

Therefore, the discharge certificate, ab initio is prohibited.

The Adjutant General issued Colonel Stephens official identification which recognized him in an actively identified status and capacity and in full force and effect existing fourteen months beyond the date of the erroneous discharge certificate. Also, the same Second Army headquarters that issued the discharge certificate on April 28, 1960, as late as July following, continued to address Colonel Stephens, referring to and identifying him as an active member in the United States Army Ready Reserve.

Regardless of the discharge certificate, Colonel Stephens has continued in an active status; and according to Army regulations, and the last orders he received, he has never elected relief from active duty, nor has he in respect thereto, ever been relieved from an active duty status. During the interim, he has passed through the zone of promotional consideration without consideration, and has, as late as November 1963, refused to accept civilian employment with the United States Air Force at \$9,475.00 per annum due to his disability determination, both total and permanent set out by the medical board on October 1, 1957, and due to the other circumstances herein explained.

At the present time, after more than 20 years service, with total and permanent disability rating made almost nine years past, he is not in receipt of Army retirement benefits, any compensation award from the Veterans Administration, nor do his children have any war orphans benefits in event of his death due to heart disease which the Army has found to have existed prior to his service.

Since 1942, Colonel Stephens has never been given a single adverse efficiency report by any commander to his knowledge. He has never been reprimanded or court martialed, or other wise had any discrepancy, with respect to his performance of duty, brought to his attention at any time. If his record indicates otherwise, it is wholly untrue; if any commander has certified to such effect, and that any discrepancies were brought to his attention for correction or improvement, it is also untrue.

Any man in the Armed Forces of the United States, who has staked his life in mortal conflict against an enemy in defense of his native land, and for the principles under which it is also governed, not knowing whether he will return to see his family or friends, is certainly entitled to a just, honest and fair hearing before his fellow man.

My son would have been retired in 1954 due to physical disability had the proper actions been taken at that time. However, they were not, so, he should have been retired in 1957 at the time of his myocardial infarction, for which he has been taking medical treatment and medication ever since at his own expense. Under such circumstances, as herein explained, and especially when he has spent the best part of his adult life in the defense of his country, no stone should be left unturned in order to see that justice prevails, thereby allowing the chips to fall where they may.

It is hoped and expected that this Honorable Committee will request and permit him a personal appearance in order that all the details may be explained to the full and complete satisfaction of this Committee, and when that is done, the ends of justice will have been met. Then, the Committee will have no hesitancy in arriving at a just conclusion. If there has ever been a miscarriage of justice, as is clearly applicable in this case, it has been perpetrated in the background, and has been of such nature or degree, that he has been denied any knowledge or information thereof. That is why it is cogently necessary for him to be allowed a personal appearance in order that he be allowed to present to the Committee some of the records now in his possession and

which the Army has made. Otherwise, the Committee will never be in position to have before it other vital information which should, in the interest of justice, be considered. The statements herein set out contain the truth and nothing but the truth.

May I have a favorable response from you and your views in this connection? All of which is respectfully submitted for your kind and just consideration.

Respectfully yours,
HENRY STEPHENS.

PRESTONSBURG, KY

PREPARE FOR DECEPTION

(Mr. BURLERSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD, and to include certain articles.)

Mr. BURLERSON. Mr. Speaker, Columnist Roscoe Drummond cautions us that Hanoi may come up soon with tricky peace overtures, but he also points out that President Johnson has made it clear we will not be budged by false hope.

As the fighting goes badly for the Vietcong, Mr. Drummond says, Hanoi may figure that the circumstances of a congressional election campaign in this country provide the right time for deceptive peace proposals.

It will not work.

As Mr. Drummond notes, President Johnson has warned against it with this statement:

We will not withdraw under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

With the assent of my colleagues, I will place Mr. Drummond's column as it appeared in the Washington Post in the RECORD:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 17, 1966]

PREPARE FOR DECEPTION: FIGHTING IN VIETNAM IS GOING AGAINST VIETCONG SO WE CAN EXPECT TRICKY "PEACE PROPOSALS"

(By Roscoe Drummond)

With fighting going badly for the Vietcong, there is reason to brace ourselves for tricky and deceptive "peace proposals" from Hanoi.

Obviously, we ought to be responsive to any initiative to end the war in a way that protects the independence of South Vietnam. But we ought to be on our guard against a trap.

Those who know the ways of the Communists believe the time is getting near when North Vietnam may engineer a diplomatic maneuver designed to sell Washington and Saigon a "peace package" with a false bottom.

Here is why the United States must be alert:

1—The logical time to put such a move in motion would be on the eve of the congressional elections.

2—The Communists would expect that the American public would leap at anything that looked like peace in Vietnam, even if the small type warned the buyer to beware.

3—They would figure that President Johnson, eager for the Democrats to do well in the congressional voting, would not dare turn down "peace proposals" which might be made, for a time at least, to look like the real article. They would figure that the temptations of election politics would coerce the Administration into accepting something which at any other time it would reject.

4—The time for such a maneuver is running out. It has to be undertaken soon—in the next two or three months—or it will be too late.

What would be the basic strategy of the Communists in a move of this kind? Their

main purpose would be to tempt the United States into taking immediate steps that would disadvantage the United States and advantage Hanoi's willingness to negotiate at all.

What would the Communists like to accomplish without making any final commitment to end the aggression? Obviously, they want to try to immobilize the United States without any guarantee the Vietcong would remain immobile.

The Communists could propose that the United States begin to withdraw its forces as a "gesture" that would help bring about negotiations a little later.

The Communists could propose that the United States de-escalate the fighting while they try to catch their breath and get ready for another push.

The Communists could propose that, as a preliminary to a future settlement, the VC be allowed a place in the Saigon regime before the new government is elected.

It is possible, of course, that there is so much controversy at the top in Hanoi on whether to keep up the war or accept negotiations that nobody will dare make a move.

If it comes, it will probably be soon. President Johnson has warned against it with his public affirmation that "we will not withdraw under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

TRI-CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE AND ADMINISTRATION INDIFFERENCE BLAMED FOR INCREASING UNREST IN LATIN AMERICA—A CRITICAL MOMENT IN INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS APPROACHES

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, on the 13th anniversary of the Castro revolution I call attention to administration's failure to meet the growing communist threat in this hemisphere.

Yesterday was the anniversary of Castro's July 26, 1953, attack on the Moncada Barracks in Cuba, recognized as the bearded dictator's first revolutionary act and the administration is still without a policy to deal with the Communist menace only 90 miles from our shores.

The administration of not following the congressional mandate aimed at halting free-world shipping to Cuba pointing out that in 1965, Canada and the United Kingdom alone exported over \$90 million of goods to Cuba.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Subversion of the House Republican Task Force on Latin America, I say the administration is guilty of gross ineptness in meeting the crucial events in Latin America. The administration has ignored last January's Tri-Continental Conference in Havana at which Communist representatives from three continents met and pronounced their goal to step up their aggression and subversion in this hemisphere. The Tri-Continental Conference is second in importance only to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Specific targets in the Communist blueprint are Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Guatemala, Ecuador and Puerto Rico. Additional resolutions were passed by the Conference on topics involving the Organization of American States, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Paraguay, and British and French Guiana.

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

16429

plication of Army rules and regulations in separating him from the military service. Judge Stephens' statement speaks for itself. In my judgment, the statement is altogether factual. I have known Henry Stephens for more than 30 years, and have known his son for an equal period of time.

I have introduced H.R. 15490 authorizing relief for James D. Stephens from the circumstances outlined.

I am greatly concerned about the lack of any appropriate administrative remedy for the circumstances of this case which leads me to the belief that the Congress should thoroughly study this matter with a possible view of enacting general legislation which will appropriately afford relief for other James Stephens who may be similarly aggrieved by hypertechnical application of rules and regulations in such disability matters. I consequently urge each Member to give attention to the case presented by Judge Stephens on behalf of his son:

WHAT THE ARMY HAS DONE TO LT. COL. JAMES D. STEPHENS AFTER MORE THAN 20 YEARS OF SERVICE

(A partial statement of facts to be used in connection with H.R. 15490, now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary)

James Darwin Stephens was born in Prestonsburg, Kentucky on May 2, 1916. At eleven years of age he began his military experiences by attending the oldest private military school of America in the hope that he would eventually be graduated from West Point thus making the Army his career.

After his graduation from military school his appointment to the United States Military Academy did not materialize. He was, however, commissioned in the Organized Reserve Corps on September 8, 1937, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was active in the reserves until 1941 when he was ordered to active duty effective April 21st.

Within six months after being ordered to duty he was sent overseas to Panama where he was on duty with the 5th United States Infantry at the time World War II began on December 7, 1941. On completion of this overseas tour, he was returned to the United States where he received additional training in the fall and winter, 1943-44, and subsequent thereto, he was sent overseas again, this time to serve in England, France and Germany.

He was one of three young combat arms officers selected from several hundred to become administrative officer of a civil affairs group in American-British combined operations of northwest Europe before and following invasion. He was the administrative officer for the American Contingent, First Civil Affairs Group, under command of Colonel J. M. Hamilton, DSO, British Army, and carried on liaison activities with the SHAEF headquarters in London.

On fulfillment of this combined mission, in October 1944, he was assigned to the 95th Infantry Division headquarters as assistant division military government officer. This was the combat phase of military government, and in this period he performed his duty in combat and under enemy fire with the 379th Infantry Regiment, and in its three battalion zones of combat in both France and Germany. While his division was in combat its operations were under the jurisdiction of the Third Army Commander, General George S. Patton, Jr. Until the Battle of the Bulge, this division saw some of the bitterest fighting in the European theater. Certain participants in such combat, particularly those in the Moselle River, Metz, Saar River line and Saarlautern objectives, were highly commended by the Third Army Commander,

General Patton. Colonel Stephens was one of those persons.

For his performance of duty under such combat conditions, in 1947, he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal. In February, 1945, he was assigned to the 12th Armored Division, which was in the Seventh Army Area under command of General Alexander M. Patch. While yet in the combat phase of military government operations, with this division he served with headquarters Combat Command "A", performing his duties with this headquarters, the 66th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 493d Armored Artillery Battalion, in the Colmar Pocket, Crailsheim, Ellwangen, Dinkelsbühl, Goppingen, Aalen, Dillingen, Laulngen, Landsberg, Murnau and other areas.

Notwithstanding the above performance and combat participation of record, the Army has certified to the Veterans Administration that Colonel Stephens had no combat. His service data shows otherwise; his Bronze Star citation shows otherwise; and General Patton's commendation shows otherwise.

When it had been determined by the Department of the Army in 1953 that Colonel Stephens would not continue on active duty beyond May 31, 1954, in April 1954, Colonel Stephens submitted his unqualified resignation from commissioned status. His Army commander recommended approval, and at that time, Colonel Stephens under the law had no further reserve service obligation. He had served more than the required two years, during the criteria of both World War II and the Korean Conflict; he had almost thirteen years extended active duty; seventeen years or more total commissioned service; and more than 71 months overseas service in three separate theaters of war and national emergency.

Before his separation in 1954 from active duty he requested a physical evaluation board for disability determination purposes; however, he was not properly referred, and therefore not ordered before one. The Army's representative in making out Colonel Stephens' separation certificate, effective May 31, 1954, determined that he was not to be assigned or transferred to any reserve component, branch or class, cognizant district or area command in any reserve capacity following separation. This certificate Colonel Stephens also signed indicating that he had no further desire to be connected with the reserves. Notwithstanding, without his request or any indication that he wanted to be assigned to any reserve status, forty-two days following his separation, the Army assigned Colonel Stephens to the reserves anyway. He was separated as a Lieutenant Colonel on his orders, but when he was assigned to the reserves without request, he was assigned as a Major.

At the time of his separation in 1954, his physical examination had no clinical evaluation which was required; however, the Army elected to change this record in order to show that one was done when, in fact, it was not done. This physical examination shows that Colonel Stephens was in perfect health three days before his statement of medical history was due in compliance with his orders.

In 1956, Colonel Stephens was ordered to duty at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He performed this tour of duty but the Army denied him credit which, were it granted, it would authorize an additional retirement year, making his total service credit more than 20 years. He had proof in his own records, as well as did the Army, that this period of service was performed. During this period of duty in 1956 a physical examination was made on him at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and on completion of it, the Chief of Medical Service postdated his review and approval by one year and three days, approving Colonel Stephens for active duty, effective June 29, 1957, nine days following his orders for active duty dated June 20, 1957.

On August 2, 1957, Colonel Stephens suffered an acute myocardial infarction while on duty at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. This condition was found to be in line of duty, not due to any misconduct, while present for duty, and while not under the influence of any drugs or intoxicants. This finding was approved by the Secretary of the Army on September 17, 1957.

On September 9, 1957, Fort Meade Army hospital published Special Orders 112, sending Colonel Stephens on attachment to the Walter Reed Army hospital for further observation and treatment only, and on completion thereof, he was to be returned to his organization and stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland by U.S. Government transportation. This order Colonel Stephens did not receive for a period of more than five years. A medical board was not authorized in this order by any commander of Colonel Stephens, nor was one appointed by his commander as required in Army regulations. Therefore, any board action taken by the Walter Reed Army hospital not in compliance with orders from Colonel Stephens' commander is illegal and of no effect.

Notwithstanding, a medical board did meet at the Walter Reed Army hospital on October 1, 1957, but it was contrary to his orders not yet known to or received by him. Not one member of this board represented Colonel Stephens' rank and branch of service, nor was any member an officer of the combat arms. The president of the medical board, on October 1, 1957, misrepresented himself to Colonel Stephens and the other members of the board, by making two different medical determinations on the same day on the same individual. The board found that Colonel Stephens' heart condition existed prior to service and gave no approximate date of origin as required by Army regulations. It found that his heart disease was total and permanent. The president of the medical board, as a member, found that the heart disease existed prior to service, while simultaneously determining that it did not. Now both records exist in official files of the Department of the Army. Any doctor with any reputation that would make a statement that a heart condition existed 20 years before it happened should have his head examined. Any man with common horse sense would know better and he wouldn't have to be a doctor.

When the findings of the medical board were approved by the hospital commander on October 3, 1957, finding that Colonel Stephens' heart disease existed prior to service, Stephens did not elect relief from active duty in writing to his commander as set out in Army regulations. When he did not do so, it became mandatory that his case be referred to the jurisdiction of a physical evaluation board.

The Army now asserts that Colonel Stephens has had a fair hearing when, in fact, one has not been held. But if a hearing has been held, it has been done in secrecy without notice to him, and without his knowledge as to where, when, who was present in his behalf, who was counsel of his choice, if any, and its findings.

In 1959, he was informed by an Army headquarters that a physical evaluation board had set forth a disability determination. Colonel Stephens has never been notified what this degree of disability determination was, nor has he ever been given any knowledge with regard to its nature, recommendation or effect.

On April 28, 1960, the Second Army headquarters mailed to Colonel Stephens, without prior notice that such an action was to be taken, a discharge certificate which stated that his commission as a reserve had terminated due to physical disqualification. This discharge certificate is erroneous, ill-founded and of no effect whatever, because, first of all, he has not been given credit for all his service which amounts to more than 20 years.

July 27, 1966

tionaries the world over, that he who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind. Now is the time for action.

PROTEST OF TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS BY COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE

(Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the time has come for the Congress of the United States, and particularly the House of Representatives, which is closest to our people, to take an official stand in protest over the treatment of American prisoners in the hands of the Communist North Vietnamese.

The latest figures, Mr. Speaker, reveal that there are at least 63 Americans now in the hands of the Vietnam Communists who are being starved, threatened, and, verbally if not physically, beaten into brainwashed submission as victims of so-called war crimes accusations.

Unless I wrongly read the signs of anger and distress on the part of the American people, these 63 Americans may well be the most important soldiers we have ever sent to foreign wars.

I say so, Mr. Speaker, because our people are tired, sick and tired of Communist arrogance, Communist deceit, Communist torture and killing.

They are tired of self-serving allies whose halfhearted support leads them to trading with the enemy and the prolongation of conflict and American casualties.

They are tired of un-American activities on the part of a noisy segment of our people.

They are tired of repeated breaches of treaties and agreements and the ineffectualness and lack of action on the part of the United Nations.

And, Mr. Speaker, they are sick and tired of our own State Department's groveling submission to threats and outright violations of international law, lest we anger and frustrate the very international bandits who are already perpetrating the atrocities.

I say, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the time to remain silent, but to speak out to our people and the world.

I say it is time to pledge retribution, no less lenient and no less swift, to Communist war criminals in Vietnam who mistreat our captured fighting men. Justice no less lenient and no less swift, Mr. Speaker, than that meted out at the close of World War II against those who committed atrocities then.

We ran them aground in their lairs. We can do so again.

And we will do so again, in the very jungles where our soldiers are fighting, if need be.

We can pledge no less, Mr. Speaker, to those who today are already the victims of Communist atrocities and may soon be victims of their firing squads.

We can pledge no less to their parents. We can pledge no less to the thousands of other American soldiers fighting in Vietnam, any one of whom at this moment may be facing a similar fate.

If there are no standards of decency among Communists, it is time to teach them some.

If there are no qualities of mercy among them, it is now time to cease dealing with them as equals among mankind.

We can begin here and now, Mr. Speaker, to do so.

The Congress can do so by officially serving notice now that we have had enough.

It can do so by refusing further foreign aid to any nation trading with the enemy; by halting all loans and grants to any nation aiding the economy or abetting the foreign policies of Communist nations; by blockading Haiphong Harbor, as we did in China.

It can do so by slamming shut the gates of international travel to those nations; by demanding rigid compliance with every facet of the United Nations Charter; by demanding pledges of support for our policies from those we have aided down the years; and by public demands of condemnation from them against Communist aggression, subversion and atrocities.

This may not be enough, Mr. Speaker, for the hour is late. But it will be a start.

It will be a welcome start, for our people and our soldiers, who know in their hearts that we are dealing with something outside the ordinary ken of human behavior.

I say, Mr. Speaker, the time for business as usual is past.

It is time to use every ounce of our intelligence, every segment of our economic power and every pledge of retribution to stop these marauders of civilized behavior.

We need send no more envoys abroad, Mr. Speaker, we need send no more visitors to the battlefield. We need no more resolutions for calm, no more editorials for caution.

We need action, Mr. Speaker, by this Congress and this House.

We need to serve notice today that our retribution will be unrelenting.

I have some personal knowledge, Mr. Speaker, of the plight of a prisoner of war.

Not many years ago, while serving as a company commander in the 106th Infantry Division in the Battle of the Bulge, my entire division was wiped out and those of my company who survived and I were taken prisoner. The memory of the disease, the dirt, the starvation, and the fear lives with me yet.

We were marched away from the front lines, herded into boxcars like cattle, and twice bombed by Allied planes. During one bombing in Nuremberg half the group were either killed or wounded, but we were proud of those bombers, and of the men who were still fighting for us and our country.

I escaped from a POW marching column, by the grace of God and because of the courage of my cellmates, whose will to live and to fight again stemmed from an inner conviction that our country was worth fighting for.

I still know our country is worth fight-

ing for, Mr. Speaker, but I wonder if those men on forced parade, jabbed by Communist bayonets, jeered and ridiculed by Communist puppets, believe in their hearts at this moment that it is.

For what is there to sustain their hopes, Mr. Speaker?

The United Nations? The Geneva Convention? The firmness and pressure for decency from most of our allies? The unity of purpose and united pursuit of peace at home?

I doubt it, Mr. Speaker. For these are weakened reeds of justice.

Our airmen, in the sweat and hunger of their cells, must remember the barges and ships of our friends in Communist harbors; our soldiers, the guns and bombs that cut and maimed them—guns and bombs made and shipped from nations we are told we must live with in peace and friendship.

War becomes a personal thing, when you are fighting it, Mr. Speaker.

It becomes more personal if you are a prisoner of it.

There is a loneliness about it that surpasses reason; the hours of it erase time and the misery of it dissolves hope.

Unless there is a certainty that you are not forgotten; that you are not to become a victim of some higher policy or some grand strategy that leads to half victories and uncontrollable stalemates, it is not endurable.

I would be ashamed as an American if this is the only hope, the only heritage we leave with those in the darkness of their cells in Vietnam today.

I do not believe it is.

If Communist Vietnam can find a "legal basis" for war crimes trials of our captive fighting men, surely we can find a "legal basis" for winning the war and securing their freedom.

Today in Hanoi the North Vietnamese have backed away from the trials, because they have discovered the American people, even those who cry for "peace at any price" cannot tolerate them. But we are warned by unnamed administration spokesmen that this backing away may be temporary and that they can change their minds at any moment and reinstitute the trials.

Our men are accused and may be judged for conducting crimes against humanity, while serving as soldiers performing the military duties we as a nation and a people sent them to perform.

And while the trials were expected momentarily what help did we get from our friends?

In Geneva the International Red Cross "talked" of what could be done; in New York the United Nations was collectively mute or antagonistic; in England and France, nations for which we have done so much, there was massive resistance to our efforts to save freedom and the lives of captured Americans.

To ask where we can turn, as a nation, Mr. Speaker, is an admission of weakness.

We can turn to ourselves—to the elected leaders of this Nation—to this Congress and this Government, and we can act now or admit our lack of ability or will to do so.

July 27, 1966

In the days ahead, Mr. Speaker, the air will be filled with cries of alarm, with organized protests against America doing anything. And, if previous patterns of action prevail, with street protests against any decision we may make in justice and reason.

But for the sake of our men in Hanoi prisons, for the safety of those still free to fight for us on the battlefield, I, for one, will endure the label of "hawk" and the slander of being called a "war-monger."

I, for one, will ignore the cries of alarm; the marching protests, and the banners of surrender.

I will do so, Mr. Speaker, because I believe it is my duty not only as a Congressman but as an American to do so—and, in addition, to do something about it.

If we have to choose freedom for those we sent to fight, against the risk of a greater conflict, I shall choose freedom.

If we have to choose between nations of courage as against those who pay only lipservice to freedom, I shall stand with the courageous, whatever the risk.

If we must choose, as Americans, between might as against sniveling threats, abject fear and weaseling foreign policies, I will stand with what is right and the might that makes it so.

So, I believe, will this Congress. So will our people.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, if I am any judge of people, I am sure they have had enough of these halfway excursions into battle; these semiwars, and semipeace, and semivictories. I know I have.

VIETNAM: THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL INITIATIVE

(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, in its lead editorial yesterday the New York Times outlined a four-point plan to promote a political settlement of the war in Vietnam which I warmly endorse.

The plan calls for a stop to the Americanization of the war by halting the buildup of U.S. troops. As the Times comments:

A quarter of a million American troops is more than enough.

Second. The plan calls for a civilian government in Saigon "that can open contact with the insurgent forces." The fastest and most effective action that can be taken here is the holding of free countrywide elections. This objective should be encouraged with every resource at our command.

Third. The Times suggests a "tapering off" of the bombing of North Vietnam in order "to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations."

Fourth. It recommends coupling efforts to reconvene the Geneva Conference with "broad diplomatic discussions" that can find a "formula for the neutralization and economic development of southeast Asia as a whole."

What is now required, as the Times makes perfectly clear "is a clear indication that the American objective is not a military victory but political settle-

ment. The American ability to escalate the war needs no further demonstration. The need now is to halt the escalation and make a vigorous new effort to achieve peace."

It may well be, as I have suggested before, that no political or diplomatic initiatives will persuade the other side to come to the conference table. Their plan may call only for military conquest, either overtly or by attrition. This plainly must be resisted.

But the costs of this war, and the dangers that a much larger war so gravely threatens, require us to pursue every reasonable course that can lead to an early and just settlement.

The proposal outlined by the New York Times yesterday is sound and reasoned. It deserves the attention and action of our policymakers.

Mr. Speaker, I include the full text of this timely editorial for the consideration of all who are concerned with this problem:

NEW OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

President Ho Chi Minh's statement that there is "no trial in view" for American military prisoners in North Vietnam is a victory for the moral influence of world opinion. That victory transcends the fate of the captive airmen, for it offers hope that common sense and common humanity ultimately may prevail against the ever greater barbarism the war in Vietnam daily inflicts on both sides.

The United States has yielded to the pressure of world opinion in the past by offering peace proposals and twice suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. But this is the first time that Hanoi has shown regard for the opinion of mankind. Its decision to back away from talk of "war crimes trials" follows direct pleas from Secretary General Thant, Pope Paul VI, numerous governments and opinion leaders everywhere, including eighteen liberal American Senators. The hope now must be that reason can prevail on the broader issues of the war itself.

The conflict in Vietnam is a political struggle that, in the end, can only be resolved by political means. In politics, timing is of the essence. A number of opportunities to probe the prospects for peace have been neglected in the past. It is vital that the new atmosphere and the new opportunity opened by Hanoi's response on the prisoner issue not be missed as well.

The approach favored by American moderates and long urged by The Times has just been summed up admirably by Prof. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. One essential element is to stop the Americanization of the war by halting the American buildup in South Vietnam; a quarter of a million American troops is more than enough. The second vital element is a civilian Government in Saigon that can open contact with the insurgent forces. Third, is the need to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations by tapering off the bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference must be linked with broad diplomatic discussions with Moscow, Paris, and other interested states to find a formula for the neutralization and economic development of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Most of all, what is needed is a clear indication that the American objective is not military victory but political settlement. The American ability to escalate the war needs no further demonstration. The need now is to halt the escalation and make a vigorous new effort to achieve peace.

(Mr. OLSEN of Montana asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the RECORD.)

[Mr. OLSEN of Montana's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

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[Mr. OLSEN of Montana's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

CONGRESSMAN HORTON OFFERS LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO TIGHT MONEY MARKET AND TO INCREASE HOUSING STARTS

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and include extraneous material.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege today to introduce a bill that will increase by \$1.5 billion the home mortgage funds available through the Federal National Mortgage Association. This proposal will authorize the U.S. Treasury to purchase an additional \$150 million in FNMA preferred stock. Since FNMA is empowered to borrow up to 10 times the amount of its capital and surplus, its borrowing power would increase by \$1.5 billion after this additional Treasury investment.

I am offering this measure to pump needed funds into the housing industry, which is experiencing a sharp decline. This bill is designed to quickly ease the credit squeeze in which the builders of this country find themselves.

I have seen statistics provided by Mr. Joseph F. McCue, executive vice president of the Rochester, N.Y., Home Builders' Association, which show that new single-family housing permits in that area will be off by 24 percent this year because of the tight mortgage market. Housing starts throughout the country are expected to be down by about 200,000 this year, at a time when other industries are prospering. Two months ago, housing starts fell to their lowest point in 3½ years.

The FNMA assists the homebuilding and mortgage industries during periods of tight money, while its sales of mortgages during periods of relative monetary ease provide a ready source of investment for long-term institutional investors. At present, however, FNMA is extended to the limit of its lending power since the authorization for Treasury purchases of its stock is fully subscribed. If we are to assist this industry during this crucial period, we should not do it at the expense of sound financial practices. Increasing the percentage lending power of FNMA on present Treasury-held stock would free more mortgage funds at the expense of watering down the equity structure of FNMA operations. By authorizing increases in Treasury purchases, however, we can expand the lending power of the Association without impairing the soundness of its operations.

This bill is fashioned to fit the immediate needs of the hard-hit homebuilding industry, and it can succeed without unduly heating up current high-speed economic conditions. This is direct, straightforward action which carries no risk of impairing FNMA's credit.

July 27, 1966

16437

I hope my colleagues will view with seriousness the plight of this industry, and that the House will see fit to take immediate action to alleviate the credit squeeze that has brought about this situation.

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous material.)

[Mr. HORTON'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., ON VIETNAM

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of my colleagues the views on the war in Vietnam which Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., set forth in the August 9 issue of Look magazine.

In discussing alternatives to current policy he says.

We must adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

Professor Schlesinger suggests:

A program of limiting our forces, actions and objectives still holds out the possibility of an honorable resolution of a tragic situation. A program of indefinite escalation offers nothing but disaster; for our adversaries can, in their own way, match our every step up to nuclear war . . .

He also observes that, as we increase our bombing of North Vietnam—

we will only solidify the people of North Vietnam behind their government, making negotiation impossible and eventually assure the entry of China into the war.

Mr. Speaker, I commend this thoughtful article to the attention of my colleagues.

[From Look magazine of Augst 9, 1966]
VIETNAM?

(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)

The moderate critics of the administration's Vietnam policy do not question its proclaimed purposes: resistance to Communist aggression, self-determination for South Vietnam, a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. They do question, with the greatest urgency, the theory that the way to achieve these objectives is to intensify the war. The more we destroy Vietnam, North and South, in their judgment, the less chance there will ever be of attaining our objectives. The course of widening the war, moreover, will mire our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia, beyond the effective use of our national power and the range of our primary interests—and may well end in nuclear war with China.

And the alternatives? Instead of supposing that a guerrilla movement can be crushed by strategic bombing, instead of using military methods to solve a political problem, we must adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

1. Stop the Americanization of the war. The bitter fact is that the war in Vietnam can never be won as a war of white men against Asians. It cannot be won "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it,

the people of Vietnam" (President Kennedy, 1963). The more we Americanize the war—by increasing our military presence, by summoning Saigon leaders, like vassals, to conferences in an American state, by transforming a local war in Vietnam into a global test between America and China—the more we make the war unwinnable.

2. A civilian government in Saigon. We have never had a government in Saigon that could enlist the active loyalty of the countryside, and we certainly do not have one in Marshal Ky's military junta. Instead of identifying American interests with Marshal Ky, and rebuffing the broader political impulses of the South, we should long since have encouraged a movement toward a civilian regime that represents the significant political forces of the country and is capable both of rallying the army and carrying out programs of social reform. If such a government should favor the neutralization of South Vietnam, if it should want to negotiate with Vietcong, even if it should wish to release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we cannot and we should not object.

3. Reconvene the Geneva Conference. We should persevere in the quest for negotiation. Since the Vietcong are a principal party to the conflict, it would appear obvious that peace talks at Geneva are meaningless without their participation. And since they will never talk if the only topic is their unconditional surrender, we must, unless we plan to exterminate them, hold out to them a prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of democratic elections, preferably under international supervision.

4. Hold the line in South Vietnam. Obviously, Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is thus a precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American ground forces in South Vietnam to demonstrate that our adversaries cannot hope for military victory. I believe that we have more than enough troops and installations there now to make this point.

It is an illusion to suppose that by increasing the size of the American Army we can ever gain a reliable margin of superiority; for, by the Pentagon's preferred 10:1 ratio in fighting guerrillas, every time we add 100,000 men, the enemy has only to add 10,000, and we are all even again.

Nor does "digging in" mean a static strategy with initiative relinquished to the enemy. The South Vietnamese Army of half a million men is better suited in many ways than are Americans to search operations in the villages.

We should also limit our bombing in the South. Have we really no better way to deal with guerrilla warfare than the aerial obliteration of the country in which it is taking place? If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against communism, what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will ever wish for American protection?

5. Taper off the bombing of North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara has candidly said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will," and thus far, bombing the North has neither brought Hanoi to the conference table, demoralized the people nor stopped infiltration. As a result, pressure arises for ever-wider strikes—first oil depots, then harbors, factories, cities, the Chinese border. But these won't work either. As we move down this road, we will only solidify the people of North Vietnam behind their government, make negotiation impossible and eventually assure the entry of China into the war. And even if we bombed North Vietnam back to the Stone Age and earned thereby the hatred of the civilized world,

this still would not settle the present war—which, after all, is taking place not in North but in South Vietnam.

6. A long-run program for Southeast Asia. We should discuss with Russia, France, China and other interested countries a neutralization program, under international guarantee, for Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam. If these states could work out forms of economic collaboration, as in the development of the Mekong Valley, the guarantors should make economic and technical assistance available to them.

A program of limiting our forces, actions and objectives still holds out the possibility of an honorable resolution of a tragic situation. A program of indefinite escalation offers nothing but disaster; for our adversaries can, in their own way, match our every step up to nuclear war—and nuclear war would be just as much a moral and political catastrophe for us as it would be a physical catastrophe for the Far East and the whole world.

(Mr. HECHLER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. HECHLER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY

(Mr. RHODES of Arizona (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. Speaker, at the July 26, 1966, meeting of the House Republican Policy Committee a policy statement regarding the homebuilding industry was adopted. As chairman of the policy committee, I would like to include at this point in the Record the complete text of this statement.

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY

Homebuilding and homebuying, one of the nation's largest industries, is faced with a major crisis. Due to the inflationary fiscal policies of the Johnson-Humphrey Administration, this major industry could slump by as much as one-third during the second half of 1966. It is tragically significant that the June building permit rate, an indicator of future activity, plummeted to the lowest point since the Census Bureau began keeping records. Private housing starts in June were down 18 percent from June 1965 and applications for FHA-insured mortgages on existing homes were down 34 percent from a year ago.

The homebuilding and homebuying crisis affects millions of Americans—the young couple who is getting married and wants to buy a home of their own, but cannot saddle themselves for 20 to 30 years with swollen payments; the family that wants to sell the house it now has or buy another but is prevented from doing so by the absence of home mortgage money; the builders and workers in the home construction industry, and all of the related industries and services that supply materials and equipment.

Under the Johnson-Humphrey Administration, interest rates are the highest in more than 40 years. As a result, high interest costs have added tremendously to the cost of financing the ever-mounting Federal debt. The rising demand for credit by the Federal government and business has drawn funds

away from credit-sensitive industries such as homebuilding. And, notwithstanding the fact that personal consumption has levelled off, plant and inventory expansion continue at a record pace as a hedge by industry against the continuing inflationary cost spiral.

The only remedy offered by the Johnson-Humphrey Administration has been support for an ill-conceived effort to place a statutory interest ceiling rate over time deposits in banks and savings and loans. We are opposed to H.R. 14026. This finger-in-the-dike approach will not create new savings nor direct additional funds to the homebuilding industry. On the contrary, it could drive personal and corporate savings from banks and savings and loans to government bonds, Federal agency issues, or the stock market—thereby further compounding the homebuilding crisis.

We Republicans do more than "sympathize" with the plight of the homebuilders and the homebuyers. We demand that the following "crash" program be undertaken before Congress adjourns:

1. Slash nondefense, nonessential domestic spending. Not just in regard to appropriations as the President has urged, but also with respect to new program authorizations which trigger the appropriations process.

2. Reduce point discounts on FHA and VA home financing through administrative adjustments of rates to more realistic levels. Five and six point discounts (\$1,500 on \$25,000 home mortgage) are stifling home financing and wiping out personal savings.

3. Suspend any further issues of FNMA participation sales other than for VA and FHA pooled housing mortgages. When the participation sales bill was being debated, we warned that this multi-billion dollar budgetary gimmick would place severe strains on the private credit market and push up interest rates to record levels. Experience with the program has fully confirmed our fears.

4. Enact the Republican-initiated proposal to grant FNMA additional borrowing authority in a prudent and legal manner.

5. Remove FNMA's \$15,000 administrative limitation on purchase of mortgages under its secondary market operations.

6. Appoint an emergency Presidential fact-finding committee on the homebuilding crisis to report its findings in sufficient time for Congressional consideration prior to adjournment of the 89th Congress.

Granted these are stern measures. However, the ever-deepening homebuilding crisis demands that immediate and effective steps be taken. The "do not open until after election" tag must be removed from this problem.

(Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. KUPFERMAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

SETTLING THE AIRLINE STRIKE: TIME FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

(Mr. CRAMER (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a resolution that is designed to provide an effective procedure for settling the present airline strike that is crippling the Nation. My resolution

would call for an immediate cessation of this strike, and would provide for the immediate resumption of the airline services that are so desperately needed by all sections of the United States. It would further provide for a special arbitration board which would settle this dispute in such a manner so as to preserve the rights, dignities, and equities of all the parties to the controversy.

Mr. Speaker, I am a firm believer in the inherent value of the traditional form of free collective bargaining. However, as in the railroad strikes in 1963, the public interest has been ignored. I am offering a resolution which will demand compulsory arbitration in this strike, having carefully weighed the equities of the situation, and given the problem considerable thought and believing a national emergency exists.

The airline strike has become an intolerable burden on the American economy and on the American people. More than 150,000 travelers and 4,100 flights each day have been affected by the walk-out. In addition, 231 cities in the United States have had their air service limited in some degree; and, 70 cities are completely without commercial air service. The strike has seriously hampered the delivering of air mail, vital medical supplies, and consumer goods.

Many States have felt the impact of the strike on their tourist industries. It has wrecked untold havoc in such supportive industries as the hotel and motel, restaurant, taxicab, and retail industries. Within these industries marginal businessmen are faced with imminent bankruptcy as a result of the strike.

In my State of Florida alone, 534 daily flights that carry an estimated 20,000 passengers in and out of our 3 largest cities have been totally canceled.

The airlines strike has been in progress for almost 3 weeks. Yet, the prospects for an imminent settlement of the dispute are dim. Each bargaining session has ended with the sides more firmly entrenched in their positions than before.

We are faced with an emergency situation of the first order. Action must be taken to correct this situation, and it must be taken promptly. It is for this reason that I submit the following resolution and strongly urge its immediate acceptance.

WHY THE DELAY ON FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE?

(Mr. KEITH (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Speaker, Monday afternoon at a high-level meeting, Food and Drug Administration officials told the Interior Department that its petition for approval of fish protein concentrate could not be granted until the FDA had further information. I am told that FDA scientists believe that the fluoride content of the powdered fish extract may be too high. As I understand it, the question is not one of toxicity, but rather of possible "cosmetic" effects. It is thought that if large amounts of FPC

were consumed by someone over a period of years, his teeth might become mottled as a result.

The possibility of mottling is not conceivable in this country, I am told, in view of the fact that FPC would only be a very modest percentage of anyone's diet. Since FPC is a food additive, appropriate levels could be prescribed for adding to cornmeal or other foods so that there would be no problem even in other countries where fewer foods are available.

As I am speaking, children all over the world are dying from malnutrition. Each moment of delay denies some of them the chance to live.

I have been advised by a number of experts that this question of fluoride content is not a valid complaint. Frankly, I cannot believe that the approval of FPC is being held up for this reason. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries scientists do not feel the fluoride content is significant. I have personally talked with a number of other eminent scientists, including Dr. Frederick Stare, world-renowned nutritionist, and head of Harvard Medical School's Department of Nutrition. These men assure me that they have worked with FPC and consider it to be perfectly safe. It has had remarkable beneficial effects in Latin America where I saw firsthand how infants who had suffered from severe malnutrition were transformed into happy, healthy children by an FPC additive introduced into their diets. The doctors seemed to be completely satisfied with the results.

Last October, the National Academy of Sciences gave its stamp of approval to FPC, and since then, the Food and Drug Administration has had ample opportunity to study the data presented to them by the Interior Department. What further proof is needed? What are the real reasons for this delay? If they are valid ones, they should be made public. If they are not, then the situation is intolerable.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1966

(Mrs. DWYER (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend her remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that at the appropriate point in the reading of the bill the distinguished gentlewoman from Michigan [Mrs. GRIFFITHS] will offer an amendment to strengthen the bill with regard to discrimination based on sex in the selection of juries.

I shall associate myself with the gentlewoman in urging the House to support the amendment for, without it, the bill will fail in a major respect to conform to the principles of equity we all subscribe to and it will fail to guarantee the kind of representative juries on which the impartial administration of justice depends.

Mr. Speaker, section 201 of the bill is designed to prohibit discrimination in the selection of jurors in State courts on account of race, color, religion, sex, na-

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

000—with a requirement for Presidential approval of any rates above these levels.

The legislation would increase bank reserve requirements substantially. It also would authorize the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to regulate interest paid by savings and loan associations.

Mr. Speaker, this measure will not accomplish its avowed purposes of stemming inflation, easing credit, lowering interest rates, and reviving the sagging homebuilding industry.

Rather, inflation is likely to increase because the administration refuses to tackle the principal cause of inflationary pressures—Federal spending in excess of revenue receipts.

This condition cannot be permitted to continue forever. We cannot hope to manipulate our monetary system to control the many fiscal and economic problems which are produced by excessive Federal spending.

These temporary stopgap measures are only political window dressing. They may actually cause conditions to worsen. We may even experience continued inflation and economic recession in certain basic industries at the same time.

The free market remains the most effective device for achieving stability in prices, living costs, wages, interest, and profits.

Federal controls, Mr. Speaker, will not produce a nickel of new money for home-financing purposes; in fact, they conceivably could reduce even further the supply of funds available to the housing industry.

THE THREATENED "SHOW TRIALS" IN NORTH VIETNAM VIOLATE THE GENEVA CONVENTION

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to join with many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in introducing a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress with regard to possible trial of U.S. airmen now held captive by the Communist regime in North Vietnam.

It is clearly evident that such trials would violate the express provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Conventions which were signed and ratified by the Hanoi regime, as well as by the United States. Article 2 of the conventions states that the provisions contained in the conventions shall apply "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."

This article is binding upon the North Vietnamese regime, since the Hanoi government has adhered to the Geneva conventions. Thus, the Communist government of North Vietnam has an obligation under international law to treat captured U.S. servicemen as prisoners of war and has no right to unilaterally abrogate the Geneva Conventions by accusing these prisoners of committing "war crimes."

Mr. Speaker, I am hopeful that the Congress will unanimously make it clear to the Communists in Hanoi that the staging of "show trials" will mean an intensification and escalation of the war and will be a serious setback to the achievement of a just and lasting peace in southeast Asia. The firmness of our convictions, as expressed in the resolutions which my colleagues and I have introduced, may deter the Hanoi regime from committing themselves to an irreversible, inhuman step toward widening the war.

HOW PRIVATE ENTERPRISE CONTRIBUTES TO A BETTER FUNCTIONING LABOR MARKET

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, early in May the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee held hearings on the development of job vacancy statistics. In June the subcommittee issued a report which emphasized the importance of this data for a well-functioning labor market and urged the continued development of this series.

Since these hearings, the need for such data has been reaffirmed in my own mind by the fact that private enterprise has moved in and begun to identify and disseminate information on job vacancies. While I would not ordinarily call attention to the activities of a private form in this fashion, I wish to do so in this case because it is a striking example of how private effort and initiative responds to a national need.

I refer to the publication Who's Hiring Who, the journal of jobs. I do not suggest that the development of this publication makes any less necessary a government job vacancy series. Each, I think, supplements the other. It may well be that the Bureau of Labor Statistics can learn something from the experience of Who's Hiring Who as it works to develop its own series.

What the publication seeks to do is organize what appears to the job seeker to be a chaotic labor market. It is designed to permit dissemination of full details on the current structure of opportunities in the national job market at all levels, including students, applicants, their advisers and organizations which need such information for adequate career and program planning.

Under unanimous consent, I include in the RECORD a press release from Who's Hiring Who, which points out where job opportunities exist in the current tight labor market.

The press release follows:

JOB JOURNAL WEIGHS EMPLOYER DEMAND FOR APPLICANTS IN 1,000 OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES

NEW YORK, N.Y., March 15.—Accountants, mechanical engineers, computers programmers, and secretaries, in that order, are the applicants (except teachers) most wanted by employers according to the Seventh Edition of Who's Hiring Who.

Published today the new edition of Who's

Hiring Who reports results of its latest national job survey and provides an unusually reliable index to the weight of employer demand for applicants in 1000 position categories.

The job-market study reveals that clerks, typists, bookkeepers, key-punch operators, and machinists fall well within the top 75 categories of most wanted applicants but also indicates that demand for the top three classes—accountants, mechanical engineers, and computer programmers—is so broad as to indicate highly critical shortages of adequately trained applicants in these fields. However, Richard Lathrop, editor of Who's Hiring Who, states, "that well qualified applicants in the top seventy-five categories should find that they have an extremely wide selection of opportunities available to them."

Engineering graduates will continue to be big men on campus in the eyes of recruiters between now and next June, according to the survey's measure of demand for current college graduates. This perpetuates a trend in evidence since Who's Hiring Who's first publication in 1959. Next highest in demand among this year's graduates are chemists followed by mathematics, physics, business, statistics, and finance majors in that order.

According to Lathrop, "heavier campus-recruiter emphasis on professional rather than business graduates reflects the intensity of needs based on production requirements even though more employers are interested in recruiting competent business and computational specialists." In all, the new edition covers requirements for college graduates in 55 major fields of study.

Although the job survey was not designed to measure the demand for teachers, it reports that at least 235,000 new teachers will be needed during 1966 if all requirements are to be met. The book provides guides for students and applicants on how to proceed if they wish to help fill these needs.

Lathrop said, "Because there are six million employable handicapped people in the U.S., the survey asked employers whether they favor hiring the handicapped when consistent with performance and safety standards. Sixty-five percent said "yes." A measure was also taken of the attitudes of recruiters toward the 50,000 members of the Armed Forces who retire each year and normally seek civilian employment. Sixty-nine percent said they would favorably consider such retirees if otherwise fully qualified for their openings. Both of these indexes to employer attitudes indicate that the barriers to handicapped applicants and those over forty are falling under the weight of increasing applicant shortages."

For the first time in the history of who's hiring who, a number of employers indicated that they are looking for mechanics with college degrees. Although a high school diploma or less is a normal requirement for mechanics, some recruiters are seeking applicants with Bachelor's, Master's, and even Doctor's degrees for jobs as aircraft, airframe, assembly and test, electrical, instrument, jet engine, radio, television, and turbine mechanics. Lathrop attributes this development to sharply rising technology and related changes in the concepts of technical and professional positions.

Symptoms of a changing and troubled world also crop up in who's hiring who on "work" for professional soldiers, plus details on how to apply for such openings. As an antidote, Peace Corps opportunities and requirements are also spelled out in detail.

Eight thousand employers and employment agencies across the nation were contacted regarding their 1966 recruiting plans during the job-market sampling. In all, more than 68,000 job openings were reported by the recruiters as scheduled for recruitment action. The reported openings are

16442

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

July 27, 1966

identified in a tabulated style which permits an unusually reliable "at-sight" indication of the weight of employer interest in each type of applicant in the thousand position categories. Openings listed cover the whole range of occupations from jail guards to senior scientists. Who's Hiring Who names the recruiters who hope to fill the openings in the coming months and specifies minimum qualifications requirements, general pay levels, overseas openings, summer jobs, temporary openings, employers who favorably consider older and handicapped applicants, and other data regarding the openings where supplied by the recruiters concerned.

During the course of their job-market study, the editors uncovered basic data about 122,000 summer jobs ranging from smoke-jumpers to science assistants which must be filled before next June. This data includes plans for about 35,000 "disadvantaged" applicants scheduled to be hired through state employment offices. Details on where and how to obtain these summer positions plus descriptions of employers offering more than 100,000 part-time and temporary positions are provided.

According to Lathrop, "Who's Hiring Who was developed to serve as a center of communication in the national job market where none had previously existed. It was designed to permit better coordination of the aims and actions of students and applicants with those of employers, schools and colleges, employment agencies, career and guidance counselors, textbook publishers, and others who focus their attention on manpower and career-development problems. The requirement for improved communication, is further served through inclusion of explicit guides to applicants on resume preparation, interviewing procedures, etc." In his view, inadequate communication of applicants' qualifications to employers is a basic factor in the improper utilization of manpower in the economy and it is his hope that these guides will help to correct this limitation.

PROPOSED MEDAL FOR CIVILIAN SERVICE UNDER PERILOUS CONDITIONS

(Mr. HARVEY of Michigan (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HARVEY of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a House concurrent resolution in behalf of hundreds of Americans who, at great personal sacrifice, have volunteered their knowledge and skill to serve their country and fellow men under perilous conditions. My resolution reads as follows:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President should award an appropriately designed medal and certificate to those citizens of the United States who, although not members of the Armed Forces or officers or employees of the Federal Government, voluntarily serve in areas where the Armed Forces are engaged in combat with hostile forces in an effort to lessen the suffering and improve the conditions of the civilian populations in such areas.

In particular, I would like to point out the difficult work being conducted by Americans in South Vietnam, which has prompted this legislation. U.S. doctors have volunteered to work without pay for at least 2 months in South Vietnam.

Their patients, as pointed out in an article in the May 20 issue of Time

magazine, are the 15.5 million civilians for whom there is, in effect, only 1 Vietnamese doctor available for every 50,000—well over 50 times worse than the physician-patient ratio in the United States.

I have learned that the first group of U.S. volunteer doctors arrived last September and have worked with similar teams from Korea, Switzerland, the Philippines, Iran, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Australia.

It is with particular pride that I mention that two doctors from my hometown of Saginaw, Mich., have already participated in this program. They are Dr. Hugh T. Caumartin, a radiologist, and Dr. Hugh L. Sulfridge, Jr., and orthopedist.

A recent brief article in the Saginaw News best describes the contribution of these doctors. Permit me to quote the article:

Hospital Corpsman James B. Beyersdorf of the Navy's 1st Shore Party Battalion, stationed in Viet Nam, has some nice words for two Saginaw doctors serving in that country as volunteers.

In a letter to the Saginaw County Medical Society, Beyersdorf—who comes home this month after more than a year in Viet Nam—writes: "First of all I am proud of what these doctors (Dr. Hugh T. Caumartin and Dr. Hugh L. Sulfridge) of my home town have done. To volunteer their time and their great knowledge of medicine to the people of Viet Nam, as well as to our servicemen. To give up a well organized practice in the City of Saginaw. They care for the deprived man and the man without. Because that is what most of the Vietnamese are. I have seen a lot of sicknesses I thought I would never see—Also, we know the reason we are here, and I believe the majority of the nation, and especially our home town, knows why we are here. I am proud to be from Saginaw."

With the cooperation of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, and the President's Office, no great difficulty should arise in singling out the men and women, in a variety of endeavors, who are deserving of this special recognition.

Further, I believe it is of great importance to focus attention on the little known of work of such humanitarian effort. This, I believe, is equal to our military commitment and successes. This is a deserving tribute to dedicated men and women who have and are making a personal sacrifice to heed a call of humanity. It is, in the truest sense, the real spirit of America at work for freedom-loving people.

PRESSURE BY BEER FIRM IN TRUST SUIT

(Mr. GOODELL (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, for the information of the Members, I place in the RECORD at this point the following article by the distinguished, Pulitzer Prize-Winning Columnist Clark Mollenhoff in the July 22, 1966, edition of the Des Moines, Iowa, Register:

PRESSURE BY BEER FIRM IN TRUST SUIT (By Clark Mollenhoff)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Justice Department records indicate that the Anheuser-Busch Co. used "political pressure" to try to bring a settlement on the highly controversial antitrust suit involving acquisition of a Wisconsin malting company.

The settlement of the suit by the Johnson administration has been subject to Republican criticism since it was settled during the same period that owners and representatives of Anheuser-Busch were making political contributions of \$10,000 to the President's Club.

PLANE TRIP

Also involved in the controversy is the fact that Donald F. Turner, head of the Antitrust Division, went to the All-Star baseball game in St. Louis in a plane owned by Anheuser-Busch. The plane ride took place only three weeks after the antitrust action was dismissed on recommendation of Turner.

Alfred Fleishman, the public relations man who arranged for the \$10,000 in contributions to the President's Club, has said there was no political pressure in connection with the settlement of the Anheuser-Busch case and no discussions of the antitrust case with the Democratic Party people who accepted the \$10,000.

The files of the Justice Department show that the trial lawyers assigned to the Anheuser-Busch case were opposed to dismissal of the action.

Trial lawyers John F. Hughes and David R. Melnicoff in a memorandum of May 9, 1966, set out the historic background of the case from the time it was filed in January, 1962, on the recommendations of Lee Loevinger, then the head of the antitrust division.

Anheuser-Busch lawyers tried to obtain a settlement in 1962 and 1963, and relative to one of these efforts in December, 1963, Hughes and Melnicoff made the following comment:

"At that time, as Mr. (Baddic J.) Rashid (chief, trial section) is aware, Anheuser was not the least bit hesitant to bring political pressure to bear from among others, Senators (STUART) SYMINGTON and (EDWARD) LONG of Missouri."

The trial attorneys contended that the lawyers for Anheuser-Busch tried to avoid a trial and had halted the "discovery" process by indicating a willingness to settle with a consent decree at several stages.

However, the trial attorneys said this appeared to them to be "dragging heels" for purposes of delay during which time the firm was operating the Rahr Malting Co. at Manitowoc, Wis.

DENY VIOLATION

Edward Barton, a lawyer for Anheuser-Busch, contended that the acquisition would not be a violation of the antitrust laws, and asked "whose interest the department (of justice) seeks to protect since all brewers, former customers of Rahr, have alternate supplies."

Hughes and Melnicoff replied: "Our answer is that the public interest will be protected by retaining a vigorous competition in the malt and beer industries as possible in light of oligopolistic tendencies in both industries."

They stated that "in one swoop the nation's largest brewer (Anheuser-Busch) acquired 9 per cent of all production of malt."

In his recommendation to dismiss the case, Turner in a June 8, 1966, memorandum stated: "With great reluctance, since I believe there should be a strong presumption against taking such action, I recommend that we consent to the dismissal without prejudice of the above civil complaint. I have had the case carefully analyzed by several staff people, and am convinced the facts simply do not support any of the possible theories which I would consider appropriate."

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

16451

TABLE 3.—Areas in the national park system for which there are statutory fiscal limitations for land acquisition—Continued

Number	Area	Ceiling authorized	Date of authorization	Ceiling reached with fiscal year 1966 or earlier year appropriations	Estimated ceiling needed	Estimated needed increase in ceiling ¹
24	Allegheny Portage NHS, Pa.	\$445,000	Aug. 31, 1964	Yes	\$445,000	None
	Johnstown Flood NHS, Pa.	*319,000	Sept. 13, 1961	Yes	*864,000	*\$545,000
25	*Fort Smith NHS, Ark.	301,150	June 5, 1965	No		
26	Agate Fossil Beds NM, Nebr.	300,000	July 14, 1960	Yes	300,000	None
27	Harpers Ferry NHP, W. Va., Md.	281,000	Sept. 18, 1964	Yes	281,000	None
28	Morristown NHP, N.J. (boundary change)	*250,000	Aug. 6, 1956	Yes	(*)	(*)
29	*Cape Hatteras NS, N.C.	*226,000	Sept. 8, 1960	Yes	(**)	(**)
30	*Fort Donelson NMP, Tenn.	169,000	Aug. 31, 1964	Yes	169,000	None
31	John Muir NHS, Calif.	155,000	June 26, 1935	Yes	155,000	None
32	Kennesaw Mtn. NHP, Ga.	125,000	Dec. 23, 1963	No		
33	Mesa Verde NP, Colo.	115,000	Sept. 8, 1961	Yes	115,000	None
34	Fort Davis NHS, Tex.	*115,000	Aug. 10, 1961	Yes	*423,500	*308,500
35	*Fort Necessity NB, Pa.	100,000	Aug. 13, 1935	No		
36	Appomattox Court House, Va.	90,000	Aug. 24, 1962	No		
37	Petersburg NB, Va.	*75,000	Feb. 19, 1962	Yes	*255,000	*180,000
38	*Lincoln Boyhood NM, Ind.	*57,100	July 3, 1926	Yes	*113,200	*56,100
39	*Shiloh NMP, Tenn.	30,000	July 6, 1961	No		
40	Cumberland Gap, Ky., Tenn., Va.	25,000	July 6, 1960	No		
41	Arkansas Post, Ark.	*20,000	May 17, 1963	Yes	(*)	(*)
42	*Big Hole NB, Mont.	20,000	May 16, 1958	No		
43	Fort Frederica NM, Ga.	20,000	Apr. 22, 1960	No		
44	Wilson's Creek BNP, Mo.	15,000	June 30, 1961	No		
45	Scott's Bluff NM, Nebr.	5,000	Aug. 31, 1965	No		
46	Alibates Flint, Tex.	2,500	Sept. 5, 1962	Yes	2,500	None
47	Capulin Mtn. NM, N. Mex.	*2,000	May 27, 1961	Yes	(**)	(**)
48	*Effigy Mounds NM, Iowa					
	*Subtotal for 18 areas for which additional fiscal ceiling is now believed needed.	71,464,100			\$ 163,446,500	\$ 87,480,300
	Subtotal for 8 areas for which no additional ceiling needed.	1,921,500			1,921,500	None
	Subtotal for 22 areas for which it is not now known if additional ceiling needed.	95,243,150				
	Grand total	168,628,750				

¹ These are tentative, preliminary estimates which are subject to change.
² Total ceiling, including ceiling on land acquisitions by the Forest Service in the Whiskeytown-Shasta-Trinity National Recreation Area.
³ The act of June 28, 1943, providing for the establishment of the Independence National Historical Park, authorized \$4,435,000 for land acquisition. Subsequent authorizations have brought the total to \$7,950,000. The last authorization was contained in Public Law 88-477 of Aug. 21, 1964, was for \$200,000, which was appropriated in fiscal year 1965.
⁴ In condemnation. Increase needed will depend on court award.
⁵ Land acquisition and construction and relocation of roads.
⁶ Land acquisition and development.
⁷ Firm estimate has not been made.
⁸ When the Shiloh National Military Park was authorized by act of June 4, 1967, a fiscal limitation of \$50,000 for land acquisition was imposed. The act of July 3, 1926, raised this an additional \$7,100. Appropriation of the \$7,100 was not completed until fiscal year 1962.
⁹ Not including estimates for 5 areas for which increases will depend on court award and are not yet available.

Area	Index	No.
Agate Fossil Beds NM, Nebr.	26	26
Alibates Flint, Tex.	46	46
Allegheny Portage NHS, Pa.	24	24
Appomattox Court House, Va.	36	36
Arkansas Post, Ark.	41	41
Assateague Island NS, Md.-Va.	3	3
Big Hole NB, Mont.	42	42
Cape Cod NS, Mass.	4	4
Cape Hatteras NS, N.C.	29	29
Capulin Mtn. NM, N. Mex.	47	47
Colonial HNP, Va.	13	13
Cumberland Gap, Ky.-Tenn.-Va.	40	40
Delaware Water Gap NRA, Pa.-N.J.	1	1
Effigy Mounds NM, Iowa	48	48
Everglades NP, Fla.	12	12
Fire Island NS, N.Y.	5	5
Fort Davis NHS, Tex.	34	34
Fort Donelson NMP, Tenn.	30	30
Fort Frederica NM, Ga.	43	43
Fort Larned NHS, Kans.	23	23
Fort Necessity NB, Pa.	35	35
Fort Smith NHS, Ark.	25	25
Golden Spike NHS, Utah	17	17
Great Falls, Va.	18	18
Harpers Ferry NHP, W. Va.-Md.	27	27
Herbert Hoover NHS, Iowa	14	14
Hubbell Trading Post NHS, Ariz.	19	19
Independence NHP, Pa.	7	7
John Muir NHS, Calif.	31	31
Johnstown Flood NHS, Pa.	24	24
Kennesaw Mtn. NHP, Ga.	32	32
Lake Mead NRA, Ariz.-Nev.	16	16
Lincoln Boyhood NM, Ind.	38	38
Mesa Verde NP, Colo.	33	33
Minute Man NHP, Mass.	10	10
Morristown NHP, N.J. (boundary change)	28	28
Nez Perce NHP, Idaho	22	22
Ozark National Scenic Riverways, Mo.	8	8
Padre Island NS, Tex.	9	9
Petersburg NB, Va.	37	37
Piscataway Park (Mockley Point), Md.	20	20
Point Reyes NS, Calif.	6	6
Shiloh NMP, Tenn.	39	39
Scott's Bluff NM, Nebr.	45	45
Vicksburg NMP, Miss.	11	11
Virgin Islands NP, V.I.	15	15
Whiskeytown-Shasta-Trinity NRA, Calif.	2	2
Wilson's Creek BNP, Mo.	44	44

TWO MONTHS IN VIETNAM

(Mr. CORMAN (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, Wally McNamee, staff photographer for the Washington Post, has recently returned from 2 months of covering the war in Vietnam.

His comments, found in the June 1966 publication of the White House News Photographers Association, will be of particular interest at the present time. Under general leave to extend my remarks, I insert into the RECORD the White House News Photographer interview with Mr. McNamee:

MCNAMEE CALLS UNITED STATES VIETNAMESE COVERAGE TOPS

Question. Wally, there has been criticism, even from within our own business, on the lack of responsibility used in the war coverage. The AP and UPI recently have even been attacked on the floor of Congress for handling "phony pictures." How do you feel about these charges?

Answer. There have been examples of poor coverage of the war, but I feel they are isolated. When you think of the hundreds, even thousands of pictures produced by the wire services and other people in Viet Nam, you realize what a fantastic job is being done over there. It's easy to cover the war itself. That's like going to a baseball game and waiting for something to happen. Reporting the war in words is the same way. Covering the political part of the struggle is almost impossible because nobody can really understand what's going on. Things change rapidly and the Vietnamese are sometimes reluctant to talk to the Americans. For instance, I tried to get to (militant Buddhist leader) Tri Quang for two weeks but was never permitted to see him.

Question. What do you think of the politi-

cal coverage? Is it factual? As little as a year ago, some of the correspondents were battling their offices over what the true picture was.

Answer. I think the people I met there are good and honorable men doing a testing job. I think that personal opinions have to become involved because the men are personally involved themselves. They are bound to have personal opinions. With the political situation the way it is, Buddhists protesting, elections being scheduled, and questions being asked as to whether or not the Americans will stay, it had to be interpreted as well as written as a news story. What happens in Viet Nam is going to be up to the people of the country themselves. The American press, therefore, has to look the situation over very carefully.

Question. Then you feel the war is being covered fairly.

Answer. Yes, but remember there is a difference between the political story and the actual war. They are both covered fairly and well. For the war coverage, the reporters and photographers go where the war is. They see for themselves what is happening.

Question. Then the stories about the correspondents covering the war from Saigon are not true?

Answer. Well, no, it is true in some cases. In fact, you can sit at the bar on the 6th floor of the Majestic Hotel near the Saigon Riverfront some nights and watch the war being fought across the water. Maybe only 10 or 20 miles away. You see the mortar pattern and the flare ships.

Question. Were you in combat in Korea?

Answer. Yes. I was a photographer there too. But it's a different kind of war in Viet Nam. So much of the fighting in Korea, when I was there in 1953 and '54, was done at night. No one took many pictures. You couldn't use flash, and people get tired of looking at tracer patterns and search lights. This is one of the reasons so many great pictures are coming out of Viet Nam. So much of the fighting is in the daylight. Then too, the cameras have improved so much. People can carry small cameras, lots of film and extra lenses.

Question. What kind of equipment did you take to Viet Nam?

Answer. I had three Nikon F's with five lenses. A 28mm, 35mm, a 50mm, a 150mm and a 200 mm. All performed well. I didn't take a motor. I carried 200 rolls of Tri-X, 36 exposure film, 60 rolls of Ektachrome X and 40 rolls of highspeed Ektachrome. All the color film was outdoor type. This proved to be plenty of film. In fact, I had to ship some home when I left Saigon.

Question. How did you work in the field?

Answer. I wore a pack. It's a lot easier than trying to handle a camera bag. The first time I went out I carried three cameras with a lens on each. But this proved awkward. One camera was always slipping or hooking onto a vine. After that I carried only two cameras—one with a 35mm and one with a 105mm. A 200 was always in my pack. This combination is what most of the photos carried in the field and proved very adequate. Some of the people carried Tele-extendors, too.

Question. How about food and clothes when you're out in the field? Does the military give you that?

Answer. No, they won't give you or allow you to buy army uniforms. You have to buy them on the black market or from a surplus store. I didn't have any of this stuff when I got there so I had to scrounge. Fatigues, pack, cartridge belt, and canteens.

Question. What is your estimate of the war itself? How does it look compared to Korea?

Answer. Well, in Vietnam, when a unit gets into a fight, they don't send everybody charging in. They call on firepower and artillery and air strikes and really blast 'em. When I was in Korea it was all trench warfare. We would send out probes and recon patrols. There was a stalemate and we were trying to hold onto what we had without getting the other guys too mad at us. In Vietnam the war is entirely different. There is no front line. You go through a village one day and it's like a Sunday afternoon walk. But a day or week or month later you can be in the fiercest fight in the world in the same place. The Viet Cong choose the fighting time and the fighting place. They want to fight you on their own terms and in spots where they figure they have a good chance.

Question. In this operation, then, you live as a civilian?

Answer. Right. The military will take care of you as best they can while you're in the field.

Question. When it's time to take pictures of the war, what do you do?

Answer. The first day, the MACV (Military Assistance Command-Viet Nam) people advise you of the various ways of getting around the country. The army runs passenger flights starting from Saigon each day to major concentration areas. So, if you decide you want to go to An Khe, where the 1st Cavalry is based, you call the Special Projects Officer the night before and he books you on this flight. If you don't make prior arrangements, you just go out to the airport and walk up the flight line asking the pilots where they're headed. Most times they're very accommodating. The Marines try to keep an escort with you all the time, but then, each outfit does it differently. With the 1st Cav., it's all up to you. They advise you that something is happening here, or there, and you go with them if you choose. You ride with Medevacs, or re-supply helicopters or walk in with the troops.

Question. Aside from being a newspaper man, simply as a citizen who has got some indication, are you personally satisfied with the way the war is being fought? Not just the individual unit or fighting man, but are you convinced that the U.S. is in Viet Nam for a good reason?

Answer. I sure am. I'm satisfied that we should be there and fighting the way we are. We should continue to do it this way as long as we're welcome. As long as the government of South Viet Nam wants us.

Question. If a government should take over in Saigon and ask us to leave, do you think we should?

Answer. Yes, definitely. We're there under a legal commitment. We were asked there by the government of South Viet Nam, and if that government says they don't want us any more, I don't see how we can stick around. If we didn't leave, any military victory would be negated by the trouble we'd be in around the world. Personally I don't think the U.S. can keep going into countries any time they feel they have to. That way we're just as bad as the other guy. We may say "you're doing the wrong thing if you chase us out of here, pal," but we'd have to go. After all, it's their country.

Question. Were you satisfied with the trip and its results?

Answer. Yes, but I was just getting to know my way around when I had to leave.

(Mr. LEGGETT (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. LEGGETT'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. BOGGS (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, one of the most noble and inspiring speeches I have ever read was made last Friday at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base, Groton, Conn., by our colleague, Congressman GEORGE GRIDER, of Memphis, Tenn. The occasion of this wonderful address was the commissioning of the U.S. ship *Flasher*, a new and powerful nuclear submarine, equipped with Polaris missiles.

This occasion—the commissioning of a new submarine *Flasher*—was particularly poignant for GEORGE GRIDER, for it was he who commanded the old U.S.S. *Flasher* in World War II. As commander of that submarine in the war, Captain GRIDER directed the sinking of more enemy tanker tonnage than has ever been sunk on any single patrol by any other submarine in history. GEORGE GRIDER was truly one of our Nation's naval heroes in World War II, and I am proud to salute him once again for his courage and his distinguished service for our country, both in war and now in peace.

What GEORGE GRIDER did for our country in World War II in the highest traditions of devoted public service, he is now doing for the people of Memphis in the House of Representatives. Never more powerfully expressed in my experience was GEORGE GRIDER'S remembrance, of his realization as skipper of the U.S.S. *Pollack*, of the injustice of prejudice between men because of the differences in the color of their skins, their religions, their national origins, and so on.

But let GEORGE GRIDER'S powerful words speak for themselves:

If you will forgive a personal reference, I came into the Navy as a product of the Southern way of life as it existed in 1932. In my childhood I even knew an ancient gentleman named Uncle Charlie who had once been a slave on my grandfather's plantation. I was the product of that environment, and brought aboard my first submarine all of the prejudices and misconceptions that such a background produces. My

service on submarines was one of the most democratizing experiences of my life. And never more intense than when I had the privilege and duty of command.

One night, nearly a quarter century ago, the U.S.S. *Pollack* was at test depth, trying to elude a long, persistent and accurate depth charge attack. The heat inside the hull was overpowering. We were all exhausted, discouraged and afraid.

In that time of great trial, I looked around the control room and saw—for the first time, really saw—human beings from four races and from so many national origins that I could not count them. Literally and figuratively, as this one great nation is today, we were all in the same boat together. I realized then with stunning force, the arrogance, the futility and the comedy of any human being's thinking that he was entitled to preferential treatment either from his Maker or from his society because of such inconsequential and accidental considerations as color or place of birth. For a long moment I no longer heard the depth charges outside.

This remembrance, coupled with GEORGE GRIDER'S actions today, reveal the strength of character in our fellow colleague, and I am pleased to share his friendship and enjoy his advice and counsel. I commend to my fellow colleagues this splendid address which Congressman GRIDER delivered last Friday at Groton, Conn., on the occasion of the commissioning of the new U.S.S. *Flasher* as a member of our nuclear submarine fleet. His message is courageous, inspiring and noble. The speech follows:

COMMISSIONING OF UNITED STATES SHIP "FLASHER" (SSN-613) FRIDAY, JULY 22, 1966, U.S. NAVAL SUBMARINE BASE, GROTON, CONNECTICUT

(Address by GEORGE W. GRIDER, Member of Congress of Tennessee)

This festive occasion brings to mind another commissioning ceremony of sorts held in Washington, D.C., in January of 1965. A somewhat decrepit retread of a submarine sallow was being launched in the United States Congress on those troubled waters filled with cross currents, storms and wind—above all wind. As he opened up his office he put forth a gleaming and untouched guest register. He opened the door for business, and hopefully sat back. I think it significant that his first caller was Commander Kenneth M. Carr, prospective commanding officer of this ship. It is an honor to return the call, Captain, and I hope you are as glad to see me as I was to see you.

It was just up river from here that I stood on the deck of a noble ship in March 1946 and mournfully ordered the striking of the commission pennant. On that day a shadow settled on the spirits of the small group of sailors who stood there. The crew had been scattered during the decommission period. The last voyage of a once great ship of war had been made under ignominious tow from the Navy yard in Philadelphia, her batteries removed, her engines silenced, her torpedo tubes sealed forever. We shook hands all around and walked slowly ashore with our shoulders slightly stooped because a name made so gallant in Pacific combat had been removed from the lists.

Today that shadow lifts, our shoulders straighten, and we look with joy on this new inheritor of the renowned name of *Flasher*.

These eyes, in the span of years, have never lost their love of caressing the lines of a ship of war, and this new *Flasher* brings a catch to my throat. Deadly, menacing, sinister, exciting and beautiful she is. Within her steel hull nestles the most awesome weapons, the most modern equipment, the most efficient and inexhaustible machinery that clever and

July 27, 1966

issue, and discovered the article about your program for collecting names of local servicemen and forwarding the Journal to them.

I have it soft here in Rome, Italy. I work on a civilian airport, wear civilian clothes to work, and live on the economy rather than on a base. But, regardless of location or type of circumstances, the Journal is very welcome, and makes available all the local news that I miss.

In view of what the Journal means to me here, it isn't hard to guess what it means to the guys in Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, Berlin and Okinawa. Seeing photos of and reading about old friends means a great deal to all of us. I can assure you, and keeping up on new civic building projects, i.e., new buildings, roads, etc. helps avoid that lost feeling when our military tour is over and we return home.

I'm sure that there are many young men who would like to write and express their gratefulness to you and to the staff of the Forest Hills Journal for your thoughtfulness and effort in their behalf, but due to duties, don't have the free time. Please accept my thanks, speaking for all of us who are receiving and enjoying news from home.

I want to publicly commend the Mt. Washington Junior Women's Club and the editor of the Forest Hills Journal for this fine public service to the members of our Armed Forces and to their families.

TRIALS IN VIETNAM OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN

(Mr. FOUNTAIN (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Speaker, if Hanoi entertained any doubt as to how we would react to war crimes trial of any of our pilots, it should have none after President Johnson's news conference statements on the matter.

An editorial in the Scripps-Howard Washington Daily News relays this warning.

The newspaper lists the warnings that have come previously from various officials at home and the appeals of Pope Paul VI and Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations.

Now the President has declared the American people would find such trials revolting and repulsive, and would react accordingly.

The editorial makes no claim to understand just why Hanoi has made the ugly threat. It expresses hope, however, that the President's warning sinks in and the threat is abandoned.

Confident that this is a hope we all share, I propose to place the entire editorial in the RECORD.

NATIONAL ECONOMY SUFFERS DAILY

(Mr. FLYNT (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, it was with surprise bordering on shock when I read a few minutes ago that the Secretary of Labor testified before the Senate Labor

Committee that the present airline strike does not amount to an emergency which requires legislative action by Congress.

My good friend Secretary Wirtz knows better than this. He knows that the airline industry is partially paralyzed and that many other segments of the national economy are suffering daily because of the very serious effects of the present strike which has halted operations of five major airlines.

The cessation of operations of these five airlines is causing a loss of more than \$7 million per day, and the daily rate of loss is increasing each day. There are 66,200 airline employees out of work; 4,100 regular scheduled flights have been canceled. More than 150,000 passengers per day are unable to obtain air transportation which they desire. These facts meet my definition of an emergency.

Some of the airlines which are operating are receiving calls which originate at the White House demanding that a named person be placed on a confirmed reservation status—or else. Many of these people have no urgent or emergency business. The only basis for priority handling of such requests for confirmed reservations is that such requests originated at the White House.

When told that the flight on which such a reservation is requested is already fully sold out, the response is, "Provide a reservation anyway." When the airline representative then asks, "Even if it means canceling a previously confirmed reservation?" the answer comes back, "Yes, even if it means canceling a previously confirmed reservation."

Members of Congress, executive department officials, and independent agency officials are also involved in asking for special handling of requests for airline reservations. We in Congress cannot smugly wash our hands and say we know nothing about it—because we do.

Mr. Speaker, in order that the effect of the airline strike might be made perfectly clear to the Secretary of Labor and to other Government officials, I suggest the immediate consideration of a resolution which I shall introduce Thursday which would provide an embargo on commercial air transportation requested by members of the White House staff, by officials and employees of the U.S. Government, including Representatives and Senators in Congress. If this is done, Mr. Speaker, I think that the people who presently deny the existence of an emergency will recognize the true situation.

Mr. Speaker, an emergency does exist in the air transportation industry, and it is time that something was done about it. I respectfully request that my resolution be appropriately referred, and that it be considered by the House.

(Mr. FLYNT (at request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. FLYNT'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

RIGHT POLICIES IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. McDOWELL], is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. McDOWELL. Mr. Speaker, the Christian Science Monitor commends President Johnson for re-emphasizing what it sets forth as the two indispensable pillars of successful policy in southeast Asia.

These are a determination that aggression will not be allowed to succeed and a readiness to keep the hand of reconciliation, peace and negotiation extended to North Vietnam and Communist China.

In his recent speech on policy in Asia, the newspaper remarks, the President extended the hand of reconciliation still further to Red China.

This is another of many laudatory press observations on the President's statement of Asian policy, and I ask that it be inserted in the RECORD, together with President Johnson's speech of July 12 to the American Alumni Council.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, July 15, 1966]

RIGHT POLICIES IN VIETNAM

The two firm indispensable pillars of a successful American policy in Southeast Asia today are an unswerving determination that aggression must not be allowed to succeed and a readiness to keep the hand of reconciliation, peace, and negotiation extended to North Vietnam and Communist China. President Johnson's White Sulphur Springs speech wisely reemphasized these two foundation stones of American policy.

Indeed, his speech did more. In addition to keeping the hand of reconciliation in view, in the case of China he extended that hand still further. Not only did he review the recent steps taken by Washington to reopen lines of communication with mainland China (to none of which Peking has yet responded) but he also made it plain that he was ready to do more if China showed any receptivity.

White House aides termed the speech the President's first major statement on China. It was in the right direction and established a policy which we hope will be adhered to. Someday, somehow America and China must again learn to live together in peace and cooperation. There must never be any doubt about America's willingness to speed that day.

Simultaneously, the President could not have done less than reiterate with utter firmness and determination the United States' undeviating intention of proving that aggression, political and territorial imperialism, and terrorism will not be allowed to succeed. It is imperative that the Communist leadership be convinced that aggression will not pay off and that a military victory is beyond their grasp.

At the same time, however, the President wisely repeated earlier assurances that Washington has no intention of overthrowing the North Vietnamese government, attacking North Vietnamese independence, seizing an inch of South Vietnamese territory or setting up permanent bases there. If Hanoi does not believe these assurances, Washington must be ready to take any steps—consistent with its obligations to Saigon—to prove its clean-handedness in these matters.

Meanwhile, Britain, India, and the United States all appear to be pressuring the Soviet Union to agree to seek to reconvene the Geneva Conference on Vietnam. It is believed that, in its heart, Russia too would like to see such a step, but that it fears Hanoi's re-

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

16461

capability of the airport on a manageable basis of a total number of operations each hour spaced evenly through the hour. The Bureau of National Capital Airports has determined that the instrument flight capacity of the airport is approximately 60 operations per hour. The historical use has been 73 percent air carrier and 27 percent general aviation. The application of these percentages would divide the available capacity between the competing users of the airport by allocating 40 operations per hour to air carriers (other than air taxi operators) and allowance for extra sections.

Air carrier flights serving passengers at Washington National Airport will continue to be limited to those whose last stop before landing at the airport and whose first stop after taking off at the airport are within 650 statute miles from the airport (in place of the 500-mile limitation in the policy statement of July 1, 1966 (31 F.R. 9148)), except for non-stop flights of less than 1,000 miles operating to or from the following:

- (1) Miami, Florida.
- (2) Memphis, Tennessee.
- (3) Minneapolis, Minnesota.
- (4) Orlando, Florida.
- (5) St. Louis, Missouri.
- (6) Tampa, Florida.
- (7) West Palm Beach, Fla.

The types of airplanes used to perform such operations would be subject to the approval of the Director, Bureau of National Capital Airports. The Director will be guided in granting approvals by considerations such as whether the airplane is a type that would increase congestion, whether it is appropriate to the airport's physical limitations, and whether it contributes to the use of the airport on a manageable basis, with due regard to the public need for service.

The Agency hopes that the limitation of 40 air carrier operations an hour can be accomplished by agreement among the various air carriers. Due to the urgency of the matter and the limited period of time available, agreement by the carriers to schedule operations within the 40 operations an hour limitation will be accepted, provided such schedules would be effective by the date the regulation becomes effective.

Should the above alternative not prove feasible, operational limitations would be imposed by applying a formula that would result in a proportional roll back, on an hourly basis, of current air carrier schedules during those hours of the day when there are more than 40 air carrier operations. Under this latter alternative, any changes to schedules that would result in moving any operation from a crowded to a non-crowded hour would be subject to the approval of the Director, Bureau of National Capital Airports.

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the docket number and be submitted in duplicate to the Federal Aviation Agency, Office of the General Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket, 800 Independence Avenue, S. W., Washington, D. C. 20553. All communications received on or before August 3, 1966, will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposal contained in this notice may be changed in the light of comments received. All comments will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons.

The proposed amendments would become effective September 1, 1966, or at the end of the present strike against the airlines, whichever is later.

The Administrative Procedure Act does not require notice or public rule-making procedures to be used in any matter relating to public property. However, in view of the importance of the proposals contained here-

in, comments from interested persons concerning the proposed action would be beneficial.

This amendment is proposed under the authority of section 1602, Title 2, District of Columbia Code; section 2, Act of June 29, 1940, as amended (54 Stat. 686); section 4 of the Act of September 7, 1950 as amended (64 Stat. 770).

DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF NATIONAL CAPITAL AIRPORTS.

Issued in Washington, D.C.

CORRECTING AN INEQUITY SUFFERED BY RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL

(Mr. FULTON of Tennessee (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, today it is my pleasure to introduce legislation designed to correct an inequity suffered by retired military personnel.

Prior to 1958, with an exception dating back to 1949 regarding disabled retirees, retirement pay was based on current active duty pay.

In 1958 the Congress granted active duty pay increases but said that for the purpose of that act persons on the retired rolls would not receive an increase in benefits.

In 1963 the Congress granted another military pay raise for personnel on active duty but at this time amended the law with a specific provision to put retired personnel on a cost-of-living benefit increase and take them off the former system whereby their retired benefits were computed on the basis of active duty pay.

Since that time active duty military personnel have received increases averaging between 10 and 13 percent. However, retired personnel have only a 4.4 percent cost of living increase and a small percentage given in lieu of the raise they would have received in 1963 if computation had continued to remain on the active duty pay scale basis.

Mr. Speaker, this is a great disservice to these retirees. They knew when they elected the military as a career that their active duty pay would be relatively low compared to civilian pay, but they also knew that they would receive a generally more liberal retirement. The changes in the 1963 law have denied them this retirement and we have, in effect, broken faith with these persons whom had been promised that their retirement would compensate for their relatively low active duty pay.

This bill will restore the retired pay system to its former status of equity and I urge early and favorable consideration by the Congress.

SENDING FOREST HILLS JOURNAL TO MEN IN ARMED SERVICES

(Mr. GILLIGAN (at the request of Mr. WALDIE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GILLIGAN. Mr. Speaker, I in-

sert in the RECORD the following letter received in my office on June 15, 1966, from Mr. E. B. Wright, Jr., editor of the Forest Hills Journal, a weekly newspaper in Cincinnati, Ohio, serving Anderson Township, Mount Washington, Newtown, and West Claremont areas:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN GILLIGAN: For some time I have been meaning to bring to your attention something which you may wish to include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at your convenience.

The Mt. Washington Junior Women's Club has decided to send each week a copy of the Forest Hills Journal to men in the service who live in the Mt. Washington-Anderson Township-Newtown vicinity. For several months this has been going on and it has proved very popular with the servicemen. Enclosed are some tearsheets which provide the details.

I thought you should know of this effort of the Women's Club because of your constant efforts to help the servicemen. In a previous letter or two you have asked that I bring anything to your attention which I feel you should know about. Well, this I feel you should.

If there is any other information you need, please feel free to contact me or Mrs. Mary Jo Wheatley, Chairman of the Club's Community Improvement Committee, who sponsored the idea.

This project began in December of last year. By February, 86 servicemen were receiving free subscriptions to the Journal, and by this date I am sure that many more names have been added. The women's club has received many letters from servicemen and their families thanking the club for this fine gesture. I would like to quote a letter written by a lieutenant on the U.S.S. *Kitty Hawk* and which was addressed to Mrs. Wheatley:

We have never met, but as a way of introduction I will say that I am one of the 86 servicemen receiving the Forest Hills Journal. When I saw the article in the February 9 issue of the Journal, I felt it would be appropriate to express my thanks.

Until now I wasn't exactly certain why or how I was receiving the subscription. Now that my questions are answered I can only say that it is much appreciated. When I was in the States I never read a Journal but now I eagerly read each page to see what has been happening. Though it takes approximately two months for a copy to arrive, it is still welcome news of home.

After six months away from the States and almost eight months away from Cincinnati, I am already eagerly anticipating my return home in June. Having flown almost 100 combat missions myself, I know all too well how hard men in the service are working over here; not only in the air but on the land and the sea. And this aids me all the more in appreciating, how much encouragement and enthusiasm from, the 'folks back home' seems to shorten our stay and make our job, though not very often a pleasant one, all the more worthwhile.

I hope that you will convey my thanks to all the members of the Mt. Washington Junior Women Club.

Another serviceman—an airman in Rome writes:

DEAR MRS. WHEATLEY: For the several months that I have been receiving the Forest Hills Journal, I've been racking my brain, and those of my parents in Mt. Washington, to discover who was responsible for the generosity and thoughtfulness. It wasn't until yesterday that I received the February 9th

July 27, 1966

fusal and Peking's charges of betrayal. But eventually some international conference must be held either under the sponsorship or within the United Nations or under the aegis of a reconvened Geneva Conference. Thus we are grateful to Britain and India for pressing such a meeting.

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT ON NATIONWIDE RADIO-TV TO AMERICAN ALUMNI COUNCIL FROM THE WHITE HOUSE THEATER, JULY 12, 1966

Ladies and Gentlemen: I wanted very much to be in West Virginia tonight to speak to the American Alumni Council, but the weather has prevented it. However, the miracle of electronics has made it possible.

I am happy to be speaking to you tonight from here in the White House. In a very special way, this is really your house.

I have great respect for the work that you do. My own career owes a large debt to men and women like you, who have made it possible for the young people of our country to learn.

I know what alumni mean to the support of higher education. Last year alumni contributed almost \$300 million to the colleges and universities of this Nation. As the father of two daughters, and as the President of a country in which more than half of our citizens are now under 25 years of age, I think I know how important that assistance is to the youth of this Nation.

Throughout my entire life, I have taken seriously the warning that the world is engaged in a race between education and chaos. For the last 2½ years I have lived here with the daily awareness that the fate of mankind really depends on the outcome of that race.

So I came here tonight because you are committed in the name of education to help us decide that contest. That is the most important victory we can ever win.

We have set out in this country to improve the quality of all American life. We are concerned with each man's opportunity to develop his talents. We are concerned with his environment—the cities and farms where he lives, the air he breathes, the water he drinks. We seek to enrich the schools that educate him and, of course, to improve the governments that serve him.

We are at war against the poverty that deprives him, the unemployment that degrades him, and the prejudice that defies him.

As we look at other parts of the world, we see similar battles being fought in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. On every hand we see the thirst for independence, the struggle for progress, and the almost frantic race that is taking place between education, on the one hand, and disaster on the other.

In all these regions we, too, have a very big stake.

Nowhere are the stakes higher than in Asia. So I want to talk to you tonight about Asia and about peace in Asia.

Asia is now the crucial arena of man's striving for independence and order, and for life itself.

This is true because three out of every five people in all this world live in Asia tonight. This is true because hundreds of millions of them exist on less than 25 cents a day.

This is true because Communists in Asia tonight still believe in force in order to achieve their Communist goals.

So if enduring peace can ever come to Asia, all mankind will benefit. But if peace fails there, nowhere else will our achievements really be secure.

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostilities. For wherever men hunger and hate there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be the seedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peace is not really writ-

ten merely in the words of treaties, but peace is the day-by-day work of builders.

The peace we seek in Asia is a peace of conciliation between Communist states and their non-Communist neighbors: between rich nations and poor; between small nations and large; between men whose skins are brown and black, and yellow and white; between Hindus and Moslems, and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bonds of peace: through international trade; through the free flow of people and ideas; through full participation by all nations in an international community under law; and through a common dedication to the great task of human progress and economic development.

Is such a peace possible?

With all my heart I believe it is. We are not there yet. We have a long way to journey. But the foundations for such a peace in Asia are being laid tonight as never before. They must be built on these essentials:

First is the determination of the United States to meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power.

You have heard arguments the other way. They are built on the old belief that "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet."

—that we have no business but business interests in Asia;

—that Europe, not the Far East, is really our proper sphere of interest;

—that our commitments in Asia are not worth the resources they require;

—that the ocean is vast, the cultures alien, the languages strange, and the races different;

—that these really are not our kind of people.

But all of these arguments have been thoroughly tested. All of them, I think, really have been found wanting.

They do not stand the test of geography: Because we are bounded not by one, but by two oceans. Whether by aircraft or ship, by satellite or missile, the Pacific is as crossable as the Atlantic.

They do not stand the test of common sense. The economic network of this shrinking globe is too intertwined—the basic hopes of men are too interrelated—the possibility of common disaster is too real for us to ever ignore threats to peace in Asia.

They do not stand the test of human concern, either. The people of Asia do matter. We share with them many things in common. We are all persons. We are all human beings.

And they do not stand the test of reality, either. Asia is no longer sitting outside the door of the 20th Century. She is here, in the same world with all of us, to be either our partner or our problem.

Americans entered this century believing that our own security had no foundation outside our own continent. Twice we mistook our sheltered position for safety. Twice we were dead wrong.

If we are wise now, we will not repeat our mistakes of the past. We will not retreat from the obligations of freedom and security in Asia.

The second essential for peace in Asia is this: to prove to aggressive nations that the use of force to conquer others is a losing game.

There is no more difficult task, really, in a world of revolutionary change—where the rewards of conquest tempt ambitious appetites.

As long as the leaders of North Vietnam really believe that they can take over the people of South Vietnam by force, we must not let them succeed.

We must stand across their path and say: "You will not prevail; but turn from the use of force and peace will follow."

Every American must know exactly what it is that we are trying to do in Vietnam. Our greatest resource, really, in this conflict—our greatest support for the men who are fighting out there—is your understanding. It is your willingness to carry—perhaps for a long time—the heavy burden of a confusing and costly war.

We are not trying to wipe out North Vietnam.

We are not trying to change their government.

We are not trying to establish permanent bases in South Vietnam.

And we are not trying to gain one inch of new territory for America.

Then, you say, "Why are we there?" Why? We are there because we are trying to make the Communists of North Vietnam stop shooting at their neighbors.

Because we are trying to make this Communist aggression unprofitable.

Because we are trying to demonstrate that guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against another nation, can never succeed. Once that lesson is learned, a shadow that hangs over all of Asia tonight will begin, I think, to recede.

"Well," you say, "when will that day come?" I am sorry. I cannot tell you; only the men in Hanoi can give you that answer.

We are fighting a war of determination. It may last a long time. But we must keep on until the Communists in North Vietnam realize the price of aggression is too high—and either agree to a peaceful settlement or to stop their fighting.

However long it takes, I want the Communists in Hanoi to know where we stand. First, victory for your armies is impossible. You cannot drive us from South Vietnam by your force. Do not mistake our firm stand for false optimism. As long as you persist in aggression, we are going to resist.

Second, the minute you realize that a military victory is out of the question and turn from the use of force, you will find us ready and willing to reciprocate. We want to end the fighting. We want to bring our men back home. We want an honorable peace in Vietnam. In your hands is the key to that peace. You have only to turn it.

The third essential is the building of political and economic strength among the nations of free Asia.

For years they have been working at that task. And the untold story of 1966 is the story of what free Asians have done for themselves, and with the help of others, while South Vietnam and her allies have been busy holding aggression at bay.

Many of you can recall our faith in the future of Europe at the end of World War II when we began the Marshall Plan. We backed that faith with all the aid and compassion we could muster.

Our faith in Asia at this time is just as great. And that faith is backed by judgment and reason. For if we stand firm in Vietnam against military conquest, we truly believe the emerging order of hope and progress in Asia will continue to grow, and to grow.

Our very able Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has just returned from a trip through the Far East. He told me yesterday afternoon of many of the heartening signs he saw as the people of Asia continue to work toward common goals.

And these are just some of them. In the last year:

—Japan and Korea have settled their long-standing disputes and established normal relations with promise for closer cooperation;

—One country after another has achieved rates of economic growth that are far beyond the most optimistic hopes we had a few years ago;

—Indonesia and its more than 100 million people have already pulled back from the brink of communism and economic collapse;

—Our friends in India and Pakistan—800 million strong—have ended a tragic conflict and have returned to the immense work of peace;

—Japan has become a dramatic example of economic progress through political and social freedom and has begun to help others;

—Communist China's policy of aggression by proxy is failing;

—Nine Pacific nations—allies and neutrals, white and colored—came together on their own initiative to form an Asian and Pacific Council;

—New and constructive groupings for economic cooperation are under discussion in Southeast Asia;

—The billion dollar Asian Development Bank which I first mentioned in Baltimore in my televised speech a few months ago is already moving forward in Manila with the participation of more than 31 nations;

—and the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin is going forward despite the war.

Throughout free Asia you can hear the echo of progress. As one Malaysian leader said: "Whatever our ethical, cultural, or religious background, the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia must pull together in the same broad sweep of history. We must create with our own hands and minds a new perspective and a new framework. And we must do it ourselves."

For this is the new Asia, and this is the new spirit we see taking shape behind our defense of South Vietnam. Because we have been firm—because we have committed ourselves to the defense of one small country—others have taken new heart.

And I want to assure them tonight that we never intend to let you down. America's word will always be good.

There is a fourth essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all: reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies.

A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia.

A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.

For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world.

We have learned in our relations with other such states that the weakness of neighbors is a temptation, and only firmness, backed by power, can really deter power that is backed by ambition. But we have also learned that the greatest force for opening closed minds and closed societies is the free flow of ideas and people and goods.

For many years, now, the United States has attempted in vain to persuade the Chinese Communists to agree to an exchange of newsmen as one of the first steps to increased understanding between our people.

More recently, we have taken steps to permit American scholars, experts in medicine and public health, and other specialists to travel to Communist China. Only today we have here in the Government cleared a passport for a leading American businessman to exchange knowledge with Chinese mainland leaders in Red China.

All of these initiatives have been rejected, except the action today, by Communist China.

We persist because we know that hunger and disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no boundaries of either creed or class or country.

We persist because we believe that even the most rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich possibilities of a diverse world.

And we continue because we believe that cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th Century.

That day is not yet here. It may be long in coming, but I tell you it is clearly on its way, because come it must.

Earlier this year the Foreign Minister of Singapore said that if the nations of the world could learn to build a truly world civilization in the Pacific through cooperation and peaceful competition, then—as our great President Theodore Roosevelt once remarked—this may be the greatest of all human eras—the Pacific era.

As a Pacific power, we must help achieve that outcome.

Because it is a goal worthy of our American dreams and it is a goal that is worthy of the deeds of our brave men who are dying for us tonight.

So I say to you and I pledge to all those who are counting on us: You can depend upon us, because all Americans will do their part.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the request of Mr. REINECKE), for 30 minutes, July 28; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN (at the request of Mr. REINECKE), for 15 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. MCDOWELL (at the request of Mr. WALDIE), for 30 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado and to include an article which appeared in the Denver Post.

Mr. ABERNETHY and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. BURKE and to include a newspaper article.

Mr. ZABLOCKI in two instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. HORTON and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. RUMSFELD in two instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. GRAY in two instances and to include extraneous material.

Mr. CALLAWAY and to include a letter during general debate in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama and to include a letter and an editorial during general debate in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) and to include letter and Times editorial during his remarks in general debate.

Mr. CALLAWAY (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) and to include letter during his remarks in general debate.

Mr. WHITENER to incorporate in his remarks the minority views contained in the report on the Civil Rights Act of 1966 and certain statements and letters by clerks of U.S. district courts and U.S. district judges.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. REINECKE) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. AYRES.

Mr. KUPFERMAN in two instances.

Mr. YOUNGER.

Mr. CONTE.

Mr. RUMSFELD in two instances.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI.

Mr. ROUDEBUSH.

Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN.

Mr. NELSEN.

Mr. HARVEY of Indiana.

Mr. BUCHANAN in three instances.

Mr. MOORE in three instances.

Mr. QUILLEN.

(The following Members, at the request of Mr. WALDIE) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. CORMAN.

Mr. FOGARTY in two instances.

Mr. CALLAN.

Mr. BINGHAM in two instances.

Mr. RYAN in six instances.

Mr. NIX.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. CAREY in two instances.

Mr. DENT.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. CLEVINGER.

Mr. BECKWORTH in two instances.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas in six instances.

Mr. MACHEN in four instances.

Mr. GETTYS.

Mr. FARNSLEY in two instances.

Mr. REUSS in six instances.

Mr. VAN DEERLIN in two instances.

Mr. VIVIAN.

Mr. RACE.

Mr. KING of Utah in three instances.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BURLISON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on this day present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 1407. An act for the relief of Leonardo Russo;

H.R. 1414. An act for the relief of Jacobo Temel;

H.R. 4083. An act for the relief of Mr. Leonardo Tusa;

H.R. 4437. An act for the relief of Bryan George Simpson;

H.R. 4458. An act for the relief of Michel Fahim Daniel;

H.R. 4584. An act for the relief of Mrs. Anna Michalska Holoweckyj (formerly Mrs. Anna Zalewski);

H.R. 4602. An act for the relief of Maj. Donald W. Ottaway, U.S. Air Force;

H.R. 7508. An act for the relief of Giuseppe Bossio;

HR. 8317. An act to amend section 116 of title 28, United States Code, relating to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma;

H.R. 8865. An act for the relief of Ronald Poirier, a minor; and

H.R. 11718. An act for the relief of Jack L. Philippot.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 22 minutes p.m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, July 28, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon.

16514

nomic life, a 50 year payout period and interest at $3\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, total \$11.9-million per year. The benefit-to-cost ratio thus calculated is 1.8. These figures reflected Federal Power Commission estimates of \$22.50 per kilowatt year plus 2.3 mills per kilowatt hour for electricity delivered in the Boston area, and \$24.50 per kilowatt year plus 2.9 mills per kilowatt hour for electricity delivered in Maine. A composite power value of \$23.50 per kilowatt year and 2.6 mills per kilowatt hour was used by the Commission in developing the hydro-electric power benefit attributable to the Dickey-Lincoln School project of \$21.5-million per year compared to \$25.1-million per year as originally estimated by FPC in 1963.

During the August 1965 hearings on the Dickey-Lincoln School project before the Flood Control Subcommittee of the House Committee on Public Works, an alternative to the Dickey-Lincoln School project, consisting of privately-financed pumped storage and nuclear baseload, was suggested by the investor-owned companies of New England. Immediately thereafter, Senator MUSKIE of Maine asked the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to again evaluate the benefits and costs of the proposed Federal development in the light of the alternative presented by the companies in their testimony before the House Subcommittee. The Bureau of the Budget again called upon the Federal Power Commission for technical assistance. On September 30, 1965, over the signature of F. Stewart Brown, Director of its Bureau of Power, the Federal Power Commission, in a memorandum to Budget, calculated the benefit-to-cost ratio of the proposed Federal project at 1.58.

This benefit-to-cost ratio transmitted by the FPC staff on September 30, 1965, was based upon a privately-financed alternative consisting of a hypothetical pumped storage site located within 75 miles of New England load centers, which could be constructed at an investment cost of \$100 per kilowatt, plus a 600,000 kilowatt nuclear plant north of Boston with transmission for 100,000 kilowatts of 50 per cent load factor power from said plant to Maine. The Commission staff calculated that such an alternative, including transmission, would provide peaking capacity at \$21.03 per kilowatt year including energy, and load factor power at \$36.38 per kilowatt year including energy. These figures yielded a total cost attributable to the proposed alternative for the Dickey-Lincoln School project of \$18.3-million per year compared to the \$11.5-million annual cost of the Federal project. The resulting benefit-to-cost ratio for the Federal project is, therefore, 1.58.

One plan provides for operation of the Federal project to develop 100,000 kw of 4500-hour per kilowatt year power and 694,000 kw of peaking capacity. Its output would be sold, including transmission, for \$15 per kilowatt year plus 3 mills per kwh for energy. Thus 4500 hour electricity would wholesale at about 6.3 mills with peaking capacity available at about \$17.40 per kw year including energy. The resulting revenue would be \$13.4-million per year assuming ten per cent losses.

SOME DIVERGENT VIEWS

Various economists and engineers and, sometimes lawyers, evaluate hydro-electric projects as well as conventional and nuclear-fired thermal plants by different methods and using a great variety of assumptions. As a long-time advocate for a particular segment of the electric industry, I, of course, recognize that various approaches to a single problem frequently yield different results. This is especially true in cases where engineering and management decisions have factored into them elements of politics or philosophy. Thus, in an address of April 13, 1966, to the Power Chapter of the Boston Section of the Institute of Electrical and

Electronic Engineers, the very distinguished Vice-President of the Boston Edison Company, Mr. Francis Staszkesy, after careful study of the relative merits of the Dickey-Lincoln School project and certain alternative projects proposed by the investor-owned companies, arrived at a conclusion exactly opposite to mine.

In his statement, Mr. Staszkesy pointed out that under the "Big Eleven" proposal the companies would add to the power supply of New England some 6.25 million kilowatts by 1972, plus some seven hundred miles of 345 kv transmission line. This very large increment of new capacity, he added, would generate more than 60 per cent of the 1972 total requirements of the area at an average cost of 4.76 mills per kilowatt hour. This, when combined with the 1965 average cost of generation for all of New England of 9.7 mills per kilowatt hour, would result in an over-all reduction of 26.4 per cent to an average of 7.14 mills per kilowatt hour in 1972. Based upon these circumstances, Mr. Staszkesy concluded that (1) the Dickey project should not be substituted for one of the Big Eleven projects, and (2) that there is no place for Dickey-Lincoln School in New England's power picture.

THE PROBLEM OF THE COOPERATIVES

The differing viewpoints of the Dickey-Lincoln School project developed by Mr. Staszkesy and myself are probably not unexpected, and, in my opinion at least, probably arise from the different operating conditions of the particular segments of the industry which each represents.

Rural electric systems in New England badly need a source of wholesale energy at a substantially lower cost than that which is available to them at the present time. Although the average revenue per kilowatt hour realized by the companies in New England from residential sales has steadily declined from an average of seven cents per kilowatt hour in 1930 to an average of three cents per kilowatt hour in 1964, the average rate for wholesale service available to the cooperatives has not shown a similar trend. In addition, as I understand it, the 26.4 per cent savings attributable to the "Big Eleven" combine will apply to generation only. Presumably, the generation component constitutes only 28 per cent of total cost and 25 per cent of revenue. Thus, the savings to the rural electric systems would probably not be more than seven per cent below present costs under the "Big Eleven" proposal.

By contrast, Federal power from the Dickey-Lincoln School development would be available to rural electric systems at from seven to eight mills per kilowatt hour delivered at load centers. This compares to the 7.4 mills per kilowatt hour estimate for the average cost of generation in New England as of 1972.

Rural electric cooperatives in Maine purchase approximately 46 million kilowatt hours per year at an average cost of 11.8 mills per kilowatt hour.

Federal power from the proposed St. John River development could be delivered to them at seven mills per kilowatt hour. They would save some \$189,000 per year or 37 per cent on present cost. In New Hampshire the cooperatives purchase some 82 million kilowatt hours per year at an average cost of 13.3 mills. Even at a delivered cost of eight mills, Federal power would save them nearly \$435,000 per year or 40 per cent on present cost. Thus, the problem, from the standpoint of the rural electric cooperatives, relates to the availability of low-cost power at load centers. From our standpoint, the Dickey-Lincoln School project offers the best alternative for solving our problem.

From the standpoint of the investor-owned companies, I can only point out that the some 700,000 kilowatts of peaking power, a major portion of which would be available to

them, constitutes approximately five per cent of the estimated 1972 New England peak load and would be sold to them at substantially below the \$21.03 per kilowatt year calculated by the Federal Power Commission as the cost of developing peaking capacity from a pumped storage unit assuming \$100 per kilowatt of installed capacity and pumping energy at three mills per kilowatt hour.

It is my sincere belief that the rural electric systems of New England have no choice but to actively advocate immediate construction of the Dickey-Lincoln School project as their best alternative for obtaining lower cost wholesale energy. It seems to me also, in view of the fact that the total installed capacity of the project available for peaking purposes is some five per cent of New England's anticipated 1972 peak load and something on the order of only ten per cent of what the investor-owned companies themselves contemplate installing by 1972, that its peaking capability can be advantageously used on the New England grid system.

HO'S MOBILIZATION

Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, an editorial in the Washington Daily News refers to Ho Chi Minh's announcement that he has ordered partial mobilization of North Vietnam's reserves.

He left unclear just what "partial" means, but the editorial in this Scripps Howard newspaper expresses the feeling that it is worse news for the people of North Vietnam than for us.

There is no joy in reading Ho's bitter denunciation of our role in Vietnam, adds the writer, but in the face of his stubbornness we can only keep up the pressure until he agrees to negotiate or gives up trying to conquer South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be included in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

HO'S MOBILIZATION

North Viet Nam's President Ho Chi Minh has ordered the "partial mobilization" of his arm reserves, as a response to American air strikes against petroleum depots near Hanoi and Haiphong. Ho left unclear just what "partial" mobilization means, but we have the feeling it is worse news for the people of North Viet Nam than it is for us.

In Ho's and other week-end statements from Hanoi, there is the standard condemnation of American "imperialists." But significantly there also is the admission the "Vietnamese people in the whole country are facing an extremely serious situation," and a new appeal to fellow-communist nations to help "more resolutely and effectively."

In short, Ho seems to be warning his people that for all the destruction the American air raids have caused so far, there's going to be more of the same in the future.

For us, there is no joy in reading Ho's bitter denunciation of our role in Viet Nam, and his emphatic rejection of the idea of open negotiations. But it's at least some comfort that Ho, in a big speech, refrained from ordering the mobilization of his 350,000 man army for a thrust across the seven-teenth parallel, stopped short of asking other communist governments for "volunteers," and said nothing about the rumored trial of downed U.S. pilots. Apparently our warnings not to tamper with the lives of our captured pilots has sunk in.

In the face of North Viet Nam's stubbornness, there is nothing for us to do but to continue to battle in the South, keep up pressure thru air raids on the North, until

Cooperative Association. I commend him for his clear and well-documented statement, which is further testimony to the overall economic worth of the Dickey-Lincoln School project to northern New England. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Robinson's speech be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PANEL ON LOW COST POWER FOR NEW ENGLAND
(Remarks of Charles A. Robinson, Jr., staff engineer and staff counsel, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 1966 New England Conference of Public Utilities Commissioners, Stowe, Vt., June 27, 1966)

It is indeed a privilege to be afforded this opportunity to exchange ideas and opinions with a group as thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced in electric power system planning, financing and operation as are the persons in attendance at this Conference. I deeply appreciate your invitation to participate in this panel.

The Conference itself is, I believe, rendering a very substantial public service by furnishing a forum in which persons possessed

of similar objectives, but perhaps with differing views on how these objectives should be achieved, can meet with the common purpose of discussing ways and means by which an indispensable commodity such as electricity can be made available to the general public at the lowest possible cost. Certainly, nothing but progress ought to result from a meeting such as this.

It is my intention, in accordance with Commissioner Gibson's request, to discuss the facts as I know them concerning the topic assigned to me—the Dickey-Lincoln School project in Maine. This is a project, I recognize, which has stirred as much bitterness between various segments of the electric power industry in New England and has given rise to as much political controversy as has any similar proposal in recent years. It is my hope that this controversy and the strained relationships which have stemmed from it, will ultimately be reconciled, and that all of the plans and proposals for reducing the cost of power throughout the northeast can proceed together in harmony.

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION IN PERSPECTIVE

The REA-financed portion of the electric utility industry, with which I have been associated for some 16 years, is small by any standard when compared with the magnitude

of the investor-owned companies which serve 80 percent of the nation's population.

The total investment in REA-financed systems throughout the United States is less than \$5 billion compared to the more than \$70 billion of assets owned by the investor-owned companies. Electric cooperatives operate only one percent of the nation's installed generating capacity and themselves generate only some twenty percent of the total energy input to their own systems. They serve some eight percent of the nation's electric consumers with five percent of the total electric energy sales for which they receive about six percent of total U.S. electric revenue.

Even if legislation now pending in Congress, which would provide supplemental capital for REA-financed systems, were enacted immediately, total investment in such systems might reach some \$15 billion by 1980 compared with an estimated industry total by that date of \$170-200 billion. And, if all regular and supplemental financing, programmed for REA-financed generation and transmission facilities through 1980, were expended by that date, such facilities would then constitute about 3.5 percent of the total industry. (Statistics for electric cooperatives in New England are shown in Table II.)

TABLE II.—Selected statistics for electric cooperatives in New England (fiscal year 1965)

	Consumers served ¹	Miles of line ¹	Annual revenue ¹	Consumers per mile	Revenue per mile	Kilowatt-hour sales × 1,000 ¹	Revenue per kilowatt-hour (cents)	Kilowatt-hour sales per consumer	Revenue per consumer
Maine.....	6,843	1,077	999,644	6.3	\$925	38,093	2.6	5,560	146
New Hampshire.....	22,698	2,917	2,655,012	7.8	912	72,176	3.7	3,200	118
Vermont.....	7,277	1,993	1,247,067	3.6	625	42,477	2.9	5,820	172
United States.....	5,440,189	1,556,956	815,432,624	3.5	522	41,382,098	2.0	7,600	150

¹ Figures furnished by REA directly, per unit figures derived via slide rule.

Source: Report of the Administrator, REA, 1965.

I emphasize these statistics not because they are per se related to the Dickey-Lincoln School project, but because the advocacy of such projects by the electric cooperatives is frequently misconstrued as an attempt to harm the investor-owned segment of the industry. In fact, the co-ops are so small a part of the industry as to be incapable of accomplishing many of the nefarious purposes with which they are sometimes charged.

COST OF WHOLESALE ENERGY

Most of the energy distributed by the electric cooperatives in New England is purchased at wholesale from other power suppliers. A very small amount is generated in REA-financed plants. All of it is extremely high in cost. During the past twenty years, the cost of wholesale power purchased by rural electric cooperatives from investor-owned electric companies throughout the United States has fallen continuously and steadily from an average of 10.1 mills per kilowatt in 1945 to 7.5 mills per kilowatt hour in 1965.

By contrast, as shown on the attached Chart I (not printed in the RECORD) the price of wholesale energy purchased by REA-financed systems in New England has fluctuated between very wide limits during the same period of time, except for the state of Vermont which exhibits a steady decline between 1950 and 1960 with slight increases thereafter. The downward trend in Vermont between 1958 and 1960 is accentuated by the availability of 8.5 mill power from the St. Lawrence-Niagara system. In Maine the recent steep decline in the average wholesale cost of power to REA-financed systems is directly traceable to the importation from Canada of increasingly large blocks of power supplied by the New Brunswick Electric Power Commission. By contrast, however, as indicated in Table I, the average 1965

cost of power from some wholesale suppliers has actually increased over the cost of the same power from the same supplier in 1950. In other cases there is little or no difference between the average rate of such purchases in 1950 and in 1965.

TABLE I.—Average wholesale cost for wholesale energy purchased by electric cooperatives in New England by source¹

[In mills per kilowatt-hour]

Source	1950	1965
Bangor Hydro Electric Co.....	13.3	16.1
Maine Public Service Co.....	19.1	19.3
Meddybemps Lake powerplant.....		12.0
New Brunswick Electric Power Commission.....		9.5
Connecticut Valley Electric Co.....		15.3
New Hampshire Electric Co.....		12.6
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire.....	12.9	12.9
White Mountain Power Co.....		17.4
New Hampshire Electric Coop.....		15.2
Central Vermont Public Service Corp.....	14.8	12.4
Citizens Utilities Co.....		10.0
Green Mountain Power Corp.....	12.7	20.4
Public Service Board of Vermont.....		8.3
U.S. total average.....	8.6	6.5

¹ Source: REA Bulletin 111-2, fiscal year 1965.

DICKEY-LINCOLN SCHOOL

From this type of wholesale power supply situation there has arisen, as might be expected, tremendous pressure on rural electric system management in New England to seek out and explore every possible avenue which might hold promise of lower wholesale rates. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that these systems have strongly supported construction of the Federal Dickey-Lincoln School hydro-electric development. Our support of the Dickey-Lincoln School project stems, not from the fact it is to be constructed by the Government, but rather

from the fact that wholesale power from it can be delivered to our cooperative load centers at rates reflecting major savings over presently available alternative sources.

The Dickey-Lincoln School project, as presently contemplated, would have an installed capacity of 760,000 kilowatts at Dickey Reservoir on the St. John River in Maine, with an additional 34,000 kilowatts at the Lincoln School re-regulating impoundment downstream. The natural flow at the Dickey site, controlled by eight million acre feet of reservoir storage, would assure annual generation of just over one billion kilowatt hours from the combined project. As planned, the power and energy from the project could be marketed by a twin circuit 345 k.v. transmission line system with terminals at Bangor and Portland, Maine and Boston, Massachusetts. Both load factor energy and peaking capacity could be produced.

Total Federal investment in the Dickey-Lincoln School project is estimated at \$227-million. The above-mentioned associated transmission system would cost an additional \$73-million—bringing the total investment in Federal facilities to \$300-million, including interest during construction.

Based on February 16, 1965 Federal Power Commission figures, annual benefits attributable to the combined project total \$21.5-million of which 98 per cent represents the hydro-electric potential. Benefits assigned to the hydro-electric features of Dickey-Lincoln School were at that time corrected downward to reflect a comparison by FPC with the cost of equivalent power and energy to be produced at a new 500,000 kilowatt steam station and a new 125,000 kilowatt steam station scheduled for installation in Massachusetts and Maine respectively. Annual charges for the combined project including transmission, using a 100 year eco-

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16515

the Hanoi regime agrees to negotiations, or decides it has had enough and quietly gives up trying to conquer the South by force of arms.

**CAPT. JAMES R. MITCHELL—
ANOTHER UTAH HERO**

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has produced many heroes and for a brief moment, I would like to pay tribute to James R. "Dick" Mitchell of Ogden, Utah, who has joined that group of men who are proving once again that courage and daring are still very much American characteristics.

Captain Mitchell was recently rescued from the North Vietnamese panhandle by a brave helicopter crew—another of those units to which American pilots owe a deep debt of gratitude—after his F-105 had been shot down by North Vietnamese ground fire. As fate would have it, Captain Mitchell was flying his 100th and last combat mission. We in Utah are proud of this native son who is a graduate of Ogden High School and the University of Utah.

Captain Mitchell is not new, however, to individual competition. The son of Mrs. Louise Mitchell and the late Ralph Mitchell was a member of the 1956 Olympic ski team which competed in Italy. His flying skill and his courage reflect the physical stamina and independent thought which made him a top competitor in the Olympic Winter Games.

In behalf of the people of my State, I want Captain Mitchell and his family to know that we appreciate the sacrifice which he has made in defense of the free world. I am pleased that his rescue will make it possible for this Nation to benefit again from his fine skills and his great courage. That he is alive and well makes us very grateful and proud that we can claim him as a native son of our State.

**POLISH MILLENNIUM HONORED
THE ISSUANCE OF A COMMEMORATIVE STAMP**

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, 1,000 years ago King Mieszko was baptized and the whole Polish kingdom he had united was converted to Christianity. Although the Catholic Church grew steadily in Poland throughout the centuries, there were often great times of trouble. In 1079 a great spiritual leader, Stanislaw, was martyred while Bishop of Cracow. He is now the revered patron saint of Poland.

The 20th century has been one of the most difficult for Christians in Poland. But the hardships they have endured and continue to endure have not diminished their abiding faith.

We in the United States have tried in some small way to show the Polish people in our country and in their native land that we acknowledge the great significance of their millennium. On July 30 a commemorative stamp will be issued celebrating the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Poland in hopes that everyone in the country will join with their Polish brothers in observing this truly great day of the millennium.

I am proud of the part I was able to play in the issuance of the commemora-

tive stamp. I ask unanimous consent that my letter concerning the millennium stamp and Postmaster General O'Brien's response to it be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEBRUARY 18, 1966.

Hon. LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN,
Post Office Department,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR LARRY: I appreciate your assurance that the suggested Polish millennium stamp is under consideration as the last commemoratives for 1966 are being selected.

In writing now, I want to reaffirm my interest in this stamp and suggest how very meaningful it would be to the American people.

Poland has long been a beleaguered land. But her creative, strong-willed people have endured partition, tyranny, war, and now the oppression of communism, maintaining their love of beauty, their spiritual strength, and intense pride in their Polish heritage.

Our society has been nourished by the Polish people who have come to the United States and taught us to appreciate more than we might otherwise have learned of the remarkable culture now trapped behind the Iron Curtain. A stamp to commemorate the Polish millennium will awaken even more interest in the glory of Poland's ancient heritage. I very much hope that it will be approved.

With thanks for your consideration, and best wishes.

Faithfully yours,

PAUL H. DOUGLAS.

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Washington, D.C., February 23, 1966.

Hon. PAUL H. DOUGLAS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: It gives me great pleasure to advise you that I have approved a commemorative stamp to mark 1,000 years of Polish culture.

Because of your personal interest in this subject, I thought you would like to know about the stamp in advance of the public announcement. The date and place of first-day sale have not been determined at this time.

Your endorsement contributed significantly to my decision to issue a stamp for this important anniversary.

Sincerely yours,

LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN.

SEDUCTION BY STATISTICS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, in the July issue of Nation's Business there is a most interesting and provocative article, entitled "Seduction by Statistics," written by the distinguished Republican leader in the Senate, EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN. As Nation's Business describes it, the minority leader indicts those Washington wizards who employ hallucinatory estimates for masquerade and mirage in an extravaganza of political chicanery on the American public which is no less than seduction by statistics.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be included in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEDUCTION BY STATISTICS

(By EVERETT M. DIRKSEN)

The city of Washington is the world center for the manufacture of statistics. Several thousand of the 2,542,590 employees on the

United States government's \$17 billion annual payroll spend their days feeding magnetic tape into computers and drawing off columns of figures. What kind of guidance do their statistics provide? Who is really benefiting from them?

Studies such as those dealing with the perspiration problem of Australian aborigines, or with the rate per hundredweight for trucking yak fat from Omaha to Chicago, are not at issue here.

My concern is with statistics essential to the formulation of sound national policy. And I charge that some of them reflect not facts but a mirage. Some are pure sleight of hand. Still others are hallucinatory. Indeed, figure management now reinforces news management in Administration tactics. The combination, as I intend to show, can be doubly dangerous.

The foremost example of sleight of hand statistics is, of course, the national budget. The President has raised it from just under \$100 billion—a figure known to have been inaccurate when presented—to \$112.7 billion. To you and me that looks like, and is, an increase of nearly \$13 billion. But the image-makers in the Administration noticed that the President, as all Presidents must do, had trimmed some of the more pendulous fat off the amounts of money requested by various agencies and departments. So out came an inspired news release, headlined "President Lops \$10 Billion from Budget."

Can a \$13 billion budget increase really be a \$10 billion cut? It cannot. It is an example of what George Orwell identified in his prophetic book, "1984," as "newspeak." It is like describing the world's biggest spender as "frugal," or Russia as a "democracy." Nobody really should be fooled by the federal budget.

Much of the same sort of numerical flummery, as many citizens are discovering, goes for last year's loudly trumpeted tax cut. What was benevolently extended by one hand of government as an income and excise tax cut, with withdrawn by the other as a hike in social security taxes, a little later. The harsh fact is that today the tax collector at all levels of government, local, state and national, takes 35 per cent of the national income.

WHERE THE HOCUS-POCUS STARTS

Largest and most potent of government's hallucinatory statistics is the gross national product. The GNP—most widely accepted indicator of the pace of America's economic growth—is used by the government also for divination and to produce euphoria in the face of inflationary spending. It is a gross national illusion. One man tolling away in the Department of Commerce, "guesstimates" the GNP by counting the dollars spent for certain goods and services, every time they go by.

He may not wear a conical hat and a black robe decorated with cabalistic diagrams, but mystic and intuitive elements do seethe and bubble in his pot.

The synthetic figure produced is stupendous—\$720 billion this year. With inflation now going at the rate of more than two per cent a year, the GNP rises automatically by \$4 billion every quarter. To make it leap upward still faster, a skeptic suggests that every man be ordered to pay his wife \$40 a week as cook and housekeeper. That would not produce any more wealth though it might set off some fireworks. But it would, as if by magic, push the GNP statistics on toward the \$1 trillion figure.

At that level, incidentally, the GNP would about equal the real national debt, \$947 billion, which is three times as high as official statistics report it. (The official debt figures omit about \$600 billion owed for services already rendered, such as the \$40 billion the government owes the civil service retirement fund.) The GNP is not wealth,

July 27, 1966

nor earnings nor anything else you can touch, borrow or spend. It is only a statistic, but every day someone says we can afford still another vast expenditure because it would "require less than one per cent of the GNP." And all too often we do make the down payment on still another tremendous program, with tremendous and unknown costs to follow.

Ironically, last summer the U.S. Commerce Department itself renounced as erroneous the GNP figures it had produced since 1929. It recalculated the lot, and then came up with a higher figure for the annual increase in labor productivity.

The increase was small, from 3.6 to 3.7 per cent, but it was sufficient to provide labor union economists a basis for demanding that another famous figure—the Administration's guidelines for wage increases—be adjusted upward.

THE STATISTICAL SNOW JOB

A bureaucratic technique now being skillfully employed in Washington can be properly termed the statistic avalanche.

A distinguished practitioner of the avalanche is Sargent Shriver, a handsome and voluble man with energy enough to run (until recently) two high government jobs while dreaming of a third. The avalanche device is triggered, for example, when Mr. Shriver is questioned at press conferences about instances of what he defends as high-spirited mayhem or arson in his scandal-ridden, politically manipulated Job Corps, which is part of the federal poverty program.

On one occasion last fall, he called down a tumbling mass of statistics which rolled end over end, at express train speed, to engulf the reporters. It included data ranging from the annual cost of keeping an inmate in the Illinois penitentiary at Menard to the median consumption of fish, classified as to weight and species, by seals in the Seattle zoo.

When at last the rush subsided, the shaken questioner was sorry he had asked the little question that started it all, namely: "How much more does it cost to keep a boy in the Job Corps than in Harvard University?"

The question had been buried in the statistical snow-job. There it will remain forever unless a shift in the political glacier opens a crevasse and exposes it to view.

Plain deception meets the needs of some. Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, has made it clear that the Administration would not hesitate to deceive about defense affairs when it deemed deception necessary. Some of the news out of Viet Nam persuades many of us that he was, in that statement at any rate, telling the truth.

Those who class the war on poverty with Viet Nam in importance surely are engaging in deception. So are the postal snoopers and the Internal Revenue wiretappers, whose work seems more suited to a collectivist than to a great society.

A phantom statistic which even compels its compilers to smile is that showing "the rising productivity of government employees." There are, of course, many conscientious, hard-working government employees among the myriads, but they are all supported by the work of someone else. What could they produce, but statistics?

HAULING OUT THE BOGEYMAN

An old favorite is what might be called the Cheshire statistic. It is pulled out of the air like a magician producing a bowl of goldfish. Such a statistic was the basis for the charge during the 1960 Presidential campaign that "17 million Americans go to bed hungry every night." Not four million or 18.1 million, but 17 million exactly. Unless many of them were reducing, that seemed to indicate a deplorable breakdown in a public relief system which was even then the most gigantic ever conceived. But then President

Johnson raised the figure two years ago to 35 million. It hung on the campaign air a while like its predecessor and then faded gently from view.

So did the terrifying missile gap discovered by Democratic creators for use in the same campaign. Both were meaningless as fact, but useful as bogies for whipping up emotion.

The dictionary defines that as demagoguery.

Cheshire or phantom statistics are common in foreign affairs, too. Successive Presidents have extolled military aid as assuring the United States of staunch allies, ready to spring to our side in the fight for freedom with "250 strategic bases, five million ground forces, 10,000 aircraft and 2,500 vessels." Well, thousands of American men are fighting for freedom today in the dark jungles of Viet Nam, but where are those eager allies?

We know where some of them are. More than 200 different ships of a dozen free world nations which have received \$29 billion in American aid are busily hauling munitions to our communist foe, the Viet Cong. Others which received even greater sums are running supplies through our toothless "quarantine" to Communist Cuba, in defiance of all our pleas and entreaties.

If we cannot expect gratitude for the \$130 billion we have poured out in postwar foreign aid, might we not demand decency? The scale of our generosity, by the way, is shown by the fact that interest on the public debt, ballooned by this aid, now runs more than \$1 billion a month, or about twice the current cost of our struggle in Viet Nam.

THOSE STRETCHABLE YARDSTICKS

Rubber statistical yardsticks to fit varied occasions also are common in government. For gauging unemployment, the long yardstick is used. Housewives, youngsters, people resting unconcernedly between jobs, are all counted as jobless to bring the unemployment total up to a level intended to cause public worry. Although unemployment is given as 2.9 million, a former director of the census recently estimated the number of male family heads out of work at only 600,000. Nobody really knows. The official guess is extrapolated from a survey of only 35,000 families.

An effort to provide a count of job openings available was defeated last year in Congress by labor union pressure, as tending to minimize the pathetic plight of the honestly apathetic.

The myth of suffering millions searching in vain for work apparently must be preserved, even though employers from one end of the country to the other complain of their inability to hire help.

There's a saying now which goes: "If you don't like the heat, change the thermometer."

For many years, the Administration's economists, along with pundits and commentators, had bemoaned the existence of a "dollar gap" abroad. But more recently, as everyone knows by now, the recipients of American bounty abroad have drawn down our gold reserves by billions. They have been able to buy gold because our gifts, loans, investments and purchases abroad have been running about \$3 billion a year greater than their transactions with us. So, suddenly with the mysterious unanimity of a cloud of gnats, they all changed direction. The dollar gap had become a dollar glut.

A cut in business investment and tourist purchases ordered by the Administration did not help enough. (Nobody knows what tourist purchases amount to.) The glut continues to grow. The Administration itself keeps on spending and donating dollars abroad through a dozen spigots. The money goes out as foreign aid, as bounties to foreign governments for sugar and coffee, as research grants to foreign scientists, as expenditures to keep U.S. troops in Europe to defend pro-

perous allies from whom we now are borrowing money, and in other ways. Further damage to our dwindling gold stocks seemed certain. What to do?

NOW YOU SEE IT—

The problem, as our leaders saw it, was how to make things look better without actually turning off or curtailing their spigots. Last August somebody came up with an idea. The government began computing the balance of payments in a new way. Dollars held by private institutions abroad were dropped from the liability column on the government's statistical tables, although they had been included in the earlier system of accounting because they can become official claims against our gold the moment they are turned into a central bank.

So, where the old fiscal thermometer showed a deficit of more than \$3 billion for 1964, the new one cut it in half. The fever has not been changed, just the thermometer. We have a new statistical mirage, and the band plays on.

One of the most serious of all the government's statistical fantasies, however, reflects our balance of trade, which is a vital part of the total balance of international payments problem. For 20 years, Commerce Department officials have been pleased to inform the President, the Congress and the people that the United States regularly sells more goods to foreign lands than they sell to us. Our foreign trade was seen in wonderful health.

With the assurance of great and rising prosperity in foreign trade, Congress has gone along with successive Administrations, Republican as well as Democratic, in acts of generosity to our outdistanced trading partners abroad. We cut tariffs, increased foreign aid and borrowed \$130 billion to lend or give away overseas.

At the same time we shipped—and are still shipping now—mountains of food and fiber as outright gifts or in exchange for non-spendable forints, dinars, zlotys, kips and rupees, all of which are reported by the Department of Commerce as commercial exports. This, of course, swells the export balance, but we receive no dollars. Americans who questioned our financial capacity to do whatever we liked, without limit, or who doubted the wisdom of supporting dictators who were busy sharpening the swords of our enemies, were laughed to scorn.

Not until the dollar stood shaken and defoliated, not until our gold stock had plummeted, did people begin to wonder if our balance of trade had really been as great as reported over the years. We began to ask if we had exposed ourselves to the gold drain by a statistical mirage in foreign trade earnings.

The answer, if you dig deep enough, is this. The United Kingdom and most other nations value imported goods on the "c.i.f." (cost, insurance, freight) basis. That means they take the purchase price abroad, add shipping and insurance costs, and end up with the total cost of the merchandise landed in their own country. The difference between the seller's figures and the buyer's is just freight and insurance. It is proper that those costs be added to the valuation of imports.

But here's the catch: The United States does not add freight and insurance costs in computing the volume of imports. We do not keep the same kind of books as our trading partners. We value our imports on the "f.o.b." basis, foreign port of shipment. Our valuations are simply the cost of the goods abroad, with freight and insurance disregarded.

From that difference in accounting arises the mirage. Our statistics are not comparable with those of other nations. We understate the value of our purchases from Great Britain, for example, by an average of 22 per cent. And that, in computing trade balances, produces a violent distortion of fact.

July 27, 1966

16521

the letter, photograph it—without even breaking the seal."

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Fishbowl Society is that most of those who live in it seem to view it with equanimity. There has been no great public outcry in response to disclosures of mounting invasions of privacy.

"People have to learn that they can say no to these things," says Rep. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER (D-N.J.). But Long warns that "by the time the people finally become indignant enough to demand that something be done, it will be too late."

In one of the definitive legal statements on the right of privacy, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote in the Harvard Law Review that "modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected (the individual) to mental pain and distress far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."

Their article appeared in 1890. Modern enterprise and invention have come a long way since.

ECONOMY HITTING NEW PEAK

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the rate is not as fast, but the key indicators show that our economy is still climbing to new highs.

Sam Dawson, the Associated Press business writer, points this out in the face of considerable talk about the economy's turning down.

It simply is not so.

With few exceptions, Mr. Dawson reminds us, key segments of the economy have not turned down or even leveled off. And there are special circumstances governing the exceptions, such as auto sales, housing starts, and new orders for durable goods.

What is really happening, as Mr. Dawson says, is that unlike the booming expansion of the first quarter of the year, the economy is now advancing at a more normal pace and responding in more healthy fashion to seasonal factors.

With the approval of my colleagues, I will enter this column in the RECORD as it appeared in the Washington Evening Star.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MOST KEY FIGURES INDICATE ECONOMY HITTING NEW PEAK (By Sam Dawson)

NEW YORK.—Much of the talk these days is about the economy turning down. But most of the key statistics show the economy is still climbing to new highs.

What is happening is that while the economy was booming ahead at a rapid rate in the first three months of this year, it is now advancing at a more normal pace and responding in a more healthy fashion to seasonal factors. With few exceptions, the key segments in the economy haven't turned down or even leveled off.

And the exceptions, such as auto sales, housing starts and new orders for durable goods, have exceptional circumstances of their own.

Car sales are lower at the moment than a year ago when they were at a record high. But no one can be sure whether that means that consumers are tightening up on spending or are influenced by all the talk about auto safety.

CONSUMER SPENDING

Although Americans were buying fewer cars in April, May and June, total consumer

spending for that period grew by \$3.3 billion to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of \$458.9 billion. You can view this with alarm because the gain was less than the \$10.4 billion advance in the first quarter of the year, or you can hail the more normal rate of advance and the new high it set.

Housing starts have had periodic sinking spells for two years now. At the moment a new uncertainty—tight money in the mortgage fund field—is complicating the picture. And tight money stems from the inflationary boom of the first three months of 1966—both because of official efforts to tighten credit and of still booming demand for loans in many fields.

New factory orders for durable goods—watched as a guide to future output—in June came to a seasonally adjusted \$24.1 billion. This was \$100 million below the May and April totals. But the June orders were \$2.8 billion higher than a year ago. And a "large increase in bookings for defense products" is reported by the Commerce Department. These seem more likely to continue to gain than to drop.

The backlog of durable goods orders actually rose by \$1.2 billion to a total of \$70.7 billion at the end of June, or \$13.2 billion more than a year ago. Factories apparently still have lots of orders to keep them busy.

GNP ALSO RISING

Worriers about the economy like to point to a slowdown in the advance of the Gross National Product. Actually, this measure of the total output of goods and services is still rising. In the second quarter it hit a new high, a seasonally adjusted annual rate of \$732 billion. The annual rate gain was \$10.8 billion above the previous record of \$721.2 billion set in the first three months of 1966.

But it was the abnormal and unexpected \$16.8 billion advance in the first quarter that sparked all the worry about the onset of inflation and the overheating of the economy, and sparked a campaign in some quarters for a rise in federal income tax rates.

The economic pace may moderate a bit more this summer. But even professional worriers aren't suggesting that the Gross National Product actually will turn down this summer or this fall.

For all they really know, the pace might pick up again and revive the old fears of overheating.

VIETCONG ATROCITIES

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, a few days ago, some of us in this body joined in an open letter to the leaders of North Vietnam to caution them against a reported plan to place on trial our airmen now in their captivity. We pointed out that we were among those whose strongest efforts remain dedicated to an early peace. We pointed out also that public humiliation of these pilots, followed by a kangaroo trial and, perhaps, by the death sentence would be reprehensible.

In fact, such sordid, barbaric drama would be so repugnant to the good sense of the world that American public opinion might well demand further escalation of the war as to compensation. Indeed, the patience of Americans of all opinions is not inexhaustible.

While the leaders of North Vietnam have shown restraint and prudence thus far in not continuing the humiliation of the captured fliers, their men in the field have not shown such concern for humanity and decency.

In the last few days we have learned that the Communist forces in Vietnam

have shelled our hospitals with mortars and have systematically killed wounded marines unable to defend themselves. Both these acts are clear violations of the Geneva Agreements. Both are acts of barbarism seldom seen in civilized countries in many years.

It is to these events that I wish now to address myself.

We who urged a continuing ban on the bombing of North Vietnam some months ago and who have remained in the forefront of seeking peace have done so as loyal Americans. It remains our conviction that violence breeds violence and escalation breeds escalation.

We felt that bombing the north—even military targets—perhaps retarded peace, in that it might stiffen opposition. We urged new efforts at an honorable peace in the military struggle so that the war-wracked Vietnamese might turn their energies better to the political and social struggle of elevating themselves.

We were concerned with humanity, wanting to spare human life and eliminate suffering. We wish to avoid the ultimate escalation that could breed atomic warfare.

The North Vietnamese, by inhuman acts of recent days, flout the efforts of all Americans to govern themselves by restraint. They invite retaliation.

Let it never be said that we who urge caution to one side fail to do so with equal vigor when the other side violates international convention.

So long as our men are committed to battle in Vietnam, I, for one, intend to vote to give them everything they need. As one who himself served his country in wartime, I could not do less.

Until such time as the differences can be settled at the conference table, we shall continue to press for peace and to speak out for humanity, temperance and justice—regardless of source. We seek deescalation and decency. Let not our efforts, our motives, our patriotism be questioned—either by our fellow Americans or by Hanoi and Peiping.

U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM—VIEWS OF FIVE EXPERTS

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the August 9, 1966, issue of Look magazine contains an article entitled: "Vietnam—What Should We Do Now?"

It is composed of answers to this question by five foreign policy and military affairs experts: Hans Morgenthau, Henry Kissinger, Hanson W. Baldwin, Herman Kahn, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Each of the five experts has a particular view on our policies in southeast Asia. Each disagrees with the others.

We must assume that if each of these experts were President of the United States, each would pursue a different policy and each would have harsh criticism of the others.

I think the article underscores the fact, Mr. President, that we are not confronted with a simple choice in Vietnam. We have a series of alternative policies, each of which can be defended or attacked by articulate experts.

July 27, 1966

16522

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

I commend the article and the differences of opinion to Senators and ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SUPPOSE THE PRESIDENT ASKED YOU "WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW?"—FIVE EXPERTS GIVE THEIR ANSWER

(NOTE.—We are at war in Vietnam. Whether we should have gotten into it or not is a separate issue. We are in Vietnam.

(Americans have always backed their armies with the moral certainty that in our victory *right* would triumph. But to many today, our cause seems stained by doubt. Never, during a foreign war, have Americans debated our national policy with such passion: "Get out . . . Escalate . . . Negotiate . . . 'Hole in' at coastal enclaves . . . Blockade Haiphong . . . Push 'hot pursuit' into Laos." The bitterness of the partisans consolidates the confusion.

(Look invited five experts, who hold varying views about Vietnam, to answer this question: "Suppose the President today asked you, 'What should we do now?'" We urged each to reply in the intentionally brief space of 1,000 words—for we sought not a plumb of agreement but sharp, specific proposals.

(Here are their answers. Each man presents a program that millions would no doubt support.)

(Hans Morgenthau: Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History, University of Chicago; director, Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy; has served as consultant to the Department of State and the Department of Defense; author of "In Defense of the National Interest, The Purpose of American Politics," etc.)

President Johnson is wont to ask the critics of his Vietnam policy, "What would you do if you were in my place?" This is a legitimate question, and it deserves an answer. Having been a consistent critic of our Vietnam policies for more than four years, I have tried to answer that question before and am glad to do so again.

Mr. President, I would say, you must choose between two alternative policies. You can start with the assumption that in Vietnam the credibility of the United States and its prestige as a great power are irrevocably engaged; that the war in Vietnam is a test case for all "wars of national liberation"; and that in consequence, the fate of Asia, and perhaps even the non-Communist world at large, might well be decided in Vietnam. If you believe this, then you must see the war through to victory. That is to say, you must escalate the war both in the South and in the North by committing what will amount (according to authoritative estimates) to a million American combat troops and by bombing, without restrictions, the industrial and population centers of North Vietnam. By doing this, you will destroy Vietnam, North and South, and risk a military confrontation with China or the Soviet Union or both. Yet these risks are justified by the magnitude of the issues at stake.

This is the policy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advocating and that you have pursued since February, 1965, even though you have been anxious to differentiate your policy from that of the Joint Chiefs. In truth, the difference between the two has not been one of kind but rather of degree. You have been escalating the war at a slower pace than the Joint Chiefs recommended. But escalate you did, and you will continue escalating because the assumptions from which you have started leave you no choice.

There is another policy, Mr. President, which you could and, in my view, should have

pursued. This policy assumes that the war is primarily a civil war; that its global significance is remote; that, far from containing China and communism, it opens the gates to both—by destroying the social fabric of Vietnamese nationalism, which is implacably hostile to China; and that, in consequence, the risks we are taking in the pursuit of victory are out of all proportion to the interests at stake.

We should never have gotten involved in this war, but we are deeply involved in it. The aim of our policy must be to avoid getting more deeply involved in it and to extricate ourselves from it while minimizing our losses. Recent events in Vietnam offer us the opportunity of initiating such a new policy of disengagement.

These events have clearly demonstrated two facts: The Saigon government is hardly worthy of the name; and the great mass of the people of South Vietnam prefer an end to the war rather than a fight to the finish with the Vietcong. The two main arguments with which our involvement has been justified have thus been demolished: that we have a commitment to the government of Saigon to assist it in the fight against the Vietcong; and that the people of South Vietnam want to be saved by us from the Vietcong—even at the risk of their own destruction. The prospect of elections to be held in South Vietnam provides us with the chance to use these new facts for the initiation of a new policy of disengagement. Such a policy would proceed on two fronts, the political and the military.

Politically, we ought to work for the achievement of four goals.

1. We must promote the establishment of a broadly-based government in which the elements seeking an end to the war would have decisive influence. This government would have the task of organizing elections for a constituent assembly and a legislature at an early date. It must be recognized that such elections will neither be representative nor "free." The group that organizes them is likely to win them. Hence, the crucial importance of the composition of the government presiding over the elections.

2. We must see to it that the government that emerges from these elections will negotiate with the Vietcong for a *modus vivendi*. Such a settlement would no doubt increase the risk of a complete takeover by the Vietcong. However, it is quite possible to visualize a coalition government under which different sections of the country, after the model of the Laotian settlement, would be governed by different factions. One can even visualize a South Vietnamese government that would be anxious to maintain its independence *vis-à-vis* the North.

3. We should put United States military forces stationed in South Vietnam at the disposal of the government that emerges from the elections, to be used as bargaining counters in negotiations with the Vietcong. In other words, we would honor our commitments and would leave it to the South Vietnamese Government to interpret them—in order to bring the war to an end.

4. Our ultimate goal would be the withdrawal of our armed forces from South Vietnam. Such a withdrawal would be coordinated with the progress of negotiations between the government of South Vietnam and the Vietcong. Our military forces would be gradually withdrawn, and our military presence would always be commensurate with the political purposes it is intended to serve.

Pending such withdrawal, our military policy would come in three parts:

1. We would stop both the bombing of North Vietnam and the search-and-destroy operations in South Vietnam that seek to kill the Vietcong and occupy territory controlled by them. For the continuation of such operations in the North and South is compatible only with a policy aiming at

victory, not with one seeking a negotiated settlement among the Vietnamese factions.

2. We would hold the cities and coastal enclaves that we and the South Vietnamese military now control. That is to say, we would be satisfied with a *de facto* division of South Vietnam.

3. We would expect the Vietcong to reciprocate by ceasing attacks upon the perimeter of our positions and by stopping sabotage within them. It can be assumed that we and the Vietcong have a reciprocal interest in maintaining the military status quo pending negotiations.

The policy here advocated, Mr. President, is anathema to the men who advise you. Yet it has always been supported by officials fairly high in your administration. It now has the support of a number of senators who in the past have been "hawks" rather than "doves."

You, Mr. President, will have to decide whether the present policy—morally dubious, militarily hopeless and risky, politically aimless and counterproductive—shall be continued or whether a better policy shall take its place. You aspire to be a great President. Whether you remain the prisoner of past mistakes or have the courage to correct them will be the test of your greatness.

(Henry Kissinger: Professor of government, Harvard, and member of The Center for International Affairs; consultant to the National Security Council under President Kennedy; author of "The Troubled Partnership, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," etc. "We are no longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.")

The war in Vietnam is dominated by two factors: Withdrawal would be disastrous, and negotiations are inevitable. American policy must take both of these realities into account.

1. The impossibility of withdrawal. An American withdrawal under conditions that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for these reasons:

Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focused on the Russian doctrine of peaceful co-existence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries—especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—that have supported our effort.

The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confidence in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam will be basically affected by the outcome there.

In short, we are no longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.

2. The inevitability of negotiation. Historically, the goal of a war, for the United States has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed. But the primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military.

July 27, 1966

What make the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government," permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure that can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

A purely military solution is impossible also because Vietnam directly engages the interests and the prestige of so many major powers. Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to respond to any overture by Hanoi for negotiations.

In these circumstances, the political program—both within Vietnam and for negotiations—is crucial. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures. Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country substantially free of terror.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

1. Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100-percent control in 40 percent of the country than 40-percent control in 100 percent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory, which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of hostile populations. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot secure control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones that contain a maximum of population—zones that can be expanded if the war continues and that will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

2. We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state—a process that took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties—a task that would be searing in the best of circumstances, but is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) We must have compassion for the travail of a society that has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for falling in our duty; and (b) we must give special emphasis to building political structures from the ground up.

3. The notion drawn from our experience in Europe, that economic assistance automatically produces political stability, does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and our concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

4. It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference that deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a forum consisting of many nations that are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, or the U.S. and France), energies may be dissipated in political jockeying that is peripheral to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to separate the issues into their component elements, each to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

5. The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity. In the lives of nations,

as of individuals, there comes a point when future options are limited by past actions. The choices of 1966 are not those of 1961. We must recognize that to be on the defensive often forces us to be engaged in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity.

We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges that most flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military problems as an integrated whole, we will not be able to deal with them individually.

(Hanson W. Baldwin: Military editor of the New York Times, Pulitzer Prize winner for journalism, graduate of Annapolis, war correspondent in the South Pacific, North Africa, Normandy, Korea, Vietnam)

It's the eleventh hour in Vietnam. The United States must decide to win or get out. It is not too late to win, but it soon may be.

Victory means, first of all, a Governmental and national determination to win.

Congress should declare a state of national emergency and authorize a limited mobilization. Our trained and ready military power is spread thin all over the world. Limited mobilization would provide—more quickly than any other means—a pool of at least partially trained manpower and organized logistical, training and combat units to sustain a rapid buildup in Vietnam and, ultimately, to strengthen our weakened positions in other parts of the world.

The President should be authorized to mobilize up to 500,000 reserves for two-year service. Draft calls should be increased as necessary. All enlistments should be extended for a minimum of six months.

South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand must be regarded as a strategic whole. The war in South Vietnam is clearly nourished from outside. Soldiers, medicines, supplies, and especially arms and ammunition, today reach South Vietnam by sea, from Cambodia, through Laos, and from North Vietnam by any and all methods. Most of the small arms now used by the Vietcong "main-force" units are standardized on the Soviet 7.62-mm caliber basis and are Chinese-manufactured. All of the heavy arms—mortars, antiaircraft guns, SAM missiles, MiG's, IL-28 bombers, and the world's largest helicopter, the Mi-6—are either Chinese- or Russian-manufactured.

We must shut off, to the best of our ability, the stream of Communist supplies into North Vietnam. We should turn off the faucet, not merely put a stopper in the drain. This means blocking the seaborne arms traffic to North Vietnam—by mining, bombing, naval gunfire; the sinking of a dredge in the narrow, silted ship channel to Haiphong; by so-called "pacific blockade" or "quarantine" or other means.

The land supply routes, even more important to the Communist war effort, must also be interrupted. Past limitations upon the bombing of railroads and roads, and of the choke points and communications bottlenecks in North Vietnam's extensive road network, must be removed. We must reduce the flow of supplies from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. Many of these supplies move partway by truck; we have been bombing the trucks but, until recently, not the fuel-oil supplies that power them. We should bomb all the fuel-oil depots in North Vietnam. Electric power plants, which provide power for a variety of war purposes, should also be bombed.

Interdiction of the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (which leads over various passes from North Vietnam through Laos or Cambodia into South Vietnam) must be improved—by eliminating some of the restrictions that now hamper bombing and particularly by assigning more trained Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air.

Air Cavalry raids by helicopter against Laotian bottlenecks on the supply route should be undertaken whenever possible. The doctrine of "hot pursuit" must be applied to any guerrilla forces that use Cambodia as a sanctuary.

At sea, the Navy's coastal surveillance and river patrols must be extended and tightened—to stop Vietcong gunrunning by junks and sampans. This will require more air and small-craft bases in South Vietnam and Thailand.

U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam should be doubled to a figure of 500,000 to 700,000 men, to enable U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to patrol areas that have been Communist sanctuaries for years. We must find and fix the main force of the enemy, and force him to expend his supplies in action, if possible. An enemy "body count" is not the proper yardstick by which to judge success in this kind of war. Even if the enemy refuses action and fades away into the jungles, or into the shadows of the U Minh Forest, the capture and destruction of his base camps, of his rice and food supplies, of his medicines and weapons and ammunition will reduce his combat capabilities. The war must ultimately be won on the ground by destroying or breaking up the main force units of the Vietcong, and especially by destroying the enemy's bases of operations.

The final part of the strategy for victory—the part that will shape the peace—is the pacification program. The American and South Vietnamese military can launch search-and-destroy and search-and-clear operations; but only specially trained South Vietnamese administrative and paramilitary forces can hold the areas that are cleared. The pacification program—in the past mishandled and underemphasized—has this year started slowly but well; it must be pushed to the maximum. For one can confirm victory in a guerrilla war only if one wins the people over and protects them against the enemy.

This is a slow, a comprehensive, a tedious process. The administrative, police, educational and health authority of the central government must be built up from what Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge calls "the precinct level."

The enemy cannot win in a military sense; he is stymied on the field of battle. But political instability in Saigon, and U.S. impatience at home, may cause us to lose the struggle—politically and psychologically.

We have no easy choices—only grim alternatives. Victory, which means making it possible for a South Vietnamese government to govern without interference from outside, is possible; but it may not be possible soon.

The victory road will be long and hard and bloody. But defeat or stalemate in Vietnam will gravely impair the U.S. position in Asia and in the world; and if we lose, our children and grandchildren will face tomorrow a far worse problem than we face today.

(Herman Kahn: Director of the Hudson Institute (a nonprofit organization conducting research in the area of national security and international order); former member of the Rand Corporation; author of "Thinking About the Unthinkable, On Thermonuclear War, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios")

I have been asked by Look to describe my personal position, rather than give an analysis of the pros and cons. The first and overwhelming point is that whether or not one agrees with the steps that led to it, our present commitment to oppose force and terror by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is as solemn an engagement as any modern nation has made. I do not believe that commitments must be blindly kept, regardless of costs; but just as we should be careful about making commitments, we should be very careful about honoring them.

Maintaining the credibility of our commitments is not just a matter of "saving face." Our ability to support world peace and security, particularly without using excessive force, depends in great measure upon the faith that other nations repose in American commitments. (Germany, Japan, India and Israel, for example, restrain their activities in obtaining nuclear weapons partly because of American commitments.)

To renege on commitments as serious as those we have made in Southeast Asia could be a major step in a disastrous erosion of faith in the United States. If faith in our commitments became so weak that we would have to give excessive commitments in order to make them believable—for example, giving minor states control over our policy (as the British had to do with Poland in 1939)—then the likelihood of major escalation, such as a war with China, would be dangerously increased.

The United States also has a crucial interest in dispelling two illusions that have grown up since World War II: that radical terrorists almost always win; and that radical regimes can subvert, or intervene in, a neighboring area with little risk. History is replete with examples of how a victory by terrorists in one area powerfully influenced the likelihood and the tactics of subversion in other areas. The invalidity of oversimplified "domino theories" should not lead us to underestimate the worldwide costs of letting the Vietcong succeed with their resort to violence. In addition, I am seriously concerned about the political and moral repercussions within the United States were we to "pull out" of Vietnam.

Our cause in South Vietnam is not immoral. Many think we are creating more destruction, more death, more human suffering than our cause justifies. But what would happen were we to let South Vietnam fall into the hands of the National Liberation Front? It is not likely that a victorious NLF would treat with restraint: the Cao Dai, the Hoo Hao, the Catholics (each a community of about 1,000,000 human beings); the 500,000 South Vietnamese soldiers; the many other groups that have demonstrated they are anti-Communist; the tens of thousands who would probably be labeled enemies of a Communist state. Those who dismiss this likelihood need only look at how the Chinese Communists and the Indonesian Army treated their opponents, and might ask themselves if the victorious NLF is likely to be more restrained. Nor should the West view with equanimity 15,000,000 people passing behind a Communist Iron Curtain.

What, then, should we do in Vietnam now?

1. An important aspect of the battle for "the hearts and minds of men" is this: Which side will succeed in symbolizing national identity? Many Vietnamese prefer good government to bad government, but even more prefer self-government to foreign control. We should encourage self-government, and should minimize our nonmilitary role.

2. Thus, we should accept and encourage more independence by the South Vietnamese in handling their political and economic problems. Even if a Buddhist nationalist comes to power, he is likely to be more opposed to the NLF than to the Americans; and if his government does not want our protection, or makes it impossible, we can then leave with honor—having fully honored our solemn commitment. (I assume we would not have connived at his election or policy.)

3. To the extent that it can be encouraged to, the Saigon government should compete with the Vietcong in promises of social reform, should launch selective but significant social-reform programs now, and should carry out pacification programs in a legal and humane way.

4. We should replace the present system of four levels of American advisers in the Vietnamese Army (which tends to result in four

levels of double veto) with a singular, more unified system.

5. We should urge the South Vietnamese Army to make promotions and assignments on the basis of merit. The efficiency of the fighting forces would be greatly increased if the army adopted the simple expedient of promotions on the battlefield, raising enlisted men to officer rank, regardless of education—rewarding proven ability, aggressiveness and dedication.

6. The amnesty program offered to the Vietcong should be broadened and liberalized. The counterinsurgency wars that have been won since World War II often involved generous, well-publicized amnesty programs. (The Philippine Government, for instance, promised and gave farms to many Huk guerrillas who surrendered.) Although the South Vietnamese think it wrong to treat rebels better than loyal peasants, it is clearly worth a good deal to South Vietnam to make surrender safe and attractive, and to guarantee a decent, useful life to the man who surrenders.

7. We probably do not need to escalate military activities against North Vietnam. The military tactics we have introduced—aggressive patrolling to carry out search-and-destroy and clear-and-hold operations—contain many significant benefits that have not yet been fully realized, but should soon show important results.

8. I believe we can pacify Vietnam. A stable, reasonable government there is possible. Although the political situation looks bad today, many current political problems are likely to be solved following, and as the result of, military victories. The political difficulties in South Vietnam are likely to be diminished when and after elections are held—especially if the elections follow military victories.

Our present policy is the only realistic alternative the United States really has. It is a hopeful policy. If we are patient, resolute, realistic, that policy can probably realize our goals. I have yet to hear of an alternative that is not likely to involve costs far greater, far more deplorable, far more inhumane in both the short and long run.

(Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.: Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities, City University of New York; professor of history, Harvard, 1954-61; twice winner, Pulitzer Prize; winner, National Book Award; assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; author of "A Thousand Days," etc.)

The moderate critics of the administration's Vietnam policy do not question its proclaimed purposes: resistance to Communist aggression, self-determination for South Vietnam, a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. They do question, with the greatest urgency, the theory that the way to achieve these objectives is to intensify the war. The more we destroy Vietnam, North and South, in their judgment, the less chance there will ever be of attaining our objectives. The course of widening the war, moreover, will mire our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia, beyond the effective use of our national power and the range of our primary interests—and may well end in nuclear war with China.

And the alternatives? Instead of supposing that a guerrilla movement can be crushed by strategic bombing, instead of using military methods to solve a political problem, we must adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

1. Stop the Americanization of the war. The bitter fact is that the war in Vietnam can never be won as a war of white men against Asians. It cannot be won "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort . . . We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam" (President Kennedy,

1963). The more we Americanize the war—by increasing our military presence, by summoning Saigon leaders, like vassals, to conferences in an American state, by transforming a local war in Vietnam into a global test between America and China—the more we make the war unwinnable.

2. A civilian government in Saigon. We have never had a government in Saigon that could enlist the active loyalty of the countryside, and we certainly do not have one in Marshal Ky's military junta. Instead of identifying American interests with Marshal Ky, and rebuffing the broader political impulses of the South, we should long since have encouraged a movement toward a civilian regime that represents the significant political forces of the country and is capable both of rallying the army and carrying out programs of social reform. If such a government should favor the neutralization of South Vietnam, if it should want to negotiate with Vietcong, *even if it should wish to release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam*, we cannot and should not object.

3. Reconvene the Geneva Conference. We should persevere in the quest for negotiation. Since the Vietcong are a principal party to the conflict, it would appear obvious that peace talks at Geneva are meaningless without their participation. And since they will never talk if the only topic is their unconditional surrender, we must, unless we plan to exterminate them, hold out to them a prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of democratic elections, preferably under international supervision.

4. Hold the line in South Vietnam. Obviously, Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is thus a precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American ground forces in South Vietnam to demonstrate that our adversaries cannot hope for military victory. I believe that we have more than enough troops and installations there now to make this point.

It is an illusion to suppose that by increasing the size of the American Army we can ever gain a reliable margin of superiority; for, by the Pentagon's preferred 10:1 ratio in fighting guerrillas, every time we add 100,000 men, the enemy has only to add 10,000, and we are all even again.

Nor does "digging in" mean a static strategy with initiative relinquished to the enemy. The South Vietnamese Army of half a million men is better suited in many ways than are Americans to search operations in the villages.

We should also limit our bombing in the South. Have we really no better way to deal with guerrilla warfare than the aerial obliteration of the country in which it is taking place? If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against communism, what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will ever wish for American protection?

5. Taper off the bombing of North Vietnam. Secretary McNamara has candidly said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will," and thus far, bombing the North has neither brought Hanoi to the conference table, demoralized the people nor stopped infiltration. As a result, pressure arises for ever-wider strikes—first oil depots, then harbors, factories, cities, the Chinese border. But these won't work either. As we move down this road, we will only solidify the people of North Vietnam behind their government, make negotiations impossible and eventually assure the entry of China into the war. And even if we bombed North Vietnam back to the Stone Age and earned thereby the hatred of the civilized world, this still would not settle

July 27, 1966

the present war—which, after all, is taking place not in North but in South Vietnam.

6. A long-run program for Southeast Asia. We should discuss with Russia, France, China and other interested countries a neutralization program, under international guarantee, for Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam. If these states could work out forms of economic collaboration, as in the development of the Mekong Valley, the guarantors should make economic and technical assistance available to them.

A program of limiting our forces, actions and objectives still holds out the possibility of an honorable resolution of a tragic situation. A program of indefinite escalation offers nothing but disaster; for our adversaries can, in their own way, match our every step up to nuclear war—and nuclear war would be just as much a moral and political catastrophe for us as it would be a physical catastrophe for the Far East and the whole world.

TANGIBLE SUCCESSES OF THE FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, David Bell, the distinguished former Administrator of the Agency for International Development, recently spoke to the National Press Club on the goals and the results of our foreign aid program. In the midst of the harsh criticism which has been directed at the alleged failures of our foreign aid program, I think Mr. Bell's speech illustrates very well some of the tangible successes of this program. Taiwan and Japan in Asia, Israel and Greece are cases where our aid has been terminated after producing spectacular economic gains. In Brazil, Chile, and Korea we see examples of economic growth combined with relative political stability.

In the past I have consistently supported sound foreign aid programs. I think it particularly important that we have authorizations extending over a period of years so that we can develop effective long-range planning. In addition, we should avoid defeating the purpose of our foreign aid program by imposing ruinous interest charges on our long-term development loans. At present an excessive amount of annual development assistance provided by free world countries is being returned to the lending nations in the form of interest payments and debt service. What has been aptly called the debt explosion by World Bank President George Woods can severely hamper and retard the sound development of nations already poor in investment capital and foreign exchange reserves.

In his speech Mr. Bell touches on Indonesia and the sharp reversal of Sukarno's policy of creating a Peking-Djakarta axis. This sudden and unexpected shift underlines the importance of keeping our foreign aid policy as flexible as possible. This year, as in the past, there have been attempts to tie the President's hand by statutory mandate; amendments were offered restricting aid to various countries in certain circumstances.

In my view, the rigidity of the law can vitiate a sound policy of foreign aid, which should be able to meet the challenges and the opportunities of a constantly changing world. We should lay

down sound goals and guidelines but should not attempt to administer the day-to-day decisions of AID by statute.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bell's fine speech be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DAVID E. BELL, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BEFORE THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 14, 1966

I come before you, from a newsman's point of view, as that most useless of creatures—a lame duck. It is too late for me to speak with authority, and too early for me to speak without responsibility. I do have a few parting comments, however, mostly having to do with the future possibilities of the U.S. foreign aid program. In the question period to follow, I will of course be glad to answer questions on any subject within my competence.

I

My first suggestion is that the prospects for economic growth in the developing countries are better than many people think. One often hears the view that the needs of the developing countries are so great—their poverty is so extreme—that the United States and the other advanced countries will have to provide aid in large amounts for decades to come. Another view sometimes heard—in a sense the reverse of the first—holds that the developing countries are so hopelessly poor, so weakly and irresponsibly governed, that sending them aid is a waste of good resources and should be stopped altogether.

As you could guess from the way I have set up these straw men, I think both are quite wrong, and are based on an excessively pessimistic reading of our experience. The record shows some startling success stories. Looking back, we forget how startling they were. Remember the case of Japan. In 1949, so responsible a source as Fortune Magazine described the United States' "\$2 billion failure in Japan", and went on to say that "the Japanese face a future uniquely bleak . . . five, ten or more years of . . . grueling work. The American taxpayer must prepare himself for an indefinite period of vast appropriations."

That of course is not what happened. Japanese economic growth has been a modern wonder. Instead of going on for an indefinite period, sizeable economic aid from the United States to Japan ended within five years of that Fortune article. More recently, Japan has agreed to repay \$490 million of our economic assistance, and in 1965, its own foreign aid program totaled more than \$240 million.

Even more significant, in my opinion, is the success of Taiwan—a story some of you in this room may have heard me tell before. The key lesson of Taiwan is that a country can achieve the conditions of self-sustaining economic growth at a surprisingly low level of per capita income. American aid has not made the Taiwanese wealthy—their per capita income is less than \$200 per year, compared to more than \$2500 per year in the United States. But our aid—and their own efforts—have given Taiwan the power to achieve further economic growth without further economic aid.

These cases, and others like Greece, Israel, Mexico, do not prove that every underdeveloped country will succeed. But they come close to showing that every underdeveloped country can succeed.

These success stories lead, I think, to three very important inferences.

One is the enormous power of modern science and technology when effectively applied

to the production conditions in developing countries. It seems to be possible for the developing countries, by making use of the scientific advances of the West, to achieve comparatively very high growth rates over sustained periods of time. The Japanese record is well-known. Taiwan's is less well-known, but nearly as spectacular.

For the past decade, Taiwan's economy has been growing at an average annual rate of 7.6 per cent. For the last five years, this rate has averaged 8.8 per cent per year. In 1965, the year in which the U.S. discontinued concessional economic aid, Taiwan's gross national product increased by 10 per cent. All these rates are approximately twice the comparable rates for the United States.

The second inference is the crucial importance of leadership in the developing countries. Modern science and technology do not apply themselves—they must be applied, as the result of strong development policies. Priorities must be set sensibly. Local resources must be raised. Incentives must be assured. Skills must be trained. All these and many other matters can be arranged only by public and private leaders in the developing countries.

It is not too much to say that the most useful effect of foreign aid is not the projects that may be built, but the support and stimulation that may be given to stronger and wiser development policies. Clearly each project should be well-run and effective, but the important question is what effect can aid have in encouraging and helping the local leadership to devise and apply firm development policies.

The third inference relates to the future need for aid from the U.S. and other donors. Just as many observers may have underestimated the prospects for economic growth, so many may also have exaggerated its cost. The purpose of foreign aid, after all, is not to help every country achieve the income standards of the advanced countries, but only to help aid recipients reach the point where they can move ahead on their own.

The real question is: what amount of concessional aid, coupled with sound self-help policies and actions, will put the country in question in position to move ahead on its own, to obtain its capital requirements on normal commercial terms, thus ending the need for concessional aid. Taiwan has only started on the road of economic development. Many years of growth will be required before Taiwan will approach present U.S. income levels. Taiwan will need to import much capital over that period. But now it can do so on normal commercial terms, without further concessional aid. Taiwan has only started on the development process, but it has already finished the aid process.

II

If these conclusions are warranted, as I believe they are, one could suggest that the future U.S. aid policy should simply be to work on with those developing countries following strong self-help policies until, in country after country, economic strength and progress have been established and each has the capacity to continue its forward momentum without our aid.

So far as it goes, this conclusion seems to me correct. There is a group of countries—such as Israel, Mexico, Venezuela—in which the need for concessional aid—grants and soft-term loans—is clearly near its end.

There is a second group of countries making strong and solid progress though it will be some years before aid can be ended. These are countries which, like India, Pakistan, Korea, Turkey, Brazil, Chile, are following sound self-help policies. United States development assistance is heavily concentrated in these countries.

These countries are clearly on the road to economic self-support. They are likely to reach their goal at different times, since each

July 27, 1966

starts with a different endowment of natural resources, skilled managers, and so forth. Some of these countries could be economically self-sustaining within five years, and even the poorest, probably within 15 or 20 years.

Our economic aid policies toward the type of countries I have been describing can be relatively simple—although their execution is frequently a very complex and difficult matter. The logic of the situation would seem to be to continue to do our full share in aiding these countries. Along with other donors, we should be prepared to provide even more aid in the future to these countries, if it will enable them to make faster headway toward economic self-support and the end of the need for outside aid.

The question of policies becomes more uncertain when we look at countries that do not have strong, full-scale development programs. Some of these are countries, such as a number in Africa, which are not in a position to make rapid progress toward economic development because they are seriously short of competent leaders, or because they have not yet found a way, in their particular political circumstances, to achieve a firm commitment to sound economic policies.

There have been suggestions that until such countries put their own houses in order there is little we can do to help them, and consequently we should do nothing. I believe such a policy would be utopian and wrong. There are certainly cases in which we should indeed provide no aid at all. Indonesia, a year ago, was such a case.

But many of these developing countries can be helped, by technical assistance and training efforts, to understand their own problems better and gradually to improve their development policies and programs. And sometimes a wise and timely use of incentives can help bring about important policy changes or reforms. This is delicate business, normally needing to be carried out privately, and preferably through the good offices of an international agency such as the World Bank or the IMF. But it can sometimes be done.

Our policy, therefore, in countries which are not fully committed to strong full-scale development programs, in my opinion, should be one of seeking to catch hold where we can, and to bring positive influence to bear where the opportunity is open to us, with the objective of helping more and more countries to embark on full-scale economic development efforts which can lead them toward economic self-support.

I have not mentioned so far one last group of countries to which we provide aid. These are the countries such as Vietnam and Laos, the Congo, and the Dominican Republic, where the first problem has been the restoration of peace and security, and economic aid is directed to assist that objective, as a prerequisite to longer-term considerations of economic and social progress.

If, therefore, you look across the developing world you can see a rough spectrum ranging at one extreme from countries torn by insurgency, through those which are at peace but are struggling to develop effective leadership and policies for development, through countries well on the road to solid development, to those at the other extreme where our assistance is terminating. It seems to me our economic aid policies can be fitted to the particular circumstances of these various types of countries, in order to help each of them achieve the next step forward from the restoration of security, through the development of effective leadership, through strong development programs, to economic independence. And it seems to me that looked at in this light, it is legitimate to say that if we stick with the job we can hope to see very substantial gains over, say, the next decade, along this path toward economic development.

III

In saying this, however, I would not wish to be understood as asserting that our present U.S. aid programs are nearly as good as they should be. A great deal of change has been underway and further changes are in prospect. I would cite three illustrations.

First, we are in process of adapting to the fact that foreign aid has become an international business—with other advanced countries in Europe plus Canada and Japan providing last year over \$2.5 billion in aid to the developing countries. The most promising arrangements for coordinating aid are the consortiums and consultative groups, of which the World Bank has established perhaps ten or a dozen, with two or three more on the horizon. Through these consultative groups, the Bank takes the lead in working out the right prescription both for the self-help actions and for the amounts and types of aid that are required for a particular aid-receiving country.

It is feasible for the United States or another bilateral aid donor to take a leading role in working out the arrangements for strong self-help in a given country. We have done so successfully in several cases. It is clearly preferable, however, for this role to be played by the World Bank or another international agency, backed up by the bilateral aid donors. The consultative group, therefore, represents in our judgment a major improvement in our methods of providing economic assistance.

A second improvement which is well underway is to place much greater emphasis among both aid recipients and aid donors on the urgency of enlarging agricultural productivity in the developing countries and, meanwhile, of improving the arrangements under which food assistance is provided to them. In this same connection there is rapidly growing a more rational approach to the problems of population growth. The United States, I am glad to say, has played a leading role in both these areas.

One illustration of this is our invitation for the annual high level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD to meet in Washington next week, with problems of food and agriculture in a prominent place on its agenda.

A third improvement which is underway in our aid programs is a greater emphasis on the encouragement of local and private initiative in the developing countries. We continue to support strongly American private investment in Asia and Africa and Latin America. And we are also finding more ways to support the growth of private and local organizations in the developing countries themselves—businesses, cooperatives, trade unions, farm organizations, and so forth. We are finding excellent support among private American organizations of all kinds for this approach, and a number of new organizations have been established by private groups to contribute to this end—as the AFL-CIO has established the African-American Labor Center and a group of businessmen led by David Rockefeller and Sol Linowitz has established the International Executive Service Corps.

In these and other ways the United States foreign aid program—and the aid programs of other countries—are in a state of rapid change and, I believe, increasing efficiency. It is a lively business, attracting highly able people to work on the challenging problems of economic and social change in the developing countries.

IV

I should like to close with an observation or two going beyond the area of economic development as such.

It is important not to expect too much. Our aid programs, when they are successful, assist developing countries to establish themselves as independent, self-supporting nations. That is a great accomplishment,

and of great value to the United States. A world of independent, self-supporting nations, cooperating together to solve common problems, is the kind of world the United States seeks—in which we believe we can live most safely and most constructively. But such a world is not utopia.

The case of France illustrates the point neatly. France has been the largest single recipient of U.S. aid—over \$9 billion in economic and military assistance. That aid accomplished what it was intended to accomplish, namely, the restoration of the French economy from the devastation of World War II, and the rebuilding of the French military forces as part of the NATO alliance. It is not an exaggeration to say that France is strong and free today as a result of United States aid, and that is a result which would have been worth a good deal more to the United States than \$9 billion. But it does not require Bastille Day to remind us that an independent France may sometimes act independently. And the moral of that story is that foreign aid can solve some problems but not all.

A final observation. The question is often asked whether United States aid helps the growth of democratic attitudes and institutions in less-developed countries. In the present state of our knowledge, we cannot be sure of the answer. My own personal view is that aid is substantially helpful to this end, for several reasons.

The first is exposure. There is no doubt that most of the thousands of persons who come to this country under our aid programs, and most of those who come in contact with our technical assistance people abroad, are impressed by the freedom and mobility of our society and the benefits of government by consent.

Furthermore, under the aid program we deliberately foster many democratic institutions—savings and loan associations, for example, democratic trade unions, cooperatives of various kinds; government agencies with an attitude of service toward people; and many others. Through such institutions, people in developed countries learn at first hand how a pluralistic society functions, and experience the necessity for responsible choice.

Finally, the economic and social policies which we foster are designed to broaden the base of economic participation and spread the powers of economic decision. Land reform, for example, is often a powerful means for making a society more democratic, as well as for stimulating the growth of investment and output in agriculture. The extension of education to more children at elementary, secondary, and higher levels broadens the basis for responsible participation in a nation's affairs.

In all these ways and for all these reasons, I believe the net effect of our aid programs is strongly positive in encouraging democratic evolution, and those critics who charge the aid program with perpetuating rigid social patterns and oligarchical control have simply not been looking at what we are actually doing around the world.

Nevertheless, I would certainly not argue that economic assistance is a sure recipe for democracy. There are many other influences at work, and it will plainly be a long, difficult struggle in many countries to find a satisfactory basis for political institutions that could properly be called democratic.

And so I am ending my association with AID with the good feeling of having been in the thick of a very good fight—of having been involved in an endeavor of very great significance to the United States and to the future of the world. The problems are extremely difficult, and we have much to learn about how to deal with them effectively. But I am convinced that the United States in its aid programs is on a sound footing. I trust we

July 27, 1966

will have the wisdom and the fortitude to stay the course.

CAPTURED FLIERS

Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, President Johnson's measured comments on Hanoi's threats to try captured American airmen as war criminals have drawn favorable attention in the press.

In response to questions at his televised news conference this week, the President said the very thought that these men have committed war crimes is deplorable and revolting. Should North Vietnam put them on trial, he said, the people of the world would react accordingly.

Both the Baltimore Sun and Wall Street Journal similarly deplore Hanoi's action while contending we must keep uppermost in mind that our purpose is to bring the fighting in Vietnam to an honorable end.

Prior to the President's comments, the Chicago Daily News, like the Wall Street Journal, branded as nonsense North Vietnam's claim that the Geneva Convention on war prisoners does not apply in this case. If North Vietnam persists in violating international agreements, the Daily News said, it should be treated as a renegade nation.

I have editorials from each of the newspapers and would like to insert them in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, July 21, 1966]

THE CAPTIVE FLIERS

While stating strongly this country's concern over the threatened North Vietnamese maltreatment of captured American fliers, President Johnson took repeated occasion at his press conference yesterday to insist that our policy in Vietnam has not changed, and is still a policy of trying through military pressure and diplomatic exploration to bring the war there to a peaceful, honorable solution. The exploration continues even now, the President reported, and of course the military pressure will be maintained. Mr. Johnson emphasized his intention of confining the pressure as applied from the air to military targets. He was doing no more than facing the harsh facts when he said that any treatment of the prisoners as other than military assignments would be "deplorable and repulsive" and would draw reaction accordingly.

The moment is a grim one, and could grow grimmer, if the North Vietnamese persist in their miscalculations—or if we for our part, in the face of what indeed is ugly provocation, abandon the painful process of trying daily to find a reasonable way through the Vietnamese dilemma. We have first to protect the fliers, and other prisoners, and then, if possible, to continue the policy of discipline and restraint, believing as we must that in the end this policy will prevail.

[From the Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1966]

THE CAPTURED AIRMEN

The North Vietnamese threat to try, and possibly execute, captured American fliers is one more depressing development in a depressing war. And because it is so emotion-packed, it is all the more necessary to try to view it calmly.

Even as it is, the plight of the men is sad enough—paraded before taunting mobs and, judging from the photos, perhaps suffering

other mistreatment as well. The idea that they might be tried and put to death as "war criminals" is evoking heated reaction here at home; one Senator warns that the U.S. would, in that event, make a desert of North Vietnam.

Understandable though the reaction is, it is not calculated to contribute to the most intelligent prosecution of the war. Hard as it is to say it, the national interest requires that the war be waged in accordance with the best military judgment, without regard to the fate of the airmen or to public outcry or to rancor within the Administration.

Actually, the Hanoi regime presumably seeks to influence America's conduct of the war. It is violating the Geneva Convention, to which it is a signatory, on the ostensible ground that the U.S. is waging an undeclared aggressive war; the contention is nonsense because the Convention applies to wars declared or undeclared. The real point is that it is in the nature of Communists to abide or not abide by the niceties of international law as it suits their purpose.

In this case it seems likely, as C. L. Sulzberger suggests in the New York Times, that the Communists are attempting to use the fliers to ward off further broadening of the war against North Vietnam; sealing off Haiphong harbor, for one example. In other words, they might try but not execute the prisoners unless the U.S. did undertake significant expansions on the attacks on the North.

We obviously cannot pretend to know whether expansion is dictated by military need. All we are saying is that it should not be done in reprisal; nor should new targets be rejected, in hope of saving the fliers, if such raids are deemed necessary for the war effort. The American purpose is to bring the war to an acceptable conclusion, and that must be the guiding consideration.

It will be a bitter thing if Hanoi carries out its threats. But when a nation is pitted against Communists, it has no reason to expect anything but Communist cruelty.

QUAKERS URGE PRESIDENT TO REVERSE LATEST ESCALATION

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the General Conference of the Religious Society of Friends, often known as Quakers, held its biennial meeting at Cape May, N.J., from June 24 to July 1. More than 3,000 members were present for the meeting, coming from more than 30 States, including my own State of Indiana.

The historic concern of the Friends for the cause of peace is a tradition to which they have held for many years. In wartime they have furnished from their ranks ambulance drivers, medics, and other workers whose mission has always been that of healing rather than joining in the hurt of actual combat. In peacetime they have been a powerful force, far beyond their numbers, for the development of relief to the needy places of the world.

It might be expected, therefore, but it is nonetheless significant, that this general conference should express its deep concern for the conduct of our policies in Vietnam. By official action, the group united in sending to President Johnson a telegram signed by 600 delegates, expressing on the same day as the escalation of bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, the strongest kind of protest:

This is another step—

Said the telegram—

in our descent toward barbarism and world anarchy.

Subsequently there was addressed to the President also a "minute" containing the statement of the Friend's group on the means which should be adopted for moving toward ending the war.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of the Friends' General Conference, which includes the texts of the two statements addressed to President Johnson, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE WAR IN VIETNAM, A DEEP CONCERN OF MEMBERS OF THE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF FRIENDS (QUAKERS)

Members of the Religious Society of Friends, meeting during their biennial conference at Cape May, New Jersey, June 24-July 1, 1966, were deeply disturbed by the announcements of the escalation of the war effort in Vietnam. In response to this escalation, Friends united in sending the following messages to the President of the United States:

1. A telegram sent on June 29, 1966 to President Johnson, signed by 600 delegates: "Our hearts go out to the many Vietnamese men, women, and children who have been killed and injured by our bombs as well as to the Americans who have died today. We are moved to protest in strongest possible terms your decision to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong areas. This is another step in our descent toward barbarism and world anarchy. The decision flies directly in the face of the Secretary-General U Thant's June 20 recommendation that the United States cease bombing of North Vietnam.

"We are filled with anguish as we think of our own responsibility and participation as American citizens in this action. We plead with you to pray for God's guidance that you will be given the wisdom and vision to adopt those policies which will end this terrible war by peaceful means and build a world in which all God's children can live in peace."

2. A minute addressed to President Johnson and other national and international leaders, approved by the Friends General Conference Central Committee on July 1, 1966:

"The General Conference of Friends, representing Yearly, Quarterly, and Monthly Meetings of the Religious Society of Friends from California to New England, meeting at Cape May, New Jersey, June 24-July 1, strongly urges President Lyndon B. Johnson, Senators, and Representatives of the United States Congress to reverse the latest escalation of the war in Vietnam involving the bombing of targets in the immediate area of heavily populated Hanoi and Haiphong. We, as Friends, have historically deplored the use of military force, but this latest action in Vietnam deeply concerns all men and women who believe that there are other ways to win the hearts of men and women than death and destruction by bombing. Bullets, napalm, and bombs have never won friends; but land reform, tax reform, and the elimination of corruption would go far toward the removal of the causes which have been a large factor in the civil war in South Vietnam.

"Among possible steps to end this war now, we urge the United States Government to:

"1. Work through the United Nations and the Geneva Conference for a peaceful solution;

"2. Accede to the proposals of the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, including:

"a. Cessation of bombing of North Vietnam;

16528

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 27, 1966

"b. Scaling down of all military activities in South Vietnam, which alone could lead to an effective cease-fire";

"c. Willingness of all sides to enter into discussions with those who are 'actually fighting'";

"3. Work for a quick return to civilian government in South Vietnam;

"4. Organize a peace-keeping force of Asians in this war-torn area under the auspices of the United Nations;

"5. Commit ourselves now to a phased withdrawal of U.S. armed forces as quickly as possible;

"6. Support plans for reconstruction of South Vietnam and North Vietnam indicated by the President in his proposals last spring at the Johns Hopkins University."

We are deeply aware of the tremendous burden of decision resting upon the shoulders of the President of the United States. We pray that he will have the courage to work through that Eternal Spiritual force which can guide us all toward a Peace on Earth for all the children of God.

CLEAN WATER

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, two prominent Eastern newspapers cheer the Senate for passing without dissent legislation designed to clean our rivers and streams.

Each asks the House to follow suit.

Much still remains to be done to rid the Nation's waters of pollution, but the New York Times and Washington Post endorse the bill to generate Federal, State, and local spending of some \$200 billion over the next 6 years.

Both newspapers declare the pollution of our water resources has reached alarming proportions. But as the junior Senator from Maine—the bill's chief sponsor—has contended, the people have given Congress a mandate to act.

In recognition of this mandate, I offer these newspaper editorials for the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 15, 1966]

MANDATE FOR CLEAN WATER

The 90-to-0 vote by which the Senate passed the clean-rivers bill is indicative of a tidal wave of reaction against filth in our streams. A few years ago it was difficult to arouse any interest in pollution or its abatement on a national scale. Now there is mounting alarm, and, according to Senator MUSKIE, the chief sponsor of the Senate bill, the people have given a mandate to Congress to end the shocking abuse of our water resources.

In any event, the Senate has responded with a commendable sense of urgency. It voted to authorize the spending of \$6 billion for pollution control over the next six years. The program is designed to stimulate a total outlay of \$20 billion, with the states and municipalities contributing the larger share. It remains to be seen whether the local governments will take full advantage of this opportunity to reclaim their corrupted rivers. But the Federal incentive will certainly be much stronger than ever before.

To date the states have been shockingly negligent in this field. With many of their rivers stinking from sewage and many harbors befouled by oil and other wastes, 42 states have done nothing at all, leaving the whole burden on their municipalities. As a result numerous towns and cities are pouring raw sewage into the same stream. Even where municipalities have made some effort

to cope with the problem, they tend to be overwhelmed by their own corruption. The wholesale fouling of our once-clear rivers is truly a national disgrace.

The central idea behind the present bill is to clean up entire river systems. At the request of a state, or several states in the case of interstate streams, the Secretary of the Interior may designate a planning agency for an entire river basin. The plan devised by that agency would have to meet the standards fixed by the bill and the state would have to put up 30 percent of the cost of the essential treatment facilities. In these circumstances, the Federal grant could amount to 50 percent of the entire cost, leaving only 20 percent for the municipalities.

Apart from the basin-wide projects, the bill would eliminate existing dollar ceilings on grants to state and local agencies for the construction of treatment works. It would set up a special program for depressed areas which cannot finance sewage treatment facilities. It would provide a 10-percent Federal bonus to encourage joint action by large metropolitan areas in meeting their pollution-control problems. Funds would also become available for the training of personnel in pollution control, for additional research in the disposal of radioactive wastes, the pollution of estuaries and so forth. It is an immense undertaking.

Let no one suppose, however, that the pollution problem is about to be solved or that no further efforts are necessary. Senator MUSKIE candidly told his colleagues that two major problems are left untouched by his bill; the disposal of industrial waste and the separation of storm and sanitary sewers. Under the best of circumstances, moreover, the billions voted by the Senate would provide only primary and secondary sewage treatment for 80 percent of the population. Someone has estimated that it will cost \$100 billion to wipe out the country's befouling of its water resources, and then it is doubtful whether the job would be complete.

The Senate bill will also need scrutiny as to the clean-water standards it provides. Yet, with all its deficiencies, it is a remarkable step forward. The House should be at least equally forthright and positive in its response to the mounting mandate for clean water.

[From the New York Times, July 15, 1966]

THE SENATE ACTS ON POLLUTION

The Senate has given a powerful thrust to the fight for cleaner air and water in America. Without a dissenting vote, it has passed and sent to the House a \$6.2-billion, six-year program to eliminate water pollution and a bill authorizing \$196 million over three years to combat air pollution.

For cleaner air, the bill would provide up to 50 per cent of the costs of antipollution programs for individual communities and up to 60 per cent for campaigns undertaken jointly by cities or states.

For cleaner water, the Senate program would go well beyond Administration requests. In fact, in his testimony on a similar bill before the corresponding House Committee, Interior Secretary Udall had urged a ceiling of \$3.45 billion over five years.

Senators did not just pluck the \$6-billion figure out of thick air, however. This sum would provide Federal contributions averaging about a third of the cost of urgently needed water purification programs across the country. Sponsors believe that if the states and localities cooperated properly, this expanded program could eliminate the present \$20-billion backlog of required waste-treatment facilities over the six-year period.

Mr. Udall is under budgetary pressure because of the expanding war effort in Vietnam. Even his proposed ceiling would go well beyond current programs and President Johnson's request for the clean-rivers campaign this year. But the need is clear and a

major, effective antipollution effort is many years overdue. House action is now imperative.

COMMUNISTS LOSE GROUND

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, if we think we have world problems, consider the view from the Communist angle.

The Aurora, Ill., Beacon-News, one of the Copley newspapers, makes this suggestion in an editorial describing the domestic and international failures that mar the outlook for Red China and Russia.

Their problems do not solve ours, the newspaper acknowledges, but they do indicate that our policies furthering multilateral alliances and economic stability among friends are right.

When the Communist world falters, the editorial advises, we should play from a hand of strength to assure victory for freedom and the dignity of man.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD this description of cracks in the Communist front.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Aurora (Ill.) Beacon News, July 11, 1966]

CRACKS DEVELOP ON ALL FRONTS—COMMUNISTS LOSE GROUND

If at times, the world problems of the United States of America seem grim and depressing, consider how the globe must look to the Communist today.

Red China, one of the two major atheistic Communist powers, is fighting a bitter internal ideological war and has a serious difference of opinion with Russia.

Its aggression in Indonesia was a total flop; it has alienated India and even Pakistan has shown a noticeable cooling to the wiles of Mao Tse-tung. A Red Chinese ideological invasion of Africa was a dismal failure. Peking's agricultural and industrial economy is archaic and stagnating.

The problems of Russia, the other large Marxist power, are no less serious. Its agriculture is so weak it is still spending hoarded gold to buy Free World wheat. Its industries are years behind major free world nations despite abortive attempts at a pseudo free-enterprise system. The people are restive, demanding more consumer goods and more luxuries.

In the political realm the problems of Russia make those of the United States seem small. After 11 years of existence, the Warsaw Pact, a counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is faltering. Without total Russian domination, there probably would not be a pact.

Romania, Yugoslavia and even the militant Czechoslovakia are rebelling at the iron hand of the Kremlin. Additionally, communism and Catholicism are in a major confrontation in Poland. And on the other side of the continent, China is casting covetous eyes on its former territories in Siberia.

In Southeast Asia the war is going badly for both the Red Chinese who spur it ideologically, and the Russians who are supplying much of the equipment and technical knowledge.

In the American hemisphere, the Russians have an albatross in the form of Fidel Castro, who may be near the verge of collapse in Cuba. The problem is further aggravated for Russia by failure of the Cuban sugar crop and inordinately low world prices for the commodity.

Because of quick and proper United States assistance, the Communists failed to gain a foothold in the Dominican Republic.

vide the ridiculous symbol of their fears by erecting a wall in Berlin. Only recently has there been a relaxing of the barriers that for so long separated the Communist-dominated countries behind the Iron Curtain from the rest of the world.

Red leaders have concluded—and correctly so—that they have much to lose if they end their isolation. The aggressive designs that typify Communist nations merely serve to keep the focus of attention on something other than their domestic problems.

The President has made it clear that Red China has nothing to fear from the U.S. if it halts its exports of terror, and recognizes that "co-operation, not hostility, is the way of the future." Even though the Red Chinese may not listen, the conciliatory speech cannot help but impress other world leaders.

The timing of the policy outline was excellent—for the President could not have spoken convincingly a few months ago while Americans and South Vietnamese were being terrorized in the streets of Saigon and repeatedly ambushed in the jungles of South Vietnam. Speaking now from a position of strength, the appeal is much more likely to be effective.

Project Headstart Is Tremendously Beneficial

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JOHN E. MOSS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 12, 1966

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, Project Headstart has proven, in my judgment, to be tremendously beneficial. I had an opportunity for close observation of its operation in the city of Alexandria, Va., last year as a result of the very active interest of my 16-year-old daughter who served as a volunteer participant in the program. Her reports of improvements were most impressive. I believe that the benefits far outweigh the costs of the program—the successes more than overbalance the few instances of failure.

The Sacramento Bee in an editorial in its issue of Wednesday, July 13, 1966, reflects in part the broad public approval of Project Headstart.

I commend the editorial, particularly the closing paragraph, to my colleagues:

[From the Sacramento Bee, July 13, 1966]

ALL START EQUAL?

When Project Head Start was initiated in the attempt to create a better educational opportunity among the disadvantaged very young there was scoffing from the critics it would become just another extravagant governmental boondoggle.

Well, after only a year's operation even the harshest critics have had to pull in their necks in the face of irrefutable testimony that Project Head Start represents a magnificent beginning at helping the disadvantaged prepare for schooling.

Those who are expert in such things have found that the IQ of children enrolled in Head Start programs increases as much as 16 per cent in the exposure. They report there not only has been a marked improvement in the educational potential of these children, the project has helped the disadvantaged to adjust socially. This cannot be considered only a side benefit. In a real sense, this adjustment is absolutely essential to living the fuller, more creative life.

There have been many stories told of the experiences of those working in Head Start

programs. Among them include the revelations that in the case of many children, the tots never had a book of their own to open and reveled in their new discovery: The picture and the written word. In the case of another a Negro child was asked what a policeman was. She replied a policeman was someone who would hurt you and throw you in jail. Such was her environmental concept of law, justice, in her tender years.

There also is the story of the teacher who was reading to these tots when a little boy stopped her and asked what the word "love" meant. It had been used in the sentence "The boy loves his father." He had never learned the word in his four years of living.

Every one may be born "equal" but the fortunes of family and environment can make all the difference; and this is where Head Start comes in.

New Opportunity in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 27, 1966

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, when nations wage war it is rare that they talk to each other with words of sympathy. The more intense the war becomes, the more difficult it becomes to envision the parties negotiating to resolve their differences.

The war in Vietnam has reached that level of intensity where all talk of negotiations begins to sound like propaganda. It is, therefore, highly significant that for the first time in this war the North Vietnamese appear to have responded to a plea by the United States and by voices of humanity everywhere. Ho Chi Minh has reportedly said that there is "no trial in view" for American military prisoners.

In an editorial yesterday morning, the New York Times explored some of the possible implications of this statement. The editorial, which deserves our careful attention, follows:

[From the New York Times, July 26, 1966]

NEW OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

President Ho Chi Minh's statement that there is "no trial in view" for American military prisoners in North Vietnam is a victory for the moral influence of world opinion. That victory transcends the fate of the captive airmen, for it offers hope that common sense and common humanity ultimately may prevail against the ever greater barbarism the war in Vietnam daily inflates on both sides.

The United States has yielded to the pressure of world opinion in the past by offering peace proposals and twice suspending the bombing of North Vietnam. But this is the first time that Hanoi has shown regard for the opinion of mankind. Its decision to back away from talk of "war crimes trials" follows direct pleas from Secretary General Thant, Pope Paul VI, numerous governments and opinion leaders everywhere, including eighteen liberal American Senators. The hope now must be that reason can prevail on the broader issues of the war itself.

The conflict in Vietnam is a political struggle that, in the end, can only be resolved by political means. In politics, timing is of the essence. A number of opportunities to probe the prospects for peace have been neglected in the past. It is vital that the new atmosphere and the new opportunity opened by

Hanoi's response on the prisoner issue not be missed as well.

The approach favored by American moderates and long urged by The Times has just been summed up admirably by Prof. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. One essential element is to stop the Americanization of the war by halting the American buildup in South Vietnam; a quarter of a million American troops is more than enough. The second vital element is a civilian Government in Saigon that can open contact with the insurgent forces. Third, is the need to build an atmosphere conducive to negotiations by tapering off the bombing of North Vietnam. Finally, efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference must be linked with broad diplomatic discussions with Moscow, Paris and other interested states to find a formula for the neutralization and economic development of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Most of all, what is needed is a clear indication that the American objective is not military victory but political settlement. The American ability to escalate the war needs no further demonstration. The need now is to halt the escalation and make a vigorous new effort to achieve peace.

Great Lakes Commission States Federal Water Pollution R. & D. Must Be Directed to Development of Effective New Waste Treatment Processes

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 18, 1966

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, water pollution problems mount in the Nation, and it has long been known that the best available conventional waste treatment plants fail to do more than retard the growth of pollution. Yet the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee found in a recent investigation that Federal R. & D. is not organized toward the development and actual field-scale testing of advanced treatment plants. Work on development of new technology proceeds at a mere \$5 million per year level, permitting only pilot-project-scale tests, while the remainder of some \$30 million per year in Federal R. & D. is diffused into small, scattered research studies. Many of these are no doubt useful, but they are no substitute for a deliberate, well-organized program directed to the development of an adequate technology which could start reversing the tide of pollution in every stream, river, and lake in the country.

The executive director of the Great Lakes Commission, Mr. Leonard J. Goodsell, in a letter to me deplors this failure to direct Federal R. & D. to the development of new, effective treatment methods. Mr. Goodsell's letter follows:

GREAT LAKES COMMISSION,
Ann Arbor, Mich., July 20, 1966.

HON. HENRY S. REUSS,
House of Representatives,
House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. REUSS: The Milwaukee Journal on July 10 carried an account of the report of your Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs, Committee on Government Operations which deplors the "Slow Research Pace in Pollution—"

July 27, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A3979

In part as a result of this flooded bond market, these predictions have now been affirmed. On July 21, the Wall Street Journal reported that Mississippi offered for sale four bond issues totaling \$17,433,000. Two of the bond issues were to finance improvements in the port facilities of Gulfport and Pascagoula, another would pay for capital improvements at various State institutions and junior colleges, and a fourth would be used to finance improvements to the State penitentiary.

Only the small \$300,000 penitentiary issue which matures in 5 years was sold. The interest rate was just under 4 percent.

The State rejected as too costly a bid of nearly 4.1 percent interest on the bond issue to improve State institutions. The other two port facility offerings carried a maximum interest limitation of 4 percent and consequently, no bids were received.

All four bond issues were rated Double A by Moody's and Single A by Standard & Poor's.

As a result of the high interest rates on municipal bonds—in part the consequence of the glutted municipal bond market—Mississippi will have to look elsewhere for financing for its needed public improvements.

The July 21 Wall Street Journal article follows:

FOUR MISSISSIPPI ISSUES OFFERED, BUT ONLY ONE, \$300,000 BONDS, IS SOLD—STATE REJECTS BIDS ON \$13,683,000 BONDS AND FAILS TO RECEIVE ANY ON TWO ISSUES TOTALING \$3,450,000

(By a Wall Street Journal staff reporter)

JACKSON, Miss.—Mississippi offered four bond issues totaling \$17,433,000 for sale, but awarded only the smallest issue, totaling \$300,000. It rejected bids for \$13,683,000 of bonds and failed to receive bids on the other two issues, totaling \$3,450,000.

The \$300,000 general-obligation penitentiary bond issue, maturing in five years, was awarded to Deposit Guaranty National Bank of Jackson, Miss., bidding alone, at an annual net interest cost of 3.9955%.

The state treasurer's office, however, rejected both bids it received for its biggest issue—\$13,683,000 general improvement bonds. The apparent best bid, offering an annual net interest cost of 4.0827%, came from a group headed by Chase Manhattan Bank, Blyth & Co. and Lehman Brothers. A group led by First National City Bank offered an annual net interest cost of 4.2260%.

TRYING FOR 4-PERCENT BID

"We obviously were hoping for a bid under 4%, but I don't think any of us were too surprised the bids were over 4% in view of the bond market situation," said State Treasurer William F. Winter, noting that "Louisiana rejected a bid over 4.50% recently." Mr. Winter said he didn't know of any civil rights protests against the Mississippi bond offering and didn't believe the recent civil rights march in the state had any detrimental effect on the bids it received for its bonds.

Before its bid was rejected, the Chase-Blyth-Lehman group was reoffering the bonds to investors, subject to award, from a yield of 3.75% for the July 1, 1967, maturities to a dollar price of 100½ for 4% bonds, due July 1, 1977-86.

All of the bonds are rated double-A by Moody's and single-A by Standard & Poor's. Proceeds were to have been used for capital improvements at various state institutions and junior colleges.

NO BID ON PORT ISSUES

The state failed to draw any bids for two port issues totaling \$3,450,000 and carrying a maximum interest limitation of 4%. Proceeds from these bonds would have gone for improvements at Gulfport and Pascagoula.

Mr. Winter said that state will finance construction slated to be supported by the \$13,683,000 general improvement bonds from short-term loans from local banks. He said several alternative financing plans, including short-term borrowing, are being studied for the planned port improvements.

Compared with other recent municipal issues, the 4.0827% "didn't look like a bad bid," Mr. Winter declared. "But the immediacy of our needs isn't such to cause us to pay that rate at this time. We're aware that sooner or later we may have to pay that interest, but we're deferring that decision for several months."

On its previous trip to the bond market, June 23, 1965, Mississippi obtained an annual net interest cost of 3.3487% in selling \$8.3 million general improvement bonds, due July 1, 1968-87, and an annual net interest cost of 3.5664% in selling \$3.5 million Greater Port of Pascagoula improvement bonds, due June 1, 1969-95.

The 1966 Civil Rights Act: A Federal-State Comparison of Fair Housing

**SPEECH
OF**

HON. HERBERT TENZER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 25, 1966

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, during the course of the debate on the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966, many questions were raised in connection with title IV, to prohibit discrimination in residential housing transactions by persons in the housing business. Because of these questions I requested statistics and research material relating to fair housing laws in the various States and territories in order to evaluate the impact of title IV on my own State of New York and on the Nation.

The statistics are interesting and revealing and I believe my colleagues will find them helpful in formulating a position with respect to title IV of the bill H.R. 14765.

The State of New York has a more comprehensive law against discrimination than the bill before the House this week. The New York State law prohibits discrimination in the sale, leasing, or rental of all housing except owner-occupied two family dwellings and the rental of a room in an owner-occupied house. Of particular significance is the fact that real estate brokers and lending institutions are specifically covered by the New York State law.

Seventeen States and the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have fair housing laws which go beyond title IV of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966. These 17 States represent more than 50 percent of the total population of the United States.

The laws of these 17 States cover public housing or publicly assisted housing

and all cover private housing. Eight of these States cover single family homes and only two—Michigan and Indiana—exempt realtors. Four States and one territory excludes lending institutions.

The 17 States are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.

More than half of all U.S. citizens live under fair housing law which go beyond the coverage of the legislation now under consideration by this Chamber. The other citizens of the United States are entitled to the same protection for so long as we diminish the rights of a single American, the rights of an American are in danger. Freedom and democracy can make no distinctions with respect to equal treatment of our citizens and I urge my colleagues to formulate their decision upon this principle and to support the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1966.

L.B.J.'s Policy Outline Well Timed

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. CLAIR CALLAN

OF NEBRASKA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, July 27, 1966

Mr. CALLAN. Mr. Speaker, the President's statement of policy in Asia before the American Alumni Council has been received with praise by several newspapers across the country. I am particularly proud that such endorsement is contained in a recent editorial by the Norfolk Daily News of Norfolk, Nebr., one of the Nation's leading smalltown daily newspapers.

This editorial comment recognizes that the President's speech may not have an immediate influence on the leaders of Red China. But it contends the speech will have a valuable impact on other countries—including those behind the Iron Curtain.

I am pleased to submit this editorial for publication in the RECORD:

[From the Norfolk (Nebr.) Daily News, July 14, 1966]

L.B.J.'s POLICY OUTLINE WELL TIMED

Red China's leaders may not be impressed by President Johnson's outline of U.S. policies toward that nation, but the effect of his Tuesday message upon officials in many other countries, especially the neutralist ones or those with Communist sympathies, should be great. This might ultimately help convince the Red Chinese that there is more to be gained from the "peaceful co-existence" which the President offered than there is in pursuing Asian conquest.

President Johnson simply asked the Red Chinese to renounce aggression and to open their doors to the world. This is, at the same time, the most difficult thing for Communists to do.

It was not until after nearly four decades of Communist rule in Russia that its officials opened the doors just a crack. The Communists in East Germany went so far as to pro-