

August 17, 1966

Occupying a \$68,000 Indian-owned plant building and aided by a \$232,000 loan from the Crow Tribe, the firm makes battery chargers for cordless electric toothbrushes and an electronic device for disinfectant units. A third product—a battery charger for cordless electric knives—will be manufactured later this month. By year's end, Indian employees are expected to reach 80, all trained under a contract between the company and the Bureau.

The plant has only one non-Indian employee, the manager. He says that tardiness and absenteeism are lower than in any manufacturing plant with which he had been associated. Under his direction, several Indians are being readied for supervisory positions over jobs that are rated as electrical assembler, mechanical assembler, inspector, and tester.

Varying degrees of skill are required. One item in production involves 19 separate hand operations, assignments in which the patient and careful Crows are particularly adept.

The new industry, U.S. Automatics, Inc., came into being last November through a \$300,000 investment by the Crow Tribe. This was approved by the tribal Industrial Development Commission and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The new building occupied by the industry is leased to the company.

At the outset, some Crows were skeptical of the industrial undertaking in view of heavy tribal investment in developing the Big Horn Recreation Area for tourism. This area, near the scene of Custer's Last Stand, is noted for the annual outdoor drama staged by the Crows in reenacting the famous battle against the 7th Cavalry.

On the drawing boards at the Crow Reservation are plans for an industrial park where the new plant building is located. The Economic Development Administration has approved a tribal request for a \$241,000 grant for this purpose. The Crows will contribute an additional \$60,000 to develop a 40-acre tract with all necessary accommodations, from natural gas to loading and unloading ramps. Construction may start next month.

Sixth Anniversary of Gabon's Independence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ADAM C. POWELL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, today the people of Gabon celebrate their sixth year of independence, and I wish to take this opportunity to extend my warmest greetings to His Excellency Leon Mba, President of Gabon; and to His Excellency Louis Owanga, Gabon's Ambassador to the United States.

The Government of Gabon has been making impressive strides in the improvement of the nation. Possessing one of the best educational systems in equatorial Africa, 85 percent of the school-age children are in school.

The economy of this former French colony has been based primarily on exports of wood. Gabon is the world's principal exporter of okoumé, a soft wood which is particularly suitable for plywood. Besides wood, Gabon has been exporting iron, oil and manganese. Of special importance are the manganese deposits at Moanda—believed to be the world's largest.

In the hope of alleviating the shortage of manpower, the government has waged an extensive battle against endemic diseases. The government has been diligent in its efforts to provide needed transportation and communication facilities for country. There are over 3,000 miles of roads and railroads being constructed in an attempt to further exploit the nation's mineral resources in the interior.

Gabon has been a member of the United Nations since 1960 and is also a member of the African and Malagasy Union, a larger grouping of twelve French-speaking nations.

So we see that Gabon is a small nation well on its way to taking its place among the more developed nations in Africa. Relations between Gabon and the United States have been friendly in the past, and I am sure will remain cordial in the future. It is a pleasure to extend my best wishes to the people of Gabon on their sixth anniversary of independence.

Order of AHEPA

SPEECH
OF

HON. RAY J. MADDEN

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 15, 1966

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, our National Capitol is again honored by being selected as the host city for the 44th Supreme Convention of the Order of AHEPA and its auxiliary organizations.

This great national fraternal order of Greek American citizens has made a major contribution over the years not only to its own members and the Greek community but also through its cooperation with civic, educational, and charitable projects beneficial to citizens of our local communities, State and Nation. The organization's charitable work has been outstanding and has continued for almost a half century. It has rendered a great service to immigrants of Greek descent in enabling them to become established and obtain educational advantages so as to better enjoy the freedoms and opportunities that this land of liberty extends to all its citizens regardless of race or religion.

AHEPA has been in the forefront in its aid and contribution toward aiding disaster victims regardless of nationality. This activity is not limited to the United States but extends throughout the world. The AHEPA organization has been instrumental in promoting friendships and close ties not only with Americans and their countrymen in their native land but with people in many other nations.

AHEPA and its members have cooperated in a major way in all our patriotic endeavors: the promotion of loyalty, participation in drives to eliminate poverty, and other political, social, and civic activities.

I wish to join along with other friends of the Order of AHEPA in wishing them many years of continued activity in their efforts toward peace, self-government, and freedom for all nations throughout the globe.

Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I submit for inclusion in the RECORD a column by Jack Foisie from the August 12, 1966, issue of the Los Angeles Times.

Mr. Foisie, longtime Times Saigon bureau chief who is now home on leave, presents his observation about behind the scene activities with regard to reports that a manpower buildup is needed in Vietnam.

The column follows:

THE ROSE-TINTED VIETNAM VIEW
(By Jack Foisie)

The Johnson Administration seems determined to keep the public looking at the Vietnam war through rose-tinted glasses.

With Congressional elections coming up in November, neither the man in the White House, nor his Secretary of Defense, wants to read that the war, if progressing at all, is moving at a snail's pace in terms of long-range objectives.

Or that, with the present troop levels, the war cannot possibly be won in eight years. Or even with more than double the 300,000 Americans presently in Vietnam, the war cannot be won within five years.

So when a rash of stories were cabled out of Saigon to this effect early this week, a "Pentagon spokesman" denied that there was any such thinking among the generals.

The denial was artful. He said neither the Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff has any studies which reach those pessimistic conclusions.

Maybe, it was suggested the following day, some of the individual services have made studies which are glum on progress in Vietnam. But they really aren't high level enough to count for much.

At his Tuesday press conference, President Johnson said: "We have not been able to find any of those reports in the government here."

It is more than coincidence that numerous reporters in Saigon, including The Times' William Tuohy, produced very similar stories at the same time. This is a sure tipoff that the stories were products of a "background" briefing for correspondents by someone high in the American military. He was willing to talk frankly if he wouldn't be quoted.

This may sound like a sneaky way of doing business, but "background without attribution" has been for years a device used by the administration for getting across a particular point of view without being held responsible for the thinking. And the military in Saigon was merely employing the same method.

Reporters don't enjoy being "used" in such fashion. But particularly during times of diplomatic crisis, the backgrounder appears to be a defensible practice, and a means of informing the readers of some facts-of-life which would never be revealed by authorities on an attributable basis.

The mystifying thing about the current Saigon "backgrounder" is that the information coming out of it was slapped down by the Pentagon.

Although not always is there complete agreement between the generals in the field and those in the Pentagon, there is seldom lack of coordination between them.

Particularly on how to use the press to their best advantage, there is tight control by Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur Sylvester.

August 17, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A4349

Questionnaire

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. KEN W. DYAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. DYAL. Mr. Speaker, in May I mailed an opinion questionnaire to my constituents in the 33d Congressional District, of California. Today I wish to thank the 10,836 persons who were sufficiently concerned to take the time to complete and return this questionnaire.

The responses were immediate and enthusiastic. I am very gratified with the number of persons who elaborated their views, either with notes on the questionnaire or with letters. It has been both enlightening and helpful to hear from so many good citizens.

This questionnaire was not printed at Government expense. It was mailed to postal patrons to obtain a cross-section of opinion on important, current issues.

As I insert the results of this questionnaire in the RECORD, for my colleagues and the Nation to see, I wish to mention that the 33d Congressional District comprises all of San Bernardino County. In area, it is the largest county in the United States, with 20,160 square miles, and a population of more than 670,000. This second fastest growing county in California is extremely diverse, with mountains, desert, and valleys combining spectacular scenery, yet we have large cities as well as agriculture, industry, and fine tourist attractions. My congressional district is as diversified as the United States itself, in many ways, and our people's opinions are worth noting.

Mr. Speaker, I insert, at this point, the tabulation of my questionnaire responses:

[Answers in percent]

1. What do you think the United States should do in Vietnam? (Check one.)	
Expand the war, including the use of nuclear weapons.....	10.3
Expand the war by conventional means without using nuclear weapons....	28.3
Continue current policy of military support.....	15.8
Withdraw our military troops immediately.....	16.6
Other.....	29.0
2. Do you favor negotiations for peace in Vietnam?	
Yes.....	70.3
No.....	26.2
No opinion.....	3.5
3. If Congress determines that we must reduce spending, in what areas do you think cuts should be made? (Indicate first, second, and third preference.)	
Agricultural subsidies.....	21.5
The space program.....	13.6
Defense spending.....	5.0
War on poverty.....	20.0
Veterans' benefits.....	4.0
Foreign aid.....	31.9
Public works programs (including construction of dams and highways)....	4.0

4. If Congress determines that additional funds are needed for fiscal 1967, how should they be raised? (Indicate first, second, and third preference.)

Increase corporate income taxes.....	35.9
Increase personal income taxes.....	21.9
Increase excise taxes.....	33.1
Increase borrowing.....	9.1

5. Interest rates: The Banking and Currency Committee of the House of Representatives may consider legislation to make the Federal Reserve Board more responsive to the fiscal and monetary policies established by the administration. Renewed interest in this program has been sparked by the Board's recent decision to increase interest rates in opposition to the position of the President and his economic advisors. Would you favor such a change?

Yes.....	29.6
No.....	50.4
No opinion.....	20.0

6. Do you believe changes are needed in our foreign assistance program?

Yes.....	97.6
No.....	.8
No opinion.....	1.6

If yes, please indicate what changes are needed:

Increase military aid.....	1.2
Increase economic aid.....	5.0
Decrease military aid.....	21.1
Decrease economic aid.....	20.5

Be more selective in nations receiving aid..... 44.7
Cut off all aid..... 7.5

7. Do you feel that Federal expenditures for space exploration should: (Check one.)

Be increased.....	13.3
Be reduced.....	40.2
Remain the same.....	46.5

8. Do you favor greater Federal effort (including higher costs) to control air and water pollution?

Yes.....	73.0
No.....	23.8
No opinion.....	3.2

9. Do you favor Federal control over aspects of the unemployment compensation system now handled by the States, removing the requirement that employers be taxed according to their employment record?

Yes.....	15.8
No.....	68.5
No opinion.....	15.7

10. Do you favor legislation to require sellers to give accurate estimates of total interest charges to purchasers (truth in lending)?

Yes.....	92.4
No.....	6.7
No opinion.....	.9

11. Do you favor legislation regulating packaging and labeling of consumer goods (truth in packaging)?

Yes.....	91.6
No.....	6.3
No opinion.....	2.1

12. Please check what you favor doing with the following programs in the war on poverty.

Project Headstart:	
Increasing.....	34.7
Reducing.....	31.8
Keeping same.....	33.5
Domestic Peace Corps:	
Increasing.....	22.9
Reducing.....	46.5
Keeping same.....	30.6

Job Corps:	
Increasing.....	33.0
Reducing.....	38.1
Keeping same.....	28.9
Neighborhood Youth Corps:	
Increasing.....	35.7
Reducing.....	36.3
Keeping same.....	28.0
Work-study grants for college students:	
Increasing.....	48.8
Reducing.....	21.8
Keeping same.....	29.4
Special small business loans:	
Increasing.....	44.4
Reducing.....	20.7
Keeping same.....	24.9

13. Do you believe the war on poverty will decrease our welfare load in:

1 year.....	1.9
5 years.....	13.0
10 years.....	17.1
Never.....	68.0

14. Do you favor legislation extending Federal safety standards to the manufacture of automobiles?

Yes.....	61.1
No.....	29.0
No opinion.....	4.9

15. Do you favor uniform traffic laws throughout the United States to avoid traffic accidents?

Yes.....	85.7
No.....	11.6
No opinion.....	2.7

16. Do you favor having your Congressman poll you for your views on important issues facing the Congress?

Yes.....	97.2
No.....	1.4
No opinion.....	1.4

It Can Be Done

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES F. BATTIN

OF MONTANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. BATTIN. Mr. Speaker, in my State of Montana, American Indians on seven reservations are making admirable efforts to better their economic plight, raise their standard of living, educate and train their youth for job opportunities, and participate in all citizen activities.

The following release by the Bureau of Indian Affairs illustrates the success of one tribe in attracting industry, furnishing and training their own people in the skills necessary for staffing and operating an industry which will undoubtedly attract other industry and offer more employment opportunities. I have unanimous consent to include the release in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

NEW COMPANY ON MONTANA'S CROW RESERVATION TO DOUBLE EMPLOYMENT

A new company that began operating only a few months ago on the Crow Indian Reservation near Hardin, Mont., plans doubling its working force in a few months to capitalize on the exceptional skill of Indian employees, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs reports.

The high-speed communication channels between Washington and Saigon are used during the quiet periods to fill in the press agents at either end. A press conference by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara is filed to the Saigon military "for your information and guidance." And a transcript or summary of every 5 o'clock "press briefing" in Saigon goes to the Pentagon molders of public opinion.

It is highly unlikely that whoever gave the Saigon correspondents the "back-grounder" on needing more troops in Vietnam did so on his own hook, without approval from his bosses in the Pentagon. The general in Saigon may even have known that the Pentagon would issue an oblique denial of the need for more troops.

It seems to be one more illustration of how the administration prefers to "acclimate" the public before putting into effect steps to increase our commitment in Vietnam.

A Good Industrial Neighbor

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT H. MICHEL

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I have unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD this editorial that appeared in the Peoria Journal Star on August 11, 1966, entitled "A Good Industrial Neighbor."

A GOOD INDUSTRIAL NEIGHBOR

When Jones & Laughlin announced their plans for a mammoth steel complex at Hennepin, one of the first questions and earliest answers was to the effect that they would NOT pollute the river.

Indeed their announcement stated that they would "put the water back in" in a bit better condition than it was when they "took it out."

Well, that's the kind of an announcement you expect, and then you wait and see if they are just saying what almost has to be said, or if they really mean it.

It seems clear already that J&L really means it.

Among the earliest activities in that huge construction and development task, we promptly discover, are very extensive works and plans for the disposal of damaging wastes.

These include extraordinary things such as burial beneath the ground at unbelievable depths where such wastes will not only be far below the river bed, and below the top soil, but below water tables or any conceivable strata affecting life on the surface.

Industry is desirable for the work it provides, the stimulus it provides for all sorts of economic activity, and, above all, for the things it manufacturers to the use, advantage and convenience of human beings.

But for a community, those industries that perform those functions in such a way as to help its own locale be cleaner, healthier, and more attractive is most desirable of all.

We are clearly fortunate, and doubly fortunate, in the character of our new neighbor to the north.

Their responsibility to produce steel that will serve mankind in a thousand ways is matched by a responsibility to serve directly as a "good neighbor" at the plant site—and J&L is displaying its possession this dual responsibility.

By setting such a standard they also make themselves an example for other industries,

and the downriver surge of industrial development is off on the right foot.

That is surely good news for all of us in this area.

Fly Now, Pay Later

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES B. UTT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, on August 15 I issued a statement to the press concerning the airlines strike in which I detailed my views on the subject of congressional action in this matter. I now note that the Daily Times-Advocate in Escondido, Calif., published an editorial on the same subject on August 10. Since this editorial is in agreement with the statement I issued I would like to insert in the RECORD both the editorial, entitled "Fly Now, Pay Later" and my August 15 statement:

[From the Escondido (Calif.) Daily Times-Advocate, Aug. 10, 1966]

FLY NOW, PAY LATER

If the House follows the Senate's lead on a bill to force machinists back to work, the country may fly now and pay later.

It will pay by bringing compulsory arbitration and federal settlement of labor disputes just that much closer. If that's the price, it's too high for us.

Turning to Washington for the answer on labor deadlocks would end collective bargaining in major industries. The unions don't want this. Management doesn't want it, even though the air lines applaud and see no danger in the bill now before Congress.

The Senate has passed a measure which would make the striking machinists go back to their jobs with five major air carriers for a maximum of 180 days while negotiations continue. Representatives in the House are considering a similar bill.

Legislative expedience seldom produces good law. The issues of union power and freedom of management decision in federally regulated transportation are proper concerns of Congress. But they should be debated at leisure and with an eye on the long view, not brushed aside in a hasty effort to end a temporary crisis.

Questions arise. What happens after the 180-day cooling period if both sides are still cool to a settlement? Does Congress again act, this time empowering the Administration to dictate terms? What happens during the 180 days? Are the air lines going to get their money's worth from disgruntled "forced" labor?

An answer to this last one has been suggested by P. L. Stiemiller, president of the International Association of Machinists. "Union members who return to work will be extra careful in everything they do," he says, "for they will not want to shoulder the blame for any accidents that might happen after the strike. Extra care takes extra time . . . After so many weeks on the picket line, union members will be tired after eight hours. In many instances they will not want to work overtime."

Translating Mr. Stiemiller's euphemisms, a work slowdown and other obstructionism is promised.

We can't blame the machinists too much. Their present wage of \$3.23 per hour, while ahead of the \$2.70 average rate for all manufacturing industries, is below that of sev-

eral comparable trades. Although they are warned to keep to the President's guide lines on rate raises, they have seen other unions ignore the guide lines without so much as a wrist slap from the White House.

Not only has the President looked away at this overstepping of guide lines, he has campaigned for a new minimum wage far beyond them, has failed to curb domestic spending, failed to raise taxes and generally failed to check the inflation he ostensibly deploras.

To get back to the air lines strike. Though it has caused marked public inconvenience, it has by no means brought public catastrophe. Railroads and busses are running, 40 per cent of air travel continues uninterrupted.

It is still better for Americans to be inconvenienced, for air lines to lose revenue and for union members to lose wages than to invite federal settlement of a major labor dispute. Perhaps the day is inevitable when this will happen, but if we can forestall it, we should.

[Press release of Congressman JAMES B. UTT, Aug. 15, 1966]

Congressman JAMES B. Utt (R-Calif.) today announced that he would oppose enactment of any bill that would cripple the system of collective bargaining in connection with the current airline strike.

In a statement released today, Representative Utt warned that enactment of proposed legislation would set a precedent that would result in Congress being forced to resolve all major labor disputes. The text of Congressman Utt's statement follows:

I am opposed to the enactment of any bill that would cripple the system of collective bargaining and infringe upon the rights of individual union members.

It should be understood that my rating with the AFL-CIO is a big fat "Zero", and that I have never had any support from labor unions. Nor have I asked for it. I am a strong supporter of the open shop provided for under the Right-to-Work Laws, and, therefore, I am a constant target of the Big Labor Barons. According to their specious reasoning, I should be among the first to want to punish labor for this uncalled-for disruption in a major transport industry of America.

I do not believe that the pending legislation ordering the unions back to work is a proper function of either the Administration or the Congress. A law to force the machinists back to work might be temporarily expedient, but it would not resolve the problem in the long run. On the contrary, it would have the effect of completely destroying free and open collective bargaining. The interest of the public must be protected against labor monopoly, but that protection can only come from a complete overhaul of our existing labor laws and would include the placing of big labor under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

The breakdown in present strike negotiations was caused by the rigid misconception of the President's so-called "guidelines" which are completely unrealistic.

In the current labor bargaining, there was a reasonable demand by the airline mechanics which would elevate their status to a higher plateau in the entire aviation field. They want recognition as an important segment of that industry. It is their job to service the planes under all conditions and to make them safe for flying. This is but one echelon below the responsibilities of the pilots who fly the aircraft and yet, I am told, the mechanics pay scale is less than that of a New York City garbage collector.

The President and his advisors refused to recognize this all-important prestige point. This fouled up the negotiations and the President, having failed utterly to bring about a

settlement, tossed the whole mess into the lap of the Congress.

There are a dozen labor contracts expiring next year and they are all big ones. If Congress sets this dangerous precedent, it will find itself resolving every labor dispute that arises; it will find itself a legislative National Labor Relations Board; and it will have no time left over to fulfill its constitutional duties.

Let it be clearly understood that both labor and management will be quick to take advantage of the precedent that would be set, should the proposed legislation become law. One party or the other would always be tempted to "hold out" just a little bit longer if they knew that sooner or later the President or the Congress would step in.

The President failed to recognize that his absurd guidelines had been completely sabotaged before he went to conference, although that fact was known by all of the labor leaders, most of the Members of Congress and much of the public. While the airline strike has been in progress, the West Coast Maritime Union negotiated a five-year contract with the shippers on the basis of an 8% annual increase, or a total of 40% over a five-year period. The shippers were happy to sign this contract because in return the unions gave up some obsolete work rules so that increased efficiency will increase productivity commensurate with the increase in wages.

If the President and the Congress would make it clear that they will not intervene in the airline strike and will withdraw from the matter, thus permitting free collective bargaining, the planes would be flying almost as soon as they could get them off the ground. But, as long as the two parties to the dispute feel that they can shunt the responsibility for a settlement off on the Government, the strike will continue.

Welcome and Continued Success

SPEECH

OF

HON. JAMES HARVEY

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 15, 1966

Mr. HARVEY of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I join with many other Members of the House of Representatives in welcoming to our Nation's Capital many representatives of the Order of AHEPA, currently conducting their 44th supreme convention.

It is with particular pleasure that I greet four outstanding citizens from my own hometown of Saginaw, Mich., who are participating in the AHEPA convention. They are Tom Demetriou, a senior at Wayne State University Law School in Detroit; Christ A. Anagnost and Achilles J. "Kelly" Tarachas, two outstanding young attorneys in Saginaw; and John Tarachas, pharmaceutical representative. They represent the Saginaw Valley Chapter No. 216.

The objects and purposes of this fraternal order of some 46,000 Greek-Americans clearly illustrates its dedication to the promotion of good citizenship and educated, informed government; to the appreciation of Hellenic culture; and to good fellowship and good moral conduct.

I have always been particularly impressed by the number one object and purpose of the AHEPA. It is, and I quote:

To promote and encourage loyalty of its members to the country of which they are citizens.

AHEPA's contributions to worthy and charitable causes; citizenship; civic participation; sports; and international relations have been widely hailed and rightfully so.

I wish all members of the Order of the AHEPA continued success and good health.

Peking Exposes Itself

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM T. MURPHY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, there really should be no doubt as to Red China's designs on the rest of Asia.

Peking itself has once again exposed the Communist's expansionist aims in rejecting Thailand's proposal of an all-Asian peace conference on Vietnam.

The Chicago Daily News refers to China's genuine objectives in an editorial saying that although Peking wants U.S. troops out of Vietnam, its goal is not peace but a clear-cut Communist victory.

We may collect the benefits of China's action, however, the newspaper suggests. Since the proposed conference would have included uncommitted nations, Peking's charge that it would serve "U.S. policies of aggression" should strike all but out-and-out Communists as ridiculous.

By inserting this editorial in the RECORD, I hope to call attention once more to the actual motives of the Communists in Asia.

The editorial follows:

PEKING HANGS UP AGAIN

Red China has made it plain it will have no part of a proposed all-Asian peace conference on Viet Nam. The parley was suggested by Thailand at a meeting of the Assn. of Southeast Asia in Bangkok. Word of the proposal had scarcely been made public when Peking blasted it as another "peace talks fraud" inspired by the United States. Without Red Chinese participation such a parley would have little meaning.

At this time Peking has nothing to gain in going alone with the "Peace for Asia Committee" proposed by Thailand. China's expansionist aims in Asia are hardly peaceful, and the military phase of the Viet Nam war, having now turned in favor of the allied forces, would allow Peking little or no bargaining leeway. Though it wants American troops and planes out of Viet Nam, its goal is not peace but a clearcut Communist victory.

North Viet Nam, inevitably, followed Peking's lead and rejected the plan.

It may be, however, that the West will emerge as a net beneficiary of the proposal and its outcome.

While the projected conference would have included Asian nations basically friendly to the United States, it also would have had as participants some of the "neutral" or "uncommitted" countries that tend to lean more to the East than to the West. To suggest, as Peking did, that such a parley might serve

the "U.S. policies of aggression and war in Asia" should strike all but the out-and-out Communist countries as ridiculous in the face of China's own aggressive record.

When Peking speaks of peace in Asia, it means peace on its own terms—imposition of Red Chinese hegemony over the continent. In rejecting the Thailand plan it has made this clearer than ever to a bigger-than-ever Asian audience.

The Smear Boys Crank Up Again

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PHILLIP BURTON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 17, 1966

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Speaker, the San Francisco Chronicle recently ran an editorial entitled "The Smear Boys Crank Up Again."

This thoughtful editorial by the San Francisco Chronicle, which has the largest daily circulation in northern California, warrants our reading and consideration:

THE SMEAR BOYS CRANK UP AGAIN

A catch-all bill to punish American citizens who send blood, medical aid or any "thing" to a "hostile foreign power" has been drummed up by the House Un-American Activities Committee as a pretext for holding hearings beginning tomorrow in Washington. Nine anti-Vietnam activists from the Bay Area have been subpoenaed, some of whom are reported to be looking forward to the publicity exposure.

The Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee's former chairman, Jerry Rubin, has rented a uniform of the American Revolutionary War period in which he says he intends to appear. He probably will be lucky to escape arrest for impersonating General Washington, but he is an odds-on bet to make the Tuesday evening news telecasts, and that is what seems to matter.

This planned keynote performance on the witnesses' side is preposterous enough, but the objective of the Un-American Committee is a danger to the freedom to dissent and a transparent effort to smear the protest movement against the Vietnam war.

Blood collections were taken on the Stanford and other Bay Area campuses last spring for shipment to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The bill before the committee, by Representative JOE POOL of Texas, would punish such an act with 20 years imprisonment. Under present Federal law, criminal penalties can be invoked against citizens providing "tangible assistance" to a hostile power or group only after Congress formally declared war. The Vietnam war is undeclared.

Another section of the Pool bill is more justifiable. It would establish the same penalty for obstructing or interfering with a troop train or other movement of the armed forces. In our opinion such a measure has validity without regard to whether the country is in a declared or undeclared war. The only mystery surrounding it is why it comes up before the Un-American Committee, instead of the Armed Services or the Judiciary Committee, where jurisdiction over offenses against the military properly belongs.

The Un-American Committee should have been abolished long ago, and might have been had it not been for the actions of various activists—Communists and others—who have

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ator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] on his offering of this amendment and his excellent statement explaining the amendment.

Mr. President, I support the McGovern amendment.

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, President Johnson, within the past month asked Congress to take a good, hard look at appropriations measures and to cut funds from these measures wherever possible. In fact, many members of the Appropriations Committee have been visited by high Government officials urging exactly the kind of cut the McGovern amendment provides.

These officials proposed that if Congress decides to increase the budget of an agency in any respect, it make a corresponding overall reduction in the remainder of the agency budget. This administration suggestion makes eminent good sense. This is what the McGovern amendment does.

The bill before us appropriates for our defense effort approximately half of the funds requested of Congress this year. The Committee on Appropriations, especially the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and I may add also the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], who is the other Senator with great knowledge of defense matters, has done a good job in slicing more than \$400 million from the House-passed version of the bill. However, the bill still contains \$525,519,000 above the President's budget. The McGovern amendment would cut virtually this amount and thus enable Senators to heed our Commander in Chief's admonition to hold down Federal spending.

The McGovern amendment makes cuts in the Defense Department appropriations bill in the right places: procurement, research, development, test, and evaluation. These are the areas, including plant and equipment and hardware expenditures, the very type of spending that contribute to inflationary pressures on the economy, the very type of spending that President Johnson has urged corporate heads to forgo.

Furthermore, these cuts are less than 1 percent of the total in this bill, and only 2.2 percent of the procurement and research funds in the bill—small enough amounts to be absorbed within the overall defense budget, especially with the leadership and wisdom Secretary of Defense McNamara has shown in economizing with the Nation's defense dollar.

When Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared before the Joint Economic Committee a few years ago, he told me, in reply to my question, that a competent administrator should be able to save up to 3 percent in a budget of this size without an adverse effect on the efficiency of the operation.

This amendment puts the Secretary to the test in this regard, but gives him leeway. It makes no cuts in 60 percent of the budget. It provides only a 2.2-percent reduction, not a 3-percent cut in the more than \$23.6 billion allocated to procurement and research and development.

Finally, Congress has every right to appropriate funds for items not included

within the President's budget, as we have done here. The McGovern amendment, as I understand it, is designed to affirm that right. But it reinforces the Congress determination that the projects the Congress has added to the budget be advanced without increasing the overall spending total.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should like to express my gratitude to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] for being willing to stay here in order that I might develop with him a few questions which occurred to me in connection with the pending bill.

As we know, this is an enormous bill, which runs just under \$60 billion. The way the bill is set up is traditional, and, to my way of thinking, is uninformative.

One of the most important questions which I think should be brought to the floor of the Senate—and I note the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is in the Chamber—is, How much of this money is ticketed for Vietnam?

I wonder if the Senator from Mississippi would be able to enlighten me in any area at all with respect to that question—

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I interrupt the Senator to say that if he will give me a few more minutes to get some material together, I shall try to answer him.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will indicate to me when he is ready, I shall be glad to yield to him.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. In that connection, I had occasion to scan an article which appeared in Fortune magazine in the April 1966 issue entitled "The Vietnam War: A Cost Accounting," by William Bowen. This, to my way of thinking, is a very careful and scholarly analysis of the cost of the Vietnamese war based on information made available to Mr. Bowen. He starts out by saying, at the head of the article:

The Vietnam war is peculiarly expensive, far more so than is generally thought. Costs are running above \$13 billion a year, and are headed up. Fortune's figures suggest that we're in for bigger defense budgets—and new economic strains.

And then it states:

The cost analysis for this article was carried out by a team consisting of, in addition to Mr. Bowen: Alan Greenspan, president of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., consultants; P. Bernard Nortman, independent economic consultant; Sanford S. Parker, chief of Fortune's economic staff; and research associate Karin Cocuzzi.

The heart of the article I believe is contained in this paragraph:

General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, has reportedly requested a buildup to 400,000 by the end of December—

Remember, the article appeared in April—

With that many U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, the cost of the war would run to \$21 billion a year—even more if bombing and tactical air support increased in proportion to the buildup on the ground. At any such level the Vietnam war would bring on economic strains beyond what most economists appear to foresee * * *

Among the questions I would like to see if my good friend from Mississippi can answer is, What information, of a nonconfidential nature, do the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee have with respect to the actual number of men presently in Vietnam, broken down into Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force?

What information of a nonconfidential nature do those committees have with respect to the present intentions of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase the present components?

Is it the intention of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the President to build up to the level of 400,000 troops?

Is it the intention of the Johnson administration to increase bombing and tactical air support in proportion to the buildup of the ground forces?

And what can they tell us in terms of expected casualties, American boys who will be killed, American boys who will be wounded, as a result of the implications of passing the pending bill?

I believe this is an important area of inquiry.

I ask unanimous consent that the Fortune magazine article which I referred to be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Fortune magazine, April 1966]

THE VIETNAM WAR: A COST ACCOUNTING

(By William Bowen)

(The cost analysis for this article was carried out by a team consisting of, in addition to Mr. Bowen: Alan Greenspan, president of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., consultants; P. Bernard Nortman, independent economic consultant; Sanford S. Parker, chief of Fortune's economic staff; and research associate Karin Cocuzzi.)

(The Vietnam war is peculiarly expensive, far more so than is generally thought. Costs are running above \$13 billion a year, and are headed up. Fortune's figures suggest that we're in for bigger defense budgets—and new economic strains.)

What happens in the U.S. economy over the next year or two, what happens to demand and production and prices and taxes, will to a large extent depend upon the cost of the Vietnam war. If anyone inside the Pentagon knows the current cost, he is not telling, nor, of course, is anyone there telling about costs associated with future operations. Accordingly, Fortune has undertaken on its own to figure out the cost—present and prospective—of the Vietnam war. It is already costing a lot more than almost anybody outside the Pentagon imagines.

At present, with about 235,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, the U.S. costs are running at a yearly rate of more than \$13 billion. Costs, it should be observed at once, cannot be translated mechanically into expenditures; a drawdown on inventories involves a cost, but may not involve an expenditure for quite some time. Still, if the war continues at only the present rate through fiscal 1967 (the year beginning next July 1), the resulting Defense Department expenditures will probably exceed the \$10 billion or so that the hefty 1967 defense budget officially allows for the Vietnam war.

But the war, it appears, will get bigger. U.S. Senators who know what Defense Department witnesses say in closed congress-

On page 19, line 8, delete "\$3,992,300,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,904,469,400."

On page 20, line 4, delete "\$1,189,500,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,163,331,000."

On page 21, line 3, delete "\$2,122,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,075,902,800."

On page 21, line 19, delete "\$51,300,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$50,171,400."

On page 22, line 9, delete "\$1,528,700,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,495,068,600."

On page 22, lines 18 and 19, delete "\$1,758,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,719,910,800."

On page 23, lines 6 and 7, delete "\$3,112,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,044,122,800."

On page 24, line 1, delete "\$459,059,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$448,959,702."

On page 25, line 2, delete "\$125,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$122,250,000."

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the amendment which I have pending at the desk is on behalf of myself and Senators CLARK, NELSON, PROXMIRE, and YOUNG of Ohio. It is an amendment to H.R. 15941, the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1967.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the name of the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART] be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the pending bill provides for a military expenditure of \$58,189,872,000 during fiscal year 1967. This figure is \$525,519,000 more than requested by the administration in the 1967 budget estimates. While this represents a desirable modest reduction in the action recently taken by the House which approved a bill containing nearly a billion dollars more than the administration deemed essential to meet legitimate defense needs, I am firmly convinced that additional cuts are necessary in order to avoid wasteful and needless military spending. My amendment would reduce the procurement and the research and development titles of the bill by 2.2 percent for a total reduction of \$522.5 million—a modest reduction that would bring the bill in line with the administration's budget request.

America ought to have a defense force which is second to none, and fully adequate to meet any reasonable need. However, I believe that the pending bill goes well beyond legitimate defense and security needs. The many millions of dollars which have been added over and above Defense Department requests will not add to our security but, more likely, will weaken our total national strength. These added expenditures will strain an already heated economy, add to inflationary pressures, increase the tax burden, and waste valuable human and material resources that are needed elsewhere. Military waste weakens a nation as much or more than waste in nonmilitary programs.

The Defense Department already has carryover funds in excess of \$42 billion. The bill as reported to the Senate would add an additional \$58.2 billion, representing a total in excess of \$100 billion for military spending. The figure to be appropriated in the pending bill represents more than the combined cost of the total Federal budgets of the New Deal period from 1933 through 1940.

Coming at a time of great economic stress and strain, I do not believe we can justify the expenditure of some \$525 million more than our leading defense officials have told us will cover our legitimate defense and security needs. Wasting money on unneeded military items does not strengthen the nation; it diverts skilled manpower and brains from other national needs and strains our economy and our taxpayers. We owe it to our men who are sacrificing so much in Vietnam to protect the economy of this nation against such waste so that the postwar world will be a time of opportunity for them—not a time of economic distress marked by excessive debt and tax burdens.

I think we tend to forget that the defense of a great nation depends not only upon the quality of its arms, important as that is, but also on the quality of its economic, political, and moral fabric. I deeply regret that even the most ardent economizers—men who vote with zeal to cut funds for education, conservation and health—are so quick to shout "Aye" for more billions for arms. It seems to me that by saving a modest amount of highly questionable military spending for more constructive investments, we will produce a stronger and more effective America, improve the quality of our lives, and strengthen the foundations of peace.

It would be ironic, indeed, if our soldiers returned from pacifying Vietnam to discover that they had not yet pacified Chicago.

The bill before the Senate contains many millions of dollars for questionable military gadgets and weaponry not requested by the Government. One of the most dubious expenditures in this bill is that of \$153.5 million for preproduction activities for the Nike X antiballistic missile system. This system may well cost in excess of \$30 billion. Our very able Secretary of Defense has said that the construction of an antiballistic missile system such as this would not "add measurably to our safety." Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that it would be worthless unless it were accompanied by a complete fallout shelter program, the cost of which might eventually reach \$100 billion. Congress has given no indication of authorizing such a shelter program.

The enormity of such costs is staggering and the benefits of the system are highly questionable. Furthermore, it would doubtless aggravate the arms race and further weaken the economy. I intend to join other of my colleagues in an effort to strike the Nike X funds from this bill—except those reserved for further evaluation—although I want to make it clear that this is not the purpose of my amendment which the Senate now has under consideration.

The amendment which I offer is a very simple one. It proposes a 2.2-percent reduction in each of the 14 items included in titles III—procurement—and IV—research and development—of the bill. These are the two military arms sections of the bill. The total reduction proposed in my amendment is \$522.5 million, or nearly the amount which has been added by the Senate committee over the 1967 budget requests.

This amendment does not require the Secretary of Defense to cut out any of the particular items which have been added by the Senate. It reduces the bill to the size suggested by the administration and gives the Secretary of Defense the authority he needs to cut out a little of the fat in our gigantic Pentagon empire—the empire which former President Eisenhower referred to in concerned terms as the growing military-industrial complex. President Johnson has urged private industry to avoid new, nonessential expenditures for capital plant equipment. I do not believe that the Congress should do any less in the field of nonessential military spending.

Of course, it is well known to all Senators that the President has objected in concerned terms to the tendency of Congress to add on expenditures above the amount requested by the administration, because it is adding undue inflationary pressures to the economy which actually jeopardize our security and make it more difficult to meet our commitments at home and abroad.

Moreover, the effect of my amendment is a limited one. The House has already passed a bill providing nearly a billion dollars more than requested in the administration budget. By adopting my amendment which brings the bill down approximately to the level requested in the budget, the Senate will merely be setting the stage for a conference leading probably to an appropriation about half a billion dollars in excess of the budget request. While this result would still be a matter of regret to me, and still above the amounts suggested by the Defense Department, it is a practical fact which ought to be taken into account by the Senate as it votes on this amendment.

Let me say to those Senators who believe that the Appropriations Committee is exactly right in the amount of funds it has recommended, that the practical way to achieve that figure in final congressional action is to adopt my amendment before the bill goes to conference.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe that the pending amendment is sound from every point of view. In the interest of sensible economy and wise defense planning I urge the Senate to approve it.

Let me just say, before I yield the floor, the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Proxmire] is a member of the Appropriations Committee and is an expert on these matters and has given great thought to ways in which needless spending can be eliminated from many aspects of our Government programs. He has been most helpful in guiding my own thinking on this amendment and in helping to shape it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished Sen-

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sional hearings have predicted a U.S. buildup to 400,000 men, or more. General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, has reportedly requested a buildup to 400,000 by the end of December. With that many U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, the cost of the war would run to \$21 billion a year—even more if bombing and tactical air support increased in proportion to the buildup on the ground. At any such level the Vietnam war would bring on economic strains beyond what most economists appears to foresee, and beyond what makers of public policy appear to be anticipating. The strains would surely add to the pressure for higher taxes.

In its Vietnam cost accounting, Fortune had considerable help from outside economists, but no access to classified data. The basic sources were public documents—federal budgets, Defense Department publications, transcripts of congressional hearings. Defense Department officials interviewed were persistently wary of discussing the costs of the war, although the department proved willing to provide some missing bits of factual information that would otherwise have been unobtainable. It turned out that some costs—of ammunition, for example—could be easily calculated from published Defense Department figures. But getting at some other costs required elaborate calculations, and still others could only be estimated. Estimates and assumptions were in all cases conservative. The results, set forth by category below, represent what is probably the first serious effort outside the Defense Department to analyze the costs of the war.

The purpose of the undertaking was not to make a case against (or for) the fiscal 1967 defense budget, but to provide a basis for looking beyond the budget and assessing the potential economic effects of the war. In wartime no defense budget can sensibly be viewed as a hard forecast of defense spending. Actual expenditures during the fiscal year will be determined by unfolding events that no budgeter can foresee months in advance. So far as the economy is concerned, then, what counts is not budget projections but Defense Department orders and expenditures.

The costs and expenditures resulting from a war do not match up in the short run. They rise and decline in different trajectories. In the early phases of any war, the Defense Department can hold down expenditures by drawing upon existing forces and supplies, just as a business firm can temporarily reduce cash outlays by letting inventories dwindle, or a family can cut next month's grocery bill by eating up the contents of the pantry. Later on in the war, expenditures catch up with costs. It must be kept in mind that "expenditures," as used here, means *incremental* expenditures—those that would not be required if it were not for the war.

An idea of the movements of costs and expenditures and defense orders, and their changing economic effects, can be gathered from the following budgetary-economic scenario of a medium-sized war—i.e., a war not very different from the one in Vietnam.

A WAR IN FIVE ACTS

Act I: It looks like a small war, and it requires only smallest incremental expenditures. The forces sent overseas are members of the existing defense establishment, and the Defense Department would have had to pay, feed, and otherwise provide for them if they were doing peacetime duties in Georgia instead of fighting guerrillas in a tropical republic. The weapons, ammunition, and equipment come from existing stocks. The extra expenses (hostile-fire pay, transportation) can be temporarily absorbed in the imminence of the defense budget, and the Ad-

ministration does not have to ask Congress for supplemental appropriations to finance the war. It is being financed, in effect, through "reduced readiness"—that is, the U.S. has fewer trained men and smaller stocks of war materiel to deploy or use in any other contingencies.

Act II: The struggle has expanded, and the armed forces need extra inflows of men and materiel to compensate for the unexpectedly large outflows to the war zone. The Pentagon places contracts for additional arms, ammunition, equipment; it expands draft calls and recruitment efforts. The Administration asks Congress for supplemental appropriations. War expenditures are still only moderate, but with defense orders increasing and inflationary expectations beginning to stir, the war is already having noticeable effects upon the economy.

Act III: The U.S. buildup on the war zone has continued. The Administration has asked Congress for large supplemental appropriations. Spending still lags behind costs, but it is rising fast—the recruits in training have to be paid, and so do the additional civilians hired. The war's economic effects, moreover, are expansionary out of all proportion to the actual increases in defense spending: the surge in defense orders has increased demand for skilled workers, materials, components, and credit in advance of deliveries and payments. To some extent, the Defense Department's materiel buildup is being temporarily financed by the funds that contractors and subcontractors borrow from banks against future payments from the U.S. Treasury.

Act IV: The U.S. military buildup in the war zone tops out. Defense production continues to rise, but the *rate* of rise is much less rapid than in Act III, and the expansionary economic force exerted by the war begins to wane. Deliveries of arms, ammunition, and equipment rolling into military depots more than match the chew-up of materiel in the war, and so some replenishment of inventories takes place. Men are moving out of training and into operating units faster than forces are being sent overseas, and so there is a net buildup of trained, deployable military forces in the U.S. Expenditures catch up with costs.

Act V: The war ends. The drop-off in contract awards and the collapse of inflationary expectations reverberate throughout the economy. Far from falling steeply, expenditures continue to rise a bit before entering into a gradual decline: the incoming deliveries must be paid for, and the men brought into the armed forces must be provided for until they are mustered out. With deliveries no longer partly offset by wartime chew-up, inventories fall rapidly, and begin to overflow. During the period of readjustment, military manpower and military inventories exceed normal peacetime requirements. Expenditures for this excess readiness largely make up for the expenditures deferred through reduced readiness in the early phases of the war.

In January, 1965, the Vietnam war was still in Act I, and to all appearances nobody in the Administration expected an Act II. The President's budget message declared that, with the "gains already scheduled," U.S. military forces would "be adequate to their tasks for years to come." The new budget projected a *decrease* in defense spending in fiscal 1966, and a *decline* in total uniformed personnel. Major General D. L. Crow, then controller of the Air Force, subsequently testified at a congressional hearing that "the guidelines for the preparation of the budget as they pertain to Vietnam were actually a carry-forward of the guidelines that were used in the preparation of the 1965 budget, and they did not anticipate increased activity, per se, in Vietnam."

IT'S NOW ACT III

Not until last May was it entirely evident that Act II had begun, but there were intimations earlier. In January, 1965, after declining for four consecutive quarters, the Federal Reserve Board index of "defense equipment" production turned upward, beginning the precipitous climb depicted at the bottom of the page opposite. In February the U.S. began bombing targets in North Vietnam. In March the decline in Army uniformed personnel came to a halt, though the downtrend continued for a while in the other services. In April the U.S. buildup in Vietnam accelerated. In May the Administration asked for, and Congress quickly voted, a supplemental fiscal 1965 appropriation of \$700 million. In June the decline in total uniformed military personnel turned into a steep rise.

The Vietnam war is now well along in Act III of the budgetary-economic scenario. Since that \$700-million request in May, 1965, the Administration has asked for \$14 billion in supplemental war appropriations. Soaring orders for ammunition and uniforms have contributed to shortages of copper and textiles for civilian use. So far, however, the costs of the war have been largely channeled into reduced readiness. The war reserve of "combat consumables" has been drawn down. New equipment and spare parts that otherwise would have gone to units elsewhere have been diverted to Vietnam—Iroquois helicopters, for example, that would have gone to the Seventh Army in Germany. Fixed-wing aircraft to replace losses in Vietnam have been ordered, but not yet fully delivered and paid for. The war has required only moderate incremental expenditure (that must be understood, however, to mean "moderate" as war expenditures go—a few billion dollars). But as deliveries roll in and the armed forces expand, expenditures will begin to catch up with the war's far from moderate costs.

In numbers of U.S. servicemen deployed, the Vietnam war is not as big as the Korean war at its peak. But costs per man run much higher than they did in the Korean war. The pay that servicemen get has gone up more than 40 percent since then. Some materiel costs have risen very steeply since Korea. The F-86D fighters in Korea cost about \$340,000 each; the F-4C's in South Vietnam cost nearly six times as much. Ammunition use per combat soldier is very much higher than in the Korean war. The M-14 rifle fires up to 150 rounds per minute, and ten rounds per minute at a sustained rate. The M-16, carried by some Special Forces troops, can use up ammunition at a full-automatic rate of 750 rounds per minute. The M-79 grenade launcher fires grenades as if they were bullets.

The nature of the war contributes to making it peculiarly expensive for its size. Technologically sophisticated military forces, magnificently equipped to kill and destroy, are inefficiently employed against meager or elusive targets. In Korea, there were visible masses of enemy forces to shoot at, and the U.S. superiority in weapons could be exerted efficiently; in Vietnam the enemy hits and runs, moves under cover of darkness or foliage. With their abundant firepower, the superb U.S. fighting men in South Vietnam clobber the Vietcong in shooting encounters, but the U.S. forces run up huge costs—in troop supplies, fuel, helicopter maintenance—just trying to find some guerrillas that they can shoot at.

FIRING INTO A CONTINENT

There is an almost profligate disparity between the huge quantities of U.S. bullets and bombs poured from the air upon targets in Vietnam and the military and economic damage the bullets and bombs do, in the aggregate. In North Vietnam the U.S. has de-

barred itself from attacking economically valuable targets such as port facilities and manufacturing plants. From bases in Thailand, F-105's fly over North Vietnam and drop their mighty payloads on or near roads, rail lines, ferry facilities, bridges. The costs to the enemy of repairing the damage are picayune compared to the costs to the U.S. of doing the damage. In South Vietnam the guerrillas seldom present concentrated targets. Machine guns mounted on helicopters and on A-47's (elderly C-47's, modified and fitted with three guns) fire streams of bullets into expanses of jungle and brush that are believed to conceal Vietcong guerrillas. The thought of an A-47 firing up to 18,000 rounds per minute into treetops brings to mind that bizarre image in Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, of the French warship off the African coast: "There wasn't even a shed there, and she was shelling the bush . . . firing into a continent."

B-52's, operating at a cost of more than \$1,300 per hour per plane, fly a ten-hour round trip from Guam to South Vietnam to strike at an enemy that has no large installations or encampments visible from the air. The B-52's have been fitted with extra racks that increase their payloads to more than sixty 750-pound bombs, about \$30,000 worth of bombs per plane. "The bomb tonnage that is resulting is literally unbelievable," said Secretary McNamara at a Senate hearing last January. Several weeks later, at a press conference, he said: "Our consumption in February . . . of air-delivered munitions alone in South Vietnam was two and a half times the average monthly rate in the three years of the Korean war." But much of that "literally unbelievable" bomb tonnage merely smashes trees and blasts craters in the earth.

Only a rich nation can afford to wage war at ratios so very adverse. But the U.S. is a rich nation. If there is a great disparity between the bomb power dropped and the economic value of the targets, there is also a great disparity between the wealth and power of the U.S. and of the enemy. The cost of the bombs is small in relation to the G.N.P. of the U.S., and the damage they do is sometimes substantial in relation to the G.N.P. of North Vietnam, or to the resources available to the Vietcong. But the costs of winning are going to be unpleasantly large.

The official position of the Defense Department is that it does not know what the costs of the war are, and that it does not even try to compute them. As a Pentagon official put it: "We have no intention of cost-accounting the war in Vietnam. Our business is to support the conflict there. Our business is not cost accounting. We have no estimates of costs. It's not practical to say the war has cost x dollars to date."

The Defense Department argues that the war costs are commingled with those of a military establishment that existed before the U.S. troop buildup in South Vietnam began. And that, of course, is true. Still, a meaningful total can be arrived at by analyzing and adding up the various war costs, regardless of whether they translate immediately into added expenditures. One way or another, we may assume, all costs will result in either added expenditures or reduced readiness, and in the reckoning of the costs it does not matter which, or when, or how.

Fortune's first objective was to arrive at an approximation of annual costs at the early-1966 level of 200,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam. The results of that analysis can serve, in turn, as a basis for calculating costs at higher levels of buildup. In what follows, costs are divided into standard categories—military personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement—that the Defense Department uses in its budgeting. To outsiders, the department's assignment of expenses to these categories some-

times seems a bit arbitrary. Some clothing is funded under personnel and some under operation and maintenance; ordinary repair parts are funded under O. and M., aircraft "spares" under procurement.

INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE THEATRE

Military personnel. As noted, the fiscal 1966 defense budget, submitted in January, 1965, projected a moderate decline in total uniformed military personnel ("active forces"), from about 2,663,000 at that time to 2,640,000 as of June 30, 1966. Actually, the decline proceeded so briskly that the total got down to 2,641,000 in May, 1965. Since then the Defense Department has announced plans to increase military personnel to 2,987,000 by next June 30, and to add on another 106,000 by June 30, 1967; by the latter date, the total would be 452,000 above the May, 1965, low point. In addition the department is expanding the civilian payroll by about 100,000 during fiscal 1966, and many of these civilians will take over work previously done by servicemen, freeing them for other duties.

It might appear that these figures could serve as a basis for calculating the personnel costs attributable to the Vietnam war. But it is impossible, without knowing the Defense Department's classified plans and assumptions, to relate the announced personnel increases to any particular force level in South Vietnam. And to have any meaning, statements about the costs of the Vietnam war must be related to specified force levels. Here we are trying to get the cost of the war at a particular level—200,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam. For this reckoning, the war personnel costs may be taken as the combined personnel costs of (1) the 200,000 men in Vietnam, (2) the peripheral supporting forces in Southeast Asia, and (3) the required backup forces. The Defense Department defines personnel costs as pay and allowances, subsistence (chow), personal clothing (the "clothing bag" issued to each recruit), plus certain other expenses. Average personnel costs in the armed forces run to \$6,100 per man per year, but the men in South Vietnam get "hostile-fire pay" of \$65 a month, and other war costs boost the average to about \$6,200. So, 200,000 men at \$6,200 or \$1,240,000,000 a year.

The peripheral supporting forces—mainly aboard Seventh Fleet ships and at bases in Thailand—numbered at least 50,000 last winter, when the U.S. force level in South Vietnam reached 200,000. That's 50,000 men at \$6,200 a year, or \$310 million.

Each thousand U.S. servicemen stationed overseas under non-war conditions have on the average about 600 other servicemen backing them up: trainees, transients, men serving in supply units or performing various auxiliary functions. But it takes far more than 600 men to back up a thousand men deployed in South Vietnam. Additional supply men are required to keep the huge quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies moving into the theatre of war. The men serving there are rotated home after a one-year tour (a three-year tour is normal for U.S. forces in Western Europe), and additional trainees are needed to support the rotation. Extra backup men are needed, also, to make up for the erosion resulting from deaths, severe injuries, and tropical ailments. In the course of a month, large numbers of men spend some days or weeks in transit to or from South Vietnam. And additional men in training require additional men to train them. With all the additions, it works out that there is a ratio of one to one, or 1,000 to 1,000, between servicemen in the theatre of war and servicemen outside the theatre but assignable to the war as elements of cost.

For the 250,000 men in Vietnam and vicinity, then, there will be 250,000 others elsewhere. Since some of these are new recruits the average personnel cost is taken to be only

\$4,700. That makes another \$1,175,000,000, bringing total personnel costs to \$2,725,000,000.

KEEPING THEM FLYING

Operation and maintenance. This category is even more capacious than its name suggests. It includes everything that does not fall into other categories—recruitment, training, medical care, repairs, operation of supply depots, transport of goods, and, in the official expression, "care of the dead." A great many of those additional civilians hired by the Defense Department in the last several months are working in O. and M.

In fiscal 1965, O. and M. for the entire armed forces averaged out to \$4,630 per man. For 500,000 men that would come to \$2,315,000,000. But the Vietnam war entails extraordinary O. and M. expenses. Planes there fly a lot more hours per month than they normally do, and the extra O. and M. involved in keeping them flying runs at a rate of more than \$200 million a year. Extra repair and maintenance are required to keep vehicles moving and equipment working. An enormous logistic flow must be coped with—more than 700,000 tons a month. The shipping costs to Vietnam amount to \$225 million at a yearly rate. Combat clothing gets ripped up in the bush, deteriorates rapidly in the moist tropical heat. And, of course, extra medical care per man is needed in a tropical war. When all the extra O. and M. costs involved are added together, the total, by a conservative reckoning, comes to \$1 billion. That brings the over-all O. and M. costs to \$3,315,000,000.

Procurement, i.e., matériel costs. As reckoned here, these are taken to be the chew-up in the war zone rather than the additional procurement resulting from the war. Ammunition and aircraft losses together account for more than 75 percent of matériel costs, and for both categories the costs can be calculated with some statistical precision.

McNamara reported last January that U.S. ground forces in South Vietnam, including Army and Marine helicopter units, were "consuming ammunition at the rate of about \$100 million per month," and that U.S. air forces were using up "air munitions" (mostly bombs) at a rate of about \$110 million per month. That works out to a combined rate of \$2.5 billion a year. At that time there were about 190,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, so for the calculation of costs at the 200,000-man level, the figure has to be adjusted upward a bit, to \$2,650,000,000.

In testifying at congressional hearings, McNamara and other Defense Department witnesses furnished numerous bits of information about U.S. aircraft operations in the Vietnam war, including losses in 1965 and numbers of sorties over various periods (one flight by one plane counts as one sortie). Sorties per month increased dramatically during 1965, and despite low loss rates per 1,000 sorties, losses added up to large numbers over the course of the year: 275 fixed wing aircraft lost as a result of "hostile action" alone, and 177 helicopters lost, 76 as a result of "hostile action," 101 in accidental crashes and other mishaps. Assuming continuation of 1965 ratios between sorties and losses, estimated annual attrition at a 200,000-man force level works out, in rounded figures, like this:

475 fixed-wing tactical planes,	
at \$1,800,000-----	\$855,000,000
165 other fixed-wing planes	
(transport, observation), at	
\$200,000-----	33,000,000
320 helicopters, at \$250,000--	80,000,000
Total-----	968,000,000

A figure for aircraft spares was arrived at by first calculating total flying costs of the aircraft operations (information on average flying costs per hour for various types of military aircraft is available). That came to

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\$800 million a year. Spares represent, on average, 20 percent of flying costs, which comes to \$160 million. With the addition of a minimal \$25 million to allow for spares required to repair planes hit by enemy fire, the total for aircraft spares comes to \$185 million.

Little information is available about matériel chew-up, apart from ammunition and aircraft. In the absence of direct evidence, however, Defense Department procurement orders provide a basis for rough estimates. It is assumed—and this is a bit of a leap—that the annual attrition of weapons, vehicles, and equipment is equivalent to one-third of the increase in procurement orders in those categories (as measured by the increase in prime contract awards from the second half of 1964 to the second half of 1965). From that procedure emerges a round figure of \$600 million for attrition of hard goods other than aircraft, ammunition, and ships (in effect, ship losses are assumed to be zero). That brings total procurement to \$4.4 billion.

The three categories together—military personnel, O and M., procurement—add up to \$10,440,000,000. That is the approximate annual cost of the U.S. operations in the Vietnam war at the 200,000-man level reached early this year. To that figure must be added support for South Vietnamese military forces. For fiscal 1967, military assistance to South Vietnam will be included in the defense budget.) Counting supplemental requests, total military aid to South Vietnam comes to more than \$1 billion in the current fiscal year. In the early 1960's, military aid to South Vietnam ran to something like \$100 million a year; the \$900-million difference can be considered a Vietnam war cost. In addition, the U.S. pays \$50 million to help support South Korean forces in South Vietnam.

Much of the \$1.4 billion that Congress has appropriated in fiscal 1966 for military construction in Southeast Asia has to be counted as part of the Vietnam war cost. According to Secretary McNamara's testimony at a Senate hearing, all of the contemplated construction "is associated with the operations in South Vietnam." Some of the facilities may have military value to the U.S. after the war is over, but it seems reasonable to suppose that at least \$1 billion of the planned construction would not have been undertaken had it not been for the war. If that is spread over two years, construction adds \$500 million a year to the cost of the war.

That brings the grand total to \$11.9 billion a year. This figure does not allow for an important deferred cost, depreciation of equipment. Since the Defense Department does not pay taxes or operate in terms of profit and loss, the business-accounting concept of depreciation is hard to apply, but the wearing out of equipment is a reality whether it is cost-accounted or not. This wear-out is a separate cost from the additional maintenance and repair required to keep planes and ground equipment operating in the Vietnam war. Tactical planes and Military Airlift Command planes involved in the war are flying 60 percent more hours per month than they normally do in peacetime, and even with extra maintenance their useful lives are being shortened. The consequences will show up in future defense budgets.

In addition, the war imposes substantial nonmilitary costs that are not included in the \$11.9 billion (or in the other war-cost figures that follow). U.S. economic aid to South Vietnam, for example, leaped from \$269 million in fiscal 1965 to \$621 million in the current year.

MORE MEN FOR PATROL, SEARCH, PURSUIT, ATTACK

The \$11.9 billion may be taken as the annual military cost of sustaining the war with 200,000 U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam—the level reached around February 1. Given

that yardstick, it is a relatively simple matter to cost out the present level (about 235,000 in South Vietnam). It can be assumed that costs have increased since February in direct proportion to the buildup, except that construction costs and military aid to South Vietnam remain unchanged. So calculated, the current cost works out, at an annual rate, to \$13.7 billion—the "more than \$13 billion" mentioned at the beginning of this article.

Efforts to project costs at very much higher levels of buildup run into some uncertainties. Costs at the 400,000-man level—the level General Westmoreland is reportedly aiming for by the end of this year—would not be double those at 200,000. For one thing, the expansion of U.S. forces will itself tend to alter the character of the war. Indeed, it has already. The widening U.S. superiority in firepower forced the enemy to cut down on direct assaults by battalions and regiments and revert pretty much to guerrilla warfare. As the number of G.I.'s in South Vietnam increases, the forces needed to guard the coastal enclaves will not have to increase proportionately, so a larger percentage of the total combat-battalion strength will be available for patrol, search, pursuit, and attack operations. Some costs, as a result, will increase faster than the number of U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam—e.g., Fortune has assumed a 5 percent increase in the rates of ground and helicopter ammunition use per 100,000 men.

But in some respects costs would not nearly double as we built up to 400,000. The existing construction plans, for example, provide for port facilities, roads, and installations beyond current requirements. Costs of supporting South Vietnamese forces would not double either—South Vietnam's military and paramilitary forces already number about 600,000 men, and an increase of even 60 percent could not be squeezed out of a total population of 16 million. (An increase to 670,000 has been announced, however, and some upgrading of the military equipment and supplies furnished by the U.S. will undoubtedly occur.) Bombing and tactical air support operations would probably not double either: lack of runways would prevent that large an expansion.

In Fortune's calculation it was assumed that the 100 percent increase in U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, from 200,000 to 400,000, would be accompanied by these less than proportionate increases: 50 percent in bombing and tactical air-support operations; 10 percent a year in construction costs; 15 percent in military aid to South Vietnam.

On these exceedingly conservative assumptions, the costs at 400,000 come to the re-sounding total of \$21 billion a year.

To calculate Vietnam war costs during fiscal 1967 it is necessary to make some assumptions about the pace of the buildup. Fortune assumed that U.S. forces in South Vietnam would increase to 250,000 men by this June 30, expand steadily to reach 400,000 as of December 31, and then remain at that level. On this basis the prospective Vietnam war costs during fiscal 1967 work out to \$19.3 billion.

USED-UP OPTIONS

The \$58.3-billion defense budget for fiscal 1967 includes, by official reckoning, \$10.3 billion in expenditures resulting from the Vietnam war. With a buildup to 400,000 in fiscal 1967, war expenditures during the year would greatly exceed this figure, but would not necessarily boost total defense spending as much as \$9 billion. For one thing, Secretary McNamara can cut somewhat further than he already has into programs not directly connected with the war.

But not very far; McNamara's options for deferring expenditures in fiscal 1967 have been pretty well used up. The 1967 defense budget shows a total of \$1.5 billion in cutbacks in military construction, strategic-missile procurement, and other non-Vietnam

programs. In view of McNamara's economizing in recent years, there cannot be much leeway left for deferrals. The Secretary himself said not long ago that in shaping the 1967 budget he had deferred "whatever can be safely deferred," which suggests that there is no leeway any more.

He has also largely used up the options for restraining expenditures by drawing down inventories and reducing trained forces outside the war theatre. McNamara has vigorously insisted that "we have a great reservoir of resources," and he is undoubtedly right about that, especially if "a great reservoir" is interpreted to include the potential capacity of the U.S. economy to produce military goods. But he has overstated his case by arguing, in effect, that the Vietnam war has not reduced readiness at all ("... far from overextending ourselves, we have actually strengthened our military position"). Counting peripheral supporting forces, the U.S. now has about 300,000 men deployed in the Vietnam war theatre, and (in keeping with that one-to-one ratio) another 300,000 men are committed to backing them up. That makes 600,000 men unavailable for other contingencies. Since the low point in May, 1965, U.S. military manpower has increased by approximately 400,000 (this figure allows for substitution of civilians for uniformed personnel), and a lot of those 400,000 are men still in training. It would be remarkable indeed if all this had somehow "strengthened our military position."

Nor is there much left to draw down in military inventories. As shown in the middle row of charts on page 121, Defense Department expenditures for procurement declined sharply in fiscal 1965—by \$3.5 billion, in fact. This decline in procurement apparently contributed to the Army shortages (of repair parts, communication equipment, helicopters, and trucks, among other things) discovered early last year by investigators of the U.S. Senate's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, headed by Mississippi's Senator JOHN STENNIS. Pentagon witnesses tried to explain that the "shortages" were mere routine gaps between reality and ideal tables of equipment. But at one point South Carolina's Senator STROM THURMOND pinned down two Pentagon generals in this exchange:

"Senator THURMOND. You have not denied those shortages, have you, General Abrams

... ?

"General ABRAMS. No.

"Senator THURMOND. And you have not, General.

"General CHESAREK. No.

"Senator THURMOND. You do admit the shortages?

"General CHESAREK. Yes, sir."

The combination of rising Vietnam requirements and thin, declining inventories led last year to surges in military production and orders far beyond what can be inferred from the official estimates of expenditures attributable to the Vietnam war. In the second half of calendar 1965, Defense Department prime contract awards ran \$3.3 billion ahead of the corresponding period of 1964—\$6.6 billion at an annual rate. In contrast, the Defense Department estimates fiscal 1966 expenditures for the Vietnam war at only \$4.6 billion. Anyone trying to catch an intimation of things to come might do well to keep an eye on orders, rather than expenditure estimates. Orders are for real: if you want the stuff delivered in time, you've got to order it in time. But expenditure estimates are not binding upon anybody.

TRYING TO AVOID THE PILE-UP AT THE END

Since they are not for real, budgetary expenditure estimates are an exceedingly unreliable guide to the future. A better guide can be found in requests for appropriations. For the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 combined, the Defense Department has estimated Viet-

nam war expenditures at \$15 billion, but for the same two fiscal years the department has already requested approximately \$23 billion in Vietnam war appropriations.

Big as they look, however, these requests for war appropriations will almost certainly be added to long before the end of fiscal 1967. That probability can be inferred from on-the-record statements by Secretary McNamara and other Defense Department witnesses at congressional hearings.

The Defense Department has based its requests for war appropriations not upon a forecast of what will actually happen in the Vietnam war, but upon what a Pentagon official calls "calculated requirements." In calculating the "requirement" for any procurement item, the department considered the lead time—how far ahead you have to order the item to have it when you need it. For complex or precisely tooled military hardware, lead times may run to a year or more, and for such items—particularly aircraft and aircraft spares—the department allowed fully for expected losses and use-up to the end of fiscal 1967. But for items with shorter lead times, requirements were calculated tightly, on the assumption that later on they could be revised and McNamara could ask for supplemental appropriations.

Supplemental appropriations have come to be viewed as natural in wartime. And McNamara's policy of asking for funds "at the last possible moment," as he puts it, has its merits. By following that policy he hopes to avoid "over-buying" and any pile-up of surplus materiel at the end of the war. (When the Korean war ended, the military establishment had billions of dollars worth of excess goods in stock or on order.) But the policy implies that the Defense Department will have to ask for more funds before the end of fiscal 1967 unless there is some unexpected abatement in the war.

Of necessity, the 1967 defense budget was constructed upon working assumptions about how big the war will get and how long it will last, and given all the uncertainties, these cannot be expected to coincide with the realities. In estimating expenditures and appropriations for fiscal 1967, the Defense Department assumed that U.S. "combat operations" in Vietnam will not continue beyond June 30, 1967. In keeping with that assumption, the 1967 budget does not provide funds for orders of aircraft or other military goods to replace combat losses after that date. Here again the assumption implies that the Defense Department will need supplemental appropriations in fiscal 1967 if the war continues at even the present rate.

McNamara has not said in public what U.S. force level in South Vietnam is allowed for in the 1967 budget, and the explanations he has offered at congressional hearings have been deleted by Pentagon censors. But at a Senate hearing in January, General John P. McConnell, the Air Force chief of staff, indicated that, for the Air Force at least, the appropriations requested so far allow for little or no expansion of the war beyond the 200,000-man level. Said McConnell in reply to a question concerning the adequacy of the funds requested: "We don't have any problem if the war continues at about the same rate as now, Mr. Chairman."

These budgeting assumptions expressed and implied by McNamara and other Pentagon witnesses lead to a strong inference: by next January, if the war continues unabated until then at even the present rate, the Defense Department will have to ask for supplemental appropriations for long-lead-time items required in fiscal 1968 and shorter-lead-time items required in the last months of fiscal 1967. Some months before next January, indeed, perhaps this summer, the department will have to begin ordering very-long-lead-time items in anticipation of fiscal 1968 combat losses.

MOUNTING ASTONISHMENT AT THE BAD NEWS

It follows that if the U.S. buildup in South Vietnam proceeds to a much higher level, the supplemental requests will run into many billions before the end of fiscal 1967. And since the military establishment will have to procure a lot of additional equipment and supplies and bring in a lot of additional men, defense expenditures will rise billions of dollars above the estimate submitted last January.

So the 1967 budget barely begins to suggest the level of Vietnam war spending that probably lies ahead. The budget is not misleading once its rather sophisticated underlying assumptions are understood; but the assumptions are not widely understood, and the Administration has not made much of an effort to see that they are. There is likely to be mounting astonishment this year and next as the bad news about the war's costs and the implied message about taxes and inflation sink in. It's a good bet that Americans will still consider the war worth winning. There is no reason for them not to know its cost.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I am so glad the Senator from Pennsylvania is asking these questions and asking them of a reliable source, a member of the committee, because I am sure the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] will tell us everything he is privileged to tell us with regard to the matter.

But I think the Senator's questions are very pertinent on the pending bill.

I shall not vote for the pending bill. I shall not vote for any bill that appropriates one single dollar to continue this war, because I happen to believe that I have a trust to exercise the check of the purse strings upon a President who does not send us a recommendation for a declaration of war, and therefore, in my judgment, continues to act completely outside the Constitution. Although at the present time strong public opinion would seem to support it, the people in the general public who are supporting it do not have the trust that I have to sit in the Senate and maintain an oath to uphold the Constitution.

I think when we start exercising the check of the purse strings, we will then force this President to get back within the framework of the Constitution, and we will stop the slaughter of these men in South Vietnam, which in my judgment we cannot possibly justify.

But that represents honest differences of opinion among us as to what our positions should be, and I think the Senator from Pennsylvania is performing a very much needed service this afternoon by asking these questions.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator from Oregon.

I wonder if the Senator from Mississippi is now prepared to respond to my question.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator prefer for me to restate the question?

Mr. STENNIS. I wish the Senator would restate his question, please.

Mr. CLARK. Primarily what I am searching for is what the Senator can tell me is the cost, direct and indirect, of the Vietnamese war in terms of this

bill. We have the bill broken down, as I said a moment ago, in traditional terms, so much for military personnel, so much for equipment, and the like, which does not provide much information; and I wonder whether, in the course of the hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Appropriations Committee, there was any testimony of a non-classified nature which would enable Senators to have at least a rough idea as to how much of this money would go into Vietnam.

In that connection, I should say to the Senator that while he was engaged in conference with his staff assistant, I put into the RECORD an article which appeared in Fortune magazine in April of this year, which suggests—and I quote the critical portion:

General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, has reportedly requested a buildup to 400,000 by the end of December. With that many U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam, the cost of the war would run to \$21 billion a year—even more if bombing and tactical air support increased in proportion to the buildup on the ground.

Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator has asked a very fine question. It is one that I have pursued, to some extent, in the hearings. Of course, the figures change from month to month, and it is virtually impossible to fully identify all the figures in the bill that would apply to the Vietnam war.

The reason for that is obvious: Many of the costs that are going on, that are directly connected with the war, are nevertheless items that we would have to spend if we were not over there. Those costs represent such items as expended material that would be used at home, or in training, and a number of other items.

But in this bill, the very best that the clerk can identify it—and he is excellent; he has been doing this for years—there are in the bill now items identifiable as being directly for the South Vietnam operation, certainly, amounting to \$8.8 billion.

Expressed in expenditures from appropriations in this bill and the military construction bill the identifiable total is \$10.3 billion.

That is a figure that is definitely identifiable, and that is a rockbottom figure. We know that that is correct. Other items could be added, and there would be some debate as to whether they should be or not; and perhaps the Pentagon would deny that they should.

But I think this figure I have given of \$10.3 billion, including the sum for military construction, would be agreed to by even the most conservative people.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator for his candid answer. Would it be fair to say that the figure the Senator has given me is the direct cost of Vietnam, exclusive of what must be very large indirect costs?

Mr. STENNIS. I think that is correct. I would put it this way: We feel that in this bill there is that much, directly identifiable, that would not be expended if it were not for the war in Vietnam.

That is not enough, though, to run the operation for 12 months. As the Senator understands, there will be a supple-

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mental request on top of the figures I have mentioned.

Mr. CLARK. That interests me. Did the Senator obtain any indication which he can reveal, from either the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as to how much the supplemental appropriation will call for, or was that one of those things where we have to wait and see what happens?

Mr. STENNIS. The Joint Chiefs cannot give us figures like that. They do not keep up with that part. They have that general information, but the Secretary of Defense, or his comptroller would have to provide the figures.

I asked the Secretary of Defense, when he was last before the subcommittee, if he would give us a very loose, general estimate, that he would not be bound by in any way, and we would understand it was the loosest kind of an estimate, as to what he thought the supplemental request would be for this fiscal year; and he respectfully declined to undertake in any way to give us such a figure.

I pointed out then, I think, that our committee, in our thinking, was at least entitled to some kind of an estimate, although I knew that he should not be held to it.

But he does not know what will be the results of air battles, or how many planes will be shot down, for instance. They gave us estimates and give the public estimates as to how much they are going to save by ammunition that they are not going to have to buy. But we cannot get any figure here, even for our own thinking. I would feel better if they would just tell the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts what they thought it might be.

I do not mind giving the Senator the benefit of my ideas. The chairman of the committee, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has recently said that, in his opinion, the cost is approximately \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion a month.

Mr. CLARK. That is without any further buildup.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. That is at the present level. I think that estimate is low enough based upon what I know about it. However, it is an estimate.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, can the Senator tell me the total number of men in the Army, Navy, and Marine force now engaged in Vietnamese operations?

Mr. STENNIS. I do not have a breakdown on the number of men in each service. However, on the mainland of southeast Asia there are now over 300,000 men. Most of those are Army personnel. It is generally estimated that at least 50,000 additional men, including those in the Navy and the Air Force, are in the area. That goes to make up the force that is actually present.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, would that include the B-52's based on Guam and the supporting crews?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. That includes the Navy, the Air Force, and all the other members of the service, wherever they are, in the theater of general operations.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, does the Senator have any ideas as to whether the administration contemplates increasing that force in the foreseeable future?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is familiar with the announcements that have already been made. There is some buildup going on. We are having additional calls for the draft.

I intend to give the Senator the direct facts. I am one of those who believe that we are involved in a situation in which we must move and move faster and harder than we have been doing or are doing. We must hit them with sufficient force.

I think the Senator is entitled to the facts. I think the people are entitled to the facts as far as the facts may be disclosed, consistent with security.

There will be a buildup. I believe that it will run approximately 400,000 men by January 1. That is my estimate. I do not know whether that figure is contained in the magazine articles or not. However, I am satisfied that the figure will be approximately that.

I made that statement almost a year ago. I was not a prophet. I do feel that a buildup is necessary and that it will be perhaps above that figure.

Mr. CLARK. I remember the statement being made at the time. Very few were willing to believe the statement. We thought the Senator was being extravagant in his suggestion. However, the Senator has turned out to be exactly correct.

In view of what the Senator has said, would he agree with the estimate contained in the Fortune magazine article, considering the level at which the Senator has testified we are now operating, and the increase which the Senator believes will be taking place, that a figure of \$21 billion a year for the cost of the Vietnamese operation is not far out of line.

Mr. STENNIS. I believe that would be approximately correct. However, I shall come back to that.

The chairman of the House Appropriations Committee has made a public statement to the effect that he thought the supplemental bill at the first of the year would be approximately \$10 billion.

Mr. CLARK. And that would be largely for Vietnam; would it not?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. That would be \$10 billion more for the war. That would be the requested amount to be added to this \$10.3 billion contained in the bill.

I think frankly that is certainly low enough. I believe there will be a minimum of \$8 billion to \$10 billion in the supplemental bill. I would not be surprised if it would be more than that amount. That would be added to the \$10.3 billion in these bills. So, I think that \$21 billion-plus would be a reasonable estimate. However, it is purely an estimate.

I have no inside information that I am not disclosing.

I believe that the big question concerns how far we should go in building up the Army beyond its present size and

strength. As I said this afternoon in debate, the question concerns a manpower problem. It is going to increase, and I think personally that we will have to have a further buildup of the Army. I would not try to estimate how much.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I realize that the Senator is under the necessity of leaving the Chamber very shortly. I do not intend to detain him. However, I wonder if the Senator would agree with these statements from the Fortune magazine article which I had printed in the Record. The first statement reads:

Each thousand U.S. servicemen stationed overseas under non-war conditions have on the average about 600 other servicemen backing them up: trainees, transients, men serving in supply units or performing various auxiliary functions. But it takes far more than 600 men to back up a thousand men deployed in South Vietnam.

Then he gives the reason. He then says, referring to last April:

For the 250,000 men in Vietnam and vicinity, then, there will be 250,000 others elsewhere. Since some of these are new recruits, the average personnel cost is taken to be only \$4,700. That makes another \$1,175,000,000, bringing total personnel costs to \$2,725,000,000.

Would the Senator agree that this backup situation, as I have read it, is accurate?

Mr. STENNIS. I would rather not try to put any figures of mine against those figures. The backup requirement in Vietnam is very heavy.

Mr. CLARK. It is a good deal heavier than it is in Europe, is it not?

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. That is due to several obvious factors. There is approximately 9,000 miles distance involved in one situation and 3,000 miles involved in the other.

Mr. CLARK. In addition to that, the men in Vietnam are engaged in a shooting war and that must run up the cost.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. The cost is very much different if it is viewed in that light. I was thinking in terms of the distance involved. The backup requirements involved in the kind of battles they engage in and everything involved in the entire situation is very heavy.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, enormous sums are being spent to bolster and hold up the South Vietnamese economy. The AID expenditure involves a very significant figure. The pacification program, if we are ever going to hold the territory long enough to try to pacify it, would also add additional hundreds of millions of dollars at least to the amount we are talking about.

Mr. STENNIS. I do not discount the effectiveness of these local troops involved there. They are doing some very fine work, and they are very effective soldiers because of the equipment that we have with which to train them.

Mr. CLARK. I have no doubt of that. I did not intend to question that.

Mr. STENNIS. I thought that we ought to mention that our tremendous backup is in spite of the fact that they are doing a good job.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, we are paying them.

Mr. STENNIS. We are supplying and carrying most of the money load. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CLARK. That is what is called defense support, because their economy would collapse unless we directly or indirectly assisted them.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is correct. We are carrying most of the money load.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense was quoted the other day as saying that he expects to lose 580 aircraft in air warfare over Vietnam this year. I believe he said—and the Senator will correct me if I am wrong—that the average cost of the aircraft was \$1,200,000.

I noted in a Philadelphia paper the other day that last week an entire squadron of 25 F-105's were shot down or otherwise made inoperable over North Vietnam.

Did the Secretary of Defense give that type of information to the committee?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I shall be glad to read to the Senator directly from the Secretary's testimony, which is on page 701, part 2, of the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. This testimony was given on August 1, so it is a very recent statement.

Senator YOUNG. I assume that will be a money loss of between \$400 and \$500 million.

They were talking losses of planes.

Secretary McNAMARA. The losses per year are running around 400. If we continue at our present rates, in fiscal year 1967, attack aircraft losses will run around 580 more in total than in fiscal year 1966. Those airplanes are worth roughly \$2 million apiece.

Mr. CLARK. May I correct the Record? I said \$1.2 million. I am sure the Senator is correct. I will make that roughly \$2 million each.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Continuing with answer of Secretary McNamara:

So that it is about \$1.2 billion. I would think it terms of aircraft losses per year at the present rate.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.

Did the Secretary or any of the Joint Chiefs give the committee any indication or any rule of thumb by which they can determine how many American boys will be killed or wounded for every aircraft that is destroyed?

Mr. STENNIS. No; we do not have any calculation like that.

These estimates on the planes are based upon the type of bombing that we are doing and the experience of the casualties there in planes. But there is no estimate about the men.

Mr. CLARK. I have asked the Defense Department to furnish me with the experience to date in terms of casualties for aircraft shot down. Within a rather wide range of possible error, and taking into account the fact that many of these aircraft, such as the B-52's, have multiple crews, and also taking into account the fact that a number of the pilots are saved even though the aircraft is shot down, it appears to run somewhere in the

nature of one and a half casualties for every aircraft shot down. Would that surprise the Senator?

Mr. STENNIS. On the B-52's, first, the Senator knows that we have lost so few. As I recall, we have lost only one or two of the B-52's.

Mr. CLARK. What is the present crew of a B-52?

Mr. STENNIS. Four men compose the normal crew of a B-52.

Mr. CLARK. How about these fighter aircraft—

Mr. STENNIS. One or two, depending on the type of aircraft. I do not believe the average loss there is one and a half per plane shot down, but I do not have any figures on that. If the Defense Department says that is it, as far as I know, that sounds high enough.

Mr. CLARK. What is the situation with respect to helicopters?

Mr. STENNIS. They usually have a full crew of 3, and casualties on those would not average as high as with the fighter craft. However, I do not have any figures in mind. A great number of those men were saved—greater than the situation with respect to the planes.

Mr. CLARK. My final question—and I apologize for detaining the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. That is all right.

Mr. CLARK. Is it not true that the major air casualties have been sustained through the bombing in the north and not in the bombing in the south? Now, there may be a qualification with respect to helicopters, but in terms of fighter and bomber aircraft, is that not correct?

Mr. STENNIS. That is not true with respect to the helicopters. Barring accidents, most of the losses elsewhere are around these fortified areas; and these losses picked up, the Senator will notice, when we went into these new target areas, and they are defended well.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator very much for his indulgence in staying here, and wish to say that there is no necessity for him to stay any longer.

Mr. STENNIS. That is all right. If the Senator has any more questions I can answer, I shall be glad to do so.

Mr. CLARK. I am most grateful to the Senator for his courtesy.

Mr. President, I had the opportunity not long ago to have breakfast with a perfectly splendid young Navy pilot who had recently returned from Vietnam, where he had flown a great many missions. He was most articulate, obviously a wonderful American boy; and on the occasion when I talked to him, he was well chaperoned by, I believe, two three-star Marine generals, three admirals and vice admirals and an Under Secretary of the Navy. He handled himself extremely well, but I am sure he did not say anything that they were not prepared to have him say.

The net result of what he told several Congressmen and myself was that the missions which he had flown over South Vietnam were really pretty much milk runs, where the danger of being injured or killed or shot down was pretty slight; but that when they went over North Vietnam, that was something else again. He said that as they got below 4,000 feet, it looked as if every tree had a machine-

gun and automatic rifles in it. He said that the North Vietnamese are pretty good marksmen. If the American planes go above 4,000 feet, they are in danger of being hit by one of the Russian missiles. The pilots say a little prayer every time they go up there, and hope that they will come back safely.

Mr. President, I have many more comments to make, and I wish to state for the Record that I have no objection to a vote taking place on the McGovern amendment at an hour tomorrow which will be convenient for most Senators.

However, as I have told the majority whip, I am under compulsion to preside at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Poverty, to mark up the administration's very important poverty amendments, which will meet at 9:30 tomorrow.

I cannot in good conscience agree to any vote on the McGovern amendment or on my own amendment, which will follow it, before, let us say, 12:15. I hope that the majority leader will be back tomorrow, and if he is not, that the majority whip will take into account the necessity for advancing this important legislation.

However, if there is an effort made to force a vote before 12:15, I will be reluctantly required—and it will be very reluctantly—to exercise such rights as I have, even at the expense of the poverty hearing, which I hope I will not be forced to exercise, to prevent such a vote.

I would certainly like to cooperate in getting a vote on the McGovern amendment shortly after noon and having the debate on my own amendment, not to extend, under the unanimous-consent agreement, for more than an hour. So, with any luck, I would be hopeful of cooperating and getting this bill disposed of by 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

I may say, in all good humor and slightly in a lighter vein, that in my 10 years in the Senate I have learned from colleagues of my dear and good friend, the majority whip, who come from the same section of the country that he comes from, one or two of the tricks or privileges, shall we say, of individual Senators. I shall say no more, but only hope that my comments will be read in the Record tomorrow, before drastic plans are made for getting this vote through before noon tomorrow.

Mr. President, finally I wish to state for the Record my strong support of the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGovern] and to express my belief that he has made a most cogent and persuasive argument in support of the amendment which he has offered.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have been asked to request unanimous consent, since there was no period for the transaction of routine morning business today, that it be in order to lay before the Senate messages and communications, receive bills for introduction and refer them, and to print various routine matters in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Sisk's curve ball which derailed Home Rule without such an up and down vote.

We are confident that Home Rule will win on a conference report rollcall in the House if the President gives this vote the same support he gave the discharge petition last year. Even without any increase in Republican support, there are sufficient Democrats who voted with Sisk to carry the Conference report for Home Rule. Our count shows sufficient votes to win this battle—but only if the President gives Home Rule priority backing.

In a message to the D.C. Democratic Central Committee at its pre-election rally on November 1, 1964, the President said: "The number one priority for the District of Columbia is home rule. Local self-government is the very basis of democracy. Our platform pledges home rule . . . I believe in home rule, and I pledge you here and now the best efforts of the next Administration to provide local self-government for the District of Columbia." The residents of the District accepted the President's pledge and did their part in response to that pledge; they supported the President by an 85% vote. We respectfully and confidently ask the President to redeem his pledge now. With the President's active help, this battle will be won.

PROGRAMS FOR PEACE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Programs for Peace," published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for August 15, 1966.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PROGRAMS FOR PEACE

The recent flurry of official hints of a large American troop buildup in Viet Nam and talk of the possibility of invading the North have seemingly given way to an attitude of receptivity toward negotiations, and we fervently hope this signals a trend. Even U.S.-sponsored Premier Ky of South Viet Nam has more or less reversed his July position on the need for an invasion as an alternative to a war of five to 10 years duration.

The instructions given by President Johnson to Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman to explore every indication that Hanoi might be seeking peace are a favorable development, though in this connection it is regrettable that Cambodia has cancelled Mr. Harriman's scheduled visit to that country. Also, the possibility is reported from the United Nations that the General Assembly which meets next month may demand an end of the bombing of North Viet Nam and a start on negotiations.

Mr. Harriman has been directed to devote full time to his assignment and presumably will study recent proposals for bringing the adversaries together. One of these has been proposed by the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, who suggested an Asian "peace for Asia committee" to arrange a conference on Viet Nam. French President De Gaulle has a plan. There have been several other peace plans proposed recently, in fact a quite sufficient number to counter a frequent Administration statement that no one has proposed a practical program.

One plan that Mr. Harriman might well consider seriously is set forth in the August issue of *Harper's* magazine by Anthony Eden, the Earl of Avon and former British Prime Minister, who was co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva conference on Viet Nam. Mr. Eden advances a 12-point program, starting with the Geneva agreements as a framework and including a cease-fire and guarantees of neutrality for the Indochina states.

In the same issue of this magazine James MacGregor Burns, political scientist and bi-

ographer of President Kennedy, calls for the creation of an economically viable "core" area in South Viet Nam, gradual reduction in military operations and increased economic aid; a "silent armistice," he says, could lead to a cease fire. In *Look* magazine for Aug. 9 Hans Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. outline peace procedures.

Then there are the standing four-point proposal of UN Secretary General U Thant and the official position of the United States as represented in its 14 points. There is, in short, no lack of working proposals, some perhaps impractical, on which the Administration may draw. The Administration ought to be stimulating discussion of peace proposals, rather than, at times, seeming to be preparing the ground for more escalation.

It is wrong to say there is no practical plan for a negotiated peace, and it is wrong to believe that Hanoi will not respond to peace overtures. If the North Viet Namese were convinced the United States wanted peace more than escalation we think there would be a different attitude in Hanoi. Why not turn the national attention to discussion of peace proposals, and then take concrete steps to prove our sincerity.

Mr. MORSE. I think it is important that information of this type be printed in the RECORD, because the administration's spokesmen continue to misrepresent the position of those of us who are opposed to this war by saying we have no counterproposal. Of course, we have had counterproposals. We have offered them in this historic debate time and time again, for more than 3 years. Others in the country have offered counterproposals. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch is offering them in the editorial to which I have just referred.

PRESERVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, on the assumption that we would be able to finish the Defense appropriations bill in 1 day, as we have so frequently done in the past, I scheduled for this afternoon a brief comment on the so-called open housing provision of the Senate civil rights bill, and having sent on yesterday to Virginia papers a synopsis of my prepared remarks, it is now too late for me to cancel the plan to deliver them.

While I have seldom, during the discussion of an appropriation bill, discussed issues that were not germane, I can truthfully say that what I propose to say about title IV of the Senate civil rights bill is not wholly unrelated to the pending discussion of how much we should spend on the defense of our own country; on a war in which we are engaged in southeast Asia, and on the defense from aggression of allies and friends in many foreign countries. The civil rights theme I propose to discuss is the preservation of constitutional liberty. Certainly, the primary purpose of a military establishment to protect us from invasion is to preserve constitutional liberty because as the world is now constituted, we have no reasonable fear of attack from any source except from the type of a former Communist leader who once said of the free world: "We will destroy you."

The military commitments that we have made to NATO; to SEATO and the North American Alliance is not quite so

specific. We agreed, when requested so to do, to help defend them from aggression, presumably, of course, the same type of aggression which might possibly be directed against our country.

We have before us the largest military bill in our history, but it could have been \$15 or \$20 billion larger had the committee included everything that the military experts thought that they needed or could profitably use and it should be clearly understood that the \$58 billion plus of the pending bill will by no means take care of what will certainly be an accelerated war effort in southeast Asia. Undoubtedly, there will be a supplemental bill for that war effort ranging from \$10 to \$15 billion, depending upon the rate at which our efforts to win that war may be accelerated. And, in addition to what is contained in the present military bill for foreign military aid, we will soon have a foreign assistance bill which will contain a very substantial amount of military assistance for our foreign allies.

One of our most scholarly Presidents was Woodrow Wilson. He had a vision that by precept and example we could induce enough nations of the world to adopt our form of representative democracy to prevent future wars. Therefore, when urging our Nation in 1917 to come to the help of France and Great Britain against the aggression of a German emperor, he coined the frequently repeated phrase, "To make the world safe for democracy." Since then, we have a Second World War; a costly war in Korea; there have been numerous armed clashes among other nations, usually referred to as brush wars. In a gigantic effort to physically rehabilitate first our allies and then every other nation that asked for financial aid, we have loaned and given away at least \$117 billion and are planning a continuation of that aid program for the foreseeable future. Yet we are no closer to making the world safe for democracy than we were in the days of Woodrow Wilson. We can, of course, temporarily protect an ally from Communist invasion as we did a few years ago in South Korea, but we have had to keep two Army divisions there ever since, and so far we have been unable to induce the voters of South Korea to adopt our form of representative democracy. Through blood, sweat, and tears, we can ultimately protect South Vietnam from the present threat of Communist control. But, will that make South Vietnam safe for democracy?

I respectfully suggest that the only way in which the type of military power we now possess will ever make the world safe for democracy is to protect people who inherently prefer to be free long enough from Communist invasion to give them a chance to be convinced that the reason we are the freest as well as the most prosperous people in the world is because of the kind of government that we have.

Nineteen days before the Continental Congress adopted our Declaration of Independence, the people of Virginia, through their representatives assembled in Williamsburg, adopted a Bill of Rights drafted by George Mason which indicated the kind of government that Vir-

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Johnson appointed me to the airlines dispute Emergency Board was because of my experiences over the years in connection with the application of the Railway Labor Act.

2. In your article, you state, "When Morse's outspoken oratory goes so far as to threaten impeachment, Johnson rewards him with new powers."

Your reference to my threatening President Johnson with impeachment is completely inaccurate. I have never threatened President Johnson with impeachment. I think I know what you had in mind, but your recollection was faulty. In a speech in the Senate on August 3, 1965, and again in another speech on August 4, 1965, I pointed out that when I went about the country, I ran into talk by some people suggesting impeachment of the President. However, I left no room for doubt in my statements in the Senate that there were no grounds whatsoever for any talk about impeachment. In fact, in one of the speeches, I said that such talk was nonsense.

I have never proposed that President Johnson be impeached. To the contrary, I have answered all mail or all statements made to me about impeachment by making perfectly clear that there is no basis whatsoever under the impeachment procedures of the Constitution for impeaching the President.

I am enclosing in this letter tear sheets from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, containing some of those statements.

3. In your article, you state, "The summer season for labor contract termination and for strikes coincides with the annual fight Senator Morse leads against the Foreign Aid Bill." The article then continues with language which I interpret to mean that you had concluded that the President appointed me as Chairman of the airlines dispute Emergency Board in order to divert my attention from the foreign aid bill.

First, let me say that I am satisfied that there isn't the slightest basis in fact for that inference. In the second place, the record is clear that I have continued to work just as hard this year as I have in the past in opposition to the foreign aid bill. I offered amendment after amendment in the Foreign Relations Committee. I voted against the Committee's final draft of the foreign aid bill as it was reported to the Senate. I spoke against the foreign aid bill in the Senate. I sought to amend it. I voted against it at the time of final passage. At the present time, I am a member of the Senate Conference Committee on the foreign aid bill. The progress of the Conference satisfies me that I will not be able to vote for the Conference Report in the Conference Committee, nor will I be able to vote for it on the floor of the Senate.

4. Although your article does not say so directly, I think some readers may imply from it that the work I have been doing for President Johnson in the field of labor disputes has diverted me from speaking out against the Administration's war in Vietnam. Of course, as the record shows, such is not the case. As the index to the Congressional Record will show, since my appointment to the airlines dispute Emergency Board on April 21, I spoke on the floor of the Senate in opposition to the war in Vietnam on the following dates: April 25, May 9, May 16, May 27, June 2, June 21, June 23, June 29, July 11, July 15, July 18, July 26, and August 12.

Likewise, I have made speeches in criticism of our foreign policy in Vietnam in various places in the country as follows:

April 22: Albany, New York; April 28—Santa Rosa, California;
April 31: Portland, Oregon; June 7—New Bedford, Massachusetts;
June 10: Salt Lake City, Utah; June 18—Chicago, Illinois;

June 19: El Paso, Texas; June 29—Poughkeepsie, New York;

June 30: Chicago, Illinois; July 20—Washington, D.C.;

On August 6, I was in New Haven, Connecticut, where I spoke at a rally for the New England-New York Conference for New Politics. On the platform with me were thirteen candidates running for the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who include in their campaign platforms proposals for de-escalating the war in Vietnam and seeking an honorable peace through existing peacekeeping procedures provided in international law. Among the States represented by these candidates were Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey. I am enclosing a copy of the speech that I gave at that political rally.

Between now and January 1, I already have accepted invitations to speak at public meetings in various parts of the United States, at which I shall set forth my views in opposition to the administration's foreign policy in Asia.

I am sending you these observations in regard to your article, because I feel that I owe it to you to set the record straight regarding my relationships with President Johnson as I know them to be. Also, because of my respect and high regard for you, I thought I owed it to you to try to clarify the misunderstanding that you seem to have concerning the reasons that President Johnson has given me the labor assignments that he has given to me.

Others have commented from time to time concerning their surprise that President Johnson and I have worked together on labor dispute problems in view of our differences over the war in Vietnam. I reply to them by saying that it has been my observation that President Johnson, both when he was Majority Leader in the Senate, and now in the White House, is what we call in American politics a professional when it comes to working with people with whom he agrees on some issues, although he may disagree with them on others. I think he shares my view that those of us in public life should be highly professional in our relationships with each other by never letting our differences on any issue prevent us from working together on other issues.

I think my relationship with President Johnson has been the same in this regard as the relationship between two lawyers. On one day, they can be on the same side of a case and work together on it, but on the next day, they can be on opposite sides and oppose each other with respect to the issues in a case but never permit personal differences to develop between them simply because they do not share the same point of view on the substantive matters involved.

I hope that the next time you are in Washington, you will have breakfast or lunch with me as I would like to visit with you.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

WAYNE MORSE.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Virginia [Mr. ROBERTSON], and then to the Senator from Missouri.

HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., chairman of the Democratic Central Committee of the District of Columbia, held a press conference today, and at that conference he issued a press release on the need for home rule, in which he again called upon the White House to give support to a pro-

posal which I shall introduce in the Senate before adjournment as a rider to the higher education bill, which would seek to have a direct vote on home rule before we adjourn, in both Houses of Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Rauh's press release be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the press release was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY JOSEPH L. RAUH, JR., CHAIRMAN, DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The struggle for Home Rule for the District of Columbia will be won or lost within the next sixty days. If the 89th Congress—the most liberal of this generation—adjourns without enacting Home Rule, it may well be years before self-government comes to the District.

The failure to enact Home Rule can only bring further disillusionment and discontent to our city. Already a large segment of the District's population has nothing but contempt for the leadership of the business community which has blocked Home Rule; soon this deep alienation from the business community will accelerate and spread to other segments of the city.

I refuse to predict riots; such predictions are too often self-fulfilling. But I do warn of an ever-increasing breakdown in the public dialogue by which cities are normally governed and ever-increasing tensions and hostilities defiling and defacing the District of Columbia as the Capital of the Free World.

With no outlet for dissatisfaction and discontent through the political processes of self-government, tensions in our city can only accelerate to and past the danger point. Already we have seen abundant evidence that, as the normal methods of political dialogue and discussion of issues fail, boycotts and confrontations begin to appear as the only means of making oneself heard. As discussion and peaceful protest fail to obtain results, alternative means of achieving recognition for a point of view will become ever more flamboyant, violent and dangerous. What is in store for us without Home Rule is an ever-escalating guerrilla warfare.

Our situation in the District is like one speaking to a foreigner. As one cannot make himself understood, he raises his voice with consequence resentment on both sides. So, as the residents of the Districts cannot make themselves understood by their rulers and accomplish what they believe is needed for themselves and their families, so they, too, will raise their voices and escalate their actions until they are finally heard. As the President said last August 26th: "The clock is ticking, time is moving."

But this calamity of tension and hostility and guerrilla warfare does not have to happen. Home Rule can be enacted before Congress adjourns. Senator WAYNE MORSE will offer a mayor-city council-delegate amendment to the Higher Education bill. This amendment can go through the Senate promptly and easily if it has the public support of the Administration; with Administration support the Higher Education bill can be reported to the floor of the Senate next week and the Morse amendment adopted before Labor Day. Sixty-three Senators voted for an even stronger bill last July; Morse's proposal removes two controversial aspects—the automatic Federal appropriation and partisan elections—and should pass the Senate this time by an even larger majority.

After conference with the House Committee on Labor and Education (which is pro-Home Rule), the matter will go to the floor of the House. This will be an up and down vote on Home Rule. Every up and down vote last year was won by the supporters of Home Rule. The only loss was on Congressman