

portion of the savings is being channeled directly from the saver to the borrower through the capital markets rather than through financial intermediaries.

Since the mid-1950's, commercial banks have been filling an increasing proportion of the nation's credit requirements, after having lagged behind other savings institutions in the immediate postwar period. However, so far this year, commercial banks have met only about one-fourth of the nation's financing needs compared to 40 percent in 1965. Indeed, the major savings institutions have had to compete for a less rapidly growing savings pie. Adapting to a slower rate of savings inflow is not an easy task, particularly if operations have been geared to a large continuing inflow.

The adjustment process, however, has been eased by a concomitant slowdown in demand in certain sectors of the economy and by the restraining effects of a tighter monetary policy. This is an opportunity to strengthen portfolios, to reassess short- and long-run factors, and to match activity more closely to supply and demand factors currently operative in the market. For financial institutions such as savings banks and savings and loan associations the adjustment process is slow because of the long-term nature of their investments. Liquidity needs and commitment policies may have to be reevaluated in light of the future prospects for housing and construction and for savings.

This reevaluation process is equally beneficial for our commercial lending institutions. The role of the large negotiable time certificate of deposit—and, more recently, the related small-denomination savings instruments—might be usefully reexamined by every bank to determine whether undue dependence is being placed on these instruments for deposit growth and whether liquidity requirements might need to be strengthened for these deposits. The competition for these interest-sensitive funds, moreover, has become so intense that it might be questioned whether there is any net gain to the bank in deposit volume or only higher interest costs. The banking system as a whole may be only stimulating more frequent shifting of funds or an upward ratcheting of the rate structure rather than attracting additional savings.

Higher interest costs in turn have placed pressure on bank profit margins. Over the longer run, profitability is a major determinant of the types of activities in which a bank engages. Attention may be focused on growth in the very short-run but only at a bank's peril can it ignore profit considerations over the long run.

Similar considerations are relevant in a bank's lending operations. The present strong upward pressures on the nation's resources call for restraint on the part of both lenders and borrowers.

The financial sector now has reached an especially significant milestone—from this point forward a high degree of statesmanship, responsibility, imagination and restraint is required. We have reached the point where adjustments must be made to circumstances that have evolved gradually—over the whole postwar period in some cases and during the present economic expansion in others. Operations cannot be blindly predicated on continuation of the previous high rates of growth in savings inflow or in the demands for credit.

All of our major financial institutions have responded well to the challenge of directing the nation's savings into productive use and of meeting the nation's credit needs. But as savings flows decline or as particular credit needs are satisfied, it is equally the responsibility of our banks and savings institutions to adjust to the changed situation. Adjustment to a slower growth rate or to shifting

demands in the economy is a much more difficult assignment than adjustment to rapid expansion, but it is an assignment whose successful completion is essential to the fundamental health of our financial system.

The past six months have emphasized another facet of our financial mechanism—the essential interrelationship of all our financial markets. The increase in the Federal Reserve discount rate and in the interest rate ceilings last December was designed to impose a measure of monetary restraint on the burgeoning economy and at the same time give banks somewhat greater flexibility in attracting deposits to accommodate strong loan demands. By raising the ceiling to 5½ percent, however, a 1½ percent differential was opened up between the rate paid on pass-book savings accounts and the rate on other time deposits. Although rates were not expected to move to the ceiling, they in fact rose rapidly as banks competed for funds. The size of the differential provided a very strong inducement for banks to develop new instruments to attract funds.

Banks have responded since December to the higher permissible rate structure with innovations in the types of deposit facilities offered to the saver, such as savings or investment certificates and savings bonds. Both the Federal Reserve and the FDIC are currently conducting surveys of banks under their supervision to find out more about these new savings instruments and how savers have reacted to them. From these surveys we hope to obtain a better insight into bank responses to changes in interest rate ceilings.

A second result of the December increase was an acceleration in the movement of funds between different types of deposits, between banks, and also between different types of financial institutions. The success of banks in attracting a larger proportion of new savings has had a dampening effect on other savings institutions. To a yet undetermined extent, moreover, banks may have drawn interest-sensitive funds out of these financial intermediaries—although other competitive investment outlets doubtless contributed to the slower growth in savings at these nonbank financial institutions. Within the banking system, in addition, larger banks found themselves competing against smaller banks.

These interactions resulting from action in one sector illustrate the close interrelationship of financial institutions in today's markets and demonstrate the difficulties of foretelling with accuracy financial responses in a financial market as complex as ours. The practically impossible task of separating and isolating one sector of the financial markets from another suggests strongly that, to the extent that regulation and supervision are needed, they should be applicable to all sectors of the market.

The ability of banks to compete successfully today against specialized thrift institutions is attributable largely to the fact that banks are multi-purpose institutions. Through their broader investment opportunities and their ability to provide a wide variety of financial services, banks are in a relatively strong position to attract customers. The advantage that banks hold over other financial intermediaries thus cannot be eliminated simply by rate equality. This conclusion leads in turn to the very interesting question of the future of special-purpose institutions.

The development of the future could very well be the evolution of single-purpose institutions toward a multi-purpose operation as financial markets become increasingly integrated. The constantly growing and diversified credit needs of our economy may push us steadily toward this concept of "one-

stop" banking. From a financial system with savings institutions at one end of the spectrum and commercial banks at the other, we may see a "merging toward the center" as our financial institutions adjust to changing circumstances. In the process we may also achieve a more efficient allocation of our financial resources without the sacrifice of private initiative and enterprise.

As recent experience amply demonstrates, our financial structure is constantly changing and adapting. New patterns in the flow of savings have emerged and new techniques are in use. Problems have arisen as a consequence of these recent developments. It is the responsibility, however, of the supervisory authorities to facilitate the necessary adjustments during transition periods with as little friction and disturbance to the market as possible. Whatever actions are taken—whether affecting rates, instruments, or even institutions—should be taken with caution because of possible unforeseen and unfortunate repercussions. The geographical diversity of our nation heightens this possibility. Serious imbalances or prolongation of the adjustment period also could result from an incorrect course of action. The impact of any particular action, moreover, could vary with the circumstances in which it is undertaken. Consequently, the supervisory authorities must be accorded maximum flexibility in this area to tailor their actions to the particular situation. Packaged prescriptions might well be unsuitable—and also highly inflexible.

The lack of a neatly packaged solution should not be equated with inability to find a solution. In many cases, an approach more easily adapted to particular circumstances or selective in its impact may be preferable.

Although our financial institutions are generally strong, there are always a few trouble spots. It is for this reason that the Corporation is currently strongly supporting the proposed legislation for cease-and-desist authority against unsafe and unsound practices of banks and savings and loan associations and for authority to remove directors or officers of institutions whose actions may weaken the position of the institution, its depositors, or shareholders. The bill now pending in Congress would reinforce and widen the range of existing remedies for correcting unlawful, unsound, or irregular practices that are unfortunately still found from time to time. It permits the supervisory authorities to take action quickly and effectively short of more drastic action such as a takeover or termination of deposit insurance, which are the alternatives now available to us. The bill also provides protection of the rights of any institution, its officers, directors, and others involved.

In closing, I would like to summarize briefly what we are learning from the dialogue in the financial community today. First, adaptability and flexibility of all our financial institutions to changing circumstances—whether on the supply side or on the demand side—are essential for the continued strength of our financial system. Secondly, any action affecting one sector of our financial markets has an impact on all other sectors; our financial markets cannot be compartmentalized. Thirdly, the complex ties between all sectors of the financial markets argue for across-the-board regulation, if regulation is needed. Fourthly, the advantage that a multi-purpose financial institution has over a single-purpose institution tends to lead us to the conclusion that a greater diversification of powers within an institution may be the development of the future. Finally, the supervisory authorities must remain alert to these developments and be prepared to aid the adjustment process. It is an important responsibility that we do not take lightly.

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densely populated sector of Indochina while Laos is the largest least populated country in the area and has the least capacity to defend itself. Laos is deeply divided, ethnically and politically. Communist forces now control about one-half of Laos.

Cambodia is also sparsely populated and is in a vulnerable strategic position. To use her main waterway to the sea, it is necessary to pass through South Vietnam on the Mekong River. The Mekong Delta is open to attack from routes which can be commanded from North Vietnam and Laos. Thus, it is essential to the security of Cambodia that South Vietnam and Laos are in friendly hands.

If Indochina fell to the Communists, it is quite possible that Thailand would divorce herself from Western defense arrangements and try to reach an accommodation with China. Historically, Thailand has adopted this flexible position of being willing to cooperate with the region's dominant power, whether that should be Great Britain, France, Japan, the United States, or China. This stance would be forced upon Thailand because of her strategic vulnerability. The bulk of the Lao people live in Thailand, which has much reason to fear a Vietnamese-Lao combination. The instability of northeast Thailand is further increased by the presence of 50,000 to 80,000 pro-Communist refugees from Vietnam who have settled there since World War II. It is clear that China has designs on Thailand, for the Chinese have designated Thailand as the next area ripe for a war of national liberation, and have even established a free Thai movement from the Thai ethnic groups living in southern China.

Burma, already beset by rebellious factions, would be another prime target. Rebel groups continue to operate in northern Malaya. Singapore has often been described as a hotbed of Communist activity. Indonesia is beset by internal difficulties and has great problems in maintaining the allegiance of her outer islands. There is a strong insurrectionist movement on one of the Philippines' main islands of Mindanao.

Thus, the removal of U.S. power could bring on a wider war as China and North Vietnam attempted to dominate the region. A threat to Burma would involve the vital interests of India, for World War II demonstrated that the country in control of Burma can easily launch attacks on India. World War II also showed that the security of Australia and New Zealand depends upon a stable situation in southeast Asia. Britain is pledged to defend Malaysia and could become drawn into a wider struggle.

In addition, American disengagement would cause friends and enemies alike to question seriously the credibility of any U.S. military deterrent.

#### CHINA'S INTENTIONS

These, then, are the stakes involved in defending South Vietnam—trade routes, economic resources, the dangers of a Vietnam united under the Communists, the weaknesses of the surrounding states, the need for a credible deterrent against China, and the dangers of a wider war. But there are still those who argue

that China has only peaceful intentions in the region and would not try to impose economic or political control. But this does not explain why China supplies the so-called wars of national liberation, or why she has formed the free Thai insurrectionary movement.

It is very difficult to assess the intentions of a rising power because each gain brings new objectives within reach. Thus, although China may have peaceful intentions now, an American withdrawal could change those intentions. Certainly, the experiences of Germany should bring second thoughts to the minds of those who disclaim the aggressive intentions of a rising power, with the belief that she is entitled to be the regional leader, in the midst of a number of weaker states.

Of course, the only certain way to determine China's intentions would be to withdraw, but this course is fraught with too many dangers. It would be too easy for China to invade the area and present the world with a fait accompli in a short period of time. And World War II demonstrated that it is extremely difficult to dislodge an invading force from the area once it has become entrenched, even with superiority in firepower and control of air and water.

Through economic development and peaceful change, the United States hopes to see eventually a number of progressive, independent, and viable states in southeast Asia, able to stand on their own feet. Is this possible? It is, according to the examples in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and South Korea, where Communist revolutionary movements, supported from outside, were finally defeated. Today, the United States and her allies are thankful that decisions were made to stand firm in these former areas, even though the outlook was often bleak. These examples lend added support to the view that the defense of South Vietnam is worth the effort. The United States should not reconcile herself to being condemned by history as the country which allowed the 200 million people and vast natural resources of southeast Asia to be controlled by powers which have pledged themselves to our destruction.

International politics usually confront a state with opportunities not to do the greatest good, but to do the least evil. It is better to limit the war to Vietnam now than to court the incalculable dangers that would stem from a wider war.

#### ADDRESS BY HON. K. A. RANDALL

(Mr. ASHLEY (at the request of Mr. GALAN) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHLEY. Mr. Speaker, all of us are aware of the restrictions of credit which have generated recent intensification of competition among financial institutions for savings. Because this is a topic of very real importance and priority consideration, I am pleased to insert in the RECORD the following remarks of Mr. K. A. Randall, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,

at the annual convention of the American Institute of Banking at San Diego, Calif., on June 3, 1966:

REMARKS BY K. A. RANDALL, CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BEFORE THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING AT SAN DIEGO, CALIF., ON JUNE 3, 1966

Last month, the House Banking and Currency Committee opened hearings on two bills designed to impose restrictions on commercial bank time deposits—one prohibits the issuance of certificates of deposit and other bank obligations and the other bars banks from accepting time deposits in amounts less than \$15,000. In the course of the hearings, additional proposals were advanced to place a uniform interest rate on all types of time and savings deposits and borrowings of banks and to permit higher rate ceilings on large deposits.

These proposals have been generated by the recent intensification of competition among financial institutions for savings, coupled with continued high levels of economic activity. It is not my intention today, however, to comment directly on these specific proposals. I want to concentrate instead of some of the major issues and problems that have been illuminated by the proposed legislation and the current situation in the financial markets. These are the issues and problems that will be with us in the years to come—in one form or another. An understanding of their nature and their implications is therefore essential.

I am particularly pleased to be able to speak to an audience such as this today because you are the ones who, in the future, will have to face and solve problems similar to those posed by the current vigorous competition for savings. Most of the managerial talent for the banking industry will be drawn from your ranks. Your ability and resourcefulness in coping with the problems of the future will be a crucial factor in preserving the strength and viability of our financial institutions.

The current economic situation is characterized by high and still rising levels of economic activity, close to full employment of our plant and manpower resources, and strong upward pressures on interest rates and on the demand for credit. Our international commitments at the same time inject an element of uncertainty into the economic outlook. The financial markets reflect the interaction of all these forces, which may be intensified this month by record corporate tax payments due at mid-month and by expectations of the savings and loan industry that withdrawals from share accounts after the dividend payment period at the end of the month may exceed the inflow of new savings.

Although pressures in the financial markets may be severe this month, generally speaking the major segments of the financial community—the commercial banks, the savings banks, and the savings and loan associations—are strong and well able to withstand these short-run pressures. Furthermore, you may be confident that the various supervisory authorities are also prepared to provide whatever assistance that may be necessary with every means at their disposal.

The present conjuncture of circumstances, nevertheless, provides several good illustrations of problems we may expect in the future. One of the major factors in the current situation is the strong competition among financial institutions for funds to meet the demand for business financing, for consumer credit, and for mortgage financing. This competition is taking place against a relative shrinkage in the volume of new savings. In the first quarter of this year, for example, saving as a percent of disposable personal income totaled only 5.0 percent compared to 5.6 percent in the last quarter of 1965. At the same time, a larger pro-

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I will be very happy to yield.

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, as I have sat here listening to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] and two of my colleagues, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKI] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] and I am sure the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. McCLORY] will participate in this discussion, a point has been made that cannot be too often said that the gentleman from New York in the well [Mr. PIRNIE] has now on two occasions stepped into the breach which has come about because the chairman of the delegation, in this instance, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE] was unable to participate. This is a great test of leadership to have such an important responsibility thrust upon one without prior notification.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that it was very heartening to see the gentleman from New York handle this emergency, to quickly take up the reins, and to effectively participate in conferences with those who establish the agenda and those who are attempting in some way to cut through complications which so quickly develop, especially during times of crisis such as is represented by the problem of Vietnam which as the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] said, pushes itself into every discussion even when the agenda did not warrant the inclusion and discussion of this particular issue. So, Mr. Speaker, we all must realize that the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] did an outstanding job and that he should be commended for it most highly.

Mr. Speaker, one of the developments of this meeting which I believe to be of outstanding importance was that when we arrived there was a heated feeling, I believe, against the U.S. delegation because of the situation in Vietnam.

But as the conference moved on and as we had the opportunity to talk to other members of the delegations from the other 50 or so countries which were participating, and as we struggled with a resolution in a committee upon which I had the good fortune to serve with the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE], we saw this effort push to the point where the resolution was finally hammered out and where it was brought before the conference, then one delegation after another spoke in favor, excepting for the Soviet bloc which in most instances spoke against it saying that they would vote in the negative. Finally when the Russian delegate spoke for his delegation he revealed that he would not vote in the negative but would abstain. Then, when the vote finally took place, all of the Soviet bloc did in fact abstain, following the leadership of the Soviet delegate.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, this resolution was in fact passed without any negative vote against the position of that resolution, turning completely about the attitude of heat which had originally been evident as the conference opened.

Mr. Speaker, I do believe that this was a tremendous accomplishment and it came about through the members of the delegation working closely together and because the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] showed a high degree of leadership under most difficult circumstances.

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and wish to call the attention of the Members of the House to the fact that the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO] worked very effectively as a member of the delegation, and as an outstanding member of this particular committee. It was his tact, his resourcefulness and his very evident sincerity that helped to supply the persuasion necessary to resolve the differences which he has described.

Further, Mr. Speaker, we can be very, very proud that the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO] has been selected as the member of this delegation whom we hope to advance to the Executive Committee of the Interparliamentary Union at the next session.

Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield to a distinguished member of our delegation, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. JONES].

Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I do not believe I can add anything to the expressions which have been made by my colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO], in complimenting the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] for the diplomatic way in which he presided and for the influence which he was able to wield over the Conference that was held.

I think all of us, as has been indicated by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO], were pleasantly surprised by the satisfactory manner in which all of the questions were resolved. I think it speaks very highly for the chairman who did such a magnificent job at the last moment when he was called upon without any previous notice that he would have to assume the leadership of the delegation, just as he had done on one other previous occasion. We were extremely proud of the way in which he handled it.

I just want to add my remarks to those that have been made here by the other delegates who were in attendance at the Conference and to concur in their statement and say that I am proud of the position that we were able to maintain there and proud of the dignity with which we conducted our tasks and of the final accomplishments of the Conference.

(Mr. JONES of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Missouri. I would just like to point out that the gentleman from Missouri speaks from a background of experience, and demonstrated dedication to the purposes of the Interparliamentary Union.

Mr. Speaker, I am sure we are all ap-

preciative of the efforts which the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. JONES] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE] put forth to portray the potential and the attitude of our country in fields related to the economic life of the world and our international responsibilities. They are very vigorous efforts which commanded the respect of those in attendance.

Again, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Missouri again for his very kind remarks.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I want to add my commendation for the very expert job that the gentleman from New York performed as chairman of our U.S. delegation to the Interparliamentary Union Conference in Canberra.

As we know, the spring conference of the IPU is intended primarily as a preparatory meeting for the fall or plenary session of this organization. Yet, we did find that there were a number of issues that had to be decided at this spring meeting.

The delegation it seemed to me to a man performed its work most capably. I think it should be brought out to the Members of the House that there is a great deal of preparatory work prior to this Conference and we are fortunate to have the assistance of the distinguished executive secretary of our organization, Dr. George Galloway and of the staff of the Library of Congress and other aids that we are able to receive from the Department of State and elsewhere so as to better equip ourselves to contend with the problems that we encounter at these international meetings.

It seems to me quite definitely as other Members have said that we dealt effectively with the various issues and the various problems that we encountered and saw to it that they were resolved favorably to our Nation.

Again I wish to stress to all the Members of the House that I cannot help but feel that there should be a greater understanding of the benefits that are derived from our participation in these Interparliamentary Union meetings as emissaries of our Nation and as representatives of our U.S. Congress. These meetings with parliamentarians from the other countries, provide an excellent opportunity for promoting good international relations and sound public relations for our country. I believe this opportunity is used in a most effective way.

I have sensed in the course of my brief experience as a delegate to the Interparliamentary Union Conference the development of warm and friendly attitudes on the part of a number of other delegates as a result of contacts that we have individually made and as a result of working together with the parliamentarians from other countries. This strikes me as being of extreme significance.

Comparisons have been made between the Interparliamentary Union and the United Nations. I know that at each of these meetings that we attend the fact is brought to the attention of the membership that we are elected representatives of the people who are speaking one to the other, handling and resolving issues considered by the Interparliamentary Union to be vital to our common good.

This is a point of great significance, it seems to me. Of course, there is a certain amount of liaison between the Interparliamentary Union and the United Nations and agencies of the United Nations, and I think this is as it should be.

Again I would like to mention that one of my own impressions, at least, and I am sure of other members of the delegation as well, was the very cordial, the very close relationship which exists between Australia, the people of Australia, and the people of the United States, which was brought out particularly at this meeting. I think a great many of us understood and appreciated this warmth of feeling and these close ties that exist between the people of our Nation and the people of Australia—a most significant fact to have in mind. I might say that the general public attitude in Australia, particularly toward our involvement in southeast Asia, was one which evidenced strong support and strong cooperation. This in itself was heartening.

I am proud indeed to have been a part of the U.S. delegation to the Interparliamentary Union Meeting in Canberra, and I wish to pay tribute to all of the members who participated in this meeting, not only for the active and knowledgeable way in which they performed, but also to compliment the group on the very splendid results which were achieved.

Mr. PIRNIE. I wish to thank the gentleman, and point out that the observations he has made with respect to personal contacts are thoughts that he has consistently put into practice. I do not think there was my member of the delegation who was more faithful in taking advantage of the opportunities for friendly exchange with the members of the other delegations. I have been proud to include in the report his very able remarks as he participated so actively in the work of the Parliamentary and Judicial Committee. I know our colleagues will be pleased also to know that former colleague Katharine St. George, with her usual charm and skill, participated very effectively in the conference.

It was a great pleasure to see with what warmth she was welcomed by the members of the other delegations, because we recall that, during the last Congress, she served as the head of the delegation and did a magnificent job; we are happy that it is possible for her to continue this participation.

I would like to close by paying tribute to the Government of Australia and all of its representatives who welcomed us with such obvious generous friendliness and hospitality. Members of our Embassy, under our very able Ambassador, Edward Clark, who made us so welcome and did everything to make our visit

pleasant and successful. His staff set a very high standard of Government service, and we are indebted to them for many helpful acts and courtesies. Likewise Ambassador Powell and his staff made our brief stop in New Zealand a most rewarding experience. May I also pay tribute to our own staff which ably supported all phases of the undertaking.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, will gentleman yield?

Mr. PIRNIE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, I just want to express my personal appreciation to the gentleman for his leadership in the work of the Interparliamentary Union, and to stress, what I believe is the very general consensus, the importance of this work in the whole underpinnings of international understanding. I certainly share with the gentleman the sentiments he has expressed today for the gentlewoman from New York who has taken such an important part in this work.

(Mr. MATHIAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague. I know how interested he has been in the work of the Interparliamentary Union. He has followed its problems and its accomplishments. His participation is welcomed, and I hope the opportunity will be presented where he can serve actively in this important work.

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the gentleman.

I would close my remarks by thanking once again every member of the delegation for faithful and loyal service in this important mission.

#### UN CHINA AND VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. RONCALIO], is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, the American commitment in Vietnam is ultimately based upon the probabilities of certain action by China if we should withdraw. It is of utmost importance to assess how China might act in the event of American disengagement and how this Chinese reaction would affect our vital interests.

South Vietnam is seen as the key to the security of all of southeast Asia. The United States has long had vital interests in southeast Asia for reasons of trade and communications, since its sea lanes control an important part of world shipping, and because of the area's natural resources. Southeast Asia exports about 91 percent of the hemp, 89 percent of the natural rubber, 76 percent of the copra and coconut oil, 68 percent of the tin, and 68 percent of the rice that enter into the world trade. These materials and others from the area are of strategic importance to the United States and her allies. Although many uses of natural rubber have been taken over by synthetics, the natural product still makes up about 30 percent of rubber consumption and there are some

rubber products for which no synthetic has been found. There has never been any tin discovered in the United States. Japan, with her scarcity of raw materials, is heavily dependent upon the products of southeast Asia.

#### LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

World War II pointed out the economic importance of southeast Asia to the United States and Japan and the strategic importance of Vietnam. Economically, a major Japanese motive during World War II was to gain control of the area's natural resources. This was the idea behind Japan's greater East Asia coprosperity sphere. Strategically, after first gaining a foothold in Vietnam, Japan was able to overrun all the rest of southeast Asia—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines—in 6 months with only 400,000 men. After the Japanese became entrenched in these positions, it was extremely difficult to remove them, due to the difficult jungle terrain and poorly developed communications. Despite these difficulties, the Western Allies committed themselves to a long and costly struggle to prevent a Japanese hegemony in southeast Asia.

Possessing much greater manpower than Japan, as well as nuclear weapons, China might be tempted to try the same thing Japan did, if the weak states of southeast Asia were deprived of outside support. China could send thousands of troops into the Indochinese Peninsula almost overnight. From this position, enjoying the same strategic advantage Japan had, she could overrun the rest of the area in a few months. Once in military control, the Chinese could control the trade and natural resources of the area by arrangements similar to those instituted by the U.S.S.R. in Eastern Europe after World War II. The measures could include joint-stock companies, Chinese managers for ports and industries, and perhaps even dismantling some industries for transportation behind the Chinese border. The nation in control of the archipelago region could also determine whose ships would pass through the area's narrow straits. An added motivation for China to restrict southeast Asia's economic relations with the outside world is that China cannot compete with the more efficient Japanese on a free market.

#### DOMINO THEORY

What are the probabilities that the Communist powers would come to dominate the region in this manner if the United States withdrew? After American disengagement, there would be little to stop the North Vietnamese from conquering South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. North Vietnamese expansionism to the south and west continued for about 800 years until it was halted by the imposition of French colonialism about 100 years ago. After the Japanese invaded the area during World War II, French authority was never reestablished in the north and the northern drive to the south and west began once more. The French attempted to arrest this drive until their defeat at Dienbinphu in 1954. North Vietnam is the most

specifications of the system comply with the standards set forth by the State department of health.

Mr. President, with the adoption of effective standards and procedures by the State department of health, and the subsequent preparation and adoption of local sewerage facilities plans, this new Pennsylvania act can provide new safeguards to assure that our communities are looking well ahead to make certain that their citizens will get an adequate supply of safe water, and at the same time will not be creating conditions in the handling of their wastes that will constitute a threat to the health, economy, and well being of their neighboring communities. I commend this new program to study and adaptation by all the other States.

#### THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, there have been in recent days several telling articles published which do much to clear up the public understanding of the situation in Vietnam—past, present and future, insofar as we can view the probabilities of future events. Among these articles are two of particular note, written by Senior Editor Arnaud de Borchgrave, of Newsweek, and by Joseph Alsop in the Saturday Evening Post.

Both Mr. de Borchgrave's "A Dissent From the Dissenters" and Mr. Alsop's "Why We Can Win in Vietnam" stand as persuasive statements on why we are involved in Indochina and what we have accomplished, as well as what we hopefully can yet achieve. I ask unanimous consent that these articles be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Newsweek, June 6, 1966]

#### A DISSSENT FROM THE DISSIDENTERS

(By Arnaud de Borchgrave, senior editor)

(NOTE.—Once again "gut" questions are being asked about the American commitment in Vietnam. Last week, Newsweek columnist Emmet John Hughes gave his views after a visit to Vietnam. This week, Senior Editor Arnaud de Borchgrave, also recently in Vietnam, dissents from the dissenters.)

"Vietnam is not important to us," Professor John Kenneth Galbraith said recently. "It is not a bastion of freedom, nor is it a testing place of democracy."

The slogans about why the U.S. is in Vietnam—e.g., making South Vietnam safe for democracy—and arguments about the slogans have contributed mightily to mass confusion at home and abroad. The rhetoric tends to obscure both the fundamental interest and the fundamental issue.

The fundamental interest, quite simply, is to contain the expansion of Chinese Communist imperialism. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia articulated one of the U.S.'s basic foreign policy goals, it is "to establish international conditions which channel the revolutionary changes taking place in many societies toward constructive ventures, and prevent the process of modernization and development from being forcibly taken over by Communist elites supported by militant Communist states employing the strategy of 'national liberation wars'."

The fundamental issue is whether we can find an effective answer to this new

method of warfare—the device whereby China and North Vietnam can expand, almost by proxy, by promoting a so-called "people's war" of so-called "national liberation."

And what we are trying to do in Vietnam is to demonstrate that changes in Asia—and elsewhere in the world—are not to be precipitated by "outside" force. Some of us have forgotten rather quickly that it was not South Vietnam that set out to absorb North Vietnam, but rather the other way round. What's at stake for the U.S. in Vietnam is not freedom and democracy for South Vietnam, though this might become a happy by-product. The key point at issue is whether the U.S. can successfully resist and subdue a war of "liberation." Similarly, what's at stake for China is whether it can prove that the balance of power in the world can be changed by tunneling under the nuclear stalemate of the major powers. Peking's chosen instruments are North Vietnam and the Viet Cong.

Countering a foreign-sponsored "people's war" is a terribly complex business. Such a conflict usually carries a minimum of risks for the sponsor. It always is made to look like a revolution of rising expectations against the forces of retrogression backed by the U.S. American intervention is hard to justify because the lineup is so confusing, deliberately so, and the people's grievances irrefutable.

When Senator RUSSELL says, "we should go in there, win and get out," one cannot help but feel that he and millions of others have not yet understood what Vietnam is all about. It is not that type of war. Classical wars with classical victories will probably never be seen again. The Communists are in for the long haul. And we should be, too. The other side will not abandon new methods of conquest until we have proved them unworkable.

In power politics—and that is still the name of the game—lines must be drawn somewhere, and if the U.S. doesn't draw them, who else in the Western world today would—or could? The alternative, it seems to me, is an isolationist Fortress America. What the U.S. is doing in Asia is no different, in basic principles, from what the U.S. helped the Europeans achieve during the past two decades: a line was drawn and Russia was contained and has now—in the words of Konrad Adenauer—"joined the ranks of those nations seeking peace in the world."

How long will it take to contain China, coax her out of her largely self-imposed isolation, and nudge her into more constructive endeavors? It could be another ten years or more. But evidence is accumulating that it might be shorter. I doubt whether Mao would be so obsessed with the need to prevent the next generation from becoming "Khrushchevite revisionists" if it were not already happening. In an attack on "anti-party elements," China's army newspaper has warned that unless they are defeated, it might be "perhaps only several years or a decade . . . before a counter-revolutionary restoration on a national scale inevitably occurred."

No other government in the world is run by such an old group of men. The average age of the Politburo is 68; of the much larger Central Committee, 61. And the next generation is already asking question, if only in the innermost recesses of their subconscious, questions about a seemingly interminable series of foreign policy reverses that stretch from the Congo to Indonesia.

Two years after Premier Chou En-lai toured Black Africa as a liberating hero, one black African country after another is expelling Chinese operatives and/or severing relations with Peking.

Captured documents have now produced the evidence that it was on instructions from

Peking that the Communist party tried to seize power in Indonesia last fall. And the ensuing bloodbath of revenge against Communism has made the Vietnam war seem mild by comparison. Indonesia was a deadly blow to Peking's strategy in Southeast Asia; the largest Communist party in the non-Communist world lies destroyed. We now see Indonesia negotiating an end to its military confrontation with Malaysia.

Other Asian countries have drawn a lesson from China's failures in Africa and the Far East, and the American commitment in Vietnam has helped to convince them that China's brand of Communism is not necessarily the wave of the future. Indeed, there is a world of difference between what some Asian leaders say publicly and what they concede privately. One of India's highest government officials told me that "if you give up in Vietnam we will most probably have to double our military presence in the Himalayas." No sooner said than he added, "but for the record I will go on saying you must get out of Vietnam."

Burma is another case in point. In Rangoon recently, Llu Shao-chi, the Chinese chief of state, could not get Burmese leaders, not noted for their pro-American sentiments, to sign a joint declaration condemning the U.S. for its actions in Vietnam.

For China—and its veteran leaders of the Long March—Vietnam is the crucial test of Mao's theories. It is also China's big chance to wreck America's entire position in Asia. If we hold our ground and Communist expansion is blocked—as it was in Malaya—the Chinese will have suffered another major foreign-policy setback. The dogmas will be shattered once and for all and we may at last look forward to change in Peking.

If we give in, what incentive will there be for China to change? We would probably have to start all over again two or three years hence, perhaps in Thailand, which is neither a better time nor a better place.

Policymakers in China and North Vietnam are convinced that the U.S. domestic front will eventually crack. They have seen thousands parade in front of the White House, some of them waving the Viet Cong colors. They know that the Republicans are already mobilizing to make an issue of the war. They can see mounting criticism against a growing commitment in a war that Americans are told can only end in stalemate. They have read in The New York Times that "there is broad agreement about Vietnam in the U.S. . . . namely that the country wants out, and its representatives in Washington know it and agree, but it must be an honorable out." They also see the slippage in President Johnson's Vietnam "ratings." And they have just heard Representative MENDEL RIVERS, the influential chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, say: "We may have to make a decision damn soon" about whether to pull out altogether. Peking, which goes on depicting the United States as being on the verge of despair, undoubtedly believes that in another year or two U.S. public-opinion pressure to get out will have grown to the point where it won't care whether the "out" is "honorable" or not.

Vietnam has been publicly debated for months. I have just toured college campuses around the U.S. Besides the notion shared by only a minuscule fraction of students and faculty, that we should simply get back into our boats and planes and pull out, no alternatives were even suggested. Most seem to realize there is little chance of peace talks until there is a change of heart on the other side.

Time is not necessarily on China's side. The more China advances scientifically and economically, the greater the schism between die-hard dogmatists and those who have to get on with the job of running a huge country efficiently and coming to terms with the

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modern world. The passing of the revolutionary mystique will mean the new generation will have to open the window, just as Russia did.

"Therapy for Peking's present almost paranoid state of mind," writes Harvard's John K. Fairbank "must follow the usual lines of therapy: it must lead the rulers of China gradually into different channels of experience until by degrees they reshape their picture of the world and their place in it."

The claim is often made that there is no practical alternative to the eventual takeover of South Vietnam by the Vietnamese Communists; that the NLF is truly a national movement in tune with the aspirations of the people; that we are still losing ground militarily; and that the South Vietnamese don't want us. Such misrepresentations get banded around as "fact" by prominent members of the intellectual community.

If Communism is so popular, why has the Viet Cong felt it necessary to assassinate more than 20,000 local officials? Three leaders of the National Students Association of America have returned from Vietnam reporting they found no sympathy for the NLF among Vietnamese students. If the NLF is the embodiment of national aspirations and its victory inevitable, how does one explain, as Buddhist leaders never tire of pointing out, that no one of prominence has joined the cause? If the NLF is indigenous to the South, how does one explain that it was created and is now controlled by Le Duan, after Ho Chi Minh the most powerful Communist leader in Hanoi?

If we are not doing immeasurably better militarily, how does one explain that Communist defectors for the first are now disclosing their unit locations and enabling U.S. forces to go in and hit them when they least expect it? Or that defectors, until the recent political crisis slowed up military operations, were running at the rate of 35,000 a year (up from 5,000 in 1964 and 11,000 in 1965)? Or that both prisoners and defectors, taken in widely scattered parts of the country, say they are physically exhausted, always on the move, with no campfires allowed at night, little food and haphazard supplies? Or that a recent survey taken among 500 prisoners showed that only 30 percent believed in a VC victory against 70 percent a year ago?

Little noted in the U.S. press earlier this year was growing evidence of indecision in Hanoi. An article by Defense Minister General Giap revealed considerable bewilderment over what he called the new factor of limitless American power which he concedes, in retrospect, thwarted the Viet Cong of imminent victory last year. American acceleration of the conflict, he warned, has "confronted the Vietnamese people with a very serious situation and the urgent task of mobilizing and consolidating all the people to fight on." Giap also admitted that victory over the United States was a long way off when the North Vietnam general wrote that "Americans have great military potential, are extremely stubborn, cruel and cunning and know how to draw lessons quickly from experience to contrive even fiercer \* \* \* fighting methods."

Politically, however, the pessimists claim we are back to square one. They argue that the coming elections are disaster incarnate, as inherently absurd as an Ionesco play, and that they will be followed by a neutralist government that will go through the motions of proclaiming its anti-Communism and at the same time thank the U.S. for its services while making clear they are no longer required.

I personally see the rapid political evolution as a drive to reassert Vietnamese sovereignty. Premier Ky and his fellow generals (and some U.S. advisers), quite unwittingly, have helped the various religious groups to surface as the true spokesmen for

the people. This is basically a healthy development. The Buddhists (about 80 percent of the population) are indeed an indigenous movement. They have no love for the West in general and the U.S. in particular—but they have no use for Peking or Hanoi either. Their leaders have said over and over again that no Communist party in Asia can live in harmony with other political parties. The last thing they want is for the U.S. to leave or stop fighting the Viet Cong until they are sure of a secure, independent, internationally guaranteed future.

The Buddhists would like to become the nucleus for a popular majority that might serve as the basis for an honorable settlement. And when and if negotiations do get underway with the Viet Cong, their only high card is America's presence. Anti-Americanism, therefore, is worrisome, not alarming.

The big question in my mind is whether the American people will have the patience, the staying power and the far-sightedness not to hand China's present leaders something they could misconstrue as a victory after an unbroken line of setbacks at home and abroad. During this holding and waiting period, we could do a lot worse than heed the President's appeal to "come together as a people and as a nation" to support the government's policy.

[From the Saturday Evening Post]

WHY WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM

(By Joseph Alsop)

In Vietnam, great numbers of Americans are now committed to a war which very few Americans even begin to understand. Most of us, of course, have a fair understanding of the issues our troops are fighting for, but only a tiny minority understand the war itself.

This has struck me with increasing force after every one of my more recent visits to Vietnam—and I have been there 16 times since 1953. People talk about other matters such as the chops and changes of politics in Saigon, where the Communists might manage an eventual victory—although I do not think they will. No one ever mentions the fairly desperate combat problems that now face the Viet Cong. No one analyzes the present strategy of our brilliant field commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland. No one refers in any way to what is currently happening on the battlefield. Yet the battlefield is where our own best hope of victory lies.

The whole pattern of the fighting, as it happens, is still determined by an almost successful gamble that the Communists made to win the war last year. Hence we must backtrack a bit at the outset in order to see the timing, the nature and the risks of this enormous Viet Cong gamble, to make what happened reasonably comprehensible.

Many normally well-informed persons still believe that a Communist guerrilla movement like the Viet Cong is something spontaneous—halfway, let us say, between a misguided patriotic society and a nationwide game of cops-and-robbers. From their first obscure guerrilla origins, however, the Viet Cong have been a second government of South Vietnam, and they still are. Furthermore—and here is the important point—this clandestine Communist second government has all the fiscal, economic, manpower and other problems that plague any normal government. Since this is also a government at war, the V.C. second government's biggest problem is naturally to recruit, equip and maintain its armed forces. This has always been the biggest problem, and its difficulties caused the Viet Cong gamble already mentioned, which was decided on in late 1963 after the coup d'etat against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 was a country in which every province had its own civil war, with the Saigon government

controlling the provincial capitals and a good many villages, with the V.C. second government controlling a good many other villages, and with troops of both sides in the field everywhere. By that time, there was a Viet Cong provincial battalion of about 500 men operating in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces. There was a Viet Cong district company of about 150 men operating in each of at least 250 of the administrative districts into which the provinces are subdivided. And in each of several thousand V.C.-controlled villages and hamlets, there was a Viet Cong guerrilla band of 20 or 30 men to maintain local discipline and to harass friends of the established government in neighboring villages and hamlets. All these V.C. soldiers—about 50,000 in the local forces and 110,000 in the guerrilla bands, or approximately 160,000 men in all—had to be paid and armed and kept supplied with ammunition and much other matériel, and all but the minority of strictly part-time guerrillas had to be provided with rations as well. Salaries and rations also had to be found for tens of thousands of Viet Cong in essentially civilian occupations, ranging upward from humble couriers and tax collectors, through secret policemen and the personnel of the medical services, to the awe-inspiring members of the Communist Party's central committee for South Vietnam in their remote jungle lair near the Cambodian border.

In addition, this second government was deeply engaged in a big and costly program of military public works. The rule books for guerrilla war, written by Mao Tse-tung and his remarkable Vietnam Communist pupil, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, lay down an absolute requirements for guerrilla main bases in areas immune to penetration by hostile troops. The mountainous jungle-covered and swampy tracts of South Vietnam provide splendid terrain for many such main-base areas. But barracks, hospitals and numerous other facilities had to be secretly built within these fastnesses. Wherever the ground was suitable, the main bases also had to be fortified by an almost inconceivably anti-like program of digging and tunneling; and although *corvée* labor from V.C.-controlled villages was used for this purpose, the hundreds, even thousands of men in the *corvées* at least had to be given rations while away from home. Finally, all the main bases had to be prestocked with medical supplies, ammunition and food. This was an enormous undertaking in itself. A single underground cache found last year, for instance, contained no less than 2,000 tons of rice. Since the cache was in a huge hole approachable only by a narrow tunnel, all this rice had evidently been carried in on men's backs, bagful by bagful.

Early in 1963, moreover, the first main forces—their nature will be explained in a moment—had begun to be mobilized in the main-base areas. Therefore, long before Diem was assassinated in November, 1963, the Viet Cong leaders had to meet a pretty imposing total budget. Their clandestine second government then controlled no more than about four million of the total South Vietnamese population of 17 million. Few legally established governments of countries having only four million people manage to keep more than 160,000 men under arms at all times, even if their soldiers are paid the merest pittance, as are the soldiers of the Viet Cong.

Such was the position when the Diem regime was brought down by an army coup, and almost the entire structure of government control abruptly came to pieces, for a while, in almost every province. The Viet Cong were thus enabled to surge forward everywhere, and this led to the decision to begin organizing main forces on a really big scale.

Like everything else the Viet Cong had done up to that time, the move to organize

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the main forces was strictly in accordance with the rule books of Chairman Mao and Gen. Giap. Main forces (the classification is Mao Tse-tung's) bear little resemblance to the simple guerrilla bands that almost everyone envisions when the Viet Cong are mentioned. They also differ sharply from the local forces—the provincial battalions and district companies, which are already well above the guerrilla level—for the main forces have no permanent regional attachments, and their units are much larger and more heavily armed. In fact, they almost exactly resemble regular troops in a regular army. According to the Mao-Giap rules, these main forces have two functions: to help the local forces and guerrillas increase the pressure everywhere, until the established government is visibly hanging on the ropes; and then to strike the knockout blows in big set-piece battles like that which finished off the French at Dienbienphu.

With more than 160,000 men already under arms, and with the additional organization of something like a brand-new regular army now decided upon, the V.C. second government obviously had its work cut out. At the outset, all went easily enough. In the secret main-base areas, with their palm-thatched barracks, their deep-dug, jungle-hidden fortifications and their painfully accumulated supply caches, large numbers of Viet Cong cadres and recruits were now assembled for regimental training. The new main-force regiments had a strength of around 1,500 men each. In design they were roughly comparable to regular light-infantry regiments of 30 or 40 years ago, and they had the capability of being joined together in light-infantry divisions for the knockout blows that were expected later. Each regiment was given an attached porter battalion of about 600 men to handle its local supply and transport. To get all these men, recruiting was stepped up in all the V.C. areas of South Vietnam. A major expansion of the supply movement from North Vietnam, down the Ho Chi Minh trail and along the sea-smugglers' routes, was also undertaken to provide the new regiments with their 57 mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, anti-aircraft guns and other crew-served weapons. And many more specially trained cadres were brought down from the Communist North to become officers and noncoms.

By New Year's Day of 1964, at least five of the new main-force regiments already had been recruited, armed and trained. By this time, too, because of their post-Diem surge, the Viet Cong controlled perhaps five million to six million people. Even so, however, the second government's base in the countryside—the Viet Cong infrastructure, as our intelligence officers call it—was still too small to support the ambitious military superstructure that was planned. To complete the plan, the masks had to be dropped. This was the Viet Cong gamble. If Gen. Westmoreland's strategy attains the hoped-for results, this dropping of the masks will be remembered as the moment when the Viet Cong began to lose the war. But it did not look that way at the time.

Until 1964 the Viet Cong had always worn two masks—one to deceive people abroad, the other for the South Vietnamese themselves. For foreign eyes, they had worn the mask of an indigenous movement of social discontent. However, as early as 1956, Le Duan, now first secretary of the Communist party of North Vietnam, had gone south to make preparations for the beginning of guerrilla war, with the aid of many thousands of cadres whom the Communist government in the North had ordered to go underground in the South when the French war ended in 1954. From Le Duan's arrival onward all the higher direction of the V.C. had come from

Hanoi. The northern Communist government had also provided large quantities of military equipment and had secretly sent further tens of thousands of cadres to the South to aid and guide the struggle there. But all this was hidden well enough that those who wished could go on claiming that this was "just a civil war."

The other mask, worn to deceive the simple people of South Vietnam, was vastly more important and valuable to the V.C. This was the mask of amiable agrarian reformers—the same mask that the Chinese Communists had worn with such success until they got control of China. Until the critical period we are now examining, the Viet Cong also wore this mask with great success, thereby gaining rather solid popular support in their "liberated areas" and seriously softening up every contested area. The success ultimately depended, however, on something much more important than Communist propaganda or V.C. land reform. It depended on a convincing pretense of government by consent, which was impossible without a considerable degree of real consent. To gain this degree of consent, the Viet Cong promised the peasants, again and again and with utmost emphasis, that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription.

These promises were approximately kept until the year 1964. Devious, even cruel, tricks were often resorted to, of course. A potential recruit's government identity card would be stolen, for example, and he would then be frightened into volunteering by warnings that the government police would shoot him as a Communist if they ever picked him up. Or an obstinate noncontributor to the Viet Cong war chest would be "struggled with" by V.C. cadres before all the people of his village, and if this public brainwashing did not get results, he might then be shot in the back of the neck as a "spy for the reactionaries and imperialists." But in the main, the V.C. military outfits really were manned by volunteers, which made the average outfit both tough and highly motivated. And in the main, besides road tolls, market tolls and the like, the V.C. tax collectors only asked the people of the villages for "voluntary contributions," which meant that the burden on the peasantry was light and easily bearable.

The trouble was that this semivoluntary system reached its limit with the creation of the first five or six main-force regiments, as did the system of largely concealed aid and direction from the North. If the masks were retained, enough men and resources to complete the war plan simply could not be secured, and both masks were therefore boldly and simultaneously dropped. Beginning in 1964, all the main forces and many of the provincial battalions were completely re-equipped with the new 7.64 mm. family of Chinese-made weapons, which required a supply movement from North Vietnam too big to be hidden any longer. At the same time, preparations also began for the eventual invasion of the South by complete units of the North Vietnamese regular army. Thus the pretense was abandoned that this was "just a civil war." At the same time, and incomparably more important, the pretense of governing by consent was also quite ruthlessly abandoned.

The repeated Viet Cong promises that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription became dead letters. Taxes were sternly imposed on the people of the villages. Quarter by quarter the Viet Cong increased these levies until they became cruelly burdensome. Universal military service was proclaimed for all males from 18 to 36. As the manhunt progressed, the Viet Cong press gangs began rounding up boys of 14 or 15. All this was a gigantic gamble, for the V.C. had now broken the first and most sacred

rule of Mao Tse-tung: Popular support of the guerrilla movement must never be endangered until the final victory. But the Hanoi leaders and the V.C. high command clearly believed that the gamble could never go sour, simply because they were so certain of an early victory—after which, of course, any grumbling in the villages could be dealt with by secret police.

To insure the expected victory, they brought off a feat probably without parallel. Although they were still no more than the second government of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong between January, 1964, and the early spring of 1965 wrung from the unhappy villages enough men and resources to increase the V.C. main forces to 24 regiments, complete with porter battalions, or the equivalent of eight army divisions. Even so, this was not enough to meet the war plan's requirements. Hence the second government undertook the considerable further responsibility of maintaining and providing porter battalions for two complete divisions of the North Vietnamese regular army, the 325th and the 304th, which covertly invaded South Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965. By the spring of 1965, therefore, besides 160,000 troops in the V.C. local forces and guerrilla bands, the second government could boast a main-force army of the strength of 10 light-infantry divisions. And this new army, with its porter battalions and longer range supply detachments, numbered close to 80,000 men. The achievement was astonishing, but the price was heavy. One can imagine the Viet Cong finance minister—they have one, even if his name is not publicly known—groaning when he learned the true scope of the main-force program. And one can all but hear his colleagues airily telling him not to worry, because victory was just around the corner.

It is almost unknown in America, but the truth is that a Viet Cong victory really was just around the corner in the late spring of last year, months after the situation had been supposedly saved by President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam. Throughout the spring of 1965 almost the whole South Vietnamese army was firmly pinned down in the provinces by the urgent requirements of local defense. In those spring months almost the whole of the army's slender mobile reserve, 13 South Vietnamese ranger and Marine battalions, was also being chewed up by new main-force regiments. By mid-June, after the bloody fight at Dong Xoai, about 60 miles from Saigon, only three of the government's reserve battalions remained in good combat trim. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had an uncommitted central reserve equivalent to at least five divisions in their main-base areas. No reserves on one side, strong reserves on the other, meant, of course, that the V.C. could win province after province by concentrating in heavily superior force wherever they chose to do so. In this manner they could count on rolling up South Vietnam like a carpet before the summer ended. Then President Johnson upset their calculations by ordering the commitment of U.S. troops on a big scale.

This order had all the elements of a brilliantly successful, if wholly unintentional, ambush, and like every good ambush, in the first place, it was a complete surprise. There had been an earlier surprise in February, when the President gave the order to bomb the North after the Viet Cong attack on the Pleiku barracks. But this second surprise was quite as complete as the first, and it was far more terrible.

Nor was this all. Effective ambushers must never attack the head of a column, nor hold their fire until the column has passed—either way, some of the enemy column may escape. But to open fire on the middle of the

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column insures that the ambushes can neither advance nor retreat, but must stand and fight and be annihilated. It was this effect that President Johnson's order unwittingly achieved.

In order to see why this was so, it is only necessary to consider what would have happened if the President had committed American combat troops in Vietnam rather more than a year earlier, when the Pentagon first urged him to do so. In that spring of 1964, the harshest and most burdensome period of the second government's main-force program still lay in the future, and the Viet Cong had barely begun to drop their masks. It would still not have been too late for a convincing reassumption of the Viet Cong mask of agrarian reformers, with no need for heavy taxes or press-ganged conscripts. The V.C. could therefore have pulled back and dug in for many more years of less intensive war, on the classical, slowly erosive, elusive guerrilla pattern that they understand so well. There can be no doubt that this is precisely what the Viet Cong would have done if the President had in fact committed U.S. troops a year earlier. The rule books are very strict about this: Mao Tse-tung strongly emphasizes the need for any guerrilla movement to be ready to retreat at once if the conditions of the struggle unexpectedly develop in an unfavorable manner.

But the Viet Cong could not follow this pull-back rule when Johnson at last committed U.S. troops, because the V.C. had already breached Mao Tse-tung's cardinal rule against alienating popular support before the final victory. It is not easy, after all, for any government, legal or clandestine, to pull back and to ask its people to fight onward indefinitely, if the most sacred promises have been broken, and if this has been justified by assertions that the war will end in triumph in a few weeks or months. It is very dangerous, too, for any guerrilla movement to dilute its fighting units with unwilling conscripts, as the Viet Cong had done. In the early summer of 1965, this danger was demonstrated by a first trickle of Viet Cong desertions, previously all but unheard of—a trickle that has now become a near hemorrhage in some units and some areas of Vietnam. Above all, there was the danger in the countryside, where heavy taxes and press-gang conscription had caused the people's former propagandized consent to be widely replaced by sullen acquiescence. This danger was also being demonstrated by the tens of thousands who were refusing to acquiesce. And these people, fleeing from "liberated areas" to government areas, have now become a pitiful refugee army of nearly a million men, women and children. Their fight has even begun to leave the V.C. areas seriously short of hands to till the crops. For these reasons, it was much too risky to pull back, and the second government made its defiant choice to continue the war in the main-force phase.

The same basic considerations that led the Hanoi and V.C. leaders to make this choice also led Gen. Westmoreland to adopt his strategy of "seeking out and destroying" the Viet Cong main forces. When the President's troop commitment abruptly gave Westmoreland the responsibility for turning the tide and winning the war, this careful yet inspired soldier had been studying the Viet Cong for many anxious months. Obviously the V.C. and North Vietnamese main-force regiments, being heavier outfits that could be located and engaged with greater ease, were the most suitable military targets for the incoming American troops. Gen. Westmoreland's chief reasons, nevertheless, for concentrating on the main forces were—and are paramilitary. Westmoreland reasoned that the Viet Cong had made themselves politically vulnerable by breaking the first rule of Mao Tse-tung, and that this vulnerability would increase as war pressures

force the V.C. to take more rice and more conscripts from the long-suffering villagers. He believed, therefore, that the already severe strains on the V.C. second government could be increased until its entire structure would crumble. And he planned to precipitate this general breakup of the second government's structure by breaking the main-force backbone of the V.C. Time alone can tell whether Westmoreland is right, but he most certainly still believes he will be proved right—if the accidents of Saigon politics do not tragically forestall the proof.

We have now examined two of the three main parts of the war's military pattern—the gamble taken by the V.C. second government to create its main forces and the ambush effect of President Johnson's troop commitment. If the Viet Cong had not gambled by breaking Mao's first rule on popular support and if they now had a less burdensome and more flexible military organization, I should be making a very different military prognosis.

But these conditions do not now exist in Vietnam, because the rules have in fact been broken. And more rule breaking is the essence of the third part of the war's military pattern, which is the acuteness of the combat problems now besetting the V.C. For the Viet Cong leaders, beyond doubt, this is the pattern's most painful part, since their entire experience has taught them to put an almost religious reliance on the simple fighting rules laid down by Giap and Mao. These tactical rules worked brilliantly well for Mao in China, and for Giap against the French and for the Viet Cong themselves until last year. They built the record, in fact, that still leads people to repeat solemnly that "regular troops cannot defeat guerrillas." Yet these closely studied, carefully defined tactical rules for guerrilla war have all but begun to work in reverse in Vietnam nowadays. This is the most far-reaching single result of the U.S. troop commitment.

Consider, for example, "old never-fail." In the years before 1965, "old never-fail" was the sardonic name used by American officers advising the South Vietnamese army for the guerrillas' surprise-attack-plus-ambush combination. This combination was the principal offensive tactic of the Viet Cong, accounting for over 80 percent of their more showy and damaging victories during all the years when the war was going well for them. First would come the predawn news that mortar shells were falling on an isolated government post, which was surrounded by a strong V.C. force that had crept up under cover of darkness. The government's province chief (the military governor) would hastily organize a relieving force, and the column of troops would move out, as dawn began to break, along the wretched, narrow road leading to the post under attack. Then would come the report that the relief column had been ambushed by another strong V.C. force which had slipped into positions commanding the road's most dangerous sector. Next the radio would fall ominously silent, meaning, of course, that the post under attack had also fallen. And so the government's forces would be further eroded and demoralized, government control would be reduced, and V.C. power and authority would once again grow proportionally.

But "old never-fail" began to work very differently with the end of the rather primitive situation envisioned by Mao and Giap—a situation in which the government had few heavy guns, only the barest minimum of air power, and no air-mobile infantry. This situation ceased to exist in South Vietnam last year. First, a network of heavy-artillery positions was thrown over most of the country, and these were linked by good communications to every government post in the populated areas, and to most of the more remote posts as well. Second, after Pleiku the President not only ordered bombing of

the North, he also authorized direct use of American air power in the South, thereby multiplying the air strength the Viet Cong had to face. And finally, the American troop commitment vastly multiplied the helicopters available for troop lifts.

Today when the Viet Cong attempt "old never-fail," as they still frequently do, the ambushers generally discover that they are really ambushes. The post chosen for surprise attack at once calls in the heavy artillery, and the big guns inevitably slow down the assault. When dawn breaks, U.S. fighters and fighter bombers make their appearance, guided by spotter planes, and unless the Viet Cong break off the attack, they become exposed targets for decimation from the air. If the situation warrants, there may also be a heli-lift of infantry, either to cut off the V.C. surrounding the post, or to take the V.C. ambushing force in the rear.

"Old never-fail" has certainly not become "old always-fail." Nor have their novel tactical handicaps taken all the fight out of the Viet Cong, any more than their widespread loss of popular support has deprived them of the active help of the 10 to 15 percent of genuine Communist converts in their "liberated areas." Only recently they were able to bring up two artillery batteries for an attack on the very outskirts of Saigon—which did not succeed, but did cause much disquiet in the city. And terroristic acts continue in most provinces at a very high rate.

Yet it is deeply meaningful that in the months from last September—when the U.S. troop commitment began to have a serious impact—until late April, when these words were written, the record shows only two victorious V.C. operations much above the petty-terror level. These were the annihilation of a South Vietnamese regiment in a Michelin rubber plantation early last winter and the more recent capture of the isolated Special Forces post at Ashau on the Laotian border. By contract, the Viet Cong failures have been too numerous to be recalled. These failures have vastly greater meaning, moreover, than might be surmised from newspaper stories of body counts of 50 enemy dead here, 100 in another place, and in another place above 200, after a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese assault has been beaten back. These stories mean that the V.C. are now regularly breaking the next-most-important guerrilla rule after the rule about always retaining popular support.

As Mao and Giap both emphasize, any guerrilla movement lives and grows and has its being by success. Great failures may perhaps be precariously survived, as happened in China at the time of the famous Long March. The rule books nonetheless enjoin guerrilla commanders always to prefer the mere assassination of a village elder to the dramatic capture of a district town, if it is thought that the attempt on the town may risk defeat. Yet the Viet Cong have been floundering forward with great obstinacy and considerable courage, from failure to bloody failure for many months, with few military successes.

These changes in the tactical situation have quite directly affected every type of Viet Cong unit, whether main-force, local-force or guerrilla—for the guerrilla bands are almost always ordered to support the larger operations in their neighborhoods. The main forces—Gen. Westmoreland's prime targets—are the units chiefly affected by another change of great significance. Life in a main-force regiment once offered a good deal to tempt an ambitious young Vietnamese. He belonged to a crack unit, which was a matter of pride. He had been taught to believe in an early victory, and as a main-force soldier he could expect personal advancement when victory was won. Above all, he did not have to endure prolonged hardship. Two or three night marches out



from the base, one or two days of fighting at the scene of his regiment's operation, and two or three night marches back to his regimental main-base area—that was about the maximum effort that was normally required each month. The balance of every month was spent resting, training, absorbing replacements and doing meticulous sand-table exercises to prepare the next sally against a government post. And all these weeks between operations were passed in the absolute security of a main base, with its simple but comfortable barracks, its rearsuring fortifications, and its food caches.

Today, however, this quite bearable existence has suffered a savage transformation. It began when Gen. Westmoreland called in the B-52's of the Strategic Air Command, with their immense loads of heavy bombs that can penetrate even fortification tunnels 30 feet below ground. Daily since late last summer, the B-52's have been hammering the main-base areas, with such effect, as captured documents have revealed, that the main-force regiments are now under strict orders to spend no more than one night, or at most two nights, in the same place. Long gone, therefore, are each month's restorative stretches of orderly barracks life.

Night after night, the main-force soldiers must bivouac in the jungle or on the mountain slopes. Every day or every two days there is a tollsome march to the next bivouac. These movements cause supply problems, and the men sometimes go hungry. There is little time for rest or training, or any of the other things that keep and outfit happy and in combat trim. In addition, as the American forces in Vietnam have grown stronger, there have been more infantry sweeps through the main-base areas—many of which had not been visited by hostile troops since the beginning of the French war. Supply caches that took months, even years, to accumulate are found and destroyed by our men. Fortifications representing hundreds of thousands, even millions, of man-hours of hard work are discovered and greatly damaged, if not always totally destroyed. V.C. outfits that have sought the base areas' security must either flee or stand and fight against hard odds. In these ways still another cardinal Mao-Giap rule has been broken—the rule that a successful guerrilla movement needs completely secure bases. Without this minimal security, Mao says, any such movement must automatically "deteriorate" into a mere "peasant revolt" which "it would be fanciful to suppose" could "avoid defeat."

From the foregoing follows the final profound change in the V.C. situation. In Vietnam the intelligence gathered has always been substantial, but the South Vietnamese formerly had no way to process intelligence as it came in, much less to respond to it promptly. Nowadays, in contrast, the intelligence gathered has multiplied many times over, partly by freer reporting by the people of the countryside, partly by mechanical means such as airborne infrared devices that spot main-force campfires and the like, and partly by the enormously increased numbers of deserters and prisoners of war. Furthermore Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters has now set up something like a Vietnamese-American intelligence-processing factory, capable of handling several tons of captured documents and several hundreds of interrogations in a single week. Thus it is no longer a case of blind men fighting men who see all too well, as it was for so many years.

The new eyes of the intelligence can even penetrate main-base areas well enough so that each B-52 strike has proved to have an even chance of finding its pinpoint target of barracks and fortifications within the huge surrounding tract of swamp or jungle or mountain forest. Movements of Viet Cong units are also being swiftly tracked if luck is good and the movements are fairly big.

Sometimes we have no luck, as with the recent attack near Saigon. Yet good intelligence enabled Gen. Westmoreland to mount no fewer than eight uniformly successful spoiling operations against long planned V.C. attacks in a recent period of only a few weeks. Thus another crucial rule is being broken pretty frequently, for both Mao and Giap lay great emphasis on all guerrillas' need to move absolutely unseen, while watching the smallest enemy movement. Inasmuch as such texts as Mao Tse-tung's *On the Protracted War* and Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* have always had the standing of scripture for both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, the Mao-Giap prescriptions' rather monotonous failure to work nowadays must be a very shaking thing in itself. The Viet Cong soldiers must be greatly shaken too by the failure of their leaders to find substitute prescriptions that work a bit better. Nowadays a Viet Cong battalion commander getting his orders for another surprise attack-plus-ambush must have the same sinking feeling that the government's province chiefs always used to have when word came in of another pre-dawn assault on an isolated post. For the long pull, an unending diet of many big and little defeats, with only the rarest success to raise the spirits, can in itself prove fatal to the Viet Cong. The strain of declining morale is already grave, as prisoner interrogations reveal, and this strain is bound to increase if Gen. Westmoreland is allowed to pursue his strategy.

These are the principal factors that control the present pattern of the fighting in Vietnam. I would be less confident of their great significance if I had not closely watched the trend of the fighting. When I visited Vietnam in the spring of 1965, one could easily discern American air power's effects on the Viet Cong. But it was equally easy to see that air power alone was not enough, and that the V.C. would win during the summer if the President did not commit U.S. ground troops.

When I visited Vietnam again last September, the full impact of the initial U.S. troop commitment was really beginning to be felt. The fine Marine victory at Chuoi had taught the Viet Cong that Americans were not "paper tigers" after all—at any rate, not on the field of battle. The first B-52 raids on the main bases were beginning to show impressive results. It was already clear that the tide had turned, but it was by no means clear as yet how the Viet Cong and their masters in Hanoi would deal with this alarming change.

On this key point there was some divergence between Gen. Westmoreland and the majority of his staff. Westmoreland already suspected that the President had achieved an unintended ambush, and he therefore doubted whether the Viet Cong were free to follow Mao's rules of "advance and retreat." His staff members were almost unanimous in expecting the Viet Cong to follow the rules. This was a disturbing prospect, for a return to classical guerrilla fighting was bound to mean American troops endlessly marching through jungle and over mountains in frequently vain pursuit of mere companies of the enemy. Westmoreland's staff asked "whether the people at home would stand for an endless penny-packet war." If there was any way at all to exhaust American patience and fortitude, endless penny-packet war was surely the most likely way.

These worries were shown to be ill-founded in October, in the obstinate battle for the Pleime Special Forces post, and in the subsequent fighting in the Ia Drang valley, which continued into early November. For days on end, with superb courage and endurance, a small band of men of the Special Forces, both American and Vietnamese, took on and hurled back a greatly superior number of troops of the V.C. main forces. When the

Pleime outpost had been relieved at last, the scene shifted to the Ia Drang valley. Here the men of the 1st Air Cavalry engaged an entire North Vietnamese division, composed of the 32nd regiment, the 33rd regiment, and the 66th regiment, with two V.C. main-force regiments in occasional support. Even by mid-October the number of American combat troops on the ground was not large, and Maj. Gen. Harry Kinnard, commander of the 1st Air Cavalry, could not afford to overcommit his vital division. Hence he never put into the line more than two battalions-plus, the battalions in combat being rotated by helicopter as the fighting went on. On our side, therefore, we did not have as much as a full regiment engaged at any one time, whereas the enemy had three regiments always engaged, with two more to aid them.

As must happen, alas, in battle, 275 men of the Air Cavalry were killed in the weeks the action lasted. But we have since captured the enemy's complete battle plans, and we also have a post-battle critique by the North Vietnamese commander on the scene, who has the pseudonym of Gen. Bai Quan. This evidence reveals that in this single battle the enemy lost the staggering total of 5,000 killed and severely wounded, as well as almost all his heavy weapons. By any test this victory against such odds was a shining feat of U.S. arms, all the more noteworthy because these were near-green American troops.

After the Ia Drang valley no one could any longer believe in an intended Viet Cong pull-back to low-level guerrilla activity. If the V.C. could not or would not pull back, it was clear that they would have to try to go forward. Furthermore, there was increasing evidence of a massive, continuing invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese regulars coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Reconnaissance also revealed that the North Vietnamese were urgently improving the trail to make it a truckable highway.

In November, therefore, Hanoi's apparent intention to reinforce the Viet Cong to the utmost led Gen. Westmoreland's staff to make carefully revised estimates of the enemy's maximum capabilities—the maximum military buildup the North Vietnamese government and the V.C. second government could achieve and support. These estimates projected a continuous growth of the enemy main forces in South Vietnam at the rate of two regiments per month until the end of 1966. In other words, the main forces, which had a strength equivalent to 10 divisions when the President committed U. S. troops, were projected to grow to a strength equivalent to about 18 divisions before next New Year's Day.

This projection by Gen. Westmoreland's staff was presented to Secretary of Defense McNamara when he visited Saigon at the end of November. It of course implied a need for a good many more American troops to match the enemy's expected increase of strength. For this reason the new estimates caused a panic in Washington when Secretary McNamara brought them home. Out of the panic grew the President's peace offensive, the pause in the bombing of the North, and other manifestations that presumably helped to renew the Hanoi leaders' slumping faith in their basic theory of American weakness of will. The question remains whether the panic was justified. I think it was wholly unjustified.

My chief reason is based on the situation I discovered when I returned to Vietnam for my most recent visit in February. On the one hand, all was far from perfection on our side. The stability of the South Vietnamese government could certainly not be taken for granted. And the President's hesitant and intricate methods of war-making, combined with the manifestoes of the war's senatorial and other critics, had deprived our men of the

absolute confidence in their support at home that American troops in combat always ought ideally to have. On the other hand, however, these imperfections, though serious enough, were powerfully counterbalanced by the situation of the Viet Cong.

The refugee flow from the V.C. areas was increasing; by the end of February the total was nearing 800,000 men, women and children, or close to one sixth of the population that the V.C. had controlled at their high point. Viet Cong propaganda was already publicly denouncing the refugee movement as an imperialist plot to diminish the rice supplies available to the second government's tax collectors. There were symptoms that the V.C. second government's available pool of conscripts had already begun to dry up in more than one province. In Gen. Westmoreland's highly successful Masher-White Wing operation, the two prime-target regiments, the 18th of the North Vietnamese 325th division and the 2nd V.C. main-force regiment, had come south into Binh Dinh province with the primary intention of taking the offensive—instead they were so badly knocked about that they were put out of action for several months. But P.O.W. interrogations revealed that these regiments' southward move from Quangngai province had the secondary purpose of securing badly needed replacements, since the press gangs had been coming back almost empty-handed.

When I went down to the delta town of My Tho, I discovered the sad plight of the most famous V.C. provincial battalion in Vietnam, called by Hanoi radio the "Ever Victorious Ap Bac Battalion" in memory of a smashing success in the past. The "Ever Victorious" had just suffered two drubbings within two months by the local South Vietnamese troops. Furthermore—and much more revealing—the battalion was now afflicted, according to a large number of defectors, with a desertion rate well above 60 percent per year. Each province in Vietnam is markedly different from the next province, and symptoms in Quangngai and in Dinh Tuong, the stamping ground of the "Ever Victorious" must never be exaggerated into nationwide symptoms, yet all this evidence was pretty impressive nonetheless.

The provincial evidence and the immense refugee movement were impressive, above all, because they had no precedents. Even more impressive, and equally unprecedented, was the evidence of the many battlefields. Until hardly more than a year ago, just one Viet Cong prisoner of war or battlefield deserter was so rare a phenomenon that Saigon would be agog about him for days on end, and it was also a real cause for celebration if as many as four or five enemy dead were found on the field of battle. Even today the V.C. and North Vietnamese have not altered the battlefield discipline that requires all killed and wounded to be carried away by their comrades, any more than they have changed their rules against desertion. After the Chulai fight, a couple of hundred Viet Cong corpses were found hidden in a trench where they had been dragged with butchers' meat hooks. More recently, V.C. P.O.W.'s have turned up with loops attached to their clothing to make dragging easier in case of need—a prebattle precaution which must surely raise fighting spirit in a wonderful manner. Thus while others might be unimpressed, I, remembering the quite recent past, was left all but incredulous by the almost daily body counts of enemy dead abandoned on the battlefield, and by the constant news of prisoners of war and battlefield deserters.

It is also worth noting that in the two months of January and February, the body counts reached a grisly cumulative total of 7,352 enemy dead. This means that the true total of enemy killed in action was certainly above 10,000, for although counts made in combat must be discounted for accidental duplication, a big addition must also be

made for enemy dead dragged away in continuing compliance with the old discipline. It is also conservative to assume that the total of the enemy's disabblingly wounded was double the total of those killed. Hence the overall figure for enemy dead and disabled in January and February alone was probably above 30,000. To this must be added 1,100 P.O.W.'s and battlefield deserters—the latter being troops who seize the opportunity of battle to squat down in a ditch until they are overrun by our men.

To be sure, not more than half these heavy V.C. losses were soldiers of the main forces, for many were porters, guerrillas, local-force troops and even civilians impressed as temporary porters. But even so, it was abundantly clear that the main forces were being very badly knocked about. This was all the more striking because the Ia Drang experience had taught the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese commanders not to court any more set-piece battles. Engaging main forces had therefore become more difficult, since they in most cases had first to be sought out. Altogether the "seek out and destroy" strategy struck me as succeeding beyond all expectations. What is more important, this opinion was—and is—shared by Gen. Westmoreland.

If you look at this war's military aspect without regard to such political factors as instability in Saigon, or hesitancy in Washington to give full backing to Gen. Westmoreland, you have to conclude that the situation is full of promise. To be sure, the enemy is still reinforcing at about the rate projected in the November estimates. To be sure, the very fact that the enemy is still reinforcing means that clearly he intends to use his reinforcements in battle. So there is hard fighting still ahead. But if you make a practical analysis of the V.C. second government's problems, you are driven to conclude that the present enemy reinforcement is like one of those last high raises that losing players sometimes make to frighten their opponents out of a poker game.

The limit on the number of troops the North Vietnamese Communists can send southward is not yet in sight, but the limit is quite clearly in sight on the number of troop units the V.C. second government can sustain in the South. This is why it is wrong to talk about an "unlimited war," and this is also the main reason for believing that we are confronted with something like a desperate last high raise in poker. If you examine the projection of enemy-troop buildup made by Gen. Westmoreland's staff, you find, first of all, that most of the buildup is accounted for by a very large additional invasion of the South by North Vietnamese. This is risky in itself, since many of the southern rank and file of the Viet Cong much resent the overt northern takeover in the South. Second, you find a very puzzling anomaly, in the form of a great increase in the burden of the already overburdened V.C. second government.

In the spring of 1965 the strain of supporting main forces of a strength of 10 divisions was already severe. If the enemy buildup continues until the end of this year as projected by the Westmoreland staff, the strain will be nearly twice as great, for the V.C. second government will be supporting main forces of the strength of 18 divisions. All the strictly military personnel of the main forces are now coming from North Vietnam—but this was already the case in 1965. But now, on the one hand, the V.C. second government has a reduced productive and manpower base, primarily because of the refugee movement. And on the other hand, if the buildup continues as projected, the second government is eventually going to have to provide the main forces with nearly twice as much rice and each month, with at least double the number of men to fill gaps in the regimental ranks, and with close to double the number of men or women

(for women are now being drafted for this purpose) to serve in the ported battalions and the longer range transport detachments. If the strain was already severe in the spring of 1965, what then will be the strain on the V.C. second government by December, 1966?

The answer, I think, is that the present enemy reinforcement has behind it a truly desperate decision—a decision, in fact, to throw in all remaining reserves, and to consume all the remaining stocks of food and other supplies still cached in the main bases, to make one final try for victory. If this be true, we are indeed confronted, with a last high raise. And the maker of a last high raise always loses the game if another player has the resources and the courage to call and raise again.

I believe that we in America have the needed courage, as I know we have the needed resources. To this hopeful observation, however, I must add two brief footnotes. First, a warning is needed concerning that phrase "losing the game." When and if Gen. Westmoreland succeeds in breaking the enemy's main forces, the big war in Vietnam will be over, and the game will really be won. Breaking the main forces will break most of the V.C. power in the countryside. It will not break all the V.C. power, however. A little war of mopping-up operations, costing few casualties and needing fewer troops, but troublesome and ugly all the same, may therefore continue for a considerable period. By method and determination, that little war can be won in the end in South Vietnam. But the war planners in Hanoi will still be the masters of the V.C. remnants of the South. They will still have the power to end all fighting by calling home their men. And the prime reason for maintaining a stern, persistent, though not irrational, bombing pressure on North Vietnam is to teach the lesson that the call-home order had better be given as soon as the big war in the South is decisively lost.

Second, despite the hopefulness of the military situation, the war can perhaps be lost somewhere in the dark labyrinths of Saigon politics. Despite all the positive factors, this warning must be reiterated, and the need for American patience with the vagaries of Vietnamese politics must be emphasized.

For close on a century before 1954, the Vietnamese had no experience of self-government. Under Ngo Dinh Diem, they then made considerable progress. As authoritarian governments go, the Diem regime was worthy of considerable respect—for more respect, certainly, than the dogmatic, harsh and gloomy Communist regime in the North—but under Diem, the Vietnamese got their bellyful of authoritarian government in Saigon. A long period of sometimes wild cut-and-try is therefore unavoidable, before the Vietnamese find the mode of government that suits their traditions, habits and outlook. There is nothing to worry about in that—so long as they do not stab themselves in the back during one of the wilder cut-and-tries. For the long pull, moreover, South Vietnam is one of the very richest countries in Asia, with an industrious and talented people who have been forcefully dragged into the 20th century by all the technological lessons of their bitter war experience. So I have no patience with those who ask, "What shall we have in South Vietnam, even if we win?" Every sort of basic factor promises a good future, if the suffering people of South Vietnam can only be granted peace at last. If that time comes, moreover, the United States can not only take the satisfaction of a stronger nation that has rendered loyal service to a weaker ally, we in our country can also sleep more easily in our own beds. For if the northern Communist aggression against South Vietnam is not successfully defeated, there will be another such aggression, and another, and another, until men begin to say, "The line must be drawn somewhere." And thus the Third World War

may begin, and that is what we are now fighting to avert.

#### THE JOSEPH H. HIRSHHORN MUSEUM AND SCULPTURE GARDEN

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, a bill to establish the Joseph H. Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden has been referred to the Committee on Public Works. The proposed site is an area bounded by Seventh Street, Independence Avenue, Ninth Street and Madison Drive. As a member of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution, which would administer the center, I want to thank Senator RANDOLPH for introducing this legislation.

To Mr. Hirshhorn the American people are indebted. His gift of some 4,000 paintings and 1,600 pieces of sculpture are thought to be among the most valuable contemporary collections in private hands. Most of us will try to understand Mr. Hirshhorn's desire to share with others the pleasure these works have brought to him. As a boy his horizons rose beyond the Brooklyn slum in which he determinately nurtured an early appreciation of the arts. Now Mr. Hirshhorn passes on to the American people the fruits of his aspirations. It is only fitting that these works have their permanent home in Washington—a city whose emergence as a cultural center mirrors the vitality and growth of our 20th century. Certainly, Mr. Hirshhorn follows nobly in the steps of other great humanitarians who have so generously given of themselves.

#### AWARD FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY TO INDIANA MAN

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on May 24 Jim Hetherington of WFBM-TV in Indianapolis received the Creative Award for television writers at the annual Alfred P. Sloan Radio-TV Awards for Highway Safety in New York City.

It is my pleasure to read his citation:

Jim Hetherington of WFBM-TV, Indianapolis, Indiana, displayed outstanding creative talent in preparation of the script for an analytical documentary entitled *A Cross By The Road*. The film explained with dramatic effect the complexity and enormity of the traffic accident problem, yet outlined with clarity the interrelated solutions which can be implemented. Widespread public response to this exceptional film created a better understanding of traffic safety values.

I am proud that Mr. Hetherington and WFBM-TV have received this recognition for their outstanding public service to the people of Indianapolis and Indiana.

The principal address at the Sloan Awards dinner was given by Under Secretary of Commerce Alan S. Boyd. His remarks effectively answer those who would dodge responsibility for mounting a really meaningful attack on traffic accidents by continuing to blame this national disgrace almost entirely on drivers.

Under Secretary Boyd has given the best explanation I have seen of the need to take account of all elements in highway transportation and of directing our

efforts to helping motorists avoid accidents, injury, and death.

As he so clearly shows, those who sit back and contend that accidents are caused in almost all cases by bad driving are in effect making excuses for doing nothing constructive about it.

Mr. Boyd shows that there is a way to do something about it, and I believe all my colleagues will be interested in his reasoning. I believe he offers assurance that the various legislative proposals now before Congress can produce a program that will get results for the American people.

I have offered amendments which I believe will improve and strengthen the program proposed by the administration, and I am confident that the Congress will enact a strong, fair and effective bill. We shall continue executive consideration of S. 3005 and the proposed amendments in the Commerce Committee tomorrow.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Boyd's speech be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY ALAN S. BOYD, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR TRANSPORTATION

(Prepared for delivery at the annual presentation of the Alfred P. Sloan Radio-TV Awards for Highway Safety, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, May 24, 1966)

There is a normal human tendency to be self-satisfied: to feel that what we are doing now and the way in which we conduct our affairs is good and sufficient. It is often uncomfortable to consider that we can and should improve our activities. But we can step out of our humdrum routine to promote, to inspire, and to educate. Those whom we honor tonight have done this by utilizing the communications media with sensitivity and imagination to promote Highway Safety.

In winning the Alfred P. Sloan Awards you have demonstrated your ability to live up to Mr. Sloan's own high ideals of public responsibility. This sense of responsibility was reflected in his life-long commitment to the cause of highway safety, and the personal leadership he gave to this cause.

Thirty years ago he joined with three other industry leaders in organizing the Automotive Safety Foundation, which he continued to support even after his retirement as an active executive of General Motors Corporation. In 1948, as founder and chairman of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, he established these awards to the broadcasting industry, and he continued to participate personally in this program so long as his health permitted.

It is good to take occasion periodically to recognize the efforts spent on traffic safety because those who are devoting their energies to this cause may be tempted to feel that they have been rowing upstream and against a strong current, at that. Tonight's ceremony affords a brief pause to look around and see where we have been and where we are going. I can't leave this simile, however, without urging you not to rest too long on your oars.

We have made considerable progress in this long upstream struggle. Travel on the Nation's roads and streets is almost three times as safe as when the Automotive Safety Foundation was founded—as measured in deaths per vehicle miles.

But it still is far from safe enough. The closer we get to shore, if you will, the stronger the current—because of the enormous growth in population, in drivers, vehicles, and highway usage. The absolute toll in lives lost,

injuries, accidents and damages now reaches new records each year.

The figures are familiar and frightening: Fifty thousand American skilled in a year; 100,000 permanently disabled; nearly 4 million injured; over \$10 billion in economic losses.

You know, and I believe more and more American citizens know, that this national tragedy need not continue. They agree with President Johnson that "we can no longer tolerate such anarchy on wheels."

Earlier this year President Johnson presented a program designed to carry forward a comprehensive, accelerated attack on traffic accidents. Congress now is preparing to make decisions about this program which I am confident will launch a new era in safer highway travel for the American people—provided the program receives the strong and continuing support it must have to be most effective.

First, let me make it as clear as I can that the Administration's approach is positive, not negative.

The Administration has not sought to create scapegoats. It has no script for "good guys" and "bad guys." It has not thought in terms of accusing or punishing anyone.

It has, instead, thought in terms of how accidents, injuries, and deaths can be reduced. We in the Administration are not interested in legislation for the sake of legislation. We are not concerned with organizing elaborate programs for their own sake—or for their propaganda value.

In three words: We want results.

Last April 22 in making an appeal for enactment of the Administration's highway safety bill, President Johnson said:

"The American people are aroused. They want action. We want action, too, but we want it to be fair and intelligent—for the American driver and the great industry that provides his car."

That sums up our goal: to obtain tangible improvements in highway safety, with fairness and intelligence.

This objective has been the guideline in formulating the Administration's proposals. I believe an examination of those proposals will bear me out.

These proposals do not anticipate any easy cure, just as they do not single out any particular villain. They do not prejudice any fact of the safety issue. Rather, they offer a program designed to take full advantage of the progress made to date, and to force the pace in discovering and implementing new knowledge and new techniques that will yield substantial, provable benefits.

The public discussion and debate of the past few months, while they have stimulated a desirable public interest in traffic safety, have tended to center attention on one or two elements of the problem. The Administration's program, on the other hand, considers all aspects.

The scope and direction of the Administration's program has been emphasized repeatedly by Secretary Connor in his appearances before Congressional Committees. I would like to quote from his testimony:

"The program that would be provided by this legislation would devote the needed emphasis and resources to all aspects of the highway safety problem. It is based on the recognition that accidents often are caused by multiple factors—they are frequently the result of some failure of the system which includes the driver, his vehicle, and his environment, including the highway, or the interaction of all three. It does not assume that any one of these elements is more important than the others, and it is not directed toward a panacea-type solution to the highway safety problem.

"The approach of this legislation, besides being directed toward all elements of the traffic safety problem, would include the

participation of all levels of the Government—Federal, State, and local—as well as industry and private organizations.”

I might add that the legislation was drafted intentionally to be flexible with regard to program, organization and administration, so as to facilitate the full use of existing knowledge and the results of research and development as they become available and as their usefulness is proven.

Specifically, the Administration proposes a broad Federal research and development program in highway safety. The Administration also seeks directive authority to set safety performance standards for automotive vehicles and their components. And the Administration is seeking \$420 million over a six year period to assist the States in developing and improving their own comprehensive traffic safety programs under uniform national standards.

The latter provision recognizes the traditional responsibilities of State and local governments with regard to control of the traffic system.

The Federal Government's responsibility to provide leadership and coordination for these State programs was clearly established by Congress last year, in an amendment to Federal-aid highway legislation. Now, the Administration is seeking Federal funds to assist the States in carrying out the objectives of this amendment.

This approach is in keeping with the spirit of Federal-State cooperation which has worked so successfully in the Federal-aid highway program. Through this program the Federal Government has made and is making an enormous contribution to highway safety. It is enabling the States to construct the Interstate Highway System, whose controlled-access freeways are the safest roads yet built. It is assisting the States in their long-range improvement programs for major highways. And now it is aiding them in a priority program for eliminating the danger traps that still remain on Federal-aid highways.

The Federal-aid program, is providing substantial benefits in safety, as well as in faster, more economical, and more comfortable travel.

Still, highways are only one element of the traffic safety problem. The legislation now on the books, as a result of last year's amendment, plus the financial aid requested by the Administration, would permit the development of a comprehensive program, with no aspect excluded.

It would permit a program directed toward the total highway transportation system, and its three basic elements: the driver, his vehicle, and the highway. The States would continue to assume primary responsibility for control of the driver and the highway, but the Federal government would take a portion of the States' responsibility for the vehicle, to the extent that it would assure that new vehicles met minimum safety performance standards. This new role for the Federal Government recognizes the desirability for uniform national standards for manufacturers, rather than separate State standards.

In addition, under its authority to set uniform standards for other areas of State traffic safety programs, the Federal Government could identify the major gaps and weaknesses that exist throughout the country today, and proceed in cooperation with the States to upgrade current programs and formulate new ones as needed.

The goal of the program I just outlined is to get tangible improvements in highway safety with fairness and intelligence. The key to how this program must proceed to get results lies in the concept that accidents and their consequences result from failures of the system which includes the driver, the vehicle, the highway, and their interaction.

While this concept is simple enough to state, its implications are not widely understood. It requires the rather belated application to highway transportation of what is known in engineering as the "systems approach."

The main obstacle to the most effective use of systems engineering in the past, has been the practice of assigning a "primary" cause in accidents—and particularly of blaming most accidents on "driver error." In this way of thinking any accident that a driver may conceivably have averted is *ipso facto* his fault. The way to prevent accidents, then, is to make all drivers perform at all times without error.

Systems engineering, on the other hand, recognizes that accidents can result from multiple causes, in the sense that a cause is any condition existing prior to the accident which it might have been possible or practicable to eliminate, and but for which the accident would have been avoided. In this view, all accident causes are equal if, by the elimination of any one of them, the accident might have been prevented.

Rather than accepting driver error as the "primary" cause of most accidents, systems engineering seeks ways to change the elements of the highway transportation system so that accidents will not occur, or so that their severity will be reduced.

For a simple parallel we can take an illustration from industry. A worker could be trained to operate a dangerous power machine and signs could be posted warning him to work safely. Then if he gets careless just once and maims himself, it is presumably his own fault. On the other hand, the machine could be designed with a protective guard which would make it impossible for him to get hurt.

In highway transportation, the effectiveness of the systems approach has been demonstrated quite clearly by the Interstate Highway System. These controlled-access freeways are consciously designed to prevent many types of traffic conflict and to make driving easier and safer.

They provide separate roadways for opposing traffic with wide medians, or median barriers, to prevent head-on collisions. They have no intersections, or cross traffic at grade, thus preventing angle collisions. They have gentle curves and grades and long sight distance. They have wide, paved shoulders and clear roadsides.

On the best of our highways, if a driver loses control of his car for whatever reason—whether he was swatting a bee, lifting his pet dog off the floor, falling asleep, or if he had a "couple of beers"—if he goes off the road, he has a chance of regaining control without slamming into a tree, or rolling into a ditch. What could have been a needless fatality becomes simply an incident.

Or take a case where the vehicle is at fault. If the brakes fail, the driver has a better chance to ride out safely on the Interstate, because there are no intersections, or driveways, or cross traffic, or sharp curves, and there are wide shoulders where he can get out of the traffic stream.

Because safety has been engineered into the Interstate System, the same drivers have only a half or a third as many accidents on the Interstate as they do on conventional highways. This year alone, the Interstate Highways now open to traffic will save the lives of at least 4,000 persons who would be killed if they were forced to use conventional roads.

It is apparent, then, that if we try to understand drivers as they are—with their capabilities and their limitations—we can design highways and vehicles that make their driving more reliable and more effective.

We need to recognize that driving today is a complicated task, that it occasionally requires drivers to make decisions and to act

with speed or precision that is beyond their abilities. We can help them by reducing the difficulty of the driving task or by giving them better tools to cope with it.

System engineering is the way to this objective. It can be effective both in preventing accidents and in reducing the severity of those that do occur. At the present time, for example, highway engineers are experimenting with breakaway sign supports for those obstacles that must remain near the pavement. Research also is underway in the Bureau of Public Roads to develop electronic or mechanical aids for the driver, which could, for instance, inform him when it is safe to pass on a two-lane rural highway, or when he is closing too fast on the car ahead.

The systems approach also looks to changes in the vehicle that will make driving more reliable, or that will prevent or reduce injury and death when accidents happen. And it looks to the interaction of the vehicle and the highway, and to reducing the adverse effects of the environment, particularly of hazardous weather conditions.

By approaching highway safety as primarily a technological problem—and only secondarily as a social or legal one—and by attempting to reduce the demands on the driver, we encounter some raised eyebrows from those accustomed to thinking of accidents in terms of driver error. It has been suggested, for instance, that this approach is somehow immoral, that it relieves drivers of responsibility for misconduct, that it excuses them instead of punishing them.

I do not agree. It is no more immoral than shaving with a safety razor instead of a straight edge.

It does say that the man who makes a mistake, where it is an honest one or pure negligence, need not suffer instantaneous corporal, if not capital, punishment. And that innocent passengers and drivers of other cars need not suffer with him. The drunken, reckless, or irresponsible driver can be brought to justice through due process of law.

Furthermore, the people we are trying to protect are not, by and large, habitually dangerous drivers. They are not the "suicidal boobs" that self-styled experts like to preach against. Nor are they imaginary. They are, in fact, you and I.

The truth is that the great bulk of accidents involve average, normally responsible drivers. This was borne out quite clearly in an analysis by the Bureau of Public Roads last summer of 150,000 California drivers' records. The study showed that almost an entirely different group of drivers is involved in accidents each year. Removing the repeaters—those who have two or more accidents in one year—would have little or no effect on the following year's accidents.

So, our annual traffic toll is, to an overwhelming degree, an accumulation of rare accidents, occurring to all too many generally good drivers. It is plain, then, that if accidents are to be radically reduced, all drivers—not just the "dangerous" few—must be helped.

This is precisely what President Johnson's traffic safety program is meant to do.

Relating this view of driver error or driver responsibility more specifically to the safety efforts we are honoring tonight, I would guess—and this is an undocumented guess—that most of the traffic safety efforts of radio and TV stations in past years would come under the heading of "driver motivation" or "driver improvement." No one, of course, would deny that there is room for improvement in the general level of driver competence. For that matter, I suppose each of us here could stand to improve his own skill behind the wheel. But while driver improvement is a worthy cause, it must be

state legislature—a revision of Wyoming's Municipal code.

He was a co-sponsor of a legislative reapportionment bill which passed the House, but died in the Senate. The reapportionment formula in the measure was very similar to that later decreed by a three-judge federal court.

One of the finest speakers on the political scene, he was much in demand for appearances at political rallies and meetings throughout the state.

He was extremely popular, and for at least eight or ten years he had been urged to seek high office. Perhaps he would have this year, or four years from now, had he lived.

Besides serving as state Democratic chairman and as a member and speaker of the House of Representatives, he served as Laramie county Democratic chairman, and eight years as Laramie county attorney—and a good one he was.

In the political arena, Walt Phelan asked no quarter and gave no quarter. But he was admired and respected by both Democrats and Republicans throughout Wyoming. His friends were many and devoted.

His death is a loss for all Wyoming, and particularly for the City of Cheyenne.

We join with his many friends in extending sympathy to his wife and two children.

[From the Cheyenne (Wyo.) State Tribune, May 31, 1966]

And whither I go ye know, and the way ye know.—St. John 14:4.

#### TRIBUTE TO WALTER

The last time we talked with Walter Phelan, it was in company with Father Bernard Brown, a Catholic priest who serves as an Oblate order missionary with the Hare Skin Indians above the Arctic Circle. It really was Father Brown's interview but Walter brought him by because the priest was a house guest of the Phelans and furthermore a longtime family friend.

For once we did not engage in any political needling with Walter, which quite often took the form of our conversation. He was intensely interested in Father Brown and the latter's dedicated efforts with the remote Indian tribe. For those who thought of Mr. Phelan as strictly either a legal expert, and he was an outstanding attorney in any arena, or a doughty opponent on the political field, and he certainly was that, too, this was something of a switch.

But there were many sides to Walter, and this is but one of those that were not revealed to the general public who most often conceived of him as a political battler, in the thick of controversy. There were even some very interesting side angles to this facet of his personality, and one that made us like him very much despite some of the jawbone conflicts we engaged in.

For example, Walter once observed to us: "There's no point in being in politics unless you can have some fun out of it." This was in connection with some statement calculated to outrage the Republicans, whom Mr. Phelan quite frequently sought to annoy, and took great delight in doing so.

As a master of wielding the political shiv, Walter often drove home the point; and when it came his turn to receive the counterblows, he did so without complaint, or resorting to the excuse that he had been ill-used, or had suffered a low form of attack.

This was because he not only was a highly intelligent man but he also possessed an intelligence graced by a well-developed sense of humor; plus a sense of the spirit of combat that did not carry with it rancor, spite or hate.

Somehow we got the impression that through the swirling smoke of broadsides fired through press releases, editorials, speeches and other forms of political weaponry, Walter was having a tremendously

good time with all of the give and take that he engendered, particularly as state chairman of the Democratic party.

The contest of living was fun as parlayed into politics, and he enjoyed it to the hilt.

This side of his personality overreached the others: That of the lawyer, of good citizen, leading layman in his church, of good father and family man. This may or may not be unfortunate, judging how one views life.

It is sad that so much talent and energy has been lost to this community, state and nation through a physical accident such as the massive coronary occlusion that Mr. Phelan suffered early Monday. He had a great future ahead of him both in the law and in politics, and this had not been diminished one whit by the fact that he did not gain the nomination for the federal circuit judgeship for which he was recommended.

His career in state government was going forward; he had every intention of running for the State Senate and most likely would have been elected, over our opposition, of course; but elected nevertheless.

We were sort of looking forward to this, and somehow secretly glad he did not stray off onto the neutral pathways of the judiciary which would have put him out of the arena.

So as we take our leave of Walter Phelan, with a great deal of sadness, we do so thinking of him loading the political cannon and firing like mad, often in our direction. We shall sincerely miss him in many respects, not the least of which was that he was both a gentleman and a staunch, but honorable, combatant.

#### RESOLUTION OF THE ARKANSAS BANKERS ASSOCIATION

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, on May 18, 1966, the Arkansas Bankers Association met in Hot Springs, Ark., and, among other things, commended the foresight and perception of the distinguished senior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] for his handling of the banking inquiry by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which he heads as chairman.

As a member of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the attached resolution be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RESOLUTION

Whereas, the banking industry occupies a position of great trust and responsibility with respect not only to its stockholders and depositors but, also, to the public; and

Whereas, isolated instances have arisen where such trust has been violated, with harmful publicity to banking as a whole; and

Whereas, the Arkansas Bankers Association feels that all reasonable precautions should be taken within the concept of the dual banking system for adequate protection against any breach of such trust; and

Whereas, certain laws have been promulgated, principally on the national level, which duplicate existing laws; overregulate banks; restrict free flow of money; and inhibit the ability of banks to attract funds; and

Whereas, even though all financial institutions were created by law for specific functions, with separate and distinct powers and services, there is a willful blurring of the distinctions, and the attempted blending of the services, to the confusion of the general public; and

Whereas, the Congress of the United States is becoming more fully aware of the existing

conditions and problems, because Arkansas' own native son, Senator JOHN L. McCLELLAN, has directed the attention of Congress to the report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on recent practices in banking: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Arkansas Bankers Association, in this Seventy Sixth Convention here assembled, urges and requests that the historic concept of the dual banking system with its inherent public trust, separate and distinct powers, be preserved without duplication and over regulation, and that Senator JOHN L. McCLELLAN be commended for his foresight and perception in the necessity to combat the existing trends.

Respectfully Submitted,

J. C. BARNETT,

Chairman.

SAM BOWMAN,  
P. L. COPELAND,  
WILLIAM H. KELLEY,  
ELLIS E. SHELTON,  
J. B. WASHINGTON,

The Resolutions Committee of the Arkansas Bankers Association.

HOT SPRINGS, ARK., May 18, 1966

#### U.N. OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President on June 2, South Vietnam made a formal request for United Nations observers to oversee the elections for a constituent assembly in September.

This request is a welcome one. It should be hailed by all who long for a solution to the tragic situation in Vietnam. For this request, if granted, will give the United Nations an opportunity to become actively involved where an objective international presence is sorely needed.

It will not be easy to gain United Nations sanction for this proposal. The President has given his strong support to the South Vietnamese request. Ambassador Goldberg shares his enthusiasm. We hope that Secretary General U Thant will lend his great personal influence and the prestige of his office to this undertaking. Most of all we hope that France and the Soviet Union will give their support to the proposal when it comes before the Security Council. Their votes are important.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous support that an editorial which appeared in the New York Times on June 3 be inserted in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### U.N. OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM

The formal request by the Saigon Government for United Nations observers at the election of a constituent assembly in September provides the opportunity for effective U.N. involvement in the Vietnamese crisis. We hope that Secretary General Thant, who has been so alert to the menacing implications for the world of military escalation and internal chaos in South Vietnam, will swiftly join President Johnson in endorsing Saigon's bid for impartial supervision of the balloting this fall.

The assembly election is an essential initial step toward establishing democratic rule in South Vietnam, and the U.N. is the ideal agency to supply observers to help guarantee fair voting in a war-shattered country with no tradition of representative government. The United States, as we have often noted, is much too deeply committed in Vietnam to be considered detached in any election role it might be asked to exercise.

June 6, 1966

11785

The Legislature noted that three Maine electric utilities and eight others from elsewhere in New England, the "Big Eleven Powerloop," also plan an atomic plant in that state.

The Maine Power Authority and the private group, known as Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, would serve the same market.

Maine Yankee Atomic and the Maine Power Authority would generate an almost identical supply of 700,000 kilowatts, more than the state needs pending an unexpected industrial expansion.

The plant at Otter Point would provide what is known as base-load or constant power and the proposed hydroelectric project at Dickey-Lincoln School would furnish peaking power.

Proponents of the Maine Power Authority believe the two projects—theirs and Dickey—could augment each other, increasing annual residential use in Maine while cutting power costs.

John N. Harris, technical consultant to advocates of the authority, believes the project could operate nearly 40 percent more cheaply than private utilities.

A power authority could produce at a cost range of from 3.1 to 3.2 mills at the start compared to a 4.8 mills cost factor for the private companies, according to Harris.

The Legislature has asked for an interim report next month and a complete report by Aug. 1.

[From the Boston (Mass.) Globe, May 19, 1966]

**OUR HIGH COST OF ELECTRICITY, IX: THE GREAT BLACKOUT PUT THE SPOTLIGHT ON POWER**

(By Richard Connolly)

When the lights went out during the Northeast blackout, the spotlight of public scrutiny shone brighter than ever on the private utilities of New England.

It still shines, much to the awareness of the utilities themselves.

More people are asking more questions about how our private utilities operate. They want to know why New England's average electric rates are the highest in the country.

They want to know what is being done about it.

"Kilowatts . . ." "Megawatts . . ." "Firm power . . ." "Peaking power . . ."

The glossary of power terms goes on and on, to the confusion of the average consumer.

He is interested in power principally in terms of his electric bill and whether it's going up or down.

The consumer is served by a monopoly. He has no choice of product.

As one congressional critic of the private power interests has pointed out, the consumer cannot go bargain hunting for "Super Krunchy Kilowatts."

Under these conditions he must rely upon his elected representatives and the regulatory agencies which they appoint. Government must stand guardian for the interests of the consumer.

Since the blackout, government in this region has taken a closer look at private power.

In Massachusetts, for example, the Legislature created a special commission to investigate the massive blackout of last Nov. 9 and the generation, distribution and cost of power.

The commission was given a broad mandate which also covers the electric rate structure and the financing of the electric companies both private and municipally-operated.

Headed by Sen. James P. Rurak (D-Haverhill), the commission has held several organizational meetings to map its job and to

determine how much money it will need. The 17-member commission includes representatives of labor, industry, private power, public power and the Legislature.

The legislation which created the commission was proposed originally by the Massachusetts Consumers' Council which said the power question has been a chronic problem.

The only way it could be solved, the Consumers' Council maintained, was through a "tough, hard-nose commission operating in the public eye."

Whether the legislative commission finds the answer for Massachusetts remains to be seen.

In its overall approach to the problem, New England has under consideration several huge projects—the "Big Eleven Power Loop," Dickey-Lincoln School and Gov. Hoff's plan to import Canadian power.

The advocates of each vouch for the relative cost benefits of the projects.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston studied the projects and the current condition of the power industry extensively and concluded that New England consumers would pay less for electricity before long.

The analysis, conducted by John Wilkinson of its research department, showed that the price would be about the same whether the new facilities are erected by public or private groups.

"Long ago," Wilkinson wrote in his review, "state legislatures and the Congress recognized that electric utilities were natural monopolies 'clothed with a public interest' and they have been regulated—more or less—ever since.

"There is justification for the belief that, in general, commission regulation of rates and service has been neither very effective nor very positive in the past," Wilkinson continued.

"There are many exceptions, of course, but too often the incentive to reduce costs has not been present, cost reductions have not meant rate reductions, and assured markets have not fostered efficiency and aggressive innovations.

"For the bold expansion that the future demands, many feel that another tool—regulation by competition—may better serve the region.

"Competition or even the prospect of it is healthy. The absence of competition, less than ideal regulation, and a limited view of the public interest may mean a sacrifice of efficiency.

"But in a natural monopoly situation, competition too many come at some sacrifice in efficiency . . .

"The elected representatives of the people of the region will decide what mix of plans and tools seem to offer the optimal solution."

**NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITE CHOSEN**

AUGUSTA, ME.—Bally Point, a peninsula on Wiscasset's Back River, has been named the "preferred site" for a \$100 million nuclear power plant, the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. president said Wednesday.

William H. Dunham said that if the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and other governmental agencies approve, the plan is to start building next year for completion in 1970. The plant would serve much of New England.

**DICKEY PROJECT DATA QUESTIONED**

WASHINGTON.—Rep. EDWARD P. BOLAND (D-Mass.) questioned in House Appropriation Committee hearings made public Wednesday the basis of cost and benefit estimates used to justify Federal Development of the Dickey-Lincoln Dam project in Maine.

During closed hearings on public works appropriations for the next fiscal year, BOLAND, an opponent of the project, questioned the reliability of data on which the estimates were based.

**TRIBUTE TO WALTER B. PHELAN, DECEASED**

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, on Thursday, June 2, it was my sad task to attend the funeral of a dear friend and State political leader, Mr. Walter B. Phelan, of Cheyenne, Wyo.

A young man with a brilliant career already well established and an even brighter future to look forward to, Walter Phelan was stricken suddenly by a heart attack. His untimely death came as a shock—not only to his wonderful family and those of us who have had the honor to know him well, but to the entire citizenry of the State of Wyoming.

For Walter Phelan was no ordinary man. He distinguished himself in every endeavor he undertook. As an attorney at law, he was considered one of Wyoming's outstanding barristers. He was the county attorney at Cheyenne for 8 years. He was the chairman of his State political party for 4 years. He served five terms in the Wyoming State House of Representatives; and during the last session of that body, he was selected to the position of speaker of the house. In this position of leadership he was able to achieve the passage of much beneficial legislation and was almost singlehandedly responsible for adoption of a revision of Wyoming's Municipal Code. Walter had planned, this year, to seek office in the Wyoming State Senate where he most certainly would have been elected. I know he would have made even greater contributions to Wyoming's destiny in that role.

Mr. President, our State—and indeed, our country—has lost a friend and an outstanding citizen in the death of Walter Phelan. My sentiments are echoed in the editorials which have appeared in the Wyoming press these past few days, and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Cheyenne (Wyo.) Eagle, May 31, 1966]

WALTER B. PHELAN

A brilliant legal and political career suddenly came to an end yesterday morning when Walter B. Phelan died.

At 46, Phelan already had established himself as one of the fine attorneys of Wyoming and as a solid leader in the Wyoming Democratic party.

He served as Wyoming Democratic chairman from June, 1961, to Dec. 6, 1964, when he resigned to accept the post as Speaker of the Wyoming House of Representatives—an honor bestowed upon him by fellow Democratic legislators.

He was serving his fifth term as a member of the state House of Representatives at the time of his death.

As Speaker of the House, during the regular session of the 38th legislature, he guided several important pieces of legislation through that body.

Long an outspoken critic of Wyoming's Right-to-Work law, he saw to it that a repeal passed the House in the 38th legislature. The repeal was defeated in the Republican-controlled Senate.

Largely because of his influence, the 38th legislature repealed a provision that had prevented Wyoming from accepting its share of federal aid for education, and he helped to push through the longest bill of the 1965

June 6, 1966

The United Nations operates with no such handicap. Moreover, the precedent set in September would be helpful in assuring similar international supervision of the wider elections that later will be necessary when negotiation of a Vietnam peace settlement and construction of an interim regime become possible.

If the Soviet Union and France want to help clear the way for an eventual termination of the fighting on the basis of democratic determination by the Vietnamese people, their support for the assignment of U.N. election observers would represent a practical road toward such a solution. The cost of adequate supervision will be substantial for a world organization already crippled by fund shortages; but it is infinitesimal when measured against the potential contribution toward establishing the rule of law in the disaster zone that is Vietnam.

#### CONDITION OF ANIMALS IN EXPERIMENTAL LABORATORIES

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, on Friday, May 27, 1966, a very instructive news report entitled "Few Animal Laboratories Pass Informal Inspection" appeared in the Christian Science Monitor.

The article gives some idea of the conditions that exist in many research facilities where perpetual caging, inadequate cages, lack of postoperative care, and careless handling by caretakers are among the main abuses to animals.

The Monroney amendment to S. 2322, the animal protective bill now pending before the Senate Commerce Committee, would restore to that bill the provisions for inspection of care and housing of research animals during the time when they are not undergoing actual experiments.

The article I have cited gives good reasons for the passage of S. 2322 with the Monroney amendment. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### FEW ANIMAL LABORATORIES PASS INFORMAL INSPECTION—LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS HELD

BOSTON.—If people really knew the condition of animals in most of the experimental laboratories in the United States, they would demand corrective legislation," said Mrs. Dorothy Dyce, of the Animal Welfare Institute, in an interview here. Hearings on bills to regulate these conditions open this week before the Senate Commerce Committee.

As laboratory animal consultant for the Animal Welfare Institute, whose headquarters are in New York City, Mrs. Dyce travels throughout the United States, observing conditions in laboratories of hospitals, schools, institutions for scientific research, and pharmaceutical houses.

Out of 104 such laboratories visited since 1963, Mrs. Dyce said that in only two did she find every animal comfortably housed and apparently given proper care both before and after surgery. These were at the Jewish Hospital in Brooklyn, N.Y., and at Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H., where in her judgment particularly conscientious veterinarians are in charge.

She pointed out, however, that without legally authorized inspection and regulation, no laboratories could be given a blanket approval, since conditions might be good in one direction and bad in another.

#### EXAMPLES OFFERED

Asked to specify some bad conditions found in laboratories, Mrs. Dyce cited:

**Perpetual caging:** In many laboratories, the animals are literally never released from the cages. Some dogs have been continuously confined for as long as seven years. In such laboratories the animals, some of them in serious condition, cannot escape the water when the cages are hosed out.

**Inadequate cages:** Most cages are far too small. In one laboratory all the cages are 30"x30"x26". Collies, boxers, and other large dogs cannot lie, much less stand, in a normal position. Cages for cats and other small animals are small and overcrowded.

**Lack of postoperative care:** It is the rare laboratory, Mrs. Dyce charges, that offers adequate treatment after surgery. Often they are left completely unattended.

**Careless handling by caretakers:** In some laboratories inexperienced caretakers are assigned to animal care resulting often in crude treatment.

#### INFORMATION AVAILABLE

The Animal Welfare Institute has been combatting these conditions by educational means. It offers free of charge, to any interested laboratory, two complete reference manuals, "Basic Care of Experimental Animals" and "Comfortable Quarters for Laboratory Animals." A film, "Handling Laboratory Animals," is distributed at cost.

But, Mrs. Dyce pointed out, education alone is not enough. Legislation is the only workable solution. The Animal Welfare Institute strongly recommends bills S. 2322 and S. 3059, now before the Senate Commerce Committee. Both would establish humane standards for conditions in laboratories as well as on dealers' premises.

For legislation regulating experimentation itself, the Institute recommends the Clark-Cleveland bills, S. 1071 and H.R. 5647, now pending in congressional committee.

#### COMMUNICATING WITH LATIN AMERICA: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, last week, I reported to the Senate on the effectiveness of our information program in Latin America in regard to books and other printed materials.

Today, I would like to turn to an equally important aspect—perhaps more important—of our effort to communicate with our Latin friends.

I am referring to the broadcast media, radio, and television, through which we attempt to reach millions of people who cannot or will not read the books which are produced by the U.S. Information Agency.

Convulsive social and political changes are occurring in Latin America. Many ingredients have figured in this reaction; one is radio.

This change is affecting more and more facets of Latin American culture and society. Ever growing numbers of people are not only being touched by it, but are participating in it—wittingly or otherwise. A tiny device helps power this ongoing social revolution. As expressed in the U.S. Information Agency's 25th semiannual report to Congress, a "device of comparatively recent invention has led to what has been called the transistor revolution in communications. Cheap, battery-powered transistor radios have enabled previously isolated, politi-

cally naive peoples to make contact with a world over the next hill or beyond the horizon or thousands of miles away. As they learn of this other world, where the living is better and men have a say about their destinies, their aspirations soar, and their ideas and attitudes undergo a change."

Meanwhile, as the industrialized nations of the world jet further into the electronic era, Latin America has not lagged far behind. If confirmation is needed, one need only refer to the statistics on the growth of television in Latin America:

Year:	Transmitters	Receivers
1961.....	123	4, 131, 000
1961.....	138	4, 782, 700
1963.....	162	5, 697, 490
1964.....	190	6, 217, 200
1965.....	211	8, 821, 200
1966 (projected).....	233	9, 405, 600

The major target of Communist propagandists today is the developing world, and, within the developing world, Latin America receives special attention.

Communist shortwave broadcasts to Latin America total over 450 hours per week.

In addition to Spanish and Portuguese, these broadcasts are delivered in English, 8 hours a week; French, 3 hours; Creole, 12 hours; and two major Indian dialects—Guarani, 3½ hours; and Quecha, 7½ hours. Communist satellite languages account for 38½ weekly broadcast hours.

Total worldwide broadcasting by Communist countries increased by 10 percent in 1965 over 1964, but two countries accounted for fully half that increase—and one of the two was Cuba. The other was North Korea. Interestingly, North Korea discontinued its 7 weekly hours of broadcasting in English to Latin America and initiated, in its stead, 14 hours of Spanish.

The U.S. counterattack against this Communist barrage is the responsibility of the Voice of America, the broadcasting arm of the U.S. Information Agency. VOA broadcasts to Latin America in Spanish, Portuguese, and English.

In Spanish, there are daily airshows from 6 to 9 a.m. and 6 to 11:30 p.m., plus a Monday-through-Friday schedule of daily half hours for 5:30 to 6 p.m. of news, for a total of 62 hours per week.

Portuguese-language broadcasts total 23½ hours weekly, consisting of a daily airshow from 5 to 8 p.m. and, Mondays through Fridays, a half hour—4:30 to 5 p.m.—of news.

Twenty-four and a half hours of VOA's weekly total of worldwide English broadcasts may be heard in Latin America. Additionally, 7 hours weekly are directed specifically to Latin America. This is the program "Report to Latin America," comprised of news back-grounders, commentaries, interviews, and topical features. The program is aired every evening from 6 to 6:30 p.m. and repeated from 9 to 9:30 p.m.

News accounts for 26 percent of the Spanish and 27 percent of the Portuguese programming of the Voice of America. Thirty percent of the Spanish

and 25 percent of the Portuguese is devoted to news analysis. Commentaries and features, plus other features centering on self-help and the Alliance for Progress, make up the remainder.

Of the approximately 38 million radio receivers in Latin America, 18 to 20 million are capable of receiving shortwave broadcasts. Including an estimated 530,000 in Cuba, VOA's daily listeners number about 4,200,000.

For special events, however, such as the coverage of Gemini flights, the VOA can count on great numbers of local Latin American radio stations picking up the VOA broadcasts and relaying them to listeners via medium-wave. In the specific case of the Gemini VI and VII launchings, 633 Latin American stations relayed the VOA coverage. A careful estimate of the audience for the Gemini IV coverage—which was relayed by 522 stations—indicated over 57 million listeners in Latin America.

Aside from special events, VOA and USIS programs are being relayed by or placed on 1,485 Latin American radio stations for a total of 11,192 transmitter hours per week. Taped package programs of VOA, placed on local stations, account for 9,315 of these hours; placement of USIS locally produced shows, 1,043; and relays of OVA programs, 834. VOA's newscasts are used, in Spanish, by 162 radio stations in 19 countries, and, in Portuguese, by over 50 in Brazil.

As the number of countries—and the number of transmitters in those countries—engaged in international shortwave radio broadcasting keep increasing, signals come closer together on the bands of receivers. What it boils down to is simply that the stronger signals are those which get through. Other things being equal, the listener will prefer the stronger, clearer signal, received more audibly and with less interference.

VOA is doing well in this constant jockeying for position. Nearly half of the total potential television audience of 39 million in Latin America listens to VOA broadcasts.

That is not to say, however, that we should relax. In an audience of 16.5 million is good, then 20 or 30 million is that much better.

Radio has effected in Latin America, as elsewhere in the developing world, what Leonard Marks, Director of the USIA, has referred to as a sort of "instant literacy." For a long time, motion pictures have filled a similar void in the area, combining sight and sound, while dispensing with the necessity for the audience to be able to read and write. Television, however, does all of this and more. It bypasses literacy, on the one hand, while, on the other, it has been used in Mexico and other countries as an instrument for teaching literacy. In closed-circuit arrangements, it helps overcome such inadequacies as lack of trained instructors in universities. From the political viewpoint, it brings the nation and the world into the homes of people. To radio, it adds the element of the visible. To the motion picture, as traditionally known in moviehouses, it adds the element of immediacy.

Much as television has already revolutionized communication in Latin Ameri-

ca—and between ourselves and Latin America—we are merely on the threshold of its full potential. What the future holds, as orbiting communication satellites are sent aloft in greater numbers, with stepped-up capabilities, and for longer periods of time, we can only guess.

During 1965, 23 countries with television in Latin America devoted 7,000 hours of their telecasting time to USIA materials.

None of the USIA's posts in these countries paid anything for this massive block of air time, which, if purchased, would have cost—by conservative estimates—\$2,350,000.

Programming for Latin America by the USIA draws on some of the material produced for worldwide use, such as "Report From America," "Science Reports," President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins University, "In Search of Peace"—on Pope Paul's visit to the United States, and "Walk in Space."

There is, additionally, areawide TV programming specifically directed at Latin America:

News: Feature clips which are distributed to posts not receiving U.S. commercial news service.

Documentaries: Such as Alliance for Progress specials and OAS specials.

News in depth: Special events coverage and special conferences, and a pilot series, called "Hemisphere Perspective."

Series: "Panorama Panamericano," a 15-minute weekly videotape program is a major regular vehicle for continued coverage of Alliance for Progress events throughout the hemisphere. It is carried on 121 television stations in 101 cities of 20 Latin American countries.

Nuestro Barrio—"Our Neighborhood"—is a 26-episode, continuing series of 30-minute dramatic programs devoted entirely to the Alliance for Progress, designed for showing in evening peak-listening periods and using top Latin American talent. It is being telecast at prime time in 24 Latin American cities on top-rated TV stations. Some cities plan daily reruns.

Country programming: Eight USIS posts produce 21 continuing television programs, while 18 produce specials and adapt and use material provided by USIA's Motion Picture and Television Service.

Special output: Among special output items have been television treatment of the Tricontinental Conference in Cuba, the Vietnam peace offensive, and the Cuban exodus.

In summary, Mr. President, this is a good record of performance that deserves the wholehearted support of the Senate. That is not to say that more cannot be done, but the Voice of America and the USIS are doing a good job now, and I am pleased to commend their performance to my colleagues.

#### CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

#### BANK HOLDING COMPANY AMENDMENTS OF 1966

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of H.R. 7371.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 7371) to amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to its consideration.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TALMADGE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, H.R. 7371, the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, as amended by the Banking and Currency Committee, constitutes a major step forward in the regulation of banks and banking. It demonstrates clearly that the Congress is fully aware of the special needs and problems in the field of banking, including both the competitive problems and the problems relating to public convenience and necessity, and can and will pass appropriate special legislation to handle these special problems.

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was the outcome of 18 years of effort on the part of my predecessor, Carter Glass, and many years of effort on the part of the Banking and Currency Committee after I became a member of that Committee. It was intended to apply in the field of banking and bank holding companies the general purposes of the antitrust laws—to promote competition and to prevent monopoly—and the general purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933—to prevent unduly close connections between banking and other businesses. For the first time, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 imposed effective and meaningful restrictions on the forming of new bank holding companies, the acquisition of banks by bank holding companies and the conduct of business within bank holding company systems. These controls have proved generally effective and satisfactory.

However, like all major statutes, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was the product of compromise, and, like all such statutes, experience under it demonstrated the need for amendments of one kind or another. We knew at the time we passed the 1956 act that it would be necessary to revise the act as the result of experience under it, and we, therefore, required the Federal Reserve Board to report to us at the end of 2 years and annually thereafter with recommendations for amendments. The Federal Reserve Board has done so, and H.R. 7371, as reported, embodies many of those amendments.



condemn three public park areas, including a small one on the Du Pont beach. This was quickly tied up in court and it looks like that's where it will stay.

But the most often heard complaint is that Du Pont enterprises do not pay their fair share of the taxes. True, in Gulf County, St. Joe pays half the property taxes the county operates on. But critics point out the company owns three-fourths of the property.

"If they just doubled St. Joe Paper Co's assessed value," said a Gulf County leader, "it would put the county schools in good shape."

To double the assessment would still leave full evaluation as a distant goal. The \$80-million paper mill is on the rolls for less than nine million dollars. As for the land, that is on the tax rolls as "wild land"—taxable at between \$5 and \$7.50 evaluation an acre (averaging 17 cents a year)—whereas it really is farm land (those pines are quite a crop) with the proper evaluation of no less than \$25 an acre.

From the beach property, which is actually worth about \$75 to \$100 a front foot, the county collects an average of 27 cents tax an acre.

St. Joe is also supposed to pay personal property tax on the equipment it uses to farm the pinelands, such as the bulldozers, planters, tractors, and trucks. But in Gulf and Jackson Counties, no woodland equipment is listed on the rolls. In Bay County it pays on only \$3,500 evaluation; in Liberty, in \$2,500—neither amount representing even a healthy fraction of the cost of a piece of big equipment.

St. Joe guards its tax immunity with a vengeance. When Calhoun County attempted to levy a \$550 tax on a bulldozer, the company took the issue into court and held it there for two years.

No ploy is too rough for St. Joe to pull when fighting taxes. Company officials told Calhoun County businessmen that if they did not get the tax assessor to let up, they would take their trade away from them. And they did.

To Calhoun, one of the poorest counties in the state, it was quite a blow. But they stood by their tax assessor.

Not many in the Panhandle will go that far in rebellion.

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**SAIGON SHOULD ACCEPT INTERIM ASSEMBLY UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE**

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed out of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to make a comment on the news this morning regarding free elections in Saigon.

Free elections are the single most important element in the future stability and well-being of South Vietnam. Only by genuinely free elections, and only after these elections produce a genuinely representative and workable government, can a Saigon government gain the legitimacy and acceptance it needs and that the people of South Vietnam want. If every step of this electoral process—from campaigning to the installation of a new government—is not conducted with openness and fairness to all, hope for bringing peace to Vietnam will seriously diminish.

I have, therefore, joined the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] the other day in proposing United Nations

supervision, and I have also proposed a cease-fire during the 3 weeks of campaigning and elections. The electoral commission of South Vietnam has properly recommended that the constituent assembly should also have legislative power and should be able to transform itself into a full-fledged parliamentary body if the proposed constitution so provides. I am particularly gratified by this proposal, because I have been advocating it myself for some time. On May 19, before the Political Committee of the Liberal Party of New York, I urged the transformation of the constituent assembly into an interim parliamentary assembly, once the work of the constituent assembly in producing a constitution is completed. The interim parliamentary assembly would be authorized to establish a caretaker civilian government until new elections are held under the Constitution.

I would strongly urge the President of the United States to use his good offices to persuade the ruling junta in Saigon to accept this proposal. It would be very unwise for the junta to prolong unduly their own military form of government.

While I am pleased about the proposal which would enable a constituent assembly to become a parliamentary assembly and designate the government, I am concerned about another proposal of which we have just had news. The electoral commission of South Vietnam has apparently advised the military junta that all those who "directly or indirectly work for Communists or neutralists should be excluded from the elections." Exclusion provisions so drawn could be used by local election officials to bar anyone they felt undesirable from either voting or running for office. It is dangerous practice to allow individual regional officials to determine who is included in a definition of "Communists and neutralists." The election must be open to all—universal suffrage by secret ballot should be the basis of participation in the September election; otherwise the results of the election might not be truly representative of the feelings of all the South Vietnamese people. As a practical matter, however, we must realize that there are certain areas in South Vietnam in which it may be impossible to have free elections. All of those observing the elections—the United States, the U.N. and other international bodies, and the whole world—will be able to judge whether areas so excluded by the Saigon government will invalidate the essential fairness of the election. The Saigon government must therefore be careful not to exclude such areas in an arbitrary manner, and I hope our Government will make this clear, too.

In short, I believe that the idea of dealing with areas where it is possible to administer fair elections is different from excluding individuals and groups. The latter process is bound to be more capricious and bound to cast doubt on the validity of the whole election.

Second, I urge the President of the United States to persuade the ruling military junta in Saigon that the sooner they end the arbitrary military government, the better for all concerned. The

first opportunity for this will be if the constituent assembly can become a parliamentary assembly and designate a government. Then, really, for the first time, we will be off to some kind of representative government in South Vietnam, a project to be devoutly wished for and which will be of tremendous importance to the future of the validity of the struggle there.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article published in today's New York Times, written by Charles Mohr, and entitled "Vietnamese Seek Lawmaking Right in New Assembly."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 6, 1966]

**Vietnamese Seek Lawmaking Right in New Assembly—Civilians' Election Law Plan Allows Chamber to Act as a National Legislature—Cloud Cast on Ky Hope—Premier's Intention to Stay on a Year May Be Periled if Junta Adopts Proposal**  
 (By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 5.—The civilians drawing up a South Vietnamese election law have recommended that a constitution-drafting assembly elected in September be given legislative functions and be allowed to transform itself into a national assembly.

If adopted, this law could end Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's hope to cling to power well into 1967.

The electoral-law drafting commission met until late tonight in Saigon to wind up deliberations which began May 5.

The commission's recommendations are expected to be presented to the military junta Tuesday and at a news conference Wednesday.

The junta, led by Premier Ky and the chief of state, Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, have reserved the right to amend the commission's suggestions, but this would certainly cause political problems.

The South Vietnamese political scene was relatively tranquil today, but the political crisis, nearly three months old, has not been settled.

**DEADLINE IS IN DOUBT**

The military junta, or directorate, is publicly pledged to increase its number by adding 10 civilians to its 10 generals by tomorrow. But tonight it was difficult to tell whether the junta could meet this deadline or was even trying to do so.

The generals had been conferring with civilian political leaders, asking them to recommend civilians to join the directorate. However, those civilians approached by generals said that no direct invitation to join the directorate had been made.

More important, informed sources said the junta might decide it had no power unilaterally to take in new members and might thus refer the question to a later meeting of the Armed Forces Congress, a body of about 30 officers, including all the senior troop commanders.

The commission drafting an election law has gone ahead with its work even though three Buddhist representatives walked out late last month in protest over Air Vice Marshal Ky's military occupation of the city of Danang.

**RECOMMENDATIONS LISTED**

The recommendations of the 29 remaining members became known tonight. Among their recommendations were:

The election to the constituent assembly would take place Sept. 11 after a formal campaign of no more than three weeks.

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The assembly would have the duty to draft a constitution but would "also have legislative power" and could transform itself into a full-fledged national assembly if the draft constitution so provides.

The assembly would consist of 159 members, 12 of them reserved for such minorities as hill-dwelling Montagnards and people of Cambodian descent.

Each constituency would be made up of 100,000 voters, except that provinces with less population than that would get at least one assemblyman.

Those who "directly or indirectly work for the Communists or neutralists" would be barred from election by provincial and central election councils.

An assemblyman could be deprived of parliamentary immunity from prosecution for remarks made on the floor if the assembly votes by a two-thirds margin that his words are "aimed at making propaganda for Communist or neutralist policies or activities."

Perhaps the key provision in the recommended election laws was that the constitution-drafting body could make laws while it sat and could draft a constitution making itself a full national assembly.

This tended to confirm the opinions expressed by Vietnamese politicians that, once elected, the constituent assembly would insist on taking a hand in South Vietnam's chaotic political problems.

Some observers think it possible the assembly would ask Premier Ky and the junta to serve as an interim government while the assembly sat and until new elections for a national legislature are held.

Many other observers, however, are convinced that the assembly will try to vote either a new interim or permanent government into power to replace Premier Ky. Many Vietnamese politicians, in fact, do not even call the prospective body a constituent assembly but refer to it in conversation as "the national assembly."

Whether Premier Ky will override the electoral-law commission's recommendations next week or whether he would try to resist a move against him by the constituent assembly next fall was not clear.

Privately, Premier Ky has said he plans to try to stay in power at least a year. Publicly, he has said that the constituent assembly can only draft a constitution and not try to govern.

In a move to heal the split in the Unified Buddhist Church, a delegation of senior monks went to the seaside town of Vungtau to try to persuade Thich Tam Chau to rescind his resignation as chairman of the church's Institute of Secular Affairs.

Informed sources indicated that Thich Tam Chau had agreed to withdraw the resignation and would return to Saigon tomorrow.

#### RIOTS MAY BE RENEWED

Although Thich Tam Chau is a so-called moderate who has tried to reduce Buddhist street agitation for the overthrow of Premier Ky and General Thieu and has tried to find some kind of compromise with the Government, there was a good chance of renewed demonstrations by militant Buddhist elements starting tomorrow.

Thich Tam Chau had ordered an end of street riots until tomorrow to give the Government a chance to show good faith on its promise to expand the directorate.

The problem is made worse by the fact that the Buddhist monks who negotiated with the junta told the Buddhist faithful last week that Premier Ky and General Thieu had promised to submit their continuation in office to an election by the directorate after it is expanded with 10 civilians. The junta denies having made any such pledge. So the compromise value of the offer to expand the directorate has shrunk considerably.

Whether the Buddhists would boycott the prospective elections to a constituent assembly was not clear. The Buddhists are believed to have a chance of winning the largest single bloc of seats in the assembly. But most politicians estimate this bloc at only 30 per cent of the seats.

Many informed sources, however, doubt that the election will take place as scheduled or ever. They feel that either continued civil disorder or second thoughts by the generals will force a cancellation.

#### INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL OF COMMERCE AND PRODUCTION

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I call the Senate's attention to the fine work of the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, the most important private enterprise organization of both Americas, North and South.

Since last Wednesday, the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production—CICYP—has been meeting in Mexico City under the chairmanship of its President, George S. Moore, president of the First National City Bank of New York, to consider some of the basic problems facing the private enterprise system in Latin America.

Last Friday, the plenary session of the council approved the resolution which placed the council in close support of increased Latin American economic integration. The council resolved to work closely with their governments to bring the Latin American free trade area close to reality—this I believe to call for a Latin American common market—to support the modification of the present slow system of tariff changes by introducing an automatic system of tariff reduction and by quickening the process of complete tariff elimination, and to harmonize among the countries of Latin America tariffs, monetary exchange and fiscal policies, and legislation affecting investment and social welfare.

I know of no quicker way to turn frustration into success, even keeping pace with the population increase, than the development of the Latin American free trade area into a common market, to which the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production is now committed. Incidentally, for the first time, the council headed by an American, George S. Moore, president of the First National City Bank.

It is also of great importance that Assistant Secretary Lincoln Gordon, who was the principal speaker before the conference, told a press conference last Wednesday that the U.S. Government would carefully consider suggesting preferential treatment for Latin America if the U.S. efforts to persuade Western Europe to drop discriminatory practices in favor of African countries failed.

I ask unanimous consent to have an article that appeared this in morning's edition of the New York Times on the CICYP conference be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 6, 1966]  
BUSINESSMEN ASK LATIN FREE TRADE—MEMBERS OF INTER-AMERICAN COUNCIL VOW TO WORK FOR ACTION BY GOVERNMENTS—GROWTH SPURS SOUGHT—MEXICO CITY MEETING CALLS FOR HARMONY IN FISCAL AND TARIFF POLICIES

(By Henry Ginlger)

MEXICO CITY, June 4—The biggest private-enterprise group in the Western Hemisphere is now under commitment to accelerate lagging efforts to integrate Latin America's economy.

Some 400 business leaders from Latin America and the United States resolved yesterday to work closely with their governments to bring the Latin America Free Trade Area closer to reality. This was the most important resolution taken during five days of meetings sponsored by the Inter-American Council for Commerce and Production.

The meeting, according to George S. Moore, president both of the First National City Bank of New York and of the council, represented the largest gathering of private business leaders ever held in the Western Hemisphere. It was called to consider practical ways of quickening the pace of economic development.

#### POLICY HARMONY SOUGHT

The final declaration calls for a harmonizing among the countries concerned of tariffs, policies and legislation affecting investment and social welfare. It calls for modification in the present slow system of tariff changes by introducing an automatic system of reduction and by quickening the process of complete tariff elimination.

The business leaders in effect called for greater competition among themselves in the interest of raising living standards, but cautiously, and in a spirit of compromise, the declaration called for taking account of current differences in economic development among Latin countries so as not to hurt the smaller, less-developed ones.

The same caution was evident in passages treating reform of large land holdings. Such reforms should be carried out, the declaration said, "with just compensation" and "in an orderly, nonviolent and progressive way." It said the reform should be "selective," taking account of the productive levels of the farms and avoiding the other extreme of very small holdings.

#### COMPLAINTS ON TRADE

The business leaders complained of trade policies of developed countries that were prejudicial to Latin America.

The declaration called for "the elimination or at least the moderation of the high degree of agricultural protectionism prevailing in Europe and the United States in the form of high import duties, quotas, internal taxes, direct or indirect subsidies to producers, etc."

The United States is now trying to persuade Europe to drop discriminatory practices in favor of Africans. Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin-American Affairs, told the press here Wednesday that his Government would carefully consider suggesting preferential treatment for Latin America if the persuasion effort now being carried out in the Kennedy-round talks in Geneva failed.

The business leaders were careful not to appear in a role hostile to Government action. Instead they called for "permanent and harmonious collaboration." At the same time they sought to assert their role as the prime creators of jobs and to confine official action to furnishing the necessary infrastructure and to creating a favorable atmosphere for private enterprise.

In private, there were many businessmen who lamented that the trend in Latin

mestic animals than human beings. The important space-related nutritional question is somewhat as follows: What form, composition, and frequency of feeding will maintain caloric, nitrogen and psychological balance in humans under various environmental stresses, at minimum total weight and cost? The psychological balance factor here is of particular importance. For example, feeder chickens thrive on the substitution of hydroxy analog for the amino acid, methionine,<sup>10</sup> but Man as a species seems to be a lot more particular about his choice of food-stuffs.

Recapitulating, this discussion has covered several aspects of the possible biological significance of the space-effort. It has made the unsubstantiated, but hopefully provocative, claim that the drive and purpose behind space exploration is basically biological, and that the long-range practical consequences will have to include colonization and adaptation of Man, as a species, to extra-terrestrial habitats. Some of the more interesting and urgent requirements for research on biological problems which will be required to insure success in this biologically defined objective have been mentioned.

Particularly during this latter portion of the discussion, it may have become fairly obvious that research on the basic biological or other problems connected with the space effort is very likely to yield beneficial knowledge which has no particular application to Man's expansion into extra-terrestrial habitats. This is exactly what is already happening. However, space exploration should be considered primarily as a biological thrust outward for the human species, and not just another step toward making life easier through a speed-up in technology. The rational dedication of the space program to the full range expansion challenge for Man should do more to release the species' potential for all purposes than any number of attempts to approach secondary objectives in a more direct fashion.

\*Providing, of course, that these value terms can really be used in connection with organic evolution. Perhaps less anthropomorphically, the failure of Man to colonize extra-terrestrial habitats could well mean the alternative expansion into analogous interplanetary or intergalactic ecological niches of some other form or forms of living matter—possibly even intelligent living matter. The possibility that exactly this kind of expansion is already occurring elsewhere in the universe cannot be excluded, although competent scholars have pointed out the astronomical odds against locating it.<sup>7</sup>

\*\*That is, kinds of environments as well as sheer geography.

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<sup>12</sup> Hardy, James O. 1964. *Physiological Problems in Space Exploration*. Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, pp. 152-195.

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### America's Moral and Legal Commitment to the People of South Vietnam

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES H. MORRISON

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, the American people have been called upon in the past to sacrifice their lives and material comfort in order that the principles of freedom and justice be maintained. We have always based these sacrifices upon the assumption that without freedom, life on this planet would be cruel and unbearable.

We are being asked again to fight in defense of enlightenment; we are being asked again to lay down our lives and our material comfort to insure that the concept of freedom does not die in the world.

No one would say that Vietnam is a pleasant war; there is no such thing. It is certainly uncomfortable to live daily with the knowledge that our servicemen are fighting and dying in a land thousands of miles away; a strange land with which most of us were unfamiliar a few short years ago. We did not choose to fight there, for those who fight to defend the rights of others seldom are fortunate enough to pick the most advantageous place to do battle. Yet, I am convinced of one thing above all: We must fight in Vietnam—we must win an honorable peace in Vietnam or we will find America's will to defend the cause of freedom questioned throughout the world. This, I feel, would be disastrous to America's position, and, more important, it would broadcast to the world that we were unwilling to support the cause of freedom, enlightenment, and decency, and that we let ourselves become vulnerable to defeat and ultimate slavery by Communist domination.

There are a few who question both our moral and legal right to be in Vietnam.

Though I will always strongly uphold the right of responsible dissent in America, I feel that these critics are grievously wrong and indeed are in many cases helping prolong the war which they so vigorously oppose. I for one firmly uphold both our moral and legal commitment to the people of Vietnam and the free world.

Legally, I feel that we are on very solid ground, a position which the American Bar Association also holds. Under the United Nations Charter, which we had a major part in drafting, the right of collective self-defense is recognized for all nations. In 1954, after the French had suffered many reverses in Vietnam, that area was divided, North and South Vietnam, by the Geneva Convention. The United States, with the cooperation of other nations in Asia and throughout the world, then entered into the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty by which we agreed to protect southeast Asia—including South Vietnam—from aggression.

This treaty was adopted in accordance with the U.S. Constitution, and it is important to note that in a very real sense the misguided and foolish handful of Americans who are sending material aid to the Communists in North Vietnam are violating the spirit and letter of the U.S. Constitution as well as assisting in prolonging a war in which U.S. servicemen are fighting.

While we are not technically in a state of war against North Vietnam, the right of the President to act as he has is clear. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have supported the commitment made by President Eisenhower in 1954. In addition, Congress expressly authorized the President to use the Armed Forces to assist any member state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. We are acting in Vietnam with the expressed consent of, and at the specific request of, the Government of South Vietnam. No matter how confusing the change of governments in that strife-torn country may seem, the facts are clear: every new leader of South Vietnam has renewed this request.

Morally, the case seems to be equally convincing. One point above all should be made absolutely clear: we are dealing with a case of cynical aggression on the part of North Vietnam and Communist China against South Vietnam. Those who completely deny this are totally blind to the facts of the case and indeed even refuse to listen to these facts. Previous to the cold war, patterns of aggression, I agree, were much more clear cut. Armies of enemy nations would openly march across borders, as Germany did in World War II. However, this type of aggression has almost always met with total defeat in the 20th century.

Recognizing this basic fact, the Communists have developed a new, more subtle pattern of aggression. Instead of openly amassing huge armies into a grinding war machine, the Communists seek to infiltrate and gain control of small, dissident groups within a country. When this is accomplished, they feed large quantities of arms, material, and men to fight a war which they call an

However, cultural adaptation is certainly not the whole story. As Eiseley<sup>8</sup> and others have pointed out, in general "... Man's cultural proclivities are directed toward making life easier for himself..." not primarily toward adaptation to Arctic or other hostile environments. Nor, in spite of Malthus, does it seem reasonable that Man has been forced entirely by population pressure, the search for food, or any other such "external" drives into the wide ecological and geographical spread the species already occupied before written history.

This paper offers an alternative hypothesis: The urge to expand the ecological range of the species, to explore and then adapt to a new environment, is a fundamental drive in Man which has real adaptive and survival value in evolution. Put crudely, curiosity may "kill the cat," but not the species. On the contrary, a species which is driven to explore and adapt to an ice age environment before it is absolutely necessary to do so, obviously improves its collective chances of surviving this type of catastrophic change in environmental and ecological circumstances. For Man, this survival value may well be on a par with that of two other traits, consciousness of self and intelligence or the ability to reason in the abstract, to which Man's success is commonly ascribed. If so, curiosity, the urge to explore, may well have been deeply ingrained in the human species by natural selection. It may even be as basic a drive for humans as other obviously adaptive urges: To eat, to reproduce, etc.

It must be admitted that this type of biological interpretation of the "challenge" set of objectives outlined at the beginning of this discussion is possibly a circular argument. Certainly it cannot be proved or disproved by acceptable scientific means. However, the interpretation does have considerable attractiveness as a basis for a rational discussion of space exploration. The postulate that the urge to explore and expand range is a basic drive in the human species, based on its survival value, could well explain much of the appeal and creative energy releasing aspects of exploration in general, and space exploration in particular, to great numbers of individuals, and especially to the relatively unsophisticated but undeniably energetic and creative young of the species. And if innate curiosity is really a basic biological drive, as this hypothesis suggests, the need of numerous other justifications for satisfying it becomes much less important.

The same hypothesis also offers a rationale construct for much space-related research and development. If the space program is to continue long enough to produce an evolutionary or biological success, at least two kinds of research programs will be required. In both programs, the need for more knowledge is awe-inspiring. In spite of the tremendous strides which have been made in the past two decades, Man's ability to explore (let alone survive in the full biological sense extra-terrestrially is in its infancy.

First, much more knowledge is needed on ways to modify extra-terrestrial, hostile environments for Man's survival. Much of the discussion in this conference has been directed to various aspects of just this problem, however, so this paper will suggest only that these modifications will, in the long run, also require more biological knowledge.

It seems to be fairly well agreed, for instance, that the chances of finding habitable ecological niches, extra-terrestrial environments, on other planets within distances approachable with even theoretical space-craft are not very great. Dole, for example, has calculated the probability of any habitable planet in the tremendous volume of 1500 cubic light years around the Earth's solar system as less than 50 percent,<sup>9</sup> and his assumptions are, if anything, fairly bold. It

seems likely, therefore, that Man will be modifying extra-terrestrial bodies extensively to permit his self-sustaining colonization.

These modifications will almost certainly have to include the obtaining of essential elements for survival from extra-terrestrial sources.<sup>10</sup> For example, oxygen might be reclaimed by the reduction of either water (if available), or minerals. Unless delivered power costs for these kinds of processes can be reduced several orders of magnitude below those presently available on Earth, however, the costs of making oxygen in any really appreciable volume by physical-chemical means alone will certainly be astronomical. In conceptual form then, the pertinent research question becomes: What sequence of physical-chemical processes, fueled by what energy sources, and followed by, or interleaved with, which biological processes, will most efficiently adapt an otherwise hostile extra-terrestrial body for the survival of Man? At the very least, it would seem wise to develop considerably more understanding of photobiological processes such as photo-synthesis in order to utilize them for various different end-products in future space colonies.

It is also interesting to note that any major colonization effort on an oxygen or water poor, or otherwise hostile extra-terrestrial body, will in many ways be analogous to an earthbound environmental modification project which has been underway with increasing success for almost 2,000 years, the reclamation of the North Sea lowlands. Although only the last century or so of this effort has utilized modern technology, it has always required the combination of physical and biological operations—and, of course, social cooperation—which will also be requisite for the expansion of extra-terrestrial colonies.

The second major area for research will necessarily emphasize the adaptation of Man and other biological organisms, in turn, to possible available extra-terrestrial habitats. In this program, there are a number of extremely important areas which need much more investigation. Because even theoretical methods for modifying it to suit Earth evolved species are not available, possibly the most important problem is the effect on living organisms of differences in acceleration or gravitational fields. Man's projected tolerance to long-term G forces probably ranges from close to or at zero acceleration (or null gravity conditions) to slightly upwards of 1.5 to 2.0 G, particularly if adaptation can take place over more than one generation;<sup>11</sup> and the effects of short-range exposures to lift-off and landing G forces have been under intensive investigation and are relatively well understood.<sup>12</sup> For obvious reasons, however, the long-term effects of less than normal gravity have not been thoroughly researched. Recent experimental work<sup>13</sup> has shown, for instance, that plant organisms will react geotropically (leaves grow "up", root areas "down") to acceleration fields of only 10<sup>-2</sup>G. That is, over three days or so, plants will integrate and respond to a force of only 1 dyne acting on each gram of tissue. It is quite possible that the musculoskeletal tissues of Man and other animals are equally sensitive, and obviously much more investigation into the long-term effects of changed gravitational fields is required.

Another research problem of real importance has to do with the gaseous environment. Even assuming the ready availability of oxygen, there will certainly be long-range difficulties in exporting or recreating extra-terrestrially atmospheric environments which exactly parallel those on Earth. For example, only pure oxygen capsule environments have been used to date in the U.S. program. A great deal more needs to be determined, therefore, about cellular and whole-organism

responses to excess oxygen toxicity, to anoxia, and to the so-called inert gases. Here again, some rather surprising recent experimental results are developing, including reports that living organisms can survive and even grow in rather surprising gaseous environments such as nitrous oxide.<sup>14</sup> Although there is no proven role for the inert gases except in certain symbiotic systems such as the leguminous plants, Earth life has been evolving for geological eons in a largely inert atmosphere, and it would not be surprising to find that gaseous nitrogen, at least, does play some rather subtle, but essential, biochemical roles.

Two other areas of real importance for further research are the effects of radiation and electromagnetic fields, and the very interesting area of biological rhythms and clocks. It is generally recognized that living matter in an extra-terrestrial environment will either have to avoid, be shielded from, or be pharmacologically or biologically protected against ionizing radiation, and much research in this area is already underway. Because it seems a much less immediate threat, however, considerably less work has been done on the possible effects of other electromagnetic fields. Definite physiological effects of distorted or high level magnetic fluxes have been reported, ranging from the polarization of certain cells in the cerebellum of pigeons, which could affect orientation, to genetic aberrations in fruit flies,<sup>15,16</sup> but the effects of long-term changes in electromagnetic fluxes on living matter are unknown.

The rhythm and clock research which is becoming possible as space voyages which are not coordinated with the Earth's angular movements become more frequent will also require intensive effort. Some of the uncomfortable, although not incapacitating, reactions of time zone changes on human physiology are now well documented even in the popular press.<sup>17</sup> However, the effects of placing Man, or other organisms whose rhythms are normally synchronous with diurnal or seasonal Earth cycles, in an extra-terrestrial environment, particularly for more than one generation, are almost entirely speculative.

Finally, it seems apparent that at least the early stages of space exploration and colonization are also going to require considerably more knowledge of human nutrition. Until it is possible to modify even limited extra-terrestrial environments to operate as balanced ecologies similar to those on Earth, costly resupply missions will be required. Even if these are limited by reuse of all of the water and oxygen possible in carefully engineered life support systems, it is still going to require between 1 and 1½ pounds a day of relatively high quality foodstuffs to maintain a Man, or his equivalent, based on present understanding of human nutrition. When multiplied for the kinds of interstellar missions needed to search for potentially habitable extra-terrestrial bodies other than Mars, either the spacecraft itself had better be made of something edible, or more research on feeding possibilities is needed.

This research might well take two directions: First, to develop more knowledge of the synthetic, entropy-decreasing reactions of living organisms which create foodstuffs, of the mechanism and control of photosynthetic processes, and of such interesting chemical bacteria as the *Hydrogemonas* which will produce edible carbohydrate from carbon dioxide and hydrogen.<sup>18</sup> The penalty for not accumulating this knowledge in sufficient depth could well be a fatal unreliability of any food producing system engineered into longer exploration, or colonization systems. Secondly, we obviously need to know much more about the feed-efficiency aspects of human nutrition. In a way, it is ironic to be entering the space age with more knowledge of how to economically feed do-

Footnotes at end of speech.

internal civil war. This is what has happened to South Vietnam, and we are fighting, successfully, I might add, to stop this flagrant violation of the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

The American people have never hesitated to offer help to support the cause of liberty and freedom in the world. We have done this for two basic reasons: first, because we believe in freedom and have built a great nation on the principles of justice and liberty, and second, because it is in the interest of all Americans to do so. We are fighting for these principles in Vietnam; we are fighting in order to help our friends fend off the rising threat of totalitarianism and communism. But we are also fighting for our own self-interest because a free nation cannot long exist in a world which is not free. If we did not fight in Vietnam, I am sure that it would not be long before we would be fighting a much more desperate and far greater war much closer to home. We must prove that America is a strong, determined nation—determined to keep liberty and freedom alive throughout the world.

As Joseph Alsop points out in his recent Saturday Evening Post article, "Why We Can Win in Vietnam," the Vietcong is making a last ditch attempt to win the war in the face of overwhelming odds. As he points out:

The present enemy reinforcement is like one of those last high raises that losing players sometimes make to frighten their opponents out of a poker game.

We must not be frightened—we will not be frightened. We have the finest fighting force ever assembled in all the world in Vietnam, and we are winning the war. I urge all Americans to continue their support of our country and the free world, the President, and all of our elected officials, and I look forward, with all Americans, to the day when we can lay down our arms and join with the war-weary people of South Vietnam in building a peaceful, prosperous, free nation, and at the same time proving to all peoples that we can and will fight and win to preserve freedom and destroy the Communists' ambition of world domination with slavery and misery which would so surely accompany it.

**Library Services and Construction  
Act Amendments of 1966**

**SPEECH  
OF**

**HON. GALE SCHISLER**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 2, 1966

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14050) to extend and amend the Library Services and Construction Act.

Mr. SCHISLER. Mr. Chairman, throughout history, the well-educated man has been essentially the well-read man. The knowledgeable man has been the man who, whether or not he had the

opportunity for formal education, would read and absorb whatever literature he could find.

Abraham Lincoln had little formal education, but he was an intelligent man. We remember that Abe Lincoln walked many miles to borrow and return a book and read that book by firelight. All who share his hunger for enlightenment and the pleasure of discovering new worlds through books value the public library in contemporary America.

The residents of Ellisville, Ill., a small community in my district, are people such as this. They have initiated a public library. The old telephone building has been donated for use by its owners Clarence and Marion Knott. Mrs. Helen Myers, junior director of Modern Woodmen, assisted by the Junior Club members, will organize the cleaning and necessary remodeling. Some books and fixtures will be donated. I am highly pleased with the initiative displayed by the people of Ellisville.

I am equally as pleased with the initiative the Federal Government has taken in providing grants for library services and construction. I gave my enthusiastic support to the Library Services and Construction Act Amendments of 1966 when the bill was passed by the House on Thursday, June 2.

Illinois will receive a \$1,193,838 Federal allotment for public library services and \$1,509,614 for public library construction. These are to be matched by \$1,805,755 and \$2,283,386 respectively in State and local funds. The ratio of Federal to State-local funds is \$39.80 Federal, to \$60.20 State-local. The combination of local initiative and Federal support under the Library Services and Construction Act will assure continued growth in the quality and number of public libraries throughout America.

**Berkeley No. 1 Graduate School in the  
United States**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. DON EDWARDS**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, the State of California has gained for itself a far-reaching reputation for its commitment, both intellectually and financially, to the ideal that everyone has the right to pursue his education as far as his ability, not his funds, can take him. The structure for this is an extensive system of junior or community colleges, State colleges, university extension, and eight campuses of the University of California.

An integral part of this commitment is quality. I was very pleased to learn of the recently published Cartter report of the American Council on Education which cited the graduate school at the University of California at Berkeley as the "best balanced distinguished university in the country." That a public uni-

versity can hold this distinction is an immense credit to the university, the State administration, public officials, and most of all, the people of California who have recognized the value and given their support to the university and colleges.

I have unanimous consent that this article from the Washington Post of May 22, 1966, describing "An Assessment of Quality in Graduate Education" be inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

BERKELEY RATED No. 1 GRADUATE SCHOOL IN U.S.

(By Gerald Grant)

An assessment of the Nation's graduate schools published today ranks the University of California at Berkeley at the top and puts the Washington universities near the bottom.

Bumping Harvard from the top of the list, the study concludes that Berkeley "is the best balanced distinguished university in the country."

The book-length study, published by the American Council on Education, finds that Berkeley's graduate schools receive a distinguished rating in five general categories—humanities, social sciences, biological sciences, physical sciences and engineering.

Harvard and Stanford appear in the top rank in four categories; Columbia, Illinois, Yale, Princeton, Michigan, and the California Institute of Technology in three, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chicago and Wisconsin in two.

D.C. "DISCOURAGING"

Other than this, however, author Allan Carter declines to make any numerical ranking of the 106 major universities named in the study. Cartter, vice president of the Council who was recently named chancellor of New York University, says universities "should not be judged on a simple average of their departmental ratings."

Turning to Washington, Cartter singles it out as "one discouraging feature of our review. The Nation's Capital stands out as one of the few major cities in the United States which do not have one or more universities of notable strength."

A total of 56 academic departments in Washington universities were included in the study, Cartter notes, and "only two managed to achieve ratings above adequate-plus."

They were Catholic University's Spanish department and George Washington University's pharmacology department, both rated "good." (The University of Maryland's mathematics and bacteriology/microbiology departments also received "good" ratings.)

Cartter adds that "it is to be hoped" that a recent cooperative agreement among Washington universities "will bring about some improvement" in the future.

STUDY IS AVAILABLE

The study, available at a cost of \$1.50 by writing to the Council at 1785 Massachusetts ave. n.w., Washington, D.C., was based on ratings submitted by 4000 scholars and department chairmen. The Council, the Nation's major higher education coordinating group, has a membership of more than 1400 colleges and universities.

Title "An Assessment of Quality in Graduate Education," the 150-page report rates graduate programs in 29 areas ranging from anthropology to sociology. It presents 58 statistical tables in which universities are judged distinguished, strong, good, adequate-plus or unfit to grant the Ph.D.

It seems likely to attract considerable attention at a time when collegians are going on to graduate schools in droves (as high as 90 percent in some Ivy League colleges) and are concerned about variations in the quality of graduate programs.

When the first major study of the graduate education was done in 1934, only 2800

Ph.D.'s were awarded annually in the United States. Today the figure is 16,000—and climbing rapidly.

#### THE AVERAGE SCHOOLS

While the study points up the excellence of the well-established academic giants, Cartter points out that it also identifies areas of excellence in otherwise average institutions. For instance, the department of anthropology at the University of Arizona, philosophy at Pittsburgh and chemical engineering at Delaware each emerged as one of the leading academic centers in its field despite the poorer showing of other departments in the same university.

### An Unusual Suggestion

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, in a speech prepared by the executive director of the community action organization in Buffalo, N.Y., for delivery at the recent White House Conference on Civil Rights, Mr. Ambrose I. Lane suggested that Negroes must assume full responsibility themselves and foster self-help projects.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to include the following editorial which appeared in the Wall Street Journal, dated June 2:

#### AN UNUSUAL SUGGESTION

At the White House Conference on Civil Rights that began yesterday, one speech urged a fresh approach to the problems of Negroes. Unfortunately, the ideas it advanced are likely to be buried by the abundance of more conventional proposals.

The potentially useful suggestion is simply that civil rights leaders stop spending so much time demanding Government solutions and instead set about to help the Negroes themselves. This rather radical advice comes from Ambrose I. Lane, executive director of Buffalo's Community Action Organization, in a speech delivered by an assistant.

As his current affiliation indicates, Mr. Lane has not been shy about exploring the kind of "cure" for Negro social and economic ills that the President's special council last week espoused; More Federal projects and lots of Federal money. But his presentation at the conference suggested a frustration with that approach.

"All the prestige within the power of the Government to confer," he said, "and all the dollars in the vaults of Fort Knox will not command for a Negro the respect that is due to a human person." And Mr. Lane was quite specific about how the massive Federal programs are, by their very nature, unlikely to succeed.

Governmental efforts, he noted, fall into two categories—"direct action" and "social work." He believes "both approaches have failed. Behind each . . . lies a basic lack of faith in the strength, ability, and resiliency of Negroes. The direct action approach conceives of the Negro as a pawn to be manipulated for short-term inconsequential gains that advance the few at the expense of the many. The social work approach conceives of the Negro as something less than a person. It views him as a problem, a threat or a pet."

Indeed, even were the problem "solved" the result would be a group not assimilated

into American society but set apart by its dependence on the Government. As that dependence grew, so the likelihood of assimilation ever taking place would diminish.

On more practical grounds, the Governmental social programs have been historically inefficient and wasteful. Political jealousy and bickering are evident all along the line, invariably steering programs from their intended goals. Then what little life remains is usually smothered by bureaucratic diffuseness.

Those are good reasons why Federal "help" is so often no help at all, and ought to be sought carefully and only as a last resort. That is what Mr. Lane has apparently learned the hard way, for he is now advocating that Negroes assume full responsibility themselves for achieving the "political, social and economic revolution that has attended the emancipation and assimilation of every minority group."

Broadly, Mr. Lane thinks only Negroes can foster in other Negroes the values of excellence, achievement and self-discipline and attack racism, defeatism and the negative self-image that many Negroes harbor.

As a start he is seeking funds—Federal or private—to establish in Buffalo a private, Negro-administered project that would test his theory. The project's undertakings would not be revolutionary: Providing scholarship money; loans to business; all sorts of vocational, cultural and pre-school training; counseling; housing; child care and health facilities.

But if the day-to-day programs aren't unusual, the underlying notion of self-help is. Once established the project would even be expected to raise its own funds.

There may well be reason to quarrel with some of Mr. Lane's specifics. Many politicians are sure to object in principle, since any program firmly grounded in individual initiative and responsibility would have little vote-pulling power. Carefully devised self-help projects, however, surely offer more chance of success than a further thoughtless proliferation of Federal schemes.

For that reason alone, it will be more than a little sad if Mr. Lane's message is lost among the voices of so many others who prefer to continue in the same old direction.

### Canada Dry Astronaut Water

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

**HON. JOHN M. MURPHY**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following comments which set forth the role of Canada Dry Corp. in the Nation's space effort—namely, the supplying of water for use by astronauts and spacecraft systems in flight. Donated by Canada Dry, and not for sale to the general public, this water called astronaut water, has been used aboard Gemini 8 and is currently aboard Gemini 9:

Canada Dry—the largest multi-flavor, brand name soft drink company in the world—has long been known for its water processing expertise in maintaining the purity and uniform taste of its more than 100 beverages marketed throughout the world.

A long respected company headquartered in New York, Canada Dry has in the past conferred the benefits of its water expertise on the British Royal family during its tour of

North America and on U.S. Olympic teams during their meets abroad by providing drinking water.

Latest beneficiary of Canada Dry's water processing expertise is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Specifically, Canada Dry has become an integral part of the space age by donating water for use by astronauts and spacecraft systems in flight.

"Purest water, in or out of this world," explains John L. Murphy, Jr., the company's vice president of quality control, "Canada Dry Astronaut Water far exceeds the drinking water standards established by the U.S. Public Health Service and the World Health Organization International standards for drinking water."

Not for sale to the general public, Canada Dry Astronaut Water has been used aboard both the Gemini 8 and Gemini 9 missions, and will continue to be used throughout the Gemini Project so long as specifications are met by the company for each manned space launch.

Canada Dry Astronaut Water is the same basic water found in the more than 100 flavors the company markets worldwide.

### My Black Position Paper

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. ADAM C. POWELL**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, this year I celebrate a quarter of a century in politics.

In those 25 years, a philosophy which has guided my thought and my every act has evolved out of my life experiences as minister, politician, Congressman, and man from Harlem.

This philosophy is summed up in what I call my "Black Position Paper."

But it is an open-end continuing document whose contents are always subject to the influence of new ideas and changing events.

The black position paper is an outline for living and call to action for America's black people.

It is, above all, that passionate reaffirmation in what black people are today and what we can be tomorrow.

The following 17 points comprise my black position paper:

1. We must give our children a sense of pride in being black. The glory of our past and the dignity of our present must lead the way to the power of our future.

2. Black organizations must be black led. Other ethnic groups lead their own organizations. We must do the same. Jews lead the American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee and B'nai B'rith. Irish control the St. Patrick's Day Parade Committee and the Irish-American Historical Society. Poles head the Polish-American Congress and the Polish National Alliance. Italians lead the Italian-American Democratic organizations and the Italian-American Labor Council. This kind of honest pluralism is a happy fact of American life.

3. The black masses must be primarily responsible for their own organizations. Only with black financial control can black organizations retain their honesty, their independence and their full commitment to the urgency of immediate equality.

tional Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, assisted by the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources. This Council would operate within the Executive Office of the President.

I am especially pleased that private industry will be invited to give significant leadership by its representation on the Council.

There exists in the world's oceans an almost limitless potential for food production, for supplementing the land's minerals, for an inexhaustible supply of pure water, for new sources of fuels and energy, for a revitalized, superior merchant marine, and even for harnessing wind and weather. We only need to learn to apply our American technological genius to their use. There is an opportunity for economic growth unparalleled since the industrial revolution.

The National Council will coordinate the team efforts of the Federal agencies, the Congress, the universities, the States, and the business-industrial communities.

With its shores washed by three great oceans the United States occupies a unique position among the nations as a sea-faring country. Our total coastline of 12,255 miles is second only in length to that of Canada. We now have the means and the opportunity to lead the world in the exploration of the sea around us, as we have led in the conquest of outer space.

## Development of the War in Vietnam

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. CLARENCE J. BROWN, JR.**

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

**Mr. CLARENCE J. BROWN, JR.** Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following speech I made May 1, 1966, before the Rotary District 667 Conference at Miamisburg, Ohio, on the development of the war in Vietnam:

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(By Congressman CLARENCE J. BROWN, JR., Seventh Ohio District delivered at the Rotary District 667 Conference, Miamisburg, Ohio, May 1, 1966)

Today we face a perilous time in our international relationships abroad because of the critical situation in Southeast Asia. The Buddhists and others opposed to the government of Premier Ky in Saigon have forced special elections to be scheduled in South Viet-Nam sometime within the next three to five months. If the independent government which results from those elections asks the United States military forces to leave Viet-Nam, our nations faces a difficult decision.

Let me take a few minutes to review the situation in Viet-Nam for you, with the hope of putting it into perspective.

As you may recall, prior to World War II the French maintained a colonial empire in Indo-China, which makes up most of the peninsula of Southeast Asia. The British in Burma and Malaya were the other colonial power on the peninsula, and the Dutch controlled the islands of Southeast Asia down toward New Guinea and Australia. The peo-

ple of these areas, which had been occupied by Japan for five years during World War II, threw out their colonial masters one by one after that war.

Before the fall of the French colonial interest, France invited the United States to assist in trying to quell the Indo-China revolt with economic and military aid. Thus, our involvement began under the Truman Administration with a decision announced by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950, only a little more than a year after China fell to the Communists—then called by some only agrarian reformers. That decision was to send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina (Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia) and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

Approximately \$375 million of military and economic assistance was channeled to Southeast Asia from the American taxpayers through fiscal year 1953. In August of 1950, the first American military assistance advisory group of 35 personnel was sent to Indo-China to advise on the use of this American equipment.

Nevertheless, by 1953, when President Truman left the White House, all of Viet-Nam above the 17th Parallel except Hanoi, a narrow corridor connecting to a coastal strip around Haiphong, and a part of the northeastern T'ai Highlands were under control of the Communist Viet Minh. In addition, Viet Minh forces were in effective control of large areas south of the 17th Parallel—including the central highlands and the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula, the southernmost part of the country.

President Eisenhower continued the program of military and economic aid to France and the Associated States of Indo-China at levels set by the previous Administration until the Fall of 1953. In September 1953, increased aid of \$385 million through 1954 was promised by the United States after two modifications of French policy had been decided on—both of them measures designed to avert impending disaster for the French.

Under the twin pressures of military reverses in Indo-China and the prodding of the United States, France had agreed on July 3, 1953, to take steps "to complete the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States . . . within the French Union." There was hope that the war, even at that late date, could be cleansed of the appearance of colonialism and would no longer seem to Asiatics to be an effort by France merely to hold on to her possessions.

The second significant decision was incorporated in the plan of French General Navarre—a plan of aggressive military action with increased French and native forces.

After the conclusion of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953, keeping the Chinese Communists from active military participation in Indo-China had become one of the concerns of American policymakers. On the day of the Korean armistice, the 16 members of the United Nations that had helped to defend South Korea had issued a joint warning against Chinese Communist action in Southeast Asia.

On May 7, 1954, the day before the Geneva discussion on Indo-China began, the French suffered their decisive defeat at Dien Bien Phu. On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, in a speech delivered at Los Angeles, detailed the conditions under which the United States would consider additional help to the French: (1) a request for assistance from the states fighting the Communists; (2) clear assurance (from France) of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) an indication of concern and support on the part of the United Nations; (4) assurance of collective action by other nations along with the United States; and (5) a guarantee that France would not with-

draw from the conflict once a further commitment was extended by others.

The last two conditions laid down by Secretary Dulles were the decisive obstacles to the formulation of any plan for U.S. intervention.

On July 20, 1954, representatives of the nine governments assembled at Geneva signed the agreement which rang down the curtain on the French Empire in Asia—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Communist China, the United States, the Marxist Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North), the State of Viet-Nam (South), Cambodia, and Laos. Three similar armistice agreements were concluded relating to Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia, and a declaration was issued.

Besides stipulations on the cessation of hostilities, the armistice agreements provided for withdrawal of foreign troops and prohibited Laos, Cambodia, and the two parts of Viet-Nam from joining any military alliance or granting military bases to foreign powers.

Also, the Geneva Agreements, in effect, recognized as Communist territory Viet-Nam north of the 17th Parallel and two provinces in northeastern Laos. Viet-Nam, north of the 17th Parallel, had already been almost totally occupied by the Viet Minh forces. The treaty provisions formalized this conquest, but they also required the Viet Minh to withdraw from South Viet-Nam, vast areas of which were under their control. Some 80,000 to 90,000 Viet Minh troops were moved out of South Viet-Nam in the execution of the agreement. Perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 melted into the civilian population and remained in violation of the Geneva Agreement. The Geneva Agreements also provided that any civilians who were residing on one side of the partition line could, if they chose, go and live on the other side. By the end of the time limit set for making the move, which was extended to July 20, 1955, almost 900,000 civilians had moved from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. In contrast, less than 5,000 had moved from the South to the North.

In spite of the relocation of Viet Minh forces into North Viet-Nam, the armistice agreement read that the 17th Parallel "should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." The conference declaration envisaged the reunification of Viet-Nam, providing for the selection of a government for the entire country by free general elections to be held in 1956.

Similar to the splitting of Viet-Nam, the assignment of two northeastern provinces of Laos as sanctuaries for troops of the Communist Pathet Lao not wishing to be demobilized was, by the terms of the agreement, temporary—"pending a political settlement."

The United States did not sign any of the three strange treaties concluded at Geneva, nor the conference declaration; nor did South Viet-Nam.

In fact, before the conference closed at Geneva, the United States issued a unilateral declaration pledging not to use force to disturb the agreements but warning that renewed aggression in violation of the agreements would be viewed as a threat to international peace and security. At the same time, President Eisenhower announced that steps would be taken to establish collective defense against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

The attitude of the U.S. Government toward Geneva was summarized by the President thus: "The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice."

Another chief flaw of the Geneva settlement lay in provisions relating to the International Control Commission set up to supervise the execution of the agreements. The Commission, composed of representatives of

This contrasts with a 50 percent increase in students.

In the past five years, the faculty has increased 37 percent, contrasting with the 25 percent growth in students.

In the ten years, the average faculty salary has increased almost 96 percent; average compensation, including fringe benefits, has increased 118 percent, more than double. In the last five years, the average salary has been improved by 41 percent, average compensation by 51 percent.

Curricular changes in the college include strengthening the upper division offerings in many departments; installation of the three-to-five year concept as the normal time to complete requirements for the Reed degree, increasing the number of inter-departmental courses; establishment of basic guide lines for research institutes, and advanced degrees in subject matter areas; and increased emphasis on the improvement of secondary school education, including the Reed master of arts in teaching program.

**FINANCIAL SUPPORT INCREASED**

Under President Sullivan's administration, financial support of the college reached unprecedented heights. In 1955, financial support was approximately \$218,000 for all purposes; this year the figure will exceed \$600,000, plus government grants. The total support received during the last decade exceeds \$8,460,000, excluding all government grants, which have amounted to \$3,890,000 during this period.

Another index of the financial growth of the college is the strengthening of the Reed endowment. In the past 10 years, it has risen from a market value of \$2,003,000 to \$5,364,000. This increase exceeds the total of all previous gifts to the endowment since the original grant establishing Reed College.

A significant event during President Sullivan's tenure was the selection in 1961 of Reed College as one of the eight liberal arts colleges comprising the first group to receive matching awards from the Ford Foundation. Reed was the only college in the western half of the country to be chosen. Under the terms of the grant, Reed raised more than \$2,809,000 in three years, matching two-to-one the Ford grant of \$1,400,000.

Simultaneously with the Ford matching program, Reed undertook a ten-year \$20,000,000 Advancement Program to strengthen the college. This broad effort planned improvements in all phases of the college's program, including increases in faculty salaries, increased student aid, and new buildings. To date, \$10,291,000 has been received or pledged toward the \$20,000,000 goal.

**GRANTS RECEIVED**

Other foundation grants of major importance have included a 1964 Rockefeller Foundation grant of \$275,000 for a pioneer program to discover talented Negro and other minority group students, and to improve their undergraduate education; a Rockefeller Foundation grant (1965) of \$336,000 to establish a research center in the humanities and to create a special program in the arts; and a Danforth Foundation grant (1965) of \$185,000 to support continuing education of high school teachers, and for instruction in the teaching of disadvantaged youth.

President Sullivan has headed Reed longer than any of his nine predecessors, with the exception of President William T. Foster, whose tenure also was 10 years.

A graduate of Harvard College in 1939 (magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa), President Sullivan received the master of arts degree from Harvard University in 1940. He was the recipient of honorary degrees from Pacific University (1960) and Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion (1961).

He received Carnegie Corporation grants for study and travel in 1954 and 1965.

Prior to accepting the Reed presidency, Sullivan was executive vice president and

treasurer of the Educational Testing Service. He had been associated with ETS since 1948. From 1946 to 1948 he was assistant director of the College Entrance Examination Board, going to that position from active duty in the U.S. Navy, where he was an intelligence officer. He was assistant dean at Harvard College prior to entering the service in 1942.

**COMMITTEES LISTED**

President Sullivan is, or has been, a member of a number of national and regional committees, including the Governor's Committee for the Oregon Graduate Center for Study and Research; advisory committee of the Oregon State Agency for Surplus Property; the Committee of Race and Education of Portland Public Schools; executive committee, Metropolitan Interfaith Commission on Race; and the board of governors, City Club of Portland. He is a member of the University Club, the Waverly Country Club, and the Harvard Club of Oregon.

In 1964 he was named a member of the White House's advisory group on domestic affairs. He has served on the board of directors of the American Council on Education; as a trustee of the Independent College Funds of America, and as chairman of the Oregon Colleges Foundation.

Sullivan also is on the advisory committee for graduate facilities of the U.S. Office of Education, and a trustee of the Committee of Economic Development.

Since 1962 he has been on the board of trustees of the College Retirement Equities Fund, and also serves on the Fund's Educator-Trustee-Advisory Committee. He is on the National Science Foundation's divisional committee for science education.

Sullivan was named first marshal for the Harvard Class of 1939 and as chief marshal for the Harvard Commencement in 1964. He is a nominee for Board of Overseers of Harvard College.

Mr. Speaker, it is my fervent hope that the existing friendship between our two countries will continue to the benefit of both.

**The Sea Around Us: Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF**

**HON. ED REINECKE**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. REINECKE. Mr. Speaker, last week the House agreed to the conference report on S. 944 establishing the Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966. The compromise version of the bill declares it to be the policy of the United States "to develop, encourage, and maintain a coordinated, comprehensive, and long-range national program in marine science for the benefit of mankind, to assist in protection of health and property, enhancement of commerce, transportation, and national security, rehabilitation of our commercial fisheries, and increased utilization of these and other resources."

As a member of the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee I have long been concerned about the fact that the national marine science program lacked a legislative base, a legislative commitment of policy and purpose, and a statutory body to plan, evaluate, and coordinate such a program. These will be provided by the enactment of S. 994.

The great sea around us is coming to be recognized as the unexplored "inner space." We need to explore and probe and study this "inner space" to the same extent and with the same enthusiasm with which we are now exploring and studying the vast outer space. For far too long we have taken for granted the oceans. We have ignored their wealth, and failed to realize their potentials.

The Marine Resources Act will stimulate the search for needed knowledge and technology; and it will encourage private investment in endeavors looking toward economic and greater use of the treasures of the sea.

S. 944 proposes expansion of our use of the oceans, the Great Lakes and the Continental Shelf by development of a comprehensive program of marine science activities including exploration, exploitation, and conservation of the resources of the ocean. These efforts will include development of ocean engineering; studies of air-sea interaction and transmission of energy, long-range studies of the potential benefits to the U.S. economy, security, health, and welfare to be gained from marine resources, engineering and sciences; and it will also provide for a thorough study of the legal problem arising out of the management, use, development, recovery, and control of marine resources.

Responsibility for carrying out these activities would be placed with the Na-

**Tribute to Denmark**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to join with my distinguished colleague from Minnesota [Mr. NELSEN], in paying tribute to the people of Denmark on the anniversary of the promulgation of the Danish Constitution. It was on June 5, 1849, that the Danes received their charter of freedom from King Frederik VII.

The United States has been enriched through the years by the arrival in this country of thousands of Danish immigrants, many of whom settled in Illinois and neighboring States. I have found the people of Danish ancestry to be industrious, thrifty, self-reliant, and loyal.

For over half a century it has been possible for Americans who are visiting in Denmark to join the people of that nation in celebrating the anniversary of American independence. At Rebild, near the thriving city of Aalborg, is a beautiful park where Danes and Americans meet each Fourth of July to observe the day upon which liberty was proclaimed throughout our infant Republic in 1776. I can think of no finer tribute from one nation to another than that.



Canada, India, and Poland, could act only by unanimous vote in cases involving violations of the territory covered by the agreements. This veto in the hands of a Communist representative was an instrument for sabotaging the execution of the agreements.

As I said, the final declaration issued at Geneva in 1954 (subscribed to by neither the United States nor South Viet-Nam) called for free elections to unify all of the Vietnamese in 1956. Recently Senator Fulbright and others have deplored the fact that this election was not held.

The reasons for the refusal of South Viet-Nam to acquiesce in the holding of the election were stated by Prime Minister Diem on July 16, 1955: "We do not reject the principle of elections as a peaceful and democratic means to achieve unity. But elections can be one of the foundations of true democracy only on the condition that they are absolutely free. And we shall be skeptical about the possibility of achieving the conditions of free elections in the north under the regime of oppression carried on by the Viet Minh."

The position of South Viet-Nam on this point was sustained by the United Kingdom, one of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference.

Among the staunchest opponents of the holding of the 1956 election was the then Senator John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts. He issued "a plea that the United States never give its approval to the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor free Viet-Nam was a party to that agreement—and neither the United States nor free Viet-Nam is ever going to be a party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the agreement they now seek to enforce."

Now, his brother Senator Robert Kennedy, wants to include the Viet Minh in any negotiated peace!

As South Viet-Nam began its existence, the prospects for its survival were minimal. Independence was thrust upon a people without political experience and without political leadership. It had no sense of nationhood. It had no industry. And, by the Geneva declaration, it seemed doomed to being swallowed up by the Communist rulers of North Viet-Nam in two years.

Yet, when the Eisenhower Administration left office in 1960, South Viet-Nam was beginning to be a stable and established government. Senator John F. Kennedy called the development "a near miracle." In his book, "Strategy of Peace," published in 1960, he said: "In what everyone thought was the hour of total Communist triumph, (meaning the months after the Geneva Agreement) we saw a near miracle take place. . . . Today that brave little state (South Viet-Nam) is working in free and friendly association with the United States, whose economic and military aid has, in conditions of independence, proved effective."

The State Department's white paper of December 1961, entitled "A Threat to the Peace," contains the following analysis of progress in South Viet-Nam: "The years of 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Viet-Nam. Food production rose an average of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were achieved and passed. While per capita food production in the north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the south. The output of textiles in the south jumped in only one year from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 million meters. Sugar production in the same one-year span increased more than 100 percent, from 25,000 metric tons to 58,000 metric tons.

"Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by the North when Viet-Nam was

partitioned, gross national product is considerably larger in the South. In 1960 it was estimated at \$110 per person in the South and \$70 in the North. Foreigners who have visited both North and South testify to the higher living standards and much greater availability of consumer goods in the latter.

"The record of South Viet-Nam in these recent years is written in services and in improved welfare, as well as in cold economic indexes. A massive resettlement program effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from the North, who voted with their feet during these years, into the economic and social fabric of the South. An agrarian reform program was designed to give 300,000 tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they work for a modest price. Under the Government's agricultural credit program, aimed at freeing the farmers from the hands of usurers, loans to peasant families increased fivefold between 1957 and 1959.

"Thousands of new schoolrooms were built, and the elementary school population in South Viet-Nam increased from 400,000 in 1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health program installed simple dispensaries in half of South Viet-Nam's 6,000 villages and hamlets. An elaborate malaria eradication program was launched to rid Viet-Nam of its most important infectious disease. Doctors and nurses went into training in South Viet-Nam and abroad to serve their people's health needs.

"This is a part, a very small part, of the setting against which the Vietcong launched their campaign of armed action, subversion, and terror against South Viet-Nam. It is a record of progress over a few brief years equaled by few young countries."

And so, this was the situation 7½ years after Geneva—as 1962 began—just four years ago.

But a viable Viet-Nam had also required security from outside aggression and from terrorism and guerrilla activities within the country. To increase security, the Eisenhower Administration had proceeded promptly in 1954 to form a regional defense organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and to bring South Viet-Nam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, within its protective cover.

Specifically, to meet the threat of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the depredations of guerrillas in the South, the United States provided military equipment and training to the forces of South Viet-Nam.

The purpose of this conditional offer, Eisenhower said, was ". . . to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."

Recognizing this fact, the Kennedy Administration later did not use American forces to repel Communist aggression in Laos. The legal commitment of the United States to South Viet-Nam is the same as its commitment to Laos. Both of these countries of Southeast Asia were brought under the protection of SEATO.

Although the Government of South Viet-Nam never established unchallenged authority in the entire countryside, a period of relative peace and stability extended from 1955 to 1959. But late in the latter year the tempo of guerrilla attacks began to assume significant proportions.

In 1960, by which time real economic progress had come to South Viet-Nam, the armed forces of the Vietcong operating in South Viet-Nam began to increase from the level of 3,000 at the beginning of the year. During this year the Vietcong assassinated or kidnapped more than 2,000 civilians. Acts of terrorism were directed particularly against local officials in rural areas to leave the countryside leaderless—the same tactic the Communists had worked in overthrowing China some dozen years earlier.

The signal from North Viet-Nam for intensification of the conflict came on September 10, 1960, at the Third Congress of the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam with a call for liberation of the South from the "rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." In December the National Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam was formed by Hanoi. This is the group with whom some Americans would like to negotiate a peace in Viet-Nam and include in the new government on the theory that they are only reformers.

In January of 1961 the United States was confronted not only with problems in South Viet-Nam but with far more acute difficulties in the neighboring nation of Laos. In Viet-Nam sporadic guerrilla attacks were going on. In Laos, Communist Pathet Lao forces were engaged in a full-scale offensive that threatened the government of Premier Boun Oum.

On March 23rd President Kennedy warned, ". . . if there is to be a peaceful solution, there must be a cessation of the present armed attacks by externally supported Communists . . . No one should doubt our resolution on this point . . . all members of SEATO have undertaken special treaty responsibilities toward an aggression in Laos."

But sixteen months later, in July of 1962, the Government of the United States acquiesced in a settlement which terminated any responsibility which the SEATO powers had toward Laos and imposed on that country a coalition government including Communist representation. Acceptance of this settlement by the government of Laos, which enjoyed recognition by the United States, was brought about by suspension of American aid.

Infiltrators from North Viet-Nam, together with local dissidents in Laos and South Viet-Nam, stimulated in South Viet-Nam what some prefer to call a civil war, but what can only be honestly referred to as a Communist effort to continue the anarchy which had existed since before World War II. The method was guerrilla warfare, terrorism, kidnapping, assassination, and atrocity. The political approach was to destroy the leadership at the local level by assassination or kidnapping and to persuade or intimidate the populace to revolt against, or ignore, the central government.

It was not difficult to convert antagonism to French colonialism to antagonism to the Viet-Nam government in Saigon. It was not difficult to slip through the jungle and into a village at night and to decapitate or emasculate some respected local leader, be gone before dawn, and return to take advantage of the local confusion and concern by preaching conversion to Communist doctrine.

The year 1961 saw the development of the conflict in Viet-Nam from covert guerrilla action to open, if still small-scale war. In that year, for the first time, the Vietcong committed forces of battalion size to combat. For the first time they launched an attack on a community as important as a provincial capital. The infiltration of Communist troops from the North, facilitated by unchallenged Communist control of eastern Laos, increased. By the end of 1961, the State Department estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 regular Vietcong troops were in South Viet-Nam—at least double the number present there one year earlier. The United States doubled its forces of military advisors in South Viet-Nam from fewer than 700 stationed there when President Eisenhower left office to 1,364.

In the period 1961 to 1963, the number of American troops in South Viet-Nam grew from 1,364 to 16,575. In this same period we were also faced with the Berlin Wall crisis and the Russian missiles crisis in Cuba. The amount of aid, military and economic, to South Viet-Nam was increased substantially although the exact figures for military

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aid are classified after fiscal year 1962. But it was then said to be running in excess of half a billion a year.

In the late Summer and Fall of 1963, the internal crisis in South Viet-Nam arising from conflict between the Diem regime and the Buddhists produced a deterioration of the military situation and a decision by the U.S. Government to encourage a change of horses. American aid was cut back. Official U.S. statements indicating lack of confidence in the Diem government and calling for a change of personnel and policy were issued. Diem was removed in a military coup and was assassinated along with his brother, Nhu.

While our government has never admitted it, I have always felt personally that we were severely implicated in the assassination and overthrow of the Diem government. Our sympathy with that overthrow had been motivated by a belief that the best way to deal with the unrest in South Viet-Nam was to bring into power a government that would be more "socially liberal" than that of Diem and Madame Nhu, who had been critical of the United States for not facing the Communist influence for what it was in the anarchy which was gripping the nation.

With the Diem overthrow our involvement in the government of South Viet-Nam became deeper and deeper, to the extent that it would be difficult to call the Government of South Viet-Nam independent of American influence.

Strangely, the setbacks that occurred at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964 began only one month after Secretary McNamara and General Taylor returned from South Viet-Nam with an optimistic report. So strong was their optimism, that an immediate reduction of the American force in South Viet-Nam by 1,000 men was announced and the prediction was made that virtually all American troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1965.

In January of 1964, when President Johnson was only one month in office, we still had less than 17,000 men in Viet-Nam. The worst of the war, from the U.S. standpoint, still lay ahead and it might still have been possible to decide to withdraw. It might be pointed out that we also still had, and still do have, the same Secretary of State and the same Secretary of Defense we have had for the last five years. But it was in 1964 that the sharp escalation began, during the same election year when one Presidential candidate was in the posture of the hawk and the other in the posture of the dove.

After the attack on American shipping by Communist forces in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, President Johnson went to the Congress he had dominated so effectively since President Kennedy's assassination and asked for a resolution of support for the actions he might find it necessary to take in South Viet-Nam. He also asked for a substantial financial commitment to that situation. The Congress voted that support without much hesitation—and without any specific elaboration by President Johnson.

At this point it is well to note that the President of the United States, under the Constitution, is given two clear powers. First, to make United States foreign policy and, second, to be commander-in-chief of American armed forces. The situation in Viet-Nam is not the first time in which a President has committed American men and material to fight in foreign lands without a formal declaration of war from the Congress. It is true that the Constitution requires that Congress declare war, but in view of the powers of the President this almost becomes a technical formality. United States Presidents have, from time to time, sent the Marines into Mexico or Nicaragua or some other place to protect American interests. In the past, major wars did not ensue. The result in Viet-Nam may be dif-

ferent, but the beginning has plenty of parallels.

There is a classic story about Teddy Roosevelt's wanting to send the great white fleet around the world when he was President in order to show off American power which had been built up during the Spanish-American War—which had immediately preceded his Administration. The Congress refused to appropriate the money for this venture. Teddy looked in the Treasury and found enough funds to send the fleet half way around the world and then told Congress if it would like to have the fleet back home, it could appropriate the necessary funds to finance the trip.

The sham of calling American troops in Viet-Nam "advisors" was dropped in 1964 as the guerrilla attacks began to be aimed more and more at American nationals, as well as the South Vietnamese. Whether our commitment to the war began at the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, or at Pleiku six months later, the sharpest escalation of the war began early in 1965, until by year-end there were approximately 181,000 servicemen in South Viet-Nam. President Johnson's posture, after the election in 1964, shifted noticeably from that of a dove to that of a hawk. He ordered limited bombing of selected targets in North Viet-Nam and general air support for the war in the South.

By the Fall of 1965 another noteworthy thing occurred. That was when Lin Piao, the Chinese equivalent of Secretary McNamara (Defense and Foreign Policy Administrator) made a speech in which he outlined the objectives of Chinese Communism in the world. The Western powers, he said, would fall to Communism just as had Free China. The Communists would first take the rural areas of the world and then the cities, as they had done in China. By the rural areas he meant Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. And when these areas had been secured, the industrial centers of the United States and Western Europe would fall easily. This is also the way the war was being conducted in South Viet-Nam. (It is worth noting that the approach of Chinese Communism is different from that of Russian Communism, which began in the cities and then spread to the rural areas.)

And so Piao seems to verify the domino theory that, should Communism win in South Viet-Nam, other nations in that area will become principal targets until all Southeast Asia is under Communist or Marxist domination. Thus, developments in that section of the world have an amazing parallel to the situation in Europe immediately before World War II. Piao has spelled out the Chinese objectives much as Hitler spelled out the Nazi objectives in Mein Kampf before World War II. Mein Kampf, though a best seller, was ignored. Many now suggest we also ignore Piao.

Few people in this country read Chinese, and only a few more have any interest in Asia, because our heritage and our commerce have always directed our attention to Europe. Since America has only recently arrived on the scene of world leadership, we do not have the tradition of knowledge and involvement in world affairs which keeps us closely aligned to remote nations like Viet-Nam.

Whether you consider our world leadership role as having begun with the Cold War 20 years ago, or with the beginning of World War II or World War I, we do not seem to have the tradition or the training for it to the extent that the British have. Someone once said it took 300 years of world leadership for the British to develop a Winston Churchill.

In the face of the obvious threat registered late in 1965 by Piao, President Johnson instituted during the year-end holidays, an unprecedented peace effort. He sent American diplomats out by the plane-load all over the world seeking assistance in urging peace in

Southeast Asia and for better than a month halted bombing of North Viet-Nam.

The silence of the Vietcong response was deafening. There was no encouragement whatsoever from the Vietcong, North Viet-Nam, Communist China or from Moscow that the peace offensive launched at that time would get a response. Or perhaps it did get a response from the Communists, to the effect that they felt sure they were winning and nothing short of complete and unconditional withdrawal by the American forces would be acceptable.

At the beginning of this year, the United States reluctantly renewed bombing in North Viet Nam—over the objection of many Americans.

During this month-long peace offensive, the doves were hard at work in this country. With demonstrations against the war, serious arguments to government leaders in favor of peace, and the general suggestion that we should include the Communists in any possible peace discussion. The Senate Foreign Relation Committee undertook its hearings on Viet-Nam under the leadership of Senator FULBRIGHT and others opposing Administration policies.

In the face of this, President Johnson, early in February, personally laid it on the line for the Ky Government in Saigon by flying to Honolulu to meet with General Ky and arrange with him for the future extension of more vast amounts of aid for social improvements in his country.

Immediately following the Honolulu meeting, Mr. Johnson sent Vice President HUMPHREY to Southeast Asia to urge other nations there into active participation in the war in Viet-Nam. And we asked the United Nations to intervene.

Thus the Johnson Administration was trying again, just as Dulles had tried, to get the same kind of international cooperation in Southeast Asia as the free nations had shown in the Korean War. But there was little response; and except for the limited military support which The Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South Korea are giving, the United States is continuing to bear the brunt of the burden in South Viet-Nam. The Security Council of the United Nations, at a meeting on February 2nd, agreed to consider the Viet-Nam War by a vote 9 to 2. The meeting was then adjourned for private consultations and discussions, and nothing further has developed since that time.

Some of us at the time of the Honolulu meeting had the feeling that perhaps this would put the President in a position of being able to say later this year that the so-called independent government in Saigon had so benefitted from the policy declarations in Honolulu that they could now win the war against Communism by themselves and it would be possible for American troops to be withdrawn—say by election day or Christmas.

The Buddhists now seem to have precluded this possibility. Now the initiative, which shifted to the United States with the fall of Diem, seems to be shifting back to the Vietnamese.

Should the new government ask American troops to leave, President Johnson must decide whether to risk the anger of world opinion and a rear guard opposition from the Vietnamese by staying in that beleaguered country whether they want us or not; or, if we withdraw, he would in effect be writing off the lives of 2,800 American men and billions of dollars in American treasure which have been committed unsuccessfully to the principle of keeping South Viet-Nam independent of the domination of Communist North Viet-Nam.

Can we afford to withdraw in defeat in the eyes of the world? And can we afford to do it in the memory of those who have fallen on the field of battle in Asia? On the other

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX

hand, the risks of a more aggressive war are obvious—both to our economy and manpower and in the eyes of the world. Can we afford it? Would it heal any Chinese-Russian split?

In Viet-Nam, we have been committed to a policy, in the words of the President, "of making it clear that aggression does not pay off for the Communists." And thus, by a self-imposed limitation, we seem to have been committed to a defensive war in which we will not go beyond the 17th Parallel on the ground. And our air attacks north of that line have been limited to supply routes only. The restrictions on our military operations are very similar to those which were self-imposed in the post-MacArthur days in Korea.

And yet, some of the nations which are our allies elsewhere in the world continue to supply North Viet-Nam directly or through Communist China. And reports come back regularly that our troops and the South Vietnamese are being outflanked through Laos or Cambodia—or the Vietcong can escape to those sanctuaries.

As during the Korean War, we are told at home that we can have both guns and butter—that we can fight a war and have "business as usual."

Any questions about the prosecution of the war are turned aside with statistics or involved explanations. Secretary McNamara has made statements which would lead to almost any conclusion one might wish to make about the prospective length of the war. He has denied shortages of bombs and then admitted that we made "distress purchases" of bombs for \$21 apiece that we had earlier sold for \$1.70 each. He has denied mismanagement of the war. But only recently a constituent of mine told me of a letter he had from a senior officer in Viet-Nam advising that the Defense Department had shipped six 6 x 6's of anti-freeze to that tropical land with which to fight the war. Last December Secretary McNamara called for the phasing out of B-52 bombers on the theory that they would no longer be needed in American defense because their capability would be replaced by missiles—and four months later B-52's were being used heavily to push the war in Viet-Nam.

It is my personal observation that Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk are, respectively, the least popular and the most sympathized with men in the President's cabinet. Secretary McNamara is unpopular because he won't brook questions and never admits an error. The reporters and Congressmen sympathize with Secretary Rusk because he will admit Administration errors even when they are his own.

It seems evident that a guerrilla war in Viet-Nam is not the kind of war we fight best. We are an industrialized nation used to the so-called conventional war of the World War II variety. The Communists tackled us on that basis in Korea and, once we had gotten into the ball-game, were repulsed and then brought to stalemate. They did not achieve their objective and the peace which ended that war left things at the status quo. It will be remembered that we did not negotiate until we had secured South Korea and were holding the Reds effectively above the 38th Parallel.

As one who gave two years of his life (although no blood, as many others did), to the U.S. goal of keeping South Korea free, I'd feel very unkind about it if our Government had negotiated away the fruits of that war effort. I rather imagine there are a number of boys now fighting in Viet-Nam—and the families of the 2,600 boys who will never fight again—who would be similarly disheartened should we negotiate away the independence of South Viet-Nam for which they fought—not to mention the billions of dollars American taxpayers have put into this principle in South Viet-Nam in the last 15 years.

The situation in the world since the end of World War II has seen the line between the Free World and the Communist World become firmly established. It goes through Korea at the 38th Parallel; between Quemoy-Matsu and Communist China at the Straits of Formosa; to the 17th Parallel in Viet-Nam; it is blurred in Laos, but by our action or inaction, it includes India in the Free World but leaves Tibet to the Communists. It is also blurred in the Near East. As a result of our non-intervention in the uprising of 1953, it leaves Hungary to the Communists and has its sharpest European definition at the Berlin wall. The greatest crises of the world since the end of World War II have occurred when there have been Communist efforts to breach this line as when the Russian missiles were found in Cuba; when the Communists invaded South Korea; and now the Communist invasion of South Viet-Nam.

Hopefully, and perhaps we should even pray a little about it, whoever wins the elections scheduled in South Viet-Nam will be in a position to stabilize the country and assist us in clearing that land of Communist infiltrators. It might be a lot easier for them to do so—and it might help the right ones to win such an election—if we could be winning the war by the time elections are held.

And so, it looks as if we may have three to five months to try to accomplish that task after four years of "limited defensive war."

Americans must be aware of the situation in Southeast Asia and understand what may happen in the near future and what the causes were. It will be necessary to understand the past and near future to know the influences these events may have in the long run.

As I indicated earlier, only the President can really make foreign policy and command our nation's war effort. The average American citizen is unable to speak with any authority on such matters because there are too many unknown quantities in the picture today. Even the average Congressman is not much better off. Only the President has available to him the sources of data and information necessary to making military and foreign policy decisions. It is apparent from the wide disparity in views held by Members of Congress on the situation in Viet-Nam and what ought to be done about it that there is no single clear-cut "right answer" among them. The President has not kept them that thoroughly informed.

Our foreign policy under President Johnson has been bi-partisan only because the Republicans have made it so voluntarily. But it is beginning to be apparent that many Members of Congress do not feel they have been kept adequately informed. Their viewpoint is best reflected in that classic statement used during World War II by Senator Arthur Vandenburg: "I don't care to be involved in the crash landing, unless I can be in on the take-off."

Since about March 1st President Johnson seems to have been making an effort to bring the Senators and Congressmen more and more into the problems of Southeast Asia. I feel he will also be obliged to bring the people of America more into his confidence in this area. If we are facing the prospect of defeat and may have to write off 2,600 American lives and billions of dollars and the vast effort invested in Viet-Nam and Laos over the last fifteen years, then it will be necessary for us to brace for that. If we face the possibility of deeper involvement and further commitment to a difficult war, it certainly will be necessary to brace for that. Or, if we are to remain on some middle ground, perhaps slow withdrawal from Viet-Nam only to fight in Thailand or Cambodia or some place else on the Southeast Asia peninsula, we should also be forewarned of that, if possible.

It behooves all Americans to be aware of

the situation in Southeast Asia in order to meet whatever challenge faces us there in the future. It also behooves us to understand the history of our involvement in that area in order to learn from it whatever lessons history can teach us. Aristotle said, "That nation which fails to learn from history is doomed to repeat it." That truism is as valid today as it was 2,500 years ago.

## GI's Life in Vietnam

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. JAMES H. (JIMMY) QUILLEN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, only through letters can we here comprehend in a small degree what it is like for our men who live and fight in a country where the terrain and climate are so unlike that of our own land.

Since it is impossible for us all to go to Vietnam and learn firsthand just how much is demanded of the men we send into battle, I would like to insert a letter from one of the young men in my district which relates how he lives over there. I commend his words to your attention:

[From the Gatlinburg (Tenn.) Press and the Sevier County (Tenn.) News Record, May 26, 1966]

SEVIER SOLDIER IN VIETNAM WRITES ABOUT THE WAR

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—The following letter was received from James Huskey, son of Mr. and Mrs. Major Huskey who live east of Gatlinburg. James was a photo technician for the Mountain Press before volunteering for the U.S. Army. The following letter was written to his co-workers at the Mountain Press but it described conditions of this "dirty" war so well we are passing it along to all our readers. We think James will not mind.)

CU CHI, VIETNAM,

Tuesday night, May 10, 1966.

DEAR FRIENDS: I hope this finds each and every one of you just fine. Tonight I am on the night shift at S-1 with my clerks, the S-1 is on 24 hour basis, next week my shift will be working days, so I thought I would take a few minutes and drop everyone back there a few words, since there is not much going on tonight.

Our unit arrived here on the 29th and just about now a few of us would like to go back to Schofield Barracks. This is the hottest place I have ever seen in my life. You just stay out in the sun here for 10 minutes and you have a sunburn. It's hot and humid and dirty, and you yourself stay sweaty and dirty all of the time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We are living in tents, right now we have floors. We raised them off of the ground for when a rain comes everything inside of the tents get wet. The rainfall is very high here in the monsoon season, it rains every day then the sun pops back out, then it is hotter than before the rain came.

A shower is something to appreciate over here, for you stay dirty all of the time and the clothes you wear stay damp and wet all the time. You wear the same set of fatigues over here for a week. Well, before that week is up, they have rotted off of you. We were issued jungle fatigues and boots a few days ago and they are just great. They are made for tropical wear and they are better than the regular army fatigues.

We are located at side of a small village called Ci Chu, out in an old rice paddy (base

June 6, 1966

camp). We are about 30 miles northwest of Saigon and about 20 miles or less from the Cambodian border.

We are getting hot meals now, before we were eating "C" Rations, and we get plenty of pop and beer. I don't care for the beer but I drink about six cans of pop a day along with water and taking malaria pills and salt tablets.

Well, I though being a clerk you would not see any action. I just thought wrong. I will be going along with the line companies to take casualty reports and will be dodging bullets. No one is safe in this war. Already here in base camp we have had two casualties. The Viet Cong fire stray rounds into camp all of the time hoping to hit someone.

After being here three months we are entitled to R&R (Rest & Recreation). There is a lot of places you can choose from to name a few, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok (Thailand) etc. I hope to go to Hong Kong, they say that city is more interesting than the others.

You carry your weapon all of the time in base camp with a basic load of ammo. Believe me I have plenty for my 45. Since being here I have seen a few of my old buddies here in the 2nd Bde., which came over here in January. The 2nd Bde. cleared and fought for every inch of this rice paddy for our base camp, and they suffered a lot of casualties. The 1st Bde. had a base camp already secured for us when we arrived here. Those guys out there in those bunkers are firing their machine guns all of the time at night, for it is night when Charlie (VC) gets out to fight. Then in the day he goes back to his tunnels.

I'm due to rotate on 28 April, 1967 and I sure wish that day would come. I don't want to stay here any longer that I have too, a year will be enough for me. The morale of the troops is very high, actually this is better than duty back in Schofield. Here you don't have to put up with a lot of nonsense and crazy things like you did back at Schofield. A lot of difference between troops in combat and troops back in a garrison post somewhere.

I have now received a call about a casualty, so I had better sign off hoping to hear from someone back there and let me know how everyone is. So long for now.

JIM HUSKEY.

### Connecticut Partners of the Alliance

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

#### HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 6, 1966

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, the Partners of the Alliance is a recent outgrowth of the Alliance for Progress which has added a new dimension to our aid mission in Latin America. This organization is composed of a nationwide network of private, nonprofit groups of U.S. citizens in partnership with their Latin American counterparts to stimulate action for their mutual economic, cultural and social development. Since this program's inception, the soundness and productivity of its novel, people to people approach to the improvement of relations has been demonstrated through various cooperative endeavors such as assisting in the equipping of hospitals and stimulating growth.

In my own State of Connecticut, the Connecticut Partners of the Alliance, under the leadership of its president, Mr. Ogden Bigelow, have entered into a partnership with the Brazilian State of Paraiba, and I have had the pleasure of working with this organization's dedicated and resourceful administrators. Their enterprising and imaginative ideas for the promotion of this vital program continue to impress me, and the Connecticut Partners' latest endeavor in this area is one which I feel may aptly serve as an example for similar groups throughout the Nation.

In order to generate grassroots support for this program among the maximum number of Connecticut residents, the Connecticut Partners have distributed to 10,000 selected Connecticut people a package of materials concerning the program's work accompanied by letters from Gov. John Dempsey of Connecticut, and Mr. Bigelow, urging participation in the Partners' work. This type of direct personal appeal to humanitarian feelings has required the expenditure of much time and effort, but I am confident that its rewards will amply justify this expenditure.

As I know that my colleagues will be interested in this new approach to the promotion of hemispheric cooperation, I offer these letters in their entirety for insertion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

CONNECTICUT PARTNERS  
OF THE ALLIANCE, INC.,  
Greenwich, Conn., May 31, 1966.

HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN,  
Member of Congress,  
1314 Longworth Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JOHN: Attached is a complete "package" of material sent to more than 10,000 known "givers" in the state of Connecticut. It is our sincere hope that this effort, which has been tremendous since all letters have been personally-addressed (as per the enclosed) and mailed first class. We are hopeful that results will justify the intense effort we have made.

In view of the fact that the Governor's letter accompanies the mailing, it has been suggested that you might be willing to submit the letter and, possibly Ogden Bigelow's letter, to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. If this is done, we can gain further publicity in Connecticut but, more importantly, James Boren, Director of the Partners of the Alliance Programs in Washington will make reprints of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for mailing to all state plans. As a matter of fact, when he was here with Charles Wiggin last week, they indicated that they intend to use our approach as an example of an efficient way to do the dual job of educating influential Americans on the importance of this program and, secondly, acquiring funds to carry on the work.

I would certainly like to have your comments. Meanwhile, thank you for all you have done and with every good wish for the future.

Sincerely,

ANSON C. LOWITZ,  
Managing Director.

CONNECTICUT PARTNERS  
OF THE ALLIANCE, INC.,  
Greenwich, Conn., May 23, 1966.

HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN,  
Member of Congress,  
1314 Longworth Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. MONAGAN: Are you concerned about tomorrow? How many times in recent months have you been disturbed by news of

the inroads being made in this hemisphere by those who are striving to destroy the hopes, initiative, freedoms, and dignity of the individual, and wished that you could do something to combat this trend?

Unfortunately, it takes a lot more than wishes and angry words to turn back an underground movement of this scope. It takes money—and plenty of it. A constant barrage of political propaganda holding out promises which never come true cannot be answered by equally empty words. It is up to US to give positive evidence to the frustrated peoples of Latin America that, under our system, promises do come true—for those who are willing to work!

The Connecticut Partners of the Alliance is a people-to-people, self-help program, under which our state has joined in a partnership for progress with the little state of Paraiba, in northeast Brazil, an area plagued by drought, disease and illiteracy, where the average span of life is 32, where only 23% of all of the elementary school teachers hold high school diplomas and more than half of all school children are in the first grade. (For more details see enclosed folder).

As a privately-financed, non-profit, tax-exempt organization, Connecticut Partners of the Alliance, Inc., is currently working with leading Paraiabans on thirty-nine projects, including: a 300-year old hospital; a university; the only pediatrics hospital in the northeast (now serving 22 million people); two institutes for the blind; emergency health and maternity posts; elementary, high and commercial schools; a home for the aged; two orphanages and other institutions.

In each case, the people have donated their labor. At no time have they asked for a handout—just a hand. By giving them this hand, the Connecticut Partners are making dreams come true, building friendships and faith where poverty and fear have long been constant companions. If you still wish you could do something definite to help end this insidious trend—now is the time!

Sincerely,

OGDEN BIGELOW,  
President.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,  
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,  
Hartford, May 16, 1966.

DEAR FELLOW CITIZENS: Some months ago, our Congressional delegation advised me of the establishment of the Partners of the Alliance under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress. The program asked that each of our 50 states join in a partnership for progress with a country, a state or an area in Latin America, to assist, through personal involvement, in building or completing specific projects where, by hard work, the people had demonstrated their determination to improve their way of life.

Connecticut was assigned Paraiba, a state whose population approximates our own, situated on the most easterly point of Brazil's northeast. There, the people, frustrated by poverty, were constantly subject to subversive propaganda setting forth promises which never materialized.

As Governor, I convened a conference of community leaders from all parts of the state, and from all walks of life, informed them of the program and sought their help in selecting six qualified citizens to visit Paraiba, meet with outstanding Paraiabans and evaluate those projects on which American cooperation would have the greatest and most immediate impact. Shortly thereafter, the Connecticut Partners of the Alliance, Inc., an independent, tax-free corporation, was established to implement projects which had been accepted by those who had gone to Brazil, and by the Board of Directors.