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ding—for the construction of a secret—as to function and as to cost—Government building in Washington. The General Services Administration—GSA—admitted that negotiated contracts are a “very unusual” procedure which are permitted “only under rare circumstances.” Reliable sources say that this building houses employees of the CIA, but, when the main CIA building was contracted, the Eisenhower administration made full details on construction public. McCloskey bid on that project but was not awarded any share of it.

It is my understanding that in the construction industry it is common knowledge that McCloskey & Co. will almost automatically receive the contract awards. Consequently, many big companies are not even bothering to bid because they know of the cheap, foul, political action that will take place by Government officials to see to it that the former Democrat national treasurer's company will get the contract. Today we have seen a patent and overt example of a corrupt government. There can be no excuse for the General Services Administration's handling of the bids for the Philadelphia Mint.

I was surprised to learn that the General Services Administration would award such a substantial contract to a company which has such a bad reputation. Presently, according to the Department of Justice, McCloskey & Co. are being sued by the U.S. Government for approximately \$5 million. The Department of Justice contends that after a thorough examination of the Boston VA hospital, it was determined that there were so many unauthorized departures from the contract plans and specifications by McCloskey and failures by the architect-engineer properly to inspect and supervise McCloskey's contract performance that local repairs were not sufficient; and that it was necessary to remove and replace the brick outer wall and windows and to construct a new frame to support the new outer wall. The cause of the failure described was the negligence of McCloskey & Co. in the performance of the construction contract. The Government has been damaged in the approximate sum of \$5 million.

On one hand, our Government is suing this company for \$5 million because of its negligence and poor construction of a Government building. On the other hand, it is improperly, in my opinion, entering into new contracts for the construction of a \$12 million building in Philadelphia. No reasonable man would enter into a contract of this nature after he had been damaged so severely and extensively because of his dealings with McCloskey.

I am appalled by the evidence that has been compiled in the McCloskey case and would hope that honest men in our Government would rise above the political pressures of the White House and see to it that the law was obeyed in issuing contracts. I thank the Senator from Delaware for his diligence and his determination in this matter.

NATIONAL DRUM CORPS WEEK

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in recognition of National Drum Corps Week, August 20–27, I am proud to salute our American youth for their participation in this pageantry of patriotism. Our Drum Corps are symphonic symbols—symbols that stimulate all of us to have a deeper understanding and a greater appreciation of our history and our heritage. Not only this spirit in sound stands for our history, our Government, our institutions, and our homes but also it represents our courage, our hopes and our visions.

By our support of the ideals for which they march, we as Americans put meaning into their sounds. Not with words as the sound of a tinkling cymbal, but with hearts swelled with gratitude for our inheritance of liberty, and with a steadfast determination to pass on to our children a glorious Government undimmed by selfish act or narrow thinking.

I encourage everyone to participate in the observance of National Drum Corps Week, and to lend support to local Drum and Bugle Corps activities.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this week is National Drum Corps Week and I am glad to join with my colleagues in paying tribute to the many young people who participate in drum and bugle corps activities as well as to their advisers and instructors who contribute significantly to the excellent results these young people achieve.

My own State of Massachusetts is the home of more than 300 drum and bugle corps and we are proud of their contributions to parades and events throughout our State. We are proud, too, of the fine way in which they represent our State at national events. This year Lynn, Mass., was selected as the site of the world open championships. On Saturday the finest performing units in the country participated in this championship competition in Lynn and all reports indicate the event was an outstanding success.

As one who on many occasions has enjoyed watching well-trained drum and bugle corps in action, I am glad to have this opportunity to tell these groups to keep up the good work. Not only do they gain a great deal from the experience of participating in the corps but their community benefits also.

VIETNAM POLICY—STATEMENT OF EDWARD W. BROOKE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this weekend Edward W. Brooke, the attorney general of Massachusetts, released a statement concerning our problems in Vietnam which I think my colleagues will find of interest. It is a thoughtful expression of his views and reflects a careful study of our policies in southeast Asia.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the statement of Edward W. Brooke.

There being no objection, the state-

ment was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

“CREATING A CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATION”—A VIETNAM POLICY STATEMENT

(By Edward W. Brooke, attorney general of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts)

Day by day, the stakes in Vietnam are growing higher and the risks more grave. It is therefore essential that we re-assess the total situation and evaluate the alternatives before us.

Our foreign policy appears to be drifting into a difficult and intractable position. Our goals in Vietnam are still unclear. Our decisions suggest the absence of a comprehensive, long-range policy objective. We appear to be taking piecemeal, spasmodic actions on a day-to-day basis, under the apparent assumption that military requirements leave us no alternative but steady escalation.

Recent reports of a projected American troop commitment of 750,000 men in Vietnam over a period of five years have been widely discussed in the press. These reports disclaimed by the President and Secretary of Defense, nonetheless raise serious questions regarding the “credibility” of the repeated assurances by the Administration that the war is going well and that we are achieving our objectives. The Administration appears to be less than candid in dispelling reports of a quick end to hostilities.

THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR AMERICAN POLICY

As a concerned American and as the Republican candidate for the United States Senate from Massachusetts, I have spoken before, at some length, on our policy and strategy in Vietnam. I have urged a policy that offers hope for a third alternative to the courses of “withdrawal” or “escalation.”

The simple answers of “withdrawal” or “escalation” are unacceptable political choices. Neither is actually a political policy at all, but only an avoidance of real solutions.

A policy of withdrawal would be a denial of the commitment that we have made, publicly and insistently, to the people of South Vietnam. It would be an outright surrender in the test of strength that we have already joined to stop the spread of Communist regimes by force or terror. It would involve not merely a loss of American “prestige,” but, more fundamentally, it would call into question before the world the seriousness of our purpose and the consistency of our policy.

On the other hand, escalation by itself can be a blind, limitless policy that feeds on itself. It can be a policy with no purpose, a military operation in which we gradually relinquish the ability to keep our actions in line with our interests. The inevitable result of escalation is to broaden the issues involved and, consequently, to make the prospect of settlement more and more unlikely. Escalation is a poor substitute of motion for direction, at a price that involves tremendous risks to ourselves and to the whole world.

I believe that a third course is still possible—a course that has as its ultimate objective a negotiated political settlement in Vietnam in accord with the interests of the Vietnamese people and the United States.

I re-affirm my belief that it is not our purpose nor is it in our interest to occupy and run Vietnam. We must recognize the limits upon our role and upon our responsibility. Our policy must be designed to support the South Vietnamese people in their determination of their own future. We have committed forces to protect that choice and to see that the South Vietnamese are guaranteed the means to make their decisions effective.

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Accordingly I have urged: (1) that we do everything possible to encourage the development of viable national institutions—political, economic, and social—in South Vietnam, and (2) that we adopt a military strategy which is both militarily and politically sound over the long period during which we hope to see essential political change in South Vietnam. These I still believe are essential requirements for a successful resolution of the war.

I have stressed the importance of elections to establish a clearly legitimate government in Saigon. For the most part, progress since then toward such elections has been encouraging. Current arrangements call for a national election in South Vietnam on September 11th. The electorate will choose delegates to a constituent Assembly which, in turn, will be responsible for drafting a national constitution. While the election will take place under conditions that are less than fully democratic, we must recognize the serious problems involved in holding any election in a war-torn country whose people have had no real experience with democracy.

While the September election may be less than hoped for as an open test of popular sentiment, it should be an important first step toward the institution of a truly representative and responsive regime.

BUILDING A CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

Beyond our support for the current elections, and the American military commitment to defend the South Vietnamese from aggression, our ultimate goal should remain a negotiated political settlement of the war. The President has repeatedly affirmed that negotiation is the highest priority of our policy, and he has held out a sincere and unconditional offer to sit down at the conference table at any time. *But this has not been enough.*

The challenge to American policy now is to create the political and military conditions that will stabilize a climate for negotiations.

Our political actions must be designed to limit the issues at stake in the conflict to those which can be successfully handled at the conference table. We must help to build the capacity and self-confidence of Vietnamese political forces to deal with them.

Our military actions should be aimed at maintaining our posture in South Vietnam and our potential position of strength at the bargaining table. We should avoid further escalation that will raise the stakes on our part and bring new and more difficult issues into the conflict.

The Administration's "two-sided" policy has held out escalation as the fastest road to negotiation. The evidence to date, however, does not support this assumption. The offer of negotiations combined with decisions to raise the level of hostilities is not a realistic policy for Vietnam—whatever its success has been in winning domestic support in the United States.

We can and we must do more to build a climate for negotiations before the course of the war is completely out of control. I feel that we are dangerously close to that point now.

Specifically I suggest a seven point program for American initiative to increase the prospects for a political solution to the Vietnamese War. These proposals are neither exhaustive nor sufficient in themselves to achieve this objective. But taken together they could give our policy an important new emphasis.

1. We should give priority attention to political development and reform in South Vietnam.

The political institutions of South Vietnam must be capable of handling a negotiated settlement. Moreover, they must be capable of maintaining authority and legitimacy in time of peace. The current political leadership of South Vietnam represents a temporary military rule acceptable only

under the strained conditions of war. I urge that we make every effort to encourage a political leadership based on broad popular consent. I have already indicated that we must support the integrity of the Constituent Assembly elections in September. Further efforts should be made to obtain international monitors at the polls—perhaps from an expansion of the present International Control Commission or from Vietnam's neighboring Asian states, acting under United Nations auspices.

Once the elections have been held, we should give further strong support to the Assembly in writing a workable constitution and in passing authority into the hands of a legislative assembly and a duly elected government. Future elections should be open to all shades of political opinion in South Vietnam. But we should avoid efforts to control the internal politics of South Vietnam or to place American influence behind any one candidate or the leader.

2. In line with this same goal of national stability we should extend and intensify our programs of social and economic reform in South Vietnam.

I wish to express my support for the program of rural reconstruction and pacification in Vietnamese villages, and I urge that the program be expanded to cover as much of the Vietnamese countryside as under control of Saigon. I further urge an expansion of our economic and technical aid to South Vietnam, as well as the assistance of our political experts for the organization of modern government services.

3. We should state clearly and firmly our intention not to expand the war by the commitment of American ground forces to North Vietnam.

We should reject Premier Ky's apparent inclination to carry the ground war northward—and our rejection should be both public and unambiguous. Secretary of State Rusk has made this situation serious by his refusal, at a recent press conference, to rule out the possibility of future American ground involvement in the North. Such an escalation of the war would be extremely costly in terms of American lives and resources. It would place the conflict in Vietnam far beyond any hope of negotiated settlement. I urge, therefore, that the Administration act swiftly to rule out any such eventuality.

4. The International Control Commission should be expanded to provide effective control of the "demilitarized" zone, instituted by the Geneva Conference to separate the two Vietnams.

Military activity has recently been extended into the demilitarized zone in response to the illegal presence of North Vietnamese troops and installations. I fully support the request made by the Administration to members of the International Control Commission that fully guaranteed international controls be set up to preserve the neutrality of the demilitarized zone.

5. We should state definitely our intention not to extend the war to neighboring Cambodia.

We should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia by a careful deployment and use of American forces along its common borders with Vietnam. Yesterday, in reversal of its previous position, the United States conceded that its air units may have bombed a Cambodian village. If this is true, the Administration should offer reparations to the Cambodian people and should take steps to ensure against any further military action against Cambodia.

There are some signs of an improvement of American relations with Cambodia. We should act to preserve Prince Sihanouk's influence as a possible mediator in future negotiations. His position and prestige can serve as a valuable stabilizing force in Southeast Asia.

6. I urge that the Administration specify

the limitations of our air action against North Vietnam and in the South and that these limitations be strictly respected.

Specifically, we must ensure against the bombing of the civilian populations of North and South Vietnam. I am concerned about the reported plans to expand the war into the MeKong delta area at the risk of indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population.

Furthermore we must avoid an escalation of the air war that might trigger direct Chinese or Russian entry into the conflict. Careful limitation of bombing along the Chinese border with North Vietnam is essential. Specifically, bombing should be limited to strategic military targets.

7. Finally, while stressing political development in South Vietnam and the prudent and restrained use of our military power to support our political objectives, we should actively seek and encourage new forums for political discussion and negotiation.

Once we have stabilized the political and military situation, by the patient, consistent application of the political-military policy I have urged, a framework for negotiations may begin to emerge. In the meantime we should give full assistance to the search for a political settlement.

The proposal for an Asian-sponsored peace conference on Vietnam, as suggested by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand, deserves our strong support. As an alternative to the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference, an all-Asia conference would underline the responsibility of the Asians themselves to guarantee their own peace. It would also help to limit the issues involved in a settlement to those that immediately concern the security of Southeast Asia. The "old" issues of the Geneva Conference and the global interests of the major powers would not be as likely to impinge upon the settlement.

The coming challenges to our policy in Vietnam—whether they be on the battlefield, in the streets, at the ballot box, or around the conference table—will require a principled purpose and wisdom seldom demanded of any great power. If we allow events to overwhelm purposes, expediency to replace policy, or emotion to eclipse reason, we shall have failed the test of history. That test of our leadership is still open—as men everywhere watch to see which course the American government and the American people will take.

DO-IT-YOURSELF SECURITY

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, last Wednesday, August 17, 1966, in the Times-Democrat of Davenport, Iowa, one of the leading daily newspapers in Iowa, there appeared an editorial entitled, "Do-It-Yourself Security." The editorial deals with the retirement of the self-employed.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the vigorous editorial of the Times-Democrat.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DO-IT-YOURSELF SECURITY

While many bills pending in Congress would curb or stifle private initiative, some seek to encourage individual industry and thrift.

One such bill is H.R. 10, which passed the House 291-0, and has to do with some changes in the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962. It is pending in the Senate where Treasury Department opposition has kept it bottled up in committee. The Davenport Chamber of Commerce recently passed resolutions favoring the bill

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1948, during a grave crisis in the Grand Alliance, or a discussion of the indications that the "National Committee" of captured German officers was at first intended as a serious signal to the German High Command and only later downgraded to a mere propaganda device. Russia's role in the post-war partition of Germany cannot really be treated without taking note of the Marshall Plan and her refusal to join in.

Laqueur's statement that the Russian leaders who considered terms for sacrificing the East German regime after Stalin's death were a minority from the start is contrary to the best evidence now available. The Rapacki plan of 1958 was not a plan for "military disengagement and a neutral zone free from nuclear weapons," but for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe which would continue to be occupied by the opposing Russian and U.S. forces. The account of West German attitudes toward Eastern Europe, stressing the absence of guilt feelings and indeed of any serious interest, is also superficial and oddly out of date.

Yet these weaknesses are peripheral to the main theme of the book. The real contribution of the final chapters to that theme lies in the account of how, with the German attack, the doctrinaire prejudices of the ruling parties were superseded by a clash involving two entire nations in unprecedented horror and violence. "What Russians and Germans think about each other" has since come to be determined primarily by this experience—the Russian experience of German invasion and crimes, the German experience first of Russian poverty, then of the same crimes and the fear of retaliation, and finally of the Russian counterinvasion and all that followed. Today, the Russian fear of a strong Germany rooted in these events is one of the causes of the persistence of German partition and of the presence of Russian forces in the heart of Europe. This in turn, by maintaining both political conflict between Germany and Russia and a military imbalance in Europe requiring the presence of American forces, is one of the main factors of political rigidity and military tension in the present world. One final irony is that Stalin, by taking the road of German partition, brought about the very alliance of the main part of Germany with the West which he had striven a quarter of a century to prevent. The story of human folly in Russo-German relations, which Walter Laqueur has told so well, is not yet at an end.

VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, one of the most knowledgeable writers about Vietnam is Jean Lacouture. To those who wish to have some understanding of our war in Vietnam, I commend Lacouture's article from the Review of Books entitled "Vietnam: The Lessons of War."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article by Jean Lacouture entitled "Vietnam: The Lessons of War."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

VIETNAM: THE LESSONS OF WAR
(By Jean Lacouture)

"On the long thin coast of Vietnam," wrote John K. Fairbank in the last issue of this paper, "we are sleeping in the same bed the French slept in even though we dream different dreams."

The dreams of course are very different but so are the beds and the dreamers themselves. Let us compare them and see when the end of the night may come.

Nothing could be more valuable for American leaders at the moment than a close examination of the disastrous errors made by the French in Indo-China from 1945 to 1956. To know the faults of a friend may not cure one's own, but from France's experience America might well learn something of what has gone so dreadfully wrong in Vietnam today.

The French had three great dreams for Indo-China and each led them into a different and more ugly phase of the war. At first, in 1946, they clung briefly to the dream of re-establishing their prewar empire in Indo-China. Indeed, for one hopeful moment they seemed to be on the verge of a promising new colonial policy: General Leclerc, sent out to "reconquer" the territory, decided instead to negotiate with the Vietnam revolutionary leader, Ho Chi Minh. Leclerc recognized Ho's Vietnam as a "free state," connected with France, but controlling its own diplomacy, army, and finances. This was the first agreement made between a European colonial power and the Asian revolution—and one of the shortest-lived and saddest in retrospect. For within weeks the intrigues of colonialists in Saigon and Paris and extremists among the Vietminh and its nationalist allies succeeded in scrapping it. The way was now open for France to plunge into full-scale colonial war. But it soon became clear to everybody that this would have been a hopeless venture, doomed from the start by the half-ruined state of France, the lack of an air force and navy, and the disapproval of the Russians and Americans.

At this point the French conceived their second Indo-Chinese dream which led them into a second war, lasting from 1948 to 1951. Now they would transform their colonial struggle into a Civil War. Against Ho's Vietminh they would set in opposition the "independent" Emperor Bao Dai, encouraging him to cultivate his own anti-Communist but nationalist leadership—a policy described by the distinguished scholar Paul Mus as "nationalist counter fire."

Perhaps it might have succeeded if the nationalists had been given a chance to make it work. But their power and prestige and autonomy were always limited. While Vietnamese and French troops died courageously, Bao Dai preoccupied himself with tiger hunting, his ministers with profiteering. The Vietminh methodically liquidated Bao Dai's officials, dominated the countryside, and organized its soldiers into divisions soon after the Chinese Communists arrived on the Northern Frontier in 1950.

After this decisive event and the outbreak of the Korean War, France dreamed once again of transforming the nature of the war in Vietnam, this time into an international conflict with Communism. In September 1951 General de Lattre arrived in Washington to argue that France, faced with Vietminh subversion supported by Communist China, now needed and deserved to have its risks shared. He was given both credits and weapons. But later, in 1954, on the eve of Dien Bien Phu, the French government demanded far more: It requested that several hundred American bombers be ordered to attack the enemy from Manila. To these requests Washington finally responded that "Indochina does not fall without the perimeter of the area vital to the defense of the United States."

We can now admire the wisdom which led President Eisenhower to reject both the agitated appeals of the French and the advice of Admiral Radford and Vice President Nixon, both of whom recommended intervention. But we may well ask why a country not considered of "vital importance" to American interests in 1954 became so in 1965. The Communist camp, after all, is no longer a monolithic force able to exert uni-

fied global pressures as had been the case in 1954. In Korea, moreover, Chinese had recently been fighting American soldiers, something they have since refrained from doing; and missile strategy has meanwhile diminished the importance of local airforce bases. One can only conclude that the diplomatic views of American leaders have hardened during these years. In the light of Mr. Rusk's performance the diplomacy of John Foster Dulles must be reconsidered and credited with an admirable flexibility.

Thus France launched three wars in Indo-China and lost them all. Its allies having refused to provoke a brutal extension of the war in order to avoid a local defeat, France's dream of an International anti-Communist "crusade" collapsed at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. General Giap destroyed France's main combat force; the Vietminh controlled two-thirds of Vietnam; and neither Hanoi nor Saigon were protected from attack.

Ho Chi Minh had offered negotiations six months before this debacle and had been ignored. Now Moscow and Peking were agreeable to an international détente and Washington seemed prepared to accept the consequences of its failure to intervene. Thus at the Geneva conference table in 1954 the Western powers benefited from a certain complicity on the part of Molotov and Chou En-lai: The West succeeded in wresting from the victors half the territory and the larger part of the material wealth of Vietnam. Ho agreed to fall back to the north in exchange for a promise that elections preparing the way for unification would be held in 1956—elections that he had no doubt of winning.

A great deal of confusion surrounds this Geneva settlement. It must be emphasized that the only texts signed at Geneva were the armistice agreements between the French and the Vietminh. No one at all signed the "final declaration" of the conference—both the United States and South Vietnam had reservations about it—and it carried only the force of suggestion. But apart from the North Vietnamese, the French were the only nation that formally guaranteed to carry out the Geneva accords that provided both for partition at the 17th parallel and for election.

And now France committed a new error (its last?), dreaming this time that it might finally leave Vietnam and forget it altogether. Diem, now installed as dictator in the South, wanted the French to quit his country as soon as possible. This was not only because certain French interests were intriguing against him—something that helped strengthen his position as a nationalist leader—but also because the French Army was the only force that could compel him to hold elections in 1956. In the event, the French quickly yielded and the last of their army departed in April 1956.

The consequences of this final French error were, and remain, enormous. Diem was now free to declare himself free of all the Geneva obligations and soon did so with American encouragement. The South could now be reorganized as an anti-Communist bastion, from which a reconquest of the North could eventually be launched. The Diem government in fact soon created a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, which, beginning in 1958, parachuted agents into the North, notably into areas such as Vinh, where Ho's agrarian reform had provoked violent peasant uprisings. But meanwhile the North, considering itself cheated by Saigon and Washington (with France's cooperation), began preparation to exploit the political and social discontent in the South to establish a base for subversive operations. And Hanoi was to show itself far more adept at this political game than Saigon.

Could the French have resolved this Vietnam problem? In fact, they were confronted

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persistently distrusted, after helping to bring untold devastation and suffering to his country—first by underestimating Russia's most dangerous enemy, and then by mistaking him for a realistic and calculable (and in that sense reliable) partner in the diplomatic game.

The attack of 1941, and its consequences that are still with us, thus cannot be understood without looking for the roots of the mistaken and indeed absurd ideas that Nazis and Bolsheviks, and more particularly Hitler and Stalin, entertained about each other in the teeth of all evidence. It is around this central theme that Walter Laqueur, Director of the London Institute for Advanced Studies in Contemporary History (into which he has transformed the Wiener Library) has written a fascinating and highly useful, if somewhat uneven, book. According to the Preface, the book had been intended to deal with the even wider subject of "what Russians and Germans have thought about each other in this century," and the opening chapters do indeed offer many illuminating glimpses into the earlier history of mutual admiration and contempt, mutual influence, misunderstanding, and hostility between these two nations. But the upshot of these earlier developments is necessarily inconclusive. For even if the element of hostility may be said to have gradually increased before the First World War, owing chiefly to the growth of a modern upper class in Russia and the corresponding loss of influence by the German Balts and other "Russian Germans," nevertheless in the Twenties the open and secret cooperation between the Soviet government and the Weimar Republic was widely approved in Germany and followed with great hopes in Russia.

It is, then, not Russian and German ideas about each other in general, but Nazi and Bolshevik ideas that are relevant to the turning point of 1941. It is in this field that Mr. Laqueur's painstaking and imaginative study of often recondite sources—from the publications of the Russian extreme Right both under the Tsar and later in exile to the early writings of Hitler's Baltic "mentors," and from Soviet doctrinaire discussions about the nature of "Fascism" to captured German police reports about the German Communists' attitude to the rising Nazi movement—has produced some striking discoveries. Mr. Laqueur shows in detail that the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," first forged and propagated in Tsarist Russia, gained a wide European audience only when used after 1917 to "explain" the Russian revolution as the result of a Jewish conspiracy, and that Rosenberg and other Baltic friends of Hitler literally copied their interpretation of Bolshevism as the triumph of the Jews and other lower races over Russia's Germanic elite from the Russian extremist émigrés. But in passing through the minds of the German Balts, this "theory" acquired the new conclusion that a state deprived of its natural elite must necessarily be weak and that the Russian Slavs, lacking a native master race, would have to submit to German conquerors once their Jewish Bolshevik oppressors had been overthrown. Hitler's view of Russia, Mr. Laqueur suggests, was formed from these sources at an early stage and was never substantially revised; even the evidence of Russia's growing industrial and military strength, though freely used by Hitler in the Thirties in order to present himself to German and foreign conservatives as their protector against the "Red Peril," did not shake his own conviction of the "fundamental" weakness of the hated regime.

Recognition that Hitler's view of Russia and Bolshevism was so closely integrated with the core of his world view does indeed offer a clue to the method underlying the madness of 1941; one recalls that in October of that year, even though stopped at the outskirts of Moscow, the Fuehrer was so con-

vinced that the campaign was all but over that he ordered a drastic cut in important branches of German arms production. But this view was not in the mainstream of German nationalist thought about Russia; as Mr. Laqueur reminds us, on his return from Landsberg fortress in 1925 Hitler had to fight a strong "National Bolshevik" faction in his own party, which saw the cooperation between the German and Russian armies as reflecting a natural kinship between the Prussian and Russian forms of "national socialism." That he defeated this faction quickly and decisively, and later easily triumphed over all rival groups holding similar ideas, can only partly be explained by the impact of his personality. The outcome suggests that those officers and intellectuals who reacted to the upheaval of the times by adopting a "national-revolutionary" outlook were less important for the victory of a totalitarian mass movement of the Right than the far more numerous uprooted middle-class elements still seeking to cling for their self-esteem to conservative values. The myth of the revolutionary conspiracy appealed most effectively to them: It was their outlook that Hitler expressed, their self-destruction that he ultimately accomplished.

The early Soviet hopes for a swift advance of Communist revolution in industrial Europe and largely centered on Germany; they changed even during Lenin's lifetime into a more realistic determination to exploit the conflict between defeated Germany and the Western powers in order to prevent an effective capitalist encirclement of Russia. Henceforth, the policy makers of Weimar Germany were judged in Moscow not according to their position on the "left" or on the "right," but according to the value they placed on secret military cooperation with Russia or to their inclination to sacrifice it to an understanding with France, then seen as the most actively anti-Soviet power in Europe. By that token, the Reichswehr appeared as the most reliable, the Social Democrats as the most dangerous force in Germany.

Stalin, with his characteristic mixture of doctrinaire rigidity and practical cynicism, formed his attitude toward the rising Nazi movement in this context. Doctrine convinced him that "Fascism" and "Bourgeois Democracy" were "only" different political forms of the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie," that Nazis and Social Democrats were "twins," related as the right and left arms of the same ruling class, and that if the Nazis ever came to power, they could not possibly carry out a policy independent of the wishes of their "masters." Preoccupation with French "interventionism" and with the danger of a Franco-German rapprochement explains why Soviet leaders and the Comintern saw the Social Democrats as the chief enemy in Germany right up to Hitler's victory, and why they imposed on the German Communists a view which prevented any concerned working-class action against the Nazi threat while there was time. Mr. Laqueur, having patiently traced the stages of this policy as well as its doctrinaire justifications, presents evidence that refutes conclusively the Communists' later claim of having been the most consistent fighters against the Nazi danger from the start; but he finds no evidence for the opposite thesis according to which Stalin or the Comintern is alleged to have deliberately favored Hitler's rise to power—whether from fear of a German revolution or in the hope that it would prove the prelude to it. Everything points to the conclusion that Stalin contributed to Hitler's victory not knowingly, but precisely by his failure to understand that a Nazi regime was a serious possibility, and that it would differ substantially from all that had gone before.

It was only in 1934 that Hitler's pact with Poland, his purge of the stormtroopers, and

his murder of General Schleicher convinced Stalin both of the strength of the new regime and of the seriousness of its anti-Bolshevism. From playing Germany against the West, Soviet policy now turned to playing the West against Germany; but Mr. Laqueur reminds us that Soviet feelers for improved relations with the Third Reich were repeatedly undertaken long before Hitler took them up in 1939, and that the tactical turn toward a united front with the democracies against "Fascism" was accomplished without serious reexamination of the esoteric doctrine about their "fundamental" equivalence. As a historian, he thus sees no grounds for surprise at the Stalin-Hitler pact, and even presents a fair case in favor of Stalin's decision to divert the war from his threshold at the last moment. What strikes him as odd is that while Hitler's basic hostility remained quite unshaken by this act of expediency, Stalin still failed to perceive it and hoped to the end he could avoid the fatal clash.

Mr. Laqueur unfolds this record of *hubris* and folly without once raising his voice; his astringent understatement are calculated to let the ironies of history speak for themselves. Not the least of his merits is the demonstration that the Soviet interpretation of Nazism has not been corrected even now: Stalin's successors, who delight in smearing their various opponents as "new Hitlers" on every occasion, have not published a single serious study of the Nazi regime. Their general textbooks of contemporary politics continue even to ignore the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Instead, they repeat the old dogmatic twaddle—including long disproved forgeries about the alleged financing of Hitler by American Jewish capitalists.

This continued Soviet failure to reexamine the nature of Nazism is due in part, as Mr. Laqueur suggests, to the difficulty of doing so within the frame work of dogmatic Marxism, but in part also to the embarrassingly close parallels between the power structures of the Bolshevik and Nazi regimes. One of the questions he has left unexplored is indeed to what extent the two movements learned from as well as misunderstood each other.

Did not Hitler's description of Bolshevik tyranny in some ways foreshadow the blueprint of his own dictatorship? There seems to be no clear evidence that the Fuehrer made an early study of the techniques of Communist one-party rule; but Mussolini certainly did so, and Hitler consciously copied his example after his return from the fortress. Stalin, in turn, may have been inspired to his purges, as Krivitski has suggested, by the example of Hitler's device of killing various actual and potential opponents in June, 1934, under the pretext that they had joined in a common conspiracy against him. Even more significant, the possibility of a legal road to Communist power, as first tested in the "popular front" strategy of the mid-Thirties and again in the early post-war years, may have occurred to Stalin under the impression of Hitler's "legal" revolution. Again, it is instructive to recall the endless Nazi ravings about the role of the political commissars in the Red Army in connection with the creation of a similar institution in the last year of the Nazi regime, after the "general's plot" had been foiled. Below the surface, a sense of kinship seems to have coexisted in both regimes with their mutual hatred.

After the crucial date of 1941, Mr. Laqueur does not quite sustain the high standard he has set in the main part of his work. The single chapter entitled "Days of Wrath 1939-63" is a *tour de force*; it displays on the whole the imaginative understanding to which the reader has by then become accustomed, but there are strange omissions and occasional unfounded judgments. One misses, for example, any mention of the peace feelers Stalin addressed to Hitler in

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by two immensely volatile forces whose demands would have shaken any Western government, as they are shaking the United States today. First, the demands of a people thirsting to overthrow colonialism and to recover their national identity, their freedom of maneuver, and their unity. But also the demands of a revolutionary group, supported by one of the great power blocs, which claims the right to impose its authority on the entire nation in the name of a Communist doctrine highly suspect to the majority: a group, nonetheless, whose heroism, discipline, and ruthlessly effective methods seem to assure its success.

It is the deep and constant intermingling of these two forces which have made the Vietnam problem seem so hopeless and defeating to the West. How can a Western government successfully sponsor an independent "nationalist counterfire" when the strongest feelings of many Vietnamese have been invested for many years in the local civil war; and when one finds among those who have rallied to the Vietminh, and then the Lao Dong and the NLF, a great many patriots, drawn to the organization because they believe it to be the hope of Vietnamese nationalism, capable of defeating colonialism and Western domination.

Perhaps it might have been possible for the French to disassociate the nationalist inspiration in Vietnam from the Communist organization. But to do this would have been very difficult. For to gain the confidence of the nationalists I believe that French aid to Vietnam would have had to meet three extremely demanding conditions: that the donor of the aid would have no right to intervene directly in the government; that the aid would be given to the most worthy leaders; and that it would not lead to the creation of oligarchies of profiteers and a climate of corruption.

By all these standards the French failed. If they ever had a chance to survive the Asian revolution, they lost it, basically, because they were unwilling to alter their patronizing colonialist attitudes and deal with Asians with some sense of mutual respect or cooperation. For the most part they preferred instead to appoint and then control the manageable, the incompetent, and the operators, many of whom made fortunes out of the corrupt French aid program.

Opposed in Vietnam, then, were a coherent, principled, and implacable revolutionary movement of militants organized in the villages—the country's fundamental social and economic unit—inspired by an evident nationalism and posing as defenders of stern justice and equality; on the other hand, a regime obviously supported and controlled by foreign powers, partly composed of former colonial officials, disdainful of peasant claims, tolerant of a social order where the influential and successful were frantically engaged in profiteering—preparing for the arrival of the inevitable catastrophe. The only possible result was a catastrophe on the scale of Dien Bien Phu.

How relevant is the French experience to Vietnam today? Certainly the American situation is different in important respects, but really how different? For example, the United States has no colonial past in Vietnam, no strictly imperialistic drive for economic gain. But its objectives are, curiously, both more altruistic and more imperious than those of its predecessor. After all, a country seeking colonial profits is quite capable of making a compromise to preserve at least some of its endangered wealth. But what of a country that supposes itself to be defending a selfless principle? In fact, the United States does seem to have several fairly concrete motives: e.g., to prove to certain nations that it is faithful to its alliances; to show the underdeveloped peoples of the Southern Hemisphere how costly it can be to choose "Marxism-Leninism." There

would seem to be sufficient elements of calculated self-interest here to make realistic bargaining possible—on the basis of spheres of influence, for example.

A second difference concerns the size and power of the forces involved. General Westmoreland not only commands a good many more troops than General Navarre (750,000 as compared with 500,000) but he is also relatively free from the financial, logistical, and transport problems that plagued the French. A far greater advantage, however, lies in America's enormous fire power as well as its air force and complete mastery of the sea. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States and South Vietnamese forces are now twenty times more powerful than the army of General Navarre (which had no more than eighty combat planes at its disposal during the battle of Dien Bien Phu). The small size of the present theater of operations in South Vietnam thus becomes a favorable factor of great importance: The French forces were charged with the defense of all Indo-China, a territory four times the present size of South Vietnam.

But given these advantages can it be said that the United States is now succeeding where France was forced to retreat? Of course, one answer must be yes, in the limited sense that it is impossible to imagine that the United States suffering a major defeat in the present circumstances. During the past year President Johnson has been able to dispatch enough American troops to Vietnam to avoid another Dien Bien Phu, but beyond this the situation is less than hopeful. The arrival of over 100,000 troops has done no more than stabilize a deteriorating military situation; it did not result in a sharp swing of military advantage to the Western side, as certain observers had expected. The military map published on January 30 in the New York Times showing four-fifths of the South "under Vietcong influence" must be regarded as accurate, notwithstanding contrary claims by officials. (Incidentally, this map recalls the military charts the French press did not dare to publish 12 years ago. The American public has recently been getting far more information on the Vietnam question from the press, television, Senate hearings, etc., than was ever available in France.)

The fact is that American policy in Vietnam, although originally inspired by very different intentions, now resembles all too closely the disastrous policy of the French. The United States has also failed to solve the problem of providing support to genuine local leaders without excessive intervention in the country itself. Indeed, it can be said that the French—perhaps hypocritically—did nevertheless succeed in transferring some responsibilities to the Vietnamese: These were quite feeble ones in military matters, rather more important in politics, and nearly total in such administrative work as tax collecting. By contrast, we are now seeing the progressive Americanization of both the war and the country itself: The influence of the local military headquarters grows weaker; the efficiency of the government in Saigon continues to decay; American experts have taken over a great many local functions. Of course one understands the concern for efficiency, but the psychological effects are hardly calculated to encourage the emergence of authentic nationalist leaders at the present time, as Roger Hillsman forcefully pointed out in his recent testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Certainly the Americans have done no better than the French in finding worthy non-Communist leadership. There is no need to reexamine now the tragic liquidation of Diemism, an event made inevitable by the sectarian religious isolation and the oligarchic obstinacy of the Ngo family. But since then, what decadence! Sad mandarins from certain conservative milieux in

Saigon—courageous and outdated men—are followed in office by juntas composed of young generals-of-fortune who add a new star to their shoulders after each defeat in battle.

As for the moral climate in Saigon, one can only say that the corruption which dominated the life of the city's elite in 1953 has now been democratized. Shady dealings having to do with aid and military programs are no longer confined to people in high places, but seem to involve every kind of business. Testifying before the Senate on February 4, Mr. David Bell, the Director of Foreign Aid, said that he knew of no black market in Saigon—which only shows that a brilliant and hard-working official has had no time to stroll along the streets of a town where someone begs you to break the law at every step.

It would be wrong to predict a priori that President Johnson's new "counterinsurgency" and "pacification" programs, based on plans for economic and social development in the Southern villages, will fail as totally as did the quite similar plans sponsored by the French and later by the Diem regime. Can they produce a qualitative change in Vietnamese attitudes toward the present government and the United States? What can be said is that any efforts by political and army leaders in the South, however doubtful their results, will surely be more effective than the current bombing of the North. I will not take up the moral aspects of these attacks. It should be sufficient to examine their diplomatic and military results thus far. According to predictions made in January 1965, several weeks of daily raids would bring the North to its knees and thence to the negotiating table. In fact, Messrs. Ho and Dong have since toughened their demands, passing from the relatively flexible "four points" of March 8th to the recent letter of January 31, which refers to the NLF as the "only representative of South Vietnam"; until then, Ho had mentioned only the NLF "program."

As for military results, we must realize that the bombing of the North has no overwhelming impact on a people who only recently emerged from a resistance movement and are now being trained to return to one; for the most part their lives are not greatly affected by the destruction of a bridge or a truck depot. On the other hand, in January 1965 there were two Northern regiments in the South, while now in February 1966 there are eight. Furthermore, the combat reserve forces in the North are numerous enough to permit the dispatch of more Northern troops to General Giap in the South every time the United States escalates the bombing. The American public has been told that the North is being bombed to save American lives. But, on the contrary, it seems clear that the bombing in the North only increases the pressure on General Westmoreland's troops. The American foot soldier must pay for the destruction caused by the American Air Force. And if Hanoi itself is bombed, we may be sure that the Vietcong forces have well-laid plans to take atrocious vengeance on Saigon, a city they have both infiltrated and surrounded. The adversaries have now sunk their claws into each other and so long as the ground fighting continues, we may expect that each blow will be followed by damaging reprisals.

Thus a political solution becomes all the more urgent although unlike the settlement of 1954, it will not be preceded by a military disaster. But here American diplomacy is the victim of its own myths. Because the United States government has decreed from the first that the war in the South was originally provoked by invasion from the North, it has insisted that a solution must be negotiated with Hanoi, and only with Hanoi.

A false historical analysis has led to a political impasse. For a careful study of the history of South Vietnam over the last ten

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years will show that from 1956 onward, strong resistance groups, the surviving members of political-religious sects crushed by Diem, were in active opposition to the regime in the South; they were in fact already called "Vietcong" by the Diem regime at that time. Furthermore, this essentially nationalist dissident movement gained added support as a result of the rural discontent which led Diem to suppress the elected municipal councils in 1957; it spread further after the promulgation of the terrible law of 1959 which prescribed the death penalty for all "accomplices of Communists"—and Communism comes cheap in South Vietnam. At this time the resistance was composed of nothing more than Southern groups organized in self-defense against Diem. Hanoi had made no connection with them. The North Vietnamese did not begin to exploit this situation and infiltrate agents until 1959; and it was only after pressure from a Southern congress of "former Vietminh resisters" in March of 1960 that they prepared to intervene. At the Northern Communist Party Congress in September of the same year the Hanoi government gave direct encouragement to the revolutionary activities in the South. Still, it was not until November 11, 1960, following an attempted military Putsch against Diem, that the Vietcong—feeling the pressure of competition from military nationalists—gave itself formal identity and established a political headquarters by creating the National Liberation Front.

Today it is clear that the NLF leaders are closely linked to Hanoi, on which they depend for much of their supplies and arms. But anyone concerned with a peaceful settlement in Vietnam should be aware of both the local origins of the Front and its strong persisting regionalism—its attachments to the milieu, traditions, economy, and countryside of the South which give it a fundamental autonomy.

And yet, notwithstanding the fact that the Southern origins of the Vietcong insurrection have been carefully confirmed, no element of the Vietnam problem has been so neglected, especially in American official circles. We may be astonished, for example, that the immense, spectacular, and probably sincere efforts of recent American diplomacy to persuade Hanoi to negotiate finally produced, after thirty days of pause in bombing, a single defiant letter. Yet, America is dealing here with a small and poorly armed country; its allies are reluctant to give it aid too openly, fearing a crushing American response. Certainly it is a Communist government, but one presided over by a man who in 1946 and 1954 was able to prove to the French his willingness to accept compromise. And of the four points posed as conditions by Hanoi last year, Washington now accepts three. Why then doesn't Ho play Lyndon Johnson's game? In a conference the North Vietnamese would hold so many trumps that their present position is hard to understand.

But perhaps they were not in a position to negotiate at all. If we look back over the history of the NLF we find support for the view that Hanoi is not able to speak for the Front. First for psychological reasons: The published program of the NLF expressly mentions the possibility of an independent South Vietnam; and it looks forward to forming an alliance with Laos and Cambodia only. Thus it seems most unlikely that the Front would consider itself adequately represented by the Northern government. Finally, there may be a purely practical reason. Combat conditions in the South are such that it is by no means certain that a decision or an agreement even if approved by the NLF would be supported by all the fighters in the field.

If we are to undertake a serious and credible search for peace in Vietnam, we must take account of this diversity of the South-

ern resistance; we must recognize that it is in fact a federation of *maquis* of different ages and differing inspiration, and that it is not as yet completely unified.

There is not as much geographic and psychological distance between the typical Southern military chief and Ho Chi Minh as there is between Ho Chi Minh and Mr. Kosygin. But to be effective now in Vietnam diplomacy must certainly take account of the *maquisard* and his part in the war. It must also attempt to understand the role of the Central Committee of the NLF, where Maoist influence is strong but where all tendencies coexist; of the Lao Dong party in Hanoi, with its pro-Chinese and pro-Russian factions; and the Political Bureau in Peking, with its cast of performers, both civilian and military. And finally we must comprehend the very complex position of the Soviet Union, which is quite unwilling to sacrifice either its policy of peaceful coexistence or its commanding position as leader of the Communist world. If the diversity of governmental levels, alliances, and forces involved in the war presents difficulties, it also offers many more chances for an alert diplomacy than were available during the monolithic conflict of the Cold War.

It is true that American leaders now argue that to recognize the Vietcong is to admit defeat. A curious intellectual position indeed—to refuse to recognize your adversary for what he is. Perhaps it is worth recalling that in December 1963, after Ho Chi Minh had first announced himself ready to negotiate, the French Socialist, Alain Savary, suggested to Georges Bidault (then Foreign Minister, now living in Brazil) that he seek Ho out for talks. "You only make them bigger by talking to them," said Bidault—who did finally talk with Ho's delegate at Geneva, but after the fall of Dien Bien Phu.

"Recognizing" the Vietcong certainly will not solve the problem of peacemaking in Vietnam at a stroke. It would nevertheless be an extremely constructive idea to focus diplomatic attention firmly on the South at the present time—without meanwhile ceasing efforts both to make contact with Hanoi and to assess Communist Chinese intentions.

But to bring about peace it will not suffice simply to recognize the existence of a powerful revolutionary organization supported by the North and already in control of the largest part of the national territory. More important is the task of reestablishing the constitutional legitimacy which Diem embodied for a brief period—reactionary as he was—and which has since vanished. The NLF is an essential element of this legitimacy because it is the heir to the revolt against Diem's totalitarianism as well as the principal force of resistance to foreign intervention. But there are others who make up the social and political society as well—the Buddhists, the Catholics, and also the Army, a bourgeoisie in uniform.

An effective policy to bring about a peaceful settlement should begin by making it possible for each of these groups to return to an active political role. While General Ky, after having won his sole victory of the war at Honolulu, occupies the stage, we may be sure that the other groups are ready in the wings, waiting for the protection and encouragement the U.S. could still supply. And from such a revived political life we could expect an authoritative leadership to emerge whose lot it would be to debate with the NLF on the future of the South and to establish a coalition government to represent South Vietnam in future peace conferences. While the NLF is the largest force in the South it recognizes that it is obviously not the only force, reserving a large fraction of the seats on its Central Committee for groups who do not belong to the NLF. The democratization of power in South Vietnam is not a fantasy. The destruction of the small democratic movements struggling to survive under Diem

was among the factors that led to the Civil War.

French colonial policy was only too familiar with these very diverse political factions and brilliantly played them off, one against the other. But to divide and rule became a pathetic policy as France's control became more feeble. An American policy which seeks a peaceful settlement must take account of both the socio-political pluralism of South Vietnam and its extraordinary capacity for finding original—and local—solutions to its problems. Surely it is time for American leaders at last to confront the people with whom they have become so inextricably involved.

INVOLVEMENT IN THAILAND

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article by Clayton Fritchey entitled "State of Affairs" for July 15, 1966.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATE OF AFFAIRS

(By Clayton Fritchey)

WASHINGTON.—Now that we have practically won the war in Vietnam (or so we are told), Americans may be interested to learn that we are well on the road to becoming involved in Thailand in much the same gradual, undeclared, and often secret, way that we did next door.

Not many are conscious of it yet, but Thailand is already so crowded with American air power that it is beginning to look more like an air base than a country.

The Pentagon has never officially acknowledged the extent of U.S. military operations in Thailand, nor does it openly admit that it is attacking North Vietnam from a supposedly non-belligerent country, but the public tipoff came when an American pilot, Capt. Murphy Neal Jones, 28, of Louisiana, downed in the first raid on Hanoi oil depots, said he had taken off from Takhlil Airbase in Thailand. Since then other captured U.S. pilots have made similar statements.

The Chinese reaction has been predictable, just as U.S. reaction would be predictable if Canada or Mexico permitted a foreign power to launch bombing attacks on American targets from bases in their countries.

Peking has already warned Bangkok against plunging into the Vietnam war, but to no avail, for the U.S. has for years systematically promoted militant anti-communism in Thailand, just as it has in South Vietnam. All we can hope is that the end result will not be the same.

Also, as in Vietnam, the people of Thailand have never been consulted about this, and for the same reason—the military clique that seized power years ago does not permit elections. And, of course, the U.S. has never prodded either country to hold elections, for a representative government might not be so willing to play the American game.

President Johnson has repeatedly said that he would be only too happy to settle the conflict in Vietnam on the basis of the 1954 Geneva peace agreement, which called for the neutralization of Indo-China, and, in effect, Southeast Asia.

In practice, however, the U.S. has violated this understanding from the beginning, first in Laos, in Vietnam, and now Thailand. Both openly and covertly, by the use of the armed forces and the CIA, the U.S. has encouraged and supported dictatorial governments in all three countries in an effort to enlist them in the American crusade against China.

Under the cloak of fighting internal Communism, the tyrant Diem set out in 1956 to smash all political opposition in South Viet-

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two to three weeks earlier than those in another. In hopes that such differences can be combined in new, improved forms of Douglas fir, approximately 4,000 trees from the Douglas fir's growth range are now being grown near Corvallis. The Oregon State University's Forest Research Laboratory is undertaking the 60-year study under the direction of Dr. Helge Irgens-Moller.

The plantation study is also tied in with experiments now underway using a special controlled-environment growth chamber in which trees may be grown under controlled temperature and with artificial lighting to stimulate varying day lengths.

Laboratory experiments already have shown that coastal Douglas fir is less influenced by changing day lengths associated with seasonal changes than are inland trees.

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY—LUMBER EXECUTIVES NEEDED—COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SEEKS MORE WESTERN RESERVISTS

It was D-day plus 60 and already American industry was well on its way toward regaining its former world supremacy. All major ports and commerce centers were totally flattened, of course, in the nuclear attack and roughly 30,000,000 people had died in panic while fleeing clogged former metropolitan areas.

Hostilities had ceased after a few days, not because of any truce but because both sides had exhausted their primary retaliatory stockpiles. After the initial shock, which left Asia a wasteland, the U.S. and Russia crippled, and Europe hardly touched, it suddenly became more important to repair domestic damage and forget about ideological differences.

Whether the war was to be continued or not was a moot question. In any case, production, materials, and facilities were all desperately needed to reestablish modern society. Successes toward that end during the previous 60 days could largely be attributed to a dedicated group of industry and business leaders called Business and Defense Services Administration Executive Reservists.

The Reservists were (and are) selected and organized by the U.S. Commerce Department because they have talent, training, and experience to operate an established Defense Materials System during threatening or actual warfare situations. They are charged, in summary, with serving the government in inventorying available supplies and facilities, assessing critical areas of need for priorities, and planning reestablishment of manufacture and supply to get essential products for military and civilian use as rapidly as possible.

More of these Reservists are needed, especially from the wood and forest products industry in the WWPA-producing region. As the chart to the right illustrates, only eight men from the 12 Western states now represent lumber or sawmilling. That would give each man administration and coordination duties for lumber products in 1½ states in the event of war.

The Department of Commerce is currently welcoming applicants to the program. They should be between 35 and 55 years old, be U.S. citizens, and have no military or civil defense commitment which would conflict with Reserve membership. Applicants should also have a strong background in industrial production and management or have comparable skills which would be of value to an emergency production agency.

Lumbermen interested in learning more about the Executive Reserve Program are invited to contact the nearest Department of Commerce Field Office (see list above). When contacting an office, request a Background Statement Form CD-174.

It must be emphasized that designation as a Reservist is subject to (1) the needs of the

Department of Commerce; (2) approval of employer and completion of a "statement of understanding"; (3) satisfactory security clearance; and (4) approval by the Secretary of Commerce.

WESTERN FIELD OFFICES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Arizona: New Federal Building, 230 N. First avenue, Phoenix, 85025

California: Western Pacific Bldg., 1031 S. Broadway, L. Angeles, 90015; Federal Bldg., 450 Golden Gate ave., San Francisco, 94102

Colorado: Federal Building, 20th and Stout street, Denver, 80202

Nevada: Federal Building, 300 Booth street, Reno, 89502

New Mexico: U.S. Courthouse, Albuquerque, 87101

Oregon: Pioneer Post Office, 520 S.W. Morrison street, Portland, 97204

Utah: Federal Building, 125 South State street, Salt Lake City, 84111

Washington: Federal Office Building, 909 First avenue, Seattle, 98104

Wyoming: Federal Building, 2120 Capitol avenue, Cheyenne, 82002

WESTERN ROSTER OF WOOD PRODUCT CLASS RESERVISTS

G. E. Karlen, Managing Partner, Karlen-Davis Company, 701 Tacoma Building, Tacoma, Washington (Sawmilling).

Leslie G. Everitt, Chairman of the Board, Everitt Lumber Company, Inc., P.O. Box 822, Ft. Collins, Colorado.

Peter C. Gaffney, Executive Vice President S.W. Forest Industries, Inc., 411 N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona (Logging, Sawmilling).

Frank E. Heard, General Manager Motrone-Heard Lumber Company, 1038 Beamer Street, Woodland, California.

Fred C. Talbot, Jr., Talbot Lumber Company, 58 Sutter Street, San Francisco, California (Logging, Sawmilling).

Richard S. McLelland, President, McLelland Lumber Company, 804 N. 5th Street, Pocatello, Idaho (Sawmilling).

Joseph H. Sampson, General Manager, Biles-Coleman Lumber Company, Omak, Washington (Sawmilling).

G. Corydon Wagner, Jr., President, Cariboo-Pacific Corporation, P.O. Box 3419, Tacoma, Washington (Logging, Sawmilling).

RESERVISTS READY FOR H-HOUR—3,500 THROUGHOUT NATION PROVIDE INDUSTRIAL READINESS

(Three times within a generation our Government has been forced to expand its civilian staff to meet war emergencies. Each time it has had to look to nongovernmental sources for additional executive talent. Time and geography have been on our side in these prior emergencies, so improvisations have not been too costly. But the march of history and technology makes it unrealistic to assume that we will again be so lucky.

(Jacobson, 34, Sales Control Manager for Boise Cascade Corporation's Yakima, Elgin, and Payette plywood mills, is currently a candidate for admission into the Executive Reserve. He was a Lieutenant in the U.S. Army between 1956 and 1959, holds a Bachelor's Degree in Management from Whitman College, and a Master's Degree in Business from Stanford University. He lives in Lake Oswego, Oregon.)

The National Defense Executive Reserve is a corps of business executives and industry specialists who have volunteered to serve in time of national emergency. Authorized by Congress in the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1955 and established by Executive Order in 1956, it now provides some 3500 Reservists within twelve government departments. Each man is trained and capable of filling key civilian positions a local,

regional, or national headquarters in case an emergency threatens.

By definition, then, our Civilian Executive Reserve is comparable to our military reserve and provides a base upon which industrial readiness can be erected much more rapidly than in the past.

A current candidate for admission into the program is Donald Jacobson, a sales control manager for Boise Cascade Corporation in Portland, Oregon. As to why he applied for admittance into the program, Jacobson sums it up by saying "You have to believe in maintaining a certain preparedness. There is satisfaction in knowing that you could contribute in the event of an emergency, and there is a real need for lumber and wood products representatives within the Reservist program."

He points out that enemy action might well include a severe and crippling initial onslaught which would make impossible our normal centralized control and management of productive economy. For this reason, current Reservist planning envisages the deployment of production agency personnel to a number of relocation sites. Each site would be capable of making separate contributions to the National program without direct control or guidance in case communications were interrupted.

"In simple terms, things can happen very quickly in our advanced world, and we must be prepared mentally and mechanically. It's a matter of contributing where one can in good faith, for those objectives which are deemed best at the time by Government officials charged with directing emergency activities."

He also emphasized that busy lumber industry executives should easily be able to afford the time to attend a maximum of six meetings per year. There are four quarterly sessions among local headquarters, and one annual visit to national headquarters in Washington, D.C. In addition, there may be a regional meeting once a year at one of three Western regional headquarters—Everett, Washington, Santa Rosa, California, or Denver, Colorado.

"As a peacetime sidelight," according to Jacobson, "Individuals and companies have a definite advantage in becoming familiar with the workings of government, especially the Department of Commerce. It offers a tremendous range of services, including an excellent library, and very complete production and marketing information."

During peacetime, the Department fosters, promotes, and develops both foreign and domestic commerce. As Jacobson states, contact with the Department is beneficial to executive reservists, as are a sense of duty and executive patriotism.

GAINS OF SOUTH VIETNAM TERRITORY BY VIETCONG

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the close of these remarks a story from Saigon, written by Jack Steele of the Scripps-Howard service, and published in the Washington Daily News of August 15.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr. Steele explains that despite the continued official claims that the war is going well for the United States, the Vietcong continue to gain control of the countryside. CBS news reports bore out this fact recently in another way by showing the airlifting of Vietnamese

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civilians out of areas in the countryside which American and South Vietnamese are losing to the Vietcong.

Far from gaining control in South Vietnam, we apparently are losing control of territory, and are simply moving the people to refugee centers to make certain they do not become dominated by the Vietcong.

A second document which I ask be printed at the close of these remarks is the testimony to the subcommittee on refugees by William Pepper.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 2.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr. Pepper is from New Rochelle, N.Y. He recently spent 5 weeks in Vietnam studying refugee problems. As Mr. Pepper's statement makes clear, by far the majority of present refugees in South Vietnam have been rendered homeless by American military action, and by far the majority of hospital patients, especially children, are there due to injuries suffered from American military activities. The plight of these children, and the huge burden they impose upon physical facilities, has been almost totally ignored by the American people.

Yet Mr. Pepper's statistics make it evident that the population of South Vietnam is nearly half under age 16, and that the breakdown of family life which the war has caused will bring adverse repercussions for decades to come.

When our administration talks of the noble works we are instituting in South Vietnam, let it not fail to point out also the destruction we are bringing to it. If we are building hospitals, we are creating far more patients than they can handle; if we are building schools, we are depriving far more children of educational opportunities than we are giving such opportunities.

I also point to Mr. Pepper's conclusion under the heading: General Security and Welfare. He states:

In a way more subtle than physical scarring, the conflict is affecting for a long time to come the structures of the Vietnamese people. It is doing this precisely because the family is being gradually eliminated as the basic unit.

He indicates that fatherless families are uniting in a tribal system, and that the thousands of abandoned and orphaned children are living in packs in the cities. Orphanages are a third "defamilized" unit that is rapidly growing in South Vietnam.

As Mr. Steele's story suggests, this picture in Vietnam is getting worse, not better, for as we lose area control, we are beginning to move people out and further destroy their means of livelihood, self-support, and family independence and organization.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Aug. 15, 1966]

EXHIBIT 1

VIETCONG SPREADS FEAR—POOR VIET POLLS
TURNOUT FEARED

(By Jack Steele)

SAIGON, August 15.—Both American and South Vietnamese officials voiced concern today that the turnout in the Sept. 11 constituent assembly election may not exceed 50 percent of the registered voters.

This would be a bitter disappointment, especially since 70 per cent of South Viet Nam's eligible voters cast ballots in less important provincial council elections in April, 1965.

A 50 per cent turnout would mean a vote of about 2.5 million, of slightly more than 5 million registered voters. Last year about 3.5 million votes were cast.

This forecast may be too pessimistic. The Vietnamese people in recent years have shown a strong desire to vote, even in relatively meaningless elections.

But it is the first current estimate of responsible officials here who have been keeping tabs on election preparations.

DRAWBACKS

These officials say a 50 per cent turnout would be "relatively good" under existing war conditions and in view of the skepticism of many Vietnamese.

They give three major reasons for their rather gloomy predictions:

The Viet Cong are mounting a campaign to terrorize and intimidate both voters and candidates.

Security has declined in many areas of South Viet Nam since the provincial council elections 16 months ago. This may keep more eligible voters from the polls.

Many Vietnamese seem unaware the election is only four weeks off. Others apparently couldn't care less about electing a constituent assembly which will have power only to draft a new constitution.

The Viet Cong, in trying to crank up a terrorist campaign to disrupt the election, are operating differently from last year when they denounced and "boycotted" the elections but did little to stop the Vietnamese from voting.

THREATS

Some candidates, particularly in the Mekong Delta, already have received assassination threats from the Viet Cong and several have pulled out of the campaign.

The Viet Cong also have launched a diabolical propaganda campaign. They pass out leaflets in and around Saigon warning men of draft age they will be hauled off to Vietnamese army training camps if they show up at the polls.

The contention that security has declined in the past year despite the buildup of nearly 300,000 American troops is contrary to the official U.S. position.

American and Korean troops have pacified small areas around their enclaves in the northern coastal cities and base camps. But their "search and destroy" sweeps actually have enabled the Viet Cong to tighten their control over many contested villages and hamlets.

EXHIBIT 2

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. PEPPER TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE SESSION, SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1966, HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN

(William F. Pepper, Executive Director of the New Rochelle Commission on Human Rights, Instructor in Political Science at Mercy College in Dobbs Ferry, New York, and Director of that college's Children's Institute For Advanced Study and Research spent between five and six weeks this spring (1966) in Viet-Nam as a Free Lance Correspondent accredited by the Military Assistance Command in that country, and the Government of Viet-Nam.

(During that period in addition to traveling, he lived in Sancta Maria Orphanage in Gia Dinh Province and in the main "shelter area" in Qui-Nhon, for a shorter period of time. His main interests were the effects of the war on women and children, the role of the American Voluntary Agencies there and the work of the military in civil action.

(His visits took him to a number of: or-

phanages—among them, AnLac; Go-Vap; Don Bosco; Hoi Duc An; Bac Ai—hospitals: Cho-Ray; Holy Family; Phu My; Saigon-Cholon (central hosp.) and shelters in Saigon, Cholon, Qui-Nhon and outer Binh-Dinh.

(He interviewed, frequently, more than once, the following Cabinet Ministers of South Viet-Nam: Dr. Nguyen Ba Kha, Minister of Health; Dr. Tran Ngoc Ninh—Minister of Education; Mr. Tran Ngoc Lieng—Minister of Social Welfare; Dr. Nguyen Thuc Que—High Commission for Refugees.

(In addition, he conferred with the leaders of the Voluntary Agency Community, and the USAID Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Mr. Edward Marks, as well as the USAID child welfare specialist, Mr. Gardner Monroe.

(Sessions were also held with Mademoiselle E. La Mer of UNICEF and Mr. Pierre Baesjous of UNESCO.

(At the present time he has a book in preparation and has authored a number of newspaper articles since returning.)

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to appear and present some personal observations on the conditions facing one segment of so called refugee population of South Viet-Nam. I only hope that these reflections will add something of value to the Subcommittee's consideration of an extremely complicated situation.

The cumulative figure of "tactical refugees", or persons displaced from their normal habitations by the conflict, and unable to return, some while ago, passed the one million mark. Only a small percentage of them have been classified as "permanently resettled."

My observations indicate that a great number of these "tactical refugees" are children and that there are others who have not been counted—also mostly children—who reside in institutions, makeshift shelters, hospitals, with friends and relations or on their own, in the cities, and provincial towns.

It may be helpful to set the framework for the present condition of childhood in South Viet-Nam, from this viewpoint, by commenting upon the quality of services, and living conditions which we have come to regard as being essential human rights of every young being.

WHO ARE THEY?

According to WNESCO study in 1964, 53% of the population of South Viet-Nam is under 21 years of age, 43.4% is under 15 years of age and 47.5% of the population are under 16. Pierre Baesjou, the chief of WNESCI officer in Viet-Nam, emphasized during the course of our lengthy conference that these per-centages were higher today. Naturally with an annual Birthrate of 50 per 1,000 and a yearly population increase of 2.5%, there would be an increase.

It should be quite obvious, then, that we are speaking of the majority of the people of Viet-Nam when we refer to her children. It should also be emphasized in the context of planning that 69% of the Vietnamese people will be under 21 by 1980.

EDUCATION

While the Ministry of Education of the Government of South Viet-Nam maintains that 70% of the children are receiving some schooling, this figure is not advanced by officials of UNICEF and UNESCO present in Viet-Nam. It is also disputed by others of the private assistance community who are concerned with school construction and educational programs. As a consensus it probably would be more accurate to say that at best 45-50% of the children of South Viet-Nam are receiving at most two hours of schooling, six days a week, nine or ten months a year. In the rural areas, the percentage of children getting even this minimal educational exposure is greatly reduced. City and town schools often function with four or five shifts to meet this standard. The classes range in size from 60 to 80 pu-

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pils. In some private schools they go up to 100 students in each class.

To indicate the shortage of facilities, there are (1) a combined total of 2,620—primary and secondary—schools that would allow a student to go from the first to the twelfth grade. This in a country that has between 7 and 8 million students in this age range. The figure is rapidly increasing, and so is the gap between available places and student demands.

Previously, students who completed five years of primary schooling had to take a national examination prior to secondary school entrance. Then those who passed would be required to take an entrance examination provided by the secondary school which they decided to enter, and usually, which was very similar to the certifying exam—After the first cycle of study—8 years—they had to take the exam for the high school cycle of three years, they would take the first part of the Baccalaureate exam. Then after the third year, the final exam is taken for the Baccalaureate, second part. They were, then, eligible for university.

The Minister of Education has abolished the national certifying examination, but students must still take the individual secondary school entrance examinations. The Minister has also eliminated the first cycle—4 years—examination.

The difficulties of the educational system of Viet-Nam may best be seen in the comparison of the number of primary and secondary school students with the number of schools available at each level.

There are 5,700 primary schools and about 5,000,000 students. The number of schools needs to be about doubled, to meet present needs.

There are 592 secondary schools and approximately 2,000,000 (minimum figure) students for those schools. The number of secondary schools needs to be increased four times to meet present needs.

These figures are based on schools with a capacity for 500 student, which is high for Viet-Nam. It is not economically feasible to construct larger schools here, at this time due to 1) the capital expense and 2) the inadequate transportation facilities that exist. Central schools require, as the American experience shows, an efficient and safe network of transportation for students who live some distance.

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS AND GRADES COVERED

Primary: 5,700 (total); 3,800 (public), 2,000 through grade 3, 1,800 through grade 5; 1,900 (private), 1,300 through grade 3, 600 through grade 5.

Secondary: 592 (total); 150 (public), 64 through both cycles, 12th grade, 86 through one cycle, grade 8; 359 (private), 138 through both cycles, 12th grade, 221 through one cycle, grade 8; 83 (semi-private) (w/Govt. subsidy), 18 through both cycles, grade 12, 65 through one cycle, grade 8.

In a lengthy conference with Dr. Tran Ngoc Ninh—since replaced by a new Secretary of State for Education—he stated that teacher training schools turn out about 1,000 primary school teachers a year and the need is for 6,000. At the secondary level, 800 teachers are graduated annually and 2,500 are needed. In both instances these requirements are set to help up with only the present needs of the population.

There conditions have rendered illiterate roughly 40% of the male population of 60% of the female population, under 15. Between 15 and 19 years of age, we find that 70% of Viet-Nam's males and 85% of her young women are illiterate, at this time.

Children housed in the refugee shelters usually receive no education at all. If 20% of those living in this condition are exposed to any schooling it is extraordinary. Some of the orphanages have educational programs of poor quality, others have none at all.

Thousands and thousands of the "street children" living on their own in cities and towns, as well as countless others who huddle with families and friends, in the city and country, never see a classroom of any type.

The Ministry of Education for South Viet-Nam receives 5% of the total national budget. The inadequacy of this allocation speaks for itself. If it were not for American private and public assistance in this area the picture would be considerably worse than it is.

HEALTH

If there were no war in Viet-Nam the status of the health of its children would be—as it is throughout the underdeveloped world—a very serious problem.

Though it is difficult to obtain precise information due to the fact that most deaths occur outside of the hospitals, specialists estimate the rate of infant mortality to be around 50% for a national average. It is conceded to be considerably higher in rural areas. The average child, barring any of the misadventures of war, may look forward to a life span of between 30 and 35 years.

The regular incidence of diseases, such as tuberculosis, polio, cholera and leprosy among others, is alarming, and the conflict has made more acute the shortage of doctors and medical personnel. There are for example, over 600 doctors in the armed services, according to Dr. Bak ha, the Minister of Health. He has only about 200 doctors working for him and there are an additional 230 who are private practitioners for a total of around 1,030 physicians in South Vietnam. The proportion of nurses—practical or otherwise—is about 9 for every 100,000 inhabitants and the proportion of midwives is 5 for every 100,000.

The general situation is, of course, rendered far more serious because of the war. In an economic vein, the Government of Viet-Nam allocates only 2% to the Ministry of Health while the U.S. AID contribution in services and medicines is somewhat larger.

The prevailing impression—and one that was contained in a recent UNICEF conference report, prepared by the Government of South Viet-Nam—is that the health of the children suffers from: 1) an absence of hygienic knowledge; 2) nutritional deficiencies (most infant deaths are the result of under nourishment, infantile beri-beri, and protein malnutrition); 3) The physical, social and psychological effects of the war, and the inability of the existing facilities to deal with the existing conditions.

Mr. Chairman, there are two profoundly heartrending effects of this war upon the children of Viet-Nam. The first, the physical damage, I shall discuss in this section and the second, the social and psychological destruction, I shall consider in the subsequent part.

My introduction to the extent of actual war injury was provided by Mr. Le Tuan-Anh the chief nurse at Cho-Ray Hospital in Saigon. The Cho-Ray children's ward consists of 40 beds and usually, not less than 70 to 85 children. In many instances one can encounter beds with two or even three children in them. The injuries vary. Some are the victims of grenade explosions, some are contacted by mortar fire and shrapnel and others by bomb explosions. A large number are the victims of Napalm and the more horrible white phosphorous bomb explosions. (White phosphorous is more terrifying because it does not extinguish as readily as Napalm. So long as the surface receives air it will burn.)

The children come to the hospitals of Cho-Ray, Holy Family in Qui-Nhon, Phu My, just outside of Saigon, and the others, in any number of ways and from all parts. Sometimes their families bring them—and leave them, so that the hospital is forced to begin orphanage care under very difficult conditions, such as exist at Phu My. Occasionally, friends usher them in, and frequently, they

appear from out of nowhere, by themselves. They range in age from the newborn on up.

My observations indicated that the children of the Viet Cong were mixed with "loyal" Vietnamese and montegnard children and, for the most part received comparative treatment. I interviewed two "V.C." children in Holy Family Hospital (Qui-Nhon) both of whom had been terribly burned and one of whom had just undergone skin grafting. They were content with their treatment, to the extent that they did not want to return to their village which they last remembered as being an inferno.

I talked with others—always through an interpreter—and received stories of night awakenings by the "War Gong" and mad, frenzied races for cover before the attack. One 15 year old related how he awoke with the "gong", called for his mother and, then, remembered no more. At that precise moment, apparently, a bullet entered one side of this head, passed out through the other side, severing an optical nerve on its way, leaving the lad permanently blinded.

Without question, however, the greatest physical damage to children, indeed to the rural civilians, generally, who reside in the 2600 odd villages, is caused by the bombing. This is the permanent physical effect that will live for the lifetimes of the scarred bodies, and then some.

It cannot be denied, Mr. Chairman, it is happening, daily, there, and for every child that is visible in a hospital bed, there must be scores that never make it that far. It is a direct result of this conflict and I submit that we as a nation have as real a responsibility for its alleviation, as we do for its perpetration.

It is true, the most extensive medical assistance presently being provided is offered by the United States. All forms of medical care are being provided in the forms of personnel, medicines, supplies and equipment. Some very fine work is being done, for example, in the areas of plastic surgery and orthopedics by Americans.

Mr. Chairman, it is not nearly enough. The number and type of facilities are clearly inadequate. The interiors of the existing hospitals are characterized by the omnipresence of flies, inadequate ventilation, and air circulation, and sanitation facilities. In immediate consideration and planning a high priority should be given to the relief of the injured children of Viet-Nam.

A Swiss organization, "Terre Des Hommes," that is dedicated to providing " * * * vigorous, immediate and direct help to the most unfortunate children," undertook its own investigation of these conditions sending two representatives to Viet-Nam on October 17, 1965. I have appended their report to this statement, (A) for the committee's consideration. They were shocked by the conditions encountered and abhorred by the inadequacy of facilities. They concluded that " * * * efficient medical and serious surgical procedures in local areas are impossible in the present circumstance."

I might add, Mr. Chairman, that in addition to waiting, each day, they are dying. Terre Des Hommes reportedly has located some 400 hospital beds in Europe and elsewhere to receive and treat immediately a beginning group that cannot be adequately treated on the scene. They requested of the United States the provision of transportation facilities for the removal of the children. From my several conversations with the Minister for Social Welfare, Mr. Tran Ngoc Lieng, I do not feel that he would oppose the removal of the children. The United States State Department has remained adamant in its refusal to cooperate with Terre Des Hommes. I have further appended correspondence on this matter, (B) and a related editorial from the (York) Penn. Gazette and Daily which describes a particular situation. (C) I would like to respectfully

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urge the Sub-Committee's consideration of the merits of the Terre Des Hommes proposal, and inquiry into the refusal of our government to assist. The evacuation for treatment program would in my judgment, immediately benefit only a small number of children involved to date, but it would constitute a beginning.

It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to say tritely that "war is hell" and this is one of its realities. Hell is worse in some parts than others. In Viet-Nam an unusually large portion of the population are children, as was pointed out earlier. Their natural habitational places of straw and bamboo and vegetational construction tend quickly to become furnaces, and ovens. This is not and has not always been the case, where men have fought.

THE GENERAL SECURITY AND WELFARE

In a way more subtle than physical scarring, the conflict is affecting, for a long time to come the structures of the Vietnamese people. It is doing this precisely because the family is being gradually eliminated as the basic unit.

Millions of Vietnamese under 21 have never known what it is to live in peace, and have been, and are, being raised without the presence of the father. The fathers of these countless ones are, of course, dead or fighting the war. This places an enormous nationwide responsibility on the mothers, for, not only must they raise the average family of five children, but, they have also to provide for them. (The 7 piasters per refugee each week paid by the Ministry of Social Welfare, which itself receives only 1/2 of 1% on the total budget, even with anticipated increase is not sufficient in these inflationary times, and any way, does not reach many unclassified families.)

The result of this situation is varied, sometimes, interestingly enough, the families and friends in shelters, such as those I visited in Qui-Nhon, Binh Dinh, and Cholon, often band together and form a type of tribe or larger independent unit.

In other instances, children are separated, abandoned or left alone and they drift into the provincial towns, where they exist in packs and on their own. Every provincial town has these urchins and Saigon appears to have thousands of them. They often syndicate their business activities—shoe shining, begging, car watching, etc.—and many are as young as seven or eight. Here, the peer group, existing and sleeping in the streets, has taken the family's place.

A third effect is reflected in the number of orphanages in South Viet-Nam. There were 77 when I left and the indications are that the number will continually increase. They house between 10,000 and 10,500 children and ranged in size from 25 or 30 to several hundreds, and the children in age from the new-born to 17 or 18 year olds. I lived in one, and visited a great number of others. The care and facilities range from poor to good. Mademoiselle La Mer, the UNICEF representative to the Ministry of Social Welfare is alarmed, along with a number of others, that the authorities will seize upon the construction of more orphanages as a solution to the problem of Viet-Nam's unattended children. This could easily happen—as I understand it did in the Korean instance—for foster parent treatment is not a part of the pattern of the Vietnamese people.

Roughly, one third of the children in the orphanages at present, have one or both parents—according to UNICEF statistics which I have appended (B); two thirds, have no parents. Physically, it is not an unattractive thought for a parent to place her child in such a setting and keep him there until he is able to work, always refusing to allow him to be placed for adoption.

Actually, these settings breed dependence and low morale and rarely provide a mini-

mally adequate educational program. Personal attention and care is characteristically absent. Food and shelter are provided, adequately, as a rule, but, in the makeshift "orphanages" which one often finds attached to the refugee shelters, these basic necessities are frequently absent, and the tiny beings more nearly resemble animals than humans.

There are bound to be long range effects upon a future adult population resulting from this de-familization, and de-personalization of the lives of their children. Immediately, one is quite conscious of the increasing problem of juvenile delinquency which is plaguing Minister Lieng to no end. It persists and grows in every city and provincial town.

The increasing suicide rate (not political suicide) in South Viet-Nam is also quite alarming—this is a fairly recent phenomenon which was raised by Mr. Baesjou—the UNESCO Representative, and also by Lawson Mooney the Director of Catholic Relief Services. While no accurate statistics are available, as yet, the incidence of self-destruction is growing, and of particular note and horror is the fact that mass or group suicides are becoming more common and that the participants are frequently teenagers.

With the destruction of the family, family life, veneration for age and physical removal from the ancestral burial place—the majority of Vietnamese indulge in confucianistic ancestral worship and do not attend any formal temple or church—a void in apparently created and a social reaction sets in.

These, then, are the more subtle effects of the physical conflict. The hundreds of children whom I met in various parts of the country, some briefly, some for periods of extended conversation and acquaintanceship, could best be described as solemn. How often, Lawson Mooney and I both commented on the fact that the majority of them did not know how to participate in any form of group play. Fun, was clearly not a part of their usual day; listlessness, definitely was. I taught English three evenings a week, for awhile to an interested group at Sancta Maria, and then, again, more briefly in Binh Dinh to some injured "V.C." children and found all of them to be quite responsive, after an initial period of timidity.

Mr. Chairman, the committee should briefly be aware of the very special problems facing the Eurasian children of South Viet-Nam. Simply put, they are by and large rejected by the society at this time, and frequently abandoned. This is a particularly relevant concern for the Sub-committee due to the increasing number of "Amerasian" or half American babies presently being produced in that country. If no plan of evacuation and foster or adoptive placement, in this country or elsewhere, is devised for these who are cast aside, then, they surely will have a difficult future road to tread.

CONCLUSIONS

The effects of the conflict, Mr. Chairman, have greatly set back the capacity of the existing government to provide essential services such as education and health care, so that even at present the needs of the population are not nearly being met. In addition, the great numbers of children live daily in a situation where they could be physically brutalized at any instant. Perhaps, even more ominous is the breakdown of the family and what this portends for the future, as well as what it means right now.

By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit some proposals for the consideration of the subcommittee.

First, that a program of mass evacuation of children from South Viet-Nam be established. That it operate on the basis of established priority conditions for evacuation (i.e. the wounded, and injured; the aban-

done, etc.). That it be implemented by the American Voluntary Agencies and groups such as Terre Des Hommes, in a coordinated fashion through its Council, (ACVA) with the financial support and general assistance of the U.S. Government and the cooperation of the Government of Viet-Nam.

Second, that, as a part of the first suggestion, and a natural follow up, thereto, a foster home and adoptive placement program be undertaken by some Voluntary Agencies who are specialists in this field, in the United States and elsewhere. In the meantime, available hospital and institutional places should be secured, also in the United States and elsewhere, for the children.

Third, that planning and construction of needed medical treatment facilities in Viet-Nam be greatly accelerated, and the number of medical personnel in service in that country be tremendously increased.

Fourth, that every effort be made to remove, immediately, the children from the areas of intense fighting—particularly in the Central Highlands, and the Northern five Provinces—and wherever possible, to resettle them in family units in more secure areas.

Fifth, that to more efficiently carry out the whole relief assistance program in Viet-Nam, consideration be given to the U.S. Government through AID contracting on a wider basis with the Vol-Agency community on a specialized basis for the purpose of dividing up the tasks and avoiding present duplication.

Mr. Chairman, the American Voluntary Agencies are doing yeoman work in Viet Nam. Without their presence, it is safe to say that the conditions previously described would be far worse. Catholic Relief Services alone, for example, transported and distributed 50,000,000 pounds of food, clothing, equipment and supplies last year. Similar efforts in varied fields were turned in by CARE, I.V.S., Church World Service, Foster Parents Plan and others. But, all of this is clearly, not enough. A new and full commitment is needed, Mr. Chairman, to rescue the children of Viet-Nam from a situation that is no way of their making. If ever a group of innocents had a claim on history it is these little ones. There must begin an immediate, effective and coordinated attack on these conditions, involving both in country and outside of the country programs and solutions. And all the while internal facilities are being developed to treat the maimed and scarred of tomorrow, let us remember that today's children are waiting.

APPENDIX

VIETNAMESE CHILDREN IN FIRE AND BLOOD
INTRODUCTION

A letter from the International Red Cross Committee (IRCC) to Terre des Hommes (9-2-1965) mentioned the Vietnamese provincial hospitals "crowded with wounded, particularly people suffering from extremely severe burns. There are among these many civilians and therefore many children." Burns and wounds resulted from bombs, bullets, grenades, napalm, phosphorous, flares.

2) Terre des Hommes simultaneously and in identical terms established contact with the government of the Vietnamese Republic (South), with the representative of the NLF (Vietcong) in Algiers and with the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North). It offered to each its immediate and direct help to Vietnamese children who were burnt or wounded and cannot be cared for properly in their present location.

3) The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North) did not answer this offer. The representative of the NLF's response (received after three months' delay) expressed only the desire that Terre des

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Hommes should make a protest with a political character. Only the government of South Vietnam gave enthusiastic support to our proposal.

4) A representative of Terre des Hommes met twice with Mr. Maunoir and Mr. Durand, delegates of the IRCC, who expressed approval of the projects of Terre des Hommes (*treatment in Europe or elsewhere of children seriously hurt but not treated, or not treatable locally.*) At the same time they asked their colleagues in Saigon to open the doors of the public health and social action ministries as well as of the Vietnamese Red Cross to Terre des Hommes.

5) Terre des Hommes then contacted (10-15-66) a representative of the State Department (Washington) at the United States Mission in Geneva, who was relatively open to our plans and asked to see us again upon our return from Vietnam. He recommended strongly that we contact Dr. J. who is an American General there.

6) Terre des Hommes reserved hospital beds in different countries (Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark) and the delegates, upon their departure to Vietnam already had "in their pocket" about 400 beds. The expense of hospitalization was assumed by Terre des Hommes.

DISEASE AND REMEDY

10-17-1965 Two representatives of Terre des Hommes, one of them a surgeon, left for Vietnam.

(a) Stop at Bangkok (Thailand)

This stop gave us the assurance that we would be able to hospitalize and treat in Thailand a sizeable number of burned and wounded children from Vietnam, thanks to the important medical facilities and hospital possibilities in Thailand. At the end of the mission we planned to visit Bangkok again.

However, it is obvious that the European public is not likely to finance an organization that provides care several thousand miles away if it is not directly shocked by the contact with Vietnamese children treated under its eyes in Switzerland or other European countries. This contact with Vietnamese children would make it possible for the European public to "live" the suffering of these children and to associate itself with it by an act of will.

(b) Visit in Vietnam

1) In the course of numerous encounters and official interviews (minister of public health, highly placed health officials, Vietnamese heads of medical departments and hospitals, American military doctors) our projects were unanimously well received. The reason for this unanimity is the obvious impossibility in a large number of cases of practicing locally any type of really efficient medicine or serious surgery (especially orthopedic surgery) because of lack of facilities and personnel.

2) Besides orphanages and baby centers, which take in innumerable children, who are starving, very seriously ill or abandoned, we visited four provincial hospitals. Only one of these (Rach-Gia) which benefits from the presence of an American medical team, seems to operate normally. The three other hospitals (Hue, Cantho, Mytho—but particularly Hue) show the frightening spectacle of an immense distress: To the extent that one finds children burned from head to foot who are treated only with vaseline, because of lack of a) ointment for burns, b) cotton, c) gauze, d) personnel. In places, with the atmosphere of slaughter houses for people, where flies circulate freely on children who have been skinned alive, there are no facilities for hygiene, no fans, and no air conditioning. We know, from reliable sources, that this extreme lack of facilities is repeated in many Vietnamese hospitals. This latter information was given to us by competent specialists or official people. One of them,

the head doctor of a large hospital told us: "I have received many representatives from diverse institutions, but, before you, none even asked to see a single child.

3) It is important to be very conscious of the fact that most of the children who are wounded, burned or sick are not in hospitals (treated in hospitals). This is because they are never found, because there is no means of transportation, or because of non-existent medical or para-medical personnel and the lack of specialized equipment or sanitary facilities. These children suffer and die without care, "at home", in villages, in straw huts, etc.

4) Out of a total of 500 (800 or 1000) Vietnamese doctors only 200 minister to the needs of the civilian population (14 million) which amounts to only a little more than one doctor per 100,000 people (end of October, 1965). The other doctors are used for military needs.

5) About the same time, a little bit later, and independently of Terre des Hommes, two Dutch doctors visited Vietnam. One of them was a specialist in plastic surgery and the other an internist. Here are extracts from texts that were published upon their return in the Dutch press: "It is indescribable. Thousands of people suffering from untended burns arrive from the interior of the country. Nobody takes care of these unfortunate people because no one seems to know what could be done. In Vietnam one encounters all the forms of infectious diseases and their complications. Every tenth South Vietnamese suffers from tuberculosis. Numerous types of sickness are not treated. There is an unimaginable number of people suffering from war wounds. The few existing hospitals are overflowing with patients. It is not rare that three people share the same bed. There are practically no nurses. Most people are tended by members of their own family, who usually sleep in the hospital itself, under the bed or next to it, anywhere where they can find room. No efficient treatment of burns is used."

6) Some figures (end of October 1965) provided by authorized official sources.

Burned and wounded children: thousands (no precise census on a national scale is possible). Even if there were only hundreds our anguish and our action would already be justified;

Completely abandoned children: thousands, including 11,000 orphans;

Children suffering from tuberculosis: see above the national percentage;

Hungry children and children suffering from undernourishment: thousands (exact census is not possible);

Children suffering from infantile paralysis or serious multiple illness: number not known but obviously enormous.

Civilian refugees (adult and children) 600,000 to 800,000. Refugees without refuge and extremely miserable.

7) Like the American doctor S. (a Colonel) in Thailand, the American doctor J. (a General) and his assistant, doctor M. (a Colonel) with whom we have had lengthy meetings, were quite favorable to the projects of Terre des Hommes. Their approval, however, depended upon the agreement of the American government (personified as far as we were concerned, by the representative of the State Department in Geneva whom we had seen before leaving and who was to be contacted upon our return) to give us the help desired by our organization, namely the loan of American military medical planes. Later the Federal Office for Aeronautics (Swiss) should consent to the landing of the planes on Swiss territory. Doctor J. who is a General, thought that it is desirable to help unfortunate children in the way chosen by Terre des Hommes because "if the U.S.A. intends to send people to train leaders, this will take much time." Meanwhile the children are waiting.

8) Conclusion.

a) Efficient medical and serious surgical procedures in local areas are impossible in the present circumstances, depending upon cases and location;

b) Not only in the hospitals, but everywhere, it is urgent to detect sick, wounded or burnt children who are unattended or insufficiently cared for;

c) Relevance of the Terre des Hommes projects: transportation to Europe, Thailand and other countries of children who have been found to need care. The existing national and international help will remain for a long time incapable of coping with all cases;

d) It is illusory to imagine that external initiatives, even powerful ones, could create from nothing, a sufficient number of hospitals perfectly provided with rigging (beds, nursing and medical personnel, supplies and equipment). The present Terres des Hommes project is not new for this organization. Several years of experience have proven that it is just, humane and efficient to treat elsewhere those who because they are not attended to, where they are, suffer, wither or die. It is another illusion to wait hopefully but helplessly until "others" (governments, institutions) should "do something." Even if this "something" is presently beginning to show signs of life, although for the time being the immense and intense need cannot be met.

e) For financial reasons, it is necessary to have at our disposal free airplanes or free places in airplanes with unoccupied seats.

f) One or several competent and permanent representatives of Terre des Hommes should be sent to Vietnam.

PRESENT CONDITIONS

1) Upon our return, in spite of his own wishes, those of General J. and our own, repeated attempts at meeting the previously encountered representative from the State Department remained fruitless.

2) Several people held a meeting at Bern (11, 26, 1965) at the Political Department of the Federal Government. A representative of the Political Department, the director and two staff members of the Federal Police for Aliens, Mr. J. P. Maunoir as delegate of the IRCC, the general secretary of the Swiss Red Cross and three representatives of Terre des Hommes, as well as others did attend this meeting. The delegate of the IRCC (an organization which has been doing what it can in Vietnam) made a final declaration: "At the IRCC we think that we are bound to help those who are victims of war or of its consequences. Therefore, we approve any action that is taken either locally or abroad. If we have the means we shall help. Our rule of action is to attend to the most pressing needs; when a child is burned or wounded, it is at that very moment that he must be helped and prevented from dying. But if, besides our own efforts, there exists an organization such as Terre des Hommes which attempts long range action we give it our approval. Our delegates, if they are able to, will help the representative that you (Terres des Hommes) shall send to Vietnam to select the children."

3) On behalf of Terre des Hommes a certified nurse, Miss V. B., left for Vietnam (12, 3, 1965). Her mission (with the understanding that she would receive the help of IRCC delegates in Saigon, according to the declaration of Mr. Maunoir in Bern) was as follows:

a) To detect seriously wounded, burned, or sick Vietnamese children who are insufficiently cared for, in the hospitals of the capital and provincial cities, as well as in villages and towns.

b) To select transferable children and organize their medical and social records. To initiate necessary arrangements for their transportation and treatment in hospitals in Switzerland, Europe (or elsewhere) where,

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upon action from Terre des Hommes, beds have already been reserved for them.

c) To organize and activate this transportation of children.

4) Active search for free means of transportation: American military medical planes (see below), airplanes or seats aboard civilian airplanes: Swissair, Air France, Alitalia, Air-India, etc. Contacts which would probably prove fruitful in the future with the International Air Transport Association (IATA, Montreal). Terres des Hommes, which needs very large amounts of money necessary for the hospitalization and care of the children, cannot spend huge sums in travel, when every day hundreds of empty seats, which do not benefit anybody, are carried across the skies of the world at great cost. Several civilian airlines, sensitive to these considerations, are enthusiastically campaigning for this new style of human cooperation. Simultaneously the search for European and extra-European facilities available at the best price is continued. Terre des Hommes is expanding into other prosperous countries in order to increase appreciably the chances for the survival of children.

5) Because it was impossible to contact the delegate of the State Department who, according to General J., is the only "competent" official, Terre des Hommes wrote to President Johnson in order to obtain his personal intervention; transmission of this request was confirmed by the chief of the U.S. Mission in Geneva, following which, the much-desired encounter between the representative of Terres des Hommes and the representative of the State Department finally took place. But he is opposed to any cooperation with Terres des Hommes under the desired conditions. American help could eventually be obtained if the Terres des Hommes organization limited its efforts to local work. Therefore, in spite of the competent support of General J. for the Terre des Hommes project we shall not have the assistance of military medical planes to aid the wounded, burned or sick Vietnamese children whom we wish to help.

6) 1.7.1966—In Saigon during a cabinet meeting the definitive and official agreement to the Terre des Hommes projects by the general-prime minister of the Vietnamese Republic was announced and a permanent inter-departmental Committee is created.

7) 1.13.1966—Terre des Hommes organized in Geneva an international press conference about these subjects. The two Dutch specialists participated in this activity.

8) 1.17.1966—Letter from the White House (Washington) to Terre des Hommes: Subtle but negative answer, to the request of Terre des Hommes.

9) 1.20.1966—Pressing message from the Red Cross: "A cruel war ravages Vietnam. Civilian hospitals are overcrowded with the sick and the wounded and it is hardly possible to attempt to give the necessary treatments. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are piled up in the vicinity of large cities and survive in the greatest misery. Incalculable number of families are torn apart. Abandoned children and orphans can no longer be counted.

10) 1.31.1966—Answer from Terre des Hommes to the White House. The text is so explicit and detailed that there was reason to conclude with "the conviction that the people and the government of the United States would assist Terre des Hommes to rescue a large number of wounded and burned Vietnamese children."

NOTES

1) The hospitalization in Europe of several hundred children shall expose them to the population of prosperous countries. As a result of having seen, known, lived with and loved these children, the people of these countries shall accept with full understanding and confidence the financing of the care

that we shall offer to hundreds or thousands of other children in countries closer to their own. The physical "transfer" and the temporary "uprooting" of these children have nothing in common with the "transfers" and the "uprooting" which are caused by suffering and death.

2) We are all in agreement with respect to the principle that local work is most desirable but who has done it efficiently and sufficiently since the beginning of the war? Was there any action from those who could do something, continue to be able to do something or preach action? To organize local hospitals would be the logical and wise thing to do. But who would make the plans, draw the blueprints, supervise the construction? When? Where? And how much time would it take? Where are the funds, the supplies, the equipment and the personnel? Where can one find large numbers of available and highly trained specialists? How many are there? Where are the necessary army of male and female nurses? If it is so easy to save locally by modern means thousands of burned, wounded and sick people, children as well as adults, why has this not already been done? Now as in past centuries, whenever horrors beyond measure are encountered, it is affirmed that! "someone is going to do something about it, somewhere." Terre des Hommes has chosen to save immediately, by available means, those little ones that can be saved. There exists an irremediable difference between the notion of working "on the scene" and the need for saving people right now.

For it is not enough to shout: "Let there be a hospital!"

[Lausanne, le 1er février 1966]

JANUARY 17, 1966.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. K.: I refer to your letter of December 14, 1965, to the United States Mission, Geneva, together with copy of letter of same date addressed to President Johnson.

I understand that both you and your associate, Dr. C., have been informed through your meetings with our Mission in Geneva that the United States Government welcomes all efforts to aid the victims of Communist aggression in South Vietnam, and we commend your organization and all others which have similar humanitarian objectives to extend medical assistance to victims, particularly children.

I am sure that you were advised by the U.S. Mission in Geneva, during your visit in Vietnam and by Mr. A. S., that some thirty countries are already engaged in extending medical assistance to victims of the conflict in South Vietnam. You also have our view that the most effective way of extending assistance is on the scene in South Vietnam where children and others can be treated near their families and in familiar surroundings. However, any medical assistance given to needy Vietnamese children outside of the country is, of course, also welcome.

As Mr. S. informed Mr. C. at a meeting in Geneva on December 20, U.S. Military aircraft cannot be provided for airlift to Europe of Vietnamese children who may need medical treatment, and no United States funds are available to support your activities in Europe. On that occasion, Dr. C. informed Mr. S. that in view of unavailability of U.S. aircraft, your organization would be able to obtain commercial aircraft on a gratis basis to enable you to proceed with the airlift plan.

Accordingly, we were somewhat surprised to learn that at a press conference on January 12 in Geneva you were reported as having stated that the U.S. Government response to your request for U.S. military aircraft to airlift needy Vietnamese children to Europe is not to be considered finally "negative". In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I repeat to you Mr. S.'s advice to Dr. C. that U.S. air-

craft are definitely not available for this purpose. Since neither U.S. aircraft nor U.S. funds are available in support of the activities which you plan to undertake in Europe, your plan is a matter to be decided upon by your organization and the Government of South Vietnam.

May I again take this occasion to commend you and your organization for the humanitarian activities which you are seeking to carry out. I regret that our commitments and undertakings are such that we cannot assist a project of this nature which is outside of South Vietnam, but I assure you that we are prepared to consider extending assistance to organizations which undertake humanitarian projects for the benefit of needy persons within South Vietnam.

Sincerely,

CHESTER L. COOPER.

LAUSANNE,
Jan. 31, 1966.

Mr. CHESTER L. COOPER,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. (U.S.A.)

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 17th inst., the text of which constitutes the reply of the United States government to the requests we have made on behalf of Vietnamese children who have been cruelly stricken by the war. This reply calls for the following comments: (The United States Government letter states:)

1. "We commend your organization and all others which have similar humanitarian objectives to extend medical assistance to victims, particularly children."

In other words, you agree with us in recognizing the existence of these child victims, whose number and the nature of whose sufferings have been evident to us on the scene. (The United States Government letter states:)

2. "... some thirty countries are already engaged in extending medical assistance to victims of the conflict in South Vietnam."

While we give due recognition, in passing, to the commitment of these countries, we are resolved on action with respect to our own concern. Our position is especially clear in the light of the "urgent" appeal now issued by the Red Cross: "The innocent victims of the war in Viet Nam must be saved . . . A cruel war is raging in Viet Nam. Civilian hospitals are overcrowded with sick and wounded. It is scarcely possible to give necessary care any longer."

Everything presently undertaken (or planned) obviously deserves only praise, but these measures cannot be considered sufficient as long as numerous wounded or burned children remain deprived of care or effective treatment.

(The United States Government letter states:)

3. "The most effective way of extending assistance is on the scene in South Vietnam where children and others can be treated near their families and in familiar surroundings."

Our viewpoint differs from yours:

a) To help "on the scene" may appear the most logical plan of action, but it is not therefore the most "effective". For the "effective" way of extending assistance is actually to save victims through supplying treatment truly suited to the nature of the malady, under the safest technical conditions, with the aid of a sufficient number of highly specialized medical and paramedical personnel (in plastic surgery, for example). They must have modern equipment which is indispensable, and sanitary conditions that have nothing in common with the horrors of the Vietnamese hospitals we have visited (only one in four is an exception).

The "most effective" manner of saving burned or wounded children who have been insufficiently treated, not treated, or who

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are untreatable on the scene is obviously then to save them elsewhere, with medical and surgical procedures which are suitable and which modern science makes available.

We would further note that, according to information received from the most trustworthy authorized sources, a very great number of these wounded and burned children are not in hospitals, but are suffering (or dying) "at private homes", either because they cannot be transported to hospitals, or because overcrowded hospitals cannot receive them, or because the hospitals have no facilities for giving them proper care; care that would be dangerous in any event because of a total lack of sanitation facilities. This lack of sanitation is often accompanied by an absence of the most elementary equipment: fans, air-conditioners, protection against flies, etc.

b) The families of these children are frequently absent, far away, wounded themselves, dead or missing.

c) As for their "familiar surroundings", these may be only a straw hut or a village where one suffers or dies without assistance, or else those hospitals whose indescribable destitution makes them veritable charnel-houses for the living.

Two Dutch doctors whom we did not know made a trip to Vietnam shortly after we did, made the same observations as we did, and drew the same conclusions: there is no possibility, on the scene and in the immediate circumstances, of being able really to cope with all the problems. This explains the favorable response with which General J. and his colleagues have received our movement's program.

(The United States Government letter states:)

4. "However, any medical assistance given to needy Vietnamese children outside of the country is, of course, also welcome."

This is precisely the type of assistance which we are furnishing. And we are very much aware that it is, as you term it, "welcome."

(The United States Government letter states:)

5. "U.S. Military aircraft cannot be provided for the airlift to Europe of Vietnamese children who may need medical treatment, and no United States funds are available to support your activities in Europe."

The members of our movement—and the world will share our feelings—experience some difficulty in picturing the United States unable to furnish aircraft which might be used to transport our children, or without the financial means to support our activities in Europe, that is, to finance the chartering of an airplane. We have never asked for funds from the United States, but simply for the loan of one or several military hospital planes, or the offer of unoccupied places in American planes.

(The United States Government letter states:)

6. "We were somewhat surprised to learn that at a press conference on January 12 in Geneva you were reported as having stated that the U.S. Government response to your request for U.S. military aircraft to airlift needy Vietnamese children to Europe is not to be considered finally negative."

At the time of that conference I declared: "I cannot bring myself to consider as absolutely negative the reply which a member of the Department of State gave us, in the name of the U.S. government.

Here are the reasons for that declaration, whose optimism will be either justified or disapproved by the future:

a) I was not able (and I am not able) to keep myself from hoping, indeed from being certain that the American people are prepared to furnish aircraft or funds for the rescue from Vietnam of burned or wounded children who at this moment cannot be saved in their own land.

b) I have good reason not to forget that part of the world owes its liberation from Hitlerian executioners to the American people. Thus, for reasons of discretion, and so to speak, in the name of the American people, I did not dare to admit publicly to the press of the world that the U.S. government has answered "NO" to the request of Terres des Hommes.

(The United States Government letter states:)

7. "U.S. aircraft are definitely not available for this purpose."

The American military air force includes hospital planes. And even if we admit that they are not available for the transportation of burned and wounded children, it would be in keeping with the humanitarian obligation toward these children of the American government and people to make these planes available.

(The United States Government letter states:)

8. "Since neither U.S. aircraft nor U.S. funds are available in support of the activities which you plan to undertake in Europe, your plan is a matter to be decided upon by your organization and the Government of South Vietnam."

Even if American aircraft and American funds cannot be used in the rescue work which has been undertaken, and taking account of the reception given by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to the program of Terres des Hommes, we deem it useful to emphasize that our plans are far from being limited to the concerns of that government and our organization.

Indeed, without making any judgment at all on the direction of this war, we feel that the armed forces of the United States, involved in acts which have mutilated our little ones, can in no way shed that involvement when it is an urgent question of saving the lives of those children. At the very moment when it is both possible and necessary to lend support, the U.S. armed forces cannot content themselves with falling back on an organization without aircraft and without large financial support or on the government of an unfortunate people.

In conclusion, in order that you may have the opportunity to express publicly the surprise occasioned by my declaration at our press conference, I am releasing to the international press, copies of the correspondence between the U.S. Government and Terres des Hommes, together with a memorandum on our activity. All items are reproduced in full, without additions, deletions or commentary; only the names of the American General and Officers favorable to our plans are replaced by initials.

With the conviction that the people and government of the United States will want to assist Terres des Hommes to rescue a large number of wounded and burned Vietnamese children, may I assure you, Sir, of my most respectful and cordial sentiments.

TERRE DES HOMMES,
(Signed) SPOKESMAN FOR TERRE DES
HOMMES.

[From the York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily]
THE MILK OF HUMAN KINDNESS FLOWS IN EUROPE—TINY VICTIMS OF U.S. NAPALM RAIDS
(By Jane Armstrong)

LONDON.—Two little faceless children from Vietnam, sent here for free plastic surgery at the famous McIndoe Burns Center, have aroused all Britain to the horrors of a war in which the innocent and young seem to be chief victims of napalm, grenades and saturation bombing.

Since British papers showed pictures of the youngsters being carried from the plane with muslin bags over their heads, money, toys and gifts have flooded the hospital at East Grinstead in Sussex. Surgeons there who are waiving the fees, already have started the

delicate work of giving back to these waifs of war new, happy faces.

"We are taking special care to make them look Vietnamese," said a hospital official.

The boy, Doan Minh Luan, aged eight, who needs 12 operations, may be here for years. His face was mutilated beyond recognition in the fire in which his family were burned alive last year. Because of the war, Luan had no treatment at all for more than four months.

The girl, Tran Thi Thong, nine, was completely scarred by a grenade and has no eyelids. Her parents are peasant farmers beyond Saigon and she will go back to them eventually.

At the Burns Center where the late Sir Archibald McIndoe restored many wartime Canadian flyers, the children are private patients. Their beds, costing \$135 a week each, are paid for by Lady Sainsbury, energetic wife of grocery chain millionaire.

"Now I am trying to bring in some paraplegic cases. I like doing things quickly," Lady Sainsbury told me.

She is starting a British branch of the Swiss charity Terres des Hommes (World of Mankind), which rescues child victims of war.

"We made the same offer to both North and South Vietnam," she said. "But the North won't send their children out to us. They replied with a statement of their beliefs."

Yet politics in South Vietnam almost prevented the first group of injured children leaving there too. When Swiss philanthropist Edmund Keyser, founder of Terres des Hommes, asked for help by U.S. military transport, American generals in the area at first backed the idea as good propaganda. But the final decision, like others in the Vietnam war, was made in the White House by the president. The answer was "No." Although the Americans airlift wounded Vietnamese soldiers, their policy is that civilian casualties depend for treatment on foreign medical teams sent in.

Keyser, who began saving children in the Spanish civil war, then asked world airlines for the use of their empty seats from Saigon. This was refused. Air fare alone costs nearly \$1,500, so Keyser and his volunteers raised the money to charter the first flight that brought 32 Vietnamese youngsters to Geneva a month ago.

Beds were promised for them all over Europe. Italy took the sickest 16 without quarantine, despite the risk of cholera.

"The big difficulty is cost of transport," said Lady Sainsbury. Vietnam is in greatest need. The children are so terribly maimed. But our ability to help them depends on free transport or raising money ourselves."

The two little Vietnamese at East Grinstead appear to have started a substantial British effort to help others like them. Donations are rolling in, sometimes as little as sixpence from an old age pensioner.

At the Vietnamese embassy, an anonymous Englishman who lived in Saigon, mans the telephone to give progress bulletins to an avid public. There is always news to report because the seven members of the embassy visit the hospital in turn to keep the youngsters cheerful.

Luan and Thong share a sterile, sealed room overlooking the hospital gardens. He is intrigued by his new building set and she by a talking doll. But they are most fascinated by television, the first they have ever seen, and by the English bathtub in which they can splash.

The hospital staff have been astonished by their happy dispositions. Within a week, Thong was greeting the nurse in English. "Hello, one, two, three, four, five, hello." She apparently memorized this from television.

Within two weeks both children had a first successful operation to restore their upper eyelids. Luan had extra surgery to

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free his chin which had "melted" into his neck so that he could not close his mouth. Now he can. A Vietnamese girl student flew from Geneva for a few days so that the youngsters would not be frightened on awakening to find their eyes blindfolded. The student also set up a special menu for them of boiled rice, vegetable soup and pork.

Then there was a second operation to give them lower lids. Then skin grafting starts little by little at fortnightly intervals until September when both will be given a rest from this harrowing procedure. Eventually Luan and Thong will move into the children's ward where lots of laughter and play is encouraged so that new faces grow, looking happy.

Lady Sainsbury, who took them to hospital and telephone nearly every day, said "they are clever children, the little boy especially. They had to relearn how to raise their new eyelids which otherwise stayed

closed. Luan learned in only three days and then taught the girl. She is more sensitive about her face. She was a pretty little thing.

There is, inevitably, some mystery as to who these children are and how they were chosen from thousands of other needy cases. There is only one children's hospital in South Vietnam where patients lie two in a bed and the death rate is depressingly high.

The Vietnam embassy, also in the dark, is sending reports on all the children to Saigon where it is hoped the ministry of social welfare finds it possible to inform relatives. No one can say what will happen to Luan, the orphan. There are at least 30,000 known children like him without anyone to care if they live or die. Lady Sainsbury hopes to bring over orphans for adoption here.

But the big obstacle to all these splendid plans is a lack of transport.

bill (S. 3158), which had been reported from the Committee on Banking and Currency, with an amendment, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That this Act may be cited as the "Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966".

TITLE I—PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD AND THE FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE CORPORATION

SEC. 101. Subsection (d) of section 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 1464(d)) is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(d) (1) The Board shall have power to enforce this section and rules and regulations made hereunder. In the enforcement of any provision of this section or rules and regulations made hereunder, or any other law or regulation, or in any other action, suit, or proceeding to which it is a party or in which it is interested, and in the administration of conservatorships and receiverships, the Board is authorized to act in its own name and through its own attorneys. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Board shall be subject to suit (other than suits on claims for money damages) by any Federal savings and loan association or director or officer thereof with respect to any matter under this section or any other applicable law, or rules or regulations thereunder, in the United States district court for the judicial district in which the home office of the association is located, or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the Board may be served with process in the manner prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

"(2) (A) If, in the opinion of the Board, an association is violating or has violated, or the Board has reasonable cause to believe that the association is about to violate, a law, rule, regulation, or charter or other condition imposed in writing by the Board or written agreement entered into with the Board, or is engaging or has engaged, or the Board has reasonable cause to believe that the association is about to engage, in an unsafe or unsound practice, the Board may issue and serve upon the association a notice of charges in respect thereof. The notice shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the alleged violation or violations or the unsafe or unsound practice or practices, and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether an order to cease and desist therefrom should issue against the association. Such hearing shall be fixed for a date not earlier than thirty days nor later than sixty days after service of such notice unless an earlier or a later date is set by the Board at the request of the association. Unless the association shall appear at the hearing by a duly authorized representative, it shall be deemed to have consented to the issuance of the cease-and-desist order. In the event of such consent, or if upon the record made at any such hearing the Board shall find that any violation or unsafe or unsound practice specified in the notice of charges has been established, the Board may issue and serve upon the association an order to cease and desist from any such violation or practice. Such order may, by provisions which may be mandatory or otherwise, require the association and its directors, officers, employees, and agents to cease and desist from the same, and, further, to take affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice.

"(B) A cease-and-desist order shall become effective at the expiration of thirty days after service of such order upon the association concerned (except in the case of a cease-and-desist order issued upon consent, which shall become effective at the time specified therein), and shall remain effective and enforce-

ANNEXE No. 3.—Distribution des orphelins dans les orphelinats du sud Vietnam

[+ Le pourcentage est calculé sur l'effectif total de chaque province, l'interpolation se fait avec la règle à calcul, ce qui fait que nous impliquons les décimales]

Provinces	Orphelins				Enfants Abandonnés		Enfants confiés par leurs parents		Total
	Ayant encore des proches parents		Sans proches parents		Nombre	Pourcentage	Nombre	Pourcentage	
	Nombre	Pourcentage	Nombre	Pourcentage					
Phu Yen	39	16.2	125	52.0	21	8	52	22.0	237
Da Nang	82	31.0	130	49.0	1	0.38	29	11.0	262
Quang Ngai	46	9.0	134	28.0	75	15	219	46.0	474
Gia Dinh	718	36.0	387	20.0	113	6	732	37.0	1950
Bien Hoa	47	29.0	104	62.0	3	1.7	7	4.3	161
Vinh Binh	52	85.0			5	8	4	6.0	61
Qui Nhon	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Vinh Long	24	24.0	4	4.0	12	12	60	60.0	100
Thuua Thien	116	17.0	113	16.0	18	2.7	412	62.0	659
Long An	34	28.0	3	2.5	1	0.8	81	68.0	119
My Tho	18	10.0	21	12.0	89	53	40	23.0	168
Go Cong	6	10.0	18	30.0	7	11	29	48.0	60
An Xuyen	57	35.0	2	3.0	1	1.6			60
Quang Tri	19	68.0	4	14.0	3	10	2	7.0	28

1 Results incomplete.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, informed the Senate that, pursuant to the provisions of section 1, Public Law 689, 84th Congress, the Speaker had appointed Mr. HAYS, of Ohio; Mr. RODINO, of New Jersey; Mr. DENTON, of Indiana; Mr. RIVERS, of South Carolina; Mr. CLARK, of Pennsylvania; Mr. ARENDS, of Illinois; Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, of Michigan; Mr. BATES, of Massachusetts; and Mr. FINDLEY, of Illinois as members of the U.S. group of the North Atlantic Treaty Parliamentary Conference, on the part of the House.

The message announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14596) making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture and related agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, and for other purposes; agreed to the conference asked by the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. WHITTEN, Mr.

NATCHER, Mr. HULL, Mr. MORRIS, Mr. MAHON, Mr. MICHEL, Mr. LANGEN, and Mr. Bow were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 2663) for the relief of Dinesh Poddar and Girish Kumar Poddar.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISORY ACT OF 1956

Mr. PROXMIER, Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of S. 3158, the unfinished business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 3158) to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory authority of Federal agencies over insured banks and insured savings and loan associations, and for other purposes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Wisconsin.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of the

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failure of the administration to meet the inflationary threat will do when they step into the secrecy of the voting booth.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senators are discussing the question of inflation and its relation to interest rates. In some respects higher costs do tend to discourage people from buying goods and services. If they must borrow money at high interest rates, then, to some extent, at least, that might tend to reduce the pressures for buying goods. But, on the other hand, in a great many cases costs have been raised, as Senators know.

For instance, we have heard criticism of the farmer—that his farm prices went up by about 3 percent. Interest rates that he paid were up about 30 percent. Interest is 10 percent of the farm cost, on the average; thus, if we multiply the 30 percent by the 10, we come up with a 3-percent factor. That is enough to amount to the 3-percent increase in farm production cost, when the farmer has to pay the 30-percent increase in the cost of the money he had to borrow to carry himself along until he can buy his equipment and other material necessary to operate the farm. It would be unfair to be critical of a farmer who raised his prices by 3 percent when his costs went up by 3 percent.

Mr. GORE. I am not criticizing the farmer.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. In contrast, the man who lends the money has raised his prices by 30 percent or more. That is a part of the real problem.

Much of the money is finding its way away from the farmers, away from the working man, away from wage earners and their families, into banks and money lenders who in turn are plowing it into large plants and equipment. We need plants and equipment, but there is a question in my mind as to whether we need them as rapidly as the present trend seems to indicate. The overall national effort is going strongly in the direction of automating and into new plants that are not necessarily needed for our war effort, into plants which, while highly desirable, could be postponed for a time.

There is a question whether, as a matter of priorities, we ought to be asking people to do without homes while we go strongly providing incentives to invest in the other field.

So far as costs are concerned, the farm is one place where, if the farmer's costs go up, he must raise his prices or take a loss.

Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator. He encourages me and gives me hope that there will be action and leadership in trying to achieve this objective.

CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, during July 1966, a total of 3,628 part I offenses were reported in the District of Columbia. This represented an increase of 27.6 percent over July 1965. Clearances for the 12-month pe-

riod ending with July 1966 were down to 27.2 percent as compared with 36 percent in July a year ago.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record the Metropolitan Police Department's July 1966 report on crime in the District of Columbia.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JULY 1966

During July 1966, a total of 3,628 Part I Offenses were reported in the District, an increase of 784 offenses or 27.6 percent from July 1965.

During this month increases occurred in the classifications of Criminal Homicide, up 4 offenses or 40.0 percent; Robbery, up 74 offenses or 23.2 percent; Aggravated Assault, up 59 offenses or 22.2 percent; Housebreaking, up 202 offenses or 28.6 percent; Grand Larceny, up 43 offenses or 30.9 percent; Petit Larceny, up 270 offenses or 30.8 percent; Auto Theft, up 132 offenses or 25.7 percent. The classification of Rape, with 14 offenses being reported, showed no change.

The increase for this month brought the trend of serious offenses (total offenses for the past 12 months) to 36,006, an increase of 2,997 offenses or 9.1 percent from the trend of July 1965, and an increase of 127.9 percent from the low point of June 1957.

Clearance of Part I Offenses for the twelve month period ending with July 1966 were down to 27.2 percent as compared with 36.0 for July 1965.

AFTER VIETNAM

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the August 21 edition of Parade, a Sunday newspaper supplement, carried an article by Jack Anderson, "After Vietnam—What?"

In it, my distinguished colleague from West Virginia, Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH, chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, expressed encouraging views as to what the future can hold for our Nation through public works programs under a peacetime economy. From his vantage point as chairman of this vital Senate committee, he is in a position to be well informed as to the value of such programs and to direct the course of public works planning. I am pleased to hear of these proposals, and, as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I shall welcome the opportunity, when it presents itself, to take constructive action on such programs.

I ask unanimous consent that the Parade article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Parade, Aug. 21, 1966]

AFTER VIETNAM—WHAT?

(By Jack Anderson)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—President Lyndon B. Johnson, studying a top-secret intelligence summary prepared in news capsule form for easy reading, stroked his chin with satisfaction. The digest reported that the Viet Cong had been hounded out of their hideouts by American search-and-destroy missions and B-52 raids. Left behind in the overrun sanctuaries had been literally tons of desperately needed food, arms and medical supplies. The black-pajamaed guerrilla fighters, spe-

cialists in ambush, were becoming the ambushed. Their morale had been rubbed raw by constant harassment. Their losses both in casualties and defections had been so severe that the Viet Cong had been forced to conscript 15-year-olds from the villages. The President looked up from his reading. "The war," he told an aide, "should be over in 1967."

UNMIXED BLESSING?

All Americans pray, of course, that the President's prediction comes true. But there is unspoken apprehension that the end of hostilities might not be an unmixed blessing. If the United States were suddenly plunged into peace, what would happen to our war-buoyed economy? A staggering \$30 million a day now being poured into the Vietnam war would go begging. Hundreds of companies geared to war production would be disrupted. Thousands of youths now employed by the armed forces would be turned loose on the streets to hunt for civilian jobs.

It is no secret that our whole economy has been juiced up by the armaments industry. A cease-fire, according to the DMS, Inc., research firm, would affect 500 companies employing one million people in 33 states. Hardest hit would be the 300 ammunition makers, next the aircraft manufacturers. Each plant compelled to shut down would effect an entire community, including grocers, merchants and shoe salesmen.

Fully aware of the problem, President Johnson is preparing to shift from war to peacetime production with a minimum lurch. He believes the changeover can be accomplished without ending America's 68 months of healthy growth. Congressional leaders and presidential advisers alike, interviewed by PARADE, agreed that defense production is not essential to prosperity. "There are too damn many wonderful things to be done," said one top planner.

Those privy to the President's thinking believe he will switch priority from fighting Communism in Vietnam to fighting poverty at home. At the first signs of economic sluggishness, he probably will cut taxes, then start diverting defense money into the Great Society.

Gardner Ackley, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, said recently, "If nothing were done to adjust nondefense government spending, there would be a big drop in demand. This would create unemployment and loss of income, which would lead to further drop in demand."

However, Ackley went on to say, "Something would be done, and quickly. I expect the first thing would be a tax reduction. . . . I would guess you'd get a combination of tax reduction and a stepping-up of some of the programs that have been slowed down in the past year."

Most White House advisers frankly are less interested in tax savings than in making the United States a better place to live.

"I am not quite sure what the advantage is in having a few more dollars to spend," said economist John Kenneth Galbraith, an unofficial presidential consultant, "if the air is too dirty to breathe, the water is too polluted to drink, commuters are losing out in the struggle to get in and out of the cities, the streets are filthy, the schools are so bad that the young wisely stay away and hoodlums roll citizens for the dollars they save in taxes." The cost of solving all these problems should take up any Vietnam slack.

The planners acknowledge that a cease-fire could cause some economic adjustment. The stock market, sensitive to the slightest change in the economy, almost certainly would go into a temporary skid. A few plants might not be able to find commercial contracts to keep their production lines rolling. Some displaced workers might have difficulty finding new jobs. Some youths who otherwise would have been drafted might also

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need to hustle to make a living. But this "transitional friction," as one economist foresees it, would be like shaking a glass of water. The movement might cause some ripples on the surface, but the water eventually would settle to the same level.

In addition, there are other factors which should soften the economic impact of a Vietnam peace:

The economy is less committed to the Vietnam war than it was, say, to the Korean War. The latter drove defense spending from 4 to 11 percent of the gross national product, as the grand total of all goods and services is called. The \$10 to \$15 billion extra Vietnam spending, however, should fall below 2 percent of this year's anticipated \$727 billion G.N.P. Therefore, a cease-fire should cause considerably less economic dislocation than followed the Korean War.

A sudden truce would bring no massive demobilization. For one thing, only one-tenth of America's 3 million men under arms are fighting in Vietnam, and these would be moved out of that country only as fast as the peace could be policed. No matter what happens in Vietnam, most of them would be needed elsewhere to defend our commitments.

It would take six to nine months to shift the production lines from defense to civilian work. Military contracts would continue to run if only to bring the war-depleted inventories back to normal levels.

Some civilian demand has built up, which would make up for some defense cutbacks. For example, the big aerospace companies, which now receive \$3.50 out of every \$10 of Vietnam spending, have a big backlog of civilian orders. Boeing alone has \$3 billion in unfilled civilian orders.

The nation's chief emergency planner, Farris Bryant, a former Florida governor, constantly reviews war and peace needs. As the President's unofficial "ambassador" to the 50 state governors, he also is in close touch with the states. "There need be no fear today that peace would affect prosperity," he told PARADE flatly. He is confident that even the dozen states most dependent on defense contracts could maintain prosperity through tax cuts, highway extensions and public works programs.

Nobody on the policymaking level thinks the leaf-raking, make-work projects of the Great Depression days would be needed to stimulate the economy. There is enough authorization already on the books to keep the economy humming. Senator JENNINGS RANDOLPH (Democrat, of West Virginia), chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee, is ready to roll with \$175 million worth of approved public buildings, post offices and water-control projects that have been held back by war priorities.

He also has a \$300 billion dream for bettering and beautifying America over the next 25 years, if only the money can be spared from munitions. Here's how he would like to bolster the economy and give the nation a facelifting with the same appropriations:

RANDOLPH believes more billions must be authorized to combat water pollution. He claims it would cost \$20 billion to clean up Lake Erie alone, could take \$100 billion to lick the problem nationally. Far from considering this a makework proposal, one expert warns: "Water pollution is our number one problem. The United States can't even operate without clean water."

RANDOLPH would like to make our great Southwestern desert blossom like a Garden of Eden. This would take a \$100 billion irrigation project that would harness 20 percent of the runoff waters from Alaska and northern Canada and pipe it to the Southwest. Power stations would also be built from the Columbia River on down.

THE OPTIMISTIC VIEW

He not only hopes to finish the Interstate Highway System by the 1972 deadline at a

cost of about \$20 billion, but he would like to build an additional 156,000 miles of scenic highways—at about \$500,000 per mile—to make our rural and mountain areas more accessible to tourists.

He is eager to proceed with depressed area construction projects, at the cost of between \$4 and \$5 billion, to help eliminate pockets of poverty.

RANDOLPH came to Washington in 1933 and helped write the New Deal's public works legislation. He believes public support is building up for peacetime projects that will make this country a better place to live. His dream of a desert-watering program may take a while to sell to the public he acknowledges, but he believes a share of any money that may be diverted from defense will go into his programs. In any case, he is firmly convinced that "the U.S. does not face the tragedy of the Depression of the 30's."

What would happen to your pocketbook if peace should be declared in Vietnam? First, your taxes likely would be cut. The latest tax cut stimulated growth and actually brought in more revenue for the government from the increased income. The cut provided people with more pocket money, which increased their buying power. Accordingly, manufacturers geared up production, creating more jobs and putting more money into circulation.

Second, peace should bring easier credit. To forestall unemployment and unused capacity, the policymakers are expected to reduce lending rates, thus making money cheaper, and likewise, driving more of it into circulation.

Today's economists have proved that they can speed up or slow down the economy by tax and credit controls. Businessmen have come to depend on planned federal spending to promote prosperity. Whatever the political arguments may be, this is how President Johnson can be expected to try to head off a recession.

"We'll have the capacity, creativeness, resolve and resourcefulness to meet the problem," predicts Senator RANDOLPH optimistically.

TITLE 19 OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1965

Mr. SALTONSTALL, Mr. President, in recent weeks a number of articles have appeared drawing attention to title 19 of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, pointing out that the program for which it makes provision seems to be developing far beyond what those who drafted it had anticipated. I, for one, have been amazed at its potential scope and cost. I do not believe that a single Member of Congress predicted what has happened. I am glad that the House Ways and Means Committee has been looking into the matter and will soon give us the benefit of its study and recommendations. Recently I had occasion to discuss the matter briefly with Chairman WILBUR MILLS, and I know that he shares the surprise and concern that many of us feel about title 19.

The Social Security Amendments Act of 1965 was referred to as the most sweeping piece of social welfare legislation ever to be enacted in this country, and sweeping it was. It is now clear that no one realized just how sweeping it really was, however. During consideration of the measure attention was concentrated primarily on two of its sections: First, the provision for a long overdue across-the-board 7-percent increase in social security benefits; and

second, the establishment of medicare to help meet the health care requirements of 19 million Americans 65 years of age and older. There was little discussion of title 19, which certainly has proved to be the "sleeper" in the bill. I am certain that no one dreamed that within the next 5 years, "medicaid," as the program established by that title is called, could come to dwarf medicare.

Title 19 was designed to bring together under one uniform medical assistance program, with certain prescribed Federal standards, various Government public assistance medical programs such as Kerr-Mills, and the programs for the blind, disabled, and families with dependent children. Also to be covered were individuals who, except for having enough income to meet their daily needs would fall within the public assistance group, and all children under age 21 whose parents qualified under the State income limitations for the medicaid program even if they had not been receiving cash payments under the aid to dependent children program. In replacing Kerr-Mills, title 19 thus extended the basic Kerr-Mills principle beyond those persons in the over-65 category to include other public assistance groups. Of course, the Federal Government has been paying the principal share of support payments to the blind, disabled, and children in families where the father is unemployed or absent. It has not, however, made a major contribution to their medical costs.

An important consideration in establishing title 19 was the desire to provide an adequate medical program for needy persons which would be an improvement over Kerr-Mills and the other program to be included under medicaid. A major objective which was incorporated in title 19 was the substitution of a flexible income standard for the rigid means test, which in some States had caused great concern. Other improvements included specific provision for five basic medical care services; reimbursement to hospitals on a "reasonable cost" basis rather than under the existing standards, where they frequently lose money on public assistance recipients; elimination of relative responsibility and residency requirement; modification of lien provisions; and State administrative flexibility. These changes are helpful and desirable and contribute toward a more meaningful program which can do the job that needs to be done in a realistic way.

States implementing title 19 will have to provide five basic medical services by July 1, 1967: One, inpatient hospital services; two outpatient hospital services; three, other laboratory and X-ray services; four, physicians' services; and five, skilled nursing home care for persons 21 years of age or older.

All States are required to have title 19 in effect by December 31, 1969, or lose Federal assistance for their State medical care programs. Also, they are required to have a comprehensive program in effect by July 1, 1975, which provides care and services to virtually all individuals who meet the plan's eligibility standards with respect to income and resources, including social services to en-