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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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products because of the "problem of uncertainty" that endlessly confronts them; baffled by all the claims they are exposed to, uncertain of the merits of unadvertised products, they decide to play it safe—so stick with the products they have heard most about. Thus heavy advertising outlays, sustained over long periods of time, create such durable preferences that it is impractical for competing firms to introduce new products—unless, of course, they are prepared to invest heavily in advertising themselves.

These investment requirements tend to discourage outside firms from entering a field, lead to more concentration of business in the field, and enable firms established in it to charge "monopolistic prices." According to a study of consumer industries cited by Turner, there is "a significant correlation between the proportion of industry sales devoted to advertising and the average profit rates which were earned."

This is the main line of the argument, but there is an interesting subsidiary theme. Sometimes, Turner allows, firms without a position in a particular market may decide to accept the cost of entering it—i.e., they may decide to make that heavy investment in advertising their own new products. In this case, there is no question about monopoly; indeed, Turner refers to advertising as "an important form of rivalry among firms." But at this point he is bothered by another thought: the possibility that "advertising costs [may be] excessive in relation to what we get out of them, and may create durable preferences going beyond the relative superiority of the product..."

His argument has a certain plausibility to it; however, a few major countervailing thoughts may be in order. First of all, it is important to observe that Turner's complaints about advertising might be applied to *any management operations that are successful*. On his view, what is ultimately dangerous about advertising is that it leads to markets dominated by too few firms. But businessmen are always trying to raise their shares of markets; and their efforts involve not only advertising and promotion, but sophisticated research strategies, plant investments, quality control and improvement, pep talks to dealers, inventory-control techniques—in short, the entire apparatus of modern management. Any time that one company's apparatus works better than its competitors', there is, on Turner's logic, an incipient problem of concentration.

## A WANTED TOUCH OF GLAMOUR

Why, then, did he single out advertising? It is obviously impossible to answer the question categorically; but there may be a clue in those remarks of his relating advertising costs to "what we get out of them." Turner suggests, in this and other passages of his speech, that he believes the legitimate function of advertising to be informational. When an ad specifies the wattage of a stereo receiver, it is doing something socially useful; when it merely registers general enthusiasm for the taste of a certain chewing gum, it is wasting society's resources, and perhaps leading consumers to pay more than "the relative superiority of the product" warrants.

Another countervailing thought may be in order at this point. A good deal of the "puffing" that goes on in ads is certainly obnoxious, but most of it is easy enough to take—and some, in fact, seems able to invest products with a touch of glamour. Furthermore, many consumers seem to want that touch of glamour. Turner's rather prim formulations about the proper role of advertising, and about ads that lead consumers to overpay, seem to preclude the notion of any real value attributable to glamour or, more generally, to the "image" that clever advertising men are able to wrap around some products. Most of us would probably disagree, and insist that Volkswagens are

more valuable because of all that high-class advertising.

Given his general fix on advertising, Turner's solution to the problems he raised is not surprising. At one point in the speech he considers the possibility of limiting the proportion of sales that firms may be permitted to spend on advertising. Alternatively, he considers the possibility that "we might promote and develop other methods of supplying information to consumers—methods which would give the consumer much better and more useful information than he now gets and at lower social cost." In practice, this seems to involve a kind of government-sponsored version of *Consumer Reports*. He is not very explicit, however, about the manner in which any such operation could be made to work fairly.

Meanwhile, it is pertinent to note one large irony about his speech. The statements about the effectiveness of advertising were about as extreme as any ever made in an ad agency's pitch for a big new client. ("Industries with high advertising outlays tended to earn profit rates which were about 50 percent higher than those which did not undertake a significant effort.") The statements were based, furthermore, on a large and scholarly study of advertising's effectiveness, undertaken jointly by William S. Comanor of the antitrust division and Thomas A. Wilson of Harvard, Madison Avenue, it is safe to predict, will be rushing to get its hands on the study.

## Elbie Jay Saves a Marriage

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 11, 1966

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, again our satirist, Arthur Hoppe, has published another of his columns on "Elbie Jay," in the Friday, August 5, issue of the San Francisco Chronicle. His column follows:

ELBIE JAY SAVES A MARRIAGE  
(By Arthur Hoppe)

Howdy there, folks. How y'all? Time for another tee-vee visit with the rootin'-tootin' Jay Family, starring ol' Elbie Jay—the kindest, lovablest, humblest feller in the world. And, like he's fond of saying, "Don't you ever forget it!"

As we join up with ol' Elbie today, he's browsing through a poll on whether he should get a haircut. That young feller coming hesitantly in the door is his prospective son-in-law, Pat Somethingrother.

Pat (nervously): Excuse me, sir.

Elbie (jovially): Why, howdy, there, son. Come in and set a spell. Can't tell you how much I'm looking forward to having little old man-to-man chats with you after the wedding Saturday. When, of course, my schedule permits.

Pat: Yes, sir, about the wedding . . .

Elbie: Don't worry, son. I'm all for it. In fact, you've made me a mighty happy man. Already, I've gone up three points in the polls.

Pat: That's nice, sir. But there's something I've got to say.

Elbie: Go right ahead, son. It's a free country. There's nothing I treasure more highly than free speech, freedom of religion and freedom of the press. Excepting, naturally, for Women's Wear Daily and others who'd violate our national security.

Pat: (wetting his lips): Well, sir, about the wedding, there's kind of a hitch . . .

Elbie (frowning): They forgot to send you

an invitation? Don't fret, son, I'll take care to see you get in.

Pat (blurring out): No, sir, it's-that-I've-decided-not-to-get-married.

Elbie: Well, now, son, I'm sure these minor details can be . . . You what?

Pat (hastily): It's not that I don't think your daughter isn't a fine girl, sir. It's just that with all this publicity . . .

Elbie: Publicity? Why, it's going to be a small, private, family wedding attended by your 700 closest friends. Like the Cabinet, the bi-partisan leaders of Congress, a couple of Governors. And there'll be me, smiling proudly. And Birdie-Bird, maybe shedding a tear or two. My, what a glorious day. I ought to go up ten points. And we got to think of the future, son.

Pat: I am, sir. I'm thinking about how it'll be to go on a honeymoon with Secret Service agents and reporters and . . .

Elbie: And I'm thinking about the November elections. You're not going to leave me standing at the altar, boy.

Pat (stouffily): As you said, sir, it's a free country. And I don't have to get married if I don't want to! (As Elbie turns purple) Er, do I?

Elbie (forcing a smile): 'Course not, son. And let me say how much I admire your courage. It's not many young men who'd give up a chance to marry my daughter in order to go off next Tuesday to fight for their country in the jungles of Vietnam. The hot, slimy, poisonous, bullet-ridden jungles of Vietnam, where your chances of surviving

Well, tune in to our next episode, folks. And meantime, as you mosey down the trail of life, remember what Elbie's ol' granddaddy used to say:

"Never underestimate the courage of our young folk. Give them the grim choice 'tween marriage and war, and they'll bravely take marriage every time."

## The High Cost of Victory

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. G. ELLIOTT HAGAN

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 2, 1966

Mr. HAGAN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the Atlanta Constitution editorial of August 9 reiterates the probable commitments which the U.S. Armed Forces may have to face to achieve total victory. I agree that the objectivity of this editorial is most commendable, but I am of the opinion that even with the escalation proposed, that our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Communist China should be again carefully reexamined to insure that we leave no reason for doubt as to our full intentions.

The editorial follows:

The Pentagon's estimate that it will take three quarters of a million men for a decisive military victory in Vietnam is, if anything, conservative. Some estimates have run as high as a million.

The essential element in a purely military solution is cutting off the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam. That involves blocking the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail, which is not a well defined road, but rather any jungle route that is open at any given time.

So a blockade requires arming the entire North Vietnamese frontier, including the border with Laos. That would take a huge number of men.

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The Pentagon study, which reflects the collective judgment of civilian, as well as military experts, makes it clear that such a build-up cannot be achieved without at least partial mobilization of our military reserves and/or massive withdrawal from Europe. That latter course is diplomatically impossible. It would shatter Western European confidence in America's commitments, and invite Soviet mischief.

So the Pentagon study is a useful reminder that "getting it over with"—a course demanded by an increasing number of impatient Americans—means calling up the reserves, interrupting family life and business careers, and surely raising taxes.

North Viet Nam at the same time should realize that this country is capable of crushing it militarily, and will do so if given no reasonable alternative.

American policy under both President Kennedy and President Johnson has been a gradual building of forces and military action in hopes the Communists would realize the hopelessness of military seizure and would instead come to the conference table.

Our escalation already has made Communist victory impossible. But without further escalation, our position is one of stalemate.

The Communists hold the key to peace in Viet Nam. Peace will come only when they agree to reasonable negotiations—or when they are crushed militarily. The choice is theirs.

In the meantime, it is good that the American public has been reminded of the costs involved.

### Fair Housing Gives North Its Moment of Truth

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.**

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 9, 1966

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, during the recent debate on H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966, the Dayton, Ohio, Daily News offered some perceptive observations on the real meaning and challenge of this bill.

In bringing this editorial to the attention of the Congress, I would like to pay tribute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McCulloch], the ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, who has fully recognized the serious problems facing our Nation, and has worked long and hard to develop reasonable, equitable solutions.

The editorial follows:

**FAIR HOUSING GIVES NORTH ITS MOMENT OF TRUTH**

The searing debate on and uncertain fate of the civil rights bill in the House of Representatives this week grows out of a simple political fact: For the first time the proposed law would hit the North, not the South.

No use blinking that fact. All the shooting is over Title IV of the proposed act. That is the part that would speed fair housing. It would require, in some circumstances, that real estate agents sell or rent houses to people regardless of whether they are white, black or somewhere in between.

Residential segregation is primarily a northern phenomenon. In the South, the old racial bars were so high that whites could have Negroes living among them as a servant-type convenience, and never be

bothered with social integration. As a result, residential segregation into ghettos is rare in Dixie except in the largest cities.

In the North, Negroes were quickly ostracized into ghettos. That way, the whites could permit them legal equality without living as neighbors, attending the same schools or having much to do with them.

Now the hidden walls which keep the Negro in the ghetto (real estate practices, refusal to lend money for home purchases in all-white areas, and so forth) are challenged.

The present federal bill has been watered down considerably. It would not apply to a homeowner who wants to sell or to a broker handling a private sale for an owner. But it still is stirring quite a fuss.

Many northern congressmen, ardent supporters of civil rights measures as long as they could woo Negro votes that way without losing white ones, now are opposing this measure. They fear white resentment.

So the moment of truth comes nearer.

Does the northern white really want to bury his head in the sand and attempt to maintain an un-American barrier to Negro freedom to move about? That is the question. It is a question citizens must answer, just as Congress must.

The answer, of course, in the long run is that American democracy must apply to all Americans. The best way to move that answer closer at the moment is to pass the current bill.

### The Quest for Peace

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 26, 1966

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, in protesting the administration's Vietnam policy, many of us do not sufficiently stress the wider implications involved in our actions there. Yet we must recognize that the war in Vietnam represents a dangerous overdependence upon military means. Further, it represents an unforgivable disparity between the American dedication to liberty and to the rule of law on the one hand, and on the other, the American disregard of international law and morality.

These two interpretations of the significance of our Vietnam policy are contained in a very thoughtful and penetrating analysis of American problems written by one of my constituents, Mr. Joseph R. Grossman. In his paper, Mr. Grossman convincingly shows us the necessity of proving to the world that our Constitution is a living document which actually guides us when we cope with our internal problems and that we honor our international commitments in the same spirit by a strict observance and even furtherance of international law.

Mr. Grossman comments on the challenges facing America from the vantage point of one who has had personal experience with the forces of aggression. His foresight and sense of values prompted him to leave Czechoslovakia before Hitler invaded. He had to abandon his home and his business, which had belonged to his family for four generations. Later, in 1939, he relin-

quished a very rewarding position, offered to him by the Government of Northern Ireland, because he felt that the British Government was not adequately preparing for the onslaught of Hitler, which actually came a few weeks after Mr. Grossman's return to the United States.

Mr. Grossman has been a citizen of our country for 20 years, and he is now concerned with the way in which we are meeting the Communist aggression. He believes that superior military might and strategy was the only way to defeat Hitler but that it is exceedingly dangerous to equate that situation with the situation we have today.

We must consider our present military strength—

He writes—

as a preventive, and not as a curative instrument.

I have unanimous consent that Mr. Grossman's analysis be printed in the Record at this point:

MISSING LINKS IN OUR QUEST FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PEACE

(By Joseph R. Grossman)

No meaningful evaluation of our contemporary scene can lose sight of the following: We live in a world of specialists who are constantly and miraculously advancing our technological progress. In this seemingly unending process, our specialists in the physical sciences have already created the means of mass destructions which, unless wisely and responsibly controlled, could put an end to life on this planet. This realization makes it inevitable that we compare our technological advances with those that can be detected in the fields of psychology, sociology and human advancement per se—and we will arrive at the most threatening and fateful realization that our moral and sociological failings may well bring about the destruction of our civilization through the misuse of our technological advances.

By carrying these logically irrefutable facts and conclusions just one step further, we will recognize that as long as our technological progress is running way in front, we must embark on a supreme and concerted effort to direct the same scientific ingenuity which has shown such phenomenal results in the physical and related sciences, to an ever greater extent toward research in the fields of human conduct and human co-existence and that both in the national and international areas of our contemporary world.

The task to remove the stated disparity and to effectively cope with the bewildering complexity of our internal and external problems requires an effort in depth penetration, which often seems to transcend the present limits of the thinking power of the human mind and of the present stage of our moral enlightenment. It is all the more deplorable that so much that we are now witnessing in official utterances appears to be based on superficiality, on preconceived notions, faulty analogies and emotionalism, rather than on the indispensable interplay between scientific minds of the highest and most diversified order and the field of practical politics. To erect and maintain an artificial barrier between research and political action, can only prove disastrous, since nothing but research, analysis and meaningful anticipation, which must precede our decisions, can adequately guide us, not only as to steps which we must take, but equally importantly as to pitfalls and courses of action which we must avoid, dangers which we must foresee and be prepared for, inequities which we must remove before they get out of hand.

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portions of the corporate tax revenue would be used for direct cash payments to the voters. Government should introduce cut-backs in some of its programs after the National Dividend payments are large enough to substitute for them.

In 1965, corporate income taxes amounted to \$30 billion. And there were roughly 70 million voters in the 1964 national elections. Assume that by the time the National Dividend plan could be put into full effect the corporate income taxes had risen to \$40 billion and the number of voters had grown to 80 million, this would mean that the National Dividend would be \$500 per year, per voter. For a man and wife, it would be \$1,000 tax free income.

The point is, however, that whatever these payments are, they will have to come from productive earnings, not from additionally inflationary spending. We will have earned them and they will not be diluting the value of the dollar. And herein lies one of the basic values of this plan as against other economic proposals such as the Negative Income Tax or the Guaranteed Annual Wage.

Several built-in factors in our economy have been responsible for the substantial annual growth in the federal government's cash income in recent years. Combined, they practically assure a continued six percent annual increase.

One major reason lies in the steady growth of the country's population and labor force. The labor force grows by more than one percent per year. Consequently, the nation's genuine output and genuine income also grow one percent per year.

This means that federal income grows by about one percent per year.

Another factor which continually lifts the nation's real output, real income and federal tax revenue is the steady annual increase of about three percent in the worker's man-hour output. The increase is brought about by investors giving our working citizens more and better equipment to work with. This means that for the nation as a whole, the real output, the real income, and the true standard of living also rise by about three percent per year. Consequently, so does federal tax revenue—which is geared to real income—rise by about that same three percent.

The third factor which lifts federal revenues is a form of creeping inflation. It is the result of wage increases being greater than production increases, thus necessitating price increases.

Since World War II, wages have risen about 4½ percent per year, while production has been boosted only about three percent. This has resulted in a price increase of about 1½ percent per year since the end of the war. Chronic price inflation such as this does not lift national output. But it does increase the nominal dollar income. Therefore, so long as the built-in price inflation proceeds, personal income, corporate income and the corporate tax revenues that depend on these incomes will increase annually an additional 1½ percent per year.

The final factor involved in the increase in government revenues is the manner in which personal income taxes are levied.

The steady rise of wages since World War II has moved more and more citizens into higher income tax brackets. Although the dollar income has been boosted by about 4½ percent per year, real income has been growing only at the rate of three percent, the rate of increase in the production of real goods.

However, personal income taxes are based on countable dollar income, not on real income. Since 1942, personal income tax rates have been sharply progressive—the higher the dollar income, the higher the rate. So, the fact that all workers are experiencing rising real and countable income and are

subject to progressive income taxes insures that the federal government's revenues from personal taxes will rise continuously as a percent of personal income.

At the rate at which American families have been moving into higher income brackets, the federal government has been benefiting to the extent of approximately one-half of one percent per year simply because progressive rather than uniform tax rates apply to all personal income.

So we see how these built-in economic factors practically assure a steady six percent annual increase in federal revenues. One percent comes from the growth of the labor force; three percent from the increase in output per man-hour; one and one-half percent from the increase in prices, and one-half of one percent from increased dollar income and progressive income tax rates.

And we also see that this six percent annual increase in federal revenues can provide all the funding needed to phase the National Dividend plan into full operation to bring its broad-based benefits to all our citizens.

The National Dividend offers far more than just a simple plan for distributing corporate profit taxes directly to those citizens who regularly fulfill their voting obligations.

It would be a perpetual feed-back of consumer buying power into the economy.

It would remove much of the fear of technological advance and would accelerate automation with its ever increasing benefits spread evenly among all citizens.

By reducing centralized federal spending power, it would strengthen the constitutional principles of states' rights and the basic concept of the rights of private property.

It would improve dollar stability by removing inflationary taxes, and reduce artificial and burdensome controls. It would make American products more competitive in world markets, and it would increase the gross national product by stimulating the incentives for investment and production.

And, finally, it could be an effective device for achieving lasting world peace by undermining the senseless ideological attacks on capitalism by Marxism. By making every voter a partner in a vigorous and understandable free enterprise system, the arguments for world socialism would begin to fade away.

Real wages come out of production, not out of government decrees. Partners would produce more, free citizens would have more cash, more confidence, more dignity. Men of good will could, through the National Dividend, work more harmoniously together.

We can have a Great Free Society inspired and financed by profit. We can have opportunity for all. We can be fed, free and happy, a shining example to other peoples of the world, who also want these same, basic things.

VV  
**IT IS A CIVIL WAR IN VIETNAM—  
FOUR FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS CONFIRM PREVIOUS VIEW OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND SENATOR STEPHEN YOUNG**

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, little by little the truth about Vietnam is coming out—the truth which has been persistently obscured by administration propaganda.

Last February, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, in the course of addressing the Northwestern University Alumni Association at Evanston, Ill., in a speech entitled "The Hanoi Myth of an Indigenous Rebellion," declared that the civil war allegations were indeed a myth. But he made this pertinent comment:

If the Vietnam war were merely what the Communists say it is—an indigenous rebellion—then the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the other by force of arms.

This is an important declaration by the second ranking official in the Department of State.

We now have further evidence that it is a civil war.

President, who was elected to the House of Representatives in 1946, and was in the Senate from 1954 to 1960, during which time he was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, referred, in his news conference of July 18, 1963, to "the civil war which has gone on for 10 years."

On February 6 of this year, Senator STEPHEN YOUNG of Ohio, a combat veteran, returning from a 3-week visit to South Vietnam, declared on the floor of the Senate:

This is a civil war going on in Vietnam. Before I visited Southeast Asia, it had been my belief that all of the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam were communists and infiltrators from the North. But I had not been in Vietnam for more than 4 days—and during that period of time, I was in every area of Vietnam—when almost immediately I observed very definitely that we were involved in a miserable civil war in the steaming jungles and rice paddies of South Vietnam. I learned from General Westermoreland that the bulk of the Vietcong fighting in South Vietnam were born and reared in South Vietnam. I learned from General Stillwell and other Generals that 80 per cent of the Vietcong fighting the Americans and the South Vietnamese in the Mekong Delta south and west of Saigon were born and reared in that Mekong Delta area. This is a civil war in which we are involved. The fighting has been going on there since 1945.

Now, we have a report from four experienced newspaper correspondents at the front to the same effect. This was heard in an educational television broadcast, transmitted over channel 13, WNDT, New York, on Monday, August 1, and at Washington, D.C., over WETA, channel 26, on August 3. It was a production of National Educational Television. The participants were: Malcolm Browne, formerly of the Associated Press and a Pulitzer Prize winner for his book on the war in Vietnam, entitled: "The New Face of War"; Jack Foisie, of the Los Angeles Times; Charles Mohr, of the New York Times; and Dean Brelis, of the National Broadcasting Co.

Touching on the question of whether this was a civil war or a war of aggression, this is what the four correspondents said:

BROWNE. Yes. One of the problems, of course, is that the administration itself, particularly Secretary McNamara, have tended to obscure some of the issues here and have deliberately misled American public opinion. For example, the continual harping on the North Vietnamese aggression has led to the supposition that the Vietcong is a North Vietnamese outfit. Well, of course, it has North Vietnamese leadership and a lot of North Vietnamese cadres and a lot of North Vietnamese weapons. But the bulk of the Vietcong is South Vietnamese. And this, of course, tends to interfere with the McNamara statement this is not a civil war. Well, of course, it is a civil war, by the Webster definition of the thing.

NIVEN (moderator). Do you all agree?

FOISIE. I think it is.

BRELSI. Yes, I agree.

MOHR. Yes, a special kind of civil war.

FOISIE. And it was more so in its early stages than it is now.

BROWNE. Yes. Just as the Spanish civil war in its early stages was more of a civil war than it got to be later.

MOHR. And also, especially, if you understand the distinction between North and South Vietnam is not made by Vietnamese in the same way that it's made by the Department of State in Washington. Even if North Vietnam is committing aggression against South Vietnam, that in itself is a form of civil war. This is a partitioned country, but it's one country. Essentially it once was.

With this further evidence, it is well to recall the statement of Under Secretary George W. Ball; namely, that if it was a civil war, "the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the other by force of arms."

Quite so; and yet, that is precisely what the United States has done.

The administration persists in denying that this is a civil war, because then it's contention that North Vietnam is the aggressor and that we are there to repel aggression, would be patently invalid.

#### EUPHORIA ON VIETNAM

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the noted columnist, Joseph Kraft, in his article appearing in the Washington Post Wednesday, has taken a close look at the question of whether the curious euphoria about Vietnam, recently making itself felt in official statements and press reports, is really justified. He finds that our current actions, based on the new rash of optimistic hope, both serve to diminish our chances for a negotiated peace and to heighten the danger of increased intervention by Peking and Moscow.

It is at least questionable, Mr. President, whether our growing military pressure will weaken, or whether it will actually increase, Hanoi's resolution to fight on. We have now bombarded the demilitarized zone, with no greater provocation than has existed for a long time past, since infiltrators have been crossing the DMZ since at least 1961, as officially noted by the State Department.

But our violation of the Geneva accords in this respect, by bombing of the demilitarized zone, has set back the prospect that they may form the basis for negotiations, as so many have suggested, including Secretary General U Thant.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article by Mr. Kraft may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1966]  
INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK: DANGERS OF EUPHORIA  
(By Joseph Kraft)

As the President's press conference yesterday indicates, a curious euphoria now shapes the official outlook on Vietnam. And perhaps the confidence is justified.

But the supporting arguments are, to put it mildly, inconclusive. As usual, moreover, bouyant hopes have yielded actions that serve to erode further the chances of a negotiated

peace. And these same actions heighten the danger—now airily dismissed—of increased intervention by Peking and Moscow.

The marks of euphoria are to be found chiefly in things that are being said at the White House and State Department. It is being said, for example, that growing American military pressure is causing the other side to scale down its operations. Supposedly the scaling down is the first step toward a slow petering out of enemy activity that is now seen as the way the war will end.

It is also being said that the last hope of Hanoi is a setback for the Democrats in the elections this fall, but that actually the poll, by showing the President's strength, will serve to shorten the war, as Lincoln's victory in the 1864 election is supposed to have hastened the end of the Civil War.

None of these claims can be disproved. But Washington has not had a good record in assessing what is happening on the other side. Many recent visitors to Hanoi—most recently General de Gaulle's friend, Jean Sainteny—report growing resolution to fight on.

As to the American elections, while North Vietnamese officials have talked about defeat for the President, they have never pitched their main hope on a failure of nerve in this country. Their focus has been the weakness of the Saigon government—a deepening condition advertised every day by the personality and actions of Marshal Ky.

These obvious flaws in the supporting logic, however, do not represent the real case against official buoyancy. The real case lies in the actions that are being taken out of a surfeit of confidence.

For a starter, there is the bombardment of the DMZ or demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam, which got under way last week. Ostensibly, the bombing was brought on by the North Vietnamese who suddenly began using the DMZ as a refuge against American attacks. But in fact, according to a Senate Department White Paper of December, 1961, hostile troops have been passing through the DMZ by the thousands for years.

The truth is that the American command now feels that it can usefully seal off the DMZ, and has chosen to do so, picking out a pretext that was available for years. What is blithely ignored is that the DMZ represents one of the principal elements of the Geneva agreements. To violate the accord openly weakens it by that much as a basis for negotiation.

A similar difficulty applies to the appeal by the Thai government for a meeting of Asian states to consider a settlement in Vietnam. The appeal has the backing of the United States, and it seems plausible as an expression of Asian leadership in Asian affairs.

But actually the Thai appeal is set in the context of a charge that the Geneva accords are unworkable because of sabotage by the Russians. There is no chance that the Thais can bring to a conference any of the belligerents on the other side. The upshot of their appeal is merely to dilute still further the one agreement that does affect all belligerents—the Geneva accords.

Playing fast and loose with Geneva might be done with impunity if it were only a question of the United States and North Vietnam. Indeed, since Hanoi shows no present signs of wanting to negotiate, it could even be argued that the United States in the interests of teaching a lesson should throw Geneva to the winds, and go all the way to military victory before sitting down to a conference.

But of course China and Russia are also affected. While they have behaved with singular prudence so far, that is largely because North Vietnam has been doing so well on its own.

Even so the continuation of the war has brought from Moscow and Peking a steady stream of increasingly serious warnings. Thus the intensification of the enemy effort—either by further Soviet input of modern equipment, or by Chinese support on the ground—remains a genuine peril, the more so as Washington, in its mood of confidence, is paying so little heed to the danger.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

#### STIMULATION OF THE FLOW OF MORTGAGE CREDIT FOR FHA AND VA ASSISTED RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3688) to stimulate the flow of mortgage credit for FHA and VA assisted residential construction.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, as Members of this body are aware, Senator BENNETT, the ranking minority member of the Banking and Currency Committee, is unable to be here for debate on this legislation, because he is in the hospital recuperating from an ulcer. He has sent me a statement giving support for the measure and expressing his disapproval of the administration policies that have brought the situation about.

He has asked me to make the statement for him.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BENNETT READ BY SENATOR DIRKSEN

Mr. President, I would like to go on record as supporting an increase in the borrowing authority of the Federal National Mortgage Association. Earlier in the year, I cosponsored a bill, S. 3482, providing an additional \$110 million to the capital stock of FNMA, which I thought would be a better means to that end. When it was discovered that that measure would not have enough support to be passed by the Congress because of budgetary considerations, I was willing to support the alternative which would increase FNMA purchasing authority by changing the borrowing ratio from the present 1 to 10 to the proposed 1 to 15, included in this bill.

#### HOMEBUILDING NEEDS RELIEF

I believe that we are all aware that the shortage of mortgage money for home financing is one of the most critical problems in our economy today. While other

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and representing a 39 percent increase from the \$25 million spent in 1960.

The consensus of the experts who testified before the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, a committee of which I have the honor of being a member, ran strongly in the direction of the need for fuller disclosure and stricter review of financial reporting.

Faulty reporting frequently occurs not only because of the volume of contributions leading to mistakes, but also because of deliberate omissions. Irresponsible bookkeeping and the short-circuiting of funds result in part from foreknowledge that campaign reports are unaudited except in cases of special investigation. Only outside inquiry can bring clarification or elaboration of reports that contain fragmentary, uneven, inconsistent, and sometimes deceptive information.

This issue is too important and necessary for cavalier treatment in any year, but especially in an election year.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I appreciate the fact that the Senator has had that letter printed in the Record.

I have received many similar letters from civil service employees who were being pressured to contribute to the Democratic Party.

This situation got so bad a couple of years ago that I introduced a resolution which called on the Attorney General either to enforce the law or, if he found the law inadequate, to make recommendations to Congress by a certain date as to what changes he felt were necessary in order to prohibit this practice.

The resolution was passed and sent to the Attorney General, and we have not heard from him since.

In addition, the President said in his message that he wanted something done to correct this practice. I take it that he had his tongue in his cheek when he said that, because I introduced an amendment to a bill this year which would have prohibited these solicitations. It would have closed this loophole, but not one word of support did I receive from the White House or from anyone connected with it. The amendment was defeated on close to party lines.

Mr. CASE. I called attention to that in my remarks, and I join wholeheartedly in supporting the Senator's efforts in this respect.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I thank the Senator.

The only conclusion we can reach is that there is an organized shakedown of civil service employees going on today to finance this Great Society. The President knows it, he must like it, he condones it, and I assume he wants it to continue. That statement stands until he helps us to pass legislation. Let him put a little arm twisting on the members of his party to help pass it, rather than telling them to use this subject in political speeches but not to vote for it.

Mr. CASE. I thank the Senator.

#### REVIEW OF VIETNAM

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, for the past 2 years, I have devoted a good deal

of my time and attention to the situation in Vietnam. I am now engaged in a three-speech review of this situation, covering first, the overall problem and a number of suggestions as to what U.S. policy ought to be; second, elections; and third, social and economic reform.

On August 8, I delivered the first of these speeches, "The Dilemma of Vietnam," in New York before the Convention of the Disabled American Veterans. The theme of this address was that the United States has taken its eyes off the real challenge in Vietnam, off the essence of guerrilla war; that these wars begin and end in the hearts and minds of the people themselves and they are nurtured in uncorrected injustices. Like guerrilla wars of the past, we should not count on this conflict ending either by means of a negotiated settlement or a military victory. Forces, of course, are needed in order to pacify the country, in order to provide a shield of confidence behind which free elections and social and economic reform can take place. But it is what goes on behind this shield that will determine ultimate success or failure.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the text of my speech before the convention of the Disabled American War Veterans.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### THE DILEMMA OF VIETNAM

As a nation we have passed the point of no return in Vietnam; it makes no sense to turn back or pull out. But it makes even less sense to charge forward head down, without knowing where we have been, without seeing the costs ahead, and without some certainty about the end and when it will all be over. There have been far too many unanswered questions about Vietnam, and there have been far too many answers that have rung hollow.

Yet, we are plunging forward, often armed with half truths, hoping for some decisive military victory, for the miracle of a peace conference, waiting for it all to end as suddenly as it appeared. These are illusions, illusions fostered by a false sense of optimism and nurtured by our own frustration. The facts are unpleasant, but unless we face them, we shall be carried step by step by events and by decisions into a situation that few willed and that no one can control.

What are we really trying to achieve in Vietnam? Can we achieve it by military means? Will differences be settled at the conference table? How long is the road ahead, and are we willing to travel it?

If we are to persevere, we must understand our goals and the costs. If we are to make further sacrifices, we must have conviction born of truth and not of illusion.

I believe we should persevere, but only if the Saigon Government takes the proper steps to legitimize its government by free elections under a constitution, and undertakes the necessary reforms to build a base of support responsive to the aspirations of the people. We should persevere only if we use our military power in a cautious and limited manner. It is fruitless to fight for those who have neither the will nor the conviction to fight for themselves, and it is folly to act as if the danger of a wider, perhaps even world-wide, war does not exist.

#### WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?

The American people have been subjected to a whole kit of unconvincing reasons for our presence in Vietnam. We have been told that we are fighting for "peace in the world." But surely we cannot believe that the out-

come in Vietnam will mean the end of war. We have been told that we are fighting for the "forces of freedom and justice." Diem and Ky hardly qualify as democratic types. Finally, we are told that this is a struggle to stop the expansion of Chinese communism. But, while this is true in part, it obscures a larger truth, and it also covers over the fact that the Vietnam conflict—going on since the late 40's—erupted as much from the injustices of colonialism as from outside promptings.

All of these explanations betray a lack of faith in the judgment of the American people. They spring from the belief that the American people will support efforts of this kind only if they are sugar-coated. I maintain just the contrary. I maintain that there would be less division and confusion within our own ranks if the real objectives were set before the people.

We are fighting in Vietnam for Asian stability, for time, and for a practical principle. Stability, on the Asian continent so that Asia does not become the Balkans of the world, so that Communist China is not tempted to test our will in a wider and more dangerous context.

Time, for the non-communist countries of Asia to strengthen and solidify their own societies and to develop a sense of regional collective responsibility so that U.S. presence will no longer be necessary on the continent as such.

The practical principle, that in view of the risks of the nuclear age, change should not be brought about by force and terror and against the wishes of the majority of the people of a country.

Fighting in Vietnam will not necessarily prevent a guerrilla war from starting in Thailand, nor a resurgence of the Laotian conflict, nor a repeat of aggression in Korea. Indeed, it is very likely that the guerrilla war in Thailand, already going on, could reach significant proportions in two to three years.

The problem is not what we shall be able to prevent by our present efforts in Vietnam; it is how much more dangerous and difficult future conditions would be if we did not act now. In other words, the risks of inaction are greater than the risks of action.

It would be a decision of high irresponsibility for the United States simply to withdraw from Vietnam without due cause, for it would throw the continent of Asia into a situation of grave uncertainty and tension. It would make all future conflicts that much more difficult to control.

There should be no mistaking one central point—it is the U.S. commitment to the non-communist countries of Asia that keeps general instability from erupting into widespread violence. Of course, there is violence and risk of escalation in Vietnam right now, but, in my judgment, to do nothing in Vietnam would be an open invitation to aggression elsewhere.

There are none who realize this better than the Asians themselves. In July of this year, Prime Minister Sato of Japan said: "An increasing recognition should be made of the fact that the United States is making a major contribution to the security of the Far East, including my country." On June 18, 1966, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, who in the past has shown no particular affinity for the U.S., stated: "A premature withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam could threaten the security of Southeast Asia." In March of this year, President Marcos of the Philippines said: "The fact that the United States shoulders the major burden of the Vietnam war does not change the fact that this is an Asian challenge."

Even more impressive evidence of these feelings is the Conference of Asian and Pacific Countries which met in Korea in June. The conference was composed of nine nations from this area, with Laos as an observer. The final declaration of this

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conference "upheld the inherent right of the Vietnamese people to self-defense and to choose their own way of life and their own form of government free from external aggression and subversion," and affirmed its solidarity with South Vietnam in this struggle.

The ASPAC Conference actually symbolizes the time factor I just spoke of. It represents the first concrete step by the nations of this area themselves in recognizing their common economic, political, and defense interests. It will take time for the nations concerned to develop common determination and combined muscle, and we must give them that time. Lack of U.S. staying-power in Vietnam would demoralize this effort and undermine confidence in our commitments. Just as NATO was necessary to provide a shield behind which a shattered Western Europe could reconstruct itself, so U.S. power is needed in Asia to give reality to the independence of this region.

Lastly in reviewing our objectives, we must not forget about the Vietnamese people themselves. There are some who assert that these people really want the U.S. out and do not really care if a communist takeover ensues. I do not know where they get their evidence or their certainty. No mortal can search the Vietnamese mind for the truth, all we can do is look at some facts and see what they indicate.

There are dozens of different groups and factions in South Vietnam each with its own point of view and desire for power. Among them, obviously, is a minority—perhaps even a sizeable minority—which supports and sympathizes with the Vietcong. But despite this powerful and organized minority and despite the terror it employs, the rest of South Vietnam has been able to wage a grueling and unwanted war for the good part of ten years. Yes, there have been defections from the ARVN forces and protests against the Saigon Government, but despite these, they continue to maintain over one-half million men-in-arms. Yes, the Buddhists dislike the U.S. presence in their country, but one never hears them ask us to leave. If the significant majority of South Vietnamese did not want to keep the communists out of power, the whole effort would have collapsed a long time ago—no matter what the U.S. did or did not do. We can supply men and arms, but we cannot create the will to fight on unless it already exists.

Our objectives in Vietnam are hard to understand. But in my judgment, the American people do not need demons, devils, and illusions, to understand their interests. The real issue is not whether we should be in Vietnam, but how we should conduct our diplomacy and our military action in order to reach the objectives of stability and time and live up to the principle of self-determination free from aggression and subversion.

#### PURSuing OUR OBJECTIVES: FORCE AND DIPLOMACY

Every war brings out a parade of prophets with bottled panaceas and pat solutions, of alarmists betokening us to concede more, and of town-criers advising us to kill more. This war in Vietnam, or indeed any guerrilla war, will not be ended by more concessions or more killings. Never since World War II have guerrillas been brought to the conference table or defeated finally on the battlefield.

What I think the American people must know is that there seems little likelihood of settling the conflict in Vietnam through negotiations or by means of increasing doses of force. This does not free us of the responsibility of refining and rethinking our diplomacy, nor does it relieve us of the necessity to use our armed forces. We should continue to seek peace through negotiations and to pacify the country through measured and

limited armed strength, but we cannot base our policy on the success of either.

To dangle the prospects of a seemingly unlikely peace conference before our eyes is to invite public disillusionment and lack of confidence; and to pour more and more men and arms into Vietnam and to widen the bombing targets without firmly set limits to our operations is to escalate unknowingly and unwillingly into a major Asian land war.

Why am I so dubious about a peace conference? Very simply, the Hanoi regime and the NLF want much more than we can possibly give—they want guarantees prior to talks that U.S. troops will be evacuated from Vietnam and that the NLF should have the "recisive voice" in a Saigon Government before elections. On our part, we are concerned that, for the moment, any inclusion of communists in the Saigon Government would mean the immobilization of that government and its speedy fall into Hanoi's hands. We have good reason to be troubled about the extent of the popular base of support of the present Saigon Government, and the instability and pitfalls of a coalition government including the communists.

Yet, even with this big gap between the objectives of Hanoi and the NLF and our own, it is conceivable that negotiations could find some common ground and provide some guarantees—if only they would agree to talk about the differences. But as far as we can see now, this seems highly unlikely.

We have only to review the recent past for confirmation. At first, they said they would talk if we would return to the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Conference. We said we would, but there was no conference. Then, the stumbling block became the acceptance by us of the NLF sitting as an independent party at the peace table. We gave this assurance publicly and privately, but nothing happened. Next came the bombings. A conference could be had if only we would cease bombing targets in North Vietnam. We did for thirty days, but that did not turn out to be enough. Now we hear it rumored that Hanoi and the NLF are waiting for our promise to include them in a provisional government, to let them have a "share of the responsibility." We responded that we were ready to talk about anything. Again, there was no conference.

There has been a continuing stream of proposals for cease-fires, U.N. supervision and discussion, heads of state meetings, pressure on the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Conference, military freeze and the recent Thai proposal for an Asian Conference of "all the principals"—some of them I made myself. But all of them were of no avail.

If Hanoi and the NLF have any doubts about our sincerity for negotiations, if they believe we are bluffing, and if they want to prove what they call our "hypocrisy", they have only to try us at the peace table. I hope they do, but I would not count on it.

I have supported our military efforts in Vietnam and I have voted the requisite appropriations, but I have made it plain each time that these efforts be limited and connected to rational policy objectives. I am concerned that out of frustration because the communists refuse to negotiate, we may be using force as an excuse for policy.

The theory behind the Administration's present military policy seems to be the idea of the breaking-point. It assumes that Hanoi and the NLF must have some point of damage acceptance at which it will no longer be rational for them to continue to fight. We have only to proceed along the spectrum of force—more troops, more and newer weapons, more bombings, new targets of devastating impact—to find their breaking-point and make them negotiate.

The assumption underlying this theory is faulty, and the consequences of the theory are dangerous. It assumes that we are deal-

ing with a rational enemy, that he has a sense of proportion, that he values more important than victory in the South. It seems to me that Hanoi, at least, has lost touch with reality. Hanoi appears willing to sacrifice its economy and its social fabric for its ends. Reaction to our bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong was to build more air-raid shelters and move people out of these cities to the country-side.

Hanoi and the NLF have their own theory about us. They believe that it is we who have the earlier breaking point, that they only have to continue a little longer before we become tired, before domestic opposition swells, and we withdraw. They are as wrong in their theory as we are in ours.

At worst, these mutual breaking-point theories can lead to World War III; at best, they will lead to a resumption of guerrilla war, leaving us back where we started. Let me explain this proposition.

We are bombing supply lines in North Vietnam. We have already bombed oil depots right outside of Hanoi and Haiphong. In a year's time, we will have upwards of half a million men in South Vietnam. What steps remain? Mining the Haiphong harbor, bombing the cities themselves, attacking airfields in the North and in China, invading North Vietnam, and starting the showdown with Peking. Crossing any one of these lines could produce a very new and more menacing configuration of battle, including greater if not direct Soviet assistance and the introduction of Chinese manpower. I do not think that either Moscow or Peking want to become directly involved in the fighting, but we should not force their hands.

Make no mistake—Vietnam is not Cuba, and if we challenge Soviet and Chinese interests directly, they will react. To speak as Premier Ky does of invading North Vietnam and having a showdown with Peking is the height of folly. Premier Ky says there can be no peace in Asia unless the U.S. defeats Communist China. This is tantamount to saying there can be no peace without World War III. Our own government should publicly disavow Premier Ky on these matters.

What happens, on the other hand, if we do not pursue the path of "quiet" escalation, and if, instead, we concentrate our military power in South Vietnam itself? While this is the course of action I prefer, it also has its limitations.

With half a million U.S. troops, a similar number of South Vietnamese soldiers, with allied support, with helicopters, modern weaponry, and air power, the communist troops operating at regimental and divisional levels in South Vietnam will get hurt and hurt very badly. Even if Hanoi infiltrates as many as six thousand troops per month, the attrition rate on these forces will be intolerably high. The Communists will soon discover that operating at Stage II of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Revolution—at the conventional force level—is too costly.

But will their answer to this be negotiations? Most probably not. Most probably they will revert to Stage I, or strictly guerrilla type warfare. This, in turn, will leave us back where we were three years ago. True, we shall have more troops on hand, but the guerrillas will still be there.

If I were convinced that we could use more force without causing a general Asian land war, and that this would put an end to guerrilla strength in the South, or that this would bring about negotiations, such a policy would have my support. But I do not believe that force alone, even measured and concentrated force in South Vietnam itself, is the main route to peace.

#### THE REAL CHALLENGE: ELECTIONS AND REFORM

With our hopes tied to a peace conference and our remedies focused on force, we have taken our eyes off the real challenge, of the

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*essence of guerrilla war. These wars begin and end in the hearts and minds of the people themselves, and they are nurtured in uncorrected injustices. As long as there is a sizeable number of people who feel they can receive a better deal from the Vietcong, or that the government is unresponsive to their needs, there will be guerrillas.*

Force, of course, is required to meet the guerrilla on the battle field, to prevent the collapse of authority, and to pacify the country. Force can provide a shield of confidence behind which free elections and social and economic reform can take place, but it is what goes on behind the shield that determines success or failure.

This has been the case in every guerrilla war since 1945. The British and the Malays fought the predominantly Chinese guerrillas in Malaya for ten years, with a numerical superiority of twelve to one. Malaya being a peninsula, there was little outside help for the guerrillas, and the guerrillas being primarily Chinese were readily identifiable. Still, it took ten years. The Philippine Government battled the Huks, who had virtually no external assistance, for eight years. In both of these instances, the tide was not turned against the guerrillas until the individual peasant began to feel the fruits of reform in his own life and until he could give his loyalty to the government.

I am not saying that our government is unaware of this time factor; it is. I am not saying that our government has ignored the social and economic reform side of the war; quite the opposite is true. I am not saying that our government fails to comprehend how vital free elections are to obtaining the loyalty of the Vietnamese people; it knows this only too well. My point is that despite our Government's understanding of these problems, it has not taken the necessary action to resolve them. Consequently, a number of hurdles to success still exist: 1) the American public's impatience with the inevitably slow progress, domestic pressures for quick results; 2) our own hesitancy in pushing the Saigon Government along the necessary paths because we fear undermining its authority; and 3) the delaying tactics and equivocating of the Saigon Government and the wide-spread corruption throughout South Vietnamese society.

In effect, the Administration has not been straight-forward enough to dispel the illusions about quick results and has not been forceful enough with the Saigon regime to press for implementation of the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

Our economic aid program to South Vietnam has been massive, considering it is a country with a population of only about sixteen million. Since 1954, and including what is projected for the next fiscal year, the total will be approximately \$3.8 billion. This year alone, we are spending about \$730 million for a variety of programs like rural reconstruction and pacification, financing of commercial imports and food assistance.

This is already a massive program, in some respects too massive since it has produced rampant inflation. We do not need to provide more dollars in aid; we do need to ensure that what we give is properly used and that it actually gets to the people.

As things now stand, the Saigon Government is dragging its heels on land reform, refuges, and corruption. The United States has to talk tougher to the Saigon leaders on these matters. We did get tough on the monetary side, and it worked—they reduced by half the value of the piaster and this did put the brakes on inflation.

We have been too squeamish on the matter of elections as well. After procrastinating, the military junta scheduled elections for a constituent assembly for September 11. This assembly is given a period of six months to draft a constitution, which in turn has to be approved by some virtually defunct body

called the National Assembly, and then promulgated by the military junta itself. By November of 1967, if the constitution is approved and promulgated, the requisite national institutions are to be established. There is no provision, at present, for a general election of a civilian government. Equally distressing, is the section of the electoral law for the constituent assembly itself which prohibits "communists and neutralists" from participating. Some explanations have been offered about this, but they are unsatisfactory. It is my concern that the military junta will use those abstract classifications to prevent anyone from running for office or voting of whom they disapprove.

Genuinely free and open elections are the only real basis for generating peoples' loyalty for their government. With so much at stake, our own government should be direct and forceful in clearing up these ambiguities and in promoting free elections for a civilian government as soon as possible.

I have taken you along the road of my own thoughts on Vietnam, and these thoughts are not optimistic. I hope I am wrong. I hope there will soon be a peace conference; I wish our military power could produce negotiations without unacceptable escalation. But I would not count on either, and I would not allow myself to be taken in by false optimism, or phrases like "renewed determination." If I am right, if we face a long and uncertain future, the American people must know it, and we must accommodate our policy on Vietnam and at home to meet it!

#### SCHOOL MILK PROGRAM SHOULD KEEP PACE WITH INCREASED FARM COSTS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this year farm costs are at an alltime high. In the second quarter of this year farm production expenses were estimated at an annual rate of \$32.5 billion. This is an increase of \$1.8 billion over 1965 and an increase of almost \$10 billion since 1957. Yet in spite of this whopping 30-percent increase in farm costs, food prices have risen only 15 percent over this period. In addition, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman indicated only last week that 80 percent of the increase in food prices since 1947 was received, not by the farmer, but by the marketing agencies, processors, and other middlemen.

Mr. President, this is one way of showing why so many dairy farmers are selling out. It also should serve as a warning that our economy is going to have to give the dairy farmer a decent income if we are to continue to expect to receive plentiful supplies of milk at modest prices.

With milk prices going up, with dairy farmers getting a relatively small percentage of the increase, this is an extremely poor time for us in Congress to attempt to exercise false economy by putting a lid on the school milk program. By allowing the Federal Government to pay a part of the cost of the milk consumed by our schoolchildren, the school milk program has played an important role in encouraging milk consumption—thus improving child nutrition and dairy income at the same time.

If the program is to continue to operate effectively, we in Congress must do our best to make sure that adequate funds are made available to offset the

recent rise in milk prices. This is why I intend to take a close look at the program as it proceeds in fiscal 1967 to see if Congress has provided sufficient funds. Additional money may be required in a supplemental bill. It is also the reason why I hope Congress will act rapidly to agree on the amount to be provided for the school milk program in the 1967 agriculture appropriation bill.

#### ONE VOICE FOR AMERICA IN VIETNAM

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, lately, there has been criticism of intensified U.S. air activity over North Vietnam on the grounds that it may discourage Soviet efforts to bring about peace through negotiation. For my own part, I question whether the Soviet Union has ever had any intention of bringing this conflict to the bargaining table.

The Soviet Union has endorsed so-called "wars of national liberation" and is supplying war material to North Vietnam. The New York Daily News recently reported the arrival of new shipments of Soviet-built aircraft to North Vietnam to counter American attacks. And, on July 6, Leonid Brezhnev announced that Soviet aid to the Communist north would grow.

In the same speech, Mr. Brezhnev charged that American acts have produced "a storm of indignation among all honest people of the world. Even the close allies of the United States," he argued, "are disassociating themselves from the crime committed by the American imperialists. Never before has the prestige of the United States fallen to such depths as now."

If the Soviet Union finds it so shameful for the United States to fight in Vietnam, why has she been so anxious to provide missiles and aircraft and military instruction to the north, and to urge aggression against the south, under the counterfeit cry of "war of liberation"?

If the world is outraged, let the U.S.S.R. show leadership, let her show that she will pave the way for the reconvening of a conference at Geneva. It was at Geneva that the agreement giving South Vietnam autonomy was reached, and the Soviet Union approved the agreement. As cochairman of the earlier conference, she has the authority, if not the duty, to act.

If the Soviet Union regards the Vietnam situation as a grave danger to peace, she should be prepared to persuade her North Vietnamese friends of the wisdom of such a course, even if it means incurring the wrath of the paranoids in Peking.

But this is a kind of leadership rarely found among totalitarians. While Brezhnev talks, Red infiltration, terror, and savagery continue.

It is clear that no meaningful effort at negotiation will succeed until the Communist side finally recognizes that it cannot succeed through force of arms and violence; but that, on the contrary, the United States, South Vietnam, and their allies are capable of putting an end to aggression and insurrection in the south.

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There is a major communications problem in getting this idea across.

As usual, the Communist camp is counting on its double standard of morality in world affairs, which dictates that violence is permitted in the name of Lenin, Marx, and Mao, but not in defense of human freedom. Because Americans believe in human values, many of our citizens accept the argument that it is wrong forcefully to resist violence in whatever cause.

Sometimes, alas, it appears that America speaks with two voices. The Communists, judging others by a mirror of themselves, delude themselves into thinking we are playing a reverse of their own double game. For the American people are overwhelmingly united to see this ugly affair through. The Communists continue to misgauge the firmness of our national will. They intensify their own military activity, believing that America is deeply divided and will give up, and that they are on the edge of victory.

I quote Ho Chi Minh on July 19:

Of late the U.S. aggressors hysterically took a very serious step further in the escalation of the war: they launched air attacks on the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong. That was an act of desperation comparable to the agony convulsions of a grievously wounded beast.

What kind of self-hypnosis is this? This war has become far too deadly to tolerate further shadow shows. The oriental aggressors should look behind the screen to see that the tiger is real.

It is highly important that America's voice come through, loud and clear and officially. There is no second American voice. However hard some may try to mount one, it is a false voice.

If the Soviet Union wants to promote a just peace, it should seek it through diplomatic negotiations rather than propaganda. Those Americans who vocally demand some kind of abrupt ending to this war, and most of us wish we could be spared all of it, must recognize that amateur attempts at political action are only convincing to the other side, and that in fact they are a cause of intensified war efforts because they deceive the other side.

The point America must emphasize is that her people are united in a determination to see the conflict grimly through. It is time the message got through, too.

#### TRIBUTE TO THE LATE CHARLES DRESSEN

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I would like to comment about Charley Dressen, Detroit Tigers manager, who died yesterday.

Charley Dressen was an outstanding son of Decatur, Ill., who got his start in baseball at Moline and once played for the Decatur Staleys pro football team—which later became the Bears. He loved and mastered baseball to an ultimate degree.

Modesty was not one of his virtues but everyone recognized Dressen's competence, his almost fanatical love for his way of life—baseball, and his concern for

the well-being of his friends and team members.

#### DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, medicare, young as it is, has already brought us many blessings. Not the least of them is the increase in attention paid to our overall national health needs. Many experts and laymen are taking a new hard look at problems that affect, not only older Americans, but all age groups.

Dr. George A. Silver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, is among those who believe that action should be taken now to counter foreseeable pressures on our health protection resources.

In an enlightening interview given to the Medical Tribune for its July 25 issue, Dr. Silver said that he is much concerned, not only with medical manpower shortages, but also with inadequacies in the delivery of medical services. In the face of such shortages, he asks, should not we find ways to help medical personnel make the best possible use of their precious time?

Mr. President, Dr. Silver's views are as timely as they are significant. I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RATIONALIZING OF DELIVERY OF CARE CALLED BEST IMMEDIATE PROSPECT

(The following news interview was obtained in the light of rapidly increasing pressures on medical manpower as part of Medical Tribune's coverage of these critical problems. Physicians are invited to express their own views in Letters to Tribune.)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The nation's immediate health manpower problems are more likely to respond to the "rationalization of our systems for the delivery of medical and health care" than to programs designed specifically to increase that manpower.

That is the opinion of Dr. George A. Silver, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, one of whose more pressing responsibilities in that job is the health manpower problem.

Dr. Silver does not dismiss as useless the many efforts aimed at producing greater numbers of medical and health personnel, whether old, new, or prospective. Moreover, he applauded, in an interview, President Johnson's recent appointment of a National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower charged with recommending ways to help meet the "critical shortage" in these fields (Medical Tribune, May 18).

But, he said, significantly increased numbers of doctors, nurses, technicians, and aides will not be available for some time, and therefore the country's present body of health workers should be employed more efficiently to meet the needs of the present and near future.

#### TASK COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT

Dr. Silver is under no illusion about the complexity and difficulty of the task. "The profession opposes many of these suggestions," he told Medical Tribune, "and a variety of other special interests in the health field interpose themselves."

But he feels that there is a clear case for "improving the systems of delivery of medical care." There are at least two classes of

people who would benefit from such an improvement, in his view.

The first, "significant in number," consists of those who have come to be termed the medically indigent, for whom services are fragmented, delayed, demeaning, unavailable—or all four at different times and places.

The second consists of those who are in fact "buying medical care," but who are not getting the best care we know how to give because the physicians who are delivering it are overburdened or lack adequate equipment or training or because the patients are in no position to find their way through the maze of contemporary sophistication in medicine.

The Department of HEW is in no way seeking to order these things better by fiat. It does, however, intend to look into the whole question of delivery of medical care. Secretary John W. Gardner, for example, believes that more has to be done in many ways and particularly in measuring performance from the standpoint of what the patient needs, Dr. Silver said.

Internally, also, the department is moving toward rationalizing its own approach to the selection and coordination of programs—defining a mission, examining the resources available, setting priorities, and allocating the resources to meet them.

#### OUTSIDE CONSIDERATIONS CITED

Naturally enough, a good many considerations from outside will enter into these rationalized calculations. Dr. Silver is not talking about mysterious pressures when he mentions these other considerations.

It is rather, a matter of simple fact that if, to take a hypothetical example, "people are thinking more about children than about old people at a given time, you will get better child programs than aged programs."

That, in his opinion, is "not a threat, but a democratic necessity." And, in any case, he said, "people here [in the department] are dedicated to the notion of the pluralistic society. If that sounds like a cliché I can only point out that if you love your mother and you say, 'I love my mother,' that's a cliché too, and it is also the truth."

While the manpower problem extends throughout the health field, the need for physicians is a striking example of time lag versus immediate necessity.

Dr. Silver is not disposed to lay great stress on arguments about the exact number of physicians or the physician shortfall, because he believes that whatever the over-all numbers may be, it is beyond argument that there are not a sufficient number of the right kind in the right places at any given moment.

If there are some 50,000 general practitioners and about 20,000 internists available for private practice, that's "nothing like enough to take care of the need we have for family health practice today."

#### NUMBER MAY SUFFICE

On the other hand, "if medical practice could be rationalized so that physicians used their time more effectively, if medical students could be channeled to the career goals where the need is greatest, if hospitals were regionalized—then perhaps we could get on quite well with the numbers we have now and are likely to have in the foreseeable future."

As to the numbers we are likely to have, he pointed out that since the big push to increase student intake began just two years ago, about 1,000 new places have been created in medical schools, new and old. The target of present legislation is another 1,000 places over the next few years.

Though a great deal has been heard about various kinds of curriculum reform, the adoption of any vast and sweeping change that would make a serious dent in the length of training is not to be anticipated in the near future, in his opinion.