just corrected, that there seems to have been a certain consensus between the opposing sides as to the possible elimination of the generals. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems to follow from that reading and from this idea that on both sides the colonels were more or less disposed to create, let us say, a high command, other than the one that has remained thus far. I wonder whether it would be possible for you gentlemen to elaborate on this, or whether you simply have no idea on the matter.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the Committee like to respond to the concern of the Representative of Mexico?

Mr. COLOMBO. With great pleasure. As the report states, Mr. President, the request to exclude the seven military men, whose names I have read in the Committee's report, was a complaint by the junta led by Colonel Caamaño and transmitted by the Committee to the military junta led by Colonel Benoit. The Act of Santo Domingo, furthermore, is clearly written, and the stamped signatures of the parties ratifying it are affixed. I believe I have responded to the concern of the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Another point now, if I may.

The PRESIDENT. With pleasure.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. I would like to know, if this is also possible, whether the distinguished representatives could give us their impressions regarding the degree of Communist infiltration in the rebel or constitutional forces, or whatever you want to call them. For example, there was the reference to this Frenchman * * * who came from Indochina, and who trains frog men * * * etc.; perhaps there is some thought that this person might have close ties, for example, with other Communists; or do they have the impression at least that, in the high command of that group, the rebel group, there is now definite and significant Communist leadership. Thank you, Mr. President.

Mr. COLOMBO. As for myself, I, as a member of the Committee, not as Chairman, have no objection to answering the question by the Ambassador of Mexico, but as a matter of procedure for answers, I wish to provide an opportunity for the Chairman to speak in general terms in order not to deny the distinguished members of the Committee their legitimate right to answer as members of the Committee, which we all are; that is, I would not want to be monopolizing the answers because, without prejudice to a given answer, we can give another of the members of the Committee an opportunity to give the reply that, in his judgment, should be given. Thus, in order to respect fair treatment and not find myself in the middle of the violent and inelegant position of monopolizing the answers—and I ask the members of the Committee whether some of them want to answer, then I ask you to give the floor first to Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, of Colombia.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Colombia, members of the Special Committee, will answer the question by the Ambassador of Mexico.

Mr. CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). Mr. President, the Representative of Mexico asks what the opinion is.

I will state mine, because I am not going to answer on behalf of the Committee, as to the degree of Communist infiltration on both sides. Of course, the question must refer to the command or sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, because I do not think it refers to any Communist leanings by General Wessin y Wessin, Colonel Saladin or any of his colleagues. With regard to the

sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamaño, many diplomats accredited in the Dominican Republic, and I can include my country's diplomatic representative, feel that, if not Col. Francisco Caamaño, whom I do not know to be personally a Communist, there are indeed numerous persons on his side that, if they are not members of the Communist Party, are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of government or political purposes. There is such a tendency in the opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and I do not mention other countries in order not to commit countries represented here. They are firmly convinced that on that side there are many persons, I do not say members registered in an officially organized Communist Party, but persons who do have leanings toward a well-known trend is prevalent in Cuba.

Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Does any member of the Committee wish to add to the answer requested by the Representative of Mexico? Is the Representative of Mexico now satisfied with the information given to him? The Ambassador of Guatemala.

Mr. COLOMBO. If the President will allow me, I do not know what system the President may have to gage the kind of questions.

The PRESIDENT. Well, your Excellency said that he wanted his colleagues to participate in the answers in their, let us say, personal status, in order to distribute the task of answering, and, naturally, the President took note of the fact that your Excellency had invited his colleague from Colombia to answer the question put by the Ambassador of Mexico. I, by way of courtesy, am asking your Excellency whether any other colleagues would like to express their opinions on the same question the Ambassador of Mexico asked. I request your Excellency to tell me whether any other of his colleagues would like to ask any questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I am going to add very little, of course, to what the Ambassador of Colombia, with his accustomed brilliance, has just said, by saying that this report, affirmed by a large number of representatives of the Diplomatic Corps, is public and well known to anyone who cares to make inquiry. But despite the respect that I owe to the opinion of the Diplomatic Corps, in order to establish this in precise terms—for I was concerned as much as was the Ambassador with being able to verify this question—I wanted to go to the source; and we spoke with the different men who were in this rebel grouping, and, a notable thing, from the head of the revolution, Colonel Caamaño, to some one known as Minister of the Presidency, they recognized that they were their great problem, they explained to a certain extent briefly the process of the history of the Dominican Republic, they confessed to us how gradually a number of elements were being incorporated with them whom they called Communists, and that their problem was to avoid infiltration for the purpose of springing a surprise and seizing control. They said this clearly, and even at one point—I in the sometimes difficult task of dividing this formal nomination of the chairmanship in which there is no merit greater than that of anyone else, because perhaps in the other four members there is much talent for doing what the Chairman did—I spoke with Colonel Caamaño and asked him in a friendly way whether he honestly believed that such infiltration existed. He confirmed this to me, but he gave me the impression that he had the courage to face it. He said to me: "They are not going to grab the movement, and my concern is that in their losing the possibility of control they have stayed behind the snipers, today there are those that do not wish a solution for the

Dominican Republic," and already he put the political label on a good part of the snipers on both sides. It should be said, Mr. Ambassador, that you will understand the extent of responsibility of the answers and the depth of the questions, and I would like to satisfy your own concern; but I have fulfilled with loyalty by reporting the conversation to you objectively, telling you that I believe that those who have the answer to this question is to be found among the actors, the protagonists of this hour who are living in the Dominican Republic. This is what I wanted to say now, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. Very well, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. DE LA COLINA. Mr. Ambassador of Colombia, I greatly value this reply; I wanted both, but naturally with reference to the reply whereby you explain one more aspect. Many thanks, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Ambassador of Guatemala like to say something on the question put by the Ambassador of Mexico?

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER (the special delegate of Guatemala). Mr. Chairman, for the moment, no; certainly this point was discussed in the Committee; the Committee also had a series of things, and since there is not yet any criterion of the Committee, I do not for the moment wish to present any viewpoint. The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Delegate of Brazil). Mr. President, I should like to corroborate the statements made by my colleagues from the Colombia and Argentina, and add one more aspect that I believe could help to clarify the approach that could be given to the problem. I should like to add, gentlemen, that with the complete collapse of public authority—since neither the forces of the Government Junta of Benoit, Santana, and Saladin nor those of Colonel Caamaño were in control of the situation—the Dominican state practically disappeared as a juridical-political entity, and the country became a sort of no man's land. The arsenal had been given to the people and an entire disoriented population of adolescents and fanatics was taking up modern automatic arms, in a state of excitation that was further exacerbated by constant radio broadcasts of a clearly subversive character. Neither do I believe that I am, nor does any of the members of this Committee believe that he is, in a position to state with assurance that the movement of Colonel Caamaño, inspired by the truly popular figure of former President Bosch, is a clearly Communist movement. But one fact is certain: in view of the real anarchy in which the country has been engulfed for several days, especially the capital city, where bands of snipers have been sacking and killing and obeying no one, any organized group that landed on the island could dominate the situation. For that reason, and our understanding coincides with that of a majority of the depositions of the chiefs of diplomatic missions accredited there, all of the members of the Committee agree in admitting that the Caamaño movement, fortunately truly democratic in its origins, since none of us sincerely believes that Caamaño is a Communist, could be rapidly converted into a Communist insurrection; above all it is seen to be heading toward becoming a government of that kind, susceptible of obtaining the support and the assistance of the great Marxist-Leninist powers. Therefore, Mr. President, we do not believe that Colonel Caamaño and his closest advisers are Communists. Meanwhile, as the entire Caamaño movement rests upon a truly popular basis, by certain areas escaping from the control of that democratic group of leaders it would be quite possible for that movement to be diverted from its real origins and to follow the oblique plan of popular-based move-

ments, which can be easily controlled by clever agents and experts in the art of transforming democratic popular movements into Marxist-Leninist revolutions. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Ecuador, Ambassador Jácome, has requested the floor.

Mr. JÁCOME (the Special Delegate of Ecuador). I wish to adhere with all sincerity and warmth of the words of the Representative of Mexico, praising the selflessness and the arduous work as well as the spirit of sacrifice with which the Committee performed its functions, and for having succeeded, by the time of its departure, in leaving a somewhat more favorable situation than the one it found upon arrival. Now that we are asking for the opinions of the distinguished colleagues on the Committee, I would like to know if they have any impression as to a formula, or if there is any desire on the part of the two factions to bring about peace by transforming the cease-fire, the truce, into a peace that will permit the political organization of the Dominican Republic and the natural process that should be followed in order to have a constitutionally stable system? It has been gratifying to hear this opinion, at least on one side, that the so-called constitutional government of Colonel Caamaño is certain that it can at a given moment control and capture the infiltrators that are determined to block peace, and, in order to take advantage of that situation, to continue the chaos that has prevailed in Santo Domingo up to now. But if that command hopes to keep and is confident that it can keep control it is natural that whatever the command thinks with regard to the possibility of a formula for stable peace through an understanding with the others—the present enemies—would be very useful and constructive to know because we would then, with a little tenacity, through friendly, fraternal mediation, have a favorable prospect of arriving, within a reasonably short time, at an understanding between the two combatants. This would be the best guarantee that the Americas, as well as the Dominican Republic, could have that those infiltrators and those elements that wish the chaos to continue, would be eliminated and hence definitely neutralized.

I would like to know what opinion the Committee formed, after it succeeded in talking with the parties in conflict, what impression does it have of the opinion or of the formulas or of the hopes they have regarding a final agreement that may return the situation to normal?

The PRESIDENT. Would the Committee like to answer the question raised by the Representative of Ecuador? One of the colleagues on the Committee; the Chairman, Ambassador Garcia Bauer, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Ambassador Penna Marinho, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo, in his capacity as Representative of Argentina?

Mr. COLOMBO. Perhaps this is the question that I shall answer with the greatest Americanist feeling, Mr. Chairman. I cannot deny, Mr. Ambassador, gentlemen, that I also, like the Ambassador of Mexico, have confessed to him that I shared and still share the concern expressed in his question and that, perhaps, it was the question that caused me the greatest concern. The most urgent problem when we left was not to find ideological banners distinguishing the parties, but to put an end to the conflict that was already becoming bloody and that could become a blood bath in the Americas. We talked with the two parties and believe me, Mr. Chairman, I at first had the feeling that law was dead; it was chaos in the Dominican Republic. We all shared it—all members of the Committee, the military advisers, the General Secretariat, our civilian advisers—and when

September 23, 1965

we arrived we found chaos, such as we had never seen or even imagined. I felt that law did not exist, and we all thought there was little hope that they wanted to find a solution that would be feasible, despite the moral authority that we represented. We were only a very few, as men, as individuals, but we bore the weight of the historic tradition of the system whose 75th anniversary we celebrated, and this inspired all the members of the Committee. From the first man of the rebel band with whom we spoke, Colonel Caamaño, to the first man with whom we spoke from the Command of the Military Junta, Colonel Benoit, we found that they were both weary of the conflict that darkened the Americas. We found in both of them a desire to achieve peace that was equal to ours.

It would be untrue, Mr. President, if I were to say that I found the wish to continue the fight at this stage of the tragedy in the Dominican Republic. There was a longing for peace and we were caught in the enthusiasm to achieve it. But we were completely surprised, Mr. Ambassador, by something more important than this objective which is essentially what we all desire; the two parties said that the solution lay in the inter-American system. Nobody assumed the right to impose peace because—and let there be no misunderstanding—the side that wishes to triumph in Santo Domingo is stabbing the sister Republic. Both factions understood the intensity of the tragedy that was unfolding in Santo Domingo; both placed their faith in the inter-American system.

During the course of conversations, when all members of the Committee asked them if they would be faithful to remaining within the system, they answered yes; with all their faith. But it was more than that, Mr. Ambassador; it was what Colonel Caamaño said, voluntarily. A newsman asked him, "If your cause was denounced in the United Nations, what would you do?" and he confessed to us that he answered that he would in no way accept that channel because he was within the system and the answer had to be found within the system. For that reason he was happy to see the Committee sent by the OAS. He placed his faith in the Organization of American States to find the solution. And when we spoke with Colonel Benoit he gave us the same affirmation; his faith is in the system.

I believe that in the midst of the agony of the Dominican Republic, this system that among ourselves we have talked so much of strengthening was more alive than ever and in an hour of testing, in the midst of a struggle more fierce than any I remember within the system, I could see that both sides felt this to be the only possible solution that could maintain peace in the Americas. Both took into account the possibility that it was being compromised: they knew that the peace of the hemisphere might be endangered if the conflict wasn't soon stopped. This, Mr. Ambassador, is what I can tell you, with great satisfaction, and I look to the system for the solution just as all of us are going to look, and you will see that the system will find that solution.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Guatemala will contribute to the answer that the Representative of Ecuador has requested.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Mr. President, I wish to add a few words to what the Ambassador of Argentina has said, in reply to the question asked by the Ambassador of Ecuador. I, as a member of the Committee and as Ambassador of Guatemala, confirm the statements made by the Ambassador of Argentina, as to the faith that the inter-American system can help in solving the problem that, so unfortunately, is faced in the Dominican Republic today. Obviously, that country is

weary of struggle and would like to arrive at some solution. I, at least, found that there certainly is a basic desire to reach an understanding between the parties and overcome present difficulties. We were surprised, for example, when we began conversations with the Rebel Commander, that a colonel was present who was a liaison officer between the Military Junta of San Isidro and the Papal Nuncio. And the manner in which he was treated, by Colonel Caamaño as well as the other members of the Rebel Command, surprised us because he was in a group completely opposed to the one he represented. We did not see the hatred that might have been expected in such circumstances. We can bear witness, therefore, to that deference, to the treatment that was shown. Also the Rebel Commander offered to the Committee itself to deliver about 500 prisoners so that it might take charge of them; that is, acts such as these indicate how they wish to end this situation that is dividing the people of the Dominican Republic; from these acts, and from others that we have seen, I have reached the conclusion that at bottom there is a desire, a keen desire to reach an understanding. The question is to find the formula for making this understanding a reality.

The PRESIDENT. Other representatives have asked to speak. I ask the members of the Committee if any of them wishes to join in the reply to the question raised by the Representative of Ecuador. The Representative of Ecuador.

Mr. JÁCOME. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am infinitely grateful for this reply which is truly promising because it has confirmed the suspicion that every human being has who knows the tragedy of a civil war; that those persons who have stained their country with blood and caused so many deaths, who have seen so much suffering and caused so much suffering, would now have reached the moment of longing for peace and perhaps each of them feeling remorse for the sufferings and the misfortunes they have caused. This is an eminently human reaction that we all know. But I am equally satisfied to hear that both parties rest their faith in the inter-American system, but I have now seen a report, a report concerning the statements made by Colonel Caamaño to the effect that he will not accept the Inter-American Force established by the last resolution of this Meeting of Consultation. We have already seen that it also seems that Colonel Caamaño and his partisans have not accepted the present state of affairs, the presence of foreign troops in Santo Domingo. Hence, would not perhaps Colonel Caamaño, and in the end all Dominicans, whatever their ideologies and whatever the barricade on which they have stood, prefer a mission of peace to a mission of guns? We might think of a permanent peace mission of the Organization of American States, which would receive the same impressions but which would be seeking a concrete formula to bring those parties together who wish to reach an understanding and give them the opportunity of not feeling pressured by arms or not having the inward suspicion that those arms are playing the game of their adversaries. I should like and I venture to put this question to the members of the committee, and I beg your pardon, as tired and fatigued as you all must be, for still abusing your time with these questions. Thank you very much.

Mr. COLOMBO. I said something, a little circumstantially, in replying to the question posed by the Ambassador of Mexico, regarding this concern that troubles the Ambassador of Ecuador. Here is the most important instance for telling the whole truth, not part of it. And I am going to tell how I saw it. The effort—I said—is mutual and so is the desire to attain peace, Mr. Ambassador, but it is not that I suspect but that

I am certain that the two sides in the struggle are not controlling their movement, because the cease-fire was accepted by the fighting groups; but an uncontrollable ingredient conspired against the carrying out of the act of Santo Domingo, an element that history shows does not find a solution by peaceful means and that grows larger whenever attempts at reaching peace are made, because what will happen, to a great extent, is what happened to us, in parleying for peace, with an absolute cease-fire by the commands so as to talk with the peace mission, but we had to parley for 2½ hours under incessant machinegun and rifle fire. Who did that? Colonel Caamaño? I think not, categorically, no.

It is the sniper ingredient, because in a town where arms are handed out to civilians, there can be only two forms of control: either when the civilians lay down their arms and surrender them willingly, or when this is achieved by a force superior to the civilian force. Let all of you ponder the difficult task of imagining a peace attempt, in which we again have the signatures of the two parties, we have the security zone, and the incident is being provoked as a factor breaking out into a tremendous catastrophe. I honestly confess that until now I could not explain how something much worse did not occur. The provocation of the snipers is constant. There are among them, no doubt, the two classes of snipers that there are in such events: those who grab a gun and continue using it with a resentment that no reasoning will lead them to lay it down, and those who continue using it with the resentment of one who cannot control the revolt. That is, these are factors that cannot be controlled by a mission no matter what flag of peace it carries.

The Government of Santo Domingo will not achieve peace until it can be imposed in a climate where conditions in a peaceful Santo Domingo exist for the recovery of institutional normality in the country. Sincerely, Mr. Ambassador, in the choice that you have given me I sacrifice my wish—which is equal to yours—to a realistic concept that one can only appreciate, unfortunately, by having been there. We wished, and we five Ambassadors who were on the mission mentioned it many times to one another, that all of you could have been there, that not one had been missing, Mr. President. That you could have been at the scene of events to see what we were seeing. In the tremendous confusion, in which it is difficult to find the thread that would open the knot we were trying to untie, where there is political and military confusion, economic disaster, confused people, general anguish, no one can find the ingredient for guidance. I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that it is urgent to seek peace in the Dominican Republic and to tarry as little as possible in discussion, because every hour of discussion is an hour you give to someone who, with good or evil intentions, could still pull the trigger that would prevent the Act of Santo Domingo from being fulfilled. This is my personal impression.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Ecuador has nothing more that he wants to say? I recognize the Representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Emilio Orbe.

Mr. ORBE (the Special Delegate of Uruguay). Mr. President, first of all, I want to adopt the words of the distinguished Ambassadors who have spoken before me in congratulating the Committee on its work and expressing the admiration of my delegation for the way in which they have performed this first part of their task. And so, our warmest congratulations to all of them. Since it is late, Mr. President, I would like to confine myself to some very specific questions. The first of the questions is as follows: for this Meeting of Consultation to be competent to take measures to bring peace

and to carry forward the work begun, it is necessary, above all, in the opinion of my Delegation, to ascertain whether the situation in the Dominican Republic is a situation that can endanger the peace and security of the hemisphere. This is the requirement of Article 19 of the Charter for carrying out collective action in matters that normally are within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. As is known, Article 19 states: "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17," which are those that refer to nonintervention. Hence my Delegation believes that a pronouncement must be made by this Meeting of Consultation to the effect that the events in the Dominican Republic constitute a situation that endangers the peace and security of the hemisphere. Departing from that basis, I should like to ask the Committee if it is of the opinion that this is the case, that is to say, that the situation in the Dominican Republic constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. That is the first question.

The second question is as follows, Mr. President: the first part of the task with which the Committee was entrusted has been carried out, and we all congratulate them. We have received a very complete report, which will be studied by the delegations and the foreign ministries. There remains, then the second part of the Committee's task, under the letter b, which reads as follows: "to carry out an investigation of all aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic that led to the convocation of this Meeting." Naturally, my Delegation understands very well that this cannot be done in one afternoon or one day. However, I should like to ask simply if the Committee believes that there is sufficient evidence to issue a report on this point within a reasonable period of time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. One of the distinguished members of the Committee would like to refer to the first question put by the Representative of Uruguay. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.

Mr. VÁSQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The first question is this: Is the situation, such that it can endanger peace and security? My reply is yes. Yes, there is a situation that endangers the peace and security. The reasons are very clear. A disturbance or even a guerrilla action in a member state where the elements of order and constituted authorities exist is not the same as in a state where the absence of the state is noted, evaluated, and recorded. What is to be done, Mr. Delegate, in the absence of the state? What does the system do when the state does not exist? What happens when blood is running in the streets? What happens, Mr. Delegate, when an American country—and I am going to speak quite frankly so that you may think about this with all the perspicacity we know you to have—is, under these conditions, in the neighborhood of Cuba? Do we sit on the balcony to watch the end of the tragedy?

Do we all sit down as if we were at a bullfight waiting for the crew to come? What are we to do, Mr. Delegates? We are in a struggle against international communism; and we are in a world, Mr. Delegate, in which America is not even separated from the other continents even by the ocean. We form part of the world, and we form part of the conditions existing in the world. The Dominican Republic, like any other country in the Americas, is a part of the system, and it is the system that will suffer from the lack of a head of state in any of its members. The matter and the problem cannot be expressed in juridical terms, in hermeneutics, needed to fit an act into a lawyer's criterion. The problem is one of deep political meaning, of

profound significance, of hemisphere importance much more serious than any of the other American revolutions could be.

There have been many revolutions in America. There have been revolutions in my country; there have been some, I believe, in yours, and I do not believe that a revolution in itself justifies the intervention of the inter-American system. That has not been my theory; that has not been the theory of my country. However, the acephalous condition of the state constitutes a problem that has occurred on very few occasions. What are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when, as the report states, the president of a junta says: "I cannot maintain order with respect to the diplomatic missions"? And what are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when the Chief presents a note in which he requests the assistance of another country and confesses with the sincerity that we have heard: "Gentlemen of the Special Committee, have the diplomatic representatives asked me for protection and I did not have the elements with which to protect them"? That is the answer to his first question. Now we have the second question: What is happening to the investigation? It is very clear, Mr. Delegate. The complex political events, the multitudinous situations are very difficult to investigate. All of us who have had contact with problems of criminology know about mob psychology; everything that is studied in the classroom, which is very simple, an investigation of a local event, an individual event, let us say.

However, when there are mobs, when they are in the midst of great movements an investigation can be conducted, investigations must be carried out. But they are obviously difficult investigations. I would spare no effort to support any machinery, agency, or committee that would carry forward that investigation. It would be very desirable. But, of course, such investigations of complex events are not very easy, because many things have happened. Actually, two or three revolutions have taken place. There was the first revolt of colonels. Then there was a revolt of a party; and after that, a revolution of a whole series of guerrilla groups, so that each one may have a different impression of the same event.

I think that, rather than an investigation of the past, what is of interest to the Meeting of Consultation and what is of interest to America is not the investigation of the past, but the investigation of the future. It is the investigation of the future that interests us. The problem is not to stop to fix responsibility, to ascertain who began to shoot first, who entered the National Palace first, who opened the windows, who got out the machinegun, who saw, who heard; all that would be an interminable process that would fill many pages and many records of proceedings. The important thing is not to look backward, but to look ahead.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Uruguay.

Mr. ORIBE. I thank Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa for his remarks. He has told me just what I wanted to know.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Representative of Brazil). Yes, Mr. President. And I also want to say to the Delegates that my reply is also yes. There are two governments, but each one is weaker than the other, completely incapable and powerless to control the situation that prevails in the country. Peace was made on uncertain terms. The Act of Santo Domingo is not a definitive peace; it is a difficult truce, a temporary armistice that may dissolve at any moment. Therefore, the Committee suggests, among the measures that in its judgment might be adopted immediately by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, the appointment of a technical military group in the city of Santo Domingo to supervise the cease-fire, as well

as other measures agreed to by the parties to the Act of Santo Domingo. We must keep watch over that peace and create conditions to prevent the struggle from breaking out again—because it could start again, Mr. President, at any moment. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. Does any other member of the Committee wish to speak on this question? The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo.

Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that after the words of my distinguished colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil and Colombia, there is very little that I might be able to add; but the responsibility involved and the importance of the question, so ably phrased by the Ambassador of Uruguay, compel all of us to make clear our position on this question. When, among the powers and duties, the duty of investigating was decided upon, I cannot conceal the fact that I felt the same as I always feel whenever an investigating committee is named. Generally it investigates nothing; few, indeed, are the investigating or factfinding committees which, in the parliamentary life of all of our countries, show any fruitful jurisprudence in their results. But this Investigating Committee did have the possibility of good results. And that was because it was aimed at two fundamental objectives that were governing events in the Dominican Republic.

I understood, first, that the investigation was to determine the scope of the danger resulting from the events, which are a matter of concern to the Ambassador of Uruguay. If this was a situation that did not threaten the peace, we would verify that immediately. If the situation was under the control of groups intent on stirring up tension in the Americas, in a struggle in the history of America, which is full of struggle between brothers, in this incorrigible vocation that is periodically written into the history of our countries, that delays the advance of law and democracy, then we would verify it immediately; and we have verified it.

This could be the beginning of a struggle confined to the two well-defined groups. But the presence of those uncontrollable factors, which I urge the Ambassadors to analyze in detail, in the evaluation of facts in order to reach conclusions, they are going to be impressed, as we ourselves were impressed, without seeing them; they have become more dangerous than the groups themselves put together. To my mind, they have become the element that will determine the fate of what is going to be done. If those groups did not exist, and if those responsible for the struggling movements had not confessed that they cannot control them, in view of the existence of a security zone, freely agreed upon by both parties, with a U.S. military force that is engaged basically in the process of keeping custody over the diplomatic zone, I would also believe, Mr. President, that perhaps we might be able to delimit the process and trust that the peace would not be so obviously jeopardized as it is in this process; because in all revolutions, even a small local one, there is the possibility that there may be the spark of a process that will affect the peace of the Americas.

But the dimensions of this situation, with elements of disturbance on both sides, who are constantly lashing out against the protection offered by the security zone, and in which, Mr. President—and this struck my attention—there is still control to prevent confrontation in a struggle that could technically be called a military struggle; or in other words, there is no military confrontation between the defenders of the zone and the contending groups of the civil struggle. And that struggle is capable of being unloosed, because of the constant harassment by those who are seeking a way to unloose it. Hence, Mr. Ambassador, this matter urgently demands that all of us succeed in finding the way to resolve this situation; that we find the way to dispel the undeniable danger that

threatens the peace in this hemisphere, which is the purpose of our organization. Because all of these things are important; economic development, social tranquillity, justice, the progress of the countries; but all of them are built on peace; without peace there is no possibility for the triumph of the inter-American system. There cannot be the slightest doubt, Mr. President, that the peace of the hemisphere is in grave peril.

But with respect to the second part of the investigation, which is also a matter of anxiety, we have contributed something in the time we had to make our investigation; more than the investigation is the word of the leaders themselves. This act is a confession, and a partisan confession without proof, Mr. Ambassador. It is not a matter of our characterizing the ideology, nobody goes about trying to do that when, actually, it has already been characterized by the leaders of the governments themselves. If necessary, that should be left to the last. I have said at previous sessions: my delegation is willing to make and is going to make an exhaustive investigation of the facts, in order to determine the blame according to the action. We shall do nothing to cover up a sharing of responsibility. But in the matter of priorities, investigation has been well placed by the Ambassador of Uruguay. The first thing to be investigated was the projection of the episode, the possibility of its affecting the peace of the hemisphere, the need for urgent action in case it is proved. We five members of the committee shared that opinion when we were there, and we reaffirm it now. The peace of the hemisphere is in such danger, Mr. President, that if the system does not respond to the call of both parties to the struggle, I believe that the peace of the Americas would not be in danger, that peace will be broken. This urgency is shown by the way we have tried to answer the concerns of the Ambassador of Uruguay.

The PRESIDENT. I ask His Excellency the Ambassador of Guatemala if he would like to speak on this point.

Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, I would like to add my voice and my opinion to those of my distinguished colleagues on the Committee. I shall also reply, rather emphatically, as was done by the Ambassador of Colombia, that the peace and security are in danger. As was already said, we in the Committee often asked ourselves and commented on the advisability of having all of the members of this meeting visit the Dominican Republic in order to see, on the scene itself of the events, the situation prevailing in that country: in a state of war, when we arrived, without water, without lights, without telephones, without public services. The lobby of the very hotel where we stayed was a scene of war—children and women sleeping in the lobby itself. The Diplomatic Corps, which met with us, also told us of the serious situation which they had gone through and were going through; anarchy ruled; the attacks that the diplomatic missions themselves had suffered; the wounded, including the diplomatic missions that had given asylum to wounded persons; and this was something that went on hour after hour.

Undoubtedly, peace and security are seriously affected when there is no authority that is respected, for although there are those who proclaim that they represent authority in each sector, it may be seen later that they do not possess it to such a degree that peace prevails; and although they sign documents, such as the cease-fire that was arranged before we arrived, or the Act of Santo Domingo, which we signed; nevertheless, it can be seen that they have no absolute control over the situation when the spectacle of wounded and dead persons is seen. We asked how many had died, how many had been wounded; and I believe that I can say, as an opinion gathered from per-

sons of whom it can be said, insofar as this is possible, that they are better informed on the matter, that at least 1,500 persons have died in Santo Domingo. And how are the forces distributed? How is the country? Fighting has taken place so far only in the city of Santo Domingo itself, but who can assure us that it will not spread throughout the country?

The rebel command states that they have maintained peace there, because they have not wished to arouse feelings in the rest of the country, and the military junta in San Isidro states that they control the rest of the country. What is the real situation? The Committee did not have time to travel through all of the Dominican Republic; but it is evident that chaos exists, that the situation is deteriorating; it changes from one hour to the next; that is clear. The day after we had an interview under the fire of snipers, as has been said here—with the constitutionalist military command, the next day, I repeat, the chief of that command was proclaimed President of the Republic, Constitutional President; and the military junta of San Isidro, which we had talked with and which signed the act of Santo Domingo, does not now exist, according to reports arriving today through the news agencies. The teletype has just brought for example, a cable reading: "Domingo Imbert, president of the new five-member junta, quickly convened a press conference and called for a peacemaking effort to rebuild the country and restore national unity without discrimination on account of political affiliation." He described Colonel Caamaño as a good personal friend.

The other members of the new junta are: Julio Postigo, 61 years old, a lawyer whom some people consider a militant in the Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch; Carlos Crisella Polomey, 51 years old, governor of one of the provinces under the deposed regime of Donald Reid Cabral; Alejandro Seber Cipo, 41 years old, an engineer; and Colonel Benoit, a member of the previous military junta of three. Imbert did not explain how or why the earlier junta resigned, or how the new one was formed. Although Caamaño could not be found to give us a statement, the leader of the Revolutionary Party, José Francisco Peña Gómez, stated over the rebel radio that the new group represented an underhanded maneuver against the interests of the Dominican people. In the Dominican Republic we constantly heard rumors, stories that got to us, to the effect that they were inciting to arms over the radio, even during the cease-fire.

The circumstances prevailing in Santo Domingo are most difficult, tremendously difficult; it would be a good thing if the representatives were to go and see how things are developing there and how, in the report we have submitted, we cannot give an exact picture of the prevailing situation, which has disturbed us deeply. The situation undoubtedly endangers peace and security, and not of the Dominican Republic alone. The representative of Uruguay also referred to the missions of investigation; and indeed, among the duties entrusted to the Committee was the duty of making an investigation of all aspects of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic that led to the calling of the Meeting. But the kind of investigation that was asked is not one that can be made in a few hours. The Committee had to give priority to what demanded priority, and the first thing was to try to restore peace and conditions of safety, to restore things as much as possible to normal, under prevailing conditions, in order that it could carry out an investigation such as we believed the Meeting of Consultation had requested.

We are in agreement that this investigation on should be carried as far as it is desired; but in the short space of time we were there,

and with all the tasks we had; and although we sought opinions and points of view on various sides; although we asked all members of the diplomatic corps to give us their views in writing; that is, their views on the situation as they saw it; although we asked the disputing groups also to explain to the Committee and to the Meeting what they considered the truth about the Dominican Republic, and also asked the Governors of the Provinces whom we interviewed to do the same, and did likewise with everyone with whom we had an opportunity to talk and question; although we sought all of the evidence that might serve as a basis for this investigation and to enable the Committee to offer its conclusions to this Meeting of Consultation; despite all this, the time was very short and we cannot give conclusions in the report we have just submitted, not even if we were to be able to change them a little later.

Points of view have been given and information collected, sometimes in personal conversations, as mentioned by the Ambassador of Argentina with respect to his conversation with Colonel Caamaño, or in conversations the members of the Committee had with various persons on the scene; but we should also listen to all parties concerned, to all who want to say something; and such an investigation takes some time. This is the reply we must give to the Ambassador of Uruguay. With respect to this second point, we have done all that we could within the short time available, in an attempt to make the cease-fire effective for the protection of refugees and those who had taken asylum, and so that food distribution could be undertaken, to bring in food, medicines, etc., that can be distributed with the necessary safety. We did a vast amount of work in a very short time, but in regard to investigation, we can say that we have scarcely begun. And despite the little that was seen, the Committee has been able to contribute something in reply to the questions that have been asked here.

The PRESIDENT. I understand that the representative of Uruguay is very well satisfied with the thorough manner in which the interesting questions put to the members of the Committee have been answered.

Mr. ORBE. Of course, Mr. President, I would like to express my appreciation once again, and I believe that what has now been said here is fundamental; because the conviction of the members of the Committee will surely allow us, through consultation, to take appropriate measures without getting into the problem of intervention.

The PRESIDENT. I recognize the special delegate of Paraguay, Ambassador Yódice.

Mr. YÓDICE. Thank you, Mr. President. First, I wish to join in the words of appreciation that have been spoken here to the ambassadors who composed our special committee that traveled to Santo Domingo and completed the great task of which we are so proud. I am very happy that from the first time the floor was requested until now we have had a series of statements from the distinguished ambassadors on the Committee, and their statements make my congratulations even warmer. As the Chairman of the Committee, the illustrious Ambassador of Argentina, Dr. Ricardo Colombo, has said, this is the moment of truth and the delegation of Paraguay is quite pleased with the action of the members of the Committee.

The delegation of Paraguay, Mr. President, is proud of this Committee because it has, in the first place, effectively carried out the peacemaking aspect of its mission as fully as is possible; it is proud of this Committee because it has justified the confidence of the Paraguayan delegation placed in it, inasmuch as the distinguished ambassadors who composed it, whose ability and inter-American spirit all of us know, as was said when the Committee's membership was ap-

proved, would determine whether or not international communism had a part in the bloody events in the Dominican Republic. If the distinguished representative of Mexico had not raised the question he did on the matter, I would have done so. I might, however, have put it differently, since I would not have confined myself to inquiring as to the possibility of Communist intervention in a specific group, but would have extended the inquiry to all aspects of the serious conflict that the Dominican people are undergoing today.

The Government of Paraguay, as I stated clearly when approval was given to the establishment of the collective inter-American force, believed from the beginning that continental security was at stake. The replies by the Ambassadors composing the Committee reporting today on certain questions regarding these delicate aspects of the Dominican situation have been categorical. My government was right. Continental security is threatened. The danger existed, and still exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit international communism to transform the Dominican Republic into another Cuba. With his customary clarity, courage, and energy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, has categorically mentioned the highly political nature of the problem we are facing. In reply to a question of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has rightly said that the peace of America is threatened, that the security of the hemisphere is threatened, and that there is a possibility that another Cuba, another Communist government in the hemisphere will arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the Dominican Republic.

We are proud of the action of our Committee, because, as the Ambassador of Uruguay said, it is helping to clarify the problem we are facing. Paraguay had no doubts when it voted on the resolution for the establishment of the inter-American force. As I said: "The Government of Paraguay approves the sending of U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic, considering that this does not imply armed intervention prejudicial to the right of self-determination of the Dominican people, but, on the contrary, that it is a measure of hemispheric defense against the intervention of Castro-Communist forces. The Government of Paraguay is aware that U.S. armed intervention has been necessary in view of the urgency of preventing extracontinental and Cuban forces and funds from annulling the Dominican people's right of self-determination, since it was evident that it would be difficult for the inter-American system to act rapidly and energetically. The Government of Paraguay reaffirms its support of the proposed establishment of a hemispheric force and will participate in it if a substantial majority of the governments of the member states do likewise."

Mr. President if there is anything to regret it is that, for the time being, this valuable, clear explanation of the seriousness of the Dominican problem furnished to us by our committee is known only to the delegates of this Meeting of Consultation.

Obviously we are going to come to a moment when the enlightened judgment of the President and of the Delegates, in my opinion, will decide that these vital conclusions reached by our Committee should be known by all of the Americas, by all of the people of the hemisphere. Because for my Delegation, Mr. President, these conclusions which appear in the written report and in the replies to the questions posed here, should not be known only by the Delegates; they should be known by all the people. I emphasize this point because I am proud that my Delegation, from the very beginning, has been concerned and has established a position with regard to the seriousness of the conflict, in view of the intervention of

international communism in the Dominican events.

Once more, I congratulate the members of our Committee; I am confident that the conclusions they now bring to us from their trip to Santo Domingo and that they will continue to bring will greatly help this Meeting of Consultation. The inter-American system must find the permanent solution referred to by the distinguished Ambassador of Ecuador in order to bring about a return of constitutionality in the sister Dominican Republic, a return of the reign of representative democracy and of human rights, and of all those inalienable principles of sovereignty that motivate the resolutions of this Meeting of Consultation in dealing with the Dominican problem. I believe, Mr. President, that with the clarity of the conclusions of the Committee we shall be walking on firmer ground. The basic conclusion that I want drawn from this statement I am now making is that we should act on the basis of these important conclusions furnished to us by the Committee; not only the conclusions appearing in the report that has been distributed, but also those verbally expressed tonight by the members of the Committee. I repeat my congratulations to the ambassadors and my confidence that these highly important conclusions will shortly be brought to the attention of all the Americas. Many thanks, Mr. President.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS (the Special Delegate of Venezuela). Mr. President, I wish to make a motion.

The PRESIDENT. What is the motion of the Ambassador of Venezuela?

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, 2 days ago when it was desired to undertake a thorough analysis of the problem, I asked this distinguished meeting to await the return of the Committee, so that we might question it and hear what proved to be an excellent and highly important report. On behalf of my government, I wish to express appreciation for the work that has been done and the sacrifices that have been made. I now wish to call attention to the following point: perhaps this session should devote itself exclusively to questions and answers, so that by speeding things up we can obtain the information as precisely as possible, leaving basic statements and studies of possible solutions until tomorrow's plenary; otherwise, we shall have to repeat many of the things already said here. This is my motion, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Mr. Ambassador, the Chair entirely agrees with you. It would really be interesting to devote ourselves to questioning the honorable Committee and its distinguished members, and the answers that they give us will be very edifying.

Time goes on, and we must take advantage of the privacy of this meeting precisely to present this type of questions and, in this same confidential setting, to obtain the answers of the distinguished Committee members. Naturally, the occasion will come for us to make detailed statements on behalf of our governments on the text of the important report presented by our colleagues on the Committee. I offer the floor to the Representative of Chile.

Mr. MAGNET (the Special Delegate of Chile). Thank you, Mr. President. The opinion that the President has just expressed so wisely is in complete accord with what I am about to say now. Although, for reasons clearly explained at the time, the Delegation of Chile abstained from voting for the establishment of the committee that has now returned to our midst, I can do no less than corroborate, briefly but sincerely, the expressions of praise that the committee has earned. Moreover, the position taken by my country does not inhibit me, for everyone's benefit, from asking some questions that are of interest to my country, and, as I understand, to the others as well. In the Act of Santo Domingo, re-

ferred to by the President in his statement, mention is made of a security zone in that city, whose limits would be indicated in a plan appended to this document. Mr. President, I believe that this security zone is a highly important factor in the cease-fire that has been obtained and that a clear delineation of this zone and knowledge of it, not just by the parties involved but by everyone, will be very helpful in forming an idea of what might happen if, as may be feared, this security zone were violated. If acceptable to the Committee, I would request, Mr. President, that this plan not only be incorporated into the Act, but also circulated by the secretariat as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT. I ask; I imagine that the Chairman of the Committee wishes to reply to Ambassador Magnet's question.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee, through me, reports that the map is now being distributed, and I apologize to the Ambassador of Chile because it was not attached to the report when this was distributed. The explanation may lie in the undeserved expression of appreciation for the Committee's work, on the part of the Ambassador. Material difficulties prevented distribution, but I now present the map to the Chair so that, as the Ambassador of Chile has wisely requested, it may be distributed as soon as possible, since it is necessary for the proper information of the Ambassadors.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair will proceed accordingly, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Colombo.

Mr. MAGNET. I wish to explain that my words did not imply the slightest criticism or reproach of the Committee.

Mr. COLOMBO. I wish to make quite clear that I have not even remotely suspected such an attitude from one whom I know to be a gentleman and distinguished ambassador who honors the inter-American system.

The PRESIDENT. Your second question, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. MAGNET. It is more than a question, Mr. President, to try to achieve some kind of friendship. I think it is quite clear both from the text and the context of the report we have just had the pleasure of hearing, especially the act of Santo Domingo—with which we were already acquainted and which is contained in the report signed on May 5—that there is not, nor was there on that date a constituted government in the Dominican Republic able to represent the country, but two parties or conflicting factions. The committee, with the knowledge it gained through its on-the-spot activity, and with its spirit of impartiality, deemed it necessary to hear the two parties or factions in order to reach some useful result. I would like to ask the Chairman of the Committee, through you, Mr. President, if the evidence that has been gathered corresponds to the truth.

The PRESIDENT. Shall I refer the question to the Chairman or to the distinguished members of the Committee?

Mr. COLOMBO. I think that, in substance, we have already answered the Ambassador's question. That is, all of us Committee members have confirmed the impression of chaos that we found in the Dominican Republic, the complete lack of authority, the existence of two groups that appeared to be standard-bearers in the conflict and with whom we felt impelled to establish immediate contact. I do not know if this will satisfy the Ambassador, and I wish he would let me know if he has any doubts that I can clear up.

The PRESIDENT. What does the Ambassador to Chile have to say?

Mr. MAGNET. It seems to me that what the Ambassador has said confirms what I—

Mr. COLOMBO. I think it is the same thing, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Is there any other question? Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. MAGNET. If it is not an imposition on you or on the meeting, Mr. President, I won-

September 23, 1965

der if it would be too much to ask the Committee to tell us how many asylees or refugees still remain in the embassies in Santo Domingo, if it has been able to obtain this information.

Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is that at this time, Mr. Ambassador, it is impossible to answer your question because, fortunately, the evacuation of asylees has already started. I have information regarding the asylees at my embassy: there were 14 who have already been able to leave. That is, this changes according to the help received, food and other, because the asylees take advantages of arriving planes in order to arrange their transportation; therefore, at this moment it would be practically impossible—because of the time that has elapsed since our arrival—to say how many asylees have been able to leave the country. Fourteen have left my embassy.

The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador satisfied?

Mr. MAGNET. I hope I am not being too insistent, Mr. President, but perhaps with the testimony of the other members of the Committee we might obtain an approximate figure, at least.

The SPECIAL DELEGATE OF BRAZIL. Mr. Ambassador of Chile, I wish to inform you that in the Embassy of Brazil there was 38 asylees, of which only 6 wished to leave the Dominican Republic. The other 32 told us that they would prefer to await the return of normal conditions in their country. Therefore, only six asylees in our embassy left the Dominican Republic.

The PRESIDENT. Does Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa wish to contribute anything?

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of Colombia). There were about 30 asylees in the Embassy of Colombia in Santo Domingo, some of whom did not wish to leave Dominican territory. Many of them, especially women and children, left on May 5 on the plane that brought in food, medicine and medical equipment.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Guatemala.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. There were 28 asylees at the Embassy of Guatemala, of whom 9 left. There are now 19 asylees at present who will be evacuated as soon as possible on the plane arriving from Guatemala with food and medicine. The Secretariat has already been informed of this.

Mr. MAGNET. Mr. President, I wish to leave on record my gratification and to pay public tribute to the patriotism of the Dominicans, since so many of them have chosen not to abandon their country, in spite of the prevailing chaos.

The PRESIDENT. We give the floor to the Representative of El Salvador, Ambassador Clairmont Dueñas.

Mr. CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS (the Special Delegate of El Salvador). Thank you Mr. President. I am going to ask a question, but I wish at this time to express my government's appreciation for the excellent work of the Committee in the face of the tragic events in the Dominican Republic. Our thanks, gentlemen. The question is as follows, and I wish to refer to the distribution of weapons to the civilian population. I wish to ask the members of the Committee whether they then had sufficient time to investigate how this distribution was made, what was the source, if it is known, whether distribution was made indiscriminately or to persons of any special tendencies, and who were the originators of this distribution. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to the members of the Committee. The Ambassador of Brazil, if you please.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, I wish to reply to the question posed by the Ambassador of El Salvador, and I do this on precarious bases, because the information

we received was precarious, and, above all, contradictory. There was, however, a common consensus in these replies, that the arsenal of weapons had been opened, access to it was given to the population, and that the civilian population, a part of which was controlled by Colonel Caamaño, was armed with automatic weapons considered by several authorities we interviewed as the best and most modern existing in the Dominican Republic. And we were able to ascertain, when we opened negotiations with the group led by the Commander of the Revolutionary Government, Colonel Caamaño, we were able to see various persons, teenagers, women, all armed with machineguns, forming small groups in the streets of the neighborhoods of Santo Domingo that were under the control of the rebels. And so there was a distribution made of all the weapons that were stored in the arsenal of the Dominican Republic to the civilian population that supported Colonel Caamaño's group. This is the information we were able to gather by means of the contacts we had with the various authorities of the Dominican Republic.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. I cannot, of course, give an opinion on the way in which the weapons were distributed, but the truth is that in the sector of the city where Colonel Caamaño's command was located, the presence of weapons, of machineguns, was visible and clear; of all citizens in the streets and of all who were around us, each citizen carried a machinegun, so that weapons were as numerous as the persons who were around us. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. Does the Ambassador of Guatemala wish to give any opinion in this respect?

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Yes, of course it could be seen in the city, as far as we could see, that automatic and other weapons were in the hands of many young civilians, and even of women. Now, according to information I received early Sunday morning, April 25, many young civilians were armed with automatic weapons from the 16 de Agosto Camp.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of El Salvador, Mr. Clairmont Dueñas.

Mr. CLAIRMONT DUEÑAS. Thank you, fellow delegates. I have a second question, if the President will permit me. I wish to ask the members of the Committee if they have seen, foreseen, or gathered, according to how we use the term, the possibility that the sector controlled by Colonel Caamaño is receiving weapons supplied by another country, not the Dominican Republic—from another country, let us say, Cuba—or is it using the weapons that they have there at this time.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Colombia, Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. There is such a profusion of machineguns in the sector of the city that we visited that in reality the importation of this item is unnecessary.

The PRESIDENT. The representatives who may wish to add something to the reply. The Representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Tejera Paris, has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Committee two questions, the first precisely about arms. Did the Committee learn of the existence, or was it able to verify that there is some system of distribution or some inventory whereby, in the forthcoming peacemaking activities, it could check what part of the arms has been returned? My experience in such matters has been that it is possible to have a very large part of the arms given to civilians returned, and then, by a supplementary house-to-house search they can be controlled. In general, the military are very good bureaucrats; they generally make inventories, and so the question I ask is not absurd.

The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to Ambassador Colombo, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, the question asked by the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela I have also asked the various bands or groups in Santo Domingo. All of them were very sorry that they could not provide me with accurate pieces of evidence, which would have been very valuable. When we were about to leave, in connection with the activities reported on in our dispatch, our report, the only part on which we obtained a reply that would help allay the Ambassador's fears was given by the United States, when the Ambassador of the United States in Santo Domingo told me that many of those who are arriving in the security zone bring arms with them and turn them in. I tried to go further into this question to ascertain the number of arms. The reply was not definite. I was told merely that this was a report that he had received from General Palmer, who had told the Ambassador of the United States that they had a certain amount of arms that were being turned in by people who were arriving in the zone for diverse reasons, many of whom were coming in search of food or medical care and who were voluntarily turning in their weapons. This is the only thing I can say, but I believe that I have contributed something to allay your fears, Mr. Ambassador, nothing more.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Thank you very much, Mr. President. The other question would be this: I was very favorably impressed and feel optimistic at the fact that the Committee noted among both the Constitutionals and the rebels a fervent desire to have the OAS intervene to seek a solution; and that even, according to what I think I heard the Chairman of the Committee say, Colonel Caamaño himself said that he rejected the Security Council solution and preferred an OAS solution, because it belongs to the system. Now I should like to ask you this: Did the Committee explore the possibility, or did it hear of any methodology of any special system, for example, the presence of a high commission of eminent persons or a high commission of good offices that could assist in returning the country to constitutional normalcy now? Does the Committee believe that there would be some possibility that such a solution would be acceptable to all the bands in conflict? I understand that now there is another change in the country.

The PRESIDENT. I refer the questions to the Committee members. Mr. Vázquez Carrizosa, please.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. It is still premature to go into that. Of course, we can find evidence of contact, points of common reference, but within an atmosphere of tension and anxiety such as surrounded us, it is difficult right now to think of formulas for a government that might unite the two parts. I do not exclude it as a possibility for the future, but apart from a similar reference to the Organization of American States, I think it is impossible for the Committee (although my colleagues may believe otherwise) to answer that question more precisely. No system came into view. The thing is it was not our job to investigate political conditions of a new government. Our mission, which was precisely set forth by the resolution of May 1, was to obtain a cease-fire, guarantees for the departure of refugees, and safe conditions for the embassies, and also to organize humanitarian aid. Moreover, the terms of the resolution of May 1 did not authorize us to enter into discussions of matters that are the concern of the Dominican people, and personally, my theory is that our mission was essentially to bring about peace—not to prejudice the will of the Dominicans regarding their own future; at least, that is my reasoning.

The PRESIDENT. The floor goes to the Representative of Guatemala, member of the Committee, to reply to certain aspects of the question raised by Mr. Tejera Paris.

Mr. GARCIA BAUER. There is no better way to answer the question raised by the Ambassador of Venezuela than to refer him to the terms of reference of the May 1 resolution of this meeting. The work mentioned by the Representative of Venezuela is not found in the terms of reference, and consequently, the Committee was prohibited from entering into that area. Undoubtedly, and this we have already said, there is a desire for understanding; there is an evident wish for peace, since a number of relationships are involved; there are people, friends of one side and of the other. The dean of the Diplomatic Corps told us of how, through him, splendid acts of humanitarianism had been performed. People asked him about their friends rumored to be wounded or dead, and he was able to give them explanation and set their minds at rest. In other words, that atmosphere has existed, and if the Ambassador of Venezuela, for example, remembers the cable that I read earlier, it mentioned one of the members of this new junta who described Caamaño as a personal friend, and also mentioned a lawyer, whom some think to be a militant partisan of the revolutionary party of Juan Bosch. In other words, it shows that there is a desire for understanding, that that desire is evident, and, of course, that there is faith in the inter-American system. How is that desire to be channeled? How can the OAS help to solve that problem that essentially must be solved by the Dominicans themselves? That is something that must be considered at the opportune time by the system, by the organs of the system. I yield the floor to Ambassador Tejera Paris.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I first want to explain that my question was not intended as criticism of the Committee, nor did I think that it could have wished to go beyond its terms of reference. I was only referring—perhaps I did not explain myself clearly—to the idea proposed informally by the Delegation of Costa Rica—I don't know if all of you know about this—for setting up a delegated committee, a committee that, by delegation of this conference, would go to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of carrying out the second part of the task of reestablishing peace—that is, the administration of the mechanics of reestablishing peace and a return to institutional normality, not the formation of a government and other such matters. Then I asked myself if such an idea had already occurred to other countries in some form or other, since such ideas are normal. That was my question. Now, I have a third one.

The PRESIDENT. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Colombo, will be so kind as to answer these questions.

Mr. COLOMBO. I want to say a couple of words regarding this concern of the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela. I share the opinion just expressed by Ambassador Garcia Bauer that our immediate job was to obtain a prompt peace. Also, we were obsessed with the fact—as undoubtedly everyone else was, without exception—that the solution to the Dominican Republic's political problem should be in complete keeping with the principle of self-determination of peoples, and that in the last analysis it was the Dominicans who must determine the direction of their institutional life. For us, it has been enough to know that they respect the jurisdiction and authority of the system and that the system assures the solution. But, Mr. President, with all respect to the Ambassador of Venezuela, neither do I think that this is the time to start discussing these

matters, since precisely for the reasons given by the Ambassador earlier, we should concentrate on the report and on the questions and answers from the Ambassadors and the Committee members respectively.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I just want some personal information, as all of us do. And another thing. From my own country's experience, especially during the dictatorship of Pérez Jiménez, Communist infiltration is generally chaotic everywhere and tries to produce chaos in the various factions. Experience shows us that it is much easier and more common for Communists to ally themselves with elements of the extreme right than with liberal ones. And so I ask whether the Committee noted or inquired as to the presence of agents and provocateurs on the side of Benoit, Wessin y Wessin, and company, or whether they investigated the presence of Communists from the other side, because some of their actions seem—give the impression of being—provocations rather than judicious acts.

The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the Committee like to say something in this regard?

Mr. COLOMBO. Thank you, yes. That also is a very pertinent question, and I think that we answered it to a certain extent when we acknowledged the existence of snipers on both sides. That is, there are snipers everywhere; they are a general disturbing element throughout the country, although we cannot attribute to them the particular ideology mentioned by the Ambassador. But it is apparent that anyone who plays the part of a sniper and has escaped the normal command of either of two groups is following his own ideology. That is all, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Would Ambassador Penna Marinho like to comment on the question presented by Ambassador Tejera Paris? Ambassador Vásquez Carrizosa? Ambassador Bauer? Would you like to, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. VÁSQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Well I just have this thought: if there are snipers in both parties, why can't they be snipers of the Wessin Communists, or snipers of the Caamaño rightists, or simply nationalists?

The PRESIDENT. Is there any comment on these last statements, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. COLOMBO. I should not like to continue this dialog because that would lead us into a maze of conjectures, Mr. Ambassador, but I believe, and I will say, that there is a fundamental difference: Colonel Caamaño's commands recognized the existence of Communist elements that were seeking to infiltrate and to gain control of his movement—an affirmation that I did not hear, nor do I believe that any of the members heard it, from Colonel Benoit.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Maybe they are not so politically sensitive.

The PRESIDENT. Well, reportedly so, according to some opinions.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I thought as much, but I just wanted to make sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. Our thanks to you, Mr. Ambassador. We shall now hear from the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Bunker.

Mr. BUNKER. I would like to express on behalf of my delegation, and indeed on behalf of my Government, appreciation and praise to all of the members of the Committee of the Meeting, individually and collectively, who, under the brilliant leadership of my friend and colleague, Ambassador Colombo, have accomplished so much in so brief a period, and under, as they have described to us, the most difficult and trying circumstances. We have heard the report of the committee this evening, and I am confident that this meeting will agree with me, that the act of Santo Domingo marks an

outstanding achievement in what has been our priority objective under the terms of the resolution, an agreement on an effective cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. As Ambassador Colombo has reported, the Secretary of State has communicated to the committee that the United States supports its work in Santo Domingo, and pledges to cooperate fully in the observance of the provisions of the act of Santo Domingo.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, something has gone wrong with the interpreting equipment because I heard the English spoken by the Ambassador much more loudly than the Spanish interpreter to whom I was listening.

The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador's speaker turned too high?

Mr. BUNKER. Shall I proceed? Well, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the questions which have been put by my distinguished colleague to the Committee, and the answers of the members, have shed further light and have made a very great contribution toward a greater understanding of the situation existing in the Dominican Republic; a contribution so valuable that I think it should become public knowledge, Mr. Chairman. I believe that it was agreed at our previous meeting that the proceedings of the private meetings and the records would become public. I trust that that will be so in this case, because I think the record is extremely valuable to provide a much wider public knowledge of the actual conditions in the Dominican Republic.

The Committee has succeeded in taking this first step of major importance. It seems to me that this meeting can now move to a second major stage of the task, for I think we can all agree that much remains to be done before conditions return to normal in that tragic and torn country. It is quite obvious, from what the Committee has said, that there is today no effective national government in the Dominican Republic. There are contending forces, each in control or perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but no political grouping or faction can lay a well-founded claim to being the government of the country. I say quasi-control because we had word from our Embassy in Santo Domingo today that the palace inside the rebel zone, in which 400 people, I believe, have taken refuge, had been attacked three times during the day. This may be indeed a violation to the cease-fire.

But it remains, Mr. Chairman, for the Dominican people, with the help of the OAS to which I understand they are looking, from the words of the Committee, to organize a government and to provide for future constitutional arrangements of their own choosing. It seems to me that it is of the greatest importance that the OAS should endeavor to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens of the Dominican Republic, and I am sure they can be found, to establish a provisional government of national unity, which could eventually lead to a permanent representative regime through democratic processes.

Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find paths of peace and to build on the base which has been established by this act of Santo Domingo. I want again to express the appreciation of my government for the splendid work of this Committee because they have established, through what they have done here, really the first and essential base for any further progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Representative of Uruguay, Ambassador Oribe.

Mr. ORIBE. Mr. President, I would like to second what the Ambassador of the United States has said with regard to making the minutes of this session public. I do this with the understanding, naturally, that they will be published as is usual; that is, that they will be complete, verbatim minutes. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. It is so agreed. Ambassador Facio, Special Delegate of Costa Rica.

Mr. FACIO. First, I would like to join in the congratulations given the distinguished members of the Special Committee for their splendid work. Second, the question I am going to ask is to clarify a concern I have with respect to the possibility of securing an effective peace in the Dominican Republic. I wish to ask the members of the Committee if they interviewed Colonel Caamaño or any members of his group after that band was established as what they allege to be the Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic?

Mr. COLOMBO. The value of the Act of Santo Domingo is precisely that it was signed after the establishment of Colonel Caamaño's group as the titular Constitutional Government, nothing more.

Mr. FACIO. Then, you had the opportunity to discuss with them their claim to be the only constitutional government of the Dominican Republic, because whether or not this claim can be maintained in either relative or absolute terms depends on there being peace through mediation between the two groups.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair again recognizes the Ambassador of Argentina.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, replying to the important question asked by the Ambassador of Costa Rica, I am pleased to tell him that the Committee delivered the Act previously to Colonel Caamaño for consideration, in order that he would have the opportunity of going into the intricacies of its legal implications, because what we wished to achieve was the first step that would lead all of us to achieve peace in the Dominican Republic, and if you read the beginning of the Act of Santo Domingo, it sets forth what Colonel Caamaño and Colonel Guerra thought of the Act and the opinion of the parties. I recall simply that it reads: "The Parties signing below who declare that they represent, in the capacities mentioned," that is, in the act of signing they declared their capacity and as we had no authority to pass judgment on the titles, which would have implied a dangerous incursion into a territory that was forbidden to us, we limited ourselves to record the capacity of each one of the groups and with all loyalty to say so frankly and without any legal doubt at the beginning of that Act which would, undoubtedly, be the road to begin working seriously to bring definitive peace to Santo Domingo.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Facio wishes to ask another question.

Mr. FACIO. Many thanks. No, I am satisfied and, of course, the question did not imply any criticism whatsoever or any desire that they depart from the norm.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, the Special Delegate of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. The Ambassador of Costa Rica asks whether the constitutional government invokes the qualification of government for the whole country and whether it authorizes the presence of another government.

Mr. FACIO. No. Naturally it is evident that each one of the parties which proclaims that it is the government aspires to this, but did you, specifically from this contract, reach the conclusion that Colonel Caamaño was in an irreducible position; not to yield. And I ask this question because after the signing of the Act of Santo Domingo, Caamaño has insisted that he does not accept the participation of an inter-American force and that the solution is that he is the President, and that he be recognized as Constitutional President, and that he represents legality.

Mr. COLOMBO. First of all, Mr. Ambassador, I would like to know whether this statement by Colonel Caamaño has been officially communicated.

Mr. FACIO. No, it is a publication.

Mr. COLOMBO. That is why I was very surprised that Colonel Caamaño transmitted that note.

Mr. FACIO. No, no, Doctor, it is a statement made in a newspaper.

Mr. COLOMBO. If we follow the newspapers in this process, Mr. Ambassador.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Colombia.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. What the newspapers say is one thing and what really happened is another, but it should be noted that many news items that are published should be investigated or it should be known to what extent they correspond to what was said or to what is done. I can only say the following: the demarcation of the zone and the existence of a corridor communicating the San Isidro zone with the center of the city were discussed personally with Colonel Caamaño. There was even a doubt regarding the conditions of the guard in the corridor. An incident had occurred the day before—many incidents occur—regarding some patrol that had entered farther than the two blocks that on one side and the other were authorized by the regulations in order to safeguard this public road; and Doctor Héctor Aristides maintained that it was intolerable that United States patrols should go beyond the limits. The military adviser who accompanied us—he was the military adviser of the Ambassador of Guatemala—who had had the occasion to read the regulations and the truth regarding the incident, explained in perfectly fair terms the truth of the fact, rectifying Doctor Aristides' understanding, but as Doctor Aristides insisted, Colonel Caamaño intervened, with some vigor, to say "no, this is something between the military and we understand one another. I believe that what the military adviser says is true; I believe that it is acceptable; I have no objection." I am stating this fact in case it clears up your doubts.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Guatemala, Mr. García Bauer.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. I only wish to mention, with regard to something that has been discussed before, especially by the Ambassador of Costa Rica and also with respect to a question that was asked before, that in Document 17 Add. 3, in which the fourth radio-telephone message of the Secretary General of the OAS, Dr. José A. Mora, reports—you all have the document before you—that the Military Junta has already traveled to Santo Domingo and is installed in the National Congress, it states, Center of the Heroes, then—

The PRESIDENT. Of the Military Junta that traveled to Santo Domingo? The fifth or the—

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. Yes, the Military Junta that was in San Isidro. It doesn't say here whether it was the five-man Junta or the three-man Junta, because I don't know if it was done before the five-man one was established, and then, in today's May 7 document, it says: "as to what is happening here, the situation continues to be very delicate, since the cease-fire agreement is being enforced with great difficulty. It is particularly affected by radio broadcasts that confuse and excite the population. Every effort is being made to stop the Santo Domingo station from issuing messages that excite the people. If this is achieved it would prevent a state of violence. The same is true with respect to the San Isidro Radio. Yesterday I went to the two broadcasting stations and transmitted a message intended to calm feelings and calling upon the Dominican people to comply with the agreements in the Act of Santo Domingo. Nevertheless, Radio Santo Domingo and Radio San Isidro continue sending messages that aid in inflaming spirits and maintaining the situation of violence." And this same document mentions the asylees who

have left and gives up-to-the-minute information regarding them. This is important in relation to the questions that we were asked previously.

The PRESIDENT. Thank you very much. Is Ambassador Facio satisfied?

Mr. FACIO. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Honduras, Ambassador Midence.

Mr. MIDENCE. My delegation wishes to join in the congratulations extended to the Committee for its magnificent work under such difficult circumstances. My Delegation feels sure that the report that has been presented today will be of immense value to this Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Bonilla Atilés, Special Delegate of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. BONILLA ATILÉS. Mr. President, Delegates: I think that of all the delegates present here none can feel the pain that I have at what I have heard tonight. Words were too few to express my appreciation to the members of the Committee. I have just had a long-distance telephone conversation, from Santo Domingo, with Mr. Antonio Imbert, and he told me that in a search for possible solutions the Military Junta had turned its power over to a civilian-military junta composed of: Antonio Imbert, president; Julio Ortigo, Alejandro Seller, Carlos Grisolia Palomé, and Colonel Pedro Benoit. This junta will try to cooperate with the mission from the Organization of American States to find solutions, which are still premature to discuss. He also informed me that the Junta has discussed with Dr. Mora the problem of the radio broadcasts, and it has been proved that Radio San Isidro has not made any inflammatory broadcasts. As to the last attack on the National Palace, of which Ambassador Bunker spoke, he confirmed to me that there are civilian refugees there.

I am not mentioning this as accusation but as fact. What interests me most at the moment, since it involves my own responsibility and that of the government, whichever it may be, and that of the Dominican people, is that out of this meeting shall come the necessary and imperative declaration that what is happening in Santo Domingo threatens the peace of the hemisphere. After knowing the facts, this is the only justification this body has for having taken the steps that it has. I do not propose that this problem be dealt with or discussed tonight because it seems to me that we are all sufficiently tired, morally and physically, so as to be unable to face this problem immediately; but I do urge the Tenth Meeting of Consultation as soon as possible to make emphatically this decision, so that the fire will not be extinguished, not only in the Western Hemisphere but in all political quarters of the world. I have nothing more to say.

Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, before ending this session and to a certain extent supplementing the report of the special committee, which has just been submitted by its chairman, Ambassador Ricardo Colombo, allow me to mention one point that ought to be brought to the attention of this Meeting of Consultation. I wish to refer to the magnificent activities of Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, the Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo. He is an exceptional figure, a veritable Don Camillo on a grand scale, with free entrée into all political areas of Santo Domingo. With astonishing ease, he leaves the headquarters of Colonel Caamaño to go to the Government Junta and from there to the American Embassy. He is a respected friend of Caamaño, as he is of Benoit and of Ambassador Bennett. They all like him and they all have the same high regard for him. It is due to his thorough understanding of things, to his moving

spirit of human solidarity, and to his profound love for the Dominican people, that the drama in that country did not assume more terrible proportions. I know that the Meeting of Consultation has already paid just tribute to Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, but it never will be too much to point out, for the eternal gratitude of America, the admirable labor of this extraordinary prelate in behalf of peace and tranquility in the troubled Dominican Republic. The Delegation of Brazil, expressing sentiments that I know are those of all of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, manifests its deep appreciation and above all its admiration for the continuous and tireless collaboration rendered by Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo, to the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation during its stay in the Dominican Republic. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Ricardo Colombo has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, with deep feeling the Delegation of Argentina wishes to add to the words of the Ambassador of Brazil concerning the outstanding work of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, that messenger of peace in the Dominican Republic. The only tribute—because everything has already been said—that I can pay under the circumstances, is to repeat here, Mr. Chairman, before the entire meeting, his final words of good-bye to us: Take—he said to me—my blessing to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers that they may achieve the high objectives of peace; the peace that, at all costs, must be preserved in this Republic where I hold this apostleship. Nothing more, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia, has the floor.

Mr. VÁZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Mr. President, it is only right to say a few words, as my colleagues from Brazil and Argentina have already done, to emphasize the merits of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Papal Nuncio, in the face of such a difficult situation. There is more; none of our action would have been possible without the advice, without the help of that eminent diplomatic representative. And still more, for the future—for it would be very difficult to think about the future of the Dominican Republic without speaking of him who so perfectly represents the ideal of Pope John XXIII concerning the coexistence of men of good will. But I have asked for the floor to speak on a point which may not be appropriate at this time but would be at another. Our report ends with several recommendations, which I do not propose to discuss at this session, but I do want to point them out to the Chair so that at the time and in the way provided for in the regulations or when it is considered opportune, they may be submitted to the Tenth Meeting of Consultation for discussion, because they do not deal with political questions, such as those we have discussed intensely, but specific points on the future organization of activities in the Dominican Republic. They are specific points of the greatest urgency, such as supervision of the cease-fire, the appointment of a group qualified to organize the relief measures for the Dominican people and evaluate their needs, the study and planning of an Inter-American Force and the coordination of all its services. Detailed, careful, and immediate consideration of these points seems to me absolutely necessary. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of Guatemala, member of the Committee, has the floor.

Mr. GARCÍA BAUER. At this time I only wish to refer to the tribute that my colleagues, the members of the Committee, have already paid to the Papal Nuncio and Dean of the

Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio, for the great work that he has performed since this grave conflict began in the Dominican Republic. The Papal Nuncio was exceptionally kind to the Committee, offering it every facility within his power, and it was through his great services that the Committee was able to accomplish what it did. He was present, tirelessly, at our interviews with Colonel Caamaño's command and with the Military Junta and, because the confidence both parties have in him, the act of Santo Domingo was signed. He always used persuasion to the effect that the purposes for which the Organization of American States was in Dominican territory should be borne in mind. As the Ambassador of Brazil has said, the Papal Nuncio was respected in every area, regardless of which authority was in power. He is a person who has the confidence of the different parties and through his good offices, because of the great collaboration he rendered, the Committee was able to accomplish its task. Hence the Committee was moved and felt that its own wishes were fulfilled when, at the Papal Nunciature in Santo Domingo, we delivered to the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps the message from the President of the 10th meeting, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa, notifying him of the action of this meeting some days ago concerning Monsignor Clarizio's work.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Colombo, Special Delegate of Argentina has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. I only wish to add one remark that seems to be strictly justifiable. In order to be able to act with the urgency that the case requires, the five-member Committee had to move up its return so that the 10th meeting could be as thoroughly informed as possible with all available data, but we were deeply concerned that before our departure the fundamental problem of the faith in the system as stated by the two sides in the struggle would not have been resolved, and the Committee was the link, at the scene of action, during the emergency, remaining in order to be able to carry out the powers accepted by both parties. It was for this reason that the Delegate of Panama, in an act that honors him, and which I cannot ignore, remained at the center of action, representing our mission. In this way, according to the conversations we held with the parties, it would be as though the Committee were present and together with military advisers and the civilian personnel he could undertake to solve whatever it might be possible to solve, to the extent that we are able—to solve the difficulties arising from the events that have taken place and that are taking place in the Dominican Republic. I want this generous act of the Delegate of Panama, from a country that has so many reasons for counting on the tradition of brotherliness in solving basic problems, to be recognized at this session. Panama is with us on the Committee, represented by its distinguished Delegate. Ambassador Calamari also wanted to be here physically with the Committee but was not able to do so. I want to stress this act of the Delegate of Panama because it is eminently fair to do so—to take note of one who has firmly carried the banner of the inter-American system into the midst of the fight. Nothing more.

The PRESIDENT. We are sure that our colleague, Ambassador Calamari, must be gratified by the eulogy given by his compatriot and our dear colleague, Ambassador Frank Morrice. [Sic]

Ambassador Díez de Medina, Special Delegate of Bolivia, has asked for the floor; and then Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela.

Mr. Díez de Medina. Mr. Chairman, I have not asked for the floor to pose any question: I have no questions to ask. I have only words of praise—of warm praise and con-

gratulations—for the distinguished members of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation, for the intelligent and devoted manner in which they carried out the delicate mission entrusted to the Committee. I only wish, Mr. President, to add my wish that the minutes of this plenary session should also include words of congratulation and appreciation for the task being so successfully performed in the Dominican Republic by Dr. José Antonio Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. Very well, we shall do so. Ambassador Colombo, the Special Delegate of Argentina has the floor.

Mr. COLOMBO. The Ambassador of Bolivia is quite right in proposing formal recognition of the fact that the Committee was able to fulfill its mission because of the brilliant efforts that were begun by Dr. José A. Mora before our arrival in the Dominican Republic. Appreciation should also be expressed to the Secretariat, which, although few in number, gave much in efforts and efficiently contributed to the success of our actions. Therefore, I second the Ambassador of Bolivia's proposal but would like to point out that we had intended to submit this matter during the session.

The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Bolivia and the Committee have interpreted the feelings and thoughts of the Chair and of all our colleagues very well. Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela has the floor.

Mr. TEJERA PARÍS. The Delegate of Bolivia anticipated what I was thinking and what is certainly the thought of all of us here. My intention was, I now confirm it, to ask the Chair to ask this Tenth Meeting of Consultation to give to the Committee, to the Secretary General, and to the members of the General Secretariat a vote of applause for the work they have done. The test that the Committee has passed has been hard both there and here, and I believe that since this is a problem that affects the whole security of the hemisphere, these colleagues deserve not only our thanks but the thanks of our governments and of their peoples, and, at this moment, enthusiastic applause which I am sure the President will be the first to begin. [Applause.]

The PRESIDENT. All of us join in the praise and tribute the Special Committee has given to the prelate Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio in the Dominican Republic and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo. We share in this with real appreciation, with affection, as our common duty. His services for the peace of the Americas, his vows and his blessings we applaud with emotion; with emotion, I say, which corresponds to the emotion that he experienced when he received our expression of deep gratitude for his magnificent labor for the peace of the Americas and for that people that we all love so well: the Dominican Republic. This closed plenary session has been highly important. We have heard the interesting report of the Special Committee. We have posed broad questions; we have obtained splendid and very clear replies, from which we can appreciate even more the extraordinary task accomplished by the Committee. Our repeated applause and eulogy for it and its members, all of whom we are honored to call our colleagues and friends. Unless you think otherwise a plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation should be indicated to consider the report in the aspects noted by the Committee, so that the meeting may act on that report. We have asked questions and have obtained answers; now comes the job of considering the report and analyzing the action to be taken by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation on the recommendations pro-

posed by the Special Committee and the conclusions that it reached.

I ask you only whether tomorrow's plenary session should be open—I understand that it should be. It should be open so that the public will know everything that we have said, both with respect to the work of the Committee and to the contents of its interesting report. I would call another closed meeting, if the Committee so wishes, but the meeting I am going to convoke for a little later today, should be public and its purpose will be to consider the report of the Special Committee, discuss it and propose decisions concerning the recommendations it makes. The delegates have already seen and have in your briefcases for later reading the fourth radio-telephone message from our Secretary General, Dr. Mora.² It is not necessary to have the Secretary read it, since I am sure all of you have read it. With respect to the minutes of this plenary session, I ask you to take note that you have 24 hours in which to give the Secretariat your corrections of style. I ask you to take note of that time period so that the Secretariat can speed up the final edition of the minutes of the plenary session.

Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, I should like you to repeat the last part as to the time and place, according to the Chair's plan, as was suggested. Please do me the great favor of repeating it.

The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir. We are going to adjourn the session and meet again in a few hours, let's say, perhaps this afternoon. It will be a plenary session of the Tenth Meeting, public, for the purpose of considering the report of the Special Committee. To consider it, analyze it, discuss it, and decide on the recommendations and conclusions reached by the Committee. It is assumed that this session should be public. The next plenary session will not be closed like this one; it will be public, so that public opinion of the hemisphere will be informed, but not just of what is in the report of the Special Committee, because I am hereby suggesting that the report should be made public, unless for some reason the members of the Committee indicate to the Chair that it should not be made public but that we ought to wait until tomorrow's session.

Mr. COLOMBO. Absolutely, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. Therefore, gentlemen, as of now the report of the Special Committee is public. Consequently, it can be turned over to the press and sent to anyone wishing it. Naturally, if at tomorrow's meeting we reach conclusions on the suggestions made by the Committee, we shall feel highly gratified. In any case I think that the time has come for the Meeting of Consultation to make concrete statements on the chaotic situation that seems to grow worse every hour. Therefore, within 5 or 6 hours, possible for 4 or 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am going to convoke the fifth plenary session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to meet in this same place and take up the report of the Committee.

The Representative of Venezuela.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, only to ask if you would be good enough to include in the order of business two specific points that I believe are relevant to the announcement you have just made: first would be consideration of whether or not the present situation in the Dominican Republic affects the security of the hemisphere; second, establishment and implementation of measures to help the Dominican people return to full constitutional democracy.

The PRESIDENT. Very well; it seems to me there is no objection to discussing these two points in the public session we shall hold

² The complete text of the fourth message of the Secretary General is published as Document 17 add. 3.

shortly—the one suggested by the distinguished Representative of Uruguay and supported by the Representative of Venezuela, and the other just mentioned by the distinguished Ambassador Tejera Paris. I recognize the Representative of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. BONILLA ATILES. Mr. President, I shall wait until tomorrow to formally present a draft resolution on my proposal that the Organ of Consultation declare the situation in the Dominican Republic to be a threat to the peace of the hemisphere.

The PRESIDENT. Very well. The Representative of Paraguay has requested the floor.

Mr. YÓDICE. I only wish to ask two questions, Mr. President. I understand, or rather, I actually heard you mention a decision on the request of the Delegate of the United States that the minutes of today's session be made public. This request was seconded by the distinguished Representative of Uruguay. From this I assume, that is, I hope, because the suggestion is also mine, that it will be agreed to make public the minutes of this session.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair has so resolved. Mr. YÓDICE. I beg your pardon. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. That's quite all right.

Mr. YÓDICE. Now, I have another question to ask of the distinguished Representative of Costa Rica, arising from an earlier statement by the Ambassador of Venezuela, because it refers to the matter of considering measures to bring democratic normality to the Dominican Republic, and during this 10th meeting of consultation, I don't recall having heard any informal proposal by the distinguished Ambassador Facio regarding the establishment, as the distinguished Ambassador of Guatemala said, of a committee of statesmen, or something similar. Therefore, I would like to ask if Ambassador Facio did or did not make such an informal proposal, because I would not want to fail to inform my foreign ministry of something that had been proposed here. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. Thank you. The Delegate of Costa Rica.

Mr. FACIO. Mr. Representative of Paraguay, I have not yet made any proposal of this sort. Perhaps it can be clarified in this way: there has been some discussion of a proposal, but not one of mine, to put some of the recommendations of the Committee into effect. I shall be very happy to give you a copy at the end of this session. But the proposal was not made by Costa Rica; it has been discussed among several delegations but is nothing specific.

Mr. YÓDICE. I understand. Thank you. I wanted to know if it was proposed here.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Tejera Paris.

Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I would like to ask the Committee on Credentials if it would be possible to have a meeting early tomorrow to reexamine all our credentials, because it appears there are certain doubts that should be clarified in the light of the information transmitted in the cable that the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic reported on a short time ago.

The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Jácome, the Representative of Ecuador.

Mr. JÁCOME. As Chairman of the Committee on Credentials I can report that I have called a meeting of the Committee for tomorrow at 3:30 p.m. Any representative who has any doubt as to himself or to his colleagues may present his complaints to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT. Gentlemen, we have taken note of the announcement just made by our colleague, the Chairman of the Committee on Credentials, and it is now the time to adjourn the session and to announce that the 5th plenary session of the 10th meeting of consultation will be held here this afternoon at 4 p.m. The session is adjourned.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. As I listened to the gentleman further comment and to his characterization of the intent of the New York Times, he subsequently said, if I understood him correctly, it was similarly slanted with regard to a caption I believe in the Herald Tribune. Might I ask the gentleman by what special competence he is in a position to judge the integrity of a great newspaper such as the New York Times with regard to the full and fair reporting of the news. Does he have any basis for the allegations that he made of the intent of the New York Times?

Mr. SELDEN. I think it was obvious from the statement I made as to what I believed was the intent of the New York Times in this instance.

Mr. REID of New York. How do you know what the intent of the New York Times was. The New York Times is one of the great papers of America and indeed of the entire free world. If the gentleman is familiar with newspapers at all, he knows that the decisions on the placement of news stories and reporting and the accuracy thereof are matters of the highest concern to any newspaper. Their overall concern is very simply with the integrity of the news and I know of no major newspaper or any newspaper in these United States that ever deliberately and knowingly tries to slant the news.

Mr. SELDEN. I do not agree with the gentleman, I have made these charges and if these particular newspapers would like to answer them, I would be interested in hearing their answer.

Mr. REID of New York. Will the gentleman answer my first question—by what special information or competence does he feel he is able to characterize what he calls, and I quote him: "the intent of the New York Times."

Mr. SELDEN. I am an average newspaper reader, and I feel sure that others have gotten from its reporting the same impression as I.

Mr. REID of New York. I thank the gentleman for his clarification because he now says it is his impression and therefore I take it he retracts his earlier charge with regard to the intent of the New York Times.

Mr. SELDEN. I do not retract anything I have said. I stand on the statement I have made.

Mr. REID of New York. As I understand the gentleman, he stands by the clarification that this was his impression?

Mr. SELDEN. I stand by the statement I have made, I will say to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. REID of New York. With respect to the OAS matter, I ask the gentleman whether the administration informed the OAS of the United States intention to land troops prior to the actual landing of our forces?

Mr. SELDEN. I understand that the individual members of the OAS were informed immediately following the order to land troops.

Mr. REID of New York. The question I have asked the gentleman—

Mr. SELDEN. I answered your question. You asked me whether the administration informed the OAS members before the landing of troops and I said it is my understanding that they were informed immediately thereafter.

Mr. REID of New York. But not before?

Mr. SELDEN. That is correct.

Mr. REID of New York. Might I ask the gentleman a second question?

Mr. SELDEN. I might add that in connection with our intervention in the Cuban missile crisis that troops had been deployed as well as naval and air force units prior to our notification of the OAS members.

Mr. REID of New York. That is not my understanding in talking with Senator KENNEDY, but let me ask a second question of the gentleman. Was there any attempt by the administration to request that observers accompany our forces and particularly that observers accompany our forces pending any dispatch of an OAS peacekeeping force?

Mr. SELDEN. As I pointed out in my statement, this was done in a matter of hours, and there was no time to send an OAS force since no OAS force was in existence.

Mr. REID of New York. The question I was asking the gentleman is whether the administration has considered a request to have a few observers—not an OAS force, but a few observers—accompanying our forces, pending a possible dispatch of OAS forces?

Mr. SELDEN. I am not aware that such a request was made. Is the gentleman telling me that such a request was made and not granted?

Mr. REID of New York. It is my understanding that there was no attempt, as understand the facts, either to inform the OAS prior to the decision and consult with them prior to the decision, nor was there any attempt to have observers accompany our forces. This in my judgment was in contravention of the OAS charter. It might also have been, and in my judgment it was, a matter that was deeply resented by many of the Latin American states—not that we acted and not that we acted promptly which I think all Americans supported, but we did not take the extra time to inform the OAS to request observers.

Does the gentleman feel that it was so impossible that a telephone could not be picked up?

Mr. SELDEN. I understand that immediately after the landing all Latin American Ambassadors were called. The order to deploy troops was given immediately, however, when it looked as though the lives of Americans in Santo Domingo were in danger.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mrs. KELLY. I would like to make this very brief observation at this point.

I believe it is very clear that the time was too important at this point to do anything other than what our Government did. I believe that and I am sure that an endeavor was made to notify the members of the OAS, but perhaps they did object at that time. I am not sure of that, but I know this for a fact, that now they are very glad that we did move as we did.

I refer to the countries of Latin America, for the reason that they now realize we had information as to what was taking place and took place, and we were defending not only their people but our people, and the free world.

Mr. Speaker, I want to take this time to compliment my colleague for his statement on the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. There has been a lack of actual reporting concerning U.S. activities in many parts of the world. That was portrayed, and very unfavorably, including pictures, of what our desire is. I think we should realize at this moment that we are doing these things for the protection of all people, for the protection of our civilization, for the protection of our way of life.

I think there is a point that the media, including all newspapers, should consider at this moment. They have a grave responsibility not only to us, but to the free world. I realize the tremendous coverage they have around the world, and they should endeavor to give an impression of that which we seek and that which they know by seeing the media in this country, and that whatever wrong impression is created by the media can be harmful.

I ask the gentleman if it is not true the reason he is taking this time today is to emphasize to a large degree what we think is factual reporting, as I hope all newspapers and media endeavor to do, that the impressions conveyed by a picture or any other means can be detrimental.

I want to give one illustration. A serviceman was seen lighting a match to a hut in Vietnam. That appeared in many papers. That picture portrayed a picture that the United States was inhuman; but they did not portray the fact that under that hut was secured, and down in the ground, many weapons of war for the destruction of our side. That is why I say the importance of today's impressions created by media or newspapers, or anything, is so vast that I urge them to consider more carefully their responsibility.

Am I right in endeavoring to seek factual reporting?

Mr. SELDEN. I think the gentleman from New York is correct, and I thank her for her contribution.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. McCORMACK. It so happens that I was at a meeting with the President when this question was discussed. It was a very important meeting. I was also present at the Cuban meeting, and I have been to many others. It is very

easy to be a critic when one does not have the responsibility—and this observation is not made with anyone in mind—but I ask myself many times, what would you do if you had the responsibility? I was faced with that situation for a number of months, and I thank God it never came about. But being a human being, I did ask myself, "Well what would you do, JOHN McCORMACK, if you were in a certain position where you had the responsibility of making a decision and had to do it—would you have the courage to do what you had to do?"

I might say that in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic, there were at least 5,000 American nationals and nationals of other countries there. If I were President of the United States at such a time when a decision had to be made, I would say that I had a primary obligation to protect the lives of the citizens of my country and that I also had another obligation to protect the lives of the nationals of other countries.

We must keep in mind the situation that existed there at that time—with mobs roaming the streets of Santo Domingo. We all know what can happen as a result of mob psychology particularly when trained minds are directing the mob and influencing it. We know the dreadful results that can follow therefrom.

I think it is only fair to say that if the President of the United States had stated even 1 hour before the marines and our forces landed that they were going into the Dominican Republic, there could have been hundreds of Americans and other nationals killed and wounded. There would have been bloodshed there that would be too terrible to picture.

It is very easy to look back and say—well, nothing happened—but the decision had to be made, looking to the future as to what could happen. President Johnson was faced with that decision and the others who were at the meeting that I referred to had our responsibility at that time. I think the President made the right decision. The question of notifying the other countries could not be resolved as it was in the case of Cuba. In Cuba we were faced with the fact that there were military installations there and possibly inter-continental ballistic missiles. At that time if Khrushchev had not backed down, it would have taken us 10 days or 2 weeks to be prepared. We would have had to bring our troops to certain parts of the United States. We would have had to bring our Air Force. We had to bring other necessary equipment—tanks and so forth—in order to be prepared. But more than that we had to make arrangements for at least 100 ships to do the transporting. So at that time there was a period of 10 days to 2 weeks at least where we had to prepare in case the situation arose where we had to do so.

So without entering into any controversy with anyone, all that I say is that this should be considered, having in mind the situation that confronted the President of the United States when he had to make the decision. In other

words, it is a question of making a decision on what might be termed before the fact. We should view it that way and not from the perspective that pertains after the fact and with knowledge of the masterful job that was done by our Armed Forces where not one single civilian was killed or injured as a result of the action that was taken in connection with the Dominican Republic.

As I said, I was one of those at that meeting. I know of no dissenting voices at that meeting and we all supported the President. I think subsequent events have completely justified the decision that was made on that occasion.

Mr. SELDEN. I think the distinguished Speaker of the House and certainly agree with his assessment of this situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Florida.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with everything that the great Speaker of this House of Representatives, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] has just said.

I think he has demonstrated once again that his vision, his long years of experience and knowledge are of such immeasurable value not only to this legislative body but to our country. His words spoken here tonight should be considered very carefully and seriously by everyone.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] is a conscientious, hard-working, dedicated and serious-minded Member of this body. As chairman of the inter-American subcommittee he has labored long and hard to know and understand the complex foreign policy problems of the Americas. His approach has always been cautious. In all the years that I have worked with him he has been very thorough and has shown deep understanding of the public responsibility which he bears. The reports of his subcommittee have always received strong bipartisan support and have always been overwhelmingly well received by this House.

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I too sat earnestly many, many hours listening to and trying to get to the facts to make a decision during those hectic and fast-moving events that took place in the Dominican Republic.

We listened most carefully to the presentation of all our Government officials.

But none of us accepted everything that was said at face value. We questioned and we questioned deeply and very penetratingly, as anyone would in our position. We also had reflected many differing viewpoints on the committee. As I say, we spent a long time.

Mr. Speaker, in tranquil times, it is difficult enough to get all the facts in any given situation in order to form an objective judgment; but it is particularly difficult to get the facts to make the judgments in times of stress and fast-moving events, such as took place in the Dominican Republic.

Based upon all the information I could get, as with the gentleman from Alabama, it was my judgment that President Johnson did the right thing, and the only thing, at that time. I fully support everything that he did in order to protect Americans and other nationals and in order to prevent a takeover in the Dominican Republic by a group not representative of the Dominican people.

Therefore, in conclusion, I should like to say that the gentleman from Alabama, in bringing this report to the House, is performing his public trust as he sees it in the highest sense of service to his country. I commend him for it.

Mr. SELDEN. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] for his remarks and I am grateful to him for his contribution.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague from Alabama.

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Alabama, has presented tonight a factual case, and I thank him for it. I would also like to thank him for setting the record straight. It is vital that men who have this knowledge and determination to set the record straight should do so.

I am also aware that the gentleman has dealt with the facts and the twisting and the slanting of the press. As an Alabamian who read the Washington Post during the trying months that have passed, I have witnessed the distortion of the press. I have watched the slanting of news. I have seen the vicious cartoons that depicted lies in this country and that twisted and distorted the events. I commend my colleague for setting the record straight.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for 5 additional minutes, and I thank my colleague from Alabama [Mr. MARTIN] for his remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none and it is so ordered.

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. BECKWORTH].

Mr. BECKWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to commend my chairman on the statement he has made, and to emphasize what the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] has just mentioned. Our chairman always proceeds in a cautious, sincere, and conscientious manner, and he undertakes to be sound in that which he does.

Certainly I applaud our illustrious Speaker on what he has said this evening. I know he has done his best at all times to keep the facts straight. His is a great contribution here this evening.

Mr. SELDEN. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I should like to address a question, if I may, to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts.

First, I am very responsive to the seriousness with which the gentleman has

discussed the subject in the meetings which he has held and the distinguished service which he has rendered this body and the country over the years.

The point I was trying to make was not the need to act promptly. I think that was clear. It was not to do anything but to support the President's steps that he thought essential in our national security to protect nationals in the area and for other purposes.

But there is one point I would raise; it is this: I address this to the gentleman in equal seriousness. I am not persuaded, that it was not possible to take 5 minutes, 15 minutes, a half-hour, or even an hour to have consulted with the OAS, and at least to have informed them at the highest level of our thinking and to consult with them with regard to the decision that we are planning to take. To say that we did not have the time is to suggest that there was an immediacy that was instantaneous. To suggest further that had we informed them of our intention to act, it might have resulted in the loss of the lives of Americans does not particularly do credit to the OAS, which I am sure would treat a communication of that kind with the importance and the security which it deserves.

My question is simply this: Diplomacy, starting back with Franklin Roosevelt, and for many years since, and for every American President since then, has been concerned with consultations. It has been concerned with upholding our treaty rights. It has been trying to convince our sister republics in Latin America that we would consult and that we would work together.

Do you not believe, Mr. Speaker, we could have found at least 5 minutes to have tried to consult before we made the final decision? I believe this would have meant a great deal in Latin America. It would have been wholly within the spirit of our treaty rights.

As someone somewhat interested in diplomacy, it is my conviction it would have made a signal and significant difference to the reception of the actual decision by some of these governments.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distinguished Speaker of the House.

Mr. McCORMACK. Let me ask the gentleman from New York a question. Assuming you were President of the United States, and assuming you were faced with the decision which confronted the President of the United States—with 5,000 Americans and other nationals faced with possible death; with the knowledge of what the slightest publicity would do, if it became known among tens of thousands of emotionally moved people, many of whom had weapons; and with trained minds there to exploit, to engineer and to direct emotionalism—the gentleman knows what I have in mind—with those 5,000 lives in peril, what would you have done under the circumstances?

Mr. REID of New York. In response to the distinguished Speaker, it is my understanding that there was a period

of time—at least an hour; certainly 30 minutes—and it is my conviction that during that period of 30 minutes it would have been possible to have informed the OAS of our intention.

I took the liberty of asking the White House that question, and I was informed that they could have done it, that it would have been possible within the span to have informed the OAS.

Mr. McCORMACK. What would be the conscience of the gentleman today? We will assume there was no information conveyed, although the representatives of all the countries are very thankful for what was done. We will assume that there was no information conveyed. What would be the gentleman's conscience, if he were President of the United States and as a result of advance information given, which had to be only for a short time, hundreds of Americans were killed or wounded? What would the conscience of the gentleman speak to him under those circumstances?

Mr. REID of New York. I believe there are two responses to that question.

First, if the President was convinced that action had to be immediate—

Mr. McCORMACK. You would agree with that, would you not?

Mr. REID of New York. If I may be permitted, I should like to finish the sentence.

Mr. McCORMACK. We want to see where we have an area of agreement.

Mr. REID of New York. If the President was convinced that action had to be immediate—that is to say, instantaneous—to protect a significant number of American lives and nationals, then I believe the President, in all the seriousness of his office, should act promptly. If, however, the President had been advised that he had a period of a few minutes at least, that the marines could not land for a certain number of minutes and that he had time to inform without any danger of loss of life—

Mr. McCORMACK. Ah, that is the question—without any danger of loss of life. How would you know it? It is a big question. There is the big factor and the gap; and the gentleman, with his usual honesty, has stated it. However, I do not want my remarks to the gentleman from New York to be misinterpreted as to his motive or intent.

In this colloquy I want the RECORD to show that I have profound respect for my friend from New York. I believe he is a great American.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SELDEN was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. McVICKER. I echo the sentiments which have been placed on record here, and properly so, by the chairman of the Inter-American Subcommittee, on which I have the honor to serve. During the hearings on this matter, the gentleman from Alabama has shown deep concern for giving fair treatment not

only to the witnesses and to the members of the committee but also to bringing the facts properly and fully to light.

I would say, if I may, to the gentleman from New York that the main question arising from our investigation and from the criticism which arose—and criticism is always healthy whether it is against the press or from the press against us—the question which we focused upon was this: Should there have been American declaration of its position and its possible action prior to the President's decision? I take it that the gentleman from New York feels that under the circumstances as the President saw these circumstances, that this is really not the question; instead that the question is: Should there have been a phone call from the President immediately after his decision was made to responsible Latin officials or to the OAS? My own very strong impression, gained sitting on the subcommittee and asking similar questions to those which the gentleman from New York is propounding here this evening, is that the President of the United States did, at the earliest possible moment, when the action phase of his decision was no longer pressing upon him and absorbing all his attention and his being, immediately contacted the leaders, not only of the OAS, of our own diplomatic service in the Latin countries, but of the major Latin countries, to advise them of his action and to consult with them as to the necessity for his action and for the followup action which he hoped would be undertaken by ourselves and by our allies and friends in the Latin countries.

A question of which split second should the President have called the OAS or the Latin leaders is merely one of splitting hairs, of begging the question. The real issue is what was in the President's mind and did he, in good faith and concordant with his responsibilities, act as he should have acted. I believe the answer to this question is as clear as a bell. The President did so act faithfully and responsibly. The principle upon which our policy with regard to the Americas has been founded is still the policy of this country—namely, that ourselves with our equals who are our friends and allies in the Latin countries, acted in concert to bring into being a police force to secure to the Latin countries, to all of the countries of these two continents security from internal chaos and aggression. When chaos and killing threatened, the immediate use of our forces was justified and, in fact, became the basis for the present existence of an OAS force in the Dominican Republic. This fact is proof of the rightness of our policy.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I might say to the gentleman also I think it might be quite difficult to call and contact and locate 18 ambassadors within a period of an hour let alone 30 minutes or 5 minutes. It would be extremely difficult to contact all of them in that period of time.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. The point I was trying to make was not one of split-

ting a hair but of our sovereign obligations under the treaty. Here, wherever we can do it, it seems to me we should practice consultation and not just talk about it. I was not trying to talk about the question of timing solely but of what has been built into our diplomacy and our relations in Latin America.

I would say to the gentleman that the information I have been given by the White House very simply was and is—and I may say also by the Department of State—that we could have informed the OAS prior to the action we took. I think it might have taken only one telephone call to the Secretary General of the OAS.

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. McVICKER. If the gentleman will yield further, if I may respond to the point that the gentleman from New York just made, again these questions were very closely delved into in the hearings which were held under the chairmanship of the distinguished gentleman from Alabama. There should be no question of an impression being left from this colloquy or from the debate that has been taking place in either of the two Houses, that the leaders or the people of any country in the Latin Americas were not aware of the developing situation in the Dominican Republic, or were not in close contact with the administration of this country.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] has again expired.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 5 additional minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not want to object, but I would like to ask the gentleman from Alabama a question. I, too, have a special order. The gentleman has had 10 extra minutes. Is this going to be the last 5 minutes' request?

Mr. SELDEN. I do not plan to request additional time.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield.

Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, in answer further to the gentleman from New York, this country was in consultation with the major leaders of the Latin American countries and with the OAS as to the events which were unfolding during the few days prior to the decision made by the President. I think that the criticism that has been leveled at the President by certain individuals is not justified if it leaves the impression that all of a sudden, out of the blue, the President made a decision and said, "Friends and allies, I will now tell you what I did." That is not the truth. That is not a statement of the facts. A statement of the facts would report that

September 23, 1965

the President of our country in the days preceding his decision, kept in close contact with the Latin American leaders and with the OAS, discussing the situation as it was unfolding.

So far as I am personally aware—and that is as far as I can speak—he did not discuss specifically the action that he took or the time that he was going to take it, because I am positive that he did not know specifically that he was going to have to take such action. He did not know the specific time. But the possibility of certain actions including use of our forces to guarantee the safety was discussed with the leaders of the Latin American countries.

Mr. Speaker, my own impression, gained from the hearings conducted by the Inter-American Committee, is that this country tried in every possible way to act in good faith with its allies in the OAS and in the Latin American countries.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I might add that from the evidence presented to the subcommittee, no one indicated that a phone call in 5 minutes would have been sufficient to notify all the members of the Organization of American States. Am I correct in that statement?

Mr. McVICKER. I certainly think so.
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for one question?

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, before I do so, I ask unanimous consent that all Members who have participated in this debate may have permission to revise and extend their remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
There was no objection.

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina, who has been waiting, and then I shall be glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate and commend my distinguished colleague from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] for his timely presentation of these facts about the Dominican crisis to the House. It has been my privilege over the years to consult with the distinguished gentleman from Alabama in reference to Latin American affairs. I cannot recall a single instance when the gentleman's advice was not only official but was pertinent to the situation at that time and proved to be correct. I remember the advice that he gave me on Venezuela and the Panama Canal and the Cuban crisis.

So, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman as strongly as I know how for the splendid job he has done as chairman of this great subcommittee. Also I would like to say that at the time of the Dominican crisis I was in the company of the distinguished chairman of the committee on Armed Services of this House, touring bases in the Southeastern part of the United States. I shall never forget how gratified, how proud civilian and military people were, for the first time in quite some time, over the action which was taken, over the decision made with allacrity by the President of the United States to preserve not

only the integrity and freedom and independence of this country from any subversive movement through the soft underbelly of this hemisphere, but to protect the Western Hemisphere and all states that believed in freedom and those principles and ideas that made the Western Hemisphere what it is.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the President; I commend him for his action in Vietnam. And I say, Mr. Speaker, that we are fortunate in this country, the American people are fortunate in having a distinguished Speaker with his experience, who served in this House with the President of the United States, and who is in touch with the Members of this great body; and how fortunate we are to have a man of his experience and ability to sit with the President of the United States when making these momentous decisions affecting the lives of millions of people on this globe.

So, again, I want to congratulate and commend my distinguished friend from Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] for his great service to this country as chairman of this subcommittee.

Mr. SELDEN. I thank my friend, the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina, for his kind remarks.

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman agree to yield for 1 minute?

Mr. SELDEN. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. REID of New York. I just want to ask the gentleman from Alabama—and I am troubled by a part of the earlier colloquy, as he may know, and I feel the gentleman has every right to question the accuracy of any news story, but I do not feel that the gentleman would want to leave the impression that he would question the integrity of the reporters themselves or of the newspapers themselves, because I think the press and the newspapers in this country are very interested in and concerned with presenting the news as straight and fairly as possible.

I believe the gentleman might want to make a distinction as to the act of news reporting and the integrity of the news reporters themselves.

Mr. SELDEN. As I pointed out earlier, I am not primarily interested in the motivation or the reason behind the bias shown in connection with the Dominican situation by some of our news media, although that in itself should be of interest. But what I am interested in is that such misrepresentation of our Nation's foreign policy role be understood for what it is—not the responsible report of a free press, but the irresponsible propaganda of some who, under the protective cloak of journalistic rights, have sought to undercut and reshape our foreign policy to suit their own preconceived views of the story they have been assigned to cover. Perhaps I am wrong, but certainly some newspaper reports that I have seen indicate to me that such was the case in some instances in the Dominican Republic.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROONEY of New York). The time of the gentleman from Alabama has again expired.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

(Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and was given permission to extend her remarks at this point.)

Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, in a rare and refreshing insight into American foreign policy, questions were raised by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] on the floor of the Senate last week. He felt compelled to raise these questions following 2 months of closed door sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which the administration presented testimony on this Government's role in the Dominican crisis. The ultimate questions raised about American foreign policy in light of our policy in Latin America was an attempt to forestall another Santo Domingo—an attempt to explore the long-term implication of Dominican action in terms of our future foreign policy.

I call to the attention of my colleagues editorials in recent days which point up the necessity for legitimate debate.

These editorials come not only from the highly respected New York Times and Washington Post but also from such distinguished newspapers as the Christian Science Monitor, the Louisville Courier Journal, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Benington Banner.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 18, 1965]

THE FULBRIGHT SPEECH

It will be a great pity if Senator FULBRIGHT's Senate speech on the handling of the Dominican crisis leads simply to a fierce public argument about the past. As he himself says, analysis of the past is useful only if it helps to avoid mistakes in the future.

There is validity in Senator FULBRIGHT's charges of initial "overtimidity" and subsequent "over-reaction." But he is careful to say that his assessments are made with the advantage of hindsight. Yet even if one concedes that there were mistakes during those early weeks of the upheaval, we believe that the U.S. Government has since done a good job in trying to pick up the pieces which it perhaps helped to shatter—albeit involuntarily.

Only the first wobbly steps have been made toward normalcy in Santo Domingo. But Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tireless and resourceful, would never have been able to encourage those steps if he had not had Washington's backing. It has been a little bit like Macmillan furiously repairing the damage done by Eden at Suez, protesting all the time that no damage had been done. But over the Dominican Republic, the Macmillan and Eden roles are combined in one man—and he wears a Texas hat.

As we have already said, however, we think that what is important now is to eschew the same kind of mistake in the future. Senator FULBRIGHT uttered a few home truths, among them:

"The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence."

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

"It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy; but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro."

Admittedly all this is easier to preach than to practice. To begin with, effective communication has to be established with that rising generation—and their confidence won. Their language will differ from ours in many ways. But most of them want for themselves what we have won and want—and the overwhelming majority of them would still prefer not to turn outside the American hemisphere or to alien tyrannies to try to get it.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 16, 1965]

STEMWINDER

Those who admire the analytical powers of Senator FULBRIGHT have come to expect penetrating truths from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that cut through the veneers of cant and illusion. He has done it again with his incisive speech about the American military intervention in the Dominican Republic. What he says about initial overtimidity, later overreaction, and lack of candor throughout is sure to lacerate a lot of feelings. But essentially his point is that with the information available to him President Johnson could have taken no other course.

The pertinent question, of course, is why the advice to the President was so bad. Beyond this the Senator asks several ancillary questions: Why, for example, did the United States veer so far from its general support for Juan Bosch, the elected President ousted by a military coup in 1963, as to oppose his return? Was this part of a more ominous shift against reform movements in Latin America out of fear that the Communists would dominate them? Do we lack confidence in our own ability to influence the course of revolution?

For social revolution, Mr. FULBRIGHT contends, is the course of the future in Latin America, and by seeming to oppose it blindly we only drive those who are dissatisfied with the oligarchical status quo into the arms of the Communists. His characterization of this country's role is acid:

"We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most un-revolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich."

In another reproach Mr. FULBRIGHT contends that the administration broke international law and damaged its own reputation in not seeking a collective decision by the Organization of American States before its own unilateral action. His point is well taken, but he might well have addressed himself further to the fundamental need for improved machinery in view of the utter inability of the OAS to reach a decision quickly in emergency.

Happily, the situation in the Dominican Republic now seems to be turning out better than might have been expected from the sorry beginning, and for this recovery the administration deserves a share of credit. In any effort to derive lessons from the experience, however, Mr. FULBRIGHT's questions deserve some frank answers, not merely anguished screams from wounded policymakers.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Post, Sept. 16, 1965]

FULBRIGHT'S HISTORY LESSON

Senator FULBRIGHT's review of U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis deserves study by

responsible Americans. It is as certain as anything in the area of foreign affairs can be certain that last April's revolution in Santo Domingo is not the last of such upheavals in Latin America. Unless there is careful, courageous analysis of where our policy failed, such as Mr. FULBRIGHT presented to the Senate yesterday, the mistakes will be repeated.

FULBRIGHT, perhaps too generously, absolved President Johnson. U.S. failures in Santo Domingo were principally the result of the faulty advice given the President by U.S. representatives on the spot, FULBRIGHT said. But Ambassador Tapley Bennett, Jr., it should be noted, is still at his post in Santo Domingo.

The danger to American lives was "more a pretext," FULBRIGHT concluded on the basis of his committee's inquiry, than a reason for our intervention. It was the threat of communism rather than the danger to American lives that produced the massive landings, he asserted.

"In their panic lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba," continued FULBRIGHT in the most significant part of his commentary, "some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion."

The Fulbright formula lacks the simplicity and he-man quality of landing the marines. But it is based on a more accurate reading of Latin American realities. It is sound counsel for the explosive future.

[From the Bennington (Vt.) Banner, Sept. 20, 1965]

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S UNPLEASANT TRUTHS

It will be surprising if Senator FULBRIGHT's blockbusting statement of last week on U.S. policy in the Dominican Republic doesn't produce a profound chill in his relations with the White House.

Senator FULBRIGHT, to be sure, was careful to blame what he considers gross mis-handling of the Dominican crisis on the President's advisers. Yet it is hardly flattering to President Johnson to say that he was pushed by his subordinates into an unjustified military adventure, and into misrepresenting the facts to the American people.

The burden of the Senate foreign policy chairman's argument is that the Marines were sent into Santo Domingo last April not, as the President claimed to save American lives put to prevent "a return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party."

He contends further that estimates of Communist influence in the revolutionary movement were grossly exaggerated and that evidence doesn't verify the administration's assertion that the revolution was in danger of being taken over by Communist elements when we intervened.

Senator FULBRIGHT also raised other important questions that our Latin American policymakers would do well to ponder before they advise the President to intervene in another revolution. Most important, Senator FULBRIGHT asks whether the administration's reaction to the Dominican crisis is part of a broader shift in its attitudes toward Latin American countries.

He makes it clear that social revolution is inevitable in Latin America, and that the United States can use its power to influence the choice the Latin Americans make. This choice, more often than not, will be between

corrupt military dictatorships and social revolutionary parties.

"Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning," the Senator declared, "the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere."

The United States must decide, he suggested, "whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left, or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro."

Predictably, the words had hardly left Senator FULBRIGHT's mouth before he was accused of being soft on communism, but these charges in no way detract from the importance of the issues he has raised. Intervention in the affairs of another nation, as the United States often loudly proclaims, is an extreme and not easily justified course of action. The lessons learned in the Dominican Republic should make us think twice before trying it again.

Under normal circumstances, one might perhaps question the propriety of such a frontal attack by the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee on the policies of a Democratic President. But the circumstances in this case are not normal, first, because the Republican leadership in Congress is too illiberal to make the point that FULBRIGHT has made, and second, because the issue raised by our Dominican adventure is far too important to be stifled by a senseless consensus.

It can be argued, perhaps, that the Senator does not make sufficient allowances for the political dilemma which the Johnson administration faced in the Dominican crisis. Obviously the President and his advisers were strongly motivated by a morbid fear of what would happen to the Democrats' political fortunes if they permitted the establishment of "another Cuba." No doubt they reasoned that even in a 1-in-20 chance of a Communist takeover was a risk to be avoided at any cost.

But this is a pretty poor excuse for a decision that allied us with the enemies of reform, violated our solemn treaty obligations, and rendered our Latin American aims deeply suspect among liberals everywhere. FULBRIGHT is right when he says the Johnson administration should have had the sense and the courage to take the minimal risk entailed in casting our lot with the forces of social justice.

[From the San Francisco (Calif.) Chronicle, Sept. 17, 1965]

A DEVASTATING POLICY BLAST

After having conducted a 2-month inquest into the Dominican Republic affair, Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT has delivered in the Senate a devastating arraignment of the Johnson administration's course of action.

It is a highly effective example of the duty of a Senator to criticize and lay bare the follies of Government policy when he profoundly disagrees with it.

We sent troops into Santo Domingo last April, he said, from "overtimidity and over-reaction" which is not yet ended; the administration acted with a "lack of candor."

The intervention a decision that the revolution launched by the Dominican rebel movement "should not be allowed to succeed."

It rested on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence on the rebels and it failed to perceive that if we automatically oppose any reform movement the Communists adhere to, we shall end up opposing every reform movement, "making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries."

Senator FULBRIGHT let the President down easily by saying he had been given faulty advice which exaggerated the Communist danger. That is true, for the President does have to base decisions on advice, yet it remains a fact—though FULBRIGHT politely refrained from saying so—that basing foreign policy too much on the advice of CIA and FBI agents, as the President did, can be fatal to the proper ends of that policy.

As the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FULBRIGHT has not only struck a very hard blow at the President's excuses for "forcibly and illegally" invading Santo Domingo, but he has also raised the ultimate question about American policy toward Latin America. His words were:

"The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. * * *

"We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America."

This needed to be said. As Senator FULBRIGHT remarked after dropping his bomb: "I think maybe they'll stop and think a bit before rushing into more military interventions."

[From the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal, Sept. 17, 1965]

WISE COUNSEL AND PLAIN TALK AGAIN FROM SENATOR FULBRIGHT

It is possible that if there were no Senator FULBRIGHT in the Senate he might have to be invented. Time and again he expresses the opinions of moderation—of what he likes to call "flexibility"—against all the zigs and zags of a foreign policy that seems to him to respond too much to mood and not enough to reason.

Senator FULBRIGHT's observations on our intervention in the Dominican Republic could hardly be expected to bring the open approval of President Johnson. But if the President is willing to listen to counsels of moderation, and recent events indicate this willingness in increasing proportion, he must acknowledge the wisdom and justice of the Senator's criticism.

Mr. FULBRIGHT attributes what he calls the "failure" of our Dominican intervention to faulty advice given the President. And in particular he warned against the tendency in this country to overreact against any suspicion of communism in Latin American efforts for social change. This attitude, he feels, makes impossible any effective cooperation from this country in the social revolutions so necessary in nations to the south of us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT, as he freely acknowledged, spoke from hindsight. But it was informed hindsight, gathered after 13 hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held in the past 2 months. If it can help rechart our policies, not only in Latin America but toward the Western World, the Senator's warning will have great value. What he is trying to tell us, after all, is that the word "Communist" no longer sums up one monolithic evil to which we must react by instinct. The currents and divergences of communism are as great in their way as the differences between democracies. All of them are not potentially deadly to us and many of the people who have been labeled Communist in struggling Latin American republics are homegrown revolutionaries struggling to right their own homegrown injustices.

If we are to intervene in every such situation because people the CIA calls Communists are in the forefront of rebel movements, we have already lost touch with the needs and the desperation which are pushing all Latin America toward change.

Senator FULBRIGHT is an effective example of the duty of a member of a representative government to open doors for this legitimate discussion. I am reminded of the words of Senator Vandenberg that "free debate is indispensable to ultimate unity. Every foreign policy must be totally debated—and the loyal opposition is under special obligation to see that this occurs." We cannot avoid public discussion.

Senator FULBRIGHT counsels a return to consistency in our relations with our neighbors in Latin America.

Senator FULBRIGHT counsels American involvement on the side of the people instead of on the side of oligarchy.

He counsels well and wisely.

DOES THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REALLY CARE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANNUNZIO] is recognized.

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIER] be permitted to extend his remarks immediately following my own remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, recently, this body voted to increase the pay of members of our Armed Forces. However, by paying the serviceman higher wages, we solved only one portion of the problem of debt management, which is growing more acute among our Armed Forces.

It is not enough to give the serviceman more money in his monthly pay check, if, at the same time, we stand by and allow loan sharks, sharp-practice finance companies, and other such operators to gouge the serviceman with assorted illegal and unethical tactics.

For far too long the serviceman has been a second, if not a third-class citizen in the area of consumer finance. The proof of this statement is in the type of establishments that habitually thrive at the entrances to military bases in this country and to a large part overseas. There is usually a pawnshop, finance company or small loan operation, insurance offices, and an assortment of used car lots. These operations offer credit, merchandise, or cash with little redtape and a minimum of waiting time. To compensate for their so-called advantages, the front-gate operators charge servicemen enormous interest rates, pad the contract with unnecessary extras, and move with unusual quickness at repossessing any goods purchased on an installment basis if the borrower falls behind in his payments.

HIGH BRASS USED AS FRONT

Not all of the operations which are predicated on the premise of getting as much from the serviceman as quickly as possible, are lodged at entrances to mili-

tary installations. Many function in respectable business districts or hide behind the guise of fancy facades such as prominent figures on the board of directors. It is particularly fashionable for military finance companies to install retired high-ranking officers on the board.

The existence of these operations is of great concern to me. But of greater concern is the reluctance of the Department of Defense to take action to protect the servicemen. This has been brought home clearly during the hearings conducted by the Domestic Finance Subcommittee, of which I am a member, into the operations of Federal Services Finance Corporation, a worldwide lending institution which deals primarily in personal and automobile loans to the members of our Armed Forces.

Of the 12-member board of directors of Federal Services, eight are retired admirals or generals, many of whom held high military posts, such as Arleigh A. Burke and Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr. Most of the company's top operating personnel are also former or retired military officers. It would appear that such a company with its predominately military orientation would go out of its way to protect the interests of the servicemen. However, the subcommittee was shocked to learn the number of ways that Federal Services had abused the serviceman's trust and confidence.

A STUDY IN UNETHICAL PRACTICES

I would like to briefly list some of the practices that Federal Services has engaged in in dealing with servicemen:

Charged interest rates that amounted to 100 percent of a 2-year loan.

Charged military customers for automobile insurance and did not notify the serviceman that the insurance had been purchased.

In some cases the serviceman was charged for insurance but no insurance was placed on his automobile. In other cases the serviceman had already purchased insurance on his automobile and thus was forced to pay not only for his own policy, but for a policy supposedly purchased by Federal Services. In other cases Federal Services would not supply the serviceman with copies of the policy that the company purchased on the automobile.

A \$30 charge was levied against cars purchased overseas for what the company termed marine insurance. This is insurance which covers a vehicle being shipped back to the United States. A number of witnesses told the subcommittee that Federal Services did not notify the serviceman that he was being charged with this marine insurance. It is interesting to note that automobiles shipped at Government expense are fully insured by the Government, thus negating the need for additional marine insurance. The subcommittee has not learned of a single instance where a serviceman has been shown a copy of the marine insurance policy.

Servicemen attempting to obtain the payoff prices on their automobiles were quoted one price by Federal Services and when they made payment in that amount were later informed that the serviceman still owed additional funds in many