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The importance of such long-range planning is illustrated by recent proposals to tamper with the funding of this program. There are few activities which have proved themselves more worthwhile than this relatively small Federal assistance provided to the local citizens. Its success is indicated by its growth since its start in 1954 to now when it serves more than 92,000 youngsters. Its practicality is shown by alternatives: It consumes a food commodity of which some, if not all would otherwise go into government surplus to be sold eventually at below cost. Its closeness to the people is shown by the arrangement in which for \$103 million a year the government pays three cents per ½ pint of milk, while the school child pays the remainder, usually from two to three cents. For this investment, the child receives daily the complete food represented by milk.

The importance of this arrangement can only be appreciated by noting that because of the warping of tastes through fads and advertisement, many children in our more affluent families receive improper food balances. But much more serious are the many case of children who come from families where adequate food is not available—children who come to school without breakfast, or children who must go home to sparse or poorly balanced evening meals. Widespread first-hand acquaintance by both parents and by school administrators who are familiar with the service the school milk program provides to youngsters has given it unusual grassroots support. No one in the country, whether from rural or urban areas, whether from a dairy or non-dairy state, has a bad word to say about this program. There are indeed very few government proposals for which this could be said.

It is, therefore, strange that of all programs this one should be selected for reduction and phasing out. Can present developments be considered otherwise? There is the proposal to reduce the Fiscal 1967 budget by \$80 million to a mere \$21 million. Since 1965 there have been efforts to tighten and limit expenditures for this program. Recent action by the House in reinstating the \$103 million for Fiscal 1967 reflects general repugnance at a move to destroy this program, and I feel the Senate will follow the lead of the House in this protest. Nevertheless, there is the threat.

The basis of this unnatural move is the argument that the money should be used elsewhere. I certainly am not unaware of the unusual demand made on our economy by the war in Viet Nam. Neither am I unsympathetic to the needs of the impoverished segments of our society; in fact I feel this program is a part of these efforts. If the distinction could be made readily between the poor and the not so poor in the classrooms, and if those able to pay could be called to do so without psychic harm to those not able to pay, I would be more sympathetic to this proposal; but this cannot be done with so intimate a thing as providing nourishment within the classroom to the children who need it.

Look at the alternative: It is the "means" test—children who do not have the money would not be required to pay, while those who do would be required to meet the full cost. A determination would be made within the school. Under this scheme, we would oblige the child publicly to drink in his socio-economic status along with his mid-morning snack. Means test for providing medical care for the aged was found completely repugnant because it destroyed human dignity. Why, now, should this same program be imposed on children?

It is small wonder that school administrators would sooner discontinue the whole milk program rather than subject the child to this humiliation. If money is the item, it should be gotten elsewhere. We spend vast amounts on futuristic programs—in

science, in exploration—all to find and develop our potential resources. I think these are wise investments. But I must also point out that the child is a natural resource too—the most basic, the most valuable, the most certain natural resource we have. Let's not stint on them.

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**SECRETARY RUSK SHOULD BE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND FRANK IN HIS STATEMENTS IF HE SEEKS PEACE IN VIETNAM**

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, speaking on our involvement in a miserable civil war and insurrection within an insurrection in Vietnam, Secretary of State Rusk has said he would go anywhere and "negotiate with any government" in the search for peace. Recently in an address in Chicago, President Johnson, according to newspaper accounts, stated "we will negotiate with any government."

I hope that Secretary Rusk is not seeking to be evasive or "cute" in making the statements he has made. I hope that our President will clarify this statement attributed to him.

The National Liberation Front is the political front, or governing body, of the Vietcong. We are fighting an undeclared war in Vietnam against the Vietcong. The Vietcong does not constitute a government. Secretary Rusk knows that. It could be argued that Prime Minister Ky and the generals who overturned the civilian government in Saigon last June do not in fact constitute a government. The facts are that Prime Minister Ky's Saigon government is not a viable government and is in actual control of less than one-fourth of the land area of South Vietnam. Without the support of our Armed Forces he and his military regime would not last 3 days. The Vietcong control a great area in what is termed South Vietnam.

The question Secretary Rusk should answer is whether in search of peace in Vietnam are U.S. delegates willing to meet with delegates representing the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong, along with delegates representing Prime Minister Ky's regime and delegates representing the Hanoi government, or that portion of Vietnam north of the 17th parallel? What is your answer to this question, Secretary Rusk?

In April 1965, President Johnson, at Johns Hopkins University, although declaring that the United States would consent to unconditional discussions, stipulated we would settle for nothing less than an independent South Vietnam. He excluded negotiations with the Vietcong. President Johnson knew, or should have known, that in excluding the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong, that the government at Hanoi could not end the fighting in behalf of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong, even if it had wanted to. In Asiatic capitals the leaders there regarded this as a device for perpetuating our position in Vietnam and assuring the rule of an American puppet government in Saigon.

Now, most recently, our President has stated that the presence of the National Liberation Front is not an insurmount-

able obstacle and that they would have no difficulty in being represented or having their views represented. Even though this was an ambiguous and evasive statement, Secretary Rusk in December 1965, according to the New York Times, "indicated that the Vietcong's political organization, the National Liberation Front, would not be given any political status or influence in South Vietnam through negotiations."

Furthermore, when Secretary Rusk issues pronouncements that the United States must guarantee the independence of South Vietnam, how can he reconcile this with the position he takes when he makes the statement:

We will go back to the Geneva agreements and abide by them?

The Geneva agreements specifically state:

The military demarcation line at the 17th parallel is provisional and should not in any way be considered as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

And in those agreements it was provided that elections were to be held leading toward reunifying Vietnam. Very definitely all of Vietnam, not merely South Vietnam. Those are the elections which our puppet head of state, Diem, called off. Very definitely, the Geneva agreements make no guarantee of the integrity of South Vietnam nor of its continued existence.

President Diem, installed by us as Chief of State of South Vietnam, announced in mid-1955 that the elections promised at Geneva would not be held. Until 1958 the Hanoi government persisted in its efforts to arrange for the promised elections, but Diem, consistently backed by the United States, refused. It was at the time evident that Ho Chi Minh would win the election by an overwhelming margin. During at least the first 3 years of the post-Geneva period, there was a lull in the military struggle. Hanoi refrained from support of insurrectionary activity in the south. By repudiating the heart of the Geneva agreements, Diem made civil war inevitable. When, in a civil war, a military struggle for power ends on the agreed condition that the controversies will be transferred to the political level, the side which repudiates the agreed conditions must expect that the military struggle will be resumed.

Although American support was given to Diem, the United States did not make a blank-check commitment to whatever regime happened to hold power in Saigon. What has been referred to as "the U.S. commitment" was a limited, qualified pledge of economic support, and it was made specifically to Diem's government. It was not in any sense a pledge of military support. The cornerstone of our Vietnam involvement, President Eisenhower's letter to Diem in October 1954, was simply an undertaking "to examine" with Diem "how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your government can assist Vietnam—in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." A criti-

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**ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PLYMOUTH ROCK NATIONAL MEMORIAL**

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for the establishment of the Plymouth Rock National Memorial, and for other purposes. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by me relating to the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 3477) to provide for the establishment of the Plymouth Rock National Memorial, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

The statement presented by Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY TO DESIGNATE PLYMOUTH ROCK AS A NATIONAL MEMORIAL

In 1970, America will celebrate the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. Although Americans honor the deeds of these hardy Pilgrims who landed in 1620, we have so far neglected to include the site of their landing in the national park system.

Because I believe the historic Plymouth Rock site should be preserved as an inspiration for all Americans, I want to introduce a bill designating Plymouth Rock as a national memorial.

The diversity of religious belief we enjoy today in America has been a natural development of the Pilgrims' own search for a land in which to practice their religion.

The origin of our American constitutional form of government can be traced to the Pilgrims' *Mayflower Compact* whereby the Pilgrims established one of the world's first civil governments by consent of the governed.

Finally, the fortitude the Pilgrims demonstrated in the face of unimagined adversity in founding their settlement has continually inspired Americans encountering difficulty in advancing their ideals.

The area of the memorial which would be authorized by this legislation would be limited, for size is not important in honoring this national heritage. Last summer, I asked the National Park Service to survey the location and recommend a suitable park area. The subsequent Park Service report will be released shortly, and it will be used as a basis for determining the precise boundaries.

In 1835, the astute French commentator Alexis de Tocqueville noted regarding Plymouth Rock:

"Here is a stone which the feet of a few outcasts pressed for an instant; and the stone becomes famous; it is treasured by a great nation; its very dust is shared as a relic."

The affection Americans feel for the courage and vision of the Pilgrims has not dimmed with the passage of time. It therefore seems most appropriate that Plymouth Rock be designated a national memorial.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF LINCOLN TRAIL MEMORIAL PARKWAY IN STATES OF KENTUCKY, INDIANA, AND ILLINOIS—AMENDMENTS**

AMENDMENT NO. 586

Mr. DOUGLAS submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (S. 1226) to provide for the establishment and administration of the Lincoln Trail Memorial Parkway in the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and ordered to be printed.

**TAX INCREASE DEAD FOR THIS YEAR—L.B.J. VINDICATED**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, yesterday's announcement that unemployment increased more rapidly last month than in any month in 2 years, and that it is back up to 4 percent should ring the death knell on any remaining prospect for a tax increase this year.

A few weeks ago the New York Times reported that at a meeting of the Nation's leading economists overwhelming favor was expressed for a prompt tax increase to take the steam out of inflation.

But almost every economic development since that time has shown how wrong this economic advice was and how right the President has been to resist it.

Since the Nation's top economists, including William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Samuelson, former president of the American Economic Association and as highly respected an economist as we have in this country, and Walter Heller, the remarkably able Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Kennedy—and clearly entitled to be called the father of the new economics—since all these brilliant economists told us we must have a big across-the-board tax increase and promptly, it may be that Congress should take a long hard look at the prime assumption behind the recommendation of these leading economists.

That assumption is that forecasting the Nation's economic future has become a reasonably exact science—even in the short run. Since the future can be forecast reasonably accurately—the assumption goes—Congress should pass legislation to enable the President and Congress to act swiftly to increase or decrease taxes to slow down inflation or speed up lagging economic growth.

Incidentally, this recommendation was the heart of a recent recommendation by the Joint Congressional Economic Committee. As one who dissented from that economic recommendation, I call the attention of Members of Congress to how ill such a convenience would have served the country, if it had been available and used, let us say, in April of this year.

If the President and Congress had increased taxes at that time, it is likely that the 4-percent unemployment of last month might very well have been substantially higher. Furthermore, the business confusion, the taxpayer irritation, the loss of confidence in Government and in the economy could have been substantial.

What developments in the past month should teach us is that even the very best of America's economic brains—and that best is very good indeed—are not capable of predicting the shortrun economic future.

Under these circumstances, shortrun changes in the tax rates to cope with an immediate expected rise or fall in economic activity are not practical, in view of the present developing but still far-from-perfected level of economic forecasting.

**SENATOR INOUE SPEAKS OUT FOR SCHOOL MILK BILL**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on May 12 the Holland subcommittee of the Senate Agriculture Committee held hearings on my proposal to make the school milk program permanent and increase Federal funding for the program. As we all know, the administration has proposed to cut this program by 80 percent so that it will take care of only the needy and children in schools without a lunch program. This would reduce program participation from 18 million children to 3 million children.

Today I draw the Senate's attention to a statement made in support of this legislation by the distinguished Senator from Hawaii [Mr. INOUE], who is a co-sponsor of the proposal. The statement points out the difficulties in applying a means test to program participants in these well written words:

Children who do not have the money would not be required to pay, while those who do would be required to meet the full cost. A determination would be made within the school. Under this scheme, we would oblige the child publicly to drink in his socioeconomic status along with his mid-morning snack. Means test for providing medical care for the aged was found completely repugnant because it destroyed human dignity. Why, now, should this same program be imposed on our children?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire statement of the Senator from Hawaii be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUE, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII

Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak in favor of S. 2921 because I believe our school milk program requires stability and permanence. This legislation would provide these essentials by fixing increments to growth needs over a period of years.

cal qualification was that even this economic aid was to be subject to Diem's carrying through reforms responsive to the aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

Except for President Eisenhower's letter, the only other undertaking which the administration cites as a proof of a Vietnam commitment is the treaty of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. But this treaty involves no American pledge to the South Vietnamese Government, which was not and could not be a signatory.

Let us hope that our President, within the near future, will publicly state that we are willing to negotiate for peace and a cease-fire in Vietnam with representatives of the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front, along with representatives of the Government of South Vietnam of which Ky is at this moment Prime Minister and with delegates of the Hanoi government of North Vietnam.

U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, has won high respect by reason of his accurate statements. He says that our intervention in Vietnam, instead of being "a fight for democracy" is fast becoming a struggle for "the identity and survival of Vietnam." President Johnson and State Secretary Rusk would be well advised if they responded to U Thant's plea in a speech at Atlantic City for a scaling down of the war on both sides and the beginning of talks by all parties, including representatives of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong. Twenty years of alien intervention in armed conflict in Vietnam resulting in the deaths of thousands of Vietnamese men, women, and children could not do other than profoundly affect Vietnamese political life and make the lives of 32 million or more men, women, and children well-nigh unbearable.

The Vietnamese were crushed under French colonialism. After the battle at Dienbienphu, the French gave up the struggle to maintain their huge colonial empire in Indochina and withdrew some 200,000 officers and men of their armed forces and disbanded the thousands of Vietnamese men enrolled as collaborators against the Vietminh, or forces of national liberation. They did not lose face. France, although no longer a staunch ally of the United States, has really become a greater and stronger nation since withdrawal from Vietnam and from another war of liberation in Algeria. The Geneva accords provided for elections which our puppet in Saigon, Diem, refused to honor. Then the Vietnamese from the north who had fought as allies and collaborators alongside the French colonial oppressors migrated to the south by the thousands, and many thousands of those in the south who had fought for national liberation migrated to areas north of the 17th parallel.

U Thant has stated clearly that 20 years of outside intervention and the presence of a succession of foreign armies has so profoundly affected Vietnamese political life that it seems illusory to present the conflict there as a contest between communism and democracy. U Thant stated, "Indeed, recent events

have shown that the passion for national identity, perhaps one should say national survival, is the only ideology that may be left to a growing number of Vietnamese." U Thant argues that escalation of this war on our part must cease.

Mr. President, without further delay we should request that negotiations be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, or in the alternative, and probably the more desirable course, under the observation and by arrangement of the International Control Commission—Poland, India, and Canada—and that our delegates participate in these negotiations for a cease-fire and peace along with delegates and representatives of the South Vietnamese Government, of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong, and of the Hanoi government to try to achieve a cease-fire and reach an armistice agreement and then commence the orderly withdrawal of our Armed Forces first to bases on the Vietnam coast and then home.

#### THE CALENDAR

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, there are a number of unobjected-to measures on the calendar which I believe could be passed by the Senate at this time. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar Nos. 1167, 1168, and 1169, in that order.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### RAILWAY LABOR ACT AMENDMENTS

The bill (H.R. 706) to amend the Railway Labor Act in order to provide for establishment of special adjustment boards upon the request either of representatives of employees or of carriers to resolve disputes otherwise referable to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and to make all awards of such Board final was considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the bill was passed be reconsidered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 1201), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The principal purpose of the bill is to eliminate the large backlog of undecided claims of railroad employees pending before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, to expedite disposition of grievances and disputes over the interpretation and application of agreements, and to provide equal opportunity for limited judicial review of awards of the Board to employees and employers.

#### BACKGROUND

##### National Railroad Adjustment Board

The National Railroad Adjustment Board was established in 1934 under the Railway Labor Act to provide machinery for resolving so-called minor disputes between individual employees and the carriers. Minor disputes arise out of grievances or interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The Board is divided into First, Second, Third and Fourth Divisions, with its 36 members (18 representatives of labor and 18 representatives of management) divided between the divisions. Jurisdiction of divisions is broken down by employee classifications. The Board handles thousands of disputes annually under a procedure which has been characterized by the courts as arbitration. If the labor and management representatives cannot agree, there is provision for selection of a neutral person by the parties or by the National Mediation Board to serve as a referee.

The Board procedure for handling disputes has worked expeditiously in the Second and Fourth Divisions. For example, the Fourth Division handles an average of 106 cases a year, remaining virtually current with no backlog at all. The Second Division, which handles an average of 247 cases a year, has a backlog of little over 1 year's work.

However, this is not the case in the First and Third Divisions. The Third Division, which handles an average of 765 cases a year, has a backlog of about 3½ years work and the First Division, which has never been current in its work, has a backlog of approximately 7½ years work.

In summary, under existing procedures prescribed in the Railway Labor Act, railroad employees who have grievances sometimes have to wait as long as 10 years or more before a decision is finally rendered on their claim. In addition, in some instances, after an employee has obtained an award, the carrier concerned refuses to pay the award, the employee is then forced to forgo the award or go to court where he is required to try his case again with the delays and uncertainties normally attendant upon litigation.

During the House and Senate hearings, witnesses for the unions and management placed the blame for the backlog in the First and Third Divisions on the failure of the other side to reach an agreement on the disposition of claims. Regardless of the merits of the contentions by either side, it is obvious that the National Railroad Adjustment Board in the operation of the First and Third Divisions has failed. The committee therefore believes that a change in existing procedure is essential. The committee believes that the procedure for special boards of adjustment provided for in H.R. 706 will remove the backlog of cases and provide an expeditious means of handling future cases.

When either party requests a special adjustment board, the committee contemplates that a number of disputes will be referred to that board. The committee believes it would only result in a proliferation of special boards to request a special board for each claim presented by an employee.

Carrier witnesses testified that many of the claims presented by employees and disputes referred to the Board are frivolous or at least without merit. Although the committee is not prejudging any claims, it believes that claims should be carefully screened by the party submitting it. The committee believes that the merits of every claim should be carefully considered by both the carrier and employee representative in an attempt to resolve the dispute before submission to the Board.

##### Judicial review

Section 3, First, (m) of the Railway Labor Act provides that awards of the National

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Railroad Adjustment Board shall be final "except insofar as they shall contain a money award." There is no means specified in the law, other than resort to courts, whereby any award of the Board may be enforced. Under section 3, First, (p) of the act, provision is made for court enforcement of awards rendered in favor of employees. Such an employee may bring action in the U.S. district court to enforce said award. The findings and orders of the Board shall be prima facie evidence of the facts as stated in the award. There is no other provision for judicial review of decisions of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.

This results in the incongruous situation that if an employee receives an award in his favor from the Board, the railroad affected may obtain judicial review of that award by declining to comply with it. If, however, an employee fails to receive an award in his favor, there is no means by which judicial review might be obtained. The committee believes that this result is unfair to employees and that an equal opportunity for judicial review should be provided under the act. Also, because the National Railroad Adjustment Board has been characterized as an arbitration tribunal by the courts, the grounds for review should be limited to those grounds commonly provided for review of arbitration awards. H.R. 706 provides an equal opportunity for judicial review and limits that review "for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of this Act, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making the order".

The committee gave consideration to a proposal that the bill be amended to include as a ground for setting aside an award "arbitrariness or capriciousness" on the part of the Board. The committee declined to adopt such an amendment out of concern that such a provision might be regarded as an invitation to the courts to treat any award with which the court disagreed as being arbitrary or capricious. This was done on the assumption that a Federal court would have the power to decline to enforce an award which was actually and indisputedly without foundation in reason or fact, and the committee intends that, under this bill, the courts will have that power. The limited grounds for judicial review provided in H.R. 706 are the same grounds that are provided in section 9 of the Railway Labor Act and also Public Law 88-108, which provided arbitration for the so-called work rules dispute.

#### HOUSE HEARINGS AND PASSAGE OF H.R. 706

Hearings on these amendments to the Railway Labor Act were held in the House for 4 days during the 88th Congress and 3 days during the 89th Congress. H.R. 706 was reported from the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on October 1, 1965. The bill passed the House without amendment by a vote of 380 to 0 on February 9, 1966.

#### SURVEY OF FISHING RESOURCES

The Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 29) to authorize and direct the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to conduct a survey of the marine and fresh water commercial fishery resources of the United States, its territories, and possessions which had been reported from the Committee on Commerce with an amendment to strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:

That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to conduct a survey of the character, extent, and condition of the coastal and fresh water commercial fishery resources, including both those resources now

being utilized by United States and foreign fishermen and those potential resources which are latent and unused, of the United States, its territories and possessions, including coastal and distant water fishery resources in which the United States has an interest or right.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Interior is directed to submit through the President a report to the Congress as soon as practicable, but not later than January 1, 1968, concerning the results of the survey authorized and directed in the preceding section.

Sec. 3. There is authorized to be appropriated, out of moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such funds as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution, but not to exceed \$200,000.

The amendment was agreed to.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

The preamble was ordered to be stricken and the following inserted:

Whereas the United States has the richest and most extensive coastal and inland fishery resources of any nation but has failed to develop, to utilize, and to conserve her fishery resources to the fullest extent; and

Whereas the fishery resources of the United States and of waters contiguous to the United States have, by their variety and abundance, attracted the fishing fleets of many European and Asiatic nations and encouraged them to send fishing vessels to these waters which are more numerous, larger, and superior in capacity and equipment to those of the United States and with such enterprise and capabilities as to threaten these resources with depletion or extinction; and

Whereas the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas came into force and effect on March 20, 1966, and the Convention for the first time under international law recognizes the dominant and special interest and rights of a coastal nation to adopt regulations to conserve fishery resources adjacent to its coast under conservation programs based on scientific studies of the resource; and

Whereas additional biological data must be gathered and scientific resource studies be completed to provide for an effective implementation of our recently acquired rights to conserve our coastal fishery resources under the 1958 Convention: Therefore be it

The title was amended, so as to read: "Joint resolution to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a survey of the coastal and fresh water commercial fishery resources of the United States, its territories, and possessions."

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from the report (No. 1202), explaining the purposes of the joint resolution.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION

The purpose of the resolution is to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a survey of the U.S. coastal and inland fishery resources.

#### LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislation is similar to a resolution enacted in May of 1944, which authorized a survey of the fishery resources of the United States and which resulted in the publication of Senate Document 51, 79th Congress, 1st session, entitled "Fishery Resources of the United States".

The resolution is also similar to Senate Joint Resolution 174 of the 88th Congress which passed the Senate late in the session without any action being taken by the House of Representatives. Senate Joint Resolution 29 was introduced on January 19, 1965. Hearings were held April 19, 1965, with testimony in support of the measure received from Dr. Stanley A. Cain, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. Department of the Interior and by Donald L. McKernan, Director, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, U.S. Department of the Interior. The resolution is also supported by other Government agencies including the Department of State and by numerous national fishery organizations such as the National Fisheries Institute, the National Canners Association, Tuna Research Foundation, National Shrimp Congress, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission.

#### THE AMENDMENT

The committee amendment focuses the survey on the extent and condition of the inland and coastal fishery resources of the United States. The Secretary of the Interior under the resolution as introduced was directed to study an extensive number of broad areas of interest to the fishing industry such as processing techniques, marketing problems, and the radiation-pasteurization of fishery products. The amount of money authorized and time permitted were not sufficient to permit a meaningful study of all the problems of the fishing industry. The purpose of the amendment is to concentrate the effort on one of the most fundamental problems, namely a lack of sufficient information about the resource particularly the enormous underutilized coastal fishery resources which are currently being threatened by foreign fleets.

#### NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

A comprehensive survey of the inland and coastal fishery resources of the United States will meet two important needs. The study will encourage the domestic use of the enormous underutilized marine resources of the United States and will provide scientific data necessary to regulate and conserve the coastal fishery resources under the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.

During the past 30 years world fishery production has about tripled. During the same period, the U.S. production has remained at the same level—5 billion pounds—with approximately 90 percent taken from coastal waters and 10 percent taken by the U.S.-flag fishing vessels off foreign coasts. The potential annual catch of fishery resources in the U.S. coastal waters has been recently estimated to be approximately five times the present domestic catch. These unutilized marine resources are being increasingly exploited off our coasts by foreign fishing vessels, primarily Russian and Japanese. During the past 5 years, foreign fleets have been attracted to our coastal waters by the availability of enormous unutilized marine resources. In the summer of 1965 no less than 1,000 large foreign fishing vessels were engaged in harvesting fishery resources within 50 miles of our coast. Ten years ago, the foreign catch in the North Pacific coastal waters was negligible. In 1965, over 2 billion pounds were taken by Russia and Japan in the Eastern Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska. If the U.S. fishing industry and fishermen had more detailed information about the extent and nature of many of these resources, they would be in a stronger economic position to engage in harvesting the resources on a competitive basis.

For the past 350 years it has been accepted under international law that the freedom to fish was one of the freedoms of the high seas. Beyond the territorial sea, fish have been considered a common resource. No na-

tion had any responsibility under international law to conserve the common resource unless that nation wished to impose upon itself such restrictions either unilaterally or through treaty. As a consequence, all high seas marine resource were subject to possible extinction to the benefit of the most effective exploiter.

The 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted four conventions. Three codified existing law, with minor exceptions. The fourth, the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas changed international law dramatically. The Convention confirmed the right of all nations to engage in fishing on the high seas, but made the right subject to the other provisions of the Convention including the obligation to conserve the living resources of the seas. The Convention established that a coastal nation has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources adjacent to its territorial sea. In addition, the coastal nation can adopt unilateral measures for the conservation of any coastal marine resource on the high seas if there is an urgent need and the measures adopted are based on scientific findings.

This recently acquired right under international law for the coastal State to protect its own coastal fishery resources is obviously dependent on the coastal State having conducted the necessary surveys and studies of the coastal marine resources to make the necessary scientific findings. This resolution directs that these vital surveys be commenced and the studies be made so the United States will be in a position to protect these valuable coastal resources which will undoubtedly be required to meet the enormous protein needs of the future.

#### COSTS

The legislation authorizes an expenditure of Federal funds in an amount not to exceed \$200,000.

### TERMINATION OF USE RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY PREVIOUSLY CONVEYED TO THE CITY OF KODIAK, ALASKA, BY THE UNITED STATES

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 2412) to terminate use restrictions on certain real property previously conveyed to the city of Kodiak, Alaska, by the United States which had been reported from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs with an amendment on page 2, line 2, after the word "numbered", to strike out "1594." and insert "1594: *Provided, however, That all revenues derived from sales, leases, or other disposition of such lands or interests therein shall be used for public school purposes.*"; so as to make the bill read:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the restriction contained in the Act entitled "An Act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey abandoned school properties in the Territory of Alaska to local school officials", approved August 23, 1950 (64 Stat. 470), limiting the use of any real property conveyed under such Act to school or other public purposes, is hereby terminated with respect to that real property conveyed under such Act to the local school officials of Kodiak, Alaska, which property is more particularly described in United States survey numbered 1594: *Provided, however, That all revenues derived from sales, leases, or other disposition of such lands or interests therein shall be used for public school purposes.**

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, was read the third time, and passed.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from the report (No. 1203), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

General authority was provided the Secretary of the Interior under the act of August 23, 1950 (64 Stat. 470), to donate to local town or city officials in Alaska lands and improvements thereon in the then Territory which were not needed by the Alaska Native Service for school purposes. The act required that the conveyed property "be used for school and other public purposes." It also required that the conveyance reserve to the United States all mineral deposits in the conveyed land and the right to prospect and remove such deposits. A failure to abide by these use provisions for a period of at least 1 year could result in a forfeiture of the granted property.

In April of 1954, 2.2 acres of land were patented with the above restrictions of use to the Kodiak School Board (patent No. 1143941) pursuant to the 1950 act. S. 2412 removes the restriction on use applicable to this conveyed land, but by amendment provides that all revenues derived from sales, leases, or other disposition of such lands or interests therein shall be used for public school purposes.

#### NEED

The city of Kodiak recently began planning with the Alaska State Housing Authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for an urban renewal project (R-19). The plan includes 2.2 acres patented to the Kodiak School Board. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has advised that since the Kodiak School Board received the property without cost from the United States, its regulations do not permit the use of Federal funds to purchase the land for an urban renewal project.

This bill, S. 2412, is similar to the act of August 10, 1964 (78 Stat. 384), which removed a similar use restriction applicable to donated Federal land used as a playground in Fairbanks, Alaska, which was also needed for an urban renewal project. In the Fairbanks case, the land was to be used for urban renewal purposes and other land would be acquired without the aid of Federal funds as a substitute playground. In this case, the Kodiak School Board will sell the 2.2 acres to the Alaska State Housing Authority for the urban renewal project. It is indicated the proceeds will be used to purchase a new school site.

It is pointed out that the 1964 act directed the conveyance to the city of Fairbanks of the reserved mineral rights of the United States. S. 2412 does not direct conveyance of these rights in the 2.2 acres of land in Kodiak. The Geological Survey reports that the 2.2 acres are not valuable for mineral development.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. YOUNG of Ohio in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

### NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA IN VIETNAM WAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been some discussion of late relative to the neutrality of Cambodia and to the Vietcong and/or North Vietnamese troops using it as a concentration point for activities directed against South Vietnam. This question has been raised many times. But on the basis of specific knowledge it appears to me that there is no firm indication to support this contention; certainly, none has been made public. I would not gainsay the possibility that Vietcong or North Vietnamese troops have retreated into Cambodia in the course of battle. But it is my belief that if they have used the territory of Cambodia it has been without the knowledge or support of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia.

As a matter of fact, Prince Sihanouk has requested that the International Control Commission look into this possibility as well as the allegation that Soviet and other outside arms are being shipped through the port of Sihanoukville for transshipment to North Vietnam.

I strongly support these requests of Prince Sihanouk and urge that we join with Cambodia in giving to the International Control Commission the responsibility for policing the Cambodian frontiers and also for looking into the question of shipments arriving in Sihanoukville although it is my belief that the ICC has already undertaken the latter task. It would be far better to agree to Prince Sihanouk's suggestion rather than to rely on ill-defined statements and presumptions because it is my belief that we should do everything possible to prevent the war from extending into Cambodia.

I realize that if the ICC undertook to carry out the request of Prince Sihanouk that it might call for additional personnel and greater expenditures. But I think this would be a small cost to pay to find the true answer to these vague allegations and charges and to prevent the extension of the war into another country in southeast Asia.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Who are now the members of the International Control Commission?

Mr. MANSFIELD. India, Poland, and Canada.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator from Montana suggests that they be vested with the responsibility of investigating and determining whether ammunition and other equipment of war are being carried across the line from Cambodia into South Vietnam?

Mr. MANSFIELD. First, let me say that this is a strong suggestion—in fact it is a request—made by Prince Sihanouk to various countries comprising the Geneva conferees, and it would apply not only to the supposed landing at Sihanoukville of arms from Soviet countries for transshipment to North Vietnam but

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also to the question of whether there are, in fact, as has been alleged, Vietcong or North Vietnamese troop concentrations, headquarters, and the like, on the Cambodian side of the frontier.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator from Montana know why the International Control Commission does not now exercise the powers which were vested in it by the Geneva accords?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Whether these particular powers are vested in the International Control Commission, I cannot state definitively at this time, but if these additional tasks were to be undertaken, it would mean more personnel for the International Control Commission as well as more expenditures for the tasks which Prince Sihanouk has requested that they undertake.

As I have tried to indicate, I think this would be an excellent move, because it would put to rest, one way or the other, the rumors, statements, and allegations which have been raised from time to time. I think it would also work in our own interest, as well as that of Cambodia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Montana has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Has Prince Sihanouk asked that this surveillance be exercised by the International Control Commission?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed, not once but several times.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I believe that the suggestion of the Senator from Montana is sound.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

#### THE MERCHANT MARINE AND THE ECONOMY OF HAWAII

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, Hawaii has a vital interest in a sound U.S. merchant marine, because our economy is dependent to a large degree on the timely arrival of ocean freight shipments from mainland U.S. ports.

For this reason, I would like to share with my colleagues the contents of an address given May 19, 1966, by Commissioner George H. Hearn, of the Federal Maritime Commission, before the Propeller Club of the port of Honolulu.

I am still shocked to be reminded that, at present, less than 9 percent of our import and export ocean commerce moves on American bottoms. In 1947, less than 20 years ago, our ships lifted 70 percent of our import and export trade.

As Commissioner Hearn said in Honolulu:

In a word, we as a nation, as a producing and trading nation, are going to have to devote our best efforts to international trade if we are to maintain our commercial supremacy.

If there are no objections, I ask that the full text of Commissioner Hearn's remarks be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS OF COMMISSIONER GEORGE H. HEARN, OF THE FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, BEFORE THE PROPELLER CLUB AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, MAY 19, 1966

Members of the Propeller Club of the Port of Honolulu and their friends, I am very happy to spend this Maritime Day observance here in Honolulu and join with you in saluting the efforts of those who have dedicated themselves to ocean shipping under the American flag, and all those whose callings are related to American flag merchant shipping. When Senator DAN INOUE personally extended to me the invitation on your behalf to visit these beautiful Islands, to inspect your marine facilities and to take part in your annual Maritime celebration, I was thrilled and honored. And I would be quite remiss, if I did not acknowledge the thoughtful courtesies extended me by Gov. John A. Burns who must personify the hospitality of these Islands. I bring to you the best wishes of not only my friends at the Civil Aeronautics Board who have visited here before, but also the regards of our Chairman John Harlee, Vice Chairman Patterson, and Commissioners Barrett and Day, who, as you know, are so vitally interested in your receiving the most economical and efficient steamship service available.

I can assure you, that your most able Senatorial Delegation, Senator Hiram Fong and Senator DAN INOUE, is particularly aware of this State's need for first class, low cost ocean transportation services, not only with your sister States, but in connection with your foreign trade as well, and that they make their concern on these matters known.

This visit, incidentally, is my first to your fair State, the jewel of the Pacific. I steamed by on several other occasions under the auspices of the United States Navy, during the war years while serving aboard the U.S.S. Iowa, the flag ship of the Fifth Fleet.

Also, while serving at the Civil Aeronautics Board, 1961-1964, I was in constant touch with your airline service problems both trunk and domestic. Consequently, I have kept abreast of your progress. And I do not refer only to those political changes which are inherent in your deserved statehood status. I am particularly impressed by your economic growth which is manifested by the modern material benefits apparent throughout the length and breadth of this beautiful State. As a member of the Federal Maritime Commission, I am pleased to note your increasing ocean borne commerce, not only with your sister States, but with the community of nations, as well.

As you no doubt know, the Federal Maritime Commission does not have the responsibility of promoting our merchant marine. Ours is the statutory obligation of administering statutes which relate to the economic regulation of common carriers by water and other entities related to common carriers, principally freight forwarders and terminal operators, for the purpose of advancing the domestic offshore and foreign water borne commerce of our Nation.

As an American, of course, I take great pride in the accomplishments of our own merchant marine, which in time of peril, has always provided the logistic support necessary to see us through the hours of darkness. I would be remiss, on this auspicious occasion, if I did not acknowledge both the patriotic and commercial role that our American merchant marine has played in our history.

In both World Wars, as well as other times of danger, merchant men flying the American flag contributed enormously to ultimate victory. And in each instance, the great majority of our merchant ships had to be

built in crash programs following long periods of neglect and decline. During the crisis in Korea, numbers of Victories and Liberties of World War II vintage were broken out of our reserve fleets to provide logistical support to our national defense efforts.

And now, at this present time, our reserve merchant fleet is again being depended upon to get the job done in Viet Nam. And this emergency service is not without substantial sacrifice. Approximately one half of our privately owned American flag tramp fleet has been devoted to the requirements of the Military Sea Transport Service with the consequence that the 50 percent of American flag vessels' share of AID type cargoes, reserved to our own commercial vessels by Congress, will not, in all probability, be carried by our ships this year. Hence, while our vessel operators are devoting their ships and services to our Southeast Asia commitments, and while American seamen are braving the dangers, daily, which are inherent in these operations, valuable commercial cargoes will fall to their competitors with the consequence that it will be all the harder for American vessels to re-establish their commercial trades when they can again devote to them their full time and attention.

During World War II, alone, as a nation we suffered the loss of over 600 vessels, and the Merchant Marine suffered the highest percentage of casualties of all of our armed services, an astonishing 14 percent.

Quite apart, however, from the obvious national defense benefits that inhere in a strong, operational Merchant Marine, are the benefits that such a fleet can bestow on our nation in our peaceful endeavors, in our quest for the Great Society which our President so purposefully pursues. At present, less than 9 percent of our import and export ocean commerce moves on American bottoms. Contrastingly, in 1947 our ships lifted 70 percent of our import and export trade. And in the so called liner trades, the backbone of established avenues of international commerce, far less than 40 percent of our foreign commerce now moves under the American flag. I find these figures, for a trade conscious nation that has the highest standard of living in the world, for a nation whose products are the envy of the world, for a nation that in essence is the storehouse of quality goods for the world, and for a nation that has a history of accomplishment of the seas, strikingly disturbing.

Our economy, moreover, devours a full 50 percent of the world's output of raw materials and these raw materials must be imported in ships. A question which these startling facts raise is, can we permit our economy to hang so materially on the thin thread of foreign flag shipping, especially when the national economic goals of the countries upon whose vessels we so depend, may be quite different, if not actually diverse, to our own? Of course, we cannot permit such a happenstance, and the Congress in its wisdom brought into being the Shipping Act, the Golden Anniversary of which, by the way, will be commemorated on September 7, 1966, to insure against such a contingency.

The Shipping Act, sometimes referred to as the Magna Carta of ocean shipping, represents a noble endeavor. Through it, our nation has undertaken, as the innovator in the family of nations, to embark on a system of economic regulation whereby our traditional policy of "open ports" could be harmonized with the legitimate desires of American exporters and importers for stable, efficient and economical service, and where our traditional antitrust concepts could be accommodated to even older business concepts of international shipping.

The foreign commerce of the United States is too vast and too important to our national security for the ocean leg of such commerce to be left to the whim or caprice of

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Zorthian, Minister Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon:

"Zorthian was less relaxed than usual. He was anxious for Sylvester to get an idea of the mood of the news corps. There had been some annoying moments in previous weeks that had directly involved Sylvester's own office. In the first B-52 raids, Pentagon releases were in direct contradiction to what had actually happened on the ground in Vietnam.

"Also, those of us involved in broadcasting were anxious to discuss the increasing problems of communication. There was general opening banter, which Sylvester quickly brushed aside. He seemed anxious to take a stand—to say something that would jar us. He did:

"I can't understand how you fellows can write what you do while American boys are dying out here," he began. Then he went on to the effect that American correspondents had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good.

"A network television correspondent said, 'Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be the handmaidens of government.'

"That's exactly what I expect," came the reply.

"An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Barry Zorthian—about the credibility of American officials. Responded the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:

"Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that?—stupid."

"One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam—a veteran of World War II, the Indochina War and Korea—suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative. Sylvester replied:

"Look, I don't even have to talk to you people. I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States."

"At this point, the Hon. Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears, bulged his eyes, stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers.

"A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question. He never got beyond the first few words. Sylvester interrupted:

"Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"

VIETNAM

(Mr. QUILLEN (at the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, so many revelations in the past months have greatly emphasized the need for a complete reevaluation of the war in Vietnam.

I believe that there should be a complete investigation of the whole Vietnam war and a report made to the American people as to the true facts.

I am deeply concerned that there seems to be no apparent plan to win. I am also deeply concerned with the physical welfare of our troops and with the policies of the Defense Department relating to those who are sent to Vietnam.

As regards the physical well-being of our men in Vietnam, I am inserting at this point in my remarks two letters from a young soldier from my district, which were written to his parents before he was killed in battle:

[From the Greenville (Tenn.) Sun, May 28, 1966]

LETTERS FROM PFC. F. T. SHELTON TELL OF VIETNAM CONDITIONS

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—Mr. and Mrs. Tom Shelton, Route 3, Mosheim, parents of Pfc. Frank T. Shelton, who was killed in Viet Nam on May 18, have received letters from their son, dated May 14 and May 17, in which he tells something of the conditions in Viet Nam. The letters appear below with the consent of the parents.)

"May 14, 1966

"Hi Mom, Dad and all,

"Hope this letter finds you all feeling well and happy. I am fine. Well Mom, I am back out here in the field. We are running short of men in our BN (battalion) now, and they got a bunch of us wounded guys to come out and secure the BW area. All I have to do is set here around BW and keep the VC from coming in on us.

"My leg is almost healed up now. It is just a little sore. In another day or two I won't even know I got hit.

"Well, Mom, I don't know how much longer we will be out here. The men are really run down. They all need a rest. They said that when we go back in we will be in main camp for a day or two and then move out on another mission somewhere. I don't know where it will be. We are about 20 to 30 miles from base camp now. So that means that we have walked about 40 miles so far.

"Well, Mom, I don't have much to write about today so I will close for now. Tell everybody hello for me. You all be good and don't work too hard. By by for now.

"Love,

"Timmy."

"May 17, 1966

"Hi Mom, Dad and all,

"Hope this letter finds you all feeling well and happy. I am fine.

"Well, Mom, we made it back to main camp yesterday morning. We are getting ready to move out right now. We will move out sometime today. We are going to Happy Valley. We have a BN up there now and they got hit hard yesterday. I don't know for sure how many men that they have lost, but it must have been a bunch. I sure hope we don't run into anything.

"We don't have too many men in my BN now. We have lost a lot of guys that have got out of the army and we don't have any replacements in yet.

"Well, Mom, I have not taken many pictures yet. I have not even taken up a roll of film.

"I am taking my camera with me so I can take some pictures of Happy Valley.

"Well, Mom, I am going to have to make this short so I will close for now. You all be good and don't work too hard. Tell everybody hello for me. By, by for now.

Pfc. Shelton had been wounded in Vietnam, and he had just returned to active duty. The question is, Should he have been sent back to active duty when he was? He says in his letter that his leg was still sore, but he was required to walk 40 miles. Why was he required to do this? The young soldier answers that question by saying that his battalion was below strength and that his battalion was being sent to assist another that also was below par.

I have never said that we should be in Vietnam, but I have continually said that, now that we are there, we must support our men to the fullest degree. And by support, I mean that they should

have all the necessary equipment, facilities, and assistance they need.

I know the Defense Department says that it is doing all that it can and that we must realize that it is somewhat difficult to transport men and supplies to a place thousands of miles away. But, I say, the Department knew this would be the case before it ever augmented our troops, and the necessary provisions should have been made long before now.

Another point, I wish to discuss today in regard to Vietnam, Mr. Speaker, is the policy of who goes to Vietnam and who is deferred. The young soldier, whom I just mentioned, has a brother now serving in Vietnam. I realize the difficulties involved in choosing who goes and who stays, but it seems only proper that if one member of a family is killed in Vietnam, another member of his family should not be left there. After all, the number of our troops committed there is small in proportion to those involved in World War II, when it was reasonable to expect every able-bodied man to be called to military service and placed in the war zone.

But such is not the case today, and I strongly recommend that this policy be carefully studied and altered to meet the situation of the present time. We owe this to the parents, wives, and children of our men, who are making great personal sacrifices.

Just because this is not an easy matter to solve does not mean that we should do nothing about it. The greater challenge requires greater efforts to fairly handle the situation.

As the number of flag-draped caskets arriving from Vietnam increases each day, my constituents ask me more and more what we are doing to see that our men are taken care of. A mother whose son also was killed in Vietnam wrote and asked me:

Please see that our boys have the very best of everything to fight this war with.

I demand that this be done, and I ask for action now.

Concluding my remarks, I am inserting here an editorial from the Greenville Sun, the hometown newspaper of Private Shelton, and I trust that the Department of Defense will carefully study the suggestions contained therein.

Let us end this war—quickly and honorably.

[From Greenville (Tenn.) Sun, May 27, 1966]

ONE SON IS ENOUGH FOR ANY FAMILY TO GIVE IN VIETNAM

The war in Viet Nam is coming closer to home all the time.

As Greenville and Greene Countians stop to mourn the death of a local son, Pfc. Frank Timothy Shelton, this terrible war in all of its poignancy is brought sharply before us.

Most Americans firmly believe that our efforts in Southeast Asia are actually in our own defense and in preserving a world balance that can contain the expansionist aims of Communist China.

Pfc. Shelton has a brother presently serving in Viet Nam. While he is not the only son, it seems to us that it would be compounding the tragedy to have to subject this

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Mr. Speaker, may I append a few pertinent quotes on the subject of public misinformation:

Thomas Jefferson: "He who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it much easier to do it a second and third time, till at length it becomes habitual; he tells lies without attending to it, and truths without the world's believing him."

John Ruskin: "The essence of lying is in deception, not in words; a lie may be told by silence, by equivocation, by the accent on a syllable, by a glance of the eyes attaching a peculiar significance to a sentence; and all these kinds of lies are worse and baser by many degrees than a lie plainly worded."

Sir Winston Churchill: "Terminological inexactitude."

Ralph Waldo Emerson: "Every violation of truth is not only a sort of suicide in the liar, but is a stab at the health of human society."

James Madison: "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both."

Mr. Speaker, here are just a few editorial comments on public misinformation:

New York Times, April 23, 1965: "The credibility of the United States government has been one of the numerous casualties of the war in Vietnam . . . Mistaken judgments are understandable—though if too frequent, indefensible; but deliberate distortion or obfuscation, or the selection or repression of facts for propaganda purposes, is inexcusable. Americans are dying in Vietnam and more will die; there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever about what they are dying for—or why."

The Wall Street Journal, December 1, 1965: "A government, like a man, can be caught in only a few misrepresentations before people refuse to believe anything it says. Much of the current clamor against the U.S. Vietnamese policy is probably based in just such a feeling. A democratic government has a moral obligation to be candid with its citizens; and lack of candor poisons the open discussion often necessary to sound policy and public support. But even from the narrow viewpoint of its own self-interest, the Administration should recognize that its credibility is a precious but easily expendable asset."

The Washington Star, January 20, 1966: "Now, in 1966, the country certainly could do with a little more truth in government and a little less fiscal sleight of hand."

The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1965: "Time after time high-ranking representatives of government—in Washington and in Saigon—have obscured, confused, or distorted news from Vietnam, or have made fatuously erroneous evaluations about the course of the war, for public consumption. . . . Yet the contradictions, the double-talk, the half-truths released in the name of the United States government about the Vietnamese War are not the fault of the USA alone. The problem goes back to the Pentagon, to the State Department, and to the White House."

Mr. Speaker, these are the views of 14 distinguished journalists on the topic of public misinformation:

Joseph Alsop, in a speech to the American Foreign Service Association, March 25, 1965: "An official is a man by definition doing the public's business. The public has a right, and the public has a need, to know about its business. . . . The truth is that practices have grown up in the American government in the last years—and particularly quite recently—of a kind that amount to an unseen

and . . . extremely unhealthy change in the basic American system.

"Our government . . . lives and moves and acts by public information. It does not matter what an inner group of policymakers may decide. If the public is not adequately informed, if they do not understand the problem, the decisions that the policymakers make will not be publicly supported, and so the job will not be done."

Walter Cronkite, CBS News, speech to the Inland Press Association, Chicago, February 22, 1966: "The very foundation of the democratic system is built on honesty and the belief in the honesty of our fellow men. . . . Yet the political lie has become a way of bureaucratic life. It has been called by the more genteel name of 'news management.' I say here now, let's call it what it is—lying."

"I would like to suggest that one of the reasons for the great confusion which wracks this nation today over the Vietnam War is the fact that we were committed without a proper airing of the facts—all the facts. This Administration and preceding ones did not level with the American people on the nature or scope of the commitment which, I submit, they themselves must have known was one of the ultimates of our policy."

Carl T. Rowan, former Director of USIA, in the Washington Star, January 26, 1966: "The question most often asked goes like this: 'Is the government telling the American public the truth about Viet Nam?' . . . 'How much is being held back to cover up other mistakes by McNamara and the rest of the Administration?' You listen and soon sense that the questioners are neither doves nor hawks. They are members of that great middle mass of Americans who want to feel committed in the great Viet Nam debate but feel too poorly informed to take a firm stand. . . . The people who have questioned me seem to understand that the national security requires the withholding of certain military and diplomatic information from the public. But these people make the point, a valid one I think, that the public does have a right to know about and discuss the options before major new decisions are made. . . . This is what the public wants and an administration that wants solid public support, as I know this one does, ought quickly to find a way to provide it."

J. Russell Wiggins, editor, Washington Post, in his book, "Freedom or Secrecy": "If a government repeatedly resorts to lies in crises where lies seem to serve its interests best, it will one day be unable to employ the truth effectively when truth would serve its interests best. A government that too readily rationalizes its right to lie in a crisis will never lack for either lies or crises."

Richard Reston, Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1965: "The President's latest problem is one of fading public confidence in official government pronouncements on the conduct of U.S. diplomacy in Viet Nam. Indeed, Washington is having trouble maintaining both at home and abroad the kind of credibility needed to support its political position. It is this loss of confidence that now gives rise to doubts and even suspicions about whether the Administration really means what is being said \* \* \*"

James Reston, New York Times, May 17, 1966: "What he (LBJ) wants is worthy of the faith and confidence of the nation, but this is precisely what he does not have, because his techniques blur his conviction. \* \* \* He is mixing up news and truth. \* \* \* He is confronted, in short, with a crisis of confidence."

David Lawrence, column in the Washington Star, April 27, 1965: "Perhaps the whole controversy would not have reached the climax that it has in recent weeks if there had not been a prelude—namely, an era of so-called managed news at the Pentagon. This has left an unfortunate blemish on the record. When the only news given out is de-

signed to accomplish a political purpose, confidence on the part of the public in the accuracy of what is printed is bound to wane."

Clark Mollenhoff, Cowles Publications, in his book, "Washington Cover-up": "No single factor is more important to the strength of our democracy than the free flow of accurate information about the government's operation. The citizen in a democracy must know what his government is doing, or he will lack the soundest basis for judging the candidates and the platforms of our political parties."

James Deakin, St. Louis Post Dispatch, in the New Republic, January 29, 1966: "The essential veracity of an American government has seldom been a prolonged case of doubt. This is why persistent charges of a 'credibility gap' in the Johnson Administration merit examination."

Anatole Shub, Washington Post Foreign Service, dispatch from Bonn, May 7, 1966: "The 'credibility gap' which has affected the Johnson Administration's pronouncements on Vietnam appears to have spread to this part of the world. A few West German officials still profess to know what U.S. policy here is going to be over the next year, but even these officials show no great confidence in their beliefs. . . . The trouble is that . . . the Administration has been saying one thing one day, doing something else on the next. . . . Wild rumors proliferate in all directions, and most of them seem to have some official source. The impression is strong that either the United States is playing it by ear from day to day, without making up its mind on any of these issues, or else that so many different minds in the Administration have been made up that nobody really knows which one counts."

Doris Fleeson, column in the Washington Star, May 4, 1965: "News management in the Nation's Capital is currently more deliberate and sweeping than it ever was during World War II or the Korean period. . . . Before the wellsprings of public discussion are further damaged or dried up, the Johnson Administration urgently needs to recognize that there is no point trying to win the world while doing irreparable injury here at home."

Jack Steele, Scripps-Howard, in the Washington Daily News, March 7, 1966: "There is a big 'confidence gap' today between Mr. McNamara and key Senate and House leaders in the fields of military and foreign policy who do not share President Johnson's faith in his Defense Secretary. . . . (It is) largely the result of heavy-handed Pentagon censorship of questions raised by Congress about the nation's military preparedness and Mr. McNamara's emotional outburst last week in answering charges that the Viet Nam war has stretched thin the nation's military manpower and equipment."

Saul Pett, Associated Press, in the Washington Star, March 6, 1966: "In a town of passing prose favorites, this year's phrase so far is the 'credibility gap' in government. Does it in fact exist? It does, or seems to, and seeming to, it exists. Among students of the Lyndon Johnson school of window dressing, there are those who detect a tendency to be passionately secretive about innocuous details, to become righteously indignant when transparent political motives are suggested, and to overdress the window. . . . Lyndon Johnson has been known to have an acute sense of secrecy dating back to his Senate days. An old friend and aide once tried to explain it: 'I think it's the gambler or politician in him. He just doesn't like to reveal his next move. He plays things close to the vest.'"

Morley Safer, CBS News, in "Dateline 1966," the annual publication of the Overseas Press Club of America. Mr. Safer reports on an informal meeting of war correspondents covering Vietnam in the summer of 1965 with Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester at the residence of Barry



June 7, 1966

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

family to the possible death of two sons in this conflict, especially since such a small proportion of our youth are participating in the conflict in any capacity.

We strongly urge the Department of Defense to reconsider their policy and when one son of a family is killed in the service of their country in that far off land that any other sons of the same family be excused from service in the war zone.

If this were an all out war in which vast numbers of our people were involved then it might be looked upon differently, but considering the limited nature of the war and the fact that so few, comparatively, are involved in the actual fighting at the present time, it seems only fair that one family not be asked to give up more than one son in this conflict as it presently exists.

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. WOLFF'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

## AMERICA

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, several weeks ago a capable and devoted State Department employee died in Miami. Francis X. Watterson not only had rendered outstanding service as special agent of the Department of State's Miami Field Office since 1955, but his earlier governmental service was of the same high type. This was particularly true of the time he spent in the armed services in World War II and in Korea.

In spite of the heavy work schedule, Francis Watterson found time to participate in community and church affairs and to devote adequate attention to his family. The inspiration which he gave his 7-year-old son Gregory is reflected in a school paper which Gregory wrote for his teacher. This simple statement is so direct and so inspirational that I have permission for its inclusion in the RECORD:

Whenever I say "America" I think of freedom, and how our country got saved, and how we won the war. Whenever I say America I think of beauty and all the wonderful things God gave us. I think of all the nice beautiful trees and flowers and pretty grass. Whenever I say America I am thankful that I live in the United States, and have such nice parents and schools, like Miami Christian is a very nice school. I think of a church and Billy Graham who tells the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ and in America the Bible is taught everywhere. On Sunday, God's day, kids go to Sunday school with nice churches and teachers and people in the United States can be saved on Sunday. Some families have certain Bible reading and prayer.

I love the United States and its beauty and nature, with God's word all over the United States, and people preaching all over the world and people in the United States are wishing that we will win the war with Viet Nam. I love the United States of America. That's why I'm so happy. When I grow up I am going to preach the gospel to the world.

## SPACE MEDICINE

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to my colleagues attention a career paper by Mario Gugierrez in accordance with his school requirements. I know that the Members would be pleased to see such a fine paper by this young student who lives in my district. Mario's career paper is on "The Profession of Space Medicine and Bioastronautics," and was a requirement of his U.S. Government and economic class.

Mr. Speaker, I respectfully include Mario Gugierrez' career paper at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

## SPACE MEDICINE

(A career paper on the profession of space medicine and bioastronautics, by Mario Gugierrez)

After carefully going over my personal qualifications and measuring them up to my personal ambitions I have decided that the career that I am best suited for and I would like most to pursue is that of being a space doctor. First I will give a summary of this profession and what it involves.

Space medicine is a relatively new field which grew directly out of aviation medicine. The objectives of the biomedical sciences are the study, prevention, and alleviation of a number of medical problems and their hazardous consequences resulting from man flight beyond the life supporting regions of the Earth's atmosphere. In other words, space medicine is to the space ship what aviation medicine is to the airplane.

Many different brands of specialists are found in the space-medical field. Some of the most important of these are, the medical researchers, physicists, astrophysicists, physiologists, biochemists, and human engineers.

Space medical research provides the basis for establishing for a sealed cabin ecology in space and in bases located on other worlds. Bioastronautical specialists examine the effects of nuclear and space radiations on tests animals and man and assist in devising methods of protecting the organism from them. They study acceleration, nutrition, respiration, toxicology, bacteriology, and the weightless phenomenon of travel in space. The results of their work help establish human tolerance to rocket flight.

Another very important aspect of this job is the selection and training of the astronauts. The chief medical advisor and his team determine whether prospective astronauts are physically in perfect condition. They then must conduct a series of tests to see how they can withstand the tortures of space. After an astronaut is selected they must then remain under constant care and study until time for their respective space mission. When in flight the space doctors are constantly monitoring all activities of the body. If any physical problem should arise while an astronaut is in space the team of physicians must be able to detect it and relay a course of action to the astronaut. After the termination of the flight the astronauts go through a physical debriefing in

which they are thoroughly checked and rechecked.<sup>1</sup>

The opportunities and rewards of this unique profession are vast and great. It is said by many authorities that the career in space medicine provides no finer way to make lasting contributions to their country.

The average net income of a physician is \$25,000 a year. Earnings tend to be much lower in the first years of practice and grow slowly. The space doctor will make about \$33,000 to \$40,000 after he has gained his position and becomes established in his specialty. The advantages of this field of medicine are not only in money but also the hours are more regular, vacations with pay, and no overhead.

Since man will constantly be exploring space and we have only begun to travel in this new frontier, this profession is as secure as the astronaut's himself.

## WHY DID I CHOOSE THIS CAREER?

According to my references<sup>2</sup> a person pursuing a career in medicine should have the following qualifications. First of all, is your capacity of learning and the degree of intelligence sufficient for tough courses of a medical education. He must be able to be a good college student without too much trouble, and he must be able to enjoy studying and find it stimulating. Secondly, does he have the capacity for hard work. He must have self-discipline and adhere to set standards and routines he has set for himself. Thirdly, he must have self confidence. He must have faith in his own ability and be self assured of his self. Next he should have the compassion to deal honestly with all kinds of personalities without becoming impatient. The physician must also have personal integrity and be depended upon not to violate confidence. In addition he must have a pleasing personal ability. He should be neat, clean and well groomed. Finally he must have good insight and judgment. He must be able to size up a total situation and be able to look under the surface of things. They must be able to understand human nature and use good psychology.

After I went over these qualifications I finally decided that I meet many of the qualifications well but there are still several that I must need to develop on. I also went to my counselor at the beginning of the year and asked his advice from what he knows of me and from my grades in high school. He told me that from what he can see there is no reason why I should not pursue this career if I had the desire and ambition.

The reason I selected the specialty of space medicine is ironically because of this career paper. Up until now I had been undecided on what special branch of medicine I would go into, but in my research for this report I came across this topic and after reading in to it I became greatly interested in it. I did some more research on it and have decided to go into this particular field.

## HOW WILL I PREPARE FOR THIS FIELD?

My preparation for a career in medicine began when I was in ninth grade and selected my courses for my sophomore year at the senior high. The following is a list of the required high school credits for a premedical college program:<sup>3</sup> Laboratory Science, 2 or 3 years; English, 4 years; Foreign Language, 2 to 4 years; Social Studies, 2 to 3 years; Mathematics, 2 years algebra, 1 year of plane geometry.

I have followed these requirements all the way and I am now preparing for my courses

<sup>1</sup> Poole, Graye, *Scientists Who Work With The Astronauts*, Dodd, Mead, & Co., New York, N.Y., copy. 1964, pp. 131-132.

<sup>2</sup> Kalb, William S., *Your Future as a Physician*, A. Richard Rosen Press, Inc., New York, N.Y., copy. 1963, pp. 32-36.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. p. 47.

in pre-medicine. I have set up an interview with the student counselor at Miami Dade Jr. College to set up my curriculum. The following requirements are needed for acceptance into a medical school: English, 12 hours; Inorganic Chemistry, 8 hours; Organic Chemistry, 8 hours; Physics, 8 hours; Biology or Zoology, 8 hours; Quantitative Analysis, 4 hours; Social Sciences, Humanities, 24 hours; Mathematics, 16 hours; Reading knowledge of French, German, or Spanish.

After I complete my four years of college in pre-med. I will apply for admissions to several schools of medicine, hoping to get into one. If I am accepted to a school of medicine where I will attend for four more years. Here I will get my first real taste of being a doctor (I am planning to apply to schools which offer courses in space medicine).

After completing my studies at the medical school I will apply for internship at a hospital. During internship you work in a hospital with real patients and it is mainly to get you used to the idea of working on human beings. The pay for an intern ranges from \$150 to \$500 and lasts for two years.

When your internship has ended you may apply for a medical license by taking either state or national board examinations. When I pass these exams I am a doctor and may apply for residency in a hospital. After I complete a year or two as a resident and have full confidence as a doctor I will take post graduate courses in space medicine after I feel I know enough to be a space doctor I will take the board tests and if I pass I will apply for a job with NASA and I will work in either Houston or Cape Kennedy.

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#### ADDRESS OF MANOLO REYES AT THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL BRANCH

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. CLEVINGER) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to read an address by Manolo Reyes, the Latin news editor of one of the South's largest television stations, WTVJ channel 4. Manolo's address was before the Young Men's Christian Association meeting in Miami.

I would like to commend this excellent address to my colleagues attention and I hope that all those who have the hopes of better and higher education for all our youth will take note of Manolo's feelings in his farewell address to Miss Edith Chase, a teacher for 41 years in the public school systems:

AN ADDRESS BY MANOLO REYES, WTVJ LATIN NEWS EDITOR, AT THE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL BRANCH, MAY 14, 1966

There are only a few times in an entire lifetime, that a human being has the privilege of facing a situation such as this one.

I am 41 years old and have never in my life had the high honor which brings me here today.

It is a sad duty, for we shall miss her unforgettable contributions to our lives.

I am here to officially bid farewell to Miss Edith A. Chase, a teacher in this country for 41 years and a pillar of education in the United States.

There is no doubt that the leaders of nations are formed in the schools, and the driving force, the motor, the central nervous system of every school is the teacher. And good schools must have good teachers.

Miss Edith Chase, during her 41 years as a teacher has proved to be one of the best in the United States. Four generations of North American citizens have passed through the classrooms of this exemplary educator. She is a great woman chosen by God to face in the classrooms a special, unique situation created in Miami during the last years.

Edith Chase was born in Minnesota. Attended St. Paul's Macalester College and later the University of Minnesota. Miss Chase graduated from the University of Miami with an A.B. Degree. She got her master's degree in Education from the University of Iowa.

Before coming to Miami, Miss Chase was high school principal in Lester, Iowa, and in Kindred, North Dakota. She also was temporary teacher in Portland, Oregon, and in Seattle, Washington.

She came to Miami in the year 1925 and was principal of Opa Locka Elementary and Southside Elementary. During the last 16 years, she has been principal of Riverside Elementary.

All the above, said in my poor language and written in half-a-page, represent, ladies and gentlemen, 41 years of the life of Miss Chase dedicated to teach, dedicated to help, dedicated to sacrifice, dedicated to form new people.

Her 41 years of teaching, guidance, love and sacrifice could not truly be told in a million pages.

There are those who believe that to be a teacher you must have the right sense of justice. That the teacher must teach with accuracy and strict discipline. For them the teacher is a judge.

Others see in the teacher a father or a mother, with an open heart to understand and guide their students as their own children.

In other words, the school is the second home, and the teachers are the continuation of the parents at school.

Miss Edith Chase has known how to wisely combine the parallel lines of love and justice, of understanding and discipline, to form a bedrock of true and truthful education, and this was demonstrated with the arrival of thousands of Cuban children to Florida. The greatest exodus to the American continent since it was discovered.

Edith Chase never dreamed, when she was attending schools in her native Minnesota, that God had chosen her to be the teacher of American citizens and of Cuban citizens fleeing oppression and tyranny.

Maybe it is because God tries those He knows He can try . . . and try she did.

With the eternal gratitude of the Cubans, Edith Chase has succeeded in the challenge given to her by history with the Cuban exodus.

The history of that Cuban exodus has apparently had three phases in these areas: The first in which everyone wondered what would happen to the thousands upon thousands of Cubans arriving here without money, clothes or future hope.

There was the second phase of resentment, quite logical in every exodus, where there were bitter comments against the Cuban exiles.

And the third one, the one we are living

now of perfect harmony, which reflects the traditional friendship of the United States and the Cuban people. Friendship born from history, sealed with the blood of the Americans and the Cubans, who fought and died together in Cuba . . . for the freedom of Cuba.

And we can say here, without the fear of making a mistake, that our brothers in their exodus had but one initial purpose: Save our children from communist claws and bring them over to study at lands of freedom. For like Americans, Cubans have an ever-burning hunger for freedom.

During the three phases encountered in these areas by the Cuban exiles, they found but one attitude in Edith Chase: An open heart to help, understand and teach. She was not a taker, but a giver, and she gave her strength to all of us.

We could reveal thousands of situations in which the problems of Cuban children were solved by Miss Chase to show her greatness of soul and her valuable council that labels her a great and memorable educator.

We must recall that the Cuban exodus has been totally new for the North American citizens and for the Cuban as well. Neither they, nor us, had ever faced a similar situation. Thus, we had to make new rules, new methods by which to work, as the new situations were presented.

And when the Cuban child did not have money to pay for lunch, he had to go to the school's office to request a special ticket to fill an empty stomach. It embarrassed him, made him feel different and insecure. Miss Chase knowing the heart of a child, rapidly ruled out the office request for lunch tickets, and established a procedure by which all entered the cafeteria to have lunch, and no one knew who could or could not pay for his lunch.

On the other occasions, the Cuban child who was at fault was taken to her office for discipline. The first question from the lips of this great woman was: "Where are your parents?" And if the child said: "In Cuba" the kiss he could not get from his mother was given by Miss Chase.

Examples like this and many more which we cannot reveal because of our limited time has gained Miss Chase the respect, the love and gratitude of the Cuban parents and teachers.

There are three kinds of human beings in life: Those who sow, those who cultivate and those who pick up the crop.

The teacher sows. The teacher throws the good seed in the virgin furrow of the new minds. The teacher is always learning in his responsibility to teach better. The teacher is a mirror, is an example. These truths have been the main reason in the life and work of Miss Edith Chase.

We are here today, with this humble but sincere act, with the simplicity of great things, to give homage to this great educator of the United States.

The seed she sowed with love and dedication has already started to give its fruits in the hearts of all those who have known her and have worked with her. Starting today, the date on which she retired to enjoy a well deserved rest, her word, her examples, her teachings get the strength of an institution. This is why we could never tell her "good by" because she has written brilliant and unforgettable pages in the history of education in the United States. These pages have set forth a volume dedicated to human kindness and understanding.

May Miss Edith Chase receive with my humble words, the recognition of a grateful country, of thousands of Cuban parents and teachers whom, with their sole faith in God, left everything behind to save their children, and found in you, an understanding soul to help them gain back their faith in themselves to educate their children through the right

\*Ibid, p. 58.

restive what we are doing and to knit up the ravelled rhetoric of "resisting Communist aggression" and "bringing self-determination to the people of Viet Nam."

He seems content for the moment, however, to keep the speaking engagements he already has and to address various groups according to their needs. At Princeton, he spoke of "the agony of power." But two days later, he publicly berated Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT before 6,000 Democrats at a party dinner in Washington and within the week at Chicago, he delivered his most belligerent address against the "Nervous Nellies" who refuse to trust him.

He is genuinely bewildered by adverse reaction to his criticism of his critics.

"Didn't they like the Princeton speech?" he asks on hearing liberal complaints about Washington and Chicago.

The President thinks these people do not understand his problems at all. He must speak one way to Democrats, to stiffen their spines for November. Ho Chi Minh is supposed to listen in one these promises to stay in and win.

There is also a strong element of self-delusion involved. The President, who enjoys the world wide amplification of his voice, is still not ready to face up to the implications.

In a difficult position, he reverts to his early days on the stump in Texas, when it was possible to address one faction in Lubbock one way and another in Wichita Falls another, and neither the wiser.

The fact that everybody in the country listens to a President every time he speaks is an imposition to a man who came to power through his capacity to negotiate with various individuals one at a time.

The intellectuals got their speech at Princeton. They were supposed to drink that in and then put cotton in their ears for the Washington and Chicago speeches, which were not intended for them.

Sometimes it appears the President would like various factions to tune out certain parts of the same speech which were intended for them. He was indignant, for instance, over the reception of his January statement in which he asked the United Nations for help and also said the U.S. would resume bombing.

Doves were supposed to focus on the appeal to the U.N., hawks on the bombs.

When the President was talking peace last winter, some people did not believe him. Now that he is talking war, they shudder. The consensus is that if he is to rally public opinion, he must take a high and consistent line and stick to it.

### Why We Can Win in Vietnam

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. JAMES H. MORRISON

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, the American people have never hesitated to offer help to support the cause of liberty and freedom in the world. We have done this for two basic reasons: First, because we believe in freedom and have built a great nation on the principles of justice and liberty; and second, because it is in the interest of all Americans to do so. We are fighting for these principles in Vietnam; we are fighting in order to help our friends fend off the rising threat of totalitarianism and communism and par-

ticularly the present world Communist revolution. But we are also fighting for our own self-interest because a free nation cannot long exist in a world which is not free.

If we did not fight in Vietnam, I am sure that it would not be long before we would be fighting a much more desperate war much closer to home with losses a thousandfold more or even larger. We must prove that America is a strong, determined nation, determined to keep liberty alive throughout the world. The free world learned a bitter and costly lesson at Munich. We must never have another Munich, by appeasement and withdrawal at Vietnam. Actually our being in Vietnam may avert world war III.

As Joseph Alsop points out in his recent Saturday Evening Post article, "Why We Can Win in Vietnam," the Vietcong is making a last-ditch attempt to win the war in the face of overwhelming odds. As he points out:

The present enemy reinforcement is like one of those last high raises that losing players sometimes make to frighten their opponents out of a poker game.

We must not be frightened; we will not be frightened. We have the finest fighting force ever assembled in Vietnam, and we are winning the war. I urge all Americans to continue their support of the President, and I look forward with all Americans to the day when we can lay down our arms and join with the war-weary people of South Vietnam in building a peaceful, prosperous, free nation.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that Mr. Alsop's article is an excellent explanation of where we now stand in Vietnam. His article, which appeared in the June 4, 1966, edition of the Saturday Evening Post, follows:

[From the Saturday Evening Post]

#### WHY WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM

(By Joseph Alsop)

In Vietnam, great numbers of Americans are now committed to a war which very few Americans even begin to understand. Most of us, of course, have a fair understanding of the issues our troops are fighting for, but only a tiny minority understand the war itself.

This has struck me with increasing force after every one of my more recent visits to Vietnam—and I have been there 16 times since 1953. People talk about other matters such as the chops and changes of politics in Saigon, where the Communists might manage an eventual victory—although I do not think they will. No one ever mentions the fairly desperate combat problems that now face the Viet Cong. No one analyzes the present strategy of our brilliant field commander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland. No one refers in any way to what is currently happening on the battlefield. Yet the battlefield is where our own best hope of victory lies.

The whole pattern of the fighting, as it happens, is still determined by an almost successful gamble that the Communists made to win the war last year. Hence we must backtrack a bit at the outset in order to see the timing, the nature and the risks of this enormous Viet Cong gamble, to make what happened reasonably comprehensible.

Many normally well-informed persons still believe that a Communist guerrilla movement like the Viet Cong is something spontaneous—halfway, let us say, between a misguided patriotic society and a nationwide game of cops-and-robbers. From their first

obscurer guerrilla origins, however, the Viet Cong have been a second government of South Vietnam, and they still are. Furthermore—and here is the important point—this clandestine Communist second government has all the fiscal, economic, manpower and other problems that plague any normal government. Since this is also a government at war, the V.C. second government's biggest problem is naturally to recruit, equip and maintain its armed forces. This has always been the biggest problem, and its difficulties caused the Viet Cong gamble already mentioned, which was decided on in late 1963 after the coup d'etat against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 was a country in which every province had its own civil war, with the Saigon government controlling the provincial capitals and a good many villages, with the V.C. second government controlling a good many other villages, and with troops of both sides in the field everywhere. By that time, there was a Viet Cong provincial battalion of about 500 men operating in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces. There was a Viet Cong district company of about 150 men operating in each of at least 250 of the administrative districts into which the provinces are subdivided. And in each of several thousand V.C.-controlled villages and hamlets, there was a Viet Cong guerrilla band of 20 or 30 men to maintain local discipline and to harass friends of the established government in neighboring villages and hamlets. All these V.C. soldiers—about 50,000 in the local forces and 110,000 in the guerrilla bands, or approximately 160,000 men in all—had to be paid and armed and kept supplied with ammunition and much other materiel, and all but the minority of strictly part-time guerrillas had to be provided with rations as well. Salaries and rations also had to be found for tens of thousands of Viet Cong in essentially civilian occupations, ranging upward from humble couriers and tax collectors, through secret policemen and the personnel of the medical services, to the awe-inspiring members of the Communist Party's central committee for South Vietnam in their remote jungle lair near the Cambodian border.

In addition, this second government was deeply engaged in a big and costly program of military public works. The rule books for guerrilla war, written by Mao Tse-tung and his remarkable Vietnam Communist pupil, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, lay down an absolute requirements for guerrilla main bases in areas immune to penetration by hostile troops. The mountainous jungle-covered and swampy tracts of South Vietnam provide splendid terrain for many such main-base areas. But barracks, hospitals and numerous other facilities had to be secretly built within these fastnesses. Wherever the ground was suitable, the main bases also had to be fortified by an almost inconceivably antike program of digging and tunneling; and although *corvée* labor from V.C.-controlled villages was used for this purpose, the hundreds, even thousands of men in the *corvées* at least had to be given rations while away from home. Finally, all the main bases had to be prestocked with medical supplies, ammunition and food. This was an enormous undertaking in itself. A single underground cache found last year, for instance, contained no less than 2,000 tons of rice. Since the cache was in a huge hole approachable only by a narrow tunnel, all this rice had evidently been carried in on men's backs, bagful by bagful.

Early in 1963, moreover, the first main forces—their nature will be explained in a moment—had begun to be mobilized in the main-base areas. Therefore, long before Diem was assassinated in November, 1963, the Viet Cong leaders had to meet a pretty imposing total budget. Their clandestine second government then controlled no more than about four million of the total South

Yes.....	50.4
No.....	49.6
6. Do you favor repeal of the provision allowing state right to work laws?	
Yes.....	42.8
No.....	57.2
7. Do you favor expanding the Federal minimum wage law requirement (\$1.25 per hour plus overtime) to persons working in hotels, restaurants, laundries and other industries now exempt?	
Yes.....	80.5
No.....	19.5
8. Do you favor a Youth Conservation Corps providing public service employment and job training for unemployed young people?	
Yes.....	77.5
No.....	22.5
9. Do you favor legislation which would allow manufacturers to set minimum retail prices on their products and prohibit merchants from selling for less?	
Yes.....	14.5
No.....	85.5
10. Do you favor a Federal law requiring that all retail packages be clearly and truthfully labeled?	
Yes.....	94.0
No.....	6.0
11. Do you favor the establishment of national standards to promote safety in automobile design and highway construction?	
Yes.....	86.1
No.....	13.9
12. Do you favor further Federal action to rid our lakes and streams of pollution?	
Yes.....	92.3
No.....	7.7

**Money Famine in the Midst of a Money Feast**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF**

**HON. JOE D. WAGGONER, JR.**

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. WAGGONER. Mr. Speaker, in his column in the May 28 issue of the Washington Post, John Chamberlain was able to reduce the mystery of the "money famine in the midst of a money feast" to terms that every layman can understand and I would like to insert it here in the RECORD for the attention of every Member who might have missed it.

The "meat of the coconut," so to speak, is, as Mr. Chamberlain points out, the lavish, often wasteful and unproductive spending spree the Federal Government is on. Until this fiscal irresponsibility, this unconscionable squandering of other people's money, is brought under control, the "famine" will continue, accelerate and grow worse. I urge every Member to study Mr. Chamberlain's clear and lucid comments:

**MONEY FAMINE IN THE MIDST OF A MONEY FEAST**

(By John Chamberlain)

It has become an article of faith that there is a "money squeeze" in the economy, Sen.

VANCE HARTKE of Indiana talks about it and worries about it. And, if you are looking for mortgage money to buy a house, you will quickly discover that the money shortage can be a grim reality. The bank won't deal with you unless you are prepared to put up 25 per cent of the purchase price and are willing to pay 6.5 per cent interest on the borrowed remainder.

Yet, strangely enough, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports in its monthly review for May, 1966, that "monetary expansion continues." We are told that "Federal Reserve credit, member bank reserves and the money supply have increased at extremely rapid rates since last summer." The accompanying tables printed in the bank letter show the money supply rising from \$160 billion in January of 1965 to \$171.1 billion in April of 1966. So, as the St. Louis Federal Reserve says, "the impression of restriction (in the money supply) may prove to be an illusion."

Why, then, should interest rates be rising? On the surface it doesn't make sense to an economic layman. One explanation could be that, with new money being constantly injected into the economy, the percentage of it going into the purchase of consumption goods in order to beat coming price increases is depriving the lending market of liquid funds for investment. Another explanation might be that lenders expect money to be worth less a year or so from now, and are therefore insisting on higher interest rates in order to protect themselves against the depreciation of their lending capital.

Whatever the explanation may be, the fact that the money supply is constantly increasing pinpoints Government responsibility for both the inflation of prices and the high borrowing rates that are presumably the reason for the "illusion" of a money squeeze. The cure would seem to be the classical one: let the Government cease inflating the money supply. Then the extra money would not be there to chase a limited supply of goods. Prices would consequently fall, and interest rates would come down.

What the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review suggests is that President Johnson's economic advisers are prolific with cart-before-the-horse thinking. Everything gets turned upside down along the Potomac. High prices are condemned as the cause of inflation, not accepted as the result.

And the effort to take some of the steam out of the boom by asking businessmen to make voluntary cuts in capital spending is just as misplaced as the attempt to halt the price rise by appealing to merchants not to take advantage of the fact that consumers have more money in their pockets.

The fact is that much of American industry is up against international competition, and must continue to cut its costs of manufacture in order to outsell the Japanese, the Belgians, and the Luxembourgiens. Since American labor is loath to take wage cuts, and since there is a premium on many types of raw materials, the only feasible way of cutting costs of production is to continue to spend money for more efficient capital equipment. So what businesses can afford to curb their outlays for new and better and more automated machinery?

The steel industry, for example, is finding it impossible now to produce nails and wire that will undersell foreign steel makers in our own home markets. And if nails and wire are vulnerable today, structural and sheet steel will be vulnerable tomorrow. So steel must work incessantly to improve its productive machinery, which means putting up more money for capital outlay. There can be temporary cutbacks in capital spending, but it would be suicidal to continue holding back for very long.

Until the cart-before-the-horse thinking along the Potomac is changed, we shall con-

tinue to get both higher prices and higher interest rates. The only sure cure for the present troubles is a cutback in the Government spending that continues to flush the money supply beyond the capability of our manufacturers to create enough goods to satisfy the swollen demand.

**When a President Needs a Line**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. DONALD RUMSFELD**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, the Mary McGrory column from the Washington Star of May 29, 1966, discusses the administration's conflicting public statements and concludes "if he is to rally public opinion, he must take a high and consistent line and stick to it."

The article follows:

**WHEN A PRESIDENT NEEDS A LINE**

(By Mary McGrory)

Under the roof of the White House, there are some "Nervous Nellies" who flinch every time the President takes the hard line on Viet Nam.

They wish the President would throw a few crumbs to the doves who cannot be expected to feed forever on his Princeton speech.

They remember that it was not the failure of the fighting men, but the evaporation of domestic support that forced the French withdrawal from Indochina in 1954.

"The President will not bug out on Viet Nam," says one of his aides, "unless the country goes out from under him."

The publication of the Harris poll showing him at an all-time low in popularity came at a particularly awkward moment. Our man in Viet Nam, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky, was violently going through what Secretary of State Rusk had once hopefully described as "the various groups working things out among themselves."

Administration officials glumly concede that if the success of Ky's coup against the Buddhists consolidated his position in Viet Nam, it did nothing for his image in the U.S.

The President was immediately shown charts which illustrate the fact that the last three Presidents suffered a slump after 30 months in office. He was even more reassured by the victory of Representative ROBERT B. DUNCAN, an all-out supporter on Viet Nam, in Oregon, the native heath of his most intemperate critic, Senator WAYNE L. MORSE, who has repeatedly called for a repudiation by voters.

Congressional leaders of his own party told him once again that he would win any showdown on Viet Nam on Capitol Hill. The House of Representatives is holding steady. As for the Senate, one House member said, "The Senate always feels it has to run the world."

The President told them that while Da Nang was erupting, the work of the electoral commission in Saigon went on. Three Buddhists, among the 28 notables charged with the task of bringing instant democracy to Viet Nam, walked out. The rest went on with their plans for creating parties and candidates for the September vote.

Criticism, which some once thought was a bridle to the President, has become a spur.

Periodically he is importuned to "go to the country" via television to explain to the

Vietnamese population of 17 million. Few legally established governments of countries having only four million people manage to keep more than 160,000 men under arms at all times, even if their soldiers are paid the merest pittance, as are the soldiers of the Viet Cong.

Such was the position when the Diem regime was brought down by an army coup, and almost the entire structure of government control abruptly came to pieces, for a while, in almost every province. The Viet Cong were thus enabled to surge forward everywhere, and this led to the decision to begin organizing main forces on a really big scale.

Like everything else the Viet Cong had done up to that time, the move to organize the main forces was strictly in accordance with the rule books of Chairman Mao and Gen. Giap. Main forces (the classification is Mao Tse-tung's) bear little resemblance to the simple guerrilla bands that almost everyone envisions when the Viet Cong are mentioned. They also differ sharply from the local forces—the provincial battalions and district companies, which are already well above the guerrilla level—for the main forces have no permanent regional attachments, and their units are much larger and more heavily armed. In fact, they almost exactly resemble regular troops in a regular army. According to the Mao-Giap rules, these main forces have two functions: to help the local forces and guerrillas increase the pressure everywhere, until the established government is visibly hanging on the ropes; and then to strike the knockout blows in big set-piece battles like that which finished off the French at Dienbienphu.

With more than 160,000 men already under arms, and with the additional organization of something like a brand-new regular army now decided upon, the V.C. second government obviously had its work cut out. At the outset, all went easily enough. In the secret main-base areas, with their palm-thatched barracks, their deep-dug, jungle-hidden fortifications and their painfully accumulated supply caches, large numbers of Viet Cong cadres and recruits were now assembled for regimental training. The new main-force regiments had a strength of around 1,500 men each. In design they were roughly comparable to regular light-infantry regiments of 30 or 40 years ago, and they had the capability of being joined together in light-infantry divisions for the knockout blows that were expected later. Each regiment was given an attached porter battalion of about 500 men to handle its local supply and transport. To get all these men, recruiting was stepped up in all the V.C. areas of South Vietnam. A major expansion of the supply movement from North Vietnam, down the Ho Chi Minh trail and along the sea-smugglers' routes, was also undertaken to provide the new regiments with their 57 mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, antiaircraft guns and other crew-served weapons. And many more specially trained cadres were brought down from the Communist North to become officers and noncoms.

By New Year's Day of 1964, at least five of the new main-force regiments already had been recruited, armed and trained. By this time, too, because of their post-Diem surge, the Viet Cong controlled perhaps five million to six million people. Even so, however, the second government's base in the countryside—the Viet Cong infrastructure, as our intelligence officers call it—was still too small to support the ambitious military superstructure that was planned. To complete the plan, the masks had to be dropped. This was the Viet Cong gamble. If Gen. Westmoreland's strategy attains the hoped-for results, this dropping of the masks will be remembered as the moment when the Viet Cong began to lose the war. But it did not look that way at the time.

Until 1964 the Viet Cong had always worn two masks—one to deceive people abroad, the other for the South Vietnamese themselves. For foreign eyes, they had worn the mask of an indigenous movement of social discontent. However, as early as 1956, Le Duan, now first secretary of the Communist party of North Vietnam, had gone south to make preparations for the beginning of guerrilla war, with the aid of many thousands of cadres whom the Communist government in the North had ordered to go underground in the South when the French war ended in 1954. From Le Duan's arrival onward all the higher direction of the V.C. had come from Hanoi. The northern Communist government had also provided large quantities of military equipment and had secretly sent further tens of thousands of cadres to the South to aid and guide the struggle there. But all this was hidden well enough that those who wished could go on claiming that this was "just a civil war."

The other mask, worn to deceive the simple people of South Vietnam, was vastly more important and valuable to the V.C. This was the mask of amiable agrarian reformers—the same mask that the Chinese Communists had worn with such success until they got control of China. Until the critical period we are now examining, the Viet Cong also wore this mask with great success, thereby gaining rather solid popular support in their "liberated areas" and seriously softening up every contested area. The success ultimately depended, however, on something much more important than Communist propaganda or V.C. land reform. It depended on a convincing pretense of government by consent, which was impossible without a considerable degree of real consent. To gain this degree of consent, the Viet Cong promised the peasants, again and again and with utmost emphasis, that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription.

These promises were approximately kept until the year 1964. Devious, even cruel, tricks were often resorted to, of course. A potential recruit's government identity card would be stolen, for example, and he would then be frightened into volunteering by warnings that the government police would shoot him as a Communist if they ever picked him up. Or an obstinate noncontributor to the Viet Cong war chest would be "struggled with" by V.C. cadres before all the people of his village, and if this public brainwashing did not get results, he might then be shot in the back of the neck as a "spy for the reactionaries and imperialists." But in the main, the V.C. military outfits really were manned by volunteers, which made the average outfit both tough and highly motivated. And in the main, besides road tolls, market tolls and the like, the V.C. tax collectors only asked the people of the villages for "voluntary contributions," which meant that the burden on the peasantry was light and easily bearable.

The trouble was that this semivoluntary system reached its limit with the creation of the first five or six main-force regiments, as did the system of largely concealed aid and direction from the North. If the masks were retained, enough men and resources to complete the war plan simply could not be secured, and both masks were therefore boldly and simultaneously dropped. Beginning in 1964, all the main forces and many of the provincial battalions were completely re-equipped with the new 7.62 mm. family of Chinese-made weapons, which required a supply movement from North Vietnam too big to be hidden any longer. At the same time, preparations also began for the eventual invasion of the South by complete units of the North Vietnamese regular army. Thus the pretense was abandoned that this was "just a civil war." At the same time, and incomparably more important, the pre-

tense of governing by consent was also quite ruthlessly abandoned.

The repeated Viet Cong promises that there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription became dead letters. Taxes were sternly imposed on the people of the villages. Quarter by quarter the Viet Cong increased these levies until they became cruelly burdensome. Universal military service was proclaimed for all males from 18 to 36. As the manhunt progressed, the Viet Cong press gangs began rounding up boys of 14 or 15. All this was a gigantic gamble, for the V.C. had now broken the first and most sacred rule of Mao Tse-tung: Popular support of the guerrilla movement must never be endangered until the final victory. But the Hanoi leaders and the V.C. high command clearly believed that the gamble could never go sour, simply because they were so certain of an early victory—after which, of course, any grumbling in the villages could be dealt with by secret police.

To insure the expected victory, they brought off a feat probably without parallel. Although they were still no more than the second government of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong between January, 1964, and the early spring of 1965 wrung from the unhappy villages enough men and resources to increase the V.C. main forces to 24 regiments, complete with porter battalions, or the equivalent of eight army divisions. Even so, this was not enough to meet the war plan's requirements. Hence the second government undertook the considerable further responsibility of maintaining and providing porter battalions for two complete divisions of the North Vietnamese regular army, the 325th and the 304th, which covertly invaded South Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965. By the spring of 1965, therefore, besides 160,000 troops in the V.C. local forces and guerrilla bands, the second government could boast a main-force army of the strength of 10 light-infantry divisions. And this new army, with its porter battalions and longer range supply detachments, numbered close to 80,000 men. The achievement was astonishing, but the price was heavy. One can imagine the Viet Cong finance minister—they have one, even if his name is not publicly known—groaning when he learned the true scope of the main-force program. And one can all but hear his colleagues airily telling him not to worry, because victory was just around the corner.

It is almost unknown in America, but the truth is that a Viet Cong victory really was just around the corner in the late spring of last year, months after the situation had been supposedly saved by President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam. Throughout the spring of 1965 almost the whole South Vietnamese army was firmly pinned down in the provinces by the urgent requirements of local defense. In those spring months almost the whole of the army's slender mobile reserve, 13 South Vietnamese ranger and Marine battalions, was also being chewed up by new main-force regiments. By mid-June, after the bloody fight at Dong Xoai, about 60 miles from Saigon, only three of the government's reserve battalions remained in good combat trim. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had an uncommitted central reserve equivalent to at least five divisions in their main-base areas. No reserves on one side, strong reserves on the other, meant, of course, that the V.C. could win province after province by concentrating in heavily superior force wherever they chose to do so. In this manner they could count on rolling up South Vietnam like a carpet before the summer ended. Then President Johnson upset their calculations by ordering the commitment of U.S. troops on a big scale.

This order had all the elements of a brilliantly successful, if wholly unintentional,

ambush, and like every good ambush, in the first place, it was a complete surprise. There had been an earlier surprise in February, when the President gave the order to bomb the North after the Viet Cong attack on the Pleiku barracks. But this second surprise was quite as complete as the first, and it was far more terrible.

Nor was this all. Effective ambushes must never attack the head of a column, nor hold their fire until the column has passed—either way, some of the enemy column may escape. But to open fire on the middle of the column insures that the ambushes can neither advance nor retreat, but must stand and fight and be annihilated. It was this effect that President Johnson's order unwittingly achieved.

In order to see why this was so, it is only necessary to consider what would have happened if the President had committed American combat troops in Vietnam rather more than a year earlier, when the Pentagon first urged him to do so. In that spring of 1964, the harshest and most burdensome period of the second government's main-force program still lay in the future, and the Viet Cong had barely begun to drop their masks. It would still not have been too late for a convincing reassumption of the Viet Cong mask of agrarian reformers, with no need for heavy taxes or press-ganged conscripts. The V.C. could therefore have pulled back and dug in for many more years of less intensive war, on the classical, slowly erosive, elusive guerrilla pattern that they understand so well. There can be no doubt that this is precisely what the Viet Cong would have done if the President had in fact committed U.S. troops a year earlier. The rule books are very strict about this: Mao Tse-tung strongly emphasizes the need for any guerrilla movement to be ready to retreat at once if the conditions of the struggle unexpectedly develop in an unfavorable manner.

But the Viet Cong could not follow this pull-back rule when Johnson at last committed U.S. troops, because the V.C. had already breached Mao Tse-tung's cardinal rule against alienating popular support before the final victory. It is not easy, after all, for any government, legal or clandestine, to pull back and to ask its people to fight onward indefinitely, if the most sacred promises have been broken, and if this has been justified by assertions that the war will end in triumph in a few weeks or months. It is very dangerous, too, for any guerrilla movement to dilute its fighting units with unwilling conscripts, as the Viet Cong had done. In the early summer of 1965, this danger was demonstrated by a first trickle of Viet Cong desertions, previously all but unheard of—a trickle that has now become a near hemorrhage in some units and some areas of Vietnam. Above all, there was the danger in the countryside, where heavy taxes and press-gang conscription had caused the people's former propagandized consent to be widely replaced by sullen acquiescence. This danger was also being demonstrated by the tens of thousands who were refusing to acquiesce. And these people, fleeing from "liberated areas" to government areas, have now become a pitiful refugee army of nearly a million men, women and children. Their flight has even begun to leave the V.C. areas seriously short of hands to till the crops. For these reasons, it was much too risky to pull back, and the second government made its defiant choice to continue the war in the main-force phase.

The same basic considerations that led the Hanoi and V.C. leaders to make this choice also led Gen. Westmoreland to adopt his strategy of "seeking out and destroying" the Viet Cong main forces. When the President's troop commitment abruptly gave Westmoreland the responsibility for turning the tide and winning the war, this careful yet inspired soldier had been studying the

Viet Cong for many anxious months. Obviously the V.C. and North Vietnamese main-force regiments, being heavier outfits that could be located and engaged with greater ease, were the most suitable military targets for the incoming American troops. Gen. Westmoreland's chief reasons, nevertheless, for concentrating on the main forces were—and are paramilitary. Westmoreland reasoned that the Viet Cong had made themselves politically vulnerable by breaking the first rule of Mao Tse-tung, and that this vulnerability would increase as war pressures force the V.C. to take more rice and more conscripts from the long-suffering villagers. He believed, therefore, that the already severe strains on the V.C. second government could be increased until its entire structure would crumble. And he planned to precipitate this general breakup of the second government's structure by breaking the main-force backbone of the V.C. Time alone can tell whether Westmoreland is right, but he most certainly still believes he will be proved right—if the accidents of Saigon politics do not tragically forestall the proof.

We have now examined two of the three main parts of the war's military pattern—the gamble taken by the V.C. second government to create its main forces and the ambush effect of President Johnson's troop commitment. If the Viet Cong had not gambled by breaking Mao's first rule on popular support and if they now had a less burdensome and more flexible military organization, I should be making a very different military prognosis.

But these conditions do not now exist in Vietnam, because the rules have in fact been broken. And more rule breaking is the essence of the third part of the war's military pattern, which is the acuteness of the combat problems now besetting the V.C. For the Viet Cong leaders, beyond doubt, this is the pattern's most painful part, since their entire experience has taught them to put an almost religious reliance on the simple fighting rules laid down by Giap and Mao. These tactical rules worked brilliantly well for Mao in China, and for Giap against the French and for the Viet Cong themselves until last year. They built the record, in fact, that still leads people to repeat solemnly that "regular troops cannot defeat guerrillas." Yet these closely studied, carefully defined tactical rules for guerrilla war have all but begun to work in reverse in Vietnam nowadays. This is the most far-reaching single result of the U.S. troop commitment.

Consider, for example, "old never-fall." In the years before 1965, "old never-fall" was the sardonic name used by American officers advising the South Vietnamese army for the guerrilla's surprise-attack-plus-ambush combination. This combination was the principal offensive tactic of the Viet Cong, accounting for over 80 percent of their more showy and damaging victories during all the years when the war was going well for them. First would come the predawn news that mortar shells were falling on an isolated government post, which was surrounded by a strong V.C. force that had crept up under cover of darkness. The government's province chief (the military governor) would hastily organize a relieving force, and the column of troops would move out, as dawn began to break, along the wretched, narrow road leading to the post under attack. Then would come the report that the relief column had been ambushed by another strong V.C. force which had slipped into positions commanding the road's most dangerous sector. Next the radio would fall ominously silent, meaning, of course, that the post under attack had also fallen. And so the government's forces would be further eroded and demoralized, government control would be reduced, and V.C. power and authority would once again grow proportionately.

But "old never-fall" began to work very

differently with the end of the rather primitive situation envisioned by Mao and Giap—a situation in which the government had few heavy guns, only the barest minimum of air power, and no air-mobile infantry. This situation ceased to exist in South Vietnam last year. First, a network of heavy-artillery positions was thrown over most of the country, and these were linked by good communications to every government post in the populated areas, and to most of the more remote posts as well. Second, after Pleiku the President not only ordered bombing of the North, he also authorized direct use of American air power in the South, thereby multiplying the air strength the Viet Cong had to face. And finally, the American troop commitment vastly multiplied the helicopters available for troop lifts.

Today when the Viet Cong attempt "old never-fall," as they still frequently do, the ambushers generally discover that they are really ambushes. The post chosen for surprise attack at once calls in the heavy artillery, and the big guns inevitably slow down the assault. When dawn breaks, U.S. fighters and fighter bombers make their appearance, guided by spotter planes, and unless the Viet Cong break off the attack, they become exposed targets for decimation from the air. If the situation warrants, there may also be a hell-lift of infantry, either to cut off the V.C. surrounding the post, or to take the V.C. ambushing force in the rear.

"Old never-fall" has certainly not become "old always-fall." Nor have their novel tactical handicaps taken all the fight out of the Viet Cong, any more than their widespread loss of popular support has deprived them of the active help of the 10 to 15 percent of genuine Communist converts in their "liberated areas." Only recently they were able to bring up two artillery batteries for an attack on the very outskirts of Saigon—which did not succeed, but did cause much disquiet in the city. And terroristic acts continue in most provinces at a very high rate.

Yet it is deeply meaningful that in the months from last September—when the U.S. troop commitment began to have a serious impact—until late April, when these words were written, the record shows only two victorious V.C. operations much above the petty-terror level. These were the annihilation of a South Vietnamese regiment in a Michelin rubber plantation early last winter and the more recent capture of the isolated Special Forces post at Ashau on the Laotian border. By contrast, the Viet Cong failures have been too numerous to be recalled. These failures have vastly greater meaning, moreover, than might be surmised from newspaper stories of body counts of 50 enemy dead here, 100 in another place, and in another place above 200, after a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese assault has been beaten back. These stories mean that the V.C. are now regularly breaking the next-most-important guerrilla rule after the rule about always retaining popular support.

As Mao and Giap both emphasize, any guerrilla movement lives and grows and has its being by success. Great failures may perhaps be precariously survived, as happened in China at the time of the famous Long March. The rule books nonetheless enjoin guerrilla commanders always to prefer the mere assassination of a village elder to the dramatic capture of a district town, if it is thought that the attempt on the town may risk defeat. Yet the Viet Cong have been floundering forward with great obstinacy and considerable courage, from failure to bloody failure for many months, with few military successes.

These changes in the tactical situation have quite directly affected every type of Viet Cong unit, whether main-force, local-force or guerrilla—for the guerrilla bands are almost always ordered to support the

larger operations in their neighborhoods. The main forces—Gen. Westmoreland's prime targets—are the units chiefly affected by another change of great significance. Life in a main-force regiment once offered a good deal to tempt an ambitious young Vietnamese. He belonged to a crack unit, which was a matter of pride. He had been taught to believe in an early victory, and as a main-force soldier he could expect personal advancement when victory was won. Above all, he did not have to endure prolonged hardship. Two or three night marches out from the base, one or two days of fighting at the scene of his regiment's operation, and two or three night marches back to his regimental main-base area—that was about the maximum effort that was normally required each month. The balance of every month was spent resting, training, absorbing replacements and doing meticulous sand-table exercises to prepare the next sally against a government post. And all these weeks between operations were passed in the absolute security of a main base, with its simple but comfortable barracks, its reassuring fortifications, and its food caches.

Today, however, this quite bearable existence has suffered a savage transformation. It began when Gen. Westmoreland called in the B-52's of the Strategic Air Command, with their immense loads of heavy bombs that can penetrate even fortification tunnels 30 feet below ground. Daily since late last summer, the B-52's have been hammering the main-base areas with such effect, as captured documents have revealed, that the main-force regiments are now under strict orders to spend no more than one night, or at most two nights, in the same place. Long gone, therefore, are each month's restorative stretches of orderly barracks life.

Night after night, the main-force soldiers must bivouac in the jungle or on the mountain slopes. Every day or every two days there is a toilsome march to the next bivouac. These movements cause supply problems, and the men sometimes go hungry. There is little time for rest or training, or any of the other things that keep an outfit happy and in combat trim. In addition, as the American forces in Vietnam have grown stronger, there have been more infantry sweeps through the main-base areas—many of which had not been visited by hostile troops since the beginning of the French war. Supply caches that took months, even years, to accumulate are found and destroyed by our men. Fortifications representing hundreds of thousands, even millions, of man-hours of hard work are discovered and greatly damaged, if not always totally destroyed. V.C. outfits that have sought the base areas' security must either flee or stand and fight against hard odds. In these ways still another cardinal Mao-Giap rule has been broken—the rule that a successful guerrilla movement needs completely secure bases. Without this minimal security, Mao says, any such movement must automatically "deteriorate" into a mere "peasant revolt" which "it would be fanciful to suppose" could "avoid defeat."

From the foregoing follows the final profound change in the V.C. situation. In Vietnam the intelligence gathered has always been substantial, but the South Vietnamese formerly had no way to process intelligence as it came in, much less to respond to it promptly. Nowadays, in contrast, the intelligence gathered has multiplied many times over, partly by freer reporting by the people of the countryside, partly by mechanical means such as airborne infrared devices that spot main-force campfires and the like, and partly by the enormously increased numbers of deserters and prisoners of war. Furthermore Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters has now set up something like a Vietnamese-American intelligence-processing factory, capable of handling several tons of captured

documents and several hundreds of interrogations in a single week. Thus it is no longer a case of blind men fighting men who see all too well, as it was for so many years.

The new eyes of the intelligence can even penetrate main-base areas well enough so that each B-52 strike has proved to have an even chance of finding its pinpoint target of barracks and fortifications within the huge surrounding tract of swamp or jungle or mountain forest. Movements of Viet Cong units are also being swiftly tracked if luck is good and the movements are fairly big. Sometimes we have no luck, as with the recent attack near Saigon. Yet good intelligence enabled Gen. Westmoreland to mount no fewer than eight uniformly successful spoiling operations against long planned V.C. attacks in a recent period of only a few weeks. Thus another crucial rule is being broken pretty frequently, for both Mao and Giap lay great emphasis on all guerrillas' need to move absolutely unseen, while watching the smallest enemy movement. Inasmuch as such texts as Mao Tse-tung's *On the Protracted War* and Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* have always had the standing of scripture for both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, the Mao-Giap prescriptions' rather monotonous failure to work nowadays must be a very shaking thing in itself. The Viet Cong soldiers must be greatly shaken too by the failure of their leaders to find substitute prescriptions that work a bit better. Nowadays a Viet Cong battalion commander getting his orders for another surprise attack-plus-ambush must have the same sinking feeling that the government's province chiefs always used to have when word came in of another pre-dawn assault on an isolated post. For the long pull, an unending diet of many big and little defeats, with only the rarest success to raise the spirits, can in itself prove fatal to the Viet Cong. The strain of declining morale is already grave, as prisoner interrogations reveal, and this strain is bound to increase if Gen. Westmoreland is allowed to pursue his strategy.

These are the principal factors that control the present pattern of the fighting in Vietnam. I would be less confident of their great significance if I had not closely watched the trend of the fighting. When I visited Vietnam in the spring of 1965, one could easily discern American air power's effects on the Viet Cong. But it was equally easy to see that air power alone was not enough, and that the V.C. would win during the summer if the President did not commit U.S. ground troops.

When I visited Vietnam again last September, the full impact of the initial U.S. troop commitment was really beginning to be felt. The fine Marine victory at Chulai had taught the Viet Cong that Americans were not "paper tigers" after all—at any rate, not on the field of battle. The first B-52 raids on the main bases were beginning to show impressive results. It was already clear that the tide had turned, but it was by no means clear as yet how the Viet Cong and their masters in Hanoi would deal with this alarming change.

On this key point there was some divergence between Gen. Westmoreland and the majority of his staff. Westmoreland already suspected that the President had achieved an unintended ambush, and he therefore doubted whether the Viet Cong were free to follow Mao's rules of "advance and retreat." His staff members were almost unanimous in expecting the Viet Cong to follow the rules. This was a disturbing prospect, for a return to classical guerrilla fighting was bound to mean American troops endlessly marching through jungle and over mountains in frequently vain pursuit of mere companies of the enemy. Westmoreland's staff asked "whether the people at home would stand for an endless penny-packet war." If there was

any way at all to exhaust American patience and fortitude, endless penny-packet war was surely the most likely way.

These worries were shown to be ill-founded in October, in the obstinate battle for the Pleime Special Forces post, and in the subsequent fighting in the Ia Drang valley, which continued into early November. For days on end, with superb courage and endurance, a small band of men of the Special Forces, both American and Vietnamese, took on and hurled back a greatly superior number of troops of the V.C. main forces. When the Pleime outpost had been relieved at last, the scene shifted to the Ia Drang valley. Here the men of the 1st Air Cavalry engaged an entire North Vietnamese division, composed of the 32nd regiment, the 33rd regiment, and the 66th regiment, with two V.C. main-force regiments in occasional support. Even by mid-October the number of American combat troops on the ground was not large, and Maj. Gen. Harry Kinnard, commander of the 1st Air Cavalry, could not afford to overcommit his vital division. Hence he never put into the line more than two battalions-plus, the battalions in combat being rotated by helicopter as the fighting went on. On our side, therefore, we did not have as much as a full regiment engaged at any one time, whereas the enemy had three regiments always engaged, with two more to aid them.

As must happen, alas in battle, 275 men of the Air Cavalry were killed in the weeks the action lasted. But we have since captured the enemy's complete battle plans, and we also have a post-battle critique by the North Vietnamese commander on the scene, who has the pseudonym of Gen. Bai Quan. This evidence reveals that in this single battle the enemy lost the staggering total of 5,000 killed and severely wounded, as well as almost all his heavy weapons. By any test this victory against such odds was a shining feat of U.S. arms, all the more noteworthy because these were near-green American troops.

After the Ia Drang valley no one could any longer believe in an intended Viet Cong pull-back to low-level guerrilla activity. If the V.C. could not or would not pull back, it was clear that they would have to try to go forward. Furthermore, there was increasing evidence of a massive, continuing invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese regulars coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Reconnaissance also revealed that the North Vietnamese were urgently improving the trail to make it a truckable highway.

In November, therefore, Hanoi's apparent intention to reinforce the Viet Cong to the utmost led Gen. Westmoreland's staff to make carefully revised estimates of the enemy's maximum capabilities—the maximum military buildup the North Vietnamese government and the V.C. second government could achieve and support. These estimates projected a continuous growth of the enemy main forces in South Vietnam at the rate of two regiments per month until the end of 1966. In other words, the main forces, which had a strength equivalent to 10 divisions when the President committed U.S. troops, were projected to grow to a strength equivalent to about 18 divisions before next New Year's Day.

This projection by Gen. Westmoreland's staff was presented to Secretary of Defense McNamara when he visited Saigon at the end of November. It of course implied a need for a good many more American troops to match the enemy's expected increase of strength. For this reason the new estimates caused a panic in Washington when Secretary McNamara brought them home. Out of the panic grew the President's peace offensive, the pause in the bombing of the North, and other manifestations that presumably helped to renew the Hanoi leaders' slumping faith in their basic theory of American weakness of

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will. The question remains whether the panic was justified. I think it was wholly unjustified.

My chief reason is based on the situation I discovered when I returned to Vietnam for my most recent visit in February. On the one hand, all was far from perfection on our side. The stability of the South Vietnamese government could certainly not be taken for granted. And the President's hesitant and intricate methods of war-making, combined with the manifestoes of the war's senatorial and other critics, had deprived our men of the absolute confidence in their support at home that American troops in combat always ought ideally to have. On the other hand, however, these imperfections, though serious enough, were powerfully counterbalanced by the situation of the Viet Cong.

The refugee flow from the V.C. areas was increasing; by the end of February the total was nearing 800,000 men, women and children, or close to one sixth of the population that the V.C. had controlled at their high point. Viet Cong propaganda was already publicly denouncing the refugee movement as an imperialist plot to diminish the rice supplies available to the second government's tax collectors. There were symptoms that the V.C. second government's available pool of conscripts had already begun to dry up in more than one province. In Gen. Westmoreland's highly successful Masher-White Wing operation, the two prime-target regiments, the 18th of the North Vietnamese 325th division and the 2nd V.C. main-force regiment, had come south into Binh Dinh province with the primary intention of taking the offensive—instead they were so badly knocked about that they were put out of action for several months. But P.O.W. interrogations revealed that these regiments' southward move from Quangngai province had the secondary purpose of securing badly needed replacements, since the press gangs had been coming back almost empty-handed.

When I went down to the delta town of My Tho, I discovered the sad plight of the most famous V.C. provincial battalion in Vietnam, called by Hanoi radio the "Ever Victorious Ap Bac Battalion" in memory of a smashing success in the past. The "Ever Victorious" had just suffered two drubbings within two months by the local South Vietnamese troops. Furthermore—and much more revealing—the battalion was now afflicted, according to a large number of defectors, with a desertion rate well above 60 percent per year. Each province in Vietnam is markedly different from the next province, and symptoms in Quangngai and in Dinh Tuong, the stamping ground of the "Ever Victorious" must never be exaggerated into nationwide symptoms, yet all this evidence was pretty impressive nonetheless.

The provincial evidence and the immense refugee movement were impressive, above all, because they had no precedents. Even more impressive, and equally unprecedented, was the evidence of the many battlefields. Until hardly more than a year ago, just one Viet Cong prisoner of war or battlefield deserter was so rare a phenomenon that Saigon would be agog about him for days on end, and it was also a real cause for celebration if as many as four or five enemy dead were found on the field of battle. Even today the V.C. and North Vietnamese have not altered the battlefield discipline that requires all killed and wounded to be carried away by their comrades, any more than they have changed their rules against desertion. After the Chulai fight, a couple of hundred Viet Cong corpses were found hidden in a trench where they had been dragged with butchers' meat hooks. More recently, V.C. P.O.W.'s have turned up with loops attached to their clothing to make dragging easier in case of need—a prebattle precaution which must surely raise fighting spirit in a wonderful manner. Thus while others might be unimpressed, I

remembering the quite recent past, was left all but incredulous by the almost daily body counts of enemy dead abandoned on the battlefield, and by the constant news of prisoners of war and battlefield deserters.

It is also worth noting that in the two months of January and February, the body counts reached a grisly cumulative total of 7,352 enemy dead. This means that the true total of enemy killed in action was certainly above 10,000, for although counts made in combat must be discounted for accidental duplication, a big addition must also be made for enemy dead dragged away in continuing compliance with the old discipline. It is also conservative to assume that the total of the enemy's disablingly wounded was double the total of those killed. Hence the overall figure for enemy dead and disabled in January and February alone was probably above 30,000. To this must be added 1,100 P.O.W.'s and battlefield deserters—the latter being troops who seize the opportunity of battle to squat down in a ditch until they are overrun by our men.

To be sure, not more than half these heavy V.C. losses were soldiers of the main forces, for many were porters, guerrillas, local-force troops and even civilians impressed as temporary porters. But even so, it was abundantly clear that the main forces were being very badly knocked about. This was all the more striking because the Ia Drang experience had taught the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese commanders not to court any more set-piece battles. Engaging main forces had therefore become more difficult, since they in most cases had first to be sought out. Altogether the "seek out and destroy" strategy struck me as succeeding beyond all expectations. What is more important, this opinion was—and is—shared by Gen. Westmoreland.

If you look at this war's military aspect without regard to such political factors as instability in Saigon, or hesitancy in Washington to give full backing to Gen. Westmoreland, you have to conclude that the situation is full of promise. To be sure, the enemy is still reinforcing at about the rate projected in the November estimates. To be sure, the very fact that the enemy is still reinforcing means that clearly he intends to use his reinforcements in battle. So there is hard fighting still ahead. But if you make a practical analysis of the V.C. second government's problems, you are driven to conclude that the present enemy reinforcement is like one of those last high raises that losing players sometimes make to frighten their opponents out of a poker game.

The limit on the number of troops the North Vietnamese Communists can send southward is not yet in sight, but the limit is quite clearly in sight on the number of troop units the V.C. second government can sustain in the South. This is why it is wrong to talk about an "unlimited war," and this is also the main reason for believing that we are confronted with something like a desperate last high raise in poker. If you examine the projection of enemy-troop buildup made by Gen. Westmoreland's staff, you find, first of all, that most of the buildup is accounted for by a very large additional invasion of the South by North Vietnamese. This is risky in itself, since many of the southern rank and file of the Viet Cong much resent the overt northern takeover in the South. Second, you find a very puzzling anomaly, in the form of a great increase in the burden of the already overburdened V.C. second government.

In the spring of 1965 the strain of supporting main forces of a strength of 10 divisions was already severe. If the enemy buildup continues until the end of this year as projected by the Westmoreland staff, the strain will be nearly twice as great, for the V.C. second government will be supporting main forces of the strength of 18 divisions.

All the strictly military personnel of the main forces are now coming from North Vietnam—but this was already the case in 1965. But now, on the one hand, the V.C. second government has a reduced productive and manpower base, primarily because of the refugee movement. And on the other hand, if the buildup continues as projected, the second government is eventually going to have to provide the main forces with nearly twice as much rice and each month, with at least double the number of men to fill gaps in the regimental ranks, and with close to double the number of men or women (for women are now being drafted for this purpose) to serve in the ported battalions and the longer range transport detachments. If the strain was already severe in the spring of 1965, what then will be the strain on the V.C. second government by December, 1966?

The answer, I think, is that the present enemy reinforcement has behind it a truly desperate decision—a decision, in fact, to throw in all remaining reserves, and to consume all the remaining stocks of food and other supplies still cached in the main bases, to make one final try for victory. If this be true, we are indeed confronted, with a last high raise. And the maker of a last high raise always loses the game if another player has the resources and the courage to call and raise again.

I believe that we in America have the needed courage, as I know we have the needed resources. To this hopeful observation, however, I must add two brief footnotes. First, a warning is needed concerning that phrase "losing the game." When and if Gen. Westmoreland succeeds in breaking the enemy's main forces, the big war in Vietnam will be over, and the game will really be won. Breaking the main forces will break most of the V.C. power in the countryside. It will not break *all* the V.C. power, however. A little war of mopping-up operations, costing few casualties and needing fewer troops, but troublesome and ugly all the same, may therefore continue for a considerable period. By method and determination, that little war can be won in the end in South Vietnam. But the war planners in Hanoi will still be the masters of the V.C. remnants of the South. They will still have the power to end all fighting by calling home their men. And the prime reason for maintaining a stern, persistent, though not irrational, bombing pressure on North Vietnam is to teach the lesson that the call-home order had better be given as soon as the big war in the South is decisively lost.

Second, despite the hopefulness of the military situation, the war can perhaps be lost somewhere in the dark labyrinths of Saigon politics. Despite all the positive factors, this warning must be reiterated, and the need for American patience with the vagaries of Vietnamese politics must be emphasized.

For close on a century before 1954, the Vietnamese had no experience of self-government. Under Ngo Dinh Diem, they then made considerable progress. As authoritarian governments go, the Diem regime was worthy of considerable respect—for more respect, certainly, than the dogmatic, harsh and gloomy Communist regime in the North—but under Diem, the Vietnamese got their bellyful of authoritarian government in Saigon. A long period of sometimes wild cut-and-try is therefore unavoidable, before the Vietnamese find the mode of government that suits their traditions, habits and outlook. There is nothing to worry about in that—so long as they do not stab themselves in the back during one of the wilder cut-and-tries. For the long pull, moreover, South Vietnam is one of the very richest countries in Asia, with an industrious and talented people who have been forcefully dragged into the 20th century by all the technological lessons of their bitter war experience. So I have no patience with those who ask, "What



shall we have in South Vietnam, even if we win?" Every sort of basic factor promises a good future, if the suffering people of South Vietnam can only be granted peace at last. If that time comes, moreover, the United States can not only take the satisfaction of a stronger nation that has rendered loyal service to a weaker ally, we in our country can also sleep more easily in our own beds. For if the northern Communist aggression against South Vietnam is not successfully defeated, there will be another such aggression, and another, and another, until men begin to say, "The line must be drawn somewhere." And thus the Third World War may begin, and that is what we are now fighting to avert.

**Our Man There**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF  
HON. JOHN A. RACE  
OF WISCONSIN**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Tuesday, June 7, 1966**

Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, I have recently had the opportunity to read the pamphlet, "Our Man There," composed by Gian Chand Sud and Frederick Arthur Gruber. The pamphlet contains a joint proposal for the creation of a training school for foreign nationals in the United States. The school would train these individuals in various aspects of political and social democracy. When graduated from this school, these individuals would be sent home to take an active role in the political life of their home nations.

The proposal is extremely interesting and warrants looking into. Certainly this Nation, as the world's bastion of democracy, should make an energetic attempt to export democracy. This proposal may or may not be the answer. Nonetheless, it might contain the genesis of a potentially beneficial international program.

I request unanimous consent that the pamphlet, "Our Man There," be included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

**OUR MAN THERE—A PROGRAM FOR THE POLITICAL TRAINING OF FOREIGN NATIONALS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES**

(A Joint Proposal by Gian Chand Sud and Frederick Arthur Gruber)

**I. AN INTRODUCTION**

Lethargy and apathy seem to be among the elements of human behavior which severely threaten the democratic way of life. Too few people care enough about their government and their ideals to constructively strive for improvement. Their interest in public affairs is limited to often uninformed grumbling. Though well meaning, there people tend to discard useful ideas with the words, "What's the use?"

This proposal has been prepared by the authors not only because they firmly believe it to be a practical, useful means of promoting the American way of life, but also because they feel an obligation toward the government and the people who have permitted the free inquiry that has, in the final analysis, led to the ideas expressed in these pages.

On these grounds the authors intend to go beyond the confines of this report. They believe that a desirable idea should culminate in action, and that an undesirable idea should

die in the forum of life, not in the net of inactivity.

**II. AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSAL**

In the years America has been engaged in the "cold war" with the Soviet Union, the west has had great difficulty gaining favor with professed neutralist nations. Communist inroads have led dedicated Americans to make critical appraisals of United States foreign policy and domestic well-being. In so doing, many well-intentioned authors have provided little in the way of constructive proposals. Instead, they have provided the communist cause with new means for undermining western initiative.

This could only be the case if, for the disputed minds, the weak points of the western pattern of life and western political philosophies are outweighed by adverse criticisms, or, if the full facts and their unbiased interpretation are presented poorly, if at all.

Freedom becomes a necessity only to those who have experienced it. It cannot be given to minds in bondage. It must be sold to them with a price tag marked "responsibility".

Since dedicated Americans firmly believe in the basic tenets of free-enterprise democracy, we are left with the realization that our political philosophies suffer not in substance, but in presentation. Why?

There are probably many reasons. One, however, becomes apparent. A good salesman realizes that a recommendation for his product by a respected third party can increase his chances for a sale to a prospective customer. The American Medical Association's endorsement of Crest Toothpaste is such a case.

The communists realize this. In South America, India, Pakistan, and the nascent African nations the natives are recruited to sell communism. The democratic way of life is being sold by travelers from abroad. American nationals, service men, overseas workers, tourists, and peace corps workers are met by curious, yet suspicious minds. They are generally not top salesmen because they are not natives.

Of course, there are pro western natives in these areas. Undoubtedly they are doing much to explain our way of life. But their effectiveness would be enhanced were they to achieve greater authority. They could reach more ears. Their statements would receive more consideration if they were in positions of respect.

In the realm of politics and of political philosophies the elected official holds authority and engenders respect.

A course of instruction in practical politics and election engineering could provide these people with the impetus to seek public office, and could aid them in securing positions of public trust.

Specifically, a program could be established to carefully train select foreign nationals in the arts of campaigning and politics.

The free world has no such program. The Soviet Union has.

**III. DISCUSSION**

Recently, several distinguished Americans have published appraisals of American domestic and foreign policy. The most eloquent commentaries are, perhaps expressed in such works as: *A Nation of Sheep* by John Lederer, *American Diplomacy* by George Kennan, and *The Ugly American* by Eugene Burdick and John Lederer.

In reviewing these works and others of the same genre; several fundamental criticisms reoccur:

1. That the American society has become apathetic. That the well-fed, well-clothed American no longer retains the pioneer spirit which permitted the colonists to turn the United States into a world leader in a scant two-hundred years. That America's citizenry is slinking into an ostrich like posture, burying its head in the lap of luxury.

2. That American diplomacy has been insensitive to foreign cultures, problems, and desires. That even America's copious foreign aid programs have been administered with a shotgun. That America has, in effect, become the chagrined tender of a belligerent world bread line.

3. That much of the world is not yet prepared to accept American-styled democracy. That, in many areas, temperament, culture, and tradition render American political ideals alien and therefore, suspect. That we are ineffectually trying to sell free-enterprise democracy in a buyer's market.

4. That America is the goldfish bowl of the world and has shown itself unable to answer just foreign criticisms. That injustice and inequalities within America's borders contradict the idealistic philosophies which the U.S. preaches abroad.

There is an element of truth in each of these criticisms. But, it is doubtful that such faults, even when taken jointly, could blind a majority of the world's intelligent men-of-good will to the selfless humanitarian goals for which America and the American way of life stand. Perfection is not a human trait.

Foreign nationals visiting the Soviet Union are generally indoctrinated thoroughly with Marxism. They are badgered until the cold communist line becomes more reaction than thought. They are thoroughly trained to become the future statesmen or revolutionaries of their home countries.

This is why we read in the newspapers, "Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, trained in Moscow..."

Why don't we read, "trained in America..."?

Why don't we provide the opportunity for politically minded, pro-western foreign nationals to receive training which might enable them to implement well-founded beliefs, to defend the way of life that respects freedom and individuality?

There is no such program available in the United States.

With a minimal expense Americans could establish such a program. Not on the Machivellian basis that the Soviet Union practices, but a thorough training school that would accept volunteers for, say, one year's intensive study in practical politics. A school that would only accept promising young people of fine character and provide them with the expenses-paid opportunity to study election engineering, social control, and to work on actual political campaigns with American politicians. A school, endowed by Americans who have not succumbed to creeping apathy, that would give these people the tools and the encouragement to protect and expand the way of life that has respected the dignity of man.

Such a program would not assure the election or the prominence of its students, but it seems likely that it would, at the least, increase the probability of their rise to a position of influence.

About one million foreign nationals are now living in the United States. Close to 64-thousand of these are college or university students who have chosen to come to America for education which may not be available in their home states. They are commonly youthful, intelligent, educated, and respected citizens of their homelands. It would be most practical to select from among these visitors, volunteers for a political training program. Most of these dynamic people could, with relative ease, rise to prominence in their native countries.

But, it would not be desirable for a cross section of these people to achieve a position of sufficient influence to implement their variegated political and social beliefs. Such an event could prove as chaotic as the appointment of a random sample of Americans now in Europe to federal positions.

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Though some foreigners now visiting the United States will return home with an enlightened perspective and a new zeal for the American system, some will be oblivious or even hostile to the American way of life. Just as Peace Corps candidates must be carefully selected, so much candidates for a training program in practical politics.

Once selected the volunteers should be given the best training that can be made available. They should become acquainted with politics in both theory and practice. In both the classroom and in the "smoke-filled" rooms. They should work both with books and with people.

This is primarily a program with long range objectives. Yet, even in the immediate future, graduates of such a training program could be of value to the democratic ideals. They would be effective salesmen of the American way of life. They could provide responsible answers to anti-American criticisms. They could spearhead a new responsive and sensitive approach to the American foreign policy dilemma.

It would not be necessary to indoctrinate these people. This country and the whole free world has no use for stooges in foreign politics. Stooges are always stooges.

Rather, the volunteers could be screened to ascertain their character and goals. If only a small fraction of the foreign nationals now visiting the United States were accepted into a training program of this nature, hundreds of active minds would be at work for freedom where now only a void exists. And it would be worth the price of over one hundred Peace Corps workers if just one trainee would be elected to a high position in his native land.

A small, well organized program of this nature could be the épee that hits its mark in place of the broadsword that only ruffles the air.

#### IV. SUMMARY

A crucial need exists at the present time to place responsible foreign nationals who are sympathetic to the American ideals in key positions in the governments of their native lands.

Little or nothing is presently being done to fill this gap in the cold war struggle with communism.

A practical method of meeting the challenge is to initiate a thorough training program for foreign nationals in practical politics. However, it is imperative that the program concentrate only upon volunteers who are already convinced that free-enterprise democracy is the most desirable political and social system.

### Fighting for Whom?

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH**

OF KANSAS  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, during a speech in Wichita, Kans., in May, I called on the Johnson administration to demand that the various South Vietnamese factions get together and get behind the war effort against the Communists, and to present plans for U.S. withdrawal if the South Vietnamese refuse to shape up. Last week one of Kansas' fine newspapers, the Lawrence Daily Journal-World, ran an excellent editorial on the situation in Vietnam. I commend it to the attention of my colleagues:

#### FIGHTING FOR WHOM?

Any normal American is intensely interested in the welfare and action of our fighting men in Viet Nam. We want our soldiers to win their battles but we don't want them to be killed or wounded. As long as they are there, we know there will be casualties and, selfishly, we are hopeful the enemy will be pushed back and will suffer more than we do.

Many people are not quite sure why we are so deeply involved in the far off steaming jungles, but we know it has developed into large-scale bitter warfare and we want our forces to be victorious. It is a case of killing or being killed, which leaves only one choice.

The great tragedy today is that President Johnson and Secretary McNamara are sending more and more Americans into the fighting to take the place of the Vietnamese who are spending their time fighting among themselves.

Supposedly we first went to Viet Nam to help the endangered people protect their government. The way it has turned out these people seem to have no government or no unity of purpose. There is far less stability than there was when our first troops arrived and the condition is worsening day by day.

American soldiers went to Viet Nam to help the southern people to win their war against the Communists from the north, and we sent them arms so they could more effectively combat the aggressors. Now those native soldiers are using the arms we sent them to fight a civil war, or to shoot at each other.

Isn't it about time for President Johnson to insist that the Vietnamese establish a legitimate and stable government if they are to continue to receive our economic and military aid?

If this isn't done soon and the natives continue to fight among themselves, the American public must realize the United States is now engaged on its own in a full scale war with the Communists of North Viet Nam, which is supported by Red China, and Viet Nam is only the stage for the first battles of a much bigger fight to come.

### Cardinal, Governor, Laud St. John's at Dedication of New Hospital Wing

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE**

OF MASSACHUSETTS  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, on May 14, it was my pleasure to participate in the dedication of a new hospital wing of St. Johns Hospital in Lowell, Mass.

The completion of this modern facility is a tribute to the efforts of the local community which raised a considerable sum in contributions, and to the cooperation of Federal, State, and local government officials.

Participating in the dedication were His Eminence Richard Cardinal Cushing, Gov. John A. Volpe, and Lowell Mayor Edward J. Early, in addition to Dr. Daniel Rubenstein, State director of hospital facilities, Dr. Thomas J. G. Tighe, president of the hospital medical staff, Sister Mary Consolata, hospital administrator, and Sister Mary Francis, assistant hospital administrator.

Under unanimous consent, I include

the article by Judith P. Erion, which appeared in the Lowell Sun on May 15 describing the dedication ceremonies, in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

CARDINAL, GOVERNOR, LAUD ST. JOHN'S AT DEDICATION OF NEW HOSPITAL WING

(By Judith P. Erion)

LOWELL.—Several thousand persons gathered on Stackpole Street yesterday to hear His Eminence Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, Governor John A. Volpe, Rep. F. BRADFORD MORSE, and other state and local dignitaries dedicate the new wing of St. John's hospital.

John F. Reilly Sr., master of ceremonies and a member of St. John's advisory board, opened the dedication by extending the hospital's thanks to all who had made the new wing possible. He commended Rev. William J. Kelley, chaplain of the hospital for 10 years, on his address at Friday night's Mass which formally opened the dedication.

His Eminence Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, then blessed the cornerstone of the new multi-million dollar wing. While laying cement on the cornerstone, the cardinal said "some people get paid \$4 an hour for this. I'm working overtime." He laughed, and said, "I guess I'm a little stingy with the cement."

The crowd stood as the cardinal led prayers for the hospital.

Sister Mary Consolata, hospital administrator, and Joseph E. Sullivan, chairman of the advisory board, also took the trowel and spread the symbolic cement.

Introduced early in the program were those who "had contributed much to the success of St. John's hospital, but were not speakers." Included were: The Sisters of St. Martha, Rev. Mother Paul of the Cross, Superior General of the Sisters of St. Martha; Rev. William Lawless, OMI, pastor of the Immaculate Conception church; Rev. Francis Scully, second assistant chaplain to Archbishop Cushing and pastor of St. Andrew's church in North Billerica; John Murphy, St. John's accountant for 32 years and the official representative of St. John's employees; Mrs. Frederick J. Loughran, president of the Ladies of Charity, and William A. Riley, one of the hospital architects.

After the invocation by Rev. William J. Kelley, OMI, and the dedication and blessing by Cardinal Cushing, Lowell Mayor Edward J. Early opened the distinguished list of speakers. "Speaking on behalf of the people of Lowell, I would like to offer thanks and congratulations to all persons involved in this dedication today," Mayor Early said.

Reilly then introduced Joseph E. Sullivan as "the foremost Catholic layman in the United States." Sullivan stepped to the microphone and said "I wrote Jack's speech, so he read it all right."

Sullivan thanked all groups who had donated time and money for the new wing and said "we have three well-equipped hospitals in Lowell. No one has to go to Boston for medical treatment, let's make that clear." He also cited Fr. Kelley, whom he said the hospital and citizens of Lowell could not begin to repay for his hours of unselfish devotion to St. John's. He also cited Dr. William F. Ryan, whom he said brought eight of Sullivan's nine children into the world. Sullivan closed his remarks by saying, "St. John's Hospital is in my will. Is it in yours?"

Mr. Reilly then introduced "a man whom we are most fortunate to have as a member of our active staff and as president of the medical staff, Dr. Thomas J. G. Tighe.

Dr. Tighe said, "The staff wants me to publicly thank Archbishop Cushing for his interest in the hospital, also the nurses, nurses' aides, Ladies of Charity, general public and personnel for all their help. He then presented the Canadian flag to Sister Mary Consolata, hospital administrator, and

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his time, money and efforts to make a better community for the people of Norwood. He was always in the vanguard in promoting civic affairs helpful to the youngsters. Some of his deeds are well known such as financing a banquet for a championship athletic team or patriotic celebration. He was a kind hearted man and always ready to be of help to a neighbor down on his luck. He was a respected businessman imbued with a civic conscience that guided him through life with one idea, "How can I best help my fellow-man?"

Yes, Nicholas Abdallah richly deserves this tribute, for he was truly one of "God's great noblemen".

I know his son, Selectman Abdallah along with other members of the Abdallah family must take great pride in this recognition.

It is well that we honor this man, and I am most grateful for the opportunity to take part in this fine ceremony.

To those of you who will enjoy the use of this fine Auditorium, do so in the spirit and with the inspiration of a great civic leader, Nicholas Abdallah, who gave unsparingly of his time and efforts for the betterment of the Community, the education and social well-being of its children, and his great devotion to patriotism and the principles of democracy on which our great Nation was founded. In doing so, the dreams, hopes and ambitions of our dedicated friend, Nicholas Abdallah will be fulfilled.

INVOCATION PRAYER GIVEN BY REV. FERDINAND V. MISZKIN, PASTOR, ST. PETER'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, NORWOOD, MASS.

Almighty and Eternal God, We humbly implore your Divine blessing on this Community gathering here this afternoon. The reason for our assembly is the dedication of the new addition to the Balch School. May this latest construction prove to be an inspiration to community spirit . . . a spirit as it should, evolve from your Holy Divine Spirit.

Dear God, We are your children . . . You are our Heavenly Father . . . We are all brothers and sisters by your great power of creation.

You also provide for us . . . but not without our cooperation.

And so today we lift up our hearts and pray for your Divine blessing. First, that what we do here today will be a reflection of your love. Second, that what others will attempt may be the fulfillment of your command: "That you love one another as I have loved you."

The School in particular demonstrates much love . . . The teacher sacrifices self for pupil . . . and this occurs generation after generation.

So today we earnestly pledge to be good neighbors, loyal citizens, true children of God.

Because you have assured us that he who loses himself in the service of others is found by You, O Almighty Eternal Loving God.

PRAYER OF DEDICATION GIVEN BY THE REVEREND FATHER NIFON ABRAHAM, PASTOR, ST. GEORGE SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, NORWOOD, MASS.

Almighty God, the giver of all gifts, we thank Thee for all the blessings we have. We thank Thee for this new building that now stands completed and ready for use. We ask thy heavenly protection upon this building so that nor wind, nor flood, nor fire or any other thing shall be able to harm it.

We thank Thee for the will to provide this place of teaching, and for this glad occasion of dedication.

Keep safe from all harm those who will use this place, and preserve the pupils and help them to continue to grow in stature, in knowledge, and in wisdom.

Bless the Board of Selectmen, the Superintendent of Schools, the Principals, the

teachers, the School Board, the construction committee, and all those who have done so much to give us this beautiful building.

We now dedicate this new wing in thy name, O Lord. For unto Thee are due all glory, honor and worship, to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit; now and ever, and unto ages of ages. Amen.

BENEDICTION PRAYER GIVEN BY REV. AL ABRACINSKAS, PASTOR, ST. GEORGE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Come, O Holy Spirit and illumine our minds. Grant that all who come to study here may learn that education does not end with book knowledge. Grant that together with this knowledge they may acquire ideals and principles that will build up their character. Grant that they may put all things in their proper perspective and see the importance of spiritual values in life.

Finally, strengthen their wills so that they may always have the courage to do what is right in these times of confusion. In these troubled times, may they learn to respect all due authority and thus help to build up a peaceful and a happy society.

May God bless us all and guide us on the one and only true course of life—a love of God and a love of one another.

Debt Limit Increase

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RAY J. MADDEN

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, the Ways and Means Committee today presented H.R. 15202 to the Rules Committee asking for a rule on legislation that during the period beginning on July 1, 1966, and ending on June 30, 1967, the public debt limit set forth in the first sentence of section 21 of the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended—31 United States Code 757b—shall be temporarily increased to \$330 billion.

In different periods over the past years the Treasury Department has recommended legislation to the Ways and Means Committee asking for increases in the public debt limit in order to meet the necessities of our expanding economy.

No doubt this legislative request for a temporary extension of the public debt limit will cause political criticism from sources over the Nation along the same yardstick as the criticism offered each time during the past years when similar requests have been made.

It is unfortunate that the critics concerning the increase of our gross public debt do not call the attention of the people to the fact that over the last 20 years our gross national product, or our general economy, has expanded and increased in far greater proportion than the increase of our gross public debt.

This week I requested from the Treasury Department a breakdown of our gross public debt figures as compared with the increase in our gross national product over the last 20 years. I think it is well for the Members of Congress to have

knowledge of the relative expansion over the years of our public debt compared to our gross national product expansion over the years of our public debt compared to our gross national product expansion. I hereby submit some of the figures submitted to me by the Treasury Department showing our gross national debt expansion as compared with our gross national product expansion over the last 20 years:

End of fiscal year	Gross public debt and guaranteed obligations	Gross national product
1945	260.1	216.4
1946	269.9	209.1
1947	268.4	229.7
1948	262.4	259.1
1949	252.8	255.2
1950	267.4	284.2
1951	265.3	329.3
1952	260.2	342.4
1953	266.1	366.6
1954	271.3	362.0
1955	274.4	398.4
1956	272.8	418.4
1957	270.6	443.1
1958	276.4	444.8
1959	284.8	485.4
1960	286.5	504.4
1961	289.2	519.6
1962	298.6	560.8
1963	306.6	588.1
1964	312.5	629.5
1965	317.9	675.2
1966	320.0	722.0

The critics of our Government policy should not become too alarmed when they find that in 1945 our gross public debt was \$259 billion compared to our gross national product of \$216 billion. In other words in 1945 our gross national debt was \$43 billion more than our gross national product.

In contrast to 1966 our gross national debt was approximately \$320 billion compared to a gross national product of \$722 billion. In other words, in 1966 our gross national product was \$402 billion more than our gross public debt.

The public should know that in 20 years we have increased our production and national economy almost \$450 billion over our gross public debt.

These facts should be taken into consideration when administration critics making statements alarming the American people that this Government's fiscal policies are on the verge of bankruptcy.

AP Chief Answers Criticism of Coverage on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, there has been some criticism of late by Government officials over the quality of press coverage from Vietnam.

In the interest of listening to both sides, I include in the Record at this point a recent statement by Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press:

[From the Chicago Sun-Times, May 31, 1966]  
AP CHIEF ANSWERS CRITICISM OF COVERAGE  
ON VIET NAM

Some Washington governmental and congressional sources have been critical of press coverage from Viet Nam. They have claimed that the American public is getting "distorted reports," "a headline type of coverage," and that American reporters there are "inexperienced."

The following statement by Wes Gallagher, general manager of the Associated Press was directed to members of that news-gathering co-operative and to AP staff members. It is reprinted here to give Sun-Times readers the facts on Viet Nam coverage.

The press always has been attacked in wartime because its reports frequently clash with government views and with the image government would like to present. And reporters, too, must bring unpleasant, confusing and discouraging reports to the public, which reacts, as all people do, with irritation.

There are two immutable rules on press criticism which are as inevitable as the tides.

1. Criticism of the press by government rises in direct proportion to the amount of adverse news printed which may not be in line with government policy.

2. Criticism by the public rises in direct proportion to the amount of news read which undermines what it would like to believe—above all on such emotional issues as the conflict in Viet Nam.

#### A SYLVESTERISM

The war in Viet Nam more than any other in recent history has invoked these two axioms. First let us deal with this "inexperience" charge. It is a "Sylvesterism" having been used frequently by the government, principally Arthur Sylvester, assistant secretary of defense, who conducts his own private guerrilla war against correspondents.

The inexperience charge is neither accurate nor pertinent to the situation.

The present AP writing staff in Viet Nam ranges in age from 61 to 25, with experience in the business of reporting as follows: 35 years, 28 years, 23 years, 18 years, 14 years, 13 years, 11 years, 8 years and 7 years. Three covered World War II and Korea. Two, Pulitzer Prize winners Peter Arnett and Horst Faas, have been in Viet Nam four years each, which is longer than Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. William G. Westmoreland and nine-tenths of the Americans over there.

#### DEATH TOLL, TOO

But neither age nor experience has anything to do with reporting. Young men fight wars and die, and young correspondents must report wars and sometimes die, as they have in every war in history. In Viet Nam, in the last 14 months, two AP men have been killed and six wounded. They were reporting firsthand—not second-guessing from Washington.

One more statistic, because there has been some criticism that the press is not spending enough to cover the war. Last year the AP spent three-quarters of a million dollars in Viet Nam on staff and communications.

Generalized attacks on correspondents as a group or upon individuals are not pertinent to the question of whether the truth is being reported from Viet Nam. The question is not who wrote the story but what the story said. Age is no guarantee against mistakes.

#### MATTER OF DETAILS

The only legitimate point at issue is whether each particular story is accurate in fact and detail. An examination of the record of what has been reported from Viet Nam in the last four years and what government officials have said about Viet Nam in the same period leaves no doubt that the reporting has been more accurate than the official statements.

This does not mean everything reported from Viet Nam is accurate. It isn't. Mistakes are inevitable.

For example, facts still are coming out of World War II which contradict both official reports and newspaper stories of the time. It is part of the confusion of war.

But on the whole, Viet Nam is being better reported and more accurately reported, with less restrictions, than any war in our history, at a great price in blood and money.

#### WORKING RELATIONS

Out of the early confusion and argument of the American build-up in Viet Nam has come a workable press-armed forces relationship. Westmoreland has laid down a set of guidelines on security matters such as troop movements, casualties, etc., which are adhered to by the correspondents. These rules stem from World War II and Korea and do not extend to the political field. Nor do they restrict a correspondent reporting what he sees.

It is significant, too, that the working relationship between the war correspondents and fighting men in the field has been excellent in contrast to the hullabaloo from Washington.

What then is the difficulty?

It is the war itself, confusing and the most controversial in American history.

#### NO MEASURING RODS

First there is the fighting. There are no measuring rods that a correspondent can use to show who's winning and losing each day. No towns are captured, occupied and put behind the lines. There is no front, few large battles by the standards of every other war. Small units strike at the Viet Cong, who strike back from ambush. U.S. forces claim a victory and the Viet Cong mortar the Saigon air base and blow up a hotel in the middle of town to dispute the claim.

There is a daily body count of enemy dead of extremely doubtful value. Who's to say the dead man was a peasant or a Viet Cong? Who's going to wander around a Viet Cong-infested jungle trying to count bodies of enemy dead? How many have the Viet Cong pulled away? In any case, if the enemy loses 100 but recruits or imports 200, who's winning?

#### GAPS FOR CLAIMS

All these imponderables leave huge gaps for claims of any kind by the South or North Vietnamese, by hawks or doves, by the government, or by those against the war.

The advocates of the war in Viet Nam like to choose the best of the reports as the only "truth," the doves the worst.

The correspondents as a whole try to report both, and incur the wrath of both hawks and doves.

But the military action, confusing as it is, comes through with startling clarity compared to the political situation.

Harassed American government officials brought up in democratic thinking have faced the dismal task of explaining, supporting, justifying and seeking to bolster seven military dictatorships in less than three years.

As the explanations get tougher, the attacks on the press reporting the comings and goings of Saigon's political squirrel cage have become more irritable.

There has been no war in history where the American government has been put in a more difficult position in supporting an allied regime. The only comparable incident took place early in World War II with American government recognition of Adm. Jean Darlan's government in North Africa. This stirred great public controversy and also attacks on correspondents quite similar to those today. But Darlan's government lasted only briefly.

The government would like the news from Saigon presented favorably in black and white.

The reader would like a clear, simple explanation of who's winning and what he, as a citizen, is paying for in blood and taxes.

But South Viet Nam is neither black nor white, nor clear, nor simple. At best it is different shades of gray, at worst a political and military enigma.

And when the reporter reports the confusion accurately he satisfies neither reader nor government, but that's his job.

There is an Orwellian "1984" concept both among some government officials and some segment of the public that if the reporter just reported the good news, somehow things would be better. This is sometimes equated with patriotism by its more extreme advocates. But this is not how this democracy functions. Nor could it and still remain a democracy.

Judge Learned Hand, in an antitrust decision years ago, against the AP, spoke eloquently of the function of the press. His words apply today.

He said:

"The newspaper industry . . . serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources and with as many facts and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same, as the interest protected by the First Amendment: it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."

## An Open Letter to the American People

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. VERNON W. THOMSON**

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, a group of Chinese scholars and professors of Nationalist China has addressed an open letter to the American people. They apparently believe that the real attitude of the Chinese people has been misrepresented and feel an obligation to correct or refute what they consider erroneous arguments. I am sure their views will be of interest to this body and to the American people and I accordingly submit their letter for the RECORD:

MAY 17, 1966.

#### AN OPEN LETTER TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

We, the undersigned, all scholars and professors of free China, are addressing this open letter to the people of the United States, our traditional ally. At a time when you are threatened by the Chinese Communists, who are the enemy of the Chinese people, certain so-called "China experts" in your country have been misrepresenting the China situation and asking for a change in your China policy to accommodate the Chinese Communist regime. We believe we have a solemn obligation to make clear to you the real attitude of the Chinese people. We want to refute the erroneous arguments of these so-called experts and make some positive, constructive recommendations.

You are the people of a great nation conceived in the spirit of the Enlightenment Movement in a new continent; and behold! We have before our very eyes the most spectacular of such experiments known to man! This modern enlightenment movement has close parallels with the cultural tradition of China. Both of our nations are God-fearing, humane, and peace loving. Thus we are close in spirit although we are historically

June 7, 1965

separate and although the vast Pacific Ocean lies between us. There exists among the two peoples very naturally sentiments of Americanophilia and Sinophilia.

Ever since China failed to retain her position as a leading nation during the 19th century, an era of power politics subjected her to the imperialism of Western European countries, Czarist Russia, Japan, and Soviet Russia. In the past century's humiliating record of Chinese foreign relations, only the United States—beginning with John Hay's "open door" policy—has consistently supported China's freedom and independence. To the elements of idealism and "enlightened self-interest" revealed then in the China policy of the United States may be traced the origin of American world policy as we find it now. In our country, the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Founding Father of our republic, envisaged a new China "of the people, by the people, and for the people" in keeping with Abraham Lincoln's ideals. This philosophy of Dr. Sun's has been incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic of China. Moreover, during the past hundred years, statesmen, educators, and religious leaders of our two countries have made innumerable, outstanding contributions to Sino-American friendship—which came to be cemented during World War II by the blood of hundreds of thousands of young men of both countries. These historic facts will be long remembered by the Chinese people.

In the years following World War II, a tragedy without historic precedent, was visited upon China even as she was prepared to cooperate with the United States in assuring peace in the Pacific region. The result is the emergence on the Chinese mainland of a Communist regime that has isolated itself from the free world and proclaimed the United States to be its sole "enemy." This regime sent troops to fight the United States in the Korean War, inflicting more than 130,000 casualties on American boys. And it is right now loudly clamoring day and night for the overthrow of what they label as "U.S. imperialists"!

How has this strange event come about? Does the Chinese Communist regime truly represent the Chinese people, as alleged in some of your newspapers, magazines, and other publications? What will be its eventual fate? What will be the shape of Sino-American relationship in the days ahead? These are all important questions deserving our serious consideration and dispassionate study.

It is impossible for us to answer all the questions in minutiae in this letter. But this much we can say with certainty: The Chinese Communist regime is not only wholly un-Chinese and does not belong to the Chinese people but is also anti-Chinese altogether. Far from being a product of the Chinese Revolution, the Communist regime in China was created amidst the postwar chaos through the intrigue and power politics of Soviet Russia. This should be evident to anyone familiar with the devastations suffered by China during her eight years of war with Japan. The Soviet Union, which with U.S. wartime assistance emerged as the most powerful country on the Eurasian continent, was allowed to occupy China's Northeast Provinces (Manchuria) under provisions of the secret Yalta Agreement. The Soviets armed the Chinese Communists with weapons seized from the Japanese and thus enabled them to challenge the rule of the Chinese National Government on the mainland. This is a well-known fact which has been admitted even by the Soviets themselves. It may be asked why the Chinese Government failed to prevent the emergence of the Chinese Communist regime. We need only think of what postwar Western Europe would have been like without the Marshall Plan and the shield of NATO. Viewed in this light, the China tragedy should be attributed to the

common failure of the free world. The Chinese Government is not the only party to blame. This is not to say that communization of the Chinese mainland was inevitable. The face of Asia would be entirely different today if the postwar United States had been far-sighted enough to foresee aggression in Korea, if it had not been plagued by so many so-called "China experts" misrepresenting the Chinese Communists as "agrarian reformers" and sowing Sino-American discord, and if it had used even a tenth of the amount of wealth and might expended by America on the Korean War to help China stop the Communists. This is a painful historic lesson that the people of both of our countries must mark well.

Because the Chinese Communist regime is an outgrowth of Soviet machinations, it can in no way be regarded as belonging to the Chinese people. So there is nothing strange about its anti-American attitude. The Soviets first proclaimed "war against U.S. imperialism" as early as the Fifth Congress of the Third International in July, 1924. In spite of that, the Chinese Communists would still not have become anti-American if they had been Chinese-oriented in their attitude. The truth is that they took their anti-American stand and entered the Korean War simply to carry out Moscow's policies. Consequently, to the Chinese people, the Chinese Communists' antagonism toward the United States is a cause for humiliation. We must, therefore, remind our American friends that it is not the Chinese people but the Chinese Communists who are antagonistic toward the United States. The Chinese Communists, steeped in cruelty, harm the Chinese people as viciously as they oppose the United States. The number of Chinese killed and wounded in the Korean War exceeded American casualties by ten to one. We must hold Stalin and Mao Tse-tung responsible for these horrible crimes.

Some people may ask: Why have the Chinese Communists become more violent in their hostility toward the United States than the Russian Communists now that there is the Peiping-Moscow split? The reasons are simple: First, Mao's party has been wholly Stalinized, and has adhered to the Stalinist orthodoxy even after the Kremlin's destalinization. This is the basic cause of the Chinese Communist break with the Kremlin. Though the Chinese Communists' relationship with the Russian Communists has undergone a change, their enmity for the Chinese people remains unchanged. Their political experience as a whole has been Stalinism and nothing else. Second, what Mao's dictatorial regime considers to be of the greatest importance is to maintain political power at home and to pursue its goals of world conquest abroad. Thus on the one hand, it has to create international tensions and to undertake military aggression so as to tighten its stranglehold on the people at home and also to divert their attention from their own suffering. On the other hand, it attempts to subvert Southeast Asian nations so as to intimidate the United States, its most formidable opponent, into pulling out of the whole of Asia.

Unfortunately, these facts have been overlooked deliberately or otherwise by the so-called "China experts" in the United States. They have purposely misrepresented the Chinese Communist regime as "China", thus confusing the public about the constituency of real China. Even more tragic is the fact that while the American people are pouring our their blood and money for the defense of Southeast Asia—the free world's last foothold in Asia—Professors John K. Fairbank and A. Doak Barnett, posing as "China experts", have unleashed an organized propaganda campaign urging recognition of the anti-Chinese Peiping regime. In so doing they are actually encouraging that regime

to commit more diabolical crimes against the Chinese people as well as against the United States. Since Fairbank and Barnett have spoken out in their false capacity as "China experts", we, the scholars and professors of free China, feel obliged to refute them.

Our refutation of the falsehoods spread by these so-called "China experts" may be summarized in seven points:

1. Mao Tse-tungism is distorted by these "experts" into something representative of a "modernized extension of the venerable tradition of China". The true Chinese tradition has, since time immemorial, consisted of: obedience to the Will of Heaven; filial devotion to one's forebears; love for one's kith and kin; honor for the wise and good; charity for man, and kindness to animals; the virtues of propriety, humility, loyalty, and sympathy; and the pursuit of universal peace and world-wide commonwealth. None of these virtues is compatible with the Godless materialism imposed on the people by the Chinese Communists in their attempt to destroy family love, to instigate mutual hate and class struggle, and to disrupt ethical human relationships. In alleging that the Chinese Communist is heir to the Chinese orthodox tradition, Prof. Fairbank betrays his ignorance of both the Chinese way of life and Communism. Like any other nation, China has her own tradition. But it could be equated neither with Communism nor with Maoism. In short, the latter is a Soviet-sponsored, anti-Chinese monstrosity that seeks total destruction of the Chinese tradition. The United States has no lack of Sinologists, many of whom have been to China. Can any of them find in real Chinese tradition even a shred of Stalinism or such Communist manifestations as: "brain-washing", "liquidation of a father by the son", "betrayal of friends", "slave-labor camps" or "people's communes"? China was once a great stabilizing force in Asia, because she pursued a benevolent tradition of befriending its neighbors. Anti-Americanism is wholly contrary to this tradition. In his distortion of China's tradition in an attempt to glorify the Chinese Communists, Prof. Fairbank singled out Lin Piao's war-mongering article on the "people's revolutionary war", which contains these passages:

"United States imperialism is stronger, but also more vulnerable, than any imperialism of the past. It sets itself against the people of the whole world, including the people of the United States."

"All peoples suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, oppression, and exploitation, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!"

Such fanatic anti-U.S. outbursts are propaganda attempts to instigate the people of the world (including Americans) to oppose the United States and assure the triumph of the socialist cause. How can anyone who has even a rudimentary knowledge of Chinese history and who is intellectually honest agree with Prof. Fairbank in accepting Lin Piao's thesis as representatives of the tradition of the Confucian ideal and practice of "government based on moral virtues"? How can the traditional Confucian concepts of benevolence and love, harmony and peace, courtesy and modesty, and universal brotherhood be equated with attempts at provoking hatred and war?

2. The second argument of Professors Fairbank and Barnett's is that Chinese Communism is an expression of nationalism, a reaction against the humiliations and reverses China has suffered in recent times. As we know, Communism originated in the West and first developed in Russia. Lenin took advantage of the clash between Eastern nationalism and Western imperialism to smuggle in Communism through infiltration as a