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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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applied by the court in the famous case of *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1, which held (1948) that state court enforcement of restrictive covenants which have for their purpose the exclusion of persons of designated race or color from ownership or occupancy of real property could not be justified.

But—even in so holding, the Court said: "Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights cases, 1883, 109 U.S. 3, the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. *That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.*" (334 U.S. at p. 13, emphasis added.)

As late as March 28, 1966, the Court said: "This has been the view of the Court from the beginning. . . . It remains the Court's view today." 86 S. Ct. 1170, at p. 1176.

And just two months before (Jan. 17, 1966), Mr. Justice Douglas had written in *Evans, et al. v. Newton, et al.*, 86 S. Ct. 486, 488: "There are two complementary principles involved in this case. One is the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses."

And further, p. 489:

"If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control or management of that facility, we assume *arguendo* that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered."

Despite these established principles of Constitutional Law, the Attorney General of the United States, on May 4, 1966, commenced his discussion (before the House Committee) of the Housing Title by saying: "In the Civil Rights Act of 1866 Congress declared:

"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." (42 U.S.C. 1982)"

That is a correct statement.

It is also correct to say that this section was formerly Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, and 8 U.S.C. § 42. When so designated it was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in *Hurd v. Hodge*, 334 U.S. 24, and of it (pp. 31-32) the Court said:

"We may start with the proposition that the statute does not invalidate private restrictive agreements so long as the purposes of these agreements are achieved by the parties through voluntary adherence to the terms. The action toward which the provisions of the statute under consideration is directed is *governmental action*. Such was the holding of *Corrigan v. Buckley*, supra." (271 U.S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521) (Emphasis added)

Corrigan v. Buckley, as well as *Hurd v. Hodge*, involved restrictive covenants as to the sale of real estate. The former involved dwelling houses on "S" Street between 18th and New Hampshire Avenues in the City of Washington. In it (271 U.S. at page 330) the Court said:

"... the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 'have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.' . . . 'It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. *Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the Amendment.*' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 . . . *It is obvious that none of these amendments prohibited private individuals from entering into contracts respecting the control and disposition of their own property;* . . . (Emphasis added)

At page 331, considering, among others, the very statute which the Attorney General took as his text, the Court said:

"... It is obvious, upon their face, that whole they provide, inter alia, that all persons and citizens shall have equal right with white citizens to make contracts and acquire property, they, like the Constitutional Amendment under whose sanction they were enacted *do not in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own property.*" (Emphasis added)

The Court which so stated was headed by Chief Justice Taft, and had among its members Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone. There were no dissents.

Despite this established law of the land the Attorney General seeks to have Congress enact legislation banning and rendering illegal "contracts entered into by private individuals" and acts and actions of private individuals, and seeks to justify such legislation "primarily on the Commerce clause of the Constitution and on the Fourteenth Amendment." "I have no doubts whatsoever" he says, "as to its constitutionality." So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, I have no doubts whatsoever as to its unconstitutionality unless the Supreme Court should, for some reason, overrule a continuous line of authorities extending over a period from 1883 to March of 1966.

As to the Commerce clause, I merely say that since the decisions in the *Heart of Atlanta Motel case*, 379 U.S. 241, and *Katzenbach v. McClung*, 379 U.S. 294, I do not pretend to know just what the scope of the Commerce clause is.

I do suggest that in the *Heart of Atlanta Motel case*, the opinion of the Court considered and deemed "without precedential value" the decision in the Civil Rights cases because the 1875 Act there involved broadly proscribed discrimination in inns etc. "without limiting the categories of affected businesses to those impinging upon interstate commerce." (p. 250)

"In contrast" said the Court (p. 250-1) "the applicability of Title II is carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people, except where state action is involved."

In the *McClung case*, the Court considered the application of Title II "to restaurants which serve food a substantial portion of which has moved in commerce." (p. 298)

In Title IV of S-3296, I do not find any reference to the commerce clause, or its language, or any words indicating that the discriminations sought to be banned have any relation whatever to the interstate flow of goods and people.

If A refuses to rent a dwelling to B because of B's race, color, religion, or national origin, (Title IV § 403(a)), it is impossible for me to see how commerce between the States is affected in the remotest degree.

The impossibility, as far as I am concerned, extends to §§ 403-(b-e), and to Section 404, although I have read what the Attorney General said on that phase of the subject matter. (Pages 21, et seq. of his statement to the House Committee.)

The Attorney General seems to rely greatly on *Wickard v. Filburn*, — U.S. —, wherein the Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act could validly apply to a farmer who sowed only 23 acres of wheat, almost all of which was consumed on his farm.

I live in a dwelling which I purchased in 1919. I have lived in it continuously since. The mortgage which formerly covered it has long since been removed. If its brick or hardware or plaster or paint ever "moved" in interstate commerce, they have long since

come to rest. If I should refuse to sell that house to a person because of his race, color, religion or natural origin, would I be subject to the sanctions of Title IV?

CONCLUSION

I cannot conceive of a better reply to the statement of the Attorney General to which I have referred than words of Mr. Justice Hugo Black uttered March 24, 1966 in his dissent in the case of *Harper, et al. Appellants v. Virginia State Board of Elections, et al.*, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1087-8.

They are, I think, particularly apt and timely because of the appeal which is being made to the Congress to disregard the past adjudications of the Court, to disregard the Constitution, and to substitute for them its own conceptions of right and wrong, to enact a law said to be "designed to help achieve equality in the market place." (p. 15)

Justice Black's words follow: "The Court's justification for consulting its own notions rather than following the original meaning of the Constitution, as I would, apparently is based on the belief of the majority of the Court that for this Court to be bound by the original meaning of the Constitution is an intolerable and debilitating evil; that our Constitution should not be 'shackled to the political theory of a particular era,' and that to save the country from the original Constitution the Court must have constant power to renew it and keep it abreast with this Court's more enlightening theories of what is best for our society. It seems to me that this is not only an attack on the great value of our Constitution itself but also on the concept of a written constitution which is to survive through the years as originally written unless changed through the amendment process which the Framers wisely provided. Moreover, when a 'political theory' embodied in our Constitution becomes out-dated, it seems to me that a majority of the nine members of this Court are not only without constitutional power but are far less qualified to choose a new constitutional political theory than the people of this country proceeding in the manner provided by Article V."

I suggest therefore that the Congress ought not to be asked to enact a statute, and certainly should not enact it merely because the Court may test its validity not by established constitutional principles but by some "new constitutional political theory."

That far in my quoting from Justice Black he was treating of the Court's power and duty.

He proceeded:

"The people have not found it impossible to amend their Constitution to meet new conditions. The Equal Protection clause itself is the product of the people's desire to use their constitutional power to amend the Constitution to meet new problems."

I interpolate—So are the Income Tax Amendment, and the Direct Elections of Senators Amendment and the Woman Suffrage Amendment. So was the Prohibition Amendment, and its repealing amendment. So was the amendment limiting the terms of service of a President. When one man was elected President four successive terms, the people acted as provided in the Constitution.

Justice Black proceeded:

"Moreover, the people, in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, designated the governmental tribunal they wanted to provide additional rules to enforce the guarantees of that Amendment. The branch of government they chose was not the Judicial Branch but the Legislative. I have no doubt at all that Congress has the power under § 5 to pass legislation to abolish the poll tax in order to protect the citizens of this country if it believes that the poll tax is being used as a device to deny voters equal protection

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of the law. See my concurring and dissenting opinion in *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 86 S. Ct. 803."

It is quite clear that discriminatory use by the State of a poll tax created by state statute would be "state action" and therefore subject to control by appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment (§ 5). In the *Katzenbach* case (at p. 832) Justice Black had said: "I have no doubt whatever as to the power of Congress . . . to enact the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 dealing with the suspension of state voting tests that have been used . . . to deny and abridge voting rights on racial grounds." (Emphasis added)

It is equally clear that Congress does not have the power under § 5 to pass legislation preventing "discrimination" if the discrimination consists of wrongs done by individuals. (86 S. Ct. at 1176) "This has been the view of the Court from the beginning . . . It remains the Court's view today." 86 S. Ct. 1176 (March 28, 1966).

MANPOWER SERVICES ACT OF 1966—TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate make some corrections in S. 2974, which are entirely technical. The bill was passed yesterday and those corrections should be made.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

BOMBING OF STRATEGIC OIL AND GAS SUPPLIES SUPPORTED

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the President of the United States yesterday ordered the bombing of strategic oil and gas supplies in the Haiphong and Hanoi area. Much comment has ensued in support or condemnation of this action. I wish to make my views understood at this time.

I support the action taken by the President without reservation and, in fact, urged him to make this type of decision late last year and again early this year.

It has been clear for some time that the North Vietnamese were wholly unresponsive to our request, indeed our pleas, to join us at the conference table in a peaceful resolution of the struggle which has engulfed the unhappy people of South Vietnam. This statement has been true since the failure of the cease fire some 6 months ago which we initiated without results.

As I wrote the President on January 28 of this year, I believe that our policy has suffered in southeast Asia just as it suffered in Korea from a too-heavy reliance on civilian advice and reluctance to permit the military commanders to accomplish our limited objectives.

The results of yesterday's bombing of the oil and gas depots in my opinion will hasten the end of this war more than any protestation of peace made by the administration. I concur completely with the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, when he said that we should, in effect, win this war or get out.

Events of June 29 will represent an important step in bringing about a growing realization in Hanoi and Peking that

their intransigence is both futile and self-destructive.

I hope, Mr. President, that the Commander in Chief now moves toward a policy of continuing the military pressure. I believe that we should, in the near future, move to blockade or mine Haiphong Harbor. I am certain that most Americans fully support these attacks on military targets which make clear our purpose to friend and foe alike. They do so confident that it is the shortest road to peace and will contribute greatly in terms of saving the lives of our men in uniform.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD editorials which appeared in the *Washington Star* on June 29, and in the *Washington Post* on June 30.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the *Evening Star*, June 29, 1966]

HITTING WHERE IT HURTS

The bombing raids on fuel storage areas near Haiphong and Hanoi presumably mean that President Johnson, after much hesitation, has decided to strike at targets that are truly vital to the enemy's war of aggression against South Viet Nam. This decision, in our opinion, is both right and necessary.

Carrier-based planes struck at storage dumps two miles from the center of the port city of Haiphong. These tanks hold about 40 percent of North Viet Nam's fuel supply—oil that is vital not only to the trucks which haul supplies into South Viet Nam but also to the operation of the North Vietnamese industrial plant. The second strike was made by Air Force planes against fuel dumps three miles from the center of Hanoi. Both attacks were described as "highly successful," and smoke was sighted 35,000 feet above the Hanoi target. United States sources say no planes were lost, although Hanoi claims that seven were downed. The returning pilots said anti-aircraft fire at Hanoi was heavy, but relatively light at Haiphong.

The decision to go after the storage dumps reportedly was made at a Security Council meeting last week. When word of the decision was "leaked," it first appeared that the President had changed his mind and that the attacks might not be made. One asserted reason was that the premature disclosure had upset elaborate plans for an after-the-event explanation of the considerations which went into the making of the decision.

It does not seem to us, however, that the President owes an explanation to anyone. The fuel dumps are military, not civilian targets. That they would be attacked was indicated 10 days ago when Mr. Johnson said the United States "would continue to raise the cost of aggression at its source." This source certainly includes military objectives in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

Now that this first blow has been struck, similar raids can be expected in the future. Hopefully, they will persuade Hanoi that the time has come for an honorable peace settlement. If not, then the administration is left with no choice except to destroy the enemy's means of maintaining his aggression.

[From the *Washington Post*, June 30, 1966]

OIL TARGETS

The practical military arguments for bombing the oil storage facilities of North Vietnam are so compelling and persuasive that the delay in mounting this attack is more surprising than the event. The unwillingness

of the Administration to act sooner can be explained only by its reluctance to bear the diplomatic risks. And this reluctance must have been overcome, finally, by the elaborate analysis of the probable civilian casualties which in turn led to the conclusion that these strikes would not alter basically the nature of the air war. All air attack involves jeopardy to civilians close to target areas, and the attack on communications no doubt has been quite as destructive of civilian life as the oil storage attacks.

It is perfectly obvious, from the figures used by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, that the effort to interdict the movement of troops and supplies by air attack has not stopped infiltration from the North. And it is clear that despite a heavy assault on such communications, the North Vietnamese have been able to mount an increasing assault.

It is the lesson of World War II all over again. The British analysis entitled *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany* had to say of the offensive against German communications: "The impression still remains that the immense power of the strategic forces was not used in the attacks on communications in such a manner as to produce the most rapid end to the resistance of the enemy."

The same report said that the attacks on oil depots, on the contrary, had "important results on the last German efforts of resistance." Elsewhere the experts of the British survey concluded that "the attack on oil made a large contribution to the Allied victory." In estimating the strategic air effort as a whole, the British postwar survey concluded that "none of the other means of pressure could have been applied with such success if the attack on oil had not taken place."

Hopes for the success of this attack in a different environment must not be exaggerated. The attack on Germany included assaults on oil production facilities as well as storage. In this case, the production facilities lie outside the target country. In addition, the North Vietnamese have no great mechanized forces to be immobilized by a lack of petrol as the German force of 1500 tanks in Upper Silesia was immobilized, and in the way other German units were deprived of the power of tactical maneuver. Still, although air attack may be less effective than it was in Europe, there is no doubt that the air arm now has struck at the best enemy target at hand.

It is important that the United States forces maintain a clear distinction between the best target for air operations and the worst one. The worst one is clearly civilian populations. It is the worst target not only because military results are not achieved, but, in addition, because the World War II evidence indicates that the effects of area bombing of civilians, far from weakening the will to resist, may strengthen it. And if this was true in Germany, of a sophisticated urban population, it is even more likely to be true of the population of North Vietnam. The loss of the comforts and conveniences of urban society would have even less effect in such a country.

There is not much doubt that Americans will overwhelmingly support the attack upon targets of such obvious military eligibility as oil dumps; and there is not much doubt that opinion in the United States and elsewhere would overwhelmingly oppose deliberate assaults on population centers.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of the regular 3-minute speeches in the morning hour, and any reports to be

filed from committees on regular business of the Senate, I be permitted to address the Senate for 20 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT *pro tempore*. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GRAND CANYON DAMS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President—

Leave it as it is. You cannot improve on it. The ages have been at work on it, and man can only mar it.

So spoke President Theodore Roosevelt on May 6, 1903, during a visit to the Grand Canyon of the Colorado. T.R.'s advice is as sound today as it was 63 years ago.

Yet at a time when the President is pressing a campaign to preserve natural beauty, Congress is being asked to approve a plan that would destroy a great part and radically change what remained of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, a canyon which T.R. described as absolutely unparalleled throughout the rest of the world.

Under the pending proposal, the Colorado River would be dammed at points north—Marble Gorge—and possibly south—Bridge Canyon—of the Grand Canyon National Park and National Monument. The length of the Grand Canyon National Monument and 13 miles of the national park would be flooded behind Bridge Canyon dam. The Marble Gorge dam would create a lake 300 feet deep behind it and would inundate 50 miles of the upper Grand Canyon.

These dams would be constructed for the ultimate purpose of bringing water into arid central Arizona. The dams themselves will not produce a drop of water for that region, or for any other region. Rather, electricity to be generated by the impounded water will be sold at a profit to help pay for diverting water from somewhere else into the Phoenix-Tucson area. In other words, the dams are a financing gimmick aptly described by the Bureau of Reclamation as "cash registers."

To provide this financing device, the Grand Canyon would be sacrificed. For myself—and I believe most Americans feel the same way—I would rather pay the additional taxes that would be required to fund the water diversion project than to sell what I regard as the birthright of our people for a mess of pottage. Moreover, there is already serious doubt that the project will be as profitable financially as its proponents claim. If that should turn out to be the case, we will end up paying for much of it anyway through subsidies to make up the loss.

Despite what many believe, the damage caused by the dams would not be localized. This is because the 280-mile-long canyon is a physical entity, the creation of a free-flowing river. With the installation of two dams, or even one, this natural process would be seriously impaired, perhaps even halted. As some conservationists have put it, a living laboratory of stream erosion would be turned into a static museum piece.

There are many strong reasons for opposing the shackling of the Colorado with additional dams. Foremost among these,

of course, is the irreparable damage to a national treasure.

Experts in conservation point out that the dams would actually waste water through evaporation and seepage in a water-short region, that technological advances in power generation may offer, in a few years, cheaper power than the dams would ever produce, and that permission to invade one national park undoubtedly would be used as a precedent for invading others.

Over and beyond all the technological, economic, and legal reasons for opposing the dams is the unassailable fact that a unique wonder of nature would be destroyed for all time.

Has not the time come to distinguish between an exploitable natural resource and a resource immune from exploitation? The Grand Canyon should—it must—fall into the latter category. For unless we can make the canyon forever inviolable, how can we hope to protect any of our parks, beaches, wildlife refuges, and the like?

The natural beauty of our land, in fact our whole environment, is an irreplaceable asset. If we want to preserve it, we must bend ourselves to the task, mindful of the disciplines that may be required.

Congress, of course, has recognized that water supply and distribution is a national, not merely a local or State problem. Just this year the Senate passed a bill creating a National Water Commission which would make a 5-year study of the Nation's water problems.

But we can meet this problem, as we can meet all of our problems, without despoiling our other natural resources. In the case of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, Theodore Roosevelt told the Nation how to treat this natural phenomenon and Congress should follow his advice:

"What you can do is to keep it for your children, your children's children, and for all who come after you, as one of the great sights which every American if he can travel at all should see. We have gotten past the stage, my fellow citizens, when we are to be pardoned if we treat any part of our country as something to be skinned for two or three years for the use of the present generation, whether it is the forest, the water, the scenery. Whatever it is, handle it so that your children's children will get the benefit of it."

And I repeat T.R.'s words:

Leave it as it is. You cannot improve on it. The ages have been at work on it, and man can only mar it.

OUR PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, it is evident that our President has yielded to many of the militarists and our generals who seem to regard their mission as waging all-out war instead of directing their energies toward maintaining the peace of the world. It is evident he yielded to the continuing demands of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No doubt the decision of our Commander in Chief to bomb areas in the suburbs of Hanoi, the densely populated capital of North Vietnam, and the oil depots, docks, and port installations in and around Haiphong, the chief port

of North Vietnam, has made the Gen. Curtis LeMays and our Chiefs of Staff very happy.

Personally I had hoped against hope that our President would direct another bombing pause of North Vietnam for a period of 15 days and in that interim would have made every effort seeking the cooperation of U Thant, U.N. Secretary General, and Prime Minister Wilson of the United Kingdom to make a final further attempt to bring about an armistice and cease-fire in Vietnam at a conference to which delegates representing the Hanoi and Saigon governments were invited to participate and, in addition, delegates representing the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong.

The President instead has chosen the course to fight the war to military victory. He has made the ultimate decision. Where it will ultimately lead no man knows. Prime Minister Wilson of Great Britain, our greatest ally, has definitely and publicly disassociated himself and his nation from us. We have lost this ally. France and Great Britain are, therefore, both now aligned against us and our policies in escalating and expanding our offensive in North Vietnam. Apparently no nations in Asia are now sympathetic toward our belligerency except Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.

For the first time in modern history we are fighting a war practically alone, abandoned by our allies and friends and in a faraway Asiatic country, Vietnam, which is of no strategic or economic importance to the defense of the United States; never has been and never will be.

"ON GOING IT ALONE"—PARTIAL TEXT OF REMARKS OF SENATOR KUCHEL AT FRESNO STATE COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, on June 8, 1966, I was honored to be invited to speak at the commencement exercises of Fresno State College, Fresno, Calif. I ask unanimous consent that the partial text of my remarks on that occasion be placed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the extracts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ON GOING IT ALONE

(Partial text of remarks by U.S. Senator THOMAS H. KUCHEL at commencement ceremonies of Fresno State College, June 8, 1966)

It is with a real sense of honor that I participate in these commencement ceremonies at Fresno State College, founded well over a half-century ago by the people and the government of our state, respected for its successful pursuit of educational excellence, its doors open to students of every race or color, who desire to come here to study and to learn. No place on earth is more richly endowed by nature than the vast valley of the San Joaquin. And of all the progress that man, and our free society, have achieved in this area, none offers greater assurances for the future than the annual product of Fresno State College.

I congratulate those who today receive degrees, who thus successfully close one stimulating chapter in their life and who are about to enter the next. Our state and nation look forward to having you participate, in one

fashion or another, in all the vast panorama of public problems which continue to perplex and plague all of us.

King Solomon said "knowledge is a wonderful thing; therefore get knowledge: but with all thy getting, get understanding."

Most of all we need to understand our fellow man. You are not alone on this campus. You will not be alone in life. The Scriptures say "It is not a good thing that the man should be alone." Our own life pattern is vastly affected by what others do, whether they live around the corner or half-way around the world. And, as this is true of the family, the campus or the community, it is also true of nations. And for a long time, our own beloved country followed an official philosophy of going it alone—or any way of trying to.

The American Revolution was a successful protest against denial of liberty. Our American heroes of that day decided we would brook no interference from anybody in living by ourselves. Our colonies determined that they were going to set their own course, and that what happened across the Atlantic would be irrelevant to our own life and to our own future. General Washington's stern counsel admonished us to avoid entangling alliances. Our few early foreign agreements dealt only with international boundaries, commerce and trade. They were hardly a violation of our first President's rule. By geography, we were effectively insulated from life on other continents. God had given us the great dividing oceans. The problems of Europe and Asia, and beyond, were, we had concluded, of no concern to us. This western hemisphere, indeed, only a part of it, was all we cared for.

Over the generations, our wealth and strength were growing. We were becoming a power in the world whether we liked it or not. In the early part of this century the United States became the world's largest producer and consumer of steel, coal, petroleum, and a large array of the other industrial items by which man reckoned power in those days. The United States led the way in new forms of transportation and communication which were bringing men closer together. The First world war hastened us towards change.

The United States was regarded by the rest of the world as a hopeful element in world affairs. We were idealistic. We hoped to outlaw war. In the 1920's, after the first world war, we signed solemn treaties to scuttle portions of our naval fleet, and, let the record be clear, we carried out the provisions, while other treaty signatories broke their word.

In our young national adulthood, we were like Gilbert and Sullivan's king "who wished all men were as rich as he, and he was as rich as rich could be."

In the modern world wealth had come to mean power; and power meant responsibility. I suppose that it has always been so.

The vast destruction wrought by the Second World War made it plain that the world, as we knew it, could not endure if free peoples continued to try to go it alone. It was made plain, too, that the mantle of world leadership for freedom had fallen upon the United States. In 1946 Winston Churchill told the people of America they had reached "... the highest point of majesty and power ever attained since the fall of the Roman Empire. This imposes a duty on the American people which cannot be rejected. With all great opportunities comes responsibility."

So began the struggle to bind up Europe's wounds, to restore her economic well being, to rekindle her self-respect and to encourage faith in freedom. We strove to help restore a system of free western nations enriched by the free exchange of views among

men. And at almost every step of the way, sometimes openly, sometimes covertly, our erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, sought to impede the reconstruction.

Here began a challenge to the rebuilding of Western Europe, of preserving Western culture and of creating stable self-governments of free peoples. That challenge has become the major political fact of the Twentieth Century. It has since spread from Europe to almost every corner of the globe. It has been the pre-occupation of the United States almost as long as any of us can remember.

Western Europe was deeply troubled in the 1940s. The ravages of the war still remained. The smaller states were afraid they might be pulled into a Red vortex, for that is what they saw happen to their eastern neighbors. They began to talk of sharing risks, of confronting danger together. Out of that challenge there came the greatest example of collective security our world has ever known. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO—came into being as a military defensive system against potential Soviet aggression. It was designed to do other things. It sought to assist in the quest for dependable disarmament and arms control agreements. It sought to advance the cause of peace in Europe and the Atlantic. It sought to find peaceful means to settling international disputes. The role of the United States, in the creation of NATO, was a major one, for it would not have come into existence without our wholehearted participation including our giant arsenal and our own men. I recall, with great pride, the name of one of my illustrious predecessors, Vandenberg of Michigan, who spoke out in the Senate, almost two decades ago, to unite our country in the realization that there must be an interdependence among the free, and that going it alone is not only perilous for us, but impossible for almost every nation on earth. It was Vandenberg who pointed the way for our country to abandon going alone as foreign policy.

As an American, I believe in the old American adage "in union there is strength." As a member of the human race, jealous of his own freedom and of yours, I believe that like-minded nations should stand together to promote both peace and freedom and to deter aggression and war. Thus, I want the Atlantic Alliance to continue. Meanwhile, I want our country to maintain its role of leadership and to continue its unrelenting quest for proper control of the instruments of war, and dependable disarmament agreements among nations. We have taken a few steps forward, of which the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is the most imposing. With American leadership, more could come about.

I regret that our longtime friend, France, did not join us in the Nuclear Treaty. I regret also that France now, under her present leadership, desires to cancel many of the important military arrangements which have been made under the North Atlantic Treaty agreement. These are distressing signs that France may desire to go it alone and to abandon many of those close ties which have so long linked us together. Just a few days ago a spokesman for the Government of France said:

"International crises no longer center in Europe, but in Asia, and the majority of NATO countries is not involved in Asia."

Graduating students, in this nuclear age, in this era of outer space, in this time of unimagined speed in travel and transportation and communication, what takes place anywhere on this earth must be of concern to people everywhere.

Surely, the detonation by Communist China of a third nuclear explosion shears away any false hope for isolation from Asia, of any European country, France included, or if any other part of this planet.

I have never forgotten the words of General MacArthur to the American Congress a decade and a half ago when he said:

"While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other."

What happens in Asia vitally concerns all of Asia, vitally concerns the Soviet Union, all of Europe, and all of the world, including the United States.

It is true that a war is raging today in Southeast Asia, and not in Europe, that the United States is involved, and that the oppressed land of South Viet Nam represents the most tragic, cruel crisis in today's world.

Our country is not alone. We receive tangible military support from South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. The Republic of the Philippines is providing token support, with some other countries, and has under consideration more widespread assistance. Last year, the Prime Minister of Australia said: "American intervention in Viet Nam was the greatest act of moral courage since Britain stood alone in the last World War."

Their sympathies of many Asian lands are with us. The Japanese Cabinet endorses United States-Vietnamese policy as it is now expressed and carried out, and Taiwan certainly does. Malaysia approves. Singapore understands. And Indonesia, having abruptly severed the tentacles of Red China, as they reached out to engulf her, is not about to encourage Red Chinese hegemony elsewhere. One Indonesian citizen recently told an American, "Please, don't tell us how to fight Communists."

We ardently pray that the crisis may be brought, before long, to a peaceful conclusion. It is to the credit of the American Government, I think, that it has repeatedly said it will go to the conference table at any time.

We may even now be witness to the birth of a new spirit of interdependence in Asia. Within this past year, one billion dollars has been subscribed for the creation of the Asian Development Bank. The majority of this sum came from Asian sources. By Act of Congress, the United States joined, as a minority stockholder, in this venture to help provide a source of repayable loans for development projects. The response to this idea, and the speed with which the Bank was organized, are unprecedented in the history of the international capital market.

In Bangkok, early this month, the leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia agreed to end their quarrels and, together with their colleagues from Thailand and the Philippines agreed to form a new union of their peoples emphasizing their common interests, and recognizing their interdependence.

The nations of Asia see that they need each other. They are learning that in possession of growing unity, and with the help of other free nations in the world, they need not succumb to the Red Chinese bully and its misnamed "Wars of National Liberation."

The point I wish to make is that the world is shrunken now to the point where armed conflict, however localized, and in whatever continent, is fully capable of quickly spreading to engulf all the globe. It is false and illusory to talk of Asia as not concerning Europe or vice-versa, in what remains of this Twentieth Century and beyond.

In your life span, graduating students, as before, the debate on going it alone will continue. Some will want to return to an isolation which really can never be. The rest of us must determine how much of the responsibility of leadership for freedom we want our America to accept. Some day, hopefully with your assistance, what Thomas Jefferson called "the disease of liberty" will inoculate all men.

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Communism does not require this totalitarian approach. We shall remain strong, firm, and rational.

Meanwhile, look at what is happening in the Soviet World. Observe the changes that are occurring with the passage of time. The vaunted economic system controlled by the dictatorship of the proletariat has given way to all kinds of capitalistic heresies: the interest rate, the profit motive, incentive rewards, and even some consumer sovereignty. The Kremlin has found that man does not live by doctrine alone, that he will work a little harder so he can enjoy the fruits of his labor, if he can relax at the end of the workday with some of the comforts of modern life, free from police-state fear.

I would agree with Henry J. Taylor that keeping up with the Russians is really "advancing backward." Among the things we would have to do to catch up are "... to destroy about two-thirds of our railway mileage, 90 percent of our airlines, 60 percent of our houses, 90 percent of our paved highways, 19 out of 20 of our trucks and cars, 40 million television sets, 9 out of every 10 telephones."

The captive peoples of Eastern Europe have become hostile to Soviet overlordship, and they have forced concessions of every kind, proving that Marxism's all-or-nothing push for domination must be tempered, or altered, to say the very least. And throughout Central Europe, the Church continues to stand like a rock unmoved by the tidal wave of Communism which sought unsuccessfully to engulf it.

In large areas of the world, Soviet and Chinese Communism have miserably failed. Their inflexible formulas of conquest, through infiltration and subversion, have been rejected by the peoples in Ghana, in the Sudan, in Malaysia, and in the Philippines, and in Indonesia. Without regard to cost or peril to themselves, they drove Communism from their lands. Developing countries will not accept foreign dogma in place of their own traditions. To them the conflict between Communism and the Free World is often irrelevant. They are not interested in the triumph of doctrine, but in the dynamics of their own growth.

One has only to read Evtushenko's *Bab i Yar* to sense the yearning of the great Russian soul, once the inspiration of Tolstol and Dostoyevski. Today it is shackled to a dogma whose falsity becomes clearer as time goes by.

The doctrines of Communism have failed; they have failed to satisfy. Its moribund spirit does not, cannot, minister to the spiritual needs of modern man.

Our own faith is not in dated slogans but in the working principles of our society, which let us adapt to changing circumstances to create new institutions, to make full use of all our resources, and to steer our course towards our goals of peace and justice for all peoples.

The Cold War has encouraged some men to be craven and cynical. But the inevitable triumph of freedom may even now be approaching. This is no time to allow a counsel of despair to prevail.

Our faith in our way of life remains our greatest strength in seeking to preserve the temple. I quote the Psalms: "except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain."

GODSPEED TO THE RAY—LAUNCHING OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, my family had a unique and memorable experience on June 21, 1966. On that day, my dear wife christened the new nuclear attack submarine, the *Ray*, which is destined to add enormous strength to the cause of freedom and to

the defensive might of the United States.

I was very glad to be asked to speak on the occasion of the launching. I ask unanimous consent that a partial text of my remarks on that occasion be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the extracts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GODSPEED TO THE "RAY"—LAUNCHING OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

Partial text of remarks by U.S. Senator THOMAS H. KUCHEL at the launching of the *Ray* (SS(N) 653) at Newport News, Va., June 21, 1966)

Today's ceremonies witness the launching of a new American undersea craft, dedicated to the defense of our freedom, and christened with an historic and gallant name. I am honored at the request of the Secretary of the Navy to speak on this occasion. From the Valhalla of our naval heroes and of our heroic naval ships, the spirit of the U.S.S. *Ray* (SS-271) of the Second World War, and of the Atlantic Alliance which followed, sends her Godspeed to the *Ray* (SS(N) 653) and to our fellow citizens who, as members of our unconquerable United States Navy, will have the duty and the honor to man her.

The earlier *Ray* commenced compiling her intrepid record in late 1943, and in the ensuing months of the War, in a fascinating story of successful engagements with the enemy, of sustaining injuries and of overcoming them, of facing dangers and repelling them, always to return to patrol again and again, of sinking Japanese ships, she earned seven battle stars, the Navy Unit Commendation, the Philippine Republic Presidential Unit Citation Badge, and other awards, from New Guinea to Leyte to Okinawa. She was converted in 1950 to a radar picket submarine, was cut in two and lengthened by 30 feet, and then went on to continue her remarkable career, joining in North Atlantic Treaty Organization exercises both in the Mediterranean and in Northern European waters, and finally retiring with honor in 1960. She was, in her life, invincible and indestructible, and she bequeaths to this nuclear giant an emblazoned name and a history of success, good fortune, and "well done."

Just a handful of years ago, American men of science found the key to unlock the secrets of the atom, and the world would never again be the same. All the dimensions by which power and energy had been gauged and measured suddenly had to be discarded. Nuclear, and subsequently thermonuclear might, catapulted the human race into a new chapter in its journey, and a new time on earth. Vast new potentials for good or for evil had opened up. Life could be made far better, or life could be summarily sheared away from this planet. Here was new and incredible power which could be used for life or death or for peace or for war.

This submarine launched today will be, as I say, a defender of freedom. Nuclear energy will turn her powerful engines for long, long periods of time, and the old restrictions of duty based on fuel reserve are forever gone. The *Ray* is as modern as tomorrow. Her propellant represents the magic of the world in which we live. To borrow the phrase of a newspaperman, she will "move with the speed of a shark, hover like a jellyfish, and dive or surface like a dolphin." Like the fish for which she is named, she will be big, powerful and maneuverable. She should be able to win all the deadly contests of hide and seek. She will be fully qualified against all enemy undersea boats. To operate this nuclear marvel will be men, officers and enlisted, all superbly skilled in nuclear science, electron-

ics, weaponry of all kinds, transistors, radar, sonar, hydraulics and digital computers.

This submarine, and the United States Navy submarine fleet which she will join, all stand for peace. She demonstrates to any potential enemy the complete futility of aggression. There can be no question but that our pre-eminent defensive might in all the elements, land and sea and air, deterred the Soviet from successful nuclear blackmail in Cuba, and, indeed, deterred them from aggressive adventures against the West during all of the Cold War. For the Soviet Union respects power, and the *Ray* represents precisely that.

In the seemingly never-ending struggle for freedom, the people of our beloved country have a responsibility of leadership which they cannot and must not shirk. After the War, Winston Churchill told our country, in 1946, that we had reached "the highest point of majesty and power ever attained since the fall of the Roman Empire. This imposes a duty on the American people which cannot be rejected. With all great opportunities comes responsibility." I believe the opportunities continue in 1966, and surely our responsibility does.

The struggle for freedom is global. In this shrunken planet, we live in a kind of congested world neighborhood. Fire or conflict erupting in any continent directly affects all the rest of us.

Today a war is raging in Southeast Asia, and the United States is participating in it. I believe I speak for the great majority of our fellow citizens when I say that we shall not repudiate our cherished goals nor abandon the responsibility we have assumed. We seek peace, we pray for peace. We want all the members of the family of nations to be free from attack or subversion by their neighbors, and, surely the security of our own beloved Nation is directly connected to world stability and to the cause of a just peace. Can you not take great inward comfort and pride from our assistance to the weak and the stricken? Last year, the Prime Minister of Australia said: "American intervention in Vietnam was the greatest act of moral courage since Britain stood alone in the last World War."

The *Ray*, in her service, will help us to maintain a vigilance for American freedom, and for the liberty and self-respect of man. The *Ray*, in her lifetime, will be a part of a vast American defense establishment designed to deter the use of force by the enemies of freedom, or, if unhappily necessary, to defeat those enemies and to destroy their force. Meanwhile, we must try, through amity, and good will, and diplomacy, to find peaceful means to settle international disputes. We need constantly to appeal to reason.

On the deck of the Missouri, after the surrender of Japan, General MacArthur said:

"The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character that will synchronize with out almost matchless advance in science, art, literature, and all material and cultural developments of the past two thousand years. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh."

Let the invincibility of the American spirit ever rise with this guardian of our freedom. Godspeed to the *Ray*.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, every person in this country, and I hope in every area of the world, must be familiar with the extraordinary and relentless efforts this country has made to stop the fighting in Asia at the conference table rather than on the battlefield. As a matter of fact, we have carried our

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"WHOSE GOD IS DEAD?"—REMARKS OF SENATOR KUCHEL AT SAN JOSE STATE COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, on June 10, 1966, I was honored to be invited to speak at the commencement ceremonies of San Jose State College, San Jose, Calif. I ask unanimous consent that the partial text of my remarks on that occasion be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the extracts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHOSE GOD IS DEAD?

(Partial text of remarks by U.S. Senator THOMAS H. KUCHEL, at commencement ceremonies of San Jose State College, June 10, 1966)

I am highly honored to speak at the commencement ceremonies of San Jose State College, oldest institution of higher learning in our state. You who attend this great school, as students or faculty, directly benefit from a long and active interest in, and a keen appreciation of, education by the people of California, something they have pretty consistently demonstrated over the last century. Yours is a history of excellence in scholarship, in an ever-widening gamut of studies, at a time of unbelievable growth, for our state and for your school.

California has been a progressive state. That is its tradition. Its people have always sought to go forward. They have had the urge of accomplishment. They believed, and they still believe, in the irreplaceable importance of education, and of higher education, as the solid base on which to build and to keep a free society.

I have forgotten who it was who long ago said "God takes care of little children, drunks, and the people of the United States." I think there may be a good deal of merit in that observation. But I also think that the future of this free nation is going to require an active interest in our society by those citizens who have had the benefit of a college education, such as you who mark your progress by degrees today. There is a far greater purpose in attending college than in simply acquiring opportunities for a greater economic advantage. There is far more to life than a dollar. In a very real sense educated Americans bear a special burden of preserving this free society, and of defending and advancing the cause of human liberty.

The things which we hold dear in America, the dignity of the individual, human freedom itself, are not for Americans alone, but for the whole human race. That was what the signers of the Declaration of Independence had in mind. And that, I believe, is what this country stands for today.

America has made unbelievable progress from the beginning. We have taken long strides towards making "equal justice under law" a reality rather than a sham. While there is much remaining to be done, much has been accomplished. Tens of thousands of disenfranchised Americans are, at long last, voting. We seek to eliminate the causes of poverty and racial unrest. A majority of Americans have been able to find time for a little more than just the pursuit of the necessities of life.

It is true that the American continent was richly endowed by our Creator. It is true that over the years we have come to recognize the value of conserving the resources of nature, of utilizing them in a manner that would permit their use in future generations as well as our own. Our almost 200 million people have created an enormous material wealth. With six per cent of the world's peo-

ple, we consume annually one-sixth of its cement, one-third of its electric power, a fifth of its coal, and a quarter of its steel. We produce one-half of its passenger cars and possess and use half of its telephones. Our national product is one-third of the total of the world, and per capita income is 7.7 times that of the average of all other nations.

We in California know some of the problems that come with a supercharged production. If the fragrance of our spring wildflowers has given way to smog, if the clear lakes of the Sierras are endangered by pollution, if the groves of God-given redwoods face extinction by the saw and the ax; it is no less the consequence of our material advance than of our negligence or selfish appetites. There was a time in this vast State of California when man could at once be alone with nature and with the works of his Creator. We now know that he may enjoy such felicity only at the sufferance of his neighbor, and, even then, as a kind of rarity.

Peace and freedom walk together. Change is the law of the universe. Each generation faces new problems. In this last third of the Twentieth Century unbelievable changes have been taking place. This is the age of nuclear power and the exploration of outer space. This is the era of instant communication and of almost instant travel. In your lifetime, this enormous scientific evolution will continue to unfold. Many of the secrets heretofore denied to our race will be unlocked in your time. But the struggle for peace and freedom will continue. Goethe said "he only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew."

We have abundance in material things, but, most important, we have abundance in freedom. This is no accident. The free flight of man's imagination is the first requisite of creativity. Free discussion of ideas is the essence of a productive organization of society. Faith in the brotherhood of man marks the high road by which our civilization may remain, and may remain free.

In most of our national life, we were concerned almost exclusively with our own development. America did not play a prominent role in world affairs until called upon by continuing crises which had inflamed the Old World, and which had begun to sear the New. In the aftermath of the First World War, our people were in an almost continuous ferment as to what our country's role in the world should be. Fear and a kind of idealism were competing with one another. President Wilson went to Europe in 1919 speaking of "open covenants openly arrived at" and urging a League of Nations to settle disputes without war. Motivated by a desire for continued isolation, the United States Senate violently disagreed. Later, the United States led the way in world disarmament. In 1928, by the Kellogg-Briand peace pact with France, the United States agreed to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. We were searching for a better world, and we were beginning to show an interest in our planet. But it took a second bloody global conflict to demonstrate that the world was not going to stop turning, and that we could not get off.

In 1948, another milestone was reached in the development of our role in the world when the late Arthur Vandenberg, speaking in the United States Senate, slammed the door on American isolationism, renouncing the idea that we could live alone in good conscience or, indeed, in self-preservation. His resolution, approved in the Senate, affirmed that United States would seek "international peace and security through the United Nations." It paved the way towards our participation in the Atlantic Alliance, together with Canada and our free friends in Europe. It courageously placed our country on record for providing the United Nations with armed strength and for the regulation and reduction of armament.

Looking back, some may think our idealism has been a trifle naive. Since the close of the Second World War, we have experienced countless international crises and have spent seemingly endless sums for foreign aid. We have learned the Arab proverb that it is not easy to give things away. Many Americans have traveled abroad as tourists only to find that "rich Americans" are fair game for high prices. We might well have become cynical. But I think we cherish our idealism still.

There are many achievements exemplifying the good will of the United States of America. Foremost among these was our help in restoring a destitute continent of Europe at the end of the Second World War. We bound up the wounds of those we fought with and those we fought against.

Following our acceptance of this task we became embroiled in the struggle of the age. America faced a monolithic adversary convinced that its own contrived doctrines were far more potent than our own beliefs in the dignity of the individual and the freedom of man. Soviet Communist leadership had long since adopted the view of all totalitarian regimes that the ends they seek justify the means they use.

For the past two decades the adversaries have been deeply engaged in this struggle. They have watched each other carefully, analyzing every move of the opponent. The Communists cried "Death to the Capitalist Imperialists," and the Free World said "Destroy Communism." If we were able to produce a nuclear bomb, Russia would make arrangements to steal the process from us. If we sought to inculcate democracy in the new states by a foreign aid program, Russia, and, subsequently, Red China, must embark on their kind of aid program, Communist style. If the Russians put a satellite in space, we did too.

You all have seen or read that great story "The Spy Who Came in from the Cold." You will remember the anonymous leader known as "Control" who tells the hero, home from a tour of duty in Berlin, what the Cold War is all about:

"... you've got to compare method with method, and ideal with ideal. I would say that since the War, our methods—ours and those of the opposition—have become much the same. I mean you can't be less ruthless than the opposition simply because your government's policy is benevolent."

And that, my friends, is the utter end of idealism.

We have paid dearly for this struggle. It brought us out into the world, only to limit our horizon. The defense of our own freedom has spread thin the wealth that we might have put into education of our children and renovation of our cities.

Let none mistake. We shall, however long, continue to maintain a pre-eminent defense, designed to deter any aggression or, if necessary, to combat and to defeat it. But it is a sad thing that among some of our people, the struggle against Communism has encouraged them almost to abandon all humanitarian ideals. Fear of the Communist demon has led some to urge that we stifle our own freedoms in order somehow, to protect them. That is not good logic. The strength of America, rests in more than guns. From our system which guarantees each of you your individual freedom, comes much of the strength of our country. Americans intend to keep their freedom whatever the cost. A desire for absolute victory in the struggle has brought others to demand illogical military actions which could catapult the world into a global war. In our Federal Government, there have been regrettable instances of public servants concealing information which did not affect national security, under a policy which can truthfully be called "managed news" and of deciding what the American people ought to know. Prevailing over

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efforts for a negotiation conference to the point of humiliation. We did it almost to the point of having our men get on their hand and knees and crawl to North Vietnam to get them to agree to some conference to end the war.

Having had no alternative, and having had every effort to settle the conflict rejected—indeed, the efforts were not only rejected; they were scorned—on yesterday American war planes bombed military targets in North Vietnam.

For my part, I do not see any alternative that was available to this country in the interest of preserving the lives of the 400,000 men we have in Vietnam. I have been waiting to hear the presentation of some alternatives by those who are critical of what has transpired in Vietnam. I shall continue to await them with interest.

This country has a tremendous responsibility to the boys over there and to their families who remain in this country. I am so convinced of the responsibility, that I not only approve of what took place yesterday, but I think we waited too long to take the action. I would be in favor of knocking out each and every target and every facility that can contribute in any way to reducing the casualty lists of American men and women who are in Vietnam.

I did not favor our involvement in Vietnam, but I do not propose to discuss a moot question of that kind today. We are there. As far as I am concerned, I do not propose to leave the 400,000 Americans who are there to their resources, which are limited—most of them are limited to rifles or machineguns—but I shall undertake to support them in every possible way, even if it results in what some people call escalation of the war in Vietnam.

On yesterday the Secretary of Defense held a press conference to announce the bombing. I did not see it or hear it on radio or television, but I did read it this morning. I thought he presented a clear picture of what transpired yesterday as far as the facts are available. It is also a lucid statement of our objectives and purposes in this war.

It is a very limited objective that we seek in Vietnam. I recommend this statement for the reading of those who talk about trying to encourage an all-out war. Our objectives in this war, as I say, are very limited; and we have been in some respects very dilatory in pushing to achieve those objectives.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Secretary McNamara at his press conference on yesterday be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PRESS CONFERENCE: HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JUNE 29, 1966

Secretary McNAMARA. Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I should like to report to you upon the air attacks on the petroleum facilities in North Viet Nam. These were carried out this morning by 46 Navy and Air Force strike aircraft. They inflicted heavy damage on three of North Viet Nam's petroleum facili-

ties. These were facilities located at Haiphong, Hanoi, and Dosan. Together they represented over sixty percent of North Viet Nam's remaining storage capacity.

The Navy aircraft participating in the strike operated from the Carriers Ranger and Constellation.

The attacks on the three targets were achieved with the loss of one aircraft—an F-105. Pilots report that while attacking a surface to air missile site in the vicinity of Hanoi, MIG aircraft were encountered. One MIG 17 was probably destroyed as the result of this encounter.

No U.S. aircraft were lost in the air engagement. At Haiphong after the attack heavy smoke rose to an altitude of more than five miles and preliminary pilot reports indicate an estimated eighty percent destruction of the target area.

At Hanoi, pilots report heavy damage to the target. Fires were observed in all four sectors of the petroleum storage area.

At Dosan, heavy damage was also reported by the pilots. Both the Navy and the Air Force pilots said that anti-aircraft fire ranged from light to heavy. It was heaviest in the vicinity of Hanoi.

The strikes against these petroleum facilities were initiated to counter a mounting reliance by North Viet Nam on the use of trucks and powered junks to facilitate the infiltration of men and equipment from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam. As a matter of fact enemy truck movement to South Viet Nam has doubled during the first five months of 1966 compared to the first five months of 1965.

In addition, the inventory of trucks in North Viet Nam has grown very rapidly and by the end of 1966 it is expected to be about double that of the end of 1965.

Furthermore, the daily tonnage of supplies moved overland from North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam has increased about 150 percent in the past year and the infiltration has increased about 120 percent during the same period. Both of these changes have led to greater reliance on the use of petroleum and petroleum products.

A measure of the intent and, I believe, then of the political decisions of the leaders of North Viet Nam is indicated by the fact that the North Vietnamese military units in South Viet Nam have almost doubled in the first five months of this year.

Today, there are approximately twice as many of those units as there were at the beginning of the year.

This increase was accomplished despite very heavy losses inflicted upon those units in combat in South Viet Nam and despite the failure of North Viet Nam to meet their infiltration objectives.

The infiltration increases in both man and equipment has required a very sharp increase in petroleum imports. Since the first of this year the average monthly imports of petroleum into North Viet Nam have increased 50 to 70 percent above the comparable periods in 1965. Stocks on hand prior to the attack were estimated to represent about two to four months' supply.

The increased importance of petroleum to the enemy's military effort is further attested by his action to improve the routes of infiltration. Some of these routes are new, some have been widened, some have been upgraded for all weather use. Bypasses have been built and bamboo canopies or trellises have been built over the jungle roads in many places in order to inhibit observation of them from the air.

A result of greatly increased movement of men and supplies by truck and by motor powered junks has been a shift from a small arms guerilla type operation against South Viet Nam to a quasi-conventional military operation which involves major supplies, major weapons and heavier equipment. These strikes were aimed at the heart of the petro-

leum system, the major storage facilities and the distribution apparatus.

Together, they are intended to achieve the following military objectives: First, to neutralize at Haiphong the only existing North Vietnamese shore facility for off loading petroleum directly from tankers.

This will force North Viet Nam to seek alternatives, less efficient off loading facilities, and this means slowing down their off loading process and probably substantially restricting it.

Haiphong through the facility attack this morning is estimated to have handled 95 percent of all imports of petroleum into North Viet Nam.

Secondly, we expect to have destroyed the contents of the major central storage facilities. Those facilities outside of Hanoi contained about 20 percent of the total storage capacity of the country, and those outside of Haiphong, over forty percent.

Together the three targets contained over sixty percent of the remaining storage capacity.

Thirdly, the strikes are expected to cripple the major trans-shipment facilities which were located in association with the petroleum storage dumps outside of Hanoi.

Fourthly, they will require North Viet Nam to devote men, material, time and effort to establish new storage and new distribution facilities.

Fifthly, they will force a high competition for the reduced petroleum supplies, and this will require more stringent rationing and will impose a lowering ceiling on the number of men that can be supported for aggression in South Viet Nam.

I want to emphasize that every effort was made to prevent harm to civilians and to avoid destruction of non-military facilities. This was possible because the two larger facilities, one located two miles from Haiphong and three miles from Hanoi were separated from built up areas.

The smaller target was located one-half mile from Dosan. At Hanoi the petroleum facilities are separated from the city proper by the Red River.

All Navy and Air Force pilots participating in these strikes were especially briefed by their commanding officers on the importance of avoiding civilian and built up areas. They were thoroughly familiarized with the targets and with the surrounding terrain. The strikes were carried out in good visibility permitting clear visual identification of the targets and of the surrounding terrain.

In summary, then, the decision to strike these targets was made to restrict and to make more costly the enemy's infiltration efforts. We believe this essential to help safeguard the freedom of South Viet Nam and to save the lives of those South Vietnamese, Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and Koreans who are fighting to insure that freedom.

Now I would be very happy to take your questions.

Question: Mr. Secretary, was there any attempt to warn the civilian population in Hanoi and Haiphong?

Secretary McNAMARA. There was no special effort to do so. This occurred in daylight. They had opportunity to be aware of it. There were no civilians, as I said, in the area of the targets.

Question: Were there Soviet ships in Haiphong at the time of the attack and were ships of any nationality unloading at the time?

Secretary McNAMARA. There were no ships unloading at the Haiphong facility at the time of attack. On this graph we have shown the location of the petroleum storage facilities in the Haiphong area. As you can see they are separated from the built up areas of the city by two to three miles.

There is a pier extending into the river and from the pier a floating pipe-

line that extends still further for the off loading of ships. There were no ships at the pier or the off loading facility at the time of the attack.

Question. Mr. Secretary, how much have you destroyed?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't answer the question. All we have as to destruction are the preliminary reports of the pilots and they don't disclose the status of the pier.

Question. Who is supplying the trucks so far as you know?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't answer the question. I think they quite clearly are coming from Bloc countries, Sino-Soviet Blocs.

Question. Sir, when was the decision made to carry out this bombing? Mr. Ball said on Sunday that there had been no change.

Secretary McNAMARA. We never discuss the time of decision for operational matters. The decision was based upon the recommendations of the commanders concerned—General Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp, the Joint Chief of Staff. It was supported by my recommendation and the recommendation of the Secretary of State and was made by the President.

Question. Mr. Secretary, there has been some fear expressed in news circles that the early releasing of information of the possibility of such a bombing run may have caused a concentration of missiles for protection around Haiphong and Hanoi. Do you have any intelligence reports from the pilots concerning their sightings?

Secretary McNAMARA. We had evidence available prior to the attack that there had been no increase in the defenses in recent days in the target areas. I think that pre-attack information is supported by the losses. We lost but one aircraft in the three attacks.

We did attack one surface to air missile site approximately twenty miles outside of Hanoi and I believe we inflicted heavy damage on that site.

Question. How many missiles were fired? Secretary McNAMARA. I can't answer that question. The final briefings of the pilots have not yet been reported to us.

Question. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how many ships were actually in the harbor and what their registry was?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I can't. All I can tell you is that there were none at the unloading facilities associated with the petroleum storage depot at Haiphong.

Question. Mr. Secretary, if this build up has occurred through the first five months of this year, why have you waited until now to make this recommendation?

Secretary McNAMARA. The question is why did we wait until now to make this attack I want to emphasize what I have told you before. Our policy is to attack in North Viet Nam only military targets and only targets of importance to the support of North Vietnamese aggression in South Viet Nam.

These targets were becoming increasingly important in the early parts of this year and have continued to become increasingly important in recent days.

For example, here is a picture taken on the 14th of June in this area. On this map I have shown the lines of infiltration running south through North Viet Nam into Laos and out of Laos into South Viet Nam. This is Haiphong, Hanoi. It was at approximately this point that this picture was taken at night on the 14th of June.

There were 51 trucks in a single convoy. I show it only to emphasize the great reliance on truck movement, the very substantial volume of that movement in recent days and the growing importance of petroleum to the infiltration of men and equipment from the north to the south.

Now, in addition, the decision to make this strike now was influenced by the fact that in recent weeks the North Vietnamese have been carrying on a program to disperse and redistribute their petroleum storage facili-

ties and in the ensuing seven photographs I will show you some evidence of that.

This particular photograph was taken on the 3rd of March and the same site is shown on the third of April. On the 3rd of March you see them beginning to dig excavations in which they plan to put the large storage tanks you can see here. By the 3rd of April they had completed the excavations and placed the tanks and all but covered them over.

Later they would plan to camouflage those. They have done so in some instances. In this photo taken on the 8th of May we see 4,000 petroleum drums being placed under the trees, camouflaged by the trees and a large number of tanks covered by the foliage awaiting installation in these excavations which are just being completed.

This is typical of the work they are doing to redistribute their petroleum previously concentrated at Hanoi and Haiphong into other areas of the country.

In this photograph taken on the 3rd of June, they have distributed about 1500 drums along the edge of this river—again an evidence of the efforts they are making to redistribute their petroleum.

In this photograph taken on the 8th of June, about two and a half weeks ago, we see dispersal of petroleum in these rail cars and dispersal of large tanks for petroleum—that is tanks to be placed in excavations.

These cars are in the rail yards of Hanoi being loaded to distribute the petroleum supplies and facilities for storage away from Hanoi in the outer parts of their country.

This photograph on the 11th of June shows a rice field outside of Haiphong in which large excavations are being dug and into those they plan to place these large tanks, no doubt planning to draw down the highly vulnerable supplies in the Haiphong storage facility that we struck this morning and redistribute those supplies into these then to be camouflaged and presumably hidden storage facilities.

In this photo taken but a week ago on the 21st of June, we see again outside of Haiphong another storage area that is being constructed, the tanks appearing on the ground, the excavations being dug here into which those tanks will be put and after which they will be buried.

I think you can understand with the increasing importance to us of this target system and importance based upon the increasing use of trucks and motorized junks as a means of transporting men and equipment from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam, and with what I would call the perishable nature of the system resulting from their plans to disperse it, it became much more desirable to then attack it now than it had been earlier.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in light of Peking's recent statements on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, how do you assess Communist China's intentions now?

Secretary McNAMARA. I can't speculate on the intentions of Red China. I can only tell you that it has been our policy to follow a program of military restraint to limit our attacks to military targets, we will continue to follow that policy.

I want to emphasize what I have said before. Our objectives in South Viet Nam are limited. Our objectives are not to destroy the Communist Government of North Viet Nam. They are not to destroy or damage the people of North Viet Nam.

They are not even to provide a basis on which South Viet Nam may become a military ally of the west. They are not even designed to develop a set of permanent military bases in South Viet Nam. They are limited solely to permitting the South Viet Namese people to have an opportunity to shape their own destiny, to select and choose the political and economic institutions under which they propose to live.

Question. Mr. Secretary, what is the rate of infiltration per month for North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam? I am asking because three and four months ago high U.S. officials were saying with some passion and conviction that although we might eventually bomb the petroleum dumps, that it was not essential to stopping or even to seriously hampering the infiltration.

Secretary McNAMARA. The rate of infiltration today we estimate to be about 4500 men a month. These are estimates and preliminary estimates only in the sense that the data as to the actual infiltration lag, the actual time of infiltration very substantially between ninety to one hundred and twenty days, so 90 to 120 days from now we will have much better evidence as to the level of infiltration of today.

Question. Is this the only time you expect to have to hit Hanoi and Haiphong?

Secretary McNAMARA. I never speculate on future military operations. I want to emphasize in answer to that question we have not hit Hanoi and Haiphong. We have directed our attacks against storage of facilities in Haiphong and the environment of Haiphong and the environment of Hanoi, both storage facilities being located 2 to 3 miles from the built up areas of the city.

Question. Mr. Secretary, you said that this would place a lower limit on infiltration. Can you discuss what this means in light of what you have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the end of April about the number of North Vietnamese—

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I don't wish to speculate on or attempt to translate the ceiling into the numbers of people that can be moved from the north to the south or the tons of supplies that can be moved from the north to the south.

I think you can recognize, however, that with over fifty percent of the petroleum consumed in North Viet Nam, consumed for military purposes, and with attacks on three targets two of which contain over sixty percent of the total remaining capacity, there is bound to be a restriction on the total movement, capability of the north to the south.

What that ceiling would be and whether it is above the current level, for example, I don't wish to hazard a guess. There is no question but what these attacks will make it far more difficult and far more costly for the north to continue the infiltration which is the foundation of the aggression in the south.

Question. How susceptible to the bombing is the remainder of the capacity?

Secretary McNAMARA. Again, I don't wish to speculate on possible attacks on the remaining capacity. I think you are well aware, however, that above ground petroleum storage facilities are highly vulnerable to attack.

Question. Mr. Secretary, with regard to our allies and particularly Great Britain, were they informed of this in advance and/or were they told to get their ships away from the Haiphong docks?

Secretary McNAMARA. To the best of my knowledge no western nations are supplying petroleum to North Viet Nam so there would be no reason to have given a warning to western shipping. Our allies are familiar with the reasons for the strike.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in view of the importance of these facilities to the North Vietnamese, is there any early evidence perhaps that the strike pilots were surprised by the rather light defense? I am talking about perhaps the absence of MIG's and SAM missiles?

Secretary McNAMARA. No. I can only report the fact that the flak from the ground anti-aircraft ranged from light in certain areas to heavy in others. It was much lighter in the Haiphong area than it was in the Hanoi area.

The surface to air missile attack was light. There was but one MIG encountered. There was but one aircraft lost. As I say, I don't wish to speculate on it but that is the fact.

Question. Could you estimate how long it might take North Viet Nam to rebuild and re-stock these facilities?

Secretary McNAMARA. No, I can't estimate that. They have only a limited rebuilding capability, however, because this uses stocks and materials—large steel plates, for example—which are in very, very short supply in North Viet Nam. So, it would be very difficult for them to rebuild.

Question. Mr. Secretary, could you clarify for me where was the MIG encountered?

Secretary McNAMARA. The MIG encountered was outside of Hanoi. In the Hanoi area there are a number of surface to air missile sites. One of these is about twenty miles outside of Hanoi. The MIG encountered, I believe, as our aircraft were striking that particular surface to air missile site which apparently had been firing on them.

Question. Mr. Secretary, are there any other significant military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area other than petroleum sites?

Secretary McNAMARA. Again, I would rather not answer the question because it would verge on speculating as to possible future operations.

Question. Mr. Secretary, were the Russians warned or otherwise informed in advance of this?

Secretary McNAMARA. I don't wish to comment on relationships with foreign governments. These are questions that should be directed to the State Department.

I do want to make one last comment, however, and that involves our emphasis on movement to the peace table.

I cannot over emphasize to you the importance that our government places on terminating successfully the operations in the south and our willingness to engage in unconditional discussions to that end.

I want to make it perfectly clear that the attacks of this morning are a part of our policy of exercising military restraint in the direction of our attacks in North Viet Nam against military targets and those in particular which are the foundation of the campaign of aggression which the north is carrying out against the south.

Question. Mr. Secretary, would you estimate what effect these attacks may have on the efforts to move to the conference table?

Secretary McNAMARA. This again would be sheer speculation and I don't wish to speculate on it.

I do want to repeat what I said before, however, that the objectives of our bombing campaign in the north are three-fold: First, we hoped it would, when it was initiated a year and a half ago, act to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese forces which were under very heavy attack by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese at the time. I think we accomplished that objective.

Secondly, the program was designed to reduce the level of infiltration or substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and equipment from the north to the south.

There is no question but that we have substantially increased the cost.

We estimate today that the North Vietnamese have been forced to divert over 200,000 people from their customary pursuits to the repair of the lines of communication associated with these infiltration routes.

Thirdly, an objective of the bombing program was to show the north that as long as they continued their attempts to subvert and destroy the political institutions of the south, they would pay a price not only in the south but in the north as well.

Those were the objectives and they continue to be the objectives of the bombing program.

The PRESS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Secretary McNAMARA. Thank you very much, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I applaud the Senator for his statement, and wish to say that I heartily agree with him.

Some time ago, I became convinced that the President of the United States had made up his mind that we were going to see this thing through, that we would not leave the battlefield in defeat or dishonor, that we would either arrive at an honorable settlement of the war, or would persevere until we prevailed. The President, I am convinced, has made up his mind that that is what we will do, regardless of what it costs him in his personal future or what the cost may be to the Federal Treasury.

In my judgment, there was never a prospect that we could defeat even a small, determined Communist power unless and until the decision to do so was made by our Commander in Chief.

The Rubicon has been crossed, and, whatever risk may be involved, I believe the American people are prepared to back their Commander in Chief in the determination that we shall either win a victory or an honorable treaty to settle this controversy. Short of that, we will persevere and do whatever is necessary to support our men in battle.

I thank the Senator for his fine statement.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am happy to yield to the Senator from South Carolina if I have time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 2 additional minutes, in order that I may yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I commend the able Senator for his statement. There is no question in my mind but that we ought to win this war. And there is no use extending the war for 2 or 3, or 4 or 5 years, having a lot more people killed, and then having a stalemate. I thoroughly agree with the able Senator from Georgia that we should use such power as is necessary to bring victory to the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Our military men have said that we should close the port of Haiphong. It has been suggested that we mine it, bomb it, or embargo it. They have said further that we should bomb, in North Vietnam, the sources of power, the sources of petroleum, the steel mills, and other strategic points of warmaking potential. I am strongly convinced that those steps should be taken. I am convinced that if the advice of the career military people is followed, we can win this war and win it within a reasonable time. The Communists must be made to know that we not only have the power to win, but that we have the will to win. Once they are

convinced of that, then I believe they will come to the peace table, but not before that.

Again I commend the able Senator from Georgia.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. If I have any time, I am happy to yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Georgia have 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, in 1964 the Republicans set up what was known as the National Coordinating Committee. It consists of the Republican leadership of both the House and Senate, a half dozen Republican Governors, an equal number of members of the national committee, and those who have been candidates for or who have served in the high offices of President and Vice President.

In December of last year—to be exact on December 13—we issued a statement. There are two short sentences in that statement that I wish to read now. The rest of it I shall put in the RECORD.

We said at that time—and this statement had the unanimous imprimatur of all those present, who came from all sections of the country:

Our first objective should be to impose a Kennedy type quarantine on North Viet Nam.

To accomplish our objectives we also recommend the maximum use of American conventional air and sea power against significant military targets.

Our purpose is and must be, once again to repel Communist aggression, to minimize American and Vietnamese casualties, and to bring about a swift and secure peace.

That is about what happened the day before yesterday.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of the Republican Coordinating Committee at its meeting in Washington, D.C., December 13, 1965, be printed in the RECORD at this point. This statement represents the official thinking of the members of my party, from all sections of the country.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(NOTE.—The following Statement was Approved Unanimously by the Republican Coordinating Committee meeting in Washington, D.C. December 13, 1965)

Questions are being raised both at home and abroad as to the devotion of the American people to peace. One cause of this confusion has been the inability of the Johnson Administration to establish a candid and consistently credible statement of our position in Viet Nam. Official statements of the Administration have been conflicting and repeatedly over optimistic. The Communists have skillfully exploited this inadequacy of our present leadership.

We Republicans believe that the people of South Viet Nam should have an opportunity to live their lives in peace under a government of their own choice free of Communist aggression.

We believe that our national objectives should not be the unconditional surrender of

North Viet Nam, but unconditional freedom for the people of South Viet Nam and support of their struggle against aggression.

Our nation, with vigorous Republican support and leadership, has dedicated itself to successful resistance to Communist aggression through programs for Greece and Turkey; in Iran, Lebanon and Quemoy-Matsu; in Austria, Trieste and Guatemala; by timely action in the Dominican Republic and today in Viet Nam.

Under our present policy in Viet Nam, there is a growing danger that the United States is becoming involved in an endless Korean-type jungle war. A land war in Southeast Asia would be to the advantage of the Communists.

Since it appears that the major portion of North Vietnamese military supplies arrive by sea, our first objective should be to impose a Kennedy-type quarantine on North Viet Nam.

To accomplish our objectives we also recommend the maximum use of American conventional air and sea power against significant military targets.

Our purpose is and must be, once again to repel Communist aggression, to minimize American and Vietnamese casualties, and to bring about a swift and secure peace.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes, I yield to the Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. The distinguished Senator from Georgia mentioned the lucidity of the statement by the Secretary of Defense. I should like to say that in the years I have served here, I have never known a Senator who was more capable of making a brief, forthright, and lucid analysis of any situation than the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

What the Senator has stated this morning coincides with the views of the Senator from New Hampshire; and he has said it in such an effective manner that I would not take the time to enlarge upon it, other than simply to say that he has presented the position of this Senator, and that I thank him for doing so.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am honored by the remarks of the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able chairman and would associate myself with the remarks he has made.

This morning, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard Under Secretary of State Ball. During the questioning the latter stated he knew of no reason, under international law or any previous precedent, which would prevent the United States from attacking military targets in North Vietnam.

Secretary Ball also agreed civilian casualties in North Vietnam were less than total American casualties alone in South Vietnam; and that executions by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese of prominent civilians in the villages of South Vietnam ran thousands ahead of any possible civilian casualties in North Vietnam.

Mr. President, I asked Secretary Ball if he believed there was anything the President of the United States could have done that he has not already done, in effort to get to the conference table on

any basis that would not jeopardize the honor of the United States. He said he knew of nothing further that could be done.

I asked if he and other members of the Cabinet and Government had the opportunity to present their thoughts to the President. Mr. Ball said all had that opportunity at all times; and he felt everything possible had been done to get the matter to the conference table.

I then remarked that when in South Vietnam, in such places as Da Nang, Anke, and Plei Me, young representatives of the United States military, all hoped—and so said—that we would do our best to stop the flow of ammunition, food, arms, and troops down the various Ho Chi Minh trails, which supplies were responsible for American casualties.

I then asked the Under Secretary of State if he felt the President should take into consideration the requests of those young Americans—of whom over 4,000 have now been killed and over 22,000 wounded—in his decisions as well as the criticisms and suggestions from those over here who say we should do anything to get to the conference table.

The Secretary's answer was that he felt the President should and did take these matters into consideration. Inasmuch as I know of no one in the Senate who feels we should get out of Vietnam, as I see it, the question is, Should we follow the enclave theory and resign ourselves to letting these young Americans sit behind the wire waiting for the next mortar attack, or should we use our sea and air power to attack military targets in order to give them a better chance to come home?

Mr. President, for the reasons that he has given this morning, I associate myself with the remarks of the able Senator from Georgia and am confident that a large majority of the Senate and our people agree with his position.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I wish quite briefly, without impinging on the time of the Senator, to associate myself completely with his remarks. I agree completely with him.

I think we have taken the right step and that the step is probably overdue.

I believe that this is the type of firm approach to the situation which the Nation should take, and that we should not be afraid to meet head on a crisis which affects the lives of 400,000 of our men and women and the fortunes and happiness of their families back home.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. And the honor of the United States of America.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak for 1 minute.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the

Senator from Georgia, even though I spoke earlier today on the subject.

I have the highest regard for the chairman of the committee. He has expressed his views on the matter very well.

I, too, believe that this action should have been taken long ago, because, as I quoted the remarks of the distinguished Senator earlier today, I agree completely with him that we are in there and should either go ahead and win or take action to get out. I think this is affirmative action to help us win and to help save the lives of American boys in the future.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator. As we say down in my part of the world, we ought to fish or cut bait.

TRIBUTES TO THE LATE SENATOR McNAMARA OF MICHIGAN

Mr. HART. Mr. President, since the death of our colleague, Senator McNamara, on April 30, a number of newspaper editorials have been printed which echoed our sorrow. As one editorial concluded:

The courage and candor exemplified by Senator McNamara will always be worthy of applause and emulation.

Another newspaper put it:

McNamara's accomplishments in the U.S. Senate, in civic endeavors and in union work were of such a magnitude and represented such meaningful improvements for his fellow man that the usual post-death tributes do not seem as necessary.

Still another said:

There can't be another Pat McNamara.

Maybe that is really all that has to be said.

Pat himself would have preferred to be remembered by deeds, not words. Nevertheless, I think Members of the Senate might enjoy reading some of the press tributes that have been paid him and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the press tributes were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Detroit (Mich.) Free Press,
May 3, 1966]

SENATE BIDS FAREWELL TO PAT

(By Robert S. Boyd)

WASHINGTON.—They called Pat McNamara's name for the last time Monday in the United States Senate.

But big, hearty Pat wasn't there to answer the roll in his familiar, gravelly voice.

Instead, Michigan Senator PHILIP A. HART sorrowfully told his colleagues officially that Pat was dead.

While flags flew at half-mast over the capitol, senators spent 45 minutes eulogizing McNamara, and then adjourned out of respect.

A planeload of senators and congressmen will fly to the funeral Wednesday. Aboard will be most of the Michigan delegation and many of McNamara's colleagues on the Senate Public Works Committee, which he headed.

Also at the funeral at Detroit's Holy Name Catholic Church Wednesday noon will be Republican Rep. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, of Grand Rapids, who is expected to be named by Gov. Romney to serve the last few months of McNamara's term.

Joining in the tributes to McNamara Monday were HART, Senate Democratic Leader

a 2,000-mile border, but only a 200-mile span. The cost in the future will be minimal and well worth our present effort and expense.

The passage of this bill by both Houses of Congress was an indication of the far-sightedness and cost mindedness of their Members. S. 3325 is a worthy amendment to Public Law 8, enacted on February 28, 1947. It attacks a significant problem. Hopefully, the results will be as successful in the eradication of the endemic screw-worm as has been the elimination of foot-and-mouth disease in Mexican and American cattle.

SHAMEFUL THAT WE FAIL TO USE CIVIL DEFENSE HOSPITALS TO SAVE LIVES OF CIVILIANS IN VIETNAM AND OTHER STRICKEN AREAS

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in Vietnam, at Clark Air Base in the Philippine Republic, and in other of our military installations in the Far East, the hospitals of our Armed Forces are jammed with wounded and sick from Vietnam. In addition to those GI's wounded in actual combat with the Vietcong, thousands have been maimed or severely wounded by jungle "booby traps" so concealed as to escape detection unless extreme caution is exercised.

Then, thousands of our young servicemen, fighting in Vietnam, have been afflicted with malaria, hepatitis and other jungle diseases. Many of these are of such a virulent nature that modern medical science has been hard put to find cures for them. As a result, unfortunately, many fine young Americans have died. In April of 1966 alone, 850 GI's were afflicted with malaria, not to mention the number of soldiers, sailors and airmen who were stricken with other dreaded tropical diseases.

At the same time thousands of soldiers fighting in the Vietnamese army and additional thousands of South Vietnamese civilians have been wounded and maimed. For many of them there are no hospital beds whatever. Many of our young men are placed on temporary cots.

Mr. President, it is shocking that while this tragic situation exists, there are 2,644 civil defense hospitals presently in storage throughout the Nation. Each contains 200 beds for a total of 528,800 hospital beds, rotting and mildewing in civil defense storage facilities. These emergency hospitals, so-called, have cost taxpayers \$75 million. In Ohio alone there are 119 of these hospitals stored away. Think of the good will we would engender in Asia were we to donate these hospitals to civilian authorities of South Vietnam. Without a doubt thousands of these hospital beds and other equipment could be put to good use by our medical corps officials in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East in countries such as India, Pakistan, Burma and Laos. Also, there is no doubt but that this equipment would save the lives of thousands of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians. In Saigon the situation of the civilian population is unfortunate and in fact very sad. It is said there is only one hospital in that

densely populated city available for civilian men, women and children.

In Ohio a recent investigation of two of these stored hospitals revealed that thousands of dollars worth of medicines had wasted away while the usefulness of even greater amounts is rapidly expiring. Hospital beds and other equipment have been rotting away from mildew and neglect.

This same intolerable situation exists in other States, and is just one more example in a long list of silly schemes and unworkable programs concocted by boondoggling civil defense officials.

Mr. President, civil defense officials have asked for an appropriation of more than \$133 million for the coming fiscal year. These bureaucrats never seem to learn. After 15 years, after the complete waste of more than a billion and a half taxpayer's dollars, and after hundreds of silly and useless schemes, they still hope to continue the ridiculous civil defense boondoggle.

There is no other function or agency of the Federal Government that has been so thoroughly discredited. Few citizens any longer take its operations seriously. Many communities throughout the Nation have discontinued their civil defense programs and expenditures officially, such as Portland, Oreg., New York City, Baltimore, Md., and elsewhere have ignored them to the point where for all practical purposes they have been abolished. Shortly after he took office, Mayor Lindsay, of New York City, announced that he would abolish that city's office of civil defense. In doing so, he saved the taxpayers of New York City more than \$1,200,000 a year. Let us hope that other mayors and governors follow this commonsense action by the mayor of New York City.

Despite these facts and despite the fact that American citizens have completely lost faith in the civil defense boondoggle, civil defense officials continue to stock shelters—holes in the ground—with food and medical supplies at a cost to taxpayers of more than \$20 million a year.

Mr. President, unfortunately, too few Governors, mayors, and county commissioners can resist the temptation of Federal matching funds to provide in many cases a comfortable haven in the political storm for political hacks and defeated officeholders. While enjoying public sinecures they do little except talk vaguely about survival plans, write messages to other bureaucrats, stage alerts to annoy their neighbors, and distribute countless reams of literature.

Daily, I—and I am sure all of my colleagues likewise—receive telephone calls and letters from mayors and other municipal officials requesting assistance in having their applications for public works and other Federal projects expedited. At the same time, the Federal Government is encouraging these officials to spend millions of taxpayers' dollars for civil defense employees and ridiculous civil defense programs.

If we cut off the head of the bureaucratic octopus in Washington, its wasteful satellites in States and cities will

soon wither away. The civil defense program has been a stupendous hoax and waste of more than a billion and a half dollars of taxpayers' money. This so-called civil defense shelter program is a huge boondoggle. The Soviet Union poses no threat of nuclear attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Its leaders seek coexistence. They are veering toward capitalism. No other nation has any capacity to assail us with nuclear warheads.

Mr. President, let us put an end to wasting more of the taxpayers' money on storing hospitals and medical equipment which will never be used, on buying so-called survival biscuits, on digging ridiculous holes in the ground and placing ugly black and yellow signs on public and other buildings, and on a thousand and one other absurd programs perpetrated by the civil defense boondogglers.

PRESS INTERPRETATION OF VIETNAM WAR

Mrs. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, a most perceptive analysis of the Vietnam war has been written by the southeast Asia correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Takashi Oka. Mr. Oka is now leaving Vietnam after covering events there for the last 5 years. The following article was written as a valedictory memo to his paper, reviewing the impact of the conflict on the Vietnamese people. I ask unanimous consent that the article from the June 30, Christian Science Monitor be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE VIETNAM WAR (By Takashi Oka)

SAIGON.—First, we must recognize that the war in Vietnam is primarily a political conflict, not a military campaign.

The war is a conflict between Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese for political control over South Vietnam. Military force is an essential aspect of this conflict. But it is far from being its only aspect. The conflict began before military means were invoked and will continue after these means are deemphasized if not discarded.

Americans have continually misjudged the nature of the Vietnam conflict because of their own background. With all the imperfections of the American system, Americans are nevertheless satisfied with it, because they essentially believe that this system has developed institutions sufficient to provide for changes and improvements from within. They look on communism as an external threat attempting to tear down and to destroy these institutions. Consequently, the American reaction to communism is by nature defensive.

When American policymakers see South Vietnam battling against Communist insurgents, they interpret the Vietnamese commitment as being exclusively defensive, the objective being to root out the Communists. What the Americans fail to recognize is that, while fighting the Communists, the South Vietnamese must also face up to a more basic issue—the unchaining of their own society from the fetters of the past and the emergence of a new, open, democratic community based on justice and equal opportunity for all citizens.

June 30, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

14147

Nov. 27—F-105s struck the SAM support facility at Dong Em 22 mi. southwest of Hanoi. Seventeen buildings were destroyed, another three were damaged.

Dec. 22—U.S. aircraft destroyed a SAM site 58 mi. northwest of Hanoi.

Prior to the bombing cessation last Dec. 24, the U.S. strategy in picking bombing targets in North Vietnam was a step-by-step effort striking increasingly important targets closer and closer to Hanoi and Haiphong. The goal was to persuade the Hanoi regime to stop aggression in the south. The bombing of a thermal electric power facility 12 mi. north northeast of Haiphong Dec. 14, one of the last major targets hit prior to the suspension, is a good example of this policy.

To pursue this policy with greatest impunity required neutralization of the SAM missile sites in the assigned target areas. As the SAM missile sites mushroomed last fall, from nine in August to over 40 in December, it became increasingly important to conduct strike missions specifically against SAM sites and support facilities. As of mid-October, only seven SAM site strikes had been conducted. From that point through early December, an average of two strikes per week were conducted. Two strikes also were flown against the Dong Em SAM support facility located 22 mi. west southwest of Hanoi. The Dong Em complex was identified as a training area and a missile assembly and repair facility serving three active SAM batteries.

In the two strikes on Dong Em, damage estimates included 27 buildings destroyed, 5 buildings damaged and 2 secondary explosions.

The initial fear of SAMs has been largely allayed by their poor record in hitting U.S. airplanes, but USAF and Navy have been forced to fly at low altitudes on strikes within the SAM envelope.

Both services now frequently use the pop-up maneuver on missions against SAM sites and other heavily defended targets within the SAM envelope. Navy units striking these targets have all but abandoned rolling in on runs from high altitude, a favored technique prior to the advent of the SAM missiles and radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns.

The pop-up technique was developed during the Cuban missile crisis in late 1962 but was not widely practiced subsequently. It involves a final run to the target at low level to escape radar detection. A pull-up is made just short of the target, and, at the top of the pull-up, the aircraft is rolled and pulled through to place the sight on the target, and a normal dive bombing run is completed.

This pop-up maneuver involves precise navigation to the pull-up point, which may be directly in line with the target or more often slightly offset, requiring a modified barrel roll or wing over to establish the aircraft in its run.

Acquiring the target is one of the most difficult tasks to master, since the pilot sees the target for the first time during the pull-up and has only a short time to become oriented and place his aircraft into an aiming trajectory. This compares with the normal mission in South Vietnam where aircraft approach the target at 7,000-10,000 ft. and have several minutes during an orbit of the target to identify it clearly.

Flying at low altitude, however, is hazardous because there are extensive light and medium anti-aircraft emplacements located in the vicinity of important North Vietnamese targets.

Many new anti-aircraft guns have been noted in North Vietnam recently. As one veteran pilot put it, "the guns up there have multiplied like rabbits the last couple of months." Conventional anti-aircraft weapons include 50 cal., 20 mm., 37 mm., 57 mm., 77 mm. and 100 mm. Some of the 57 mm.

and almost all of the 87 and 100 mm. artillery are radar-controlled.

Fire from the smaller caliber automatic weapons, from 37 mm. down, has been responsible for downing the large majority of aircraft over North Vietnam. Principal weapons used against SAM sites have been bombs of the 750-lb. category or less. Air Force uses 750-lb. M-117s frequently, since they are in the supply system. The Navy, which doesn't own any 750-pounders, uses 500 and 250-lb. bombs frequently. Both occasionally drop larger bombs in the 1,000- and 2,000-lb. class and fire 2.75-in. rockets also.

A typical F-105 load is six 750-lb. bombs. Normally, one or more flights of four aircraft are employed per mission. Only one pass is made by each aircraft. The Martin Bullpup air-to-ground guided missiles are not being used against SAM sites because of the prolonged period an aircraft must be in a dive to observe and correct the missile on its flight to the target. This provides enemy radar-controlled anti-aircraft, as well as SAM missiles, with sufficient time to track and shoot down the diving aircraft.

SAM site strikes, like all other missions over North Vietnam, normally are planned at White House or Commander-in-Chief, Pacific level, with the Pentagon controlling strikes against all major targets. The requests are written into the daily orders issued by USAF's 2nd Air Div. and Navy's Carrier Task Force 77, and include number of aircraft to be used, ordnance to be carried, strike time, routes and altitudes.

Commanders in Vietnam plan only such things as rendezvous times with tanker aircraft for air-to-air refueling. In the case of joint USAF-Navy operation, they iron out minor details of coordination.

Most SAM missiles are transported from Siberian ports to North Vietnam by ship to the main port of Haiphong, located east of Hanoi. Much of the shipping is done in Russian vessels manned by Communist bloc countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. Russia also supplies the radars for the radar-controlled anti-aircraft, although Communist bloc countries such as Czechoslovakia supply some of the guns. Russia also supplies advisers and technicians to operate and maintain the equipment.

SAM missiles generally have missed to the rear of U.S. aircraft rather than in front. Occasionally, missiles have exploded far in front of attacking aircraft, however, for no apparent reason. Exploding missiles make a "great dirty green-brown glob of smoke," according to one pilot's description.

Proximity fusing was thought to be used initially, but pilots now believe that command detonation via the radar link between ground and missile is being used predominantly. Command detonation is almost always used at low altitudes. SA-2s also are equipped with contact fuses to detonate the warhead on impact.

Layout of SAM sites generally is the same—radar and fire control system in the center of the site and missiles on launchers surrounding the radar. Pilots have noted that adjacent missiles often are 20-30 deg. offset in heading.

Although single SAMs are fired occasionally, more often two or three will be fired in close succession, much like a ripple firing. This may be an attempt to increase hits or counter new defensive tactics.

SCREW-WORM ERADICATION IN MEXICO

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, yesterday, this body passed S. 3325, which provides for U.S. cooperation through the office of the Secretary of Agriculture in the task of eradicating the screw-worm from Mexico. I cosponsored this

legislation with Mr. MONTROYA because I come from a State which has been plagued in the past with the harmful effects of the screw-worm. In 1965, California and Arizona undertook a program to control the migration of the screw-worm and after a test period of 11 weeks, we have not had one recurrence. The importance of this to the breeders of livestock in my State and in this country is a matter with which we cannot be lightly concerned.

Programs to combat infestation by screw-worms were begun 9 years ago by five of our Southeastern States. Even though this area was in part surrounded by water and the land to the north was of such a climate so as to prevent the screw-worm from surviving the winter, there was a chance of reinfestation by migration from bordering States to the southwest. Consequently, inspection stations were needed along the Mississippi River. These were created 6 years ago and were maintained for 4 years at a cost to the Government of \$750,000 per year. There was no cost-sharing by the State or local governments involved. With the eradication of this insect, it then became necessary for States to protect themselves from further infestation from Mexico. The cost of maintaining a barrier line at the border rested with the Federal Government. The Agricultural Appropriation Act of 1966 makes \$2.8 million available for this purpose, with only minor cost-sharing by the States.

This plan was begun in 1962 and in 1966 the artificial barrier was extended to California and Arizona at a \$1 million cost to the Federal Government with the two States adding an additional \$600,000. Arizona and California's program was begun in May 1965 with a \$100,000 funding provided for under the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1965. In March of this year, it was reported that not one screw-worm had been found to be living in either State during the preceding 3 months, even though the climate would have permitted the insects to maintain life throughout the winter.

Although we might now say that the screw-worm has been eradicated through all the States on our southern border, future migrations will be possible during the present summer if an effective barrier is not maintained. However, the cost of this has proven to exceed \$5 million per year.

This bill—S. 3325—will allow a reduced cost with a greater chance of effectiveness in the future. Already the United States has extended the barrier south of Arizona into Mexico, but the span between the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico is a long one, 2,000 miles long, and if the purpose of the barrier is to be achieved, then the entire border must be patrolled. The legislative intent of S. 3325 is to provide for cooperation between two governments, that have always maintained excellent relations in the past, to seek to move the barrier to the south so as to eventually reach the Isthmus of Tehuantepec having effectuated a total eradication of the screw-worm to the north. If this can be achieved, no longer will we have to patrol

BROAD TERM NEEDED

Today, North Vietnam is a thoroughly Communist state. South Vietnam, however, cannot be described as thoroughly anything. "Non-Communist" is the only term broad enough to encompass all elements which are not Communist. While the non-Communists agree on opposition to communism, there is a sharp distinction between those who fight communism in order to preserve the status quo—their own privileges—and those who are fighting to change society at the same time as they resist the Communists.

I believe strongly that the non-Communists have no chance of success against the Communists unless they adopt a revolutionary viewpoint—a viewpoint that change is essential in the structure of existing society—not after the Communists are defeated, but in order to defeat the Communists.

When a newspaper analyzes and explains the various political forces in South Vietnam, it should distinguish clearly between elements which would either help or hinder the revolutionary cause. These elements exist within all the political forces, and the conflicts between them are often intense.

A newspaper should give the reader some idea of major factors in Vietnam's past that condition the political climate of today—the Confucian philosophy of government, the cycle of alternating rebellions and tributary relations with China, the effect of the French conquest and the opening of the Western window.

VARIOUS ROLES INVOLVED

It should explain the role of the armed forces, of the religious groups, the secular political parties, the students, the trade unions, the ethnic minorities.

It should study the Communist adversary in relation to these non-Communist forces, discussing how the Communists have capitalized on areas neglected or underestimated by the non-Communists—first and foremost the peasants.

When a paper is confronted with coups and demonstrations, it should show how various forces are attempting to use these disturbances as instruments of political change. Obviously, the Army favors coups, while religious and other pressure groups rely on strikes and demonstrations.

A paper should explore what are the practical possibilities of introducing elections, Western-style constitutions, and the two-party system as possible instruments of political change.

It should discuss the American presence for its effect, both positive and negative, on politics in South Vietnam. On the positive side, we can see that the very presence of egalitarian-minded, non-precedent-bound Americans has helped to shake sections of society loose from traditional moorings. On the negative side, the United States's defensive reaction to communism has caused it to rely on Vietnamese elements which tend to represent the status quo rather than a revolutionary viewpoint.

A paper's basic viewpoint should be that the Vietnamese revolution is not lost, but remains unfinished. The Communists insist that they are going to complete it in their way. The non-Communist Vietnamese, divided as they are, are at least united in their determination that this shall not happen.

Which, then, of the non-Communist political forces, or which combination, can forge a winning team capable of carrying the revolution through to fruition? What are the practical chances of success? Could changes in present American policy enhance these chances, and how?

These are the basic political questions to which a newspaper should address itself in its coverage of the Vietnamese conflict.

Second, a newspaper must never forget, nor allow its readers to forget, the villager, the

man over whom both sides in this conflict are fighting.

Who is the villager, and what does it mean to live in a Vietnamese village today? We have all seen pictures of him, his wife, his children—clad in black shirt and trousers or shorts, plowing fields, riding buffaloes, paddling sampans, cowering in trenches while guns boom, planes bomb, huts burn. For 20 years he has known little but death and destruction.

If he is a tenant, his landlord moved to the city long ago and cannot exact rent. But until recently, the government insisted as a matter of form that he pay rent, or, if land reform had been carried out, that he pay for his land on installment.

But the Communists have also carried out land reform, under which they gave clear title to the tiller. Now Saigon is belatedly emulating the Communists, but the peasant still knows that his former landlord stays in the city, on the Saigon side. Which is better: to pay rent to the landlord or taxes to the Communists?

Every time a villager goes in and out of his hamlet, he must get permission from the local police. If he is drafted for military service, he must serve far from his own home, for the government fears that otherwise he might defect. If he is in a village under government control, Communist agents come through at night asking for contributions. Government agents are there by day. The villager must pay both.

(I met a retired policeman who lived in a fair-sized town—just outside district headquarters. He paid 500 piastres to the Communists whenever they demanded it, because, he said, the government couldn't protect him at night, when he needed protection.)

Both government agents and the Communists are continually searching for spies and agents in the village, hauling off suspects to the city or the jungle as the case may be. I asked a province chief once what the villagers would most like the government to do for them, expecting he would say "schools" or "fertilizer" or "credit."

EXACTIONS OPPOSED

Instead he said, "What a villager wants the most are two things—no arbitrary arrests and no illegal exactions. But in order to guarantee him these two simple things, a great deal of investigation is necessary and many other things must first be put in order."

If the village is in a Communist area or, as in most cases, in the middle, the peasant is continually in the path of operations, conducted by both sides. I have been with government forces on such operations. Most villages we entered were deserted; anyone found, especially able-bodied men, was immediately grilled.

The villagers are the potential enemy, as far as the soldiers are concerned, and if I were a soldier, inching my way forward along slippery paths with obstacles and traps barring my way, and mines, grenades, and ambushes an ever-present threat, I might feel the same way.

Under the best of circumstances it does a villager little good if he is treated as an enemy by the soldier and is visited two weeks later by an eager-beaver civic-action cadre intent on showing him how to grow better crops. Furthermore, that kind of cadre seldom visits the villages; the most frequent visitor is one who paints propaganda slogans about the terrible Viet Cong in order to fire the villagers with enthusiasm to participate in the war. (The Communists do the same thing in reverse, but somewhat more intelligently than Saigon.)

War is always dehumanizing, and I think a newspaper should make a special effort to keep the Vietnamese villager from becoming anonymous, a far-off man in a far-off land. The villager is patient, hard-working; he is

not stupid, nor unwilling to change, so long as he sees it is in his own interest to change.

Contrary to what many sophisticated political scientists say, he needs democracy more than almost anyone else, because he is the most imposed-upon person in Vietnam, and it is only through practical democracy that he can begin to have a voice in his own affairs.

Third, we should realize that this is not a war between Americans and Vietnamese, however much it may seem to be so depending on time and place.

This is a war between Vietnamese and Vietnamese. On one side are Vietnamese who believe in and are motivated by the Communist ideology, or by nationalism as taught and defined by the Communists, or anti-Communists—some, but not all, motivated by a genuine sense of nationalism and the need for a non-Communist social revolution. Some fight because of military professionalism.

Americans came to Vietnam to help the non-Communist side. To the extent that more and more non-Communist Vietnamese acquire a positive motivation, to that extent the war is being won. What individual Americans do in Vietnam can help in this direction, or hinder it.

A newspaper should be fearless in giving examples of both helpful and negative aspects of the American military presence. Sometimes a team of American military advisers works well with its Vietnamese counterpart; sometimes the reverse is the case. A paper should strive to report factually the less savory aspects of the war, without sensationalism but also without glossing over what should be exposed.

Fourth, we should have a clear and realistic attitude toward negotiations to end the Vietnam conflict.

Both the United States and the Communists say that all parties to the conflict must return to the Geneva treaty of 1954. The Communists tax us with having refused to implement elections to reunify the country in 1956. We say that Hanoi has violated the treaty by infiltrating men and materiel across the 17th parallel in order to conduct subversive war against Saigon.

There is a wide gap between the American and Communist position regarding what a "return to Geneva" would mean. The Americans want northern infiltrators to return to the North, the southern guerrillas to stop fighting, and in effect return to the status quo of 1959, before the insurrection began.

The Communists insist that Hanoi has no part in the war in the South, and that the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front is the only "genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people."

Communists and Americans agree that the dispute is about South Vietnam, not about the North. Washington repeatedly disclaimed any intention of "liberating" the North. Americans even agree with the Communists that South Vietnam should be neutral, with no foreign troops or bases.

But the Communists want South Vietnam to be under the Communist-dominated Liberation Front. The Americans want to preserve a South Vietnam that will have the freedom to choose its own future.

As for the South Vietnamese themselves, they do not speak with one voice on this issue. Extremists talk of liberating the North. Others are absolutely opposed to allowing the Liberation Front any role in South Vietnam, even a purely political one.

They argue that the Geneva treaty of 1954 in fact divided the country into two parts—Communist and non-Communist. The Communists got the North, the non-Communists got the South. Those in the North who did not want to live under Communist rule came South—almost a million of them. Those in the South who did not

want to live under non-Communist rule went North—about 125,000.

INFILTRATION PUSHED

The trouble in South Vietnam began because the North began infiltrating back to the South those people who had originally chosen to go North. Therefore, one condition for peace talks should be that the North should take back all those southern (and northern) Communists which it has infiltrated into South Vietnam since 1954.

But a number of South Vietnamese believe that even after yielding on all other conditions, the northern regime will insist on the Liberation Front's right to continue as a purely political party in the South.

I tend to agree with them. I also believe that this is a condition we should accept. We have said from the beginning that this was a political contest between Communists and non-Communists. During nine years Ngo Dinh Diem tried to win this contest, essentially by imitating Communist methods of repression. He failed. This should be a lesson that communism cannot be uprooted by methods of suppression.

If South Vietnam is to be an open society, and I see no point in fighting this war unless it is to preserve this choice, we cannot simply drive the Communists underground. In some form or another, whether explicitly under the Communist label or as a "people's movement" of some kind, the Communists should be forced to contest election so that the actual degree of their support becomes clear to the people.

A newspaper's editorials should seek to define the kind of South Vietnam that would emerge from negotiations. They should expose imprecisions and vaguenesses on the part of Saigon and Washington, as well as of Hanoi and the Liberation Front.

They should make clear to southern extremists that we are not prepared to fight for the liberation of the North. They should also make clear to the Communists and neutralist nations that we are not fighting to keep South Vietnam as an American satellite, and that our commitment is not to a specific regime but to the preservation of the South Vietnamese people's freedom of choice.

The Geneva treaty of 1954 did offer them that freedom, and we want to see it maintained.

Fifth, a newspaper should have the courage to advocate American withdrawal if and when the United States loses the support of the South Vietnamese people.

I recognize that at some point one may come to feel that the lack of improvement in the Vietnamese political situation, as manifested in continuing corruption and the unwillingness of the ruling classes (generals, politicians, whoever they may be) to make the necessary sacrifices, as well as in the growing estrangement of the people, make victory impossible.

At that point a newspaper should fearlessly advocate United States withdrawal, whatever considerations of face or prestige may be involved.

Many of my friends believe that point has already been reached. Others cannot conceive of such a situation arising so long as the United States itself stands firm.

I do not believe that victory—which I define as the preservation of South Vietnam's freedom of choice—is impossible. At the same time the United States cannot fight this war without the support of the South Vietnamese people. The war is certainly as important to the United States as it is to South Vietnam—but not more so.

The time may come when a newspaper will have to make a moral choice between continuing to inflict death and destruction over a wide portion of the South Vietnamese countryside and letting the Communists take over. The fact that the Communists have no scruples about sowing death and destruction does not justify our doing the same.

The war is worthwhile to us only so long as it is worthwhile to a demonstrable majority of the South Vietnamese people. When it ceases to be so worthwhile, then we have no moral right to continue in South Vietnam, and a newspaper should point this out.

LOW INTEREST, HIGH INTEREST, AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, concern has been expressed recently in certain segments of the U.S. banking community that a 3-percent interest rate after a 10-year grace period on AID development loans will adversely affect U.S. exports. Their argument is that, since 90 percent of development loans to foreign countries finance U.S. exports, any tightening of credit will affect our trade balance negatively; and thereby worsen the balance of payments.

This is curious reasoning.

In the first place the 90 percent so-called tied figure ignores the substitution effect on credit sales for cash sales under program loans, which is now widely recognized and accepted. As an astute banker, Mr. A. Von Klemperer, vice president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, stated on June 13, 1966:

Let me raise a warning flag that exporters must watch. On the face of it we are entirely correct when we say that the balance of payments effects of government foreign aid and loans is minimized by the fact that they are tied to exports of U.S. goods and services. Still, a subtle change is taking place in this area which makes this statement less meaningful than in the past and detracts from the value of tying aid and loans as a means of helping our balance of payments.

A growing volume of AID loans, and even one or two Eximbank loans have been made recently for general or only loosely specified exports, rather than for specific development projects. Specific projects that could not materialize without a loan do result in additional exports from the United States. Loans for general merchandise exports do not necessarily create additional exports. In some cases they will merely release funds in the recipient countries for other imports that are, as likely as not, purchased in countries other than the United States.

Lending policies must be adjusted to these facts of life to avoid a situation where foreign aid and loans create an additional drain on our hardpressed balance of payments.

Second, a 3-percent interest charge after a grace period of 10 years is far below commercial lending terms on export credits—generally now between 5¾ and 7½ percent depending on the "credit worthiness" of the borrower—and also far below the interest charges on loans of other developed countries, the World Bank and the Eximbank, the bulk of which generally fall between 5 and 6 percent.

If we accept the argument that raising interest rates from 2½ to 3 percent militates against U.S. exports, what is one to assume with regard to bank loans that run at 6 or 7 percent? If one accepts the argument of these of our international bankers at face value, one must conclude that their charges are utterly destructive of U.S. exports.

Development loans now carry a 2½-percent statutory minimum interest rate, starting after 10 years. To raise this to 3 percent will have little, if any, effect on U.S. exports.

Frankly, it would seem that the real concern of certain American banks doing business abroad lies in the doubtful ability of the less developed countries to repay the hard loans of these institutions without the continuing input of soft loans. As of March 31, 1966, these hard loans stood at \$4.9 billion.

Does it make any sense for the United States to gear its entire aid-lending terms to the possible needs of a relatively few group of bankers?

Why should we commit public funds on soft terms to countries so as to insure the "soundness" of hard loans committed by other institutions and governments?

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of private banking loans and credits to less developed countries as of March 31, as listed in the May Federal Reserve Bulletin, be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Banking loans and credits outstanding to less developed countries as of Mar. 31, 1966

[Millions of dollars]	
SHORT-TERM	
Latin America.....	2,201
Asia, excluding Japan.....	583
Africa.....	135
Total.....	2,919
LONG-TERM	
Latin America.....	1,263
Asia, excluding Japan.....	409
Africa.....	193
Total.....	1,865
TOTALS	
Latin America.....	3,464
Asia, excluding Japan.....	992
Africa.....	328
Grand total.....	4,784

MEDICARE

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, medicare should be administered for the benefit of people who are ill. It should not be administered for the convenience of Government officials who write regulations.

There is a real danger that many hospitals operating in small communities in rural areas, if rejected by medicare, conceivably cannot continue to operate as a hospital. This could lead to the doctors in many rural towns being compelled to go elsewhere.

Mr. President, I wish to insert in the RECORD an article written by Mr. Tom Allan and appearing in the Omaha World-Herald on Monday, June 27, 1966, entitled "Callaway, Nebr., Hospital Flunked by Medicare."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Omaha (Nebr.) World-Herald, June 27, 1966]

REDTAPÉ ANGERS CUSTER COUNTIANS—CALLAWAY, NEBR., HOSPITAL FLUNKED BY MEDICARE

(By Tom Allan)

CALLAWAY, NEBR.—FOR years this Custer County community of six hundred has considered itself a Sand Hills medical center.

June 30, 1966

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of the entire membership, this compact would vest a virtual veto power in any four members of each State's seven-member delegation on the Commission.

I point out these flaws and shortcomings in the hope that they will be recognized and overcome through sincere and dedicated work by the members of the Commission. I am willing to give the compact and the Commission a chance, but we should not mistake the fact that this compact may be ineffective.

At best, the Commission could serve to focus public attention on those aspects of air pollution originating in one State which affect the territory and citizens of the other State. It could also serve as a focal point of legal authority for certain necessary interstate activities, for instance, a regional network of air monitoring devices with centralized data recording. Most important, however, is the authority which would be vested in the Commission to order a municipality, corporation, person, or other entity to cease causing or contributing to pollution of the air in a State other than that in which the pollution originates.

I would certainly hope that any interstate commission set up to deal with the problem of air pollution would not only coordinate the separate State activities as they affect the border areas, but also would help to strengthen, improve and accelerate those activities. We have had plenty of study groups and task forces in the field of air and water pollution control. What we need now is hard-hitting action at the Federal, State, and local levels of Government. To the extent the Commission is going to give us that action, I am for it. My decision to support the proposed compact is based largely upon legal advice I have received which indicates that should the interstate Commission established under the compact prove to be ineffective in abating air pollution originating in one State and endangering the health or welfare of persons in another State the Federal Government still retains its authority to move in and bring suit to stop the pollution. In other words, the compact can set a floor but not a ceiling.

If the compact is to contribute anything to the separate efforts of the localities and the States, the wholehearted cooperation of at least the majority of each State's seven member delegation on the Commission will be required. I believe that this compact could be of real help in combating our regional air pollution problem, but I want to make it quite clear that the compact is no panacea and that the public should not be deluded into believing that the solution of our air pollution problem is near at hand because of the compact. The interstate Commission will reflect the extent of this willingness of the State and local agencies to work together in a sincere and disinterested effort to protect the health of Illinois and Indiana citizens.

I am going to support the compact in the Congress and I certainly hope that the members of the Commission which will be created if the Compact is approved will take seriously their responsibility to the public. I want to enable

such good as may come from the compact to have its full chance of fruition while being fully aware of its weaknesses.

**STATEMENT BY SENATOR JAVITS—
"NORTH VIETNAM BOMBING:
THE WRONG DECISION"**

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is necessarily absent from the Senate. I have been asked to request unanimous consent that a statement which he has prepared entitled "North Vietnam Bombing: The Wrong Decision" be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"NORTH VIETNAM BOMBING: THE WRONG DECISION"—STATEMENT BY SENATOR JAVITS

The U.S. bombing of oil depots outside of Hanoi and Haiphong, no matter how it is explained, does mark an escalation of the Vietnamese conflict. The decision to bomb so near these major population centers may have valid military justifications, as stated by Secretary McNamara, but the humanitarian and diplomatic repercussions will be unfavorable, and they may far outweigh the military effects.

I have repeatedly warned that the immediate effect of escalation is likely only to be greater loss of lives and not the greater likelihood of negotiations. I, therefore, have stated that any step-up of military activities should be preceded by realistic proposals to halt the escalation and start a negotiating cycle. To this end, I have suggested an internationally inspected military freeze, that is, a cut-off on sending additional troops by both sides.

Now, it is true that the President did warn Hanoi that the U.S. may have "to raise the cost of aggression at its source." It is also true that we did make an offer for the "reciprocal lessening of hostilities." Finally, it is true that the private efforts of a former Canadian diplomat to bring the Communists to the conference table ended in failure.

The onus for rejecting these warnings and efforts lies squarely on the leaders of North Vietnam and the NLF. But the fact that they were rejected did not mean that the U.S. had to respond by bombing so close to civilian centers. The bombing action has already been taken; there is no changing that. But the President could have chosen to demonstrate otherwise our renewed will and purpose. The bombing of the oil installations was the wrong decision for the following reasons:

1. Despite Secretary McNamara's hard-to-believe assurances, North Vietnamese civilians were undoubtedly killed in the raids. Secretary McNamara's denials strain the credibility of the American people.
2. Our breaking of the civilian-military barrier in Vietnam could lead to Communist terror reprisals in major population of South Vietnam, such as Saigon.
3. The United Kingdom, an important and loyal ally in our policy in Vietnam thus far, regretted the bombings and "disassociated" itself from them. Prime Minister Wilson's reaction probably will be mild in comparison to others around the world.
4. The bombings may result in increased Soviet assistance to North Vietnam in the form of ground-to-air missiles and MIG fighters, and in the increased danger of Communist Chinese intervention.
5. The military effects on North Vietnamese troops and supply infiltration into

the South are uncertain. Even Secretary McNamara had to admit that the effects cannot be judged for another three months, and that the most he could promise is that the bombings would "restrict infiltration and make it more costly."

We cannot undo what has already been done, but we can state as unequivocally as possible our willingness to negotiate and our willingness to hold unconditional discussions not only with the North Vietnamese but with the National Liberation Front and Communist China. I also feel—even assuming the President made this clear a week ago—that we should repeat specifically our willingness to accept an internationally supervised military freeze on the introduction of additional forces into South Vietnam as the framework for truce negotiations.

I feel that the President should make this sort of statement to the nation and the world as clearly and as deliberately as he announced the U.S. willingness to negotiate for peace during his now famous speech at Johns Hopkins University on April 17, 1965. At that time, too, objections were raised to such a declaration on the grounds that the President had made similar statements many times before. But his declaration at Johns Hopkins had the effect of calming fears throughout the world.

A similar clear and definite statement is needed once again: to meet the new situation brought about by the recent bombings.

THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE OIL DEPOTS

Mr. DODD. President Johnson's decision to destroy the oil depots in the Hanoi-Haiphong area was a necessary one, and one which will effectively limit the ability of the North Vietnamese to inflict casualties upon American servicemen. This step was taken with all necessary precautions, and the fact that population centers were carefully excluded from attack is proof to the world that we oppose not the people of North Vietnam but only the aggressors who are using that country as a stepping stone to further conquest.

The Communists have shown that rather than cease their aggression, they seek to enlarge it. The infiltration of North Vietnamese regular troops and supplies into South Vietnam has increased in recent months. The choice before us is whether we will sit idly by and permit the means of aggression to build up to ever larger proportions, or whether we will act to destroy these means at their very source.

We have chosen to destroy such supplies before they have had the opportunity to inflict casualties on American servicemen. We have also taken an important step in making it clear that aggression will not be permitted to succeed.

No one, I am certain, wants to see a wider war in Vietnam. But the war cannot possibly be won without certain decisive measures. And the alternative to winning the war is losing it.

I have no difficulty in understanding why those elements who would like to see the American forces in Vietnam defeated condemn yesterday's raid. But the great majority of those who have sincerely criticized the President's decision do not, I am certain, want to see the American forces in Vietnam defeated and would not like to see us surrender

the South Vietnamese people to communism. There is a contradiction, in short, between their basic attitude toward the Vietnam war and the position they take on the specific matter of yesterday's bombing raid.

In a significant column in this morning's Washington Post, William S. White points out:

The mortal issue in South Vietnam has now demonstrably narrowed down to a single real question. Will the people of the United States stand firm against Communist aggression now that it is in sober fact a losing aggression militarily?

The only drawback to a military victory, White notes, is that the Communists will be given the "hope that the will of the American majority will falter at last." To this degree, it is what we say and do in this country that will determine our stance in the world.

Mr. White also describes an important speech recently given by the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew which has had little publicity in this country. I met Lee Kuan Yew when I was in Singapore last year, and at that time had the opportunity to spend an evening with him. On that occasion he said to me privately precisely what he has repeated recently in public. It deserves the attention of all Americans.

Prime Minister Lee said that "the little fishes" in Asia would be swallowed one by one if the United States allowed South Vietnam to fall into Red China's hands.

Do you believe—

He continued—

that the Indians are stooges and lackeys of the Americans? Do you believe that Pakistan is a lackey of the Americans? They are friends of China. Then there are the Burmese. They are the best neutralists in Asia. How is it that none of them has really said that "this is a crime against humanity committed by the Americans?"

The reason, Lee stated, is that they know that Communist aggression must be stopped, for they are next on its list.

I wish to share this column with all Senators, and therefore ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE MORTAL ISSUE: WILL UNITED STATES STAND FIRM AS REDS FALTER?

(By William S. White)

The mortal issue in South Vietnam has now demonstrably narrowed down to a single real question. Will the people of the United States stand firm against Communist aggression, now that it is in sober fact a losing aggression militarily, until the assailants can be forced to enter honorable peace arrangements?

The interconnected question is this: Will a handful of pacifist-minded Senators—the FULBRIGHTS, the ROBERT KENNEDYS and so on—continue, however good the motives of their endless "dissent," to give the Communists hope that the will of the great American majority will indeed falter at last?

President Johnson and other officials of this Government have for some time believed that the true battlefield was shifting from the front lines in Vietnam to the home front here. Now, every scrap of independent information from the Communists themselves—interviews with captured Red officers,

surveys by detached American correspondents, wholly unpolitical intelligence reports—tells one story and one alone.

This, simply, is that the Communist invaders themselves now admit that they cannot defeat the Allies in South Vietnam—unless American home divisions become so savage as to enfeeble the whole underpinning of the Allied efforts.

The plain reality is that this war against Communist aggression cannot now be lost on the actual firing line.

For proof the most important fact is that the rainy season May-October Red offensive which every year before this has all but cut South Vietnam in two has this year been effectively halted before it could begin.

A second important fact is in the now lost attempt of the Buddhist politico-clerical extremists to overthrow Premier Ky. That they were defeated is significant, of course. But it is even more meaningful that they tried it at all. Why? Because as power-seekers the prize—control of South Vietnam—was for the first time of genuine value. Why genuine? Because for the first time it was plain that to have political control of South Vietnam would mean something; that South Vietnam was not going to fall to Communist conquest. What plotters would seriously seek to seize a regime in imminent danger of falling to a Communist invader whose first act would be to take off the heads of that regime?

And if the Communists have passed the point of no return in purely military terms, they have also passed it in Asian political terms. All of Asia except that part of it already in the Red Chinese grip is accepting now the bottom reality that South Vietnam's rescue from attack is indeed the salvation of all the rest.

One illustration of this is in a recent speech by the leftist Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew which has had little or no publicity here. In a talk before a Socialist Club in Singapore Lee said bluntly that whatever their ideologies the "little fishes" in Asia would be swallowed one by one if the United States allowed South Vietnam to fall into Red China's hands.

"Do you believe," he went on, "that the Indians are stooges and lackeys of the Americans? Do you believe that Pakistan is a lackey of the Americans? They are friends of China. Then there are the Burmese. They are the best neutralists in Asia. How is it that none of them have really said 'this is a crime against humanity committed by the Americans?'"

They have not said it, Lee went on, for the simple reason that they know the Communist attack on South Vietnam must not be allowed to be repeated if there is to be any safety left in all Asia.

THE HOUSING SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, pending at present before the Senate is additional so-called civil rights legislation. Recently I testified before the subcommittee headed by the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN] in regard to this legislation. I understand that the housing section is particularly obnoxious to citizens all over the United States. The Greenville News, of Greenville, S.C., recently published an editorial which contains very timely and appropriate remarks in regard to title IV, the housing section of this particular bill. In order that all Senators may have the benefit of this outstanding editorial entitled "Title IV Mocks Civil Rights," which was pub-

lished on June 25, 1966, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TITLE IV MOCKS CIVIL RIGHTS

Passage of the housing section, or Title IV, of the civil rights bill now before Congress could have a disastrous effect on homeowners in the United States.

It could be particularly devastating in growing areas like upper South Carolina, where people move in and out by the thousands each year.

Take Greenville County. Each year there is a sizeable turnover in privately-owned homes—large, medium and small. This results from Greenville's growth as a metropolitan center. People move in and buy homes; they move out and put their homes up for sale to other newcomers similar to themselves.

Title IV could change all this.

Suppose a typical homeowner leaving Greenville puts his house up for sale, hoping to get enough equity from it to buy another house in his new location. Then a member of some minority group looks at the house. After negotiations, the owner and the would-be buyer fail to come to terms.

Under Title IV the would-be buyer could sue the homeowner in federal court. He would have many advantages over the defendant under the terms of Title IV:

—The plaintiff's attorney's fees and court costs would be paid by the taxpayers; the defendant would have to foot his own bills.

—A preliminary injunction against sale of the house could be issued immediately, without any testimony or defense.

—The U.S. attorney general could intervene in behalf of the plaintiff, throwing the entire weight and power of the federal government against the homeowner.

—The house would be off the market until a final decision is reached—perhaps three years later. Thus the homeowner's funds would be tied up.

—The plaintiff, if he wins, could get actual damages, plus almost any amount of "balm" for "humiliation and mental pain and suffering." The defendant, if he wins, gets nothing.

In other words all the "rights" are with the plaintiff. The defendant has only the right to defend himself, if he can afford to finance a defense against the resources of the federal government.

This iniquity, if written into law, would be enough to bring into question the value of owning a home at all. Already it is difficult enough, with inflation, taxes and higher-priced mortgage money adding to the cost of home ownership.

The plight of the homeowner under Title IV is a terrible thing to contemplate in a land where a man's home is supposed to be his castle. Title IV in effect makes a mockery of the "civil rights" label under which it moves.

ADDRESSES OF VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY AND AT THE U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, the Vice President of the United States, HUBERT HUMPHREY, possesses—among his other endearing characteristics—a deep and abiding affection for youth.

The Vice President himself personifies the happy, optimistic, future-looking attitude of youth.

Presidential campaign, 1964

	Johnson (Democrats)	Goldwater (Republicans)
1. Advance funds:		
(a) Sept. 1.....	\$6,521,631.40	\$6,521,631.40
(b) Sept. 15.....	6,521,631.40	6,521,631.40
(c) Oct. 1.....	6,521,631.40	6,521,631.40
(d) Oct. 15.....	6,521,631.40	6,521,631.40
Total.....	26,086,525.60	26,086,525.60
2. Post election payment: Dec. 1.....	7,735,729.40	(¹)
3. Total Federal financing for party candidates.....	33,822,255.00	26,086,525.60
4. Total Federal financing.....	59,908,780.60	

¹ No postelection payment due.

Presidential campaign, 1968

	Democrat	Republican
1. Advance funds:		
(a) Sept. 1.....	\$5,135,637.60	\$5,135,637.60
(b) Sept. 15.....	5,135,637.60	5,135,637.60
(c) Oct. 1.....	5,135,637.60	5,135,637.60
(d) Oct. 15.....	5,135,637.60	5,135,637.60
Total.....	20,542,550.40	20,542,550.40
2. Postelection payment: Dec. 1.....	(¹)	(¹)
3. Total Federal financing for party candidates.....	(¹)	(¹)
4. Total Federal financing.....		(¹)

¹ Dependent upon total popular vote cast in 1968 presidential election.

S. 3496

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Presidential Campaign Fund Act of 1966".

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 2. When used in this Act—

- (a) The term "political party" means any political party which presents a candidate for election as the President of the United States.
- (b) The term "presidential campaign" means the political campaign held every fourth year for the election of presidential and vice-presidential electors.
- (c) The term "presidential election" means the election of presidential electors.
- (d) The term "administrator" means the Comptroller General of the United States.

ADVANCED PAYMENTS FROM UNITED STATES TREASURY

SEC. 3. (a) On September 1, September 15, October 1, and October 15 of the presidential campaign year, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay into the treasury of any political party which has complied with the provisions of section 5 an amount (subject to the limitation in section 5(b)) equal to 20 per centum of the amount computed under subsection (b).

(b) The amount referred to in subsection (a) for any political party shall be computed as follows:

- (1) multiply \$1 times the popular vote cast in the preceding presidential election for the candidate of such party for the Presidency;
- (2) multiply \$1 times the popular vote cast in the preceding presidential election for the candidate who received the next to the highest number of votes;
- (3) take the figure in paragraph (1) or (2), whichever is the lower, and subtract \$1,500,000. The resulting figure is the amount to which the 20 per centum will be applied for purposes of subsection (a).

POST ELECTION PAYMENT FROM UNITED STATES TREASURY

SEC. 4. On December 1 of the presidential election year, the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay into the treasury of any political party which has complied with the provisions of section 5 an amount (subject to the limitation in section 5(b)) computed as follows:

- (1) multiply \$1 times the popular vote cast for its presidential candidate in the presidential election;
- (2) multiply \$1 times one-half of the total popular vote cast for all presidential candidates in the presidential election;
- (3) take the figure reached in paragraph (1) or (2), whichever is the lower, and subtract the sum of \$1,500,000 plus amounts previously received as advance payments from the Secretary of the Treasury under section 3.

CERTIFICATIONS BY TREASURER OF POLITICAL PARTY

SEC. 5. (a) No payment shall be made under this Act into the treasury of a political party unless the treasurer of the party has certified the total amount spent or incurred (prior to the date of the certification) in carrying on the presidential campaign, and has furnished such information as may be requested by the administrator.

(b) No amount shall be paid under section 3 or 4 to the treasury of a political party in an amount which, when added to previous payments made out of the Treasury to such political party, exceed the amount spent or incurred by the party in carrying on the presidential campaign.

(c) The administrator shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the amounts payable to any party under sections 3 and 4 of this Act. The administrator's determination as to the popular vote received by any candidate shall be final and not subject to review.

CREATION OF ADVISORY BOARD

SEC. 6. There is hereby created an advisory board to be known as the Presidential Campaign Fund Board to counsel and assist the administrator in the performance of the duties imposed upon him under this Act. The Board shall be composed of two members designated by each political party whose candidate for the presidency received a popular vote of more than ten million at the last presidential election, and three additional members selected by the political party representatives upon the concurrence of the majority thereof. The term of the first members of the Board shall expire on the sixtieth day after the date of the first presidential election following the date of the enactment of this Act and the term of subsequent members of the Board shall begin on the sixty-first day after the date of a presidential election and expire on the sixtieth day following the date of the subsequent presidential election. The Board shall select a Chairman from among its members. Members of the Board, while attending meetings or conferences of the Board shall be entitled to receive compensation at the rate of \$75 per diem, including travel time, and while away from their homes or regular places of business they may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by section 73b-2 of title 5 of the United States Code, for persons in the Government service employed intermittently.

APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED

SEC. 7. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary and appropriate for the carrying out of the provisions and purposes of this Act.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills:

- H.R. 13417. An act to amend the act of October 4, 1961, to facilitate the efficient preservation and protection of certain lands in Prince Georges and Charles Counties, Md., and for other purposes; and
- H.R. 14312. An act to increase the authorization for appropriation for continuing work in the Missouri River Basin by the Secretary of the Interior.

OUR POLICY OF ESCALATION

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, yesterday's news from Saigon confirmed what had been rumored for several days. We have now moved into a new phase of the escalation which continues ever upward, as for the first time we have loosed our bombs in the very outskirts of Hanoi. The decision has been taken to bomb oil and supply depots so close to the centers of population that civilian casualties in the north are bound to result. This is the policy which the hawks have advocated, including Barry Goldwater during the campaign of 2 years ago:

What will be the results?

I have asked this question before. In an address on April 19 at Ball State University in Muncie, Ind., I asked what would be the response to just such an action. I said:

Do we know what the response will be? We are told that Hanoi has available, not yet committed to any action, Russian MIG's of the latest design, capable of outflying our Skyhawks. At what point will the decision be made to put them into battle? As time goes on will the Chinese send not only non-combatant work crews to aid Hanoi, not only technicians but actual combat troops? If this happens, what will be our response? It is our announced endeavor, each time we step up the pace, to make the results too costly, to halt the response from the other side. But the history of the case, and not in Vietnam only, is that escalation breeds escalation.

Are we truly looking for peace? Or are we obsessed with the need to keep pushing ever further and further the military escalation whose results are a stiffening of morale and a constant deterioration of the purported search for peace?

Listen to the words of a great leader, Winston Churchill, who was certainly no "nervous Nellie," concerning the use of military force properly and when needed. In the first volume of his six-volume classic on World War II, "The Gathering Storm," Churchill had this to say:

Those who are prone by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances, they

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might be right not only morally but from a practical standpoint.

How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands! How many misunderstandings which led to war could have been removed by temporizing!

I am fearful that there are among the President's advisers, at least, are those who, in Churchill's words, "are prone by temperament and character" to plunge impatiently for the way of the firebrand rather than exercise the patience needed for the peaceful compromise.

Last week I distributed to each Member of the Senate a copy of a citizens' white paper entitled "The Politics of Escalation." This publication was initiated by a personal investment of \$100 each by 10 professors of Washington University in St. Louis, who were joined in its preparation by a group of professors from other schools, particularly the University of California at Berkeley. They have not sought to adduce new facts, but they have made an examination of what has occurred in the twin realms of military escalation and diplomatic peace efforts during the period November 1963, through January 1966.

In the tradition of scholarship, they have footnoted and documented their work thoroughly. Likewise, they have sought objectivity in their report, refraining in the recounting from expressions, of conclusions or opinions which could not be substantiated. I must confess that their material tends to become bogged down in the recital of facts, statements and dates to the point where it is not always easy to follow.

But this historical study of facts and events, including some peace proposals which did not come to light until weeks or months later, brings to attention an apparent pattern of action which I fear is once more being repeated. The authors have not charged, nor do I, that our increases in military pressure, in escalation, have time after time been the response to new pressures for that "peaceful compromise" of which Churchill spoke. But the fact is inescapable that, in the juxtaposition of events on the peace front and on the military front, time and time again just as there appeared some possibility of movement toward a negotiated reduction of the conflict, our military escalation has been tightened another notch. In the careful words of the professor-authors in their summary and conclusions, in citizens' white paper entitled "The Politics of Escalation," it is stated:

Available evidence does not prove that escalations were intended solely or primarily to counter efforts at compromise or negotiation. A study of the chronology of American escalations within the political context reveals, however, that the major American intensifications of the war have been preceded less by substantially increased military opposition than by periods of mounting pressure for a political settlement of the war.

It is not possible to find the road to peace by escalating war. But because that has been our policy, enunciated by the President in his Baltimore speech of April 7, 1965, and because other nations of the world do not agree with that policy, our supposed search for a way out of

the dilemma has been met with increasing skepticism by those traditionally our friends. In the Baltimore speech, President Johnson said of our objectives:

We know that air attacks alone will not accomplish all of these purposes. But it is our best and prayerful judgment that they are a necessary part of the surest road to peace.

Our military policy of nullifying aggression has consistently taken precedence over a diplomatic policy of exploring with earnest diligence the avenues which could lead to the same end, and which must in the long run do so.

Let me cite some specific case histories which find their parallel in the bombing now 2 or 3 miles from the heart of Hanoi and Haiphong. The first took place in July and August 1964, when peace pressures were followed by the events of Tonkin Bay and a climactic air strike against three coastal bases. The second was the opening of U.S. bomb attacks in the north on February 7, 1965, during the visit to Hanoi of Premier Kosygin. The third escalation, following a peace effort by interested third parties, was the bombing of a major power station a dozen miles from Haiphong, closer than any bombing until yesterday's.

On July 23, 1964, President de Gaulle called for a meeting "of the same order and including, in principle, the same participants as the former Geneva Conference." The foregoing is a quotation from his statement.

On July 25 the Soviet Government addressed a communication to the 14 nations that had participated in the Geneva Conference on Laos in 1961-62, urgently suggesting reconvening of the Conference. Here was the voice of Russia added to the voice of France.

On July 26, according to the French publication *Le Monde*, Nguyen Huu Tho, leader of the National Liberation Front, stated the willingness of the Vietcong political arm "to enter into negotiations with all parties, groups, sects, and patriotic individuals. The NLF is not opposed to the convening of an international conference in order to facilitate the search for a solution."

Hanoi endorsed the proposal and appealed for reconvening "as rapidly as possible to preserve the independence, peace, and neutrality of Laos and to preserve the peace of Indochina and southeast Asia." Here was added, on August 4, the voice of North Vietnam.

By then Peking had also given its endorsement to the proposal, speaking with the voice of one more vitally interested nation.

Within the same period, Secretary General U Thant put forward the same suggestion for reconvening of the Geneva Conference. U Thant referred to his frequent reiteration of that view stated on May 24, 1966, when, in a speech to the convention of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, he said:

I have said that peace can only be restored by a return to the Geneva Agreements and that, as a preparatory measure, it would be necessary to start scaling down military operations, and to agree to discussions which include the actual combatants. * * * The

solution lies in the hands of those who have the power, and the responsibility, to decide. If they seek a peaceful solution, the United Nations and many of its Members stand ready to help them in all possible ways.

What was the U.S. response to all this growing pressure for a Geneva-type conference, to the proposal for such a conference by President de Gaulle, by Russia, and by U Thant, with the support of Hanoi and Peking?

On July 24, the day after De Gaulle's statement, President Johnson said in his press conference:

We do not believe in conferences called to ratify terror, so our policy is unchanged.

On the following day, July 25, an order was issued dispatching an additional 5,000 to 6,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam. Our unchanged policy was that of escalation, not negotiation, it would seem.

About the same time, the United States was being accused of aggression in several incidents in the Tonkin Bay area. Hanoi protested to the International Control Commission on the 27th of July that Americans and their "lackeys" had fired on North Vietnamese fishing vessels. On July 30, they claimed that South Vietnamese patrol boats had not only raided North Vietnamese fishing vessels in the Tonkin Gulf but had also bombed the islands of Hon Me and Hon Ngu under protective cover from the U.S. destroyer *Maddox*, and again lodged a complaint with the Control Commission. On August 2 came the first of two incidents that resulted in the famous Tonkin Bay resolution, which many of us now regret.

According to the North Vietnamese, the *Maddox* entered their territorial waters which, like many nations, they contend extend to a 12-mile limit. Three North Vietnamese torpedo boats engaged the *Maddox*, which was undamaged, and U.S. planes sank one of the torpedo boats, damaging the other two. According to the official U.S. version, this was an unprovoked attack because we hold to a 3-mile limit on territorial waters.

I am not charging that the sequence of events proves a causative relationship between the pressures for peace and the actions of the United States which followed. I am merely stating the facts as reported. But among those facts are the dispatch of more troops ordered on July 25, and elevation to great importance of the Tonkin Bay incidents. The climax here was caused by further action on August 4, when the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*, another destroyer, were reported to have been attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats, two of which were sunk. The next day came retaliation—heavy U.S. air attacks on three major North Vietnam coastal bases, which were demolished along with destruction or damage to 25 boats. President Johnson issued a directive. Where standing orders to U.S. warships had been to "repel" enemy attackers, they were now ordered to "destroy" them.

This instance of peace pressures as a prelude to hard military action came at a time when Premier Khanh was tottering, and one result of the dramatic show of power, a use of power out of proportion to the size of the provocation, was

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to shore up his regime and lessen the chance of peace talks.

II

Everyone now acknowledges that a vital decision in the war was taken when the United States, on February 7, 1965, began the bombing of North Vietnam which has taken another turn of intensification in the last 24 hours. What were the circumstances and the facts?

Premier Kosygin was in Hanoi at the time. The New York Times on February 2 reported that there was "developing speculation in the administration that Mr. Kosygin's trip might be the opening move in a broad Soviet attempt to mediate between the United States and the Hanoi regime for a settlement of the Vietnamese war."

In the previous month of January, there had been a great deal of internal unrest in Vietnam, an outbreak of pro-neutralist and anti-government, and anti-American demonstrations. On January 7, a general strike was called in Hue, and by the 13th it had spread to Danang, where Vietnamese civilians failed to report for work at the U.S. air base. Editorials appeared in Saigon papers demanding negotiations and deploring continuation of the war. Police on January 17 fired on demonstrators in Hue and Dalat, wounding four students. Shortly after, 30 were wounded in a demonstration by 5,000 Buddhists in Saigon. The U.S. Information Service library was sacked at Hue. And on January 27, the civilian regime was overthrown by Nguyen Khanh.

So, before the first North Vietnam bombing raid of February 7, there was a climate ripe for the kind of peace effort speculation accorded to Kosygin. On February 16, Russia did propose to North Vietnam and China the convening of a new international conference based on "unconditional negotiations" which would have met President Johnson's call for "unconditional discussions." A week later De Gaulle publicly called for negotiations without preconditions, and a day afterward, U Thant again made a similar appeal. At the time he said, significantly, since the Russian overtures to Hanoi and Peking were not made public until months later:

The great American people, if only they know the true fact and the background to the developments in South Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed is unnecessary.

We were told that the bombing of the north on February 7 was our retaliatory response to the guerrilla raid on Pleiku in which eight Americans were killed. But in view of the climate toward peace, the unrest in South Vietnam, is it possible that the decision had been taken and the bombing planned and that only a sufficient cause for public consumption was needed?

Again, I do not make the charge that the United States was eagerly awaiting an opportunity for escalation in order to stall off the possibilities of negotiation leading to retirement or de-escalation. But the Pleiku attack occurred early in the morning of Sunday, February 7, Vietnam time, which was Saturday afternoon in Washington. And

the American plane strike started with 12 hours afterward. Had the attack been planned in advance, and was Pleiku a suddenly suitable pretext?

Two days earlier, on February 5, the New York Times had called the turn:

Now again the Asian Communists, this time in South Vietnam, seem ready to bid for power through a negotiated settlement. The Soviet Union, apparently fearful that a continuation of the war in South Vietnam may lead to United States bombing of North Vietnam, is reappearing in the role of a diplomatic agent.

While the Russians were fearful of our bombing escalation to the North, were we afraid of their peacemaking de-escalation and seeking to forestall it?

III

Let me relate now a third instance in which there occurred a juxtaposition of peace efforts and escalation.

As Senator MANSFIELD's report early this year made clear, the 34,000 American troops of May 1965, had increased to 165,700 in November. There had been a stepped-up response by the Vietcong, with increasing numbers of North Vietnamese regulars coming into the battle area. Incidents initiated by the Vietcong had also escalated, as the Mansfield report shows on page 3:

The Vietcong initiated 1,038 incidents during the last week in November and the total number of incidents which had increased steadily throughout 1965, reached 3,588 in that month.

Our escalation of the war, obviously, was being met by escalation. The north was supplying more and more support, although according to the Mansfield report North Vietnam still accounted for only about 14,000 out of the total 230,000 on that side.

On December 17, it was revealed by the St. Louis Post Dispatch that Washington had received a month earlier, on November 20, a message delivered to Ambassador Goldberg by Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani. It reported the interview of Prof. La Pira with Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong, who expressed a strong desire for a peaceful solution—specifically, a cease-fire, a halt to the landing of American troops, and acceptance of Hanoi's four points, which Ho Chi Minh characterized as "application, in other words, of the Geneva accords."

Prof. La Pira's discussions were on November 11. Our reply by Secretary Rusk to Foreign Minister Fanfani's November 20 letter was delivered to him in New York on December 6, and on December 13 Mr. Fanfani notified Secretary Rusk that his own summary of the reply had been delivered to Hanoi. This was an escalation of peace efforts.

On December 15, American planes for the first time bombed the Haiphong area, destroying a power station 14 miles from the city. Of this, the San Francisco Chronicle on December 20 noted:

Some U. N. delegates . . . pointed out that the war had been escalated after the States reply was related to Hanoi.

A few days later, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch stated that on December 8, Ambassador Goldberg had been explicitly warned "that Ho would not enter

peace negotiations with the U.S. if the Hanoi-Haiphong area were bombed."

Now, again, I am not charging that we deliberately sabotaged another peace effort. But facts are facts, and it is my firm belief that it is essential for the American people to have the facts.

Let me note here, parenthetically, that later on, I will introduce a statement made by Mr. Arthur Sylvester that if the American people think they are going to get the true facts, they are stupid.

I will have more to say about that later. But, facts are facts, and it is essential for the American people to have the facts.

Too often we have learned, as in this case in mid-December, that events of great significance in the area of peace possibilities, occurred a month earlier.

IV

But what, it might be asked, about the bombing lull of 37 days early this year, from December 24 to January 31, 1966?

Was this not a true effort for peace, they will say?

During the same time there was a 12-hour cease-fire from 7 p.m. Christmas Eve until 7 a.m. Christmas Day, and later the New Year—"Tet"—cease-fire of January 20 to January 24. Otherwise the ground war continued. One cannot but ask why, if these cease-fires could be arranged for such short special occasions, a cease-fire for negotiation of peace could not also be developed, if escalation of peace were as much our concern as escalation of military action.

The lull in the bombing raids was accompanied by well-publicized travelings about the world by our emissaries on announced peace missions—which in the case of the Philippines and Korea included urgent invitations to step up the size of their troop contingents. But aside from the short cease-fires, as I have said, ground action did not halt.

We cited the buildup of forces on the other side as a major ground for the decision to resume bombing. At the same time, we continued with a more rapid buildup of our own forces. And on January 27 we launched Operation Masher.

This, said the New York Times, was "the largest amphibious operation by the United States since the 1950 Inchon landing in Korea."

The plan—

Said the times—

is to move three infantry and three artillery battalions repeatedly across a 450 square-mile section of Binh Dinh Province to look for a battle.

"To look for a battle," is the phrase used by the paper.

On January 28, they found it. Near Anhai, on a sandy beach, 300 U.S. 1st Cavalrymen reported meeting 500 or so of the enemy and killing 103 in a 2-day battle. The next day the order went to Pearl Harbor which led to resumed bombing raids on January 31.

As the bombing was resumed, it was stated that we had not seen signs of response from Hanoi to our policy of lull. Yet, until our Operation Masher, there had been a remarkable absence of clashes with North Vietnamese regulars.

Were we sincere in our charges against Hanoi for its troop buildup during the pause? Secretary Rusk said on February 1, the day after bombing resumed, that the Vietcong and North Vietnam "made clear their negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of the suspension of bombing. Infiltration of men and material from the North into South Vietnam continued at a high level"—New York Times, February 1, 1966, page 12.

In the same report of his press conference, the question was asked:

Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the fact that there's been no large-scale direct contact with North Vietnamese troops since the latter part of November?

In his reply the Secretary spoke of "indications at the present time that there is very active contact with North Vietnamese forces there." This very active contact was the result of the Operation Masher action "to look for battle." The "high level" of infiltration was estimated at from 1,700 to 4,500 men a month. But during the 37 days of the bombing pause our own increase of men entering the area was a buildup of more than 14,000, with 6,000 men arriving during the 10-day period of January 18-28.

Were our apparently frantic and highly publicized peace missions by any chance giving to the world a picture such as Mr. Rusk painted of the North Vietnamese? Did we, by any chance, at least as much as the North Vietnamese, present a "negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of the suspension of bombing"? Could it have been said of us that we acted in the same good faith we charged Hanoi with breaking when our own "infiltration of men and material continued at a high level"? Were we then already irrevocably committed, and had we been a long time so committed, to complete reliance on military power and to ignoring the bright potentials for peace whenever they appeared?

As one of a group of Senators who sought by a letter to the President for a decision to extend the bombing pause, I believed that we needed to present a positive, not a negative, view "by deeds as well as words." The answer to our letter was a citation of the Tonkin Bay resolution, which at the time of its passage certainly did not envision any use as justification in these circumstances of what the Senate believed was a specific narrow endorsement. We were not alone, and while we may still be a minority of those who speak aloud, although there has been a rising chorus of those who cry for the firebrand policy of more and more escalation—a cry rooted in the same desire I hold to end the conflict—there has also been a rising demand for cessation of this policy in favor of a negotiated peace.

That demand, by those of us who in Churchill's words desire to "seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise," was being voiced at the time by other nations than our own. Said the New York Times on January 20:

The Governments of Britain, France, and Japan, all allies of the United States, and the

Communist Governments of Europe as well as the governments of a number of non-aligned nations are said to be pleading for several weeks or even months of restraint.

But again the opportunity passed. We chose the road of escalation.

v

Now we have chosen the road of escalation again, as our 46 planes swung in over the close-in targets at Hanoi and Haiphong. Is there any parallel of juxtaposition now with a preceding peace-making effort carrying the danger of success? Or is it merely coincidence that once again, as late as Sunday, there have been articles analyzing the possibilities of success inherent in the efforts of Canadian diplomat Chester Ronning?

Regardless of what the answer may be, it is worth noting that a dispatch by David Kraslow, of the Los Angeles Times, datelined from Ottawa on last Saturday, June 25, and appearing in the Washington Post on Sunday, stated as a point "readily acknowledged by high Washington sources" that—

Canada has opened up, through Ronning, a unique and useful channel to Hanoi.

The Johnson Administration has not lost sight of the fact that the Hanoi regime readily receives Ronning and is willing to talk to him, even though he represents a nation closely allied with the United States. We recognize the potential importance of this—

A Washington official said.

Then later in the article comes this statement, which perhaps deserves to be italicized as importantly prophetic:

The question of further American escalation of the war, it is felt here, is closely related to the Ronning missions. The Canadians are extremely sensitive on this point. Major military escalation by the United States, informed sources here suggest, could torpedo the Ronning operation and deeply embarrass the Canadian government.

It is believed that Ottawa has discussed the matter of escalation with Washington in connection with the Ronning probes.

Again I ask, is it only coincidence that such a report appears on Sunday and our new escalation takes place on Wednesday? Or is there here a recurrence of a familiar pattern, a pattern in which professions of peace interest are only words while the deeds which follow are a hard application of military force through increased escalation?

One can not be sure—

Wrote Mr. Kraslow, concerning what the prospects of Mr. Ronning's efforts might be—

a speck of hope, a possible opening. We cannot tell—

He said—

because Ronning's findings are being closely held. The Canadian and North Vietnam governments agreed there would be no public disclosure of the details of Ronning's conversations with the leaders in Hanoi.

But the ground for hope lay in the fact that:

Few Westerners have the access that Ronning has to senior officials in North Viet Nam. From his long service in China and in other parts of Asia, Ronning is personally well acquainted with many leaders in Peking and Hanoi. . . .

Ronning is considered one of the ablest Asian hands in the Western world. Now 71, he was summoned from retirement in western Canada for the Viet Nam assignment. . . .

Ronning had important roles in both the 1954 Geneva Conference on Viet Nam and the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos. He was in charge of the Canadian mission in Red China from 1949 to 1951.

The recent trip was Mr. Ronning's second to Hanoi—the first was in March—in a Canadian effort which has special significance when it is recalled that Canada is one of the three members of the International Control Commission established by the 1954 Geneva Conference. The Canadian operation is described as "a long-range, infinitely complex and delicate diplomatic probe that involves a number of governments besides the warring parties."

What chance will Chester Ronning have to complete this delicate mission, now that our military escalation has loosed a torpedo against it? Have we by design, by purpose, by commitment to expanding military action ever further and more dangerously, closed another door looking on the garden of peace? When, if ever, will we know?

Yesterday the wires and the cables were humming with the adverse reactions, as well as others favorable, from at home and abroad. Or perhaps that statement is not quite correct—there seem to have been no really favorable cables from abroad. Even Prime Minister Wilson, whose policies with the United States are tempered by the fact that he is a supplicant for support from us for bolstering of the pound sterling, was not deterred from expressing regret and stating:

Nevertheless, we have made it clear on many occasions that we cannot support an extension of the bombing in such areas.

Russia's reaction bears out the wisdom of the judgment of our majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, when he said:

The action will bring about greater amounts of aid from the Soviet Union and Peking.

Moscow said as much when they said:

Our country and the other Socialist states are providing, and will continue to provide, the necessary aid in the just struggle of the Viet Nameese people.

I have noted before the erosion of our friendship with other nations caused by our actions in Vietnam. By our go-it-alone policy, disregarding the overtures of those who would initiate helpful moves toward peace, by our disregard for world opinion, we have increasingly cut ourselves off from a leadership traditionally based on moral qualities of compassion and generosity and true democracy rather than military might. Now we are engaged in an undeclared war against half of a small nation all of whose people, after 20 years of constant struggle, want to find a way out of their morass of civil conflict.

We played a leading role in founding the United Nations. We gave it a home in Manhattan. We developed the Marshall plan. We supported UNRRA and

UNICEF, and with a just cause in Korea we secured its moral and military support. But now we defy the principles of the U.N. Charter, and we move out of step, as a cartoon in the Washington Post on Sunday devastatingly portrayed while charging that our lack of allies comes about because they are all out of step with us.

We have sought with billions in our military pocketbook, billions which we in the Senate have helped too eagerly to provide, and with the big stick of unchallengeable power, to make clear in Vietnam that "father knows best." We are determined to fasten the blessings of democracy on everyone, whether they want it or not, and nowhere more so than in Vietnam. Our escalation is costing a very high price in world opinion. We are no longer isolationist by rejecting the rest of the world, but we are becoming isolated because the rest of the world now rejects us.

We stand all but alone in Vietnam.

Most of what token help we are receiving is reluctant, as with the Philippines whose President has had such difficulty in securing commitment of his legislature to the troops he has promised.

In Korea, our only substantial ally, the troops are bought. We are paying all the costs for the 20,000-man contingent in Vietnam, and we will pay for any new commitments and contingents.

Except for the few hundred Australians and New Zealanders involved, other nations have confined themselves to humanitarian measures such as sending medical teams, flood relief, or hospital equipment.

A consortium of West German businessmen has provided China with the promise of a steel mill.

It is rumored that some of their contacts for financial support have run back to our own country. It is significant for us to remember that not one country in North or South America has troops by our side. In all the continent of Europe, not one country has troops by our side. In all the continent of Africa, not one country has troops by our side. Excluding Korea—unless we want to count the Philippines—in all of Asia, not one country has troops by our side.

The major countries in all the continents of the world are against us.

I cannot help repeating what the Japanese told me when I was there. They said:

We have been in Southeast Asia once. We are not going back. Besides, we want your military bases out of Okinawa. We want Okinawa returned to Japan. We want your military bases out of Japan.

I asked at that time what I thought was a pertinent question:

Who will then defend your against the Chinese Communists?

Their very easy reply was:

You must remember that we are second cousins to the Chinese, and we are trading with them.

I asked how much they traded with them and if there was any restriction on the items. They said:

We are trading with them to the extent that we think it is best to do so, and when it is profitable. We do not intend to let their business go by the wayside.

We think of Peking as our enemy. Our friends are selling their surplus wheat to China, a country that we say is directing the activities of North Vietnam.

Our neighboring country to the north, with whom we have friendly relations and a common boundary, Canada, has just recently completed a long-term agreement to sell their surplus wheat to China.

The grain bins on the northern border of the United States have been discovered to be depleted of their surplus grain. It might be interesting to find out how much of that surplus wheat has found its way across the border and over to the enemy, Peking.

VI

The earth-bound politics of Vietnam cannot be solved by the airborne cavalry of America.

The anonymous southeast Asia statesman who made that memorable summing up to Emmet John Hughes, as he reported it in the May 30 Newsweek, put our hard choice clearly when he continued:

You now have probably a last decision to make. You may try to smother all forces in Vietnam seeking compromise and peace—thus pitting them all against you. Or you may try to work with the best of these forces in their confused attempts at negotiation, so that the very imperfect end of it all still will allow you to leave with dignity.

Have we now made our last decision, the decision that, come what peace opportunities there may, our way shall be irrevocably that of military escalation, of might that loses us our tradition of right, of acceding one after another to the successive unsuccessful next steps which pave the road to atomic holocaust in the sacred cause of anticommunism?

It takes no courage to do what we are doing today. We drifted into the situation at first, without planning. But to plan escalation of what has been called this "dirty little war" into an ever larger, dirtier, more tragic conflict is worse than no planning at all.

Secretary General U Thant has portrayed what is happening when he said:

Little by little, larger forces and more powerful armaments have been introduced, until an anguished and perplexed world has suddenly found that a limited and local conflict is threatening to turn into a major confrontation. And though the fear—

I want to emphasize this—

and though the fear of a much larger conflict may still have a restraining influence upon the demands of military strategy, the temptation to win a military success may still prove stronger than the more prudent call to reason.

U Thant has long since, and repeatedly, set forth three measures by which we must proceed for peace. With these I agree: return to the Geneva agreements; include the actual combatants in the discussions; and "start scaling down military operations" rather than escalation.

To do these things instead of what we

are now doing requires courage. We must resolve, in the words of John Emmet Hughes, "to ignore all zealots who still shout their preposterous prescription that a little more military medicine can cure political sickness." We must give up the mythology that says the National Liberation Front is a figment of the imagination. The Geneva accords were signed by France and by the Vietnam, not by the state of Vietnam whose delegate stood by protesting. The willingness to deal with such an entity as the NLF, a nongovernment, requires courage, but its recognition appears the major sticking point in much of the discussion about negotiation.

And we must deescalate rather than move always as inexorably as a juggernaut toward the horrors of conflict with China and the dropping of the hydrogen bomb. We should follow the sage advice of General Gavin, and in moving back to enclaves we should hold and negotiate.

When we in Congress consider proposals for watersheds and dams and projects of the Corps of Engineers, we rely heavily on the careful calculation of what the corps calls the cost-benefit ratio.

What is the cost-benefit ratio in Vietnam? A truthful answer to that question, including the costs of our go-it-alone policy in the loss of America's now tarnished moral leadership among the nations, is too great for persistent escalation. Let us work as diligently for peace.

One final proposal. Russia is a co-chairman of the Geneva Conferences of both 1954 and 1962. Britain is the other cochairman. As a first step, I propose that they together demand a convening of a third Geneva Conference to bring us back to an implementing of the Geneva accords, with whatever modifications may be found necessary. I shall reiterate this proposal directly to the British people in a BBC satellite broadcast this evening. I propose that the situation has become so serious that it is the duty of the other nations concerned to answer such a call, and that the process must be strengthened and implemented in whatever way is possible through the United Nations, to whom our unilateral action is doing all but irreparable damage by the destruction of its usefulness.

For the problem is one of self-discipline. We have not found it hard to call for United Nations action in the Congo, in Cyprus, in Israel, and in Jordan. But we in the United States, who are able by our power to act in a different way from the small powers, must also subject ourselves to the good judgment and the cooperative appraisal of the world community. Otherwise, we have perhaps once and for all lost our right to moral leadership and become only another in the long parade of powers, from Alexander's Greece to our own day, who have trusted to might instead of right.

U Thant said in his speech last month:

The solution lies in the hands of those who have the power and the responsibility, to decide. If they seek a peaceful solution, the United Nations and many of its members

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stand ready to help them in all possible ways.

It is we who have the responsibility, it is we who have the power. It is we who must turn toward a peaceful solution and withdraw from this pattern of escalation, courageous in the right, to find the answer in peace at the bargaining table.

During the delivery of Mr. HARTKE'S speech,

Mr. CLARK. The Senator from Indiana has been kind enough to give me an advance copy of his most important and stimulating remarks. I regret I was unable to be present when he began, and I shall have to leave before he finishes, but I do recall that the Senator's suggestion at the end of his address is that we attempt to start to settle the Vietnamese war by returning to the Geneva Convention and the Geneva organization which consists of cochairmen from Russia and Great Britain. Is this not correct?

Mr. HARTKE. The Senator is exactly correct.

Mr. CLARK. I wonder if the Senator has any information as to whether our country would be willing to urge the co-chairmen of the Geneva Convention, Great Britain and Russia, to call a meeting, which we would attend, in the interests of obtaining peace.

Mr. HARTKE. I have no such information. I was not present at the hearings this morning before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which I understand were followed by an interesting discussion, but I see no reason, if we are sincerely interested in peace—and I hope and pray we are—why we would not make it almost in the form of insistence to our good friends from Britain—who have been willing to stand by us under extreme circumstances—and say to our British friends and to Russia jointly, "You are chairmen of this Commission; call it, and we will come. We insist that you call it. We will place this matter in front of you, and let the nations of the world be the judges."

Mr. CLARK. I understand our official position is that we have been willing to go to a new Geneva meeting if the co-chairmen were to call such a meeting. Great Britain is said to have made earnest efforts to persuade Russia to join them in calling such a meeting, but it is understood that the Russians have been unwilling to do so.

I call to the Senator's attention a dispatch which appears on page 21 of this morning's Washington Post. The headline is "De Gaulle End His Policy Talks at Round Table Session in the Kremlin." Then this statement appears, under the byline of Gilbert Sedbon, from Moscow, under date of June 29:

French sources said the two sides agreed—

That is, France and Russia—

that the Vietnam problem should be settled on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Conference agreements which ended the 7-year war in former French Indochina.

If the Russians agree that the Geneva Convention is the place to start peace talks, and if the British likewise agree, why should not the U.S. Government to-

day call upon Russia and Britain to go through with the agreement, which the British say they are prepared to do, and which this article now says the Russians wish to do also, as a result of their conversations with De Gaulle?

Mr. HARTKE. The Senator from Pennsylvania, of course, knows the answer to that. It is obvious that we should; and we should not be the reluctant dragon, to be drawn or forced into peace discussions. From the typical American viewpoint, we should be the first ones to seek to end the killing, to secure peace in the world, to bring peaceful settlements to disputes—especially that dispute which has now been labeled an American war by the South Vietnamese themselves.

We should not only say we are willing to go if they call it; I think we should make it a positive declaration of purpose, that the President should say to these countries, "We ask—we do not request, but we demand—that you immediately call this group together, and we will be there."

I think there is no reason under the sun why, if we would demand such action, that it would not result in a positive movement toward peace. I repeat, as the Senator from Pennsylvania has just pointed out, not only are the Russians willing, but according to the statement from which the Senator quoted, the French are also willing.

I call the Senator's attention to a UPI dispatch of today, under item No. 21—which is timed at 12:16 p.m. today—under the heading "De Gaulle," dateline Moscow:

President de Gaulle and Soviet leaders called today for an end to all foreign intervention in Vietnam and a return to the 1954 Geneva Far Eastern peace settlement. They warned that the Vietnam War is a threat to peace, and said they have agreed to continue consulting each other on the Vietnam situation. They did so in a 2,000 word joint declaration at the end of the De Gaulle official 12-day visit to Russia. It was signed by De Gaulle and Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny.

Mr. CLARK. Is it not true, I ask the Senator from Indiana, that a reconvening of the Geneva powers has also been advocated by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations?

Mr. HARTKE. Not only has he advocated it, but advocated it repeatedly. He has pointed out the point which I am trying to make in my remarks today: The real prelude to this is that the powers responsible—and I hope we recognize that we are involved, now, in that war over there—must try to create the climate, not for greater resistance, not for pent-up emotions, but for constructive action.

All I can say to my friend from Pennsylvania is, I wonder how interested we would be in peace if we saw bombs dropping on the outskirts of Washington, D.C.? I think it would intensify our efforts to resist, and to say, "We will never come to the peace table with those people."

Mr. CLARK. It has been said there is a crisis of credibility in our country with respect to our earnest desire to end the Vietnamese war through negotiations.

The Senator from Indiana has pointed out, with powerful logic, the many occasions on which, while talking peace, we have stepped up and escalated the war.

I would think that if the Secretary of State—and, indeed, the President also—wished to show to the world the sincerity of our statements that we desire peace, the time is right now, today or maybe tomorrow, but no later, for the President to call on Russia and Britain to reconvene the Geneva powers, and to ask the assistance of U Thant and the United Nations in bringing such a meeting about, so that we could sit down and begin an end to this frightening war, which is costing the lives of so many American boys and the crippling of so many others.

Mr. HARTKE. I think the suggestion of the Senator from Pennsylvania is proper. Let me point out that in the item which he referred to a moment ago about Secretary General U Thant, U Thant has said the United Nations stands by, ready and willing to assist. What he is saying to us is, "I am willing to help you; I am willing to go along and be the intermediary, if you wish me to be. But at least give me something to talk from. Give me the starting signal. Give me something to indicate that you are willing to move forward with me."

Mr. CLARK. I appreciate the Senator's comments, and I congratulate him on the splendid address he is making. I hope the suggestions we have made in this short colloquy will receive some attention, both at Foggy Bottom and the White House.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania. I know of no one who has been more diligent in his efforts to seek a solution to this terrible quicksand situation in which we have become involved. His sterling performance on the Foreign Relations Committee speaks well, not only for himself, but for the entire committee and the Senate in general.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend for his kind words, and only hope, while few Senators are present this afternoon, that all of them will read my friend's perceptive address.

(At this point the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF) assumed the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HARTKE. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota, who for a long time has led a tremendous fight in the Senate toward a peaceful solution of this problem.

I should like to point out, parenthetically, before I yield, that I do not believe the Senator from South Dakota, who carries the highest decorations of this Government, should come before us with a feeling that he is not a patriot.

I do not mean to embarrass the Senator from South Dakota, but remarks have been made that we who are interested in peace are not patriotic to this country. I believe that possibly more courage is required for some of us to speak out for peace than is required to speak out for continued war.

I do not mean to embarrass the Senator, but I have spoken the truth about his decorations, and his combat service

needs no reiteration. However, sometimes people have a tendency to lose sight of some of those who are engaged in the struggle for peace.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I appreciate the overly generous estimate of me that has been stated by the Senator from Indiana, but I really rose to commend him on the clarity of his expression today.

The Senator from Indiana has made a number of statements in recent months on the difficult problem in Vietnam. I believe that his contribution this afternoon represents his finest effort. I commend him not only on the clarity of his statement, but also on the remarkable courage that he has displayed in everything he has said this afternoon.

The Senator from Indiana took on a new leadership role in the Senate early this year, not that he had not made many great contributions in the past. But in speaking out as he has, and in using his talents and skill to persuade others to speak out, I believe he has made a contribution to the better understanding of the issues in Vietnam and to the discussion of those issues in the Senate and across the country.

As the Senator from Indiana has said, the easiest thing in the world to do in time of war is to join the parade. No great initiative is required. No great intelligence of courage is required to drift along with the crowd in time of war.

One of the greatest Americans reminded us a good many years ago that the first casualty in time of war is the truth. Therefore, I was happy to hear the Senator from Indiana emphasize the right of the American people to know the truth. One way by which they find the truth is through the discussion of various points of view in the Senate.

I believe the Senator from Indiana would be the first to agree that men of good will can disagree on this issue and on how it should be dealt with. One method by which a better understanding of the problem can be attained is the kind of frank expression of opinion with which he has favored Senators today.

In my opinion, it will be more difficult for honest dissent to be heard henceforth. The more the bombs and the guns roar, the more difficult it is for thoughtful voices to be heard over that kind of escalation.

I know of no Member of the Senate who loves public service and loves political action more than does the Senator from Indiana. I know that he does not risk his political career lightly; but he takes that risk by speaking out at a time when the war is heating up, because he loves his country, he loves his family, and he loves the peace of the world more than he is concerned about his own political security.

I believe that many people in this country may at first applaud the recent step-up in our military effort. They are looking for some way out; they are looking for some way to bring the war to an end; and the temptation is to conclude the war with an all-out push of that kind. They believe that perhaps such action will offer a solution that has not yet been found.

I recall the sad words of the late President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Senator from Indiana will recall that immediately after that tragic misuse of American power that backfired on us, the standing of President Kennedy in the public opinion polls went up. He turned to one of his aides and said:

Isn't it too bad that the worse we do, the more our public opinion standing improves?

I suspect that there will be some temporary applause for the recent action. But when the people learn once again that this is not the answer to the kind of problems that face us in Vietnam, the disillusionment will set in again.

Again, I applaud the Senator's speech in the Senate this afternoon.

Mr. HARTKE. I thank the Senator from South Dakota for his fine words.

Much has been said in frank discussions on the floor of the Senate about the truth. I might refer to some of the persons who probably do not agree with me about the military efforts, but who have attempted repeatedly to bring some facts to the floor of the Senate, only to realize later that what they had tried to persuade others was the truth, was not the truth.

I recall that during the summer of last year, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. SRENNIS] stated that by the end of the year the annual cost of the war would be in the neighborhood of from \$10 billion to \$12 billion. The immediate reply was:

He is wrong; it will not be nearly half that much.

But when the cold calculations were in, his figures were correct. He stated that the increased cost of the war would be much greater than the people had been led by the military authorities to believe it would be. The Secretary of Defense said it would cost from \$14 billion to \$16 billion. He said he had always agreed that that would be the price.

The Secretary of Defense puts the cost at \$14 billion to \$16 billion. He has always agreed that this was the price. Fortune magazine paints a more realistic picture of the cost at \$23 billion to \$25 billion. When I raised this question with the Secretary of the Treasury it was said that this figure was wrong. They said the correct figure was \$10 billion to \$12 billion. Another distinguished Member of this body, the chairman of the committee, told me:

All I can tell you is that probably the more correct figure is about \$30 billion.

He is a man who does not agree with the position which the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] and I take in connection with the military aspect of the war.

When we talk about these things there is room for vast difference of opinion but there is not room for people to be called disloyal to the country because they are willing to stand up for what they believe.

If in this country one has to conform to some level of thinking, whether one believes it or not, this country has lost one of the basic pillars upon which it was built.

If the Senate is not something more than the handmaiden of those who call the tune, why not abolish the body and save the expense? If this is supposed to be the function of the Senate, I see no need for serving here longer. I do not want it implied by that that I see no use for service. I believe the Senate is establishing its independence as a branch of the Government. I believe the Committee on Foreign Relations is recognized as a copartner, as was demonstrated this morning. It is not going to take a back seat. It is going to be present and it is going to continue to point out what it believes.

The distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] is in the Chamber. His leadership in this field should lead all of us to greater hope and inspiration.

I thank the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I join in the tribute that the distinguished Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] has extended to the senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE].

Earlier today, the Under Secretary of State, George Ball, appeared as a witness before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In response to questions, he alleged that there was no evidence from the latest contacts with the government of Hanoi that Ho Chi Minh was any more inclined than before to come to the bargaining table; that all of the soundings had been negative; and that it was only after this judgment had been reached that the new extension of the bombing was ordered.

I would ask the senior Senator from Indiana whether we are not simply increasing the dosage of a medicine that has already failed to cure the patient? We notch up the war to a still higher level after years of continuous escalation, even though the whole process has brought us no closer to a negotiated settlement than we were 12 months ago, and even though the number of American troops engaged in the war has increased by more than tenfold?

I cannot see the logic that leads our decisionmakers to the conclusion that what has failed before is now suddenly going to succeed by notching the war up to a still higher level of general danger.

Does the Senator from Indiana agree?

Mr. HARTKE. I most certainly agree with the statement of the Senator from Idaho.

Yesterday the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] issued what I suppose would be considered a rather straightforward statement. I had occasion to talk to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] before he left for his home State. He said:

Not alone do I mean what I say, but I feel it more deeply than I said it.

I wish he were here because what he said in those statements is exactly what the Senator from Idaho said, and that is that the same advice which proved faulty in the past is being used over again, and the same reasons are being given for the same type of action.

Hopefully and prayerfully, if this would bring the end to the war, I believe

that the American people would applaud it. But to claim every other week that peace is virtually around the corner has the same effect as the economic effect of the claim of the end of a depression being just around the corner. This stirring of hope when there is no hope is worse than being brutally truthful about the facts.

I think that the American people are stronger than the leadership gives them credit for being. I think they have the courage to face up to the facts of life and courage to be a little humble in front of the rest of the world, if that be the requirement. They have the courage to send forth their youth, as they have demonstrated in past military efforts. We have love of country but we also have love of man. I think that we underestimate the character of the American people. I do not wish to cast a reflection on the American people for an eternity which they do not deserve and unfortunately that is happening more and more each day.

I wonder how we will justify it with our conscience, the conscience of the Nation, in years to come.

Mr. CHURCH. I understand that the argument for widening the war effort is to increase its cost to North Vietnam to the point where Ho Chi Minh is forced to the negotiating table. I have never agreed with this notion, never in the past, nor do I agree with it now.

I do not think Ho Chi Minh can be forced to the negotiating table on his knees—unless we drag him there in chains.

I am disturbed, as is the senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], with the moral implications of this American involvement in Vietnam. I have recently returned from a visit to Western Europe. I went to the principal capitals of countries that have long been allied with, or friendly to, the United States. I was in Geneva, Brussels, Paris, London, Bonn, and West Berlin. Nowhere in Western Europe is there any enthusiasm for American policy in southeast Asia. Indeed, I was disheartened by the extent and vigor of the criticism.

When we find so negative a reaction to American policy in so favorable a region as Western Europe, one must ask: How are people in other areas, areas which are historically less closely related to the United States, evaluating American policy? What are the Africans thinking about it? What is the reaction of Asian people in regions close to Vietnam?

It is clear that fewer and fewer governments are willing publicly to support American policy. Even Prime Minister Wilson, who for so long has so stalwartly supported the American position against mounting political opposition at home, yesterday dissociated his government from our most recent extension of the bombing in Vietnam.

I have tried to analyze the growing amount of opposition to our Vietnamese policy in so many parts of the world. It seems to me that there are at least three factors accounting for the adverse reaction. First, there is the factor that the American intervention in Vietnam is a

conspicuous one that all the world can immediately perceive. After all, we have come as an outsider from the opposite side of the globe.

We have come in massive numbers with a gigantic show of expensive equipment. We have moved in typical American fashion, which fairly shouts out to the whole world.

So dramatic has this intervention been that foreign people, for the most part, have lost sight of the earlier intervention by the North Vietnamese into the south. It is the American presence in Vietnam which has attracted world attention. This is understandable from still another standpoint, because American intervention partakes of a different character. No matter how often we stress that the North Vietnamese have engaged in an aggression against South Vietnam, we cannot obscure the fact that the North Vietnamese still remain Vietnamese, and that until the American intervention occurred, this was a Vietnamese war between various factions of Vietnamese people in a country that had not been traditionally divided into two parts, but had historically preserved its general homogeneity. The objective of the war was classically that of any civil war; namely, to determine what the character of the government of Vietnam would be, and whether the temporary division which was established at Geneva in 1954 was to be sustained.

Now, given these considerations, it is entirely understandable that the world should think of the Vietnamese war in terms of American intervention, rather than in terms of the aggression of the north against the south. That is one factor.

The second factor is the obvious disparity in the size of the contesting nations. The United States is the strongest, wealthiest, and most powerful Nation in the world—and all the world knows it. We have brought the great weight of American military power to bear—increasingly so with the latest decisions—on a very primitive, undeveloped, little Asian land which most of the world, including most of the people of the United States, had never heard of until the war began.

Now, in that situation, there is no glory ever to be gained by the United States in any sort of military conquest. In that situation, the natural human reaction, in other parts of the world, is to identify with the underdog. This is working to the advantage of the Hanoi government and is continuing to erode against the prestige of the United States.

I know that there are those who say it does not matter, that the United States is a great and powerful land which cannot expect to be loved. Mr. President, I do not expect that this country should be loved, but it does concern me when I find so much evidence that we are not being respected.

I think, in part, this has to do with the great imbalance represented in the present military action, and the natural human reaction elsewhere in the world to that situation.

Then, there is a third factor, the fact that although we keep emphasizing our

peaceful intentions and our willingness to go to the conference table, we are expanding the war effort at the same time. When we enlarge the war, on the one hand, and reassert our interest in peace, on the other, and this pattern persists month after month, there comes a time when people begin to doubt that our deeds match our words. We have often said as much in our criticism of the Soviet Union and other foreign countries. Thus, I believe that, for the first time, there are many people in the world who are questioning American purposes in Vietnam.

I mention these factors to the Senator with a deep sense of regret because I think that the combination has led to a serious deterioration in American prestige. It is serious, not because we expect to be loved, but because the moral position of this country is the basis for the real and lasting leadership which we can exercise in world affairs. We are paying a severe penalty. Accordingly, I must say, without extending my remarks further—and with apologies to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota who awaits to make a speech on this subject, to which I look forward with great interest—that the latest extension of the war is part of a pattern which is doing this country grave damage in the eyes of the rest of the world. It is placing us in a position in which we find ourselves increasingly isolated.

I would hope we could look for some different kind of prescription, instead of continuing to increase the doses of the sort of medicine that clearly has not worked in the past and gives no indication, according to the latest evidence that can be adduced by the Secretary of State, that it is woking for us now—some different kind of medicine that will increase the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

We do not want Vietnam as a protectorate of this Nation. It is not our purpose to conquer—for clearly we can—it is, rather, an attempt to reach an equitable settlement which can find support from all the factions of the Vietnamese people and lead ultimately to self-determination. If we can accomplish this objective, then I think American prestige will begin to soar upward again. I thank the Senator for his exceptionally fine address and commend him for it.

Mr. HARTKE. I shall have to leave shortly, may I say to the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] who is waiting to make his speech.

Let me say to the Senator from Idaho that I think the three points he has made are well taken. Yet I think the biggest item in his remarks is that part in which he points to the fact that we have a chance for continued leadership in the world. We seem to be throwing it away. For what cause? We are losing the right to be the moral and idealistic leaders in the world, with ideals that appeal to minds of men, rather than pushing ourselves and forcing ourselves with our military might, where the people must come to us in chains, as the Senator has said. I hope we are past that day.

This Nation has a Supreme Court. Many people criticize it, but not only do

we recognize the right of the people to disagree with each other and to discuss those differences of opinion, but I do not know of anyone who advocates that the American people should be put in a position where they are forced, whether by military force or in any other way, to agree. This seems to be a new concept that has sprung up.

I must leave. I think I should go so I have a chance to tell the British people that there is some thinking over here which indicates the Prime Minister may have been right.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I do not mind at all having waited through the remarks made by the Senator from Idaho, as well as the Senator from Indiana. I am tempted to cut short my speech. In fact, I think that is what I shall do, because the remarks of the Senator from Idaho say what I wanted to say better than I can phrase it.

Once again I commend the Senator from Idaho for his clarity and eloquence on this subject.

Before I move on to my own prepared remarks, apropos of what the Senator had been commenting on a few minutes ago, about some of the difficulties we face in stabilizing our position in Vietnam, is it not true that we have been running against the force of nationalism, the desire for self-determination, through our own intervention, and that we have become identified with the forces which have not reflected the aspirations of the Vietnamese people?

I call attention, for example, to the blunt fact that all but one of the South Vietnamese generals who represent the military junta fought with the French against their own people in the war for independence which followed World War II. Would not this be roughly comparable to having eight or nine Benedict Arnolds attempting to run the United States in the years that followed our own war for independence some 175 years ago?

Mr. CHURCH. Yes. The present junta government in Saigon cannot possibly be regarded as anti-French, considering the generals who form the ruling body. I think, from the beginning, that the problem in Vietnam has been that the Communists, at an early date, managed to assume the leadership of the nationalist movement. Ho Chi Minh led the fight for independence against the French.

It is unfortunate that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist. I rejoice that in most parts of Asia and Africa the nationalist movements have been non-Communist led. But the fact that communism was so closely identified with nationalism in Vietnam gave it strong popular appeal.

This has doubtlessly sustained Ho Chi Minh as a kind of Vietnamese hero, while, by the very admission of the present officials who are most closely identified with the support of American policy, those who represent the government in Saigon are not even well known to the Vietnamese people, let alone identified with the great, sustained patriotic Vietnamese endeavor to achieve their independence from the French.

Mr. McGOVERN. And those who are well known are recognized for their role on the French side in the fight for independence, as military figures who joined with the French in trying to subdue the Vietnamese people in their fight for independence, and in keeping Vietnam as part of the French empire.

Mr. CHURCH. The Senator is correct. I think this underlines a point of great importance. If American policy is to be a factor in Asia in discouraging the further spread of communism, it will never be accomplished in any lasting way through the massive intervention of western military forces.

It may be that we can occupy a limited area like South Vietnam and hold it for as long as we are willing to maintain an army of sufficient size in that country. But in the overall pattern, military intervention in Asia under the guise of preventing the spread of communism is the surest prescription for self-defeat. The real bulwark against communism in Asia is indigenous nationalism, which has worked most effectively in areas where our presence has been limited and restrained.

Look at what has happened in Indonesia, where many months ago Sukarno invited us out. Our own presence is so limited in that country that we cannot possibly claim credit for the most successful repression of communism that has occurred in Asia.

Mr. McGOVERN. Would not the Senator say that part of that success was brought on by the heavyhanded tactics of the Chinese in trying to intervene too obviously and too crudely, and that they receive a bad reaction in those instances where they try to exert their influence too dramatically?

Mr. CHURCH. Without any question, that is true. I cite the example of Burma, where there was a Communist-led guerrilla war some years ago. Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations, himself a Burmese, said not long ago that if there had been the kind of military intervention in Burma that has occurred in Vietnam, he himself was convinced that Burma today would either be a partitioned country, half-Communist, or all of it would be Communist.

Yet that country, with more than 1,200 miles of common frontier with China, managed, through the assertion of an indigenous nationalist effort, to successfully put down the guerrilla war.

That is the kind of force behind which American policy in Asia should rally. I think that unless we learn this lesson, Vietnam may be the first of a series of tragedies which can only diminish American influence in that great region of the world.

I thank the Senator for permitting me to trespass upon his time.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator for his observations.

Mr. President, the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was doubtless a military success. It testifies again to what I observed during a visit to Vietnam last fall—that our troops and our pilots are men of unquestioned bravery and skill. I think they represent the finest combat

team we have ever assembled. As a bomber pilot in World War II, I appreciate the precision and the remarkable capability of our pilots on this mission.

Doubtless, the destruction of a portion of North Vietnam's oil supply will hamper their conduct of the war, and delay their timetables. It may mean that they will have to resort more to their traditional guerrilla tactics rather than relying so heavily on the quick movement of troops and supplies by motor transport.

But, Mr. President, I view the latest bombing effort with deep misgivings for two reasons: First it represents another dangerous new dimension to the Vietnam war; and second it dodges once again the basic political issue of the conflict. It would seem to be a move toward a bigger, bloodier, and perhaps longer war and a lessening of the chances for a negotiated settlement. As the Senator from Indiana has said so well this afternoon, it forecloses, at least for the time being, the possibility of negotiations. If it follows the pattern of previous efforts, we can expect the Russians, the Chinese, and other allies of North Vietnam to respond by sending more aid into the war. It now seems quite certain that each new commitment of force by us will be met by a countermove on the other side.

What began in the 1950's as a local struggle among two groups in South Vietnam has now moved another step closer toward a full-scale international conflict. The most obvious side result of the recent bombing is that we have lost the support for our Vietnam policy of a major ally, Great Britain. The British Prime Minister responded to the bombing with the statement:

We must disassociate ourselves from an action of this kind.

Let us be clear, Mr. President, what is at question here is not the obvious bravery and skill of American soldiers and pilots. Neither does one question the military impact of strategic American bombing.

But we are not dealing in Vietnam primarily with a military problem. We are dealing primarily with a political problem which is the establishment in Vietnam of a stable government that has the confidence of its own people. That is a task which can never be performed by anyone other than the Vietnamese people themselves. And the more we dodge that central fact, the more trouble we are going to encounter in southeast Asia and the more difficult becomes a final resolution of this tragic conflict.

It has been said that there are many paths to peace, and I have no doubt that our military advisers and our President now believe that the path to peace in Vietnam lies in increasing military operations. In the past 18 months we have virtually taken over the war. But we are further away from a settlement today than we were a decade ago or 2 years ago. We have no major ally for our venture there; we are largely alone in the struggle.

A few hundred miles to the south of the targets which our planes hit so accurately this week lies Saigon, where we

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are backing a government that is incapable either of winning a military struggle or governing its people. We can smash any target we choose, but we cannot deliver good government to Saigon by bombing Hanoi.

I do not discount the fact that it takes time to build a solid government, but that is basically a matter of securing the kind of indigenous loyalty which General Ky and his predecessors have not earned from their people. Our greatest continuing error in Vietnam is that we are using American troops and planes to compensate for the political weakness of a regime that lacks the support of its own citizens.

If we are willing to sacrifice thousands of American soldiers and pilots, we can probably kill enough Vietnamese and destroy enough property to win the military battles in the end. Surely, the mighty United States, as Senator Church indicated a moment ago, has enough power to crush a little impoverished state like Vietnam. But what assurance do we have that this bloody crusade will produce a stable government in Saigon acceptable to its people and friendly to the United States?

It is said that we are bombing the north to encourage General Ky's regime in the south. But the more America takes over the conduct of the war, the more General Ky uses his forces not to fight the Communists, but to suppress the Buddhists and other critics of his regime.

A United Press report yesterday on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong states:

The strikes . . . once again gave a dramatic demonstration of America's ability to bomb virtually at will anywhere in the Communist nation.

But we had better not draw too much consolation from this demonstration of American control of the skies. The issues that will determine the future of Vietnam are on the ground—in the rice paddies, the villages, and within the Vietnamese people. I can think of no real problem in South Vietnam that is going to be solved by bombing North Vietnam.

Even if we win all the military battles, I fear that the results will be something as follows:

First. We will have so completely destroyed the fabric of Vietnamese society that either the Communists or some other dictatorial regime will take over by default, or else American forces will have to stay there indefinitely.

Second. We will succeed in driving the North Vietnamese into a closer and closer alliance with their traditional enemy—China, and perhaps succeed in reuniting the now fractured Communist bloc. Creating a military and political wasteland in Vietnam is an invitation to Chinese penetration.

Third. We will jeopardize the most important diplomatic interest of the United States, which is improved relations between the Soviet Union and the United States—the world's two great nuclear powers.

Fourth. We will have damaged the worldwide moral and political influence of the United States in bypassing the United Nations by a unilateral demon-

stration of the capacity of a rich, white Western nation to crush a backward Asiatic state.

Fifth. In addition to the inestimable loss of thousands of our finest young men, the \$2 billion a month that we are pouring into this war will jeopardize the value of our dollar, increase the inflationary pressures on our economy, and undercut important programs of social and economic progress in our own society.

Instead of self-defeating efforts to compensate for the political weakness of South Vietnam by bombing North Vietnam, I would suggest the five following steps:

First. We should try to make credible to all parties our commitment to holding elections as has been promised by Premier Ky. We should make this commitment clear to the Vietnamese military, to the different civilian factions, and to the rest of the world. The greatest danger is that a new army coup to forestall the elections, or a move by Ky to constrict the elections to such a degree that they lose all appeal to the civilian leaders, and especially the Buddhist groups. We should try to maintain the momentum of Ky's promise, whether or not Ky himself survives or is replaced by a new military coup or by the sort of military-civilian panel contemplated in the last few weeks. Only elections can produce the sort of balance that will reassure jealous factions of a voice in the Government and protection against persecution. All significant political groups including the National Liberation Front must be invited to participate in the elections and in the arrangements for the elections.

Second. I suggest no further U.S. military buildup in Vietnam pending elections. I would urge that we end the bombing operations and that we curtail our offensive operations on the ground.

Third. I suggest that we or Saigon seriously attempt to negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front for a cease-fire before the elections. I have always found it difficult to understand the rationality of refusing to negotiate with the NLF. If it is true that the NLF as a fighting force is controlled by Hanoi as a subsidiary of the northern Communist Party, then it makes no difference whether we deal with them or with the Hanoi government. As far as northern elements are concerned, dealing with them admits no more than that they are in the south, and as far as southern are concerned, dealing with them could not be objectionable unless it amounted to a recognition of their belligerency in a legal sense, which would be quite unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the NLF is, as it claims to be, a fully representative independent southern organization, we must talk with them directly one day. To quibble over the implications of recognizing the existence of the NLF when so many lives are being lost every day in warfare with them is a nightmarish absurdity.

As to the participation of the NLF in the election and the arrangements for such an election, it seems to me that those are the only terms they could accept for a cease-fire. A cease-fire is im-

portant to the success of the election process. Furthermore, the objections to NLF participation that were valid 10 years ago no longer apply. As previously stated, they are by no means the only organized national political force any longer; their program is no longer without competitors, their leaders' names are unknown to the mass of the people compared with those of other political leaders, and although their control is effective in large areas of the countryside, it is minimal in the population centers; it may very well be that they would get a minor fraction of the vote in an authentic election.

Fourth. I suggest the introduction of an effective international presence in South Vietnam to help assure the validity and integrity of the electoral process. It should remain during an interim period to help stabilize the political scene. This would rectify to some degree our initial mistake of intervening unilaterally in a complex struggle that calls for action by the international community. It now seems unlikely that the Security Council will undertake this task, but the members of the International Control Commission have given signs of a willingness to do so.

Fifth. I suggest immediate reaffirmation by the U.S. Government of its readiness to abide by the results of free elections, readiness to withdraw U.S. military troops and bases from South Vietnam, and readiness to observe the essential provisions of the Geneva accords, including the possibility of peaceful reunification of North and South Vietnam.

I fully endorse the recommendation made by Senators HARTKE and CLARK this afternoon for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to seek an end to the war. The current discussions between President de Gaulle and the Russian Government seem to hold out a new hope that Russia might cooperate with Britain as cochairmen of the Geneva Convention in calling for a new conference on Vietnam.

The NLF may reject these proposals. Perhaps the most likely response is a demand for the prior withdrawal of American troops, harking back again to the Geneva accords. In that case, the demonstrable presence of North Vietnamese formations in the south in the last year or two would give us a bargaining point. We could agree to the withdrawal of our troops in return for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. But whatever the initial reply from the other side, I think that the cessation of our bombing and offensive ground actions, combined with a proposal for a cease-fire, open elections, and direct negotiations is the right policy for the United States. It is the right policy if the proposal succeeds. It is the right policy if it starts a dialog with the enemy, no matter how protracted. And it is the right policy even if the NLF rejects it for a time, because it will show the non-Communist political forces in Vietnam and the rest of the world that the United States desires peace and self-determination for southeast Asia.

Mr. President, one of the most revealing factors in our Vietnam experience has been the widespread opposition to our policy of a large portion of our academic and religious communities. The moral and intellectual questions associated with a great nation trying to bring its enormous military might to bear on the troubles of a small turmoil-afflicted state have deeply disturbed thoughtful Americans.

A profound expression of the conscience of the academic and professional communities appeared in the Sunday New York Times, June 5, 1966. I ask unanimous consent that this statement and the names of its sponsors be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, together with a brilliant analysis of our Vietnam dilemma by Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, which appeared in the May 28 issue of the New Republic.

There being no objection, the statement and analysis were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, June 5, 1966]

ON VIETNAM

Events of the past few months have further undermined the administration's stated rationale for involvement in Vietnam—that American armed force is there to defend the Vietnamese. The continuing demonstrations in Hue, Danang and Saigon, with their anti-Ky and anti-American slogans, have made it clearer than ever that the Saigon regime has virtually no popular support. Military activities have been steadily escalated, and American military power has been forced to assume the brunt of the fighting from the South Vietnamese army. An estimated 100,000 soldiers deserted this army in 1965 alone (N.Y. Times 2-24-66).

The successive regimes in Saigon which our government has been supporting were never popularly elected, and since shortly after the inception of the civil war have not governed more than a portion of South Vietnam. Nonetheless, the administration has attempted justification for American military intervention by claiming that these regimes have had popular support and could therefore be considered legitimate governments for all of South Vietnam.

The dramatic exposure of these false promises and of the fragile basis for our policies has led many prominent Americans, including some former supporters of the war, to declare that our forces must be prepared to leave Vietnam if a new government there asks us to do so.

But our administration's previous response to reverses in Vietnam has been escalation, bringing with it increasing death and destruction, and we are particularly alarmed at the extension of B-52 bombings to the North and new air raids in the Hanoi-Hai-phong area. To escalate military while our position disintegrates politically is immoral, futile and perilous.

Furthermore, while increasing numbers of political leaders and commentators question the entire policy of the United States in Vietnam, the American force, approximately a quarter of a million men, is conducting "search-and-kill" operations and continues massive daily bombings in the course of which thousands of Vietnamese and Americans are being killed and wounded.

The interests of our country and the strength of our belief in the right of self-determination demand that ways be immediately found to disengage ourselves from this intolerable situation. We are convinced that such a course is in accord with the mood of increasing numbers of Americans.

We call upon our government:
To cease all bombing, North and South, and all other offensive military operations immediately;

To indicate that it will negotiate with the National Liberation Front and all other interested parties for a peaceful settlement;

To encourage in every way, and in no way to interfere with, the free exercise of popular sovereignty in Vietnam;

To evaluate seriously whether self-determination for the Vietnamese as well as our own national interests would not be best served by termination of our military presence in Vietnam.

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Yale University

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Other Institutions

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Delaware

University of Delaware

R. J. Bresler, C. A. Carpenter, Jr., D. E. Ingersoll, S. E. Koss, S. Lukachevich, G. Malz, F. Roberts, E. Seymour, E. Stryms, R. Wolters.

District of Columbia

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Other Institutions

Gloria W. Bishop, William H. Denham, James Donaldson, Irving Franke, H. David Hammond, Nathan Hare, Edmond Harris, Rev. Richard T. McSorley, Richard Raskin, Lewis Schipper, Arthur Woskow.

Idaho

Idaho State University

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Illinois

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University of Illinois

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Other Institutions

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Indiana

Indiana University

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Manchester College

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Simmons College

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C. Hawthorne, Joseph L. Hozid, Leonard J. Kitsch, Kenneth F. Kister, Lawrence L. Langer, Ruth S. Leonard, William Manley, George W. Nitchie, Georgia T. Noble, C. Richard Rohrberg, Richard C. Sterne, Robert C. Vernon.

Smith College

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Tufts University

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Wellesley College

Sigmund Abeles, Lillian A. Anderson, Duncan Aswell, Grazia Avitabile, Sylvia Berkman, Paul A. Cohen, Alice B. Colburn, Ann Congleton, Helen Storm Corsa, Fred Denbeaux, Herbert Gale, Janet Z. Giele, Arthur Gold, Edward V. Gulick.

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Mark Fried, October Cullum Frost, Bernard Goldsmith, Carl Goldstein, Mrs. Carl Goldstein, Charles W. Goodell, Kathryn G. Gordon, Elizabeth A. Green, Manfred Halberstadt, Mary Hamilton, Henry S. Huskell, Edwin Hedman, Bernard Howard, Muriel T. Hirr, Lee Holt, Sylvia Hurwich.

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Michigan

Albion College

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Michigan State University

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University of Michigan

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Wayne State University

David Asdourian, Janet Asdourian, Ernst Benjamin, Robert Broner, Robert Buckeye, David Burner, H. Warren Dunham, Otto Feinstein, Ronald Formisano, Eugenie Fox, Alan Gross, Herbert Haber, Harold Froman, Adrienne James, Lawrence Jennings.

James Keeney, Alexandra McCoy, Emerson R. Marks, Lynn Parsons, Geraldine Pittman, Richard Place, Richard Reinitz, Barry Rothaus, Murray Seidler, Stanley Shapiro, William F. Shuter, Leo Stoller, Paul Sporn, Ellen Stekert, Athan Theoharis, David Wineman, R. H. Wright.

Other Institutions

Helen Isaacson, Huron Smith, Jr.

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University of Minnesota

Henry E. Allen, Marvin Bacaner, Robert H. Beck, May Brodbeck, Edward Coen, Marc S. Cohen, H. Ted Davis, Mr. & Mrs. Lionel B. Davis, Lonnie J. Durham, Charles Edwards, David L. Eggenschwiler, Herbert Feigl, Avrom Fleishman.

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Murray D. Rosenberg, Martin Roth, Lanny H. Schmidt, James L. Scoggins, Mulford Q. Sibley, Allan H. Spear, G. Robert Stange, Henry L. Taylor, Romeyn Taylor, Burnham Terrell, Leonard Unger, Mr. & Mrs. Laurence Victor, Maurice B. Visscher, Elaine E. Vogt, Joseph L. Waldauer, Dennis W. Watson, Frank W. Whiting, F. M. Williams.

Other Institutions

Anne D. Pick, Dimitri Tselos.

Missouri

University of Missouri

Bruce J. Biddle, Allen F. Davis, Justin C. Huang, William R. Morrow, Linton J. Murphy, John C. Schuder, Paul Wallace, Betty K. Wilson, H. Clyde Wilson, Harold D. Woodman, Leonora Woodman, David Wurfel.

Other Institutions

T. C. Bailey, William W. Beifuss, Julian B. Fleischman, Edward Henderson, Russell M. Jones, David Kennell, Theodore Rosebury, Albert Schatz, Paul Siff, H. Warrington Williams.

Montana

University of Montana

David Alt, William Ballard, Chester Beaty, Agnes Boner, Meyer Chessin, Merrel Clubb Jr., Philip Favero, Robert Fields, Clarence Gordon, Annette Gottfried, C. Rulon Jeppesen, Fred Kersten, Barclay Kuhn, John Lawry, Edwin Marvin, Rodney Mead, James Peterson, David Peवार, Ronald Plakke, Sherman Preece, Jr., Howard Reinhardt, Dexter Roberts, Carlton Scott, Arnold Silverman, Arthur Willis.

New Jersey

Drew University

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Fairleigh Dickinson University

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Monmouth College

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Newark College of Engineering

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Princeton University

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JOHNSON'S DILEMMA—THE ALTERNATIVES NOW IN VIETNAM

(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

The events of recent months have brought the Vietnam war to a turning point. They have shattered at two places the wall of myths which thus far has protected us from contact with reality. Through two gaping holes reality stares us in the face, reducing to its true fictional dimensions what we mistakenly took to be the facts.

First of all, there is no such thing as a government in Saigon, and there has not been one since Diem's downfall in November, 1963, which we can be committed to assist and defend. South Vietnam is for all practical purposes divided into four autonomous fiefdoms, coterminous with the four corps areas and governed by their respective military commanders, over which the Saigon government exerts at best only the most tenuous control. In the attempt to restore its control over the First Corps area, the Saigon government had to resort to civil war.

This erosion of central control started with Diem's downfall and has been accentuated under Ky. Charles Mohr reported in *The New York Times* of April 15 that Ky "had virtually no popular support." He has no support from his subordinates either. When he criticized General Thi on March 3 in Danang in front of his staff, the latter asked: "Should we listen to this little man from Saigon?" General Chuan, appointed by Ky as the successor to Thi, expressed himself in favor of the aims of the anti-government demonstrations while mildly opposing in words the occurrence of demonstrations, and was forthwith dismissed. General Chieu, the Secretary-General of the military Directory, was seized in Hue by demonstrators and, in a speech over the radio station, duplicated General Chuan's performance. General Dinh, who was appointed to replace Chuan, is reported to be backing a "revolutionary corps" composed of rebellious troops and students. When government troops approached Danang on May 14, he fled to the house of General Walt, commander of the US Marines. According to *The New York Times* of May 16, he "was relieved of command because of 'disloyalty to the central government.'" He was reported to have fled to Hue to join in open rebellion against the Ky regime. In his place, the government appointed Brig. Gen. Huynh Van Cao. . . . General Cao is the fourth man to hold the First Corps post in a little more than two months."

Junior officers of the First Corps issued a declaration of no confidence in the regime. Soldiers, policemen, civil servants—those who are the government in action—demonstrated in the streets against Ky and his associates. Robert Shaplen reports in *The New Yorker* that "one of the highest ranking leaders in the present government remarked to a friend that he did not know who among the 26 members of the present cabinet 'might be Communists.'" C. L. Sulzberger summed it all up when he wrote in *The New York Times* of April 20: "For today the North of this tortured land, comprising the heart of ancient Annam, is almost an autonomous third Vietnam: although it is not controlled by Hanoi, it is but tenuously linked to Saigon. Vietnam once comprised three administrative areas—Tonkin, run from Hanoi; Cochinchina, run from Saigon; and Annam, run from Hue. At the moment history repeats itself."

The other myth that has been exploded by recent events is the assumption that we are in Vietnam to protect the freedom of a people who want to be protected by us. The recent disturbances have been marked by widespread anti-Americanism aimed at our presence in South Vietnam. That sentiment was openly expressed by the demonstrators and voiced by high military personnel. Buddhist leaders declared their satisfaction with the prospect of our departure. In his speech of April 18 at Hue, the Buddhist leader, Tri Quang, declared that "we are oppressed by two pressures—the Communists and the Americans. In the face of such monopolization and control, we must regain our right of self-determination. . . ." It is significant that General Dinh, mentioned above, invited Tri Quang to repeat this speech in Danang. The missteps of Ky, whom President Johnson had compared to Professor Rexford Tugwell, one of the architects of the New Deal, were widely blamed upon his "American advisers." Workers on American installations went on strike. Americans were attacked in the streets, and in consequence, several hundred American civilians had to be evacuated from Danang and American soldiers ordered off the streets of Vietnamese cities.

The mythological character of these two assumptions—the existence of a government in Saigon which we are committed to aid and defend, and the existence of a South Vietnamese people eager to be saved by us from Communism—has, of course, been well known to those observers who were capable of looking at the situation objectively, and there is no lack of printed material pointing to it. (Cf. on anti-Americanism, for instance, Jack Langguth's article in *The New York Times Magazine* of August 8, 1965.) Yet the clash between fiction and reality, revealing the fictions for what they are, has come as a shock to many of those who had lived in a self-created world of what Mark Twain has called "conscience-soothing fantasies." In consequence, there has been a sharpening and a radicalization of policy alternatives. There are those who recommend that we take over the government of South Vietnam and pursue the war with new vigor in the South and, more particularly, in the North. Others, such as Senators JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, VANCE HARTKE, JACOB JAVITS, RICHARD RUSSELL, JOHN STENNIS and many others who want to maintain their anonymity suggest that we leave Vietnam if a duly-elected government requests us to and some, such as Senators RUSSELL and STENNIS, are identified with both recommendations as alternatives.

The chief victim of this new contact with reality is likely to be President Johnson's moderate policy. The recent escalation of air attacks against the North is likely to be a portent of things to come. The mainstay of that moderate policy has been a two-

pronged war, seeking pacification in the South, interdiction of supplies and erosion of the will to wage war in the North. Both policies have failed. Pacification, aside from its incompatibility with a war necessarily waged without discrimination between combatants and civilians, requires a government which can keep pacified areas under its control and command the loyalties of the inhabitants. Yet the Saigon government cannot even control its own officials and its cities, which openly defy it and are honeycombed with Viet Cong agents.

The bombing of the North, strictly limited in terms of targets, suffers from the same inner contradiction which Winston Churchill, on the occasion of the League of Nation's sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War, put in the following epigram: "First, the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved that there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions. It was evidently impossible to comply with these three conditions." Similarly, President Johnson knows that effective bombing of North Vietnam conjures up the risk of a military confrontation with China or the Soviet Union or both; he is resolved that there must be no such confrontation, and he has decided upon the bombing of North Vietnam. Thus, in terms of its objective of bringing the Hanoi government to its knees and isolating it from the South, the bombing of North Vietnam, limited by the risk of a military confrontation with China and the Soviet Union, is of necessity an exercise in futility.

THE LIMITS OF BOMBING

It is at this point that the advocates of expanded bombing have logic on their side. If you want to test bombing as an instrument of political warfare, you must hurt the enemy until you have reached the limits of his endurance. Where these limits are is, however, a very open question. The experiences of World War II and of the Korean War cast serious doubt upon the effectiveness of even unlimited bombing as an instrument of political warfare. They suggest that under the impact of continuing attacks from the air, the morale of a government and of a people may stiffen rather than disintegrate.

The main issue raised by the suggestion to lift the restraints upon the bombing of North Vietnam, however, transcends the effectiveness of bombing as an instrument of political warfare. It concerns our relations with China and the Soviet Union. Neither of the two major Communist powers can afford to watch the destruction of a "fraternal Socialist country" without giving aid commensurate with the threat. Their leadership of the world Communist movement and, more particularly, their competition for it compel them to escalate their aid in proportion to our escalation of the damage we inflict upon North Vietnam. For China, that compulsion is compounded by her concern for national security. Where such escalation would stop or whether it could be stopped at all is anybody's guess. One can certainly not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union and China would supply North Vietnam with "volunteers" and "technicians" on a large scale. The possibility of escalation, therefore, includes the risk of a direct military confrontation between the United States, on the one hand, China or the Soviet Union or both, on the other.

To the question as to whether we ought to take such a risk, no *a priori* affirmative or negative answer can be given. Rather the answer depends upon the assessment of the stakes in terms of the national interest of the United States, for which such a confrontation would take place. In other words, we are facing here again the much debated question, why are we in Vietnam? If the stakes in Vietnam are as high as the supporters

of the war make them out to be, if indeed the credibility of the United States and its prestige as a great power are at issue, if perhaps even the fate of Asia and of the non-Communist world at large will be decided in Vietnam, then the risk of a direct military confrontation with China and the Soviet Union is worth taking. If, on the other hand, the stakes are minor or as mythological as the commitment to a Saigon government and the eagerness of the people of South Vietnam to be defended by us have already proved to be, then the risks we have been taking have been out of all proportion to the interests involved, and by the same token there is no legitimate reason for increasing drastically these risks. This is indeed what I believe.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE

The stakes by which our continuing presence in Vietnam and the expansion of the war are justified are, in ascending order of plausibility, resistance to aggression, the containment of China, the containment of Communism, and the prestige of the United States.

We must prove, so the first argument runs, that aggression, especially in the form of "wars of national liberation," does not pay by frustrating it in Vietnam. I shall not raise here again the otherwise relevant question as to whether we are facing in South Vietnam foreign aggression in the true sense of the word, and shall limit myself to pointing out that the argument assumes both a uniform pattern of aggression and a causal nexus among different manifestations of it. In this view, there exist, say, five opportunities for aggression throughout the world. By stamping out number one, one is supposed to have gone a long way toward preventing the others from materializing. This is, of course, an utterly dogmatic view of the world, completely oblivious of the concrete circumstances of time and place which determine the success or failure of political action. From this apolitical and unhistoric vantage point, the political processes appear as a series of litigations, the outcome of which is determined, in the manner of a legal precedent, by the outcome of the first.

In truth, each case of "aggression" is *sui generis*, and except in the rare case of a close political and military connection, the outcome of one can at best have only a remote psychological influence upon the outcome of the others. The success of Soviet "aggression" in Hungary and Cuba did not predetermine the success of aggression elsewhere. Neither the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion nor the success of the intervention in the Dominican Republic provide a precedent for anything. What happened in North Vietnam in 1954 and in Laos since 1958 has had no determining effect upon what happened elsewhere in the world, Southeast Asia included; at best, it was one factor among many. Our stake in thwarting "aggression" in South Vietnam must, then, be judged on its own merits, not in the unreal terms of remote determining effects.

That requirement is answered by the argument that we are in South Vietnam in order to contain China. However, the argument is devoid of factual support on three grounds. First, it assumes that the extension of Hanoi's rule to South Vietnam or the establishment of an independent South Vietnamese government of which the Viet Cong are a part would be tantamount to the expansion of Chinese influence into South Vietnam. In truth, however, China is being contained in Vietnam, North and South, even under the present most adverse circumstances, not by our military presence but by the innate nationalistic hostility of all of Vietnam to China. The expansion of Chinese influence has been stopped by the nationalism of Vietnam, as it has by that of North Korea.

Our military presence in South Vietnam and our war against the North—and this is the second error—far from serving the cause of China's containment actually serves her expansion; for it weakens that indigenous nationalism which everywhere in the uncommitted world contains the influence of the great powers. By making war upon the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, we are making war upon the most effective instruments of Vietnamese nationalism, and in the measure that we escalate the war, we force them into unwanted dependence upon China. Thus our policy has results exactly opposite to those intended.

Finally, the result would not be different if we were successful in our aim of destroying the power of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and establishing and maintaining some sort of anti-Communist government there. Such a government would from the outset be discredited in the eyes of the Vietnamese people since it could not maintain itself without massive American support. From whatever angle one approaches the problem, one cannot escape the existential incompatibility between Vietnamese nationalism and a white military presence, however benevolently conceived.

This being the case, the argument that we must remain in Vietnam in order to contain China blends into the one that we must remain in Vietnam in order to contain Communism, regardless of the preferences of the government and people of South Vietnam. By shifting the argument to an abstract ideological plane, we hope at the same time to avoid entanglement in the concrete issues of Vietnamese politics and to put our policy into the framework of a worldwide anti-Communist design. Yet that shift does not allow us to escape the confrontation with Vietnamese nationalism, which is fatal to that argument, too. It is the polycentric nature of modern Communism, as it reveals itself in the extremely peculiar conditions of Vietnam, that defeats the argument.

The interests and policies of China, the Viet Cong and the government of North Vietnam are not identical, although they all embrace Communism. North Vietnam seeks the unification of Vietnam under its own auspices; among the Viet Cong, there are strong anti-Northern tendencies; and China wants to reduce all of Vietnam to the position of a satellite. If we want to contain the Communism of the North, we might want to strengthen the Viet Cong's tendencies toward autonomy. If we want to contain the Communism of the Viet Cong, we thereby weaken one element which could have contained the Communism of the North. And by weakening either, we of course weaken the nationalistic barrier which Vietnamese nationalism interposes against the expansion of Chinese power. Thus a doctrinaire anti-Communism makes a rational foreign policy altogether impossible.

Finally, there is the argument that our prestige requires us to stay in Vietnam. It is really the decisive argument upon which our policy stands or falls. It is implicit in all the others that have been advanced—commitment, defense of freedom, opposition to aggression, containment—and it has a measure of merit. Our prestige is indeed engaged in Vietnam. However unwise it might have been to engage it and, more particularly, to escalate that engagement drastically in word and deed, the engagement of our prestige is an undeniable fact. We have committed our power, our resolution, and our wisdom to an outcome of the struggle in Vietnam favorable to the interests of the people of South Vietnam, as we see them, and to our own.

However, this threefold commitment of our prestige shows a fatal flaw. Nobody at home or abroad doubts our power to destroy the Viet Cong, be it even through genocide. Nor can anybody doubt our resolution to do so

if this were to serve the interests at stake. What many Americans and an overwhelming majority of foreigners doubt is our wisdom in engaging our power and resolution in behalf of patently fictitious assumptions. Is our prestige better served by proving again and again what requires no further proof: that we have power and resolution, or by correcting policies which so many disinterested observers regard as being politically unwise, militarily unprofitable and morally dubious? Is it really a boon to the prestige of the most powerful nation on earth to be bogged down in a war which it is neither able to win nor can afford to lose? This is the real issue which is presented by the argument of prestige.

The rational resolution of that issue is rendered difficult by two factors. On the one hand, it requires the admission that the nation's policies have been mistaken and have fallen short of their goals. On the other hand, it requires the admission that the nation's policymakers have been mistaken and have fallen short of their tasks. Thus the prestige of the nation is inextricably intertwined with the personal prestige of the policy-makers. Certainly this nation is great and successful enough for its prestige to survive the admission of a misadventure. But those who govern us do not seem to think so; for they are lacking in that measure of confidence in themselves, of inner strength, nay, of greatness which will give a government the courage to step before the nation and the world and say, we have been mistaken. In the short run, the continuation of bankrupt policies, concealed by fictitious assumptions about the real world, promises an easy way out. In the long run, no government can escape the consequences of its mistakes, and the longer it persists in them, the greater will be the loss both to the substance of the national interest and to national and personal prestige.

The arguments in favor of our staying in Vietnam, then, do not bear objective scrutiny. This has always been so. What is new in the present situation is the opportunity it provides to disengage ourselves honorably and with a minimum loss of prestige from a profitless and risky misadventure. According to present plans, there are supposed soon to be elections in South Vietnam. These elections, if they are held at all, are not going to be representative or "free." First, elections can only be held in that part of Vietnam, comprising at best half of the population, which is firmly under the control of the military. Second, the Viet Cong will not be allowed to participate. Third, since the advocacy of a negotiated settlement is a criminal offense in South Vietnam, one very important segment of opinion will have no legitimate outlet. Finally, Vietnam has no real tradition of fair nationwide elections or national issues. Thus the government that administers the elections is likely to win them. It is in our interest to see to it that elections are actually held, and that through them political elements will come to the fore which will seek to liquidate the war through a negotiated settlement. To that end, we ought to work for the establishment of a broadly-based coalition government in which war-weary elements of the South Vietnamese population would have a decisive voice.

These political elements conceive of the issue of the war in different terms from ours. While for us the issue is between Communism and freedom, the South Vietnamese insofar as they are anti-Communist, see it as a contest between a tyranny which at least can boast to have liberated the country from foreign domination, and a succession of tyrannies considered the tool of yet another foreign domination. These Vietnamese tend to equate the Communists with the Americans, and they would like to get rid of the latter while being confident

being able to fend off the former. Tri Quang's statement quoted above is a faithful expression of that position. We may consider this position to be utterly mistaken and contrary to the best interests of the people of South Vietnam as we see them, but if we are not prepared to impose our conception of their interests upon them by seeing to it that they be rather dead than red, we must accept it as the point of departure for a new American policy of disengagement.

LEAVING IT TO THE VIETNAMESE

The implementation of such a policy would be subordinated to the policies of the government of South Vietnam. We would refrain from imposing our conception of our commitments upon such a government and would leave it to them to interpret it. While the ultimate goal of such a policy would be the phased withdrawal of American forces, they would remain during the period of negotiations as a bargaining counter on behalf of the government of South Vietnam. This political purpose would be served by the continuing American occupation of the cities and coastal bases, which are today the mainstay of American military power in South Vietnam.

The "enclave" policy which I advocated in the Milwaukee Journal of June 27, 1965, and with which more recently Generals James M. Gavin and Matthew B. Ridgway and others have been identified, here finds a new and productive political purpose. This policy would amount to the temporary acceptance on our part of the existing de facto division of South Vietnam into the territory controlled by the Viet Cong and by the South Vietnamese military. It would imply the cessation of search-and-destroy forays and of air attacks and the maintenance of the status quo in the cities and the military bases presently under anti-Viet Cong control. Since such an arrangement would be intended to last only for the duration of negotiations, it could be expected, and might even be stipulated, that the Viet Cong would abstain from attacks upon, and acts of sabotage within, these enclaves.

We had the opportunity to embark upon such a policy last June when some prominent members of the Quat government tried to move toward a negotiated settlement. It was exactly because of this that the Administration allowed that government to be overthrown by General Ky. Is the Administration reader now to grasp that opportunity, especially after two assumptions upon which our present policy is based have been revealed as fictions? It would be rash to give a positive answer to that question.

There have always been government officials of fairly high position who were in favor of such a policy, and many common citizens, journalists and even hawkish senators, under the impact of recent events, have come to see reality at least partially in its true light. Yet the spokesmen of our government, as by conditioned reflex, endeavor to close the holes in the wall of myths with new fictions in order to keep an unwelcome reality out. One spokesman has dismissed the political disintegration of South Vietnam as "growing pains." Another has welcomed the upsurge of anti-Americanism as a healthy sign of nationalism. In contrast, and in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, a third one has discovered that the recent political turmoil in South Vietnam contained "only a very small overlay of anti-Americanism" and basically was "about the kind of government that can most efficiently carry on the war." These inanities are shown up for what they are by a Saigon dispatch of Charles Mohr in *The New York Times* of April 21, quoting an official source to the effect that, "There is a very real war-weariness in this country and the Buddhists represent it politically. I don't think there

is any doubt that they will try to find ways to end the war."

The melancholy conclusion is inescapable that governments, like men in general, if they are capable of learning at all, learn from experience rather than from rational arguments. A blister burned on a child's finger is more persuasive than parental warnings. Perhaps we have not yet suffered enough for the lessons of Vietnam to sink in. Thus men must die, women must weep, what nature has provided and man has wrought must be destroyed, because governments, blinded by prejudice and paralyzed by pride, learn too slowly for the good of the governed.

Mr. MCGOVERN. Mr. President, one of the best informed observers of the Vietnam conflict is the distinguished columnist Joseph Kraft. Mr. Kraft writes from a rich historical background combined with close, informed observation of the political and military struggles of Saigon. His column in the May 18, 1966, issue of the *Washington Post* should be read by every Member of Congress and the officials of our Government. I ask unanimous consent that this important article, together with James Reston's column of the same date in the *New York Times*, Walter Lippmann's columns of May 17 and May 19 in the *Washington Post*, and Emmet John Hughes' article in *Newsweek*, May 30, 1966, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the *Washington Post*, May 18, 1966]

INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK: DEGRINGOLADE

(By Joseph Kraft)

Degringolade is a French word meaning how everything slowly came apart. It is the only word I know that adequately indicates what has been set in motion by the events of last weekend in South Vietnam. For the military seizure of Danang is an episode so many-sided in its potential dangers that the perils have to be counted in order to be realized.

The first danger is the reinforcement of the regime of Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. But the Ky regime is unfit to govern South Vietnam, or any other country. As now organized, it is not suited even to fight a war. It has little capacity to clear and hold territory in the wake of American military successes, still less to provide security and social services.

Most of the leading generals in the regime—particularly the regional, or corps, commanders—are quite simply racketeers, selling off jobs, contracts, real estate, supplies and anything else that comes under their control. Marshal Ky, though evidently honest, is a hot-headed young pilot. The immediate seat of all the recent trouble seems to be a kind of temper tantrum last March that led him to sack the former corps commander at Danang.

Secondly, there is the probable alienation, not only of the militant Buddhists but of virtually the whole elite of the central coastal plain stretching from Hue to within a few hours of Saigon. Though cool to the Saigon government and suspicious of all foreigners, including Americans, the center has at all times represented a distinctly nationalistic strain.

Probably the best way to repel communism in Vietnam is to mobilize the xenophobic nationalism of the center. But now the center is under the gun of the government. It will be a very lucky thing if the center, and in particular the militant Buddhists, do not commence private negotiations with the

Communists. It will not be the first time that militaristic efforts to repeal communism by force have driven local nationalists into the arms of the Communists.

Thirdly, the avenue for moving from military to civilian rule has not been blocked. Even if some kind of elections are held, nobody can have any faith in their honesty or seriousness. General Ky has already indicated that he intends to rule no matter what the result of the poll.

Lastly, the other side can only be further convinced of the utility of keeping up the fight. The only true possibility of heading off the insurgency is to divert its support to a genuinely nationalistic regime—a regime that might have emerged from free elections. But against a regime that is as inherently weak and unstable as the Ky regime, the Communists are bound to keep up the pressure.

The American role in all this is murky. But it is certainly no good pleading that the United States was caught by surprise. Virtually everybody in South Vietnam knew for weeks that some such move was in the offing. On April 27, this column, written from Saigon under the title "Coups and Counter Coups" suggested the possibility of a move by Marshal Ky "aimed at preserving the present military crowd in power."

The truth of the matter is that in the face of this plain menace the American response was uncertain and weak. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge never made it clear that the United States absolutely insisted on free elections without any advance military horseplay. When Ky first said that he would stay in power for another year, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said only that he must have been misinterpreted. No effort seems to have been made to forestall Ky's airlift to Danang by putting a tight check on fuel supplies. On the contrary, all signs indicate that American officials, by turning a blind eye and deaf ear, actually encouraged Marshal Ky to move to Danang.

Perhaps Rusk and Lodge have some clear program for South Vietnam. But to me, anyway, that is not the way it looks. To me, it is not clear that they know what they are doing. And maybe that is why, at every juncture, President Johnson finds that his only choice is to send in more troops and step up the bombing.

[From the *New York Times*, May 18, 1966]

WASHINGTON: THE EVADED MORAL QUESTION IN VIETNAM

(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, May 17.—President Johnson has been confronted for some time with a moral question in Vietnam, but he keeps evading it. The question is this: What justifies more and more killing in Vietnam when the President's own conditions for an effective war effort—a government that can govern and fight in Saigon—are not met?

By his own definition, this struggle cannot succeed without a regime that commands the respect of the South Vietnamese people and a Vietnamese army that can pacify the country. Yet though the fighting qualities of the South Vietnamese are now being demonstrated more and more against one another, the President's orders are sending more and more Americans into the battle to replace the Vietnamese who are fighting among themselves.

THE TWO OPTIONS

Ever since the start of this latest political crisis in Saigon, the President has had before him two courses of action. The first was to make clear to all the contending South Vietnamese leaders that the United States was going to limit its reinforcements, its military and economic aid, its casualties, and its military operations to the minimum until they had composed their differences.

The objective of this course was to try to produce unity, and failing that, to provide time for a basic reappraisal of the American commitment.

The second course was to appeal to everybody to get together and meanwhile to keep the war going as best we could with the American forces. President Johnson chose the second course. He is appealing and fighting, though he has even less reason to believe in the formation of a stable government now than he had at the beginning of the crisis.

WHAT JUSTIFICATION?

Justifying this historically, and particularly, justifying it personally to families of the casualties in the coming monsoon offensive will not be easy. If there were a reasonable expectation of political stability, the thing might be done, but lacking that, it is hard to see why the President rejected the course of a defensive pause.

The latest review of the war here with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge did not deal primarily with fundamental policy, but with operations. It did not focus on where we now stand or where we mean to go from here, but on what to do about the inflation and the shipping in Saigon, and the tactical problems in Danang and Hue, and how to pump a little more sawdust into the ruling generals in the capital.

There is little reason to believe that President Johnson's latest "appeal" to the Buddhist leader, Thich Tri Quang, will have any more effect than the other innumerable appeals that have been made to that militant monk by other Americans in the last few weeks.

He is clearly not thinking much about putting aside "the lesser issues in order to get on with the great national tasks." He is summoning his followers to new demonstrations against the military junta in Saigon and the generals in the Government are moving troops of the Seventh Infantry Division out of the operations against the Communists to deal with the expected rioting in the capital.

Pleats of appeals have been made by President Johnson among others, to General Ky, to "compose his differences" with the Buddhists and get on with the formation of a civilian government, but his answer to that was first to increase his military power by kicking out his rival general in the First Corps area, and lately sending his marines to Danang and bringing the country to the verge of civil war.

It may be that, in the face of all this petty and provocative folly, President Johnson is playing a waiting game and being more clever than anybody here can see. What he will do if his latest appeal to Tri Quang is ignored and followed by more chaos in the streets remains to be seen.

WHAT COMMITMENTS?

At one point, however, if the present trend continues, there will have to be a new definition of all the commitments that have been given. Our commitment to Saigon originally rested on Saigon's commitment to fight and govern, neither of which it is now doing effectively. The President's commitments in this war involve not only a handful of generals who seized power, but involve the Vietnamese people and the American people as well.

Our commitment was to a "legitimate government" and what we now have in Saigon is neither "legitimate" nor a "government." Our commitment was to help them win the war not to replace them on the battlefield. Our arms were provided to fight the aggressors and not to start a civil war. Our promise was to help South Vietnam, not to destroy it.

[From the Washington Post, May 17, 1966]
TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE OBLIGATIONS OF POWER

(By Walter Lippmann)

In a careful prepared address at Princeton University the President said last week that "the issue for this generation . . . has to do with the obligations of power in the world for a society that strives despite its worst flaws always to be just, fair, and human." This is indeed the issue for this generation of Americans. What are our obligations in the exercise of the great power which we possess? This is the question which is troubling our people deeply and is dividing them dangerously.

The oldest and the first American answer to the question is in the Declaration of Independence, that power may be used only with "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." This is the original American commitment, not to use force without taking into account the opinions of others. This fundamental commitment against the unilateral use of force in human affairs has been, in the American view, the prime obligation of power.

This has been the American idea from the beginning, and in the course of time it has evolved into a fundamental belief that the use of power must be brought under the reign of law. In this century the conviction has expressed itself in American support of the principle of collective security, as represented by the League of Nations, and then by the United Nations and by the regional agreements for the maintenance of peace.

From this, the fundamental obligation of power that it should not be exercised unilaterally, President Johnson has departed conspicuously. Though his intentions have been honorable, though his purposes have no doubt been good, the fact of the matter is that he has used military force more than once—in Santo Domingo, in the Stanleyville intervention, and in Vietnam without asking advice or seeking the consent of our allies all over the globe. He did not go before the United Nations for a verdict as to whether there was an aggression in South Vietnam. He did not consult, as the Treaty stipulates, the other members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, he did not seek the advice and approval of the Organization of American States before going into Santo Domingo. His conduct of foreign relations has been willful, personal, arbitrary, self opinionated, and the fact is that he has won no important support for the Vietnamese war and that all the great states of Asia and Europe are absent from Vietnam, are anxious and suspicious.

The president and his apologists have persuaded themselves that the war in Vietnam is a continuation of and is legally and morally and strategically the same as, the resistance to the Kaiser, the resistance to Hitler, the resistance to Stalin, the resistance in Korea. They are mistaken. The conduct of American foreign policy since President Johnson was inaugurated in 1965 marks a radical break with the past. President Truman did not intervene in Korea on his own decision; he intervened after he had received the approval and support of the United Nations. This was no mere legal and moral facade. The proof is that the war was fought with the support of seventeen nations. In neither of the world wars of this century did the United States intervene alone or fight alone.

The President said at Princeton that "unlike nations in the past with vast power at their disposal, the United States has never sought to crush the autonomy of her neighbors." Someone should explain to the President that a remark like that, showing that vast power is combined with perfect self ap-

proval, grates badly on the nerves of many people at home and abroad.

It is "the taking of too much upon one's self as one's right" which, as the Oxford English Dictionary says, is what "arrogance"

[From the Washington Post, May 19, 1966.]

TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

(By Walter Lippmann)

It is not easy to know what to think about the economic issues which are now before the country. Thus the President's closest official economic advisers have been surprised by the boom since they published their estimates in January. One of the members of the Council of Economic Advisers, Mr. Arthur Okun, explained in a speech made last week why the Advisers find it difficult to forecast the course of the economy: "The most important message bearing on economic policy is that the *uncertainties in the defense area have not yet been resolved.*" The central uncertainty is how big a military buildup there is to be in Vietnam in the calculable future.

Because of this uncertainty the current discussion about inflation, how serious it is and how bad it may become and what to do about it, is carried on in the dark. The fact of the matter is that the buildup which is now taking place, and is unofficially estimated to reach 400 thousand men by December, is not reflected in the budget of 1967, the budget under which the Government will operate for a year from this July. We know that the budget places a figure of 4.6 billion on "special Vietnam costs" for the year ending this June 30, and 10.3 billion for the year which begins July 1.

But these figures are misleading. For until recently the buildup has been carried on chiefly by drawing upon the accumulated stocks of materials and trained manpower. This way of conducting the war, which has been done so ably by Secretary McNamara, is ceasing to be possible because the stocks have been drawn down as far as is prudent.

Now, to draw upon stocks which have already been paid for does not require expenditures which show up in the appropriations for the budget. But to replenish the stocks does require new appropriations for expenditure. Therefore, in the period which we have now entered, the military buildup will become more visible in a steep rise of expenditures.

The only available estimate of what this is likely to mean is to be found in a cost accounting, made by unofficial economists, which is published in Fortune magazine for April. This article has all the earmarks of expertness and conservatism, and it comes to the conclusion that the war at its present level is actually costing 13 billions, and that at the level of 400 thousand men the war will cost at an annual rate of 21 billions. Since the 400 thousand level will not be reached until December, the cost of the war for fiscal 1967 is reckoned by Fortune magazine at 19.3 billion.

This steeply rising rate of expenditure will, through what the New Economists call the "multipliers," result in a great increase of the demand for goods and services. This will mean inflation unless total demand is reduced by taxation.

On the question of what to do about the developing inflation, the Administration has thus far refused to heed the advice of its own economists, of men like Dr. Heller, who are the architects of the Kennedy-Johnson prosperity. Though these economists are urging the President to ask for the standby legislative authority to levy higher taxes which would yield an additional \$5 billion of revenue, the Administration is refusing to say no and is refusing to say yes to the economists, hoping that somehow something

will happen to make it unnecessary to increase taxes in an election year.

In its resistance to a tax increase, the political judgment of the Administration has popular support. Recent polls show that while there is widespread popular discontent with the inflation which is already under way, only about 1 in 5 of the people is in favor of raising taxes.

As the war increases the inflationary demand, if the Government will not curb the demand by direct taxes, there is left, as in all our other wars, the attempt to freeze prices and wages by exhortation, guidelines, and administrative controls. These are an effort not to let the excessive demand operate against the inadequate supply of goods. It worked pretty well during the Second World War: there were no great black markets, the people did save and did buy bonds. It was only when the war was over, when the patriotic emotion was no longer controlling; that the pent-up inflation burst upon us.

The Administration may prefer to repeat the policy of the Second World War. There will, however, be one ingredient of that policy which will be lacking, the great popular patriotic sentiment which responded to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and to Hitler's conquest of western Europe. The American intervention in South Vietnam is the most unpopular war within the memory of living Americans, and it will not be easy, therefore, to suppress by patriotic exhortations the visible effects of the underlying inflation.

[From Newsweek, May 30, 1966]

EMMETT JOHN HUGHES ON A VIEW OF
VIETNAM

I had been in Saigon but a few hours when an American friend told me a trivial incident shared a day earlier with an American officer. The two men had been idly strolling a quiet street near the city's center when the restless eye of the officer caught half-sight of a flashing arm, a few yards off to his side, and then an ominous missile hurtling toward them. He spun swiftly and poised his hands to try to catch the grenade and throw it a safe distance. It flew past him, softly struck a wall, and neatly bounced back to the Vietnamese youth who had thrown it. It was a dirty but innocent rubber ball. As the youth snared it, he smiled with knowing bemusement, then skipped down the street whistling softly, glancing back, and grinning enigmatically. And the Americans were left to blink in wonder over the meaning of his mirth: was he a carefree youth harmlessly laughing at the Americans' alarm, or a sullen Saigonese spitefully tricking them into panic? They would never know. And when I left Vietnam a week later to continue a journey through Asia and Europe, I could not help feeling that this most unhistoric incident somehow captured—more eloquently than all the military briefings and embassy conferences—the troubled spirit of the American presence, for all its awesome armor . . . its hazy elusiveness of purpose and its uneasy vision of the future.

I never left Vietnam, in the political sense, on all my travel around the world, for the conflict in Southeast Asia excites the concern of all capitols and foreign offices, from Manila to Singapore to Paris and London. And with absolute unanimity, all ministers and diplomats—Asian or European, leftist or rightist—privately voiced a few unvarying sentiments. All regretted the extent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. All spoke, however, with no hint of conventional anti-Americanism; they simply voiced grave sorrow over the American dilemma. All yearned for diplomatic negotiation and U.S. withdrawal, on politically decent terms. All insisted that such terms would have to accept a major Communist role in South Viet-

nam's politics. And all deeply feared that both Hanoi and Peking would spurn any negotiation for the foreseeable future. As one of the highest officials in the British Foreign Office stated the matter: "To the cool eye of Peking, you have been led to commit 300,000 men to a struggle that costs China exactly nothing. If you were Peking, why would you negotiate?"

Throughout Southeast Asia, there await ready retorts to an American's common question: why is not the grim continuance of the war blamed more upon Communist obstinacy than American militancy? In the first place, there recurs a refusal to equate the military interventions of Hanoi and of Washington. As one quite pro-Western statesman insisted to me: "The two actions look to us very different. They are not just Asian; they are Vietnamese. And you cannot contend that the military behavior of one half of a small country toward its other half resembles closely the intervention, from 10,000 miles away, of the world's greatest military power." And in the second place, there prevails a general skepticism about U.S. promises to accept a neutralist Vietnam. As one Foreign Minister argued: "Your ambassadors and your generals keep saying that you are waging war in the holy name of 'anti-Communism.' Yet Washington keeps saying it will gladly negotiate with the Communists and accept their popular election to a Saigon government. It is hard to understand how you can sincerely hold both views. In fact, it is hard to know just what your government imagines is going to be won out of all this."

It is no easier to know the answer after an intensive look at the Vietnam scene itself.

It is a scene of almost stunning disproportions and incongruities. "Your military expansion in a country of less than 15 million," a Saigon editor wryly remarked to me, "may mean that we have witnessed right here, this last year, the most sudden population explosion in the world." The size of U.S. forces is no more striking, moreover, than their élan: from the gifted Gen. William Westmoreland down, they display poise and verve. And yet this, too, seems to have its anomalous aspect. During a full day of helicopter-hopping with Westmoreland to a string of isolated Special Forces outposts near the Cambodian border, I found one memorable instant singularly sad. It came in the form of the happy retort of the local commanding officer in the green beret, after Westmoreland had asked for any proof of Viet Cong weakness in the area: "Oh, yes, sir. In recent months, we had one villager inform on Viet Cong movements. And we welcomed one deserter: a 17-year-old girl. Sir, these are encouraging signs."

It is a scene clouded, too, with all the contradictions and confusions of judgment that often have baffled the U.S. public. In Saigon, the private forecasts of U.S. diplomats and U.S. generals concur perfectly on only one point: the public forecasts on Vietnam by Washington have been absurdly optimistic. But the authoritative witnesses agree on very little else. There is no more informed U.S. diplomat in Saigon than the man who assured me one day: "We have taken the military bounce out of the Viet Cong, and one more year will dramatically reduce our casualty lists." But there is no more informed U.S. general in Saigon than the realist who warned me the next day: "There is no significant turning in sight. Probably, the planned rate of Vietnam recruitment will have to be cut back; we have asked too much of them. Certainly, the American casualty rate will stay near the same ratio for a long time: the larger the forces, the more the casualties." And all informed guesses as to when a kind of success might crown the vast American effort fall in a sweeping time span:

somewhere between five years and one generation hence.

And it is a scene that quickly betrays some critical deceptions attempted by some U.S. policymakers and their propagandist. To be specific . . .

It is not possible to respect a regime under Premier Nguyen Cao Ky as concerned with democracy or competent to govern. The Premier is immature and shallow, vastly pretentious and wildly mercurial. I found him thus, throughout one of his three-hour monologues, and any responsible American in Saigon knows him to be thus. Asked to contemplate a negotiated peace with Hanoi—at any time or on any terms—he has a flat and final way of scorning the notion: "I would rather go out and shoot myself." As for political enemies within his own borders, he views them with a giddy contempt, and he enjoys intoning a rather lethal kind of litany: "If I wish, I could destroy them all." As for U.S. politicians and U.S. publicists who have hailed Ky as a serious hope for Vietnam's future—after the tinsel drama of the Honolulu conference—they have much to answer for.

It is no more believable for the U.S. to pretend that its Vietnam policy faithfully follows the free will of the people than to pretend that its Communist foes are mere "bandits" surviving solely by "terror." Despite their public pieties, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. military privately dread the prospect of national elections. The fear is not quixotic: who can guess how a people so scarred by war, and so impoverished in leadership, will practice sovereignty? Throughout this spring's political crisis, therefore, the U.S. pressed Ky hard to put down the Buddhists and to put off the elections. Now the next American hope rests on a grudging constitutional formula: an assembly indirectly elected, only the President chosen by popular vote and the President empowered to rule in any crisis by emergency decree.

It is utterly untrue to blame the country's political ferment on the cryptic politics or ambitions of a cabal of Buddhist monks. As falsehood always begets falsehood, this fiction is essentially the invention of those U.S. propagandists who must explain away their earlier fabrication, namely: a South Vietnam that had "turned the corner" in military security and political progress. The Buddhist protesters did not wantonly wreck this political Camelot: it never existed. And the agitations of Buddhists or students or workers are most plainly symptoms, not causes, of a half-nation in half-agony. Nor are the causes mysterious or malevolent. There has to be some war fatigue in the people. There has to be some resentment of the economic shocks caused by a foreign army of a quarter-million men. And there has to be a nagging awareness and a wearying regret—among the urban educated as well as the rural illiterate—that their present war and their future destiny no longer seem *theirs* for the waging or the winning. As one Saigon professor gently asked me: "Do you realize how long it has been since *we* made a major decision about war or peace? And if I just meekly ask you where *you* are taking *us*—can you tell me?"

I could not.

The riddle must bring at least some anguish to all caught in it. And it seems rooted in a strange anomaly. For sometimes a great modern nation has been chastised for allowing its undaring politicians to disparage or to deter the power of its undaunted military; so it was said of France in its own Vietnam struggle. But it has remained for the United States to contrive the contrary blunder; to credit its military power with a gift for the most elaborate political achievement—the making of a new and free nation.

This stays—as it has always appeared—the fatal flaw. It is a debatable theory that the Vietnam conflict has perilously overextended U.S. power *militarily*, for some U.S. presence presumably could stay impregnable for decades. But it is a demonstrable fact that U.S. policy has overextended itself with reckless extravagance *politically*. This involvement is wholly without precedent in American policy. It bars no analogy at all to the defense of Germany or Korea or Greece. For the American undertaking here—and here alone—implies an intent profoundly different from defending free nationhood and repelling aggression. Behind the military shield, it means educating a whole people to govern themselves when they have never done so. It means discovering a corps of democratic leaders where it has never existed. It means writing laws and combating poverty. It means inventing new political institutions and fostering new political parties. And far from the simple defense of free nationhood, it means arousing a sturdy sense of nationality in a people who have never been a nation.

Such a nearly delirious design would require, among many remarkable things, one luxury above all; a vast amount of time. But time is running out in Vietnam. The five years—or the generation—coveted by U.S. planners cannot be wrested from the turbulent politics or the tired people. The people's clamor, always confused and often querulous, yet carries a simple appeal; if not pacification, at least participation. But the harshly ironic truth is that the self-government of Vietnam, so revered in official American oratory, only carries menace to official American policy. For must not the deepest impulses of any Vietnamese civilian assembly soon prove to be a collective desire to show independence of the Americans and a competitive desire to appear the man or the faction most ingenious in talking the foe toward peace? Just two days before Premier Ky agreed to hold elections, I asked this question of a most authoritative spokesman for U.S. policy in Saigon. And he answered bluntly: "If any elected assembly sits in Saigon it will be on the phone negotiating with Hanoi within one week."

The choices that now are left to the United States would appear almost tormenting.

They suggest, both politically, and militarily, a set of self-locking dilemmas. If national elections are stifled, the U.S. presence must shelter behind a succession of sometimes servile, sometimes surly, military regimes. If national elections are free, the U.S. presence—while by no means sure to be instantly denounced—nonetheless instantly becomes the creature of the vagaries of Saigonese politics. If U.S. military progress stalls, Hanoi or Peking need only relax and rejoice. If U.S. military progress quickens, Hanoi or Peking need only hint a desire to negotiate with Saigon or Washington—with the sure knowledge that the hint would suffice to set each capital at odds with itself and with the other.

All the bleak choices rather inexorably dissolve, however, toward one. As a wise and sympathetic statesman of Southeast Asia stated to me: "You are going to leave Vietnam. You are not going to be routed or humiliated: your armadas and your bombers make you the greatest power even in the South Pacific. But you are going to leave because the earth-bound politics of Vietnam cannot be solved by the airborne cavalry of America."

"You now have probably a last decision to make. You may try to smother all forces in Vietnam seeking compromise and peace—thus pitting them all against you. Or you may try to work with the best of these forces in their confused attempts at negotiation, so that the very imperfect end of it all still will allow you to leave with dignity. Your last choice, then, is clear: either you will one

day withdraw because you shrewdly appear to want to—or because it plainly appears you have to. Is this really so hard a choice?"

It may not seem a hard choice in abstract logic, but it is a stern choice in American politics. It would require of Washington almost a convulsion of candor and a revolution in courage. This means the courage to concede, after all, that the present hope of history for Vietnam has never been more, in truth, than a nation dealing with Peking much as Poland duels with Moscow. It means the resolve to ignore all zealots who still shout their preposterous prescription that a little more military medicine can cure political sickness. And it means the wisdom to sense that American repute in Asia is not dignified but diminished by untiring war for the unattainable victory . . . and American honor is not tarnished but brightened when so great a power can say, with quiet assurance: we have judged poorly, fought splendidly, and survive confidently.

I can think of no other way that the leaders of the United States might match the courage of the soldiers they have dispatched.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that articles by I. F. Stone and Walter Lippmann appearing in the May 25, 1966 Minneapolis Tribune; an excellent article by Joseph C. Harsch which appeared in the Christian Science Monitor just before the recent bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong; and an article by former Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Tran Van Dinh appearing in the July 2, 1966 issue of the New Republic be printed at this point in the RECORD:

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 25, 1966]

THE REAL RISK IN VIET NAM

(From I. F. Stone's Weekly)

WASHINGTON.—A U.S. embassy official in Saigon said to me, "Nobody can come out here with an open mind and not have it changed by what he sees."

Since most VIPs see only U.S. officials, it is not surprising that their minds are changed in the desired direction. Perhaps mine is closed. Though I listened as sympathetically as I could to officials of quite different views, I must confess that I heard nothing to change it.

On the contrary, it seemed to me that the same exercise in self-delusion so many newspapermen have observed in the past was still going on. I cite as example a remark which offers a clue to the current crisis in Hue and Da Nang. At one of the first backgrounders I attended in Saigon I was startled to hear a briefing officer dismiss the Buddhist student demonstrations. "The students," he said, "don't represent anything."

I thought the remark all the more disturbing because it came from an official who has a reputation for intelligence and candor. It may well be that if you could run the whole population of Saigon through a computer it would turn out that few had ever heard of the student protests.

Conceivably you might also find that they expressed the most widespread feelings in the country—weariness with the war and antagonism to the presence of so many foreign troops. To dismiss the Buddhist students seemed foolish to me.

Students tend to be the most concerned and vocal group in every society. They are the men and women who will soon be governing the country. To decide that they represent nobody is a comforting way to dismiss protest, but a sure way to miscalculate political forces.

Admittedly there are students of varying opinion in Saigon: pro-war students and anti-war students, anti-election students, and pro-election students, Catholic students and Buddhist students. It is only the latter that the briefing officer was downgrading.

These tranquilizing rationalizations become the premises of policy. Ever since the Buddhist demonstrations were sparked by the removal of General Thi, there has been a disposition in the U.S. embassy not only to dismiss the demonstrators as "just a bunch of Buddhist beatniks" but also to hope the military would disperse them by force.

This is the historic delusion that revolutionary movements can be scattered with a whiff of gunpowder. There was disappointment that Ky did not put down the Saigon demonstrations by force and that he withdrew his troops from Da Nang in April after we flew them there for a confrontation with anti-government troops. From several sources I heard not only that Ky was being advised to precipitate a showdown in Da Nang but also that there were promises of U.S. funds to rebuild the city if his planes had to bomb out the rebels.

There was a strong current of disapproval when Ky backed down and promised elections instead. Ky's attack on Da Nang last week and the equivocal wait-and-see attitude of the White House seem to me quite consistent.

What the U.S. establishment fears is that once representative government is launched, it will be hard to control. What our military men desire is a secure base while they carry on the war; they want no disruptive experiments in democracy.

It is here that military needs conflict with political aims. To win the people you have to risk letting them express themselves, and that means risking a government which might negotiate peace.

[From the Minneapolis Tribune, May 25, 1966]

VIETNAM DISASTER PERCEIVED

(By Walter Lippmann)

WASHINGTON.—The hardest question facing us at the moment is whether or not the disintegration of the Saigon government and army can be stopped and reversed. The official position is, of course, that it can be.

But there is no prospect now visible that the South Vietnamese people and the South Vietnamese army can be united and rallied for the prosecution of the war. Unless this condition changes radically we shall increasingly be fighting alone in a country which has an army that is breaking up and a government which has little authority.

We must hope that the President and his strategic planners are prepared for such a development.

If the Saigon forces disintegrate, it will no longer be possible to continue the war on the theory that the mission of our troops is to smash the hard core of the enemy while the Saigon troops occupy and pacify the countryside.

What then? We shall be hearing from those whose first article of military faith is unlimited belief in airpower. They are arguing that the way to repair the breakdown in South Viet Nam is to bomb Haiphong and Hanoi in the North. The administration, we are told, knows the folly and the futility of that course.

Is there any real alternative to a holding strategy, sometimes called the enclave strategy, pending the negotiation of a truce and an agreement for our phased withdrawal from the Asian mainland? If the Vietnamese war cannot be won by the Air Force, if it cannot be won by American troops fighting alone in South Viet Nam, what other strategic option is there?

The only other option would be to make no new decisions and pursue the present course and hope that things are not so bad as they seem and that something better will turn up. The President is bound to be strongly tempted to take this line. The alternatives open to him are dangerous or inglorious and repulsive to his cautious but proud temperament.

A great head of government would have seized the nettle some time ago, as long ago as 1964, and would have disengaged gradually our military forces. But that would have taken a highmindedness and moral courage which are rare among the rulers of men. For rulers of men nearly always will do almost anything rather than admit that they have made a mistake.

Yet the moment of truth comes inexorably when a radical mistake has been made. The mistake in this case has been to order American troops to fight an impossible war in an impossible environment. The American troops, which may soon number 400,000 men, are committed to an unattainable objective—a free pro-American South Vietnam. They are commanded to achieve this on a continent where they have no important allies and where their enemies have inexhaustible numbers.

[From the Christian Science Monitor]
ON MORE BOMBINGS
(By Joseph C. Harsch)

WASHINGTON.—Recent public opinion polls in the United States disclose a rising public impatience with the slow pace of victory in Vietnam. It is said that majority opinion now favors more bombing of North Vietnam.

The theory, presumably, is that by bombing around Haiphong and perhaps even Hanoi itself the North Vietnam government and people might be induced to give up their effort to sustain the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

It is possible that the bombing of Haiphong and the mining of the harbor might reduce the amount of men and supplies moving down the jungle trails from the north to the south. However, this is not certain. The net effect of the bombing to date has probably been to attract more aid to North Vietnam from other Communist countries than might otherwise have been sent. It has also given North Vietnam the benefit of the "sympathy for the underdog" emotion.

COMMON CONSENT

But even if some military advantage might be gained from spreading the bombing, there are still powerful reasons bearing on the President in Washington against such action.

The main reason against more bombing is that the moment the United States bombs Hanoi or attempts by bombs to cut Haiphong off from the outside world, the nature of the war will be profoundly changed.

At the present time a tacit understanding exists which is accepted by the Russians and the Chinese.

Under this present set of "local ground rules" governing the air war against North Vietnam the United States limits its bombing to road and rail lines and a few specific targets such as the power plant near Haiphong. These are targets which can be hit without risk of hitting large numbers of civilians. The hitting of them does manifestly put some restraint on the supply line to the south.

By common consent this kind of bombing is accepted as being a justifiable answer to the fact that men and supplies from North Vietnam are moving to South Vietnam. The United States is making war on the supply line to South Vietnam. Both Russia and China have agreed, by their behavior, that Washington is entitled to do this.

NEW STRAIN

But it is implicit in the "ground rules" that, if the United States "escalates" its purpose in North Vietnam, the rules would be changed.

For example, bombing Hanoi would be a totally different thing from bombing the road and rail lines from Hanoi to the south. Hanoi is a heavily populated capital city. Bombing it would be making war on a mass of people and a government. Both Moscow and Peking are formally allied to that government and profess interest in the welfare of the people.

The bombing done so far does not force Moscow and Peking to recognize their obligations as allies to Vietnam. But if the United States made war not just on the supply line but on the government and the people of North Vietnam, a new strain would be put on both Chinese and Russian restraint.

It is conceivable that the United States could bomb and invade North Vietnam and conquer the country and Russia would do no more than protest. It is inconceivable that China would allow any such development without strong reaction. And Russia might feel forced to join in.

CHANGING RULES

So long as the military measures against North Vietnam are aimed only at the supply system and not at the government or people, the war continues in its present and familiar pattern.

But any change in the ground rules is bound to lead to change in the response.

Those who favor bombing Hanoi and the port and harbor of Haiphong are really talking about widening the war to include China.

Changing ground rules in the middle of a war is quite as risky as changing horses in midstream. Which is why the President will not necessarily give in to the new pressures even if his popularity has hit new lows.

He is said to understand that getting from a small-size war in Vietnam into a major war with China, and perhaps Russia too, would not necessarily win the next election for the Democrats.

[From the New Republic, July 2, 1966]

ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM: PRELUDE TO AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT?

(By Tran Van Dinh)

(NOTE.—Tran Van Dinh was *Chargé d'Affaires and Acting Ambassador of Vietnam to the United States in 1963. After representing his country in Argentina and India he resigned from the Vietnamese Foreign Service to live and work in Washington, D.C., as a journalist, author and lecturer. He was born in the imperial city of Hue in 1923 and fought against the Japanese and then the French, 1942-49, in the nationalist cause.*)

In retrospect, we can see that it was the Honolulu conference in February, which brought together President Johnson and the leaders of the Saigon government, which indirectly provoked the agreement between the military junta and the Buddhists for an election this September of a national assembly for South Vietnam. But it also encouraged General Nguyen Van Thien, the head of state, and General Nguyen Cao Ky, the prime minister, to consolidate their power. Assured of US support, the first logical step was for them to try to bring corps commanders under more direct control.

General Nguyen Chanh Thi, a Buddhist and potential rival of Ky, was dismissed March 10. Thi was the tough paratrooper officer who revolted unsuccessfully against President Ngo Dinh Diem in November, 1960; he had commanded the first tactical zone and the first corps, with civil and military jurisdiction over the Northern provinces and the main cities of Danang and Hue, the

Buddhist strongholds. The Buddhists reacted to his dismissal with demonstrations, and extracted from the generals a promise for elections and formation of a civilian government. A subsequent statement by Ky on May 8 to the effect that he intended to remain in power set off more demonstrations; this time the Buddhists demanded Thieu's and Ky's resignations. Ky sent loyal marines to occupy Danang and Hue.

Nevertheless, all parties still agree on the need to hold elections for a national assembly by September 11. The recent threat by Thich (Venerable) Tri Quang, the militant Buddhist leader, to sabotage the elections should be interpreted as a tactical move to force the resignations of Thieu and Ky. The Ky government hopes to get an elected assembly of its choice by barring "neutralists" as well as "Communists" and by restricting the assembly's function to merely writing a constitution before adjourning. But President Johnson, in his speech on Memorial Day at Arlington Cemetery, said, "South Vietnam is moving toward a government that will increasingly reflect the true will of its people." Barring unexpected developments, I believe elections will be held sometime this year, though perhaps not in September; that the assembly that is elected will seek to end the war through negotiations; and that the Viet Cong will not refuse to negotiate.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge said on April 1 that "the Vietnamese never had elections on a national basis and a national question and it's never happened in their whole history." He erred (see Bernard B. Fall's article in *The New Republic* of May 14, 1966), but he nonetheless reflected the thinking of people who suspect that elections will lead eventually to a negotiated settlement of the war. These "counterinsurgency" experts are confident the war can be won as it was in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines, where the insurgents lost support and just faded away. Ideally, "wars of national liberation" could be solved by social and economic reforms, by winning the hearts and minds of the people who then deny the "water" to the insurgent "fish." But in Vietnam this requires two things.

The first is localization of the war. Yugoslavia helped the Greek insurgents, but the United States Air Force did not bomb military installations, roads and bridges in Yugoslavia. The British did not bomb Thailand during the Malayan campaign, although the Malayan Communists had training and rest camps inside Thailand. British diplomacy worked out a reasonably effective agreement with Bangkok for the joint control of the Thai-Malayan border. The United States did not blockage Indonesia, although arms were smuggled from that country to the insurgent Huk in the Philippines. But after February, 1965, when the U.S. Air Force started bombing North Vietnam, the war was internationalized.

A relatively competent, honest, respected and stable leadership and a relatively coherent and efficient administrative structure in South Vietnam is the second necessary condition. These are clearly missing today, and extensive bombings in the South, the use of defoliants and chemicals, and growing direct participation in the war by American troops will not help create that structure.

A GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE

Those who in their hearts oppose the coming elections and those who favor them both realize that they will bring about a new political climate and a more representative government. Until now, the "Front for the Liberation of the South" (usually called the Viet Cong) has claimed to be the "only representative" of the people in South Vietnam, a claim backed by North Vietnam. As long

as the Saigon government remains in the hands of the military junta, which at best represents only the interests of senior officers who fought with the French colonial forces during the 1945-1954 war of independence, the Viet Cong's claim sounds valid to many Vietnamese. With the election of a national assembly which in turn chooses a civilian government, the Viet Cong's claim would be much weaker. By the same token, the United States would gain considerable moral and political ground, for it has been accused rightly or wrongly of having since 1963 helped "a military clique," instead of the Vietnamese people, who have had no way of expressing their acceptance or rejection of that help.

Only an unwarranted optimist could expect the coming elections to be totally free and to reflect faithfully the will of the people who are under the nominal control of Saigon. At the same time it is not unreasonable to assume that in an elected assembly the Buddhist group, alone or in coalition with others, will have a decisive voice. The Buddhist leadership believes that Buddhism is the only force outside the Viet Cong which has grass-roots appeal and which has sizable international support. The Reverend Tam Chau, chairman of the Institute for Secular Affairs, recently attended the World Buddhist meeting in Ceylon to develop and strengthen outside contacts, especially among neighboring Buddhist nations. The Buddhist leadership feels it can successfully compete with the Viet Cong on both national and international levels.

What are the basic aims of the Buddhists? They are: defense of Buddhism, anti-Communism, independence, peace and social revolution through the revival of authentic Vietnamese values and the reestablishment of national dignity. These aims are shared by the vast majority of the Vietnamese, especially those in the countryside who in the past 25 years have been caught tragically in the midst of cruel wars and betrayed revolutions. (There are Buddhist leaders, I should note, who are very dubious about anti-Communism. Thich Nhat Hanh, director of the School of Social Studies at the Van Hanh Buddhist University in Saigon, said on June 4 in Washington: "... I am afraid of identifying myself with the dollar-making people; anti-Communism has become a real business in the last 10 years in South Vietnam." Thich Nhat Hanh is touring the United States to plead for an end to the war.)

Buddhist leaders feel that American soldiers have brought with them a "materialistic culture," and that American dollars are corrupting Vietnamese society and Vietnamese culture based on Buddhist values of purity and austerity. Hundreds of bars in Saigon and other Vietnamese cities and a growing army of Vietnamese prostitutes are constant reminders of the threat to national dignity. Many Buddhists look back nostalgically to one of the most stable and most prosperous dynasties in Vietnamese history: the Ly dynasty (1010-1225). During this period, Buddhism became the state religion and the monks contributed greatly not only to the religious life of the nation but its cultural and literary life as well.

The Buddhist leaders believe that only through a social revolution based on Buddhist values can the Vietnamese people recover their lost national dignity and lost cultural values, without which it is not possible either to compete with the Viet Cong or build a decent Vietnamese nation. Without political independence and national dignity this war is meaningless and the anti-Communist issue becomes secondary.

But the present military leaders, who were humiliated during the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and who have tasted power and its material advantages, are trying to cling to power as long as possible.

Some believe the United States will never withdraw its forces from South Vietnam

short of a total military victory, which, now that the war has been carried beyond the 17th parallel, can be achieved only by the defeat of the Viet Cong army in the South and the defeat of the North Vietnamese armed forces in the North. But, in my opinion, by that time the Chinese would have entered the war; there would be armed confrontation between the United States and China and with it the complete annihilation of the Vietnamese in both South and North. Already, with the kind of military strategy being pursued in the South, total military victory in the South means the South's destruction.

NEGOTIATION STEP BY STEP

I believe President Johnson and his Administration sincerely seek an honorable settlement of the war, one by which the United States will not be defeated either militarily or in its basic political aims. With the huge and efficient American military commitment in South Vietnam, the war has been "unlosable," militarily, since 1965. The leaders in Hanoi know that. In his interview with a British journalist, James Cameron, the prime minister of North Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, was quoted as saying, "We're not trying to vanquish the United States. There seems to be some preposterous belief in America that we are threatening them—a poverty-stricken little country like Vietnam threatening the most powerful nation on earth! We are trying to get rid of them. They're on our soil and we don't want them there. Let them go away and the war is over." In other words, Hanoi is not expecting a second Dien Bien Phu, in the military sense. The only Dien Bien Phu which seems possible in the long run would be a political and economic one. And this may happen, given a prolonged war conducted in its present conventional way, and growing dissatisfaction among the Vietnamese masses. The United States, with its unlimited resources in money and men, perhaps could prevent it, but the logical result would be lengthy occupation by the US Army of South Vietnam. No Vietnamese and few Americans want that.

Hanoi's prime minister must be thinking of "getting rid of" the Americans by a political settlement, by negotiations. But who is to negotiate with whom? President Johnson's peace drive last Christmas was received coolly by Hanoi and the Viet Cong. On one hand, the US will find it difficult if not impossible to enter into direct negotiations with the Viet Cong or with Hanoi, as that will surely meet with strong opposition from the Saigon government, either the present one or even a future civilian government. On the other hand, the Viet Cong and Hanoi could not possibly deal with the present military junta, which they say represents "no one." The only answer would be to create conditions under which the Vietnamese can negotiate among themselves, conditions under which an elected government in Saigon can enter into gradual contact with the Viet Cong. That is why only elections can pave the way for a negotiated peace.

Such negotiations, when they take place, will require a great deal of skill on both sides. When they do begin, the following steps can be predicted:

1. Taking advantage of the new political climate created by an elected national assembly which "recommends that the government look into the problems of war and peace and the American military commitment," the civilian government could challenge the Viet Cong to prove their repeated desire for peace. A localized cease-fire and exchange of prisoners of war could then be discussed by the military commander in one "tactical zone" with the commander on the opposite side. (It is significant that during the attacks on Danang by General Ky's marines, the Viet Cong proposed that the dissident anti-government forces join with

them, keeping intact their units and their command.)

2. Based on the results in one "tactical zone," the same pattern could be adopted more easily and rapidly in other zones until a general cease-fire has been realized in all South Vietnam.

3. During the final phase of negotiations for a general cease-fire and an exchange of prisoners, the delegates of the Saigon government and of the Viet Cong would meet for preliminary talks in a neutral capital, say Rangoon. If they wished, both Hanoi and Washington could send observers to the meeting, but it would be wise for Washington not to insist on it. The capital of neutral Burma served in 1958-59 as the site for a conference between Thai and North Vietnam delegates to try to work out repatriation of Vietnamese refugees in the northeast of Thailand (repatriation was halted by the US bombing of North Vietnam).

4. These preliminary talks would provide both sides with an opportunity to discuss the procedure for reconvening the Geneva Conference, the co-chairmen of which are the United Kingdom and Russia. There have been repeated promises by all parties concerned to accept such a conference. The United States role in a future Geneva Conference should be more decisive than it was in 1954. Also, in order to respect the political realities of the 1960's, it would be advisable to enlarge membership of the Conference to include, besides the original nations (United Kingdom, USSR, France, People's Republic of China, Laos, Cambodia, the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam), the Viet Cong, Thailand, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, since all of them have been direct participants in the Vietnamese conflict. It is expected that the other side will insist on more representation friendly to them, so as to balance the composition of the conference. This should not be insurmountable.

5. Among the main problems a new Geneva Conference would discuss, the thorniest would be:

Formalization of the terms of the cease-fire and the exchange of prisoners;

Control and supervision of the armistice agreements by an international body;

Supervision by an international body of elections, first for the unified government of South Vietnam, later for reunification of Vietnam.

ENLARGED GENEVA CONFERENCE

The 1954 Geneva Agreements set up an International Control Commission—India (chairman), Canada and Poland—to supervise implementation of the armistice agreements and supervise elections for the unification of Vietnam. But within a few months it became clear that the Commission lacked "teeth." It had little logistical support; it was denied cooperation or even moral backing by both South and North Vietnam; and in later years, with the decline of the role of India in world affairs, it lost much of its initial prestige. It is remarkable, however, that even today, though the ICC has become totally ineffective as a result of the enlargement of the war, North Vietnamese authorities continue to protest to the Commission about "violations by the United States of the Geneva Agreements." This indicates that North Vietnam wishes to keep the machinery of the ICC in being, for future use. The new ICC should be enlarged to comprise—besides India, Canada and Poland—the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China, Australia, one Asian neutral country (Burma), one Asian anti-Communist country (Thailand) and one Eastern European country (Rumania). The United States could volunteer to put at the disposal of the Commission the facilities at such bases as Cam Ranh, Danang, Vung Tau, Tan Son

Nhut. "These bases would also serve as centers for regrouping, protection and evacuation to countries of their choosing of persons who for personal reasons or political conviction refuse to accept the terms of the armistice agreements. The chairmanship of the Commission should be rotated every six months, in the alphabetical order of countries represented.

6. Regarding eventual withdrawal of American land forces, the pattern adopted in an agreement signed by President Ho Chi Minh and M. Sainteny—the representative of France—in Hanoi on March 6, 1946, may be helpful. According to that agreement, "each year a fifth of the French troops will be relieved by the Vietnamese army; this relief will thus be effectively completed after five years." This should be supervised by the ICC. If and when elections for the reunification of Vietnam take place (three or five years after the conclusion of the armistice agreements) no foreign troops from any country must remain in Vietnam. This condition must be attached to a solemn pledge, made by the Vietnamese authorities at the time, not to enter into any military alliance and not to allow any military foreign base on Vietnamese soil. The role of the new and enlarged ICC, so far as Laos and Cambodia are concerned, would remain unchanged.

North Vietnam was very bitter when elections for reunification, stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements, did not materialize in 1956. It is useless to blame one side or the other, but it must be expected that North Vietnam will insist on firmer guarantees than those provided in the 1954 Agreements. These guarantees can be provided by the United Nations, which should ratify the results of the new Geneva Conference. The UN should also send observers to be attached to the International Control Commission, selected from member nations not represented in the ICC. The UN presence in Vietnam would last as long as Vietnam wished, even after the election for reunification and after the ICC had fulfilled its mission. Pending reunification of the country, at which time Vietnam would be admitted as a full-fledged member of the world organization, both North and South Vietnam would maintain observers at UN headquarters.

It is evident that the road to an honorable settlement in Vietnam requires a great deal of patience from the travelers. But an attempt must be made, and the first step is elections in South Vietnam. This in turn calls for an unequivocal reaffirmation by the United States that it will abide by the results and the effects of this year's elections in the South. If one trusts frequent statements by the President and his Secretaries of State and Defense, such a reaffirmation presents no difficulties. The U.S. should use its diplomatic influence to convince the government in Saigon to act in a like manner and with the same good faith.

In the long run, the United States will have achieved its basic aims in Vietnam—normalization and a nonaligned Vietnam. Historical and geopolitical realities, as well as immediate interests, dictate that no government in a reunified Vietnam could afford to be a satellite of China and still remain in control; likewise no Vietnamese government could afford to be totally dependent on the United States and still enjoy the support of the people. Thus, eventually, Vietnam can contribute to the American policy of "containment without isolation of China," preparing the way for normalization of relations between the U.S. and China.

(At this point Mr. McGOVERN assumed the chair.)

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, it has been a privilege today to listen to some of the challenging and thought-provok-

ing addresses by the Senator from Indiana and by the present occupant of the Chair, and the comments by the Senior Senator from Idaho concerning the situation in Vietnam.

Those speakers are certainly more expert and exercise more leadership in this particular area than I.

I think it is especially important that it was emphasized that, a year ago, we were spending approximately \$1 billion a month. Today we are spending approximately \$2 billion a month. We can look forward to an acceleration and escalation of the war, and it is my opinion that we shall be spending \$3 billion a month or more within a short time.

As casualties pour in, as costs increase, as draft calls increase, as perhaps taxes go up, and as we may be forced to institute controls, a change may occur in the opinion that the Senator from South Dakota has suggested would be the immediate reaction.

I agree that probably most of the American people will feel that the bombing is justified, and that it is a part of the U.S. military endeavor.

I believe that as a result of the bombing and as a result of the speeches that have been made in the Senate today—in the highest tradition of the Senate—it is the responsibility of President Johnson to again outline the objectives and the goals of this country in the war in Vietnam. Of major importance, I believe he must tell the American people what we are trying to do, where we are going, and how we shall achieve the objectives and the goals that he must outline.

No longer can we rely on the fact that we, as a nation, were invited into Vietnam to resist aggression, because a half dozen governments have been in existence in Vietnam since the government which first invited us in and asked for advisers. Many Senators voted for all the necessary resolutions and appropriations.

As the result of this escalation of the war and as the result of this bombing, full and frank disclosure must take place as to just where we are going, what we are attempting to do, and what our objectives and goals are.

The debate that occurred this afternoon, by the Senator from Indiana and the Senator from Pennsylvania and others, is in the tradition of the Senate—of dissent, of explanation. I believe the debate will be helpful to the American people in finding out where we are going.

CONGRESS AFTER 6 MONTHS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the close of business today, the Senate will take a short and well-earned rest until July 11. It is my hope that this period will be used to recharge batteries because, although much has been accomplished in the past 6 months, I would be less than candid if I did not confess that much more must be done.

We have a big legislative program to get through and I believe it is safe to predict that we will not adjourn before we have measured up to our responsibilities and completed this program.

Thus far, the Senate has passed a series of major bills, some of which are innovations and represent major contributions.

We can take comfort in the fact that this well-earned, if all too brief, recess will be taken with the knowledge that for the moment our calendar is practically bare.

For the first time in history we have passed legislation providing for—

- An auto safety program;
- A highway safety program;
- A tire safety program;
- A program calling for truth in packaging;

- Establishing a Federal program of safety for metal and nonmetallic mine safety;

- Extending urban development planning to rural areas;

- Alleviating the recurring national shortages of railroad freight cars;

- An accelerated program of fish protein concentrate research including authority to construct five demonstration plants;

- Authorizing funds for the construction and furnishing an official residence for our Vice President.

The foregoing were "firsts." In addition the Senate has passed—

- Four appropriation bills;
- A bill authorizing the President to accept membership in the Asian Development Bank;

- Authorizations for additional economic and military aid to Vietnam;

- The Tax Adjustment Act;

- The GI benefits bill;

- A 5-year extension of the Library Services and Construction Act;

- Emergency aid to India;

- Approved four reorganization plans;

- An expansion of the mandatory safety provisions of the Mine Safety Act;

- The annual AEC authorization measure;

- The annual Coast Guard authorization;

- The annual space authorization;

- The Manpower Services Act;

- An increase in the Small Business authorization;

- The Participation Sales Act of 1966;

- An extension of the Renegotiation and Defense Production Acts;

- An increase in the temporary debt limit;

- The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments;

- The copper tariff suspension and numerous stockpile disposal bills;

- The annual military procurement and military construction authorizations;

- An extension of the Federal Airport Act;

- Established Cape Lookout as a part of the President's recreation program;

- A bill providing a third powerplant for Grand Coulee;

- A bill enlarging the scope of the water resources research program;

- Established a National Water Commission;

- A bill establishing a national wild river system;

- A bill reforming the Federal bail procedures;

- Established the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission;

And, among other items, ratified five treaties.

Before we can ring down the curtain on the 2d session of the 89th Congress, we must consider—

The bill establishing the Department of Transportation;

The Civil Rights Act of 1966;

The foreign aid authorization bill;

Unemployment compensation reforms;

An increase in minimum wage and an expansion of coverage;

The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1966 which includes the demonstration cities program, grants to assist in planned metropolitan development, coordination of Federal activities in metropolitan development, land development and new communities, and mortgage insurance for group practice facilities;

The District of Columbia minimum wage and District of Columbia Revenue Act and home rule which are in conference;

The expanded water and air pollution programs;

The Federal pay bill;

Food for freedom;

The crime bills;

Narcotics rehabilitation;

The Foreign Investors Tax Act;

The Health Professions Training Act, the Child Safety Act, the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Service Act, the Drug Safety Act, the Hospital Modernization Act, and the International Health program;

A bill continuing and accelerating the war on poverty;

A clean elections bill;

An extension of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Higher Education Act, and an International Education Act.

This list is by no means inclusive or final as there will be other measures to be considered.

The Congress can leave here by Labor Day if, and if it is a big if, we buckle down upon our return. Therefore, it is my hope that each of you will enjoy this well-earned respite from daily Senate activities and return ready to grind out the program so this session can hold its head high in the company of the 1st session of the 89th—one of the most productive sessions in our Nation's history.

To summarize the Senate's activities so far, I ask unanimous consent that the following report be printed in the Record following my remarks.

The being no objection, the legislative activity report was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY THROUGH JUNE 30, 1966

Days in session.....	93
Hours in session.....	424:53
Total measures passed.....	433
Treaties ratified.....	5
Confirmations.....	41, 168
Public Laws.....	129

Following is a brief summary of all major general bills upon which the Senate has acted this session, with presidential recommendations listed first and followed by other legislation categorized by subject. If there is no roll call vote breakdown, Senate action has been by voice vote.

PRESIDENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Appropriations, 1966

Vietnam supplemental: Appropriates an additional \$13.1 billion. Public Law 89-374. Vote: Senate passage 87 (58 Democrats, 29 Republicans)—2 (2 Democrats).

Second supplemental: Appropriates a total of \$2.8 billion, including \$12.1 million for rent subsidies, \$9.5 million for Teachers' Corps, and \$12 million for Selective Service System for higher costs relating to an increase in induction needs. Public Law 89-426.

Vote: Senate passage 72 (54 Democrats, 18 Republicans)—12 (10 Democrats, 2 Republicans).

Appropriations, 1967

Interior Department and related agencies: Appropriates a total of \$1,321,615,800. Public Law 89-435.

Treasury-Post Office: Appropriates a total of \$7,196,429,135. Public Law 89-474.

Asian Development Bank: Authorizes the President to accept membership on behalf of the United States in the Asian Development Bank and authorizes an appropriation of \$200 million. Public Law 89-369.

Vietnam supplemental economic aid: Authorizes for the current fiscal year additional economic aid in the amount of \$290 million for southeast Asia and \$25 million for the Dominican Republic; plus an additional \$100 million for the worldwide contingency fund. Public Law 89-371.

Vote: Senate passage 82 (55 Democrats, 27 Republicans)—2 (2 Democrats).

Vietnam supplemental military authorization: Authorizes a total of \$4.8 billion additional for fiscal 1966 for military activities in Vietnam. Public Law 89-367.

Vote: Senate passage 93 (61 Democrats, 32 Republicans)—2 (2 Democrats).

Tax Adjustment Act: Increases revenues in 1966 and 1967 by approximately \$6 billion to help finance the war in Vietnam; extends social security coverage (\$85 minimum) to all who are or reach 72 by 1968 and are not receiving railroad retirement, Federal, State or local pensions; increases excise tax on automobiles to 7 percent and telephone service to 10 percent through March 31, 1968; increases withholding and accelerates corporate tax payments. Public Law 89-368.

Vote: Senate passage 79 (55 Democrats, 24 Republicans)—9 (5 Democrats, 4 Republicans); Conference report 72 (49 Democrats, 23 Republicans)—5 (1 Democrat, 4 Republicans).

Emergency aid to India: To help India meet her pressing food shortages, this act makes available under Public Law 480 certain agricultural commodities including food grain, corn, vegetable oils, milk powder, cotton and tobacco. Public Law 89-406.

GI benefits: Provides educational assistance for veterans who have served on active duty for more than 180 days since January 31, 1955. Public Law 89-358.

Vote: Senate adopted House amendments 99 (67 Democrats, 32 Republicans)—0.

Library services: Extends the Library Services and Construction Act to June 30, 1971, and authorizes appropriations totaling \$700 million. H.R. 14050. Public Law 89-

Medicare: Extends from March 31 to May 31, 1966 the deadline for enrollment in the medical insurance portion of the social security health insurance program for the aged. Public Law 89-384.

Truth in packaging: This act is designed to insure that labels of packaged consumer commodities adequately inform consumers of the quantity and composition of their contents and to promote packaging practices which facilitate price comparisons by consumers. S. 985 passed Senate June 9.

Vote: Senate passage 72 (56 Democrats, 16 Republicans)—9 (1 Democrat, 8 Republicans)

Reorganization Plan No. 1: Approved the transfer of the Community Relations Service from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Justice and the transfer of all its functions from the Secretary of Commerce to the Attorney General. Effective April 22, 1966.

Vote: Senate rejected disapproval resolution: Yeas, 32 (11 Democrats, 21 Republicans); nays, 42 (42 Democrats).

Reorganization Plan No. 2: Approved the transfer of the water pollution control functions from HEW to the Department of the Interior. Effective May 10, 1966.

Reorganization Plan No. 3: Approved the transfer to the Secretary of HEW the functions now vested in the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. Effective June 25, 1966.

Reorganization of Navy Department: Effective May 1, 1966.

Coal mine safety: Extends the mandatory safety provisions of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act to mines regularly employing less than 15 men underground, and strengthens other provisions of the act to increase the protection of lives and property in all underground coal mines. Public Law 89-376.

Metal and nonmetallic mine safety: Reduces the high accident rate and improves health and safety conditions in mining and milling operations carried on in the metal and nonmetallic mineral industries, establishes a Federal program of systematic inspection of such operations which affect commerce, and requires development, issuance, and enforcement of health and safety standards. H.R. 8989 passed Senate amended June 23.

Vote: Senate passage 57 (41 Democrats, 16 Republicans)—18 (7 Democrats, 11 Republicans).

AEC: Authorizes \$1,964,128,000 for operating expenses and \$295,830,000 for plant and capital equipment, or a total of \$2,259,958,000 for fiscal 1967. Public Law 89-428.

Coast Guard authorization: Authorizes \$126 million for fiscal 1967 for the Coast Guard to procure vessels, aircraft and to construct shore and offshore establishments. Public Law 89-381.

Space authorization: Authorizes a total of \$5,008,000,000 to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for fiscal 1967. H.R. 14324 in conference.

SBA authorization: Increases by \$125 million the ceiling on loans and outstanding commitments for the regular business loan program, the disaster loan program, and title IV loans under the Economic Opportunity Act; also increases by \$125 million the total amount which may be appropriated to the present revolving fund; establishes two revolving funds, one for disaster loans without an authorization ceiling and a second fund to finance other SBA lending programs. Public Law 89-409.

Participation Sales Act of 1966: Allows the Federal National Mortgage Association to sell to private investors shares, or certificates of participation, in loans pooled from the portfolios of several Federal agencies, including the Small Business Administration. Public Law 89-429.

Vote: Senate passage 39 (34 Democrats, 5 Republicans)—22 (2 Democrats, 20 Republicans); Senate adoption of House amendments, 50 (47 Democrats, 3 Republicans)—20 (2 Democrats, 18 Republicans).

Defense production: Extends the Defense Production Act of 1950 to June 30, 1968. H.R. 14025. Public Law 89-

Civil Defense emergency extension: Extends to June 30, 1970, the President's authority to deal with the effects of an enemy attack upon this Nation. H.R. 13125. Public Law 89-

Debt ceiling: Provides a temporary debt limitation of \$330 billion beginning on July

The existence of this letter has never been mentioned publicly before. I have the permission of Mr. Dryfoos's widow, now Mrs. Andrew Helskell, to read it to you today:

"Dear Marian:

"I want you to know how sorry I was to hear the sad news of Orvil's untimely death.

"I had known him for a number of years and two experiences I had with him in the last two years gave me a clear insight into his unusual qualities of mind and heart. One involved a matter of national security—the other his decision to refrain from printing on October 21st the news, which only the man for The Times possessed, on the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba, upon my informing him that we needed twenty-four hours more to complete our preparations.

"This decision of his made far more effective our later actions and thereby contributed greatly to our national safety.

"All this means very little now, but I did want you to know that a good many people some distance away, had the same regard for Orvil's character as did those who knew him best.

"I know what a blow this is to you, and I hope you will accept Jackie's and my deepest sympathy.

"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."

In the Cuban missile crisis, things were handled somewhat differently than in the previous year. The President telephoned directly to the publisher of The New York Times.

He had virtually been invited to do so in their conversation in the White House barely a month before.

That conversation had been on the subject of security leaks in the press and how to prevent them, and Mr. Dryfoos had told the President that what was needed was prior information and prior consultation. He said that, when there was danger of security information getting into print, the thing to do was to call in the publishers and explain matters to them.

In the missile crisis, President Kennedy did exactly that.

Ten minutes before I was due on this platform this morning Mr. Reston telephoned me from Washington to give me further details of what happened that day.

"The President called me," Mr. Reston said. "He understood that I had been talking to Mac Bundy and he knew from the line of questioning that we knew the critical fact—that Russian missiles had indeed been emplaced in Cuba.

"The President told me," Mr. Reston continued, "that he was going on television on Monday evening to report to the American people. He said that if we published the news about the missiles Khrushchev could actually give him an ultimatum before he went on the air. Those were Kennedy's exact words.

"I told him I understood," Mr. Reston said this morning, "but I also told him I could not do anything about it. And this is an important thought that you should convey to those young reporters in your audience.

"I told the President I would report to my office in New York and if my advice were asked I would recommend that we not publish. It was not my duty to decide. My job was the same as that of an ambassador—to report to my superiors.

"I recommended to the President that he call New York. He did so."

That was the sequence of events as Mr. Reston recalled them this morning. The President telephoned the publisher of The New York Times; Mr. Dryfoos in turn put the issue up to Mr. Reston and his staff.

And the news that the Soviet Union had atomic missiles in Cuba only 90 miles from the coast of Florida was withheld until the Government announced it.

What conclusion do I reach from all these facts? What moral do I draw from my story?

My conclusion is this: Information is essential to people who propose to govern themselves. It is the responsibility of serious journalists to supply that information—whether in this country or in the countries from which our foreign colleagues come.

Still, the primary responsibility for safeguarding our national interest must rest always with our Government, as it did with President Kennedy in the two Cuban crises.

Up until the time we are actually at war or on the verge of war, it is not only permissible—it is our duty as journalists and citizens to be constantly questioning our leaders and our policy, and to be constantly informing the people, who are the masters of us all—both the press and the politicians.

RESOLUTION TO REQUIRE FRANCE TO SETTLE WORLD WAR I INDEBTEDNESS

(Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. THOMSON of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I am today introducing a House concurrent resolution asserting the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary to require the Republic of France to make full and prompt settlement with respect to past due principal and interest of its World War I indebtedness to the United States.

While America still struggles to resist aggression and preserve freedom throughout the world, at extreme cost and sacrifice and a heavy drain on our gold reserves, France has grown rich and prosperous from the stimulus of \$7,472 million in U.S. economic and military aid since 1946. While she refuses to make any payments on her delinquent principal and interest owing this country from World War I in the amount of \$4,688,478,839.77, she has embarked upon a deliberate program to destroy our gold reserves and undermine the value of our dollar.

Since 1962, France has withdrawn \$2,369 million from the United States, including \$103 million the first quarter of 1966, and the policy continues unabated. The first month of the second quarter this year, she withdrew \$78 million in gold, and it is anticipated that her request for the month of May will amount to about \$75 million.

Mr. Speaker, if the French have so many extra American dollars with which to buy gold, I think we should advise President de Gaulle to continue sending the dollars to America, but that from now on they will be applied not against our gold, but against France's long delinquent debt to America.

THANK THE PRESIDENT FOR DECISIVE ACTION AT HANOI-HAIPHONG

(Mr. BUCHANAN (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the half million Americans it is my privilege to represent in the Congress, I want to thank the President for the decisive action taken in the bombing of oil depots at Hanoi and Haiphong yesterday morning.

According to preliminary damage reports by returning pilots, the complex at Haiphong, which represents 40 percent of the fuel storage capacity of North Vietnam, and 95 percent of the facilities for unloading tanker ships, was 80 percent destroyed by Navy jet bombers. Air Force F-105's, according to pilot estimates, destroyed 90 percent of another target tank farm 3½ miles from the center of Hanoi, which contained 20 percent of the nation's storage facilities.

This means that 50 percent of North Vietnam's fuel storage capacity may have been destroyed in this raid, and their ability to unload petroleum products from ships also seriously hampered. In my judgment, such use of our air power can, shorten, rather than lengthen, the conflict in North Vietnam. Boldness, decisiveness, and willingness to use our strength constitute strong weapons toward achieving an honorable peace. It seems clear that timidity, indecisiveness, and the clamor for withdrawal, or peace at any price, serves only to encourage the enemy and lengthen the conflict.

I respectfully urge, therefore, the Commander in Chief to continue to increase the military pressure upon the aggressor and to make yesterday's bombing the first in a series of bold new steps in support of the American troops who are fighting with such courage and distinction in South Vietnam.

Abraham Lincoln once described our country as "the last, best hope for human freedom." From my own visit to Vietnam in February, I am convinced beyond all unconvincing that we are the last, best hope for freedom and self-determination for the people of southeast Asia.

If we falter in our purpose, if we do not stand firm, if we yield before the aggression of a brutal tyranny, millions of people in Vietnam will be plunged into the dark night of Communist totalitarianism. All of southeast Asia will be gravely in danger, and the hope for peace, freedom, and the security of the entire free world will be further and gravely threatened.

Every soldier fighting in Vietnam knows that our cause is just, and their mission important. No one of them is willing to turn back, to compromise or to surrender.

If we are to prove worthy of our Nation's heritage, and of the courage and the sacrifice of our fighting men, those of us entrusted with the leadership of this Republic must be equally committed to the cause of human freedom. It must be more precious even than peace, and more to be desired than all the wealth we are expending in the conduct of this unpopular, frustrating, and complicated little war.

We have invested our young men in southeast Asia. A nation can make no

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"For nearly nine months Cuban exile military forces dedicated to the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro have been in training in the United States as well as in Central America.

"An army of 5,000 to 6,000 men constitutes the external fighting arm of the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council, which was formed in the United States last month. Its purpose is the liberation of Cuba from what it describes as the Communist rule of the Castro regime."

His article, which was more than two columns long and very detailed, was scheduled to appear in the paper of Friday, April 7, 1961. It was dummied for Page 1 under a four-column head, leading the paper.

While the front-page dummy was being drawn up by the assistant managing editor, the news editor and the assistant news editor, Orvil Dryfoos, then the publisher of The New York Times, came down from the 14th floor to the office of Turner Catledge, the managing editor.

He was gravely troubled by the security implications of Szulc's story. He could envision failure for the invasion, and he could see The New York Times being blamed for a bloody fiasco.

RECOLLECTIONS CONFLICT

He and the managing editor solicited the advice of Scotty Reston, who was then the Washington correspondent of The New York Times and is now an associate editor.

At this point, the record becomes unclear. Mr. Reston distinctly recalls that Mr. Catledge's telephone call came on a Sunday, and that he was spending the weekend at his retreat in the Virginia mountains, as described by Arthur Schlesinger. As there was no telephone in his cabin, Mr. Reston had to return the call from a gas station in Marshall, Va. Mr. Catledge and others recall, with equal certainty, that the incident took place on Thursday and that Mr. Reston was reached in his office in Washington.

Whichever was the case, the managing editor told Mr. Reston about the Szulc dispatch, which said that a landing on Cuba was imminent.

Mr. Reston was asked what should be done with the dispatch.

"I told them not to run it," Mr. Reston says.

He did not advise against printing information about the forces gathering in Florida; that was already well known. He merely cautioned against printing any dispatch that would pinpoint the time of the landing.

Others agree that Szulc's dispatch did contain some phraseology to the effect that an invasion was imminent, and those words were eliminated.

Tad Szulc's own recollection, cabled to me from Madrid the other day, is that "in several instances the stories were considerably toned down, including the elimination of statements about the 'imminence' of an invasion. 'Specifically,' Mr. Szulc said, 'a decision was made in New York not to mention the C.I.A.'s part in the invasion preparations, not to use the date of the invasion, and, on April 15, not to give away in detail the fact that the first air strike on Cuba was carried out from Guatemala.'"

After the dummy for the front page of The Times for Friday, April 7, 1961, was changed, Ted Bernstein, who was the assistant managing editor on night duty at The Times, and Lew Jordan, the news editor, sat in Mr. Bernstein's office fretting about it. They believed a colossal mistake was being made, and together they went into Mr. Catledge's office to appeal for reconsideration.

Mr. Catledge recalls that Mr. Jordan's face was dead white, and he was quivering with emotion. He and Mr. Bernstein told the

managing editor that never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed for reasons of policy. They said they would like to hear from the publisher himself the reasons for the change.

ANGRY AT INTERVENTION

Lew Jordan later recalled that Mr. Catledge was "flaming mad" at this intervention. However, he turned around in his big swivel chair, picked up the telephone, and asked Mr. Dryfoos to come downstairs. By the time he arrived, Mr. Bernstein had gone to dinner, but Mr. Dryfoos spent 10 minutes patiently explaining to Mr. Jordan his reasons for wanting the story played down.

His reason were those of national security, national interest and, above all, concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba. He repeated the explanation in somewhat greater length to Mr. Bernstein the next day.

I describe the mood and behavior of the publisher and editors of The New York Times only to show how seriously and with what intensity of emotion they made their fateful decisions.

Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Jordan now say, five years later, that the change in play, not eliminating the reference to the imminence of the invasion, was the important thing done that night.

"It was important because a multi-column head in this paper means so much," Mr. Jordan told me the other day.

Mr. Reston, however, felt that the basic issue was the elimination of the statement that an invasion was imminent.

Ironically, although that fact was eliminated from our own dispatch, virtually the same information was printed in a shirt-tail on Tad Szulc's report. That was a report from the Columbia Broadcasting System. It said that plans for the invasion of Cuba were in their final stages. Ships and planes were carrying invasion units from Florida to their staging bases in preparation for the assault.

When the invasion actually took place 10 days later, the American Society of Newspaper Editors happened to be in session in Washington, and President Kennedy addressed the society. He devoted his speech entirely to the Cuban crisis. He said nothing at that time about press disclosures of invasion plans.

APPEAL BY PRESIDENT

However, a week later in New York, appearing before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the President asked members of the newspaper profession "to re-examine their own responsibilities."

He suggested that the circumstances of the cold war required newspapermen to show some of the same restraint they would exercise in a shooting war.

He went on to say, "Every newspaper now asks itself with respect to every story, 'Is it news?' All I suggest is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of national security?'"

If the press should recommend voluntary measures to prevent the publication of material endangering the national security in peacetime, the President said, "the Government would cooperate wholeheartedly."

Turner Catledge, who was the retiring president of the A.S.N.E., Felix McKnight of The Dallas Times-Herald, the incoming president, and Lee Hills, executive editor of the Knight newspapers, took the President's statement as an invitation to talk.

Within two weeks, a delegation of editors, publishers and news agency executives was at the White House. They told President Kennedy they saw no need at that time for machinery to help prevent the disclosure of vital security information. They agreed that there should be another meeting in a

few months. However, no further meeting was ever held.

That day in the White House, President Kennedy ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information. His examples were mainly drawn from The New York Times.

He mentioned, for example, Paul Kennedy's story about the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. Mr. Catledge pointed out that this information had been published in La Hora in Guatemala and in The Nation in this country before it was ever published in The New York Times.

"But it was not news until it appeared in The Times," the President replied.

While he scolded The New York Times, the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, "If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

"SORRY YOU DIDN'T TELL IT"

More than a year later, President Kennedy was still talking the same way. In a conversation with Orvil Dryfoos in the White House on Sept. 13, 1962, he said, "I wish you had run everything on Cuba. . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time."

Those words were echoed by Arthur Schlesinger when he wrote, "I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster."

They are still echoing down the corridors of history. Just the other day in Washington, Senator RUSSELL of Georgia confessed that, although he was chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, he didn't know the timing of the Bay of Pigs operation.

"I only wish I had been consulted," he said in a speech to the Senate, "because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been."

It is not so easy, it seems, even for Presidents, their most intimate advisors and distinguished United States Senators to know always what is really in the national interest. One is tempted to say that sometimes—sometimes—even a mere newspaperman knows better.

My own view is that the Bay of Pigs operation might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if The New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty—their duty to keep the public informed on matters vitally affecting our national honor and prestige, not to mention our national security.

Perhaps, as Mr. Reston believes, it was too late to stop the operation by the time we printed Tad Szulc's story on April 7.

"If I had it to do over, I would do exactly what we did at the time," Mr. Reston says. "It is ridiculous to think that publishing the fact that the invasion was imminent would have avoided this disaster. I am quite sure the operation would have gone forward."

"The thing had been cranked up too far. The C.I.A. would have had to disarm the anti-Castro forces physically. Jack Kennedy was in no mood to do anything like that."

PRELUDE TO GRAVER CRISIS

The Bay of Pigs, as it turned out, was the prelude to an even graver crisis—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In Arthur Schlesinger's opinion, failure in 1961 contributed to success in 1962. President Kennedy had learned from experience, and once again The New York Times was involved.

On May 28, 1963, the President sat at his desk in the White House and with his own hand wrote a letter to Mrs. Orvil Dryfoos, whose husband had just died at the age of 50. The letter was on White House stationery, and the President used both sides of the paper.

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greater investment. It must not be made in vain.

We must, therefore, with all the wisdom, skill, and power at our command, boldly strike and resolutely stand until the freedom and self-determination of the people of southeast Asia are secured, and Communist aggression is firmly and permanently thwarted.

Everything that America is cries out that there is no real alternative for our Republic. The only pathway to an honorable peace lies in the fulfillment of our mission and in securing the victory for human freedom in southeast Asia.

SHORTSIGHTEDNESS IN WHEAT PROGRAM

(Mr. ASHBROOK (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, not too many years ago periodic releases by the Department of Agriculture would announce reductions of this Nation's surplus wheat supply in justification of the stringent controls which shackled the American farmer. So effective has been the Federal program that we are no longer confronted with a sizable grain storage bill annually. However, another problem might soon be forthcoming—a domestic scarcity of wheat insufficient to cope with our food commitments.

It is generally conceded that national security demands at least 500 million bushels of wheat from both public and private sources be carried over from one crop year to the next. As of May of this year USDA estimated the carryover at approximately 555 million, and private sources estimate that a year from now the supply may well fall to around 250 million bushels. The 15-percent increase in acreage allotments recently allowed by the Department might well prove wholly insufficient in the face of our many food commitments abroad.

The national business and financial weekly, Barrons, in its June 27 issue, commented at length on this issue. The situation is not entirely bleak, Barrons notes, for the Government might be compelled by necessity to get off the farmer's back. Serious consideration must be given this issue before the cupboard is bare, and for this reason I include the article, "Back to 'The Pit,'" in the RECORD at this point:

BACK TO "THE PIT"—ONLY WASHINGTON IS DOING BUSINESS AS USUAL IN WHEAT

"Thus it went, day after day. Endlessly, ceaselessly The Pit, enormous, thundering, sucked in and spewed out, sending the swirl of its mighty central eddy far out through the city's channels. . . . All through the Northwest, all through the central world of Wheat the set and whirl of that innermost Pit made itself felt; and it spread and spread till grain in the elevators of Western Iowa moved and stirred and answered to its centripetal force, and men upon the streets of New York felt the mysterious tugging of its undertow. . . . Nor was The Pit's centrifugal power any less. Because of some sudden eddy, a dozen bourses of continental Europe clamoured with panic, a dozen Old-World banks trembled and vibrated. Because of an unexpected caprice in the swirling of the

inner current, some far-distant channel suddenly dried, and the pinch of famine made itself felt among the vine dressers of Northern Italy, the coal miners of Western Prussia. Or another channel filled, and the starved moujik of the steppes, and the hunger-shrunken coolie of the Ganges' watershed fed suddenly fat and made thank offerings before ikon and idol."

The foregoing passage, from Frank Norris' historic novel about wheelers and dealers in grain, was published over half-a-century ago. Since mid-June it has begun to seem as timely as ever. For after several relatively barren decades, Chicago's Board of Trade—"The Pit"—suddenly has sprung to life. On Thursday, June 16, some 59 million bushels of wheat changed hands, up nearly tenfold from a year ago; all told that day, a record-breaking 270 million bushels of soybeans and grains were bought and sold. The surge in volume has staggered even the world's largest commodity mart: for the first time in its 118-year history, the opening bell was delayed last week for over an hour. Spot and futures contracts have risen sharply across-the-board.

As in 1902, the current resurgence of The Pit—and the agricultural revolution for which it stands—may well have earthshaking consequences. After generations of government-inspired glut, the Western World in general, and the U.S. in particular, stand on the brink of scarcity. For the latter-day descendants of the moujiks and coolies, whose new rulers have proven even less capable of feeding their subjects than the old ones, the shift in global supply and demand may prove a temporary disaster. For farmers in this country, contrariwise, it represents a heaven-sent opportunity at last to strike off the federal yoke. Largely unsuspected by the bureaucrats, whose talents rarely run to either flexibility or foresight, the winds of change are blowing hard. They may yet succeed in uprooting a lifetime of farm mismanagement.

The force of the gathering storm already has been felt in several places. One is the official forecast of the domestic wheat crop, which, because of tornadoes, hail and drought, declined in May from 1,372 million bushels to 1,235 million (and may dip further). Meanwhile, estimates of the carryover, i.e., the quantity of wheat available in private and public hands from one crop year to the next, have plunged. Last August the U.S. Department of Agriculture put the carryover as of June 30, 1966, at a comfortable 780 million bushels. By last month the estimate had dropped to 555 million and, according to private sources the carryover a year hence may fall to around 250 million, or less than half the minimum reserve that every Secretary of Agriculture, from Ezra Taft Benson to Orville Freeman, has deemed essential to the national security. With an end to decades of surplus at last in sight, grain quotations naturally have soared—wheat today sells in Kansas City for \$2 per bushel, nearly half again as much as last year—while The Pit has regained much of its old-time speculative lure.

Unlike Chicago, however, Washington is still doing business as usual. Last year the Department of Agriculture, in angry reprisal for what it considered the dumping of Canadian wheat, raised the U.S. export subsidy, thereby stimulating shipments abroad and putting pressure on the world market price. Despite the mounting scarcity, the agency continues extravagantly to subsidize such sales. Indeed, so Barron's has learned, its outstanding foreign commitments under Public Law 480 and like give-away programs currently exceed 300 million bushels, or slightly more than the Commodity Credit Corp. has in storage, thus raising the unprecedented prospect that the CCC, in order to fill its contracts, sooner or later may have to buy from the trade.

What goes by the euphemistic name of supply management has worked no better at home. All last winter the Commodity Credit Corp, presumably in an effort to restrain the rising cost of food and fiber, poured wheat onto the domestic market. At one point in March, it even succeeded in driving the price of wheat below that of corn (which ordinarily commands at least 10% more), thereby creating an incentive for farmers to feed the staff of life to hogs. Despite the surging market, which lately has made hash of all its efforts at restraint, the CCC persists in depleting its stocks. Equally alarming, Agriculture has done relatively little to encourage future supplies. So far it has raised acreage allotments for the new crop year by only 15%, an increase which, given the vagaries of man and nature, at best might yield no more than another 200 million bushels. In view of the magnitude of probable demand—underscored the other day by the disclosure of the record-breaking three-year Soviet purchase of Canadian wheat—the move runs the risk of proving too little and too late.

Bureaucracy, of course, pooh-poohs the ugly possibilities. Secretary Freeman, who somehow managed to tour the Soviet Union three years ago without observing any signs of crop failure, last Friday said that he saw no cause for alarm. If wheat turns out to be scarce, averred the Secretary, the U.S. can always ship sorghum and corn. If there is no bread, let them eat johnnycake. Official blindness aside, as most grain merchants and farmers would agree, the need for change is clear. In particular, Washington should begin to review the means by which, with heedless generosity, it has sought to nourish friend and foe alike. Over the years, for example, USDA has shipped hundreds of millions of bushels of grain to Algeria, Poland, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia; unfilled commitments to these lands currently exceed 50 million. Thereby the U.S. has merely succeeded in bolstering shaky Socialist regimes; furnishing the wherewithal for such overt acts of aggression as the Egyptian expedition to Yemen, and encouraging reciprocal acts of friendship like the notorious Tricontinental Conference in Havana (Barron's, March 21), at which, with support of delegations from Algiers, Warsaw, Cairo, and Belgrade, the Communist world declared war on the Western Hemisphere. "Food for Peace" in the best of times made no sense. Today, when there may not be enough to go round, it's a folly the U.S. no longer can afford.

The same is true of the whole farm program. Designed to cope with what looked like permanent over-abundance, it merely succeeded, at fearful cost to the public purse, in piling up huge and largely unwanted surpluses. Now, thanks in great measure to the Third Horseman, who is riding roughshod over most of the Socialist world, shortage is swiftly overtaking glut. In the face of scarcity, an overwhelming mass of evidence, past and present, attests, improvident governments can do little or nothing. The time has come to give the marketplace free rein.

CAPTAIN HOWARD INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

(Mr. BOB WILSON (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, on June 13 in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Senate—on page 12436 Capt. Joseph L. Howard, Navy Supply Corps, is correctly listed under the heading "Executive nominations received by the Senate

June 13, 1966." However, Captain Howard was inadvertently omitted from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Senate—June 24, listing for Senate Executive nominations confirmed on that date for temporary promotion to the grade of rear admiral.

The permanent CONGRESSIONAL RECORD has been corrected but I wanted to take this opportunity to call my colleagues' attention to this clarification and correction; and to congratulate a distinguished constituent from San Diego.

SUGGESTIONS TO CONVENE THE AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

(Mr. AYRES (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. AYRES. Mr. Speaker, I shall suggest to Education and Labor Chairman ADAM CLAYTON POWELL that he convene the ad hoc Subcommittee on the International Labor Organization, of which I am a member, for the purpose of reactivating the review of our participation in the work of that international organization.

I believe that this is of the utmost importance at the present time in light of the withdrawal of the AFL-CIO from the current Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. While the AFL-CIO did not permanently withdraw from the ILO, some years ago the National Association of Manufacturers permanently withdrew from the tripartite arrangement that makes up the American delegation.

We ask nothing more of international conferences than they be conducted in a manner in which all can justly deliberate. The past history of the activities of the International Labor Organization has not been, in recent times, conducive to equitable negotiations between the parties involved.

In 1963, as a congressional appointee, I journeyed to Geneva, Switzerland, to take part in the ILO Conference. I was greatly disturbed at what took place there.

Upon my return here, I made a full report on the floor of this House. I stated that I believed in the avowed objectives of the ILO but those objectives were being shunted aside and the Conference turned into a propaganda mill for the Communist nations. This, of course, became most effective when a Communist controlled the meeting by occupying the position of chairman. This was the case when I attended the Conference and was equally true this year.

In 1963, I asked Chairman POWELL to call a series of meetings of the ad hoc Subcommittee on the International Labor Organization so that a review might be held. The distinguished chairman, himself an expert on these matters, agreed that such a review be held.

Four days of hearings were held that year. Our principal witnesses were the heads of our delegation: Rudolph Faupl of the AFL-CIO; Hon. George L. P. Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor for

International Affairs and the Representative of the U.S. Government; and Richard Wagner, who represented the employer delegation.

My sole purpose in calling for the review was to see whether a better climate for an international conference might be created. I had no criticism of our American delegates—rather I simply wished to discover whether we could make their work more meaningful.

I can well understand the frustrations that fair-minded delegates do incur when they cannot operate in a state of equality.

In the Conference that I attended, and in this year's meetings, I am told, the cards were definitely stacked against us. The plenary session became a forum in which our enemies brought forth all of their "hate" propaganda, often without reply on our part.

In view of our war in Vietnam, this propaganda has an added importance. Our opponents would have us appear as the "villain" of international affairs, and thus blacken our motives in the Vietnam struggle.

The International Labor Organization was chartered by the League of Nations in 1918. In 1948, it became an agency of the United Nations. Its charter states that it aims to promote social justice; improve labor conditions and living standards; and promote economic stability. With these objectives, we can heartily agree. We have done all of these things since our inception as a Nation.

Labor standards are formulated and adopted by the Conference. However, the member nations do not have to ratify them. For example, even such a universally recognized right as the freedom from forced labor has never been fully ratified though the resolution for its enactment was passed many years ago.

Each nation's delegation is divided into three parts—government, worker, and employer. Each of these is supposedly able to function independently. The U.S. delegation does, but this is not true of the Communist and dictator-controlled nations. Their worker and employer delegates would not dare to differ from their government's position. One would but have to examine the voting records to realize the truth of this statement.

The United States contributes over one-fourth of the cost of the International Labor Organization. It has just been demonstrated that our voice therein is pitifully small.

I note that the United States was criticized for only paying 25 percent of the budget of the ILO. We were attacked for discrimination because we paid less of the cost for this agency than we paid to the United Nations and some other organizations. The budget of the ILO for 1967 is \$23,317,000. Our share was \$5,829,250. This contribution, too, should be reviewed.

I shall not speak here of the attacks that were made upon the United States for its participation in the war in Vietnam. However I do believe that they should be reported upon by the U.S. delegates to the Congress.

On June 1 of this year, at the opening day of the ILO Conference, the U.S.S.R. delegate, Mr. Volkov, while placing in nomination for the Presidency Mr. Leon Chajn, of Poland, stressed that the Soviet Union attached "exceptional importance to the election of a president of the Conference."

Mr. Chajn was assured of election when a spokesman for the entire continent of Africa, Mr. Nsanze, of Burundi, rose and stated that all of the many nations of his continent were solidly supporting the Communist nominee for president.

I mention this particularly because I have read reports from Europe that this was a surprise to the American delegation. I cannot understand this as the Soviet Union had announced the previous year that they would elect Mr. Chajn as president in 1966.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that ad hoc committee on the International Labor Organization should ask the delegates and advisers to the 1966 Conference to testify as to the actual happenings and ask them for suggestions as to the improvement of the conditions in which they found themselves in Geneva. Perhaps one day the Congress may wish to review our participation in the many other international conferences.

I reiterate that I favor international conferences but emphasize that the climate in which they are conducted must be fair and equitable to all.

I believe that all are agreed that some very good suggestions came out of our 1963 review of the ILO Conference. I believe that a hearing in 1966 is of major importance.

I shall also ask the Honorable DANTE B. FASCELL, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to conduct hearings. Chairman FASCELL has held such hearings in the past and has made some very fine reports on the subject.

I have served with the U.S. delegates to the ILO and have full confidence in their capabilities. I do believe that the congressional review, that I ask for, will be to their advantage.

(Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee's remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

GUIDELINES AND A FREE ECONOMY

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, recently, there has come to my attention the remarks of W. Allen Wallis, president of the University of Rochester, and a distinguished economist entitled "Guidelines as Instruments of Economic Policy," which were presented to the fourth annual American Bankers Association economic symposium on April 1, 1966.

Some criticism of USPHS code domination and material partisanship has reached the ears of influential senators and representatives. Two already have asked the Surgeon General for an explanation of the code committee work of the agency.

The latest controversy, which some code authorities fear may set back code revision procedure, developed after the Apr. 28 meeting here of the A40 Sectional Committee of the American Standards Association.

It was called by Malcolm C. Hope, who is secretary to the committee, supposedly to consider only the code appendices. Hope is also chairman of the PHS Technical Committee on Plumbing Standards, which is the group responsible for revising and bringing up-to-date the 11-year old ASA A40.8 National Plumbing Code.

Hope's chief job is as acting chief, Division of Environmental Engineering and Food Protection, USPHS.

He wears a fourth hat as alternate member of the Technical Committee on Plumbing Standards representing the Conference of State Sanitary Engineers.

The charges of partiality by USPHS apparently stem from a surprise motion by Hope to include approval of three types of plastic pipe in the revised code despite a voting procedure protest from the representative of the National Association of Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors, Contractor was informed.

Represented on the ASA committee are manufacturers of various pipe materials, including copper, steel, asbestos cement, bituminous, clay, cast iron, and ABS and PVC plastic.

However, representatives of three major pipe associations were absent from the Apr. 28 meeting because they said they understood, from the notice that only the appendices would be considered.

During the meeting, an industry representative made a motion to approve both ABS and PVC plastic pipe for soil, waste, vent, storm drainage and portable water service, both inside and outside buildings. The motion was lost in a tie vote.

Normally, this would have brought an end to all questions regarding approval of plastic pipe at this time in the revised National Plumbing Code.

But Hope offered a motion to approve ABS and PVC plastic pipe for the same uses, though limited to one and two-family dwellings only. His motion also included approval for a third kind of plastic pipe known as PE (polyethylene) for potable water.

This motion carried by a narrow margin, aided by what some competing pipe representatives charged was the weight of USPHS authority.

This vote procedure, Contractor was told, was strenuously challenged by the PHCC representative on the ground that too many affirmative votes favoring plastic pipe were cast by representatives of the plastic pipe industry.

It is quite probable that the plastic motion would have lost if the meeting notice had covered all subjects which were to be considered, some pipe manufacturers' representatives have said privately.

Hope could argue that his tactics at the Apr. 28 meeting were of little moment inasmuch as plastic pipe cannot be finally approved without a letter ballot vote of the ASA Sectional Committee.

Each member of the committee will vote to approve or disapprove each of 14 chapters plus an appendix.

A vote for approval requires no further comment, but a vote for disapproval requires specific reasons explaining each vote.

Asked one committee member: "Is USPHS so far committed to approval of the revised code in its present form that a vote for disapproval should be made so burdensome?"

It is expected that the National Plumbing Code revision work and some of its controversial aspects will be debated at the convention of the PHCC in Atlantic City, June 20-23.

DOMINION DAY

(Mr. PELLY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, 99 years ago tomorrow, on July 1, 1867, the Dominion of Canada came into existence as a result of the passage in London of the British North American Act. Let us commemorate today the birth of our neighbor whose historical ties with Great Britain and with Europe so closely parallel our own, but whose self-government came as a result of an evolution that reflected a distinctive level of political maturity and good judgment on the part of Great Britain and Canada.

The Fourth of July for Americans connotes the courage and endeavor of our forefathers as well as their conviction in and implementation of their ideals. The First of July has a similar meaning for Canadians, for their leaders, too, had convictions, ideals, and the courage to implement them. Although the method of achieving these ideals differed completely, the end results were the same. Each nation won its independence as a child of the same nation, and as brothers in similar images.

This very brotherhood stemming from similar heredity and environment may well be the catalytic factor in the ever-growing friendship and cooperation between our two nations. What other two contiguous nations can boast an undefended border of over 4,000 miles which has in essence been undefended since the Rush Bagot disarmament agreement of 1817. Although minor disputes have arisen, as well always occur between two sovereign states, both nations can be proud of their ability to resolve such disputes in a spirit of continuous brotherhood.

We cannot limit our expression of respect for Canada, however, merely to an appreciation of the friendship and brotherhood which she has extended to us. We must also congratulate her on the important role she has assumed in the international community of nations. Canada is a member of the United Nations and can be proud of the service in that body of a large number of outstanding Canadians, including her present Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, as President of the U.N. General Assembly in 1952-53. In addition, she is a member of NATO, the Colombo Plan Council, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and various other intergovernmental organizations. Canada ranks fifth in world trade, which is some indication of the economic progress she has achieved. Canada has assumed the responsibilities and fulfilled the obligations which are integral to the international status she has attained.

May we, therefore, extend our congratulations to Canada on this day upon which she celebrates having received the

right of self-determination as a Dominion in full recognition of the interdependence of our two nations based on mutual consideration of each other's aims and principles.

AIR ATTACKS NECESSARY FOR PEACE

(Mr. BERRY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Speaker, the air attacks on oil depots in North Vietnam have brought a great deal of criticism, particularly from the English Government.

I find little sympathy for the British views. Their criticism of the bombing raids is mercenary diplomacy which places their trade with the enemy above the need to contain communism in southeast Asia.

It is no wonder the British oppose our bombing raids, because it is hurting their business with North Vietnam. Since the beginning of the year, 29 British ships have docked in North Vietnamese ports. Last year, 136 United Kingdom ships carried cargo and supplies to the Hanoi government.

Ho Chi Minh will never go to the conference table so long as he is benefiting from the war and he will continue to benefit so long as his supply lines are left intact. We have no business carrying on a 1966 defensive campaign using 1866 ground war tactics dictated by the enemy.

American boys are fighting and dying in Vietnam for freedom, not just American freedom but freedom for Great Britain as well. Their fathers fought and died for freedom of the British and French in World War II. Prime Minister Wilson and President de Gaulle seem to have short memories. It is time to think first of the well-being of America and less about the pound of Britain and the franc of France.

MY VISIT WITH LOU CRAMTON

(Mr. HARVEY of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HARVEY of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, a few months ago, on a wintry January day, I met with an elderly gentleman in his home in Saginaw, Mich. It turned out to be the finest "investment" of a usually busy time schedule that all Congressmen must meet during district visits. My visit was with Lou Cramton, then 91 years of age, who had previously served for 18 years as a distinguished Member of this Chamber.

I feel most fortunate that I had the opportunity to know him personally. It is remarkable also to note at this time that we have present in this 89th Congress four outstanding Members who served with former Congressman Louis C. Cramton. They include our Speaker, the Honorable JOHN W. McCORMACK and Congressmen EMANUEL CELLER,

June 30, 1966

recognizing the status of dedicated citizen soldiers.

Thank you for your interest and your thoughtfulness in informing me of the status of H.R. 10457.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD J. SMITH,
Colonel, Artillery NYARNG.

ROCHESTER, N.Y.,
June 14, 1966.

HON. FRANK J. HORTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: Thank you so much for all the cooperation and assistance I have received in regard to National Guard Technicians.

I have been informed that the latest bill on clarifying the status of National Guard Technicians is H.R. 14556. I should appreciate a copy of this bill and any other information available on the progress which has been made on correcting the existing inequities of National Guard Technicians.

Sincerely yours,

LEON A. JUDWICK.

AMSTERDAM, N.Y.,
May 20, 1966.

HON. FRANK J. HORTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HORTON: I am writing to ask your support of a bill that would correct a long standing inequity in employment standards affecting a small minority of Federal employees.

On April 20, 1966, the Honorable F. Edward HEBERT introduced a bill into Congress, H.R. 14556, Technician Retirement. Passage of this bill would assure the National Guard employees a retirement program similar to the Federal Civil Service Employees. The entire Technician program would thereby gain much additional stability and security. At present, a Technician is automatically eliminated from the National Guard and Technician employment at age 60. At this point, he cannot collect Social Security Benefits, his only meaningful retirement plan, at this time.

I urge you to become familiar with this bill, H.R. 14556, and recognize its need and purpose. Your support of this particular legislation would be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

ELIZABETH C. HALL.

JAMAICA, N.Y.,
February 17, 1966.

HON. FRANK J. HORTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: The Association of Civilian Technicians Inc. is sending a delegation to Washington, D.C. on 24 and 25 February 1966. The Association represents approximately 2400 full time civilian employees employed by the National Guard in the various Armories and Depots throughout New York State.

The delegation will be led by its President, Mr. Vincent J. Paterno. One of the purposes of the visit is to discuss with various legislators the provisions of HR 10457 which bill affects us greatly. We have learned through news media that the Defense Department has proposed extensive changes to HR 10457 but to date we have not been able to learn what changes are to be made and whether the proposed changes will be to our benefit.

Mindful of your busy schedule and time permitting, the delegation would be honored if you were able to receive them for a brief period.

Sincerely,

THOMAS A. O'BRIEN,
Secretary, ACT, Inc.

No. 108—19

ROCHESTER, N.Y.,
January 7, 1966.

Congressman FRANK HORTON,
36th District of New York,
107 Federal Building,
Rochester, N.Y.

DEAR SIR: I am writing this letter to you so it can be put into my file of complaints in regards to being employed by the New York State Arsenal as a Federal employee but not being recognized as one in other Government installations.

But under the present conditions I can't make a move. This is too bad after all the years I have spent and the knowledge I have received as acting U.S. Property receiving and disbursing officer covering all fields of Military equipment.

I only hope some day something can be done as I am getting older and would like to get credit for the years spent here at the Arsenal.

Thanking you again and the best wishes for the New Year.

Very truly yours,

Mr. FRANKLIN R. HARDER, Sr.

ROCHESTER, N.Y.,
January 14, 1966.

HON. FRANK J. HORTON,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HORTON: Enclosed is information sent to us from our Syracuse office in regard to the situation which exists with National Guard Technicians. We believe that the pamphlet "A Search for Identity" explains this position. This and the several other enclosed publications should give a clearer view of our status.

Objections to Bill H.R. 1045 are:

a. Does not define us either as "Federal" employees or "State" employees—just "National Guard Technicians".

b. Technicians would be carried under Civil Service Retirement Act, yet have no Civil Service status.

c. A person employed under Section 709 must be a member of the National Guard. Objections to National Guard Regulation NGR 51 dated 2 Jan. 64:

a. Pg. 1-3, par. 1-15. Technicians must comply with the Hatch Act as administered by U.S. Civil Service Commission, yet have no Civil Service Status.

b. Pg. 1-1, par. 1-4. Non-Guardsmen cannot be promoted to higher grade than that held on 1 Dec. 1960. Females cannot be promoted unless designated by Chief, National Guard Bureau.

c. Pg. 3-13, par. 3-38. Federal government authorizes contributions of 6½% for Technician participation of State retirement programs according to Section 709—no action.

d. Pg. 3-14, par. 3-39. Disability and death benefit programs—no action.

e. Pg. 3-14, par. 3-41. District of Columbia National Guard Technicians are members of Federal Civil Service Retirement—why not Technicians of other states?

f. Pg. 7-1, par. 7-1. Technicians are covered by Federal Employees' Compensation Act—yet are not considered "Federal" employees.

g. Pg. 7-1, par. 7-4. Emphasizes that Federal retirement is not provided for Technicians.

h. Pg. 7-1, par. 7-6. Technicians are under Federal Unemployment Compensation, yet ruling does not imply that Technicians are "Federal" employees.

It is to be understood that National Guardsmen in their military status as Guardsmen (not as civilian employees) do have a retirement plan after serving a designated number of years in the National Guard. This has no bearing in their capacity as a civilian employee. Our problems are purely those of Technicians in a civilian status.

We wish to express our appreciation to you and to your staff for devoting so much of your valuable time to this problem. If we can be of any assistance, feel free to call on us. Thanking you,

Sincerely,

LEON A. JUDWICK.
Mrs. LOUIS R. VIAVATTENE.

Mr. Speaker, the bill referred to in many of these letters is H.R. 14556. It provides for the same clarification as the bill I am submitting, except that my bill would take effect July 1, 1966. National Guard technicians have waited a long time for this recognition of their importance to this Nation.

I see no reason why they should wait another year to reap benefits that have been rightfully theirs for many years already. Some of those who have contacted me have served as Guard technicians for more than a decade. Others are nearing retirement age, and would be ineligible if the bill does not take effect until 1967. Thus, I urge the members of the committee and all of my colleagues to keep this condition in mind when the proposal reaches the floor for consideration.

FEDERAL BIAS IN NATIONAL PLUMBING CODE

(Mr. GLENN ANDREWS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GLENN ANDREWS. Mr. Speaker, recently there was brought to my attention an article entitled "USPHS Code Intervention Stirs Ire," which appeared in the June 15, 1966, issue of a periodical known as the Contractor, a trade publication for the plumbing-heating-cooling industry. The article carried the byline of Seth Shepherd, who is editor of the publication.

To state the matter plainly, the article sets forth changes which, if true, constitute a serious indictment of the role of the U.S. Public Health Service in revising the National Plumbing Code. I for one take a dim view of a building code involving the authority of the U.S. Health Department promulgated in the manner described in this article. I submit that an atmosphere of adroit parliamentary maneuver on the part of the U.S. Health Service to effect a power play among competitive manufacturers is no proper incubator for establishing national standards.

Mr. Speaker, under permission granted, I place this article in the RECORD in order that the Surgeon General and the appropriate committees of this House may proceed with this information to conduct whatever investigation they might consider necessary for the protection of the public health and welfare:

[From the Contractor, June 15, 1966]

USPHS CODE INTERVENTION STIRS IRE

(By Seth Shepherd)

WASHINGTON.—Further intervention in the slow-moving revision of the National Plumbing Code by U.S. Public Health Service has set off a new rumble in the plumbing industry, Contractor learned this month.

the modification of duties or other import restrictions; and
S.J. Res. 168, Joint resolution to authorize the President to issue annually a proclamation designating the 7-day period beginning October 2 and ending October 8 of each year as "Spring Garden Planting Week."

GOLDEN WEDDING ANNIVERSARY OF PRESIDENT AND MRS. DWIGHT EISENHOWER

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, tomorrow, July 1, 1966, is the golden wedding anniversary of President and Mrs. Dwight Eisenhower. This is the first time in 119 years that a President and his lady have reached this golden anniversary period. It is only the third time it has happened in the history of our country.

To celebrate this occasion, a distinguished bipartisan group, including President Truman, Bob Hope, and the former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, have set up a tribute to President and Mrs. Eisenhower. People all over the country who wish to express their appreciation to our former President and his lady are being asked to make their contribution to a cause that is very close to President Eisenhower's heart, the new Eisenhower College in Seneca Falls, N.Y., in my congressional district, a college which is now in the process of development and which plans to open its doors as a liberal arts, coeducational institution in the fall of 1967.

I am sure I speak for all Members of this House in extending to President and Mrs. Eisenhower our warm and sincere congratulations on this very happy occasion. I feel sure too that the response that will be made to Eisenhower College in tribute to President and Mrs. Eisenhower, will do much to move forward an educational project which has the warm and sincere support of the beloved former President.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I am happy to yield to the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. All on this side of the aisle have personally expressed congratulations and very best wishes to General Eisenhower and Mrs. Eisenhower on their 50th anniversary. It is a great milestone in their wonderful life, and all of us hope they will have many more years of mutual happiness and good health.

It is a great tribute to a great President that a new educational institution has been established known as Eisenhower College. I am sure it will have a distinguished and productive career in educational circles. All of us hope that it will do as well educationally as General Eisenhower did in his great career on behalf of our Nation.

In closing let me reiterate my congratulations to General and Mrs. Eisenhower on their golden wedding anniversary. They are beloved by all Americans and we wish them well.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. I join the distinguished gentleman from New York and the distinguished minority leader in this word of tribute. All Members, I am sure, join in this expression of congratulations to a great and beloved American and his gracious lady.

I am also happy that a college identified with the former President's name is being established in New York. I believe this is quite appropriate. It was in upstate New York, at West Point, that General Eisenhower received his college education, which led to one of the most illustrious military careers in the history of our country and was followed, of course, by his election as President of the United States.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman.

(Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks and include two articles.)

[Mrs. GREEN of Oregon addressed the House. Her remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

BOMBING OF OIL STORAGE AREAS IN HAIPHONG AND HANOI

(Mr. KING of Utah asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, the recent bombing of the oil storage areas in Haiphong and Hanoi creates a situation which each Member of Congress finds difficult to sidestep. He either approves, or he disapproves. There is no neutrality.

It goes without saying that no one is elated over this decision to bomb. For President Johnson, it was particularly soul-rending. To inflict death in any form, and on any person, is an action which no normal person desires to take, under any circumstances.

But that is not the question before us. The issue, simply put, is whether we support the President in his decision to stop the flow of arms and materiel which were being illegally imported into South Vietnam, for the purpose of cutting down our own troops, as well as those of our allies. This was a difficult, but an inevitable military decision. We cannot ask American soldiers to risk their lives in combat without our taking reasonable military measures to reduce their risk. To be humane is divine, but not at the expense of the lives and safety of our own troops.

This conflict is not of our own choosing. We did not ask the North Vietnamese to come swarming down across the 17th parallel, in violation of the Geneva accord of 1954. The decision was theirs. It was made years before we ever set foot, militarily speaking, in South Vietnam. It was only a matter of days, or weeks, following the Geneva accord that the North Vietnamese sought means to violate it, and to subject the

South Vietnamese to their evil domination. It was they who sowed the tares, and now are reaping, the bitter harvest.

I support the President in this action. I support him because he was right, and what he did was necessary.

Our troops in the field are not crying for our sympathy. They are certainly not crying to be pulled out of combat. What they are crying for is our support—physical, intellectual, and moral.

I call upon all Americans to give them that support. The Communists are counting on our becoming weak and vacillating. Irresolution is our only real enemy. This is the time to show the resolution needed to make our previous efforts fruitful, and to make our present sacrifices not in vain.

BOMBING IN VIETNAM

(Mr. DORN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, the President, as Commander in Chief, is absolutely right in using every means at his disposal to save the lives of American boys in Vietnam. My people support the President's action in bombing the petroleum dumps at Hanoi and Haiphong. To wait for this fuel to bring mortar shells, mines, and ammunition to kill American soldiers would be foolish and tragic. These targets were strictly military—the same as a rifle or grenade in the hands of an enemy soldier.

Our combat soldiers at the front in Vietnam are performing superbly. Their gallantry and determination offer no encouragement to the enemy. The Communist aggressor, however, is encouraged to continue his aggression by irresponsible speeches and statements of some at home. Those in the United States who create disunity are aiding the Communists in their ambition to conquer southeast Asia. Those who advocate coalition government with the Vietcong are aiding the Communists in their ambition to overrun southeast Asia. Those who demonstrate against American policy to halt aggression are aiding the enemy. Those in the United States who charge that our American troops are immoral are echoing the hysterical charges of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung and are thus aiding those would-be conquerors of Asia. The charge that our fighting men are immoral is a charge leveled at every mother and father in the United States. It is a charge leveled at the very foundation stone of our American Christian philosophy. This charge is not true, but nevertheless encourages the enemy in its dreams of world conquest.

In South Vietnam our men are engaged in a desperate struggle to defeat the atheist Communist aggressors. They are proving that "God is not dead." They are fighting under the banner of ethics, morality, and the worth and dignity of the individual.

The moral climate of our men in South Vietnam excels that of any combat area in modern times. Chapels are going up everywhere. Hospitals, medicine, and

House of Representatives

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1966

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The following prayer was offered by Rev. Charles H. Hay, All Saints' Episcopal Church, Winter Park, Fla.:

Be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.—Romans 12: 2.

Almighty God, our Heavenly Father, who hast called our Nation to a place of trust and responsibility throughout the world, we humbly thank Thee for all the ways in which Thou hast blessed and guided us in the past and present; continually inspire, we pray Thee, the minds and hearts of all to whom Thou hast committed the responsibility and leadership of this Nation; hold before them Thy standard of truth and justice, thereby saving them from all ungenerous judgments. Direct and prosper all their considerations and endeavors to the advancement of Thy glory, the safety, honor, and welfare of all Thy people, that peace and happiness, truth and justice may be established among us for all generations; granting them the will to make all their choices in accordance with Thy will, so that we all may take our part in the fulfillment of Thy purpose—through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Jones, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills of the House of the following titles:

On June 17, 1966:

H.R. 15151. An act to permit the planting of alternate crops on acreage which is unplanted because of a natural disaster.

On June 18, 1966:

H.R. 11748. An act to amend section 111 of title 38, United States Code, to authorize the prepayment of certain expenses associated with the travel of veterans to or from a Veterans' Administration facility or other place, in connection with vocational rehabilitation or counseling, or for the purpose of examination, treatment, or care.

On June 20, 1966:

H.R. 706. An act to amend the Railway Labor Act in order to provide for establishment of special adjustment boards upon the request either of representatives of employees or of carriers to resolve disputes otherwise referable to the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and to make all awards of such Board final;

H.R. 3957. An act to authorize establishment of the Fort Union Trading Post National Historic Site, N. Dak. and Mont., and for other purposes;

H.R. 6646. An act to amend the Recreation and Public Purposes Act pertaining to the leasing of public lands to States and their political subdivisions; and

H.R. 10431. An act to declare that certain federally owned land is held by the United States in trust for the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe.

On June 21, 1966:

H.R. 2290. An act for the relief of Charlotte Schulz;

H.R. 13866. An act to authorize the disposal of aluminum from the national stockpile;

H.R. 13768. An act to authorize the disposal of celestite from the supplemental stockpile;

H.R. 13769. An act to authorize the disposal of cordage fiber (sisal) from the national stockpile;

H.R. 13770. An act to authorize the disposal of crocidolite asbestos (harsh) from the supplemental stockpile; and

H.R. 13773. An act to authorize the disposal of opium from the national stockpile.

On June 22, 1966:

H.R. 3177. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase dependency and indemnity compensation in certain cases; and

H.R. 9961. An act to amend chapter 15 of title 38, United States Code, to provide that where a veteran receiving pension under this chapter disappears, the Administrator may pay the pension otherwise payable to the wife and children.

On June 23, 1966:

H.R. 3692. An act for the relief of William F. Kuhlman;

H.R. 5533. An act for the relief of Kuniki Nagano Zwiefelhofer;

H.R. 8219. An act for the relief of Cho Myung Soon and Cho Myung Hee;

H.R. 8833. An act for the relief of Sarah Antoinette Cappadona;

H.R. 9643. An act for the relief of Haider Raza and his wife, Irene Raza, and their children, Afzal Anthony and Haider Raymond Raza;

H.R. 10133. An act for the relief of Fritz A. Frerichs;

H.R. 10838. An act for the relief of certain employees of the Post Office Department at Eau Gallie, Fla.;

H.R. 12396. An act for the relief of Elton P. Johnson; and

H.R. 12676. An act to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide that certain forms of copper be admitted free of duty.

On June 24, 1966

H.R. 1283. An act for the relief of Lee Chung Woo;

H.R. 3774. An act for the relief of Wanda Olszowa;

H.R. 5003. An act for the relief of Evangelia G. Latsis;

H.R. 5984. An act to amend sections 2275 and 2276 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, with respect to certain lands granted to the States;

H.R. 10357. An act to provide for the striking of medals in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the U.S. Secret Service;

H.R. 15124. An act to amend section 316 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended; and

H.R. 15202. An act to provide, for the period beginning on July 1, 1966, and ending on June 30, 1967, a temporary increase in the

public debt limit set forth in section 21 of the Second Liberty Bond Act.

On June 29, 1966:

H.R. 6438. An act to authorize any executive department or independent establishment of the Government, or any bureau or office thereof, to make appropriate accounting adjustment or reimbursement between the respective appropriations available to such departments and establishments, or any bureau or office thereof;

H.R. 6515. An act to supplement the act of October 6, 1964, establishing the Lewis and Clark Trail Commission, and for other purposes;

H.R. 7042. An act to amend section 402(d) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; and

H.R. 14266. An act making appropriations for the Treasury and Post Office Departments, the Executive Office of the President, and certain independent agencies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, and for other purposes.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 6125. An act to amend Public Law 722 of the 79th Congress and Public Law 85-935, relating to the National Air Museum of the Smithsonian Institution; and

H.R. 13125. An act to amend the provisions of title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed, with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 14888. An act to amend the act of February 28, 1947, as amended, to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate in screw-worm eradication in Mexico.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills and a concurrent and joint resolutions of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 2825. An act to amend the Communications Act of 1934 with respect to obscene or harassing telephone calls in interstate or foreign commerce;

S. 3093. An act to amend the acts of March 3, 1931, and October 9, 1962, relating to the furnishing of books and other materials to the blind so as to authorize the furnishing of such books and other materials to other handicapped persons;

S. 3106. An act for the relief of Dr. Alberto L. Martinez;

S. 3110. An act for the relief of Jose R. Cuervo;

S. 3141. An act for the relief of Hom Shek See and his wife, Hom Mon Hing;

S. 3222. An act for the relief of Dusko Doder;

S. Con. Res. 100. Concurrent resolution to express the sense of Congress with respect to certain agreements which would necessitate

ministry are available to our men, our friends and enemies.

Our men are fighting the atheist enemy and at the same time they are fighting poverty, suffering, disease, and oppression. In no war has the moral chasm been wider than between our men and the atheist enemy who have no regard for human life. The line is clearly drawn in South Vietnam between our men who are fighting to preserve individual liberty and high moral standards as opposed to filth, terror, sabotage, and disregard for the individual as manifested by the Communist invader.

The United States will persevere until victory in South Vietnam. We will persevere until the Communists are halted in their diabolical plan to pillage and plunder southeast Asia and use these resources to conquer Asia and the free world.

NATIONAL SPRING GARDEN PLANTING WEEK

(Mr. HICKS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Speaker, for some time I have observed with interest the renewed enthusiasm of our citizens in beautifying the land we live in. This enthusiasm is apparent wherever we turn. It is seen in the landscaping of our public parks and buildings, in our schools. Groups ranging from school children to civic associations and professional and garden organizations are taking another look at the quality of our surroundings, and, it would seem, finding room for vast improvement.

The impetus for this interest in beauty, as you know, came from the leadership given by President and Mrs. Johnson and the White House Conference on Natural Beauty in May 1965.

Literally, it might be said that beauty is springing up all over the place. When a city or community starts to spruce up, everyone seems to want to pitch in. Telephone companies have designed booths that enhance new settings amid flowering shrubs, trees, and flowers. Urban authorities have planted tens of thousands of roses, tulips, and daffodils in squares and parks, and giant flower pots brimming with geraniums and petunias add splashes of color to sidewalks. One hotel has an unusual garden on the roof of its ballroom that has no public access—it is solely to give guests a pleasant view from their windows.

All of this represents a sharp break with the recent past in which litter and clutter seemed to be dominant characteristics of our way of life. I am anxious to see beauty replace ugliness wherever it is found. I want all of our people to be "beauty-minded," and I believe that to accomplish this purpose we must start at the beginning—in our own homes and gardens.

A National Spring Garden Planting Week Committee has recently been formed for this very purpose. It is made up of groups and organizations among whom beautification has long been a unifying theme. They include National and State garden clubs, garden writers,

State horticultural societies, and leading trade associations and organizations who feel a special responsibility for creating a more beautiful environment for ourselves and our children.

In discussing this display of citizen concern for beautification with my colleague in the other body, Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON, we agreed that Congress has a responsibility to create a framework that will bring beautification to the most personal level, one in which each of us can participate. We agreed that many of the plans offered at last year's White House Conference can best be implemented by citizens who are themselves active in promoting beautification of their homes and communities.

I therefore offer a joint resolution to create a National Spring Garden Planting Week, to be declared each year by the President as the first full week of October. During this week, people in communities throughout the land will be urged to plant lawns, trees, shrubs, bulb flowers, and other annuals to insure that spring will bring with it more beautiful homes and gardens. The fall period was selected because it is the ideal time for plantings of the permanent or annual type. Fall is the time to begin planting spring gardens.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Governors of our States, the mayors and civic leaders of our cities and towns, and all of our citizens who are concerned about the kind of surroundings in which we live will wholeheartedly support the leadership that we in Congress provide. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution so that it can be approved prior to October 1966.

The groups listed at the close of my remarks, who make up National Spring Garden Planting Week Committee, will reach literally millions of people who, in turn, will join effectively in this national crusade for beauty. This resolution, I believe, will be an effective means of giving support to the national leadership provided by President and Mrs. Johnson, whose dream of a more beautiful America has already been rewarded with dramatic proof that people are hungry for beauty in their lives.

The list referred to follows:

NATIONAL SPRING GARDEN PLANTING WEEK COMMITTEE

Miss Ernesta Ballard, Executive Secretary, The Pennsylvania Horticultural Society.
Mr. Richard Beatty, Editor, House Beautiful's special publications division.
Mr. Clifford W. Benson, Executive Secretary, The American Iris Society.
Mr. Alfred W. Bessesen, Horticultural Editor, Ohio State University.
Mr. John Burton Brimer, Garden Editor, The Macmillan Company.
Miss Minnie Hall Brown, Garden Writer.
Mr. Kenneth A. Bryant, Editor, Florist and Nursery Exchange.
Mr. Carroll C. Calkins, Associate Editor, House Beautiful magazine.
Mrs. Morgan A. Casey, President, International Garden Club, Inc.
Mr. A. R. Crooks, Garden Writer.
Mr. Ben Arthur Davis, Hope Haven Garden Service.
Mr. Douglas M. Fellowes, Garden Writer.
Mrs. Marshall E. Ford, Garden Writer.
Miss Jean Foster, Garden Writer.
Mrs. Earl H. Hath, Executive Secretary, National Council of State Garden Clubs, Inc.

Mr. W. Ray Hastings, Executive Secretary, All-America Selections.

Mr. Paul E. Jones, Garden Writer, Spokane Daily Chronicle.

Mr. Robert F. Lederer, Executive Vice President, The American Association of Nurserymen.

Mr. Alfred B. La Gasse, Executive Director, National Recreation & Park Association.

Mr. C. H. Lewis, President, American Rose Society.

Mr. Richard L. Nowadnick, Secretary and Treasurer, Northwest Bulb Growers Association.

Miss Mary O'Brien, Editor, Beautiful Gardening & Living Outdoors magazine.

Mr. C. Dan Pennell, Secretary, American Peony Society.

Mr. Ted Sabelis, Chairman, Washington State Bulb Commission.

Mr. Robert W. Schery, Director, Lawn Institute.

Mrs. Raymond T. Schmelzele, Town & Country Garden Club.

Miss Rachel Snyder, Editor in Chief, Flower & Garden magazine.

Mr. George Spade, Executive Secretary, Men's Garden Clubs of America.

Mr. Gustave Springer, Director, Netherlands Flower-bulb Institute.

Mr. C. Powers Taylor, President, Landscape Nursery Council.

Mr. Felix R. Tyroler, President, National Tulip Society.

Dr. Cynthia Westcott, "The Plant Doctor."

Dr. Thomas W. Whitaker, Executive Secretary, American Plant Life Society.

Dr. Richard P. White, Director, Horticulture Research Institute, Inc.

Dr. Donald Wyman, The Arnold Arboretum with Harvard University.

POLICY OF FIRMNESS PAYS DIVIDENDS

(Mr. SELDEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, the inauguration tomorrow of Joaquin Balaguer represents not only a victory for the cause of representative government in the Dominican Republic, but also a vindication of a policy of firmness in the face of Communist subversive aggression. As chairman of the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, I supported the President's action of last year in moving quickly to prevent the establishment of another Communist base in the Caribbean.

It will be remembered that there were those who severely criticized this decision to act against a potential Communist takeover in Santo Domingo. These opponents of that decision, many of whom are now among the chorus criticizing our stand against Communist aggression in Vietnam, were vocal and vehement in their denunciation of our troop action in the Dominican Republic.

Perhaps it would be too much to expect some of these critics of last year publicly to reconsider their position in light of the successful outcome of the Dominican situation.

Nevertheless, it would be well, at a time when fresh outcries are being raised against this country's determination to safeguard freedom in southeast Asia, if we reminded these critics that a policy of firmness against Red aggression in our own hemisphere has resulted in a victory

for the people of the Dominican Republic and the free world.

I congratulate the people of the Dominican Republic on their new administration, and on the successful manner in which they have emerged from a difficult period in their history. And I commend those who formulated and stood firm in behalf of a policy which produced this result.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that members of the Committee on the Judiciary have until midnight Tuesday, July 12, 1966, to file additional and minority views on the bill H.R. 14765.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I object.

Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. Has the report been filed?

The SPEAKER. The report has been filed.

Mr. WAGGONNER. I withdraw my objection, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. This is a request that other members might have permission until July 12 midnight to file minority or other views. Is that correct?

Mr. CELLER. And additional views.

Mr. WAGGONNER. I withdraw my objection, Mr. Speaker.

WILL THE UNITED STATES STAND FIRM NOW THE REDS ARE FALTERING?

(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I am sure that a great majority of Americans joined me in a long-awaited sigh of relief as this Nation undoubtedly shortened the war in Vietnam by bombing both Hanoi and Haiphong yesterday. There is no way to reckon the number of American soldiers' lives were saved by this attack on the supply nerve-center of the Vietcong. There is no way to count the days we have lopped from whatever the calendar is which reckons our length of stay there. Nor is there any way to estimate the cost in dollars and cents this bombing has brought about. But each of these benefits has been achieved, though we will never know how much each represents.

The President, with a dread-filled decision to make, took longer than many of us wanted him to take to come to this point, but I am the first to say that we do not have the knowledge available to him and I bow to his judgment.

I know that his decision to interdict the Communist supply lines will not be looked upon with any pleasure by the peaceniks both in and out of Government who have aided and comforted the enemy with their endless dissent, but that is of no importance. Their totally unrealistic view of the situation in Vietnam cannot be accommodated while American soldiers are dying.

What is important is that this Nation stand firm on the homefront now that the war front is firmer than it has ever been. Anyone with even a passing knowledge of the French effort in Vietnam knows that their expeditionary force fought the Communists valiantly for 10 years and the outcome of that war might have been different had not Communists on the homefront in France undermined the morale of the people and rob them of the will to win. The French force at Dienbienphu did not suffer a military defeat, since less than 10,000 men from an army of 270,000 were engaged in the battle. The French at home no longer had the will to continue the war. This Nation must not make the same mistake; we must not lose the will to win.

Columnist William S. White drove home this point in his column in today's Washington Post and I commend it to the attention of every Member, as follows:

THE MORTAL ISSUE—WILL UNITED STATES STAND FIRM AS REDS FALTER?

(By William S. White)

The mortal issue in South Vietnam has now demonstrably narrowed down to a single real question. Will the people of the United States stand firm against Communist aggression, now that it is in sober fact a losing aggression militarily, until the assailants can be forced to enter honorable peace arrangements?

The interconnected question is this: Will a handful of pacifist-minded Senators—the FULBRIGHTS, the ROBERT KENNEDYS and so on—continue, however good the motives of their endless "dissent," to give the Communists hope that the will of the great American majority will indeed falter at last?

President Johnson and other officials of this Government have for some time believed that the true battlefield was shifting from the front lines in Vietnam to the home front here. Now, every scrap of independent information from the Communists themselves—interviews with captured Red officers, surveys by detached American correspondents, wholly unpolitical intelligence reports—tells one story and one alone.

This, simply, is that the Communist invaders themselves now admit that they cannot defeat the Allies in South Vietnam—unless American home divisions become so savage as to enfeeble the whole underpinning of the Allied efforts.

The plain reality is that this war against Communist aggression cannot now be lost on the actual firing line.

For proof the most important fact is that the rainy season May-October Red offensive which every year before this has all but cut South Vietnam in two has this year been effectively halted before it could begin.

A second important fact is in the now lost attempt of the Buddhist politico-clerical extremists to overthrow Premier Ky. That they were defeated is significant, of course. But it is even more meaningful that they tried it at all. Why? Because as power-seekers the prize—control of South Vietnam—was for the first time of genuine value. Why genuine? Because for the first time it was plain that to have political control of South Vietnam would mean something; that South Vietnam was not going to fall to Communist conquest. What plotters would seriously seek to seize a regime in imminent danger of falling to a Communist invader whose first act would be to take off the heads of that regime?

And if the Communists have passed the point of no return in purely military terms, they have also passed it in Asian political terms. All of Asia except that part of it already in the Red Chinese grip is accepting

now the bottom reality that South Vietnam's rescue from attack is indeed the salvation of all the rest.

One illustration of this is in a recent speech by the leftist Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew which has had little or no publicity here. In a talk before a Socialist Club in Singapore Lee said bluntly that whatever their ideologies the "little fishes" in Asia would be swallowed one by one if the United States allowed South Vietnam to fall into Red China's hands.

"Do you believe," he went on, "that the Indians are stooges and lackeys of the Americans? Do you believe that Pakistan is a lackey of the Americans? They are friends of China. Then there are the Burmese. They are the best neutralists in Asia. How is it that none of them have really said 'this is a crime against humanity committed by the Americans?'"

They have not said it, Lee went on, for the simple reason that they know the Communist attack on South Vietnam must not be allowed to be repeated if there is to be any safety left in all Asia.

RECLAMATION BUREAU WANTS TO EXPAND

(Mr. WAGGONNER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, the story of how one small town helped itself and benefited its adjacent area, was included in an editorial in the Shreveport Journal on June 23. The fact that the town in question happens to be my hometown may have attracted my attention, but the story would be worth everyone's attention, regardless. Plain Dealing, La., is a town of some 1,200 enterprising, hard-working people, who, in this instance, had no hesitation to vote a bond issue of \$172,377 as their share in building three reservoir dams for their area.

This editorial is an inspiration and I would like for every Member to have an opportunity to read it:

RECLAMATION BUREAU WANTS TO EXPAND

Before the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956 was enacted certain congressmen attempted through that legislation to extend the jurisdiction of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation from the 17 Western states to all other states and territories. Congress wisely rejected their proposal before passing the bill. Now another effort is being made through a proposed amendment to the 1956 law.

The revived proposal would empower the Bureau to furnish assistance in developing small, water-resource projects in 31 Eastern states just as it has been doing in the West. Of course, the agency would have to establish offices in all these states and staff them with administrators, technicians, engineers, geologists and clerical personnel.

There is not the slightest justification for extending the Bureau's jurisdiction with substantial increases in operating expenses. The Bureau's help is not needed, because adequate assistance in the development of small reservoirs and related projects is available to communities in the 31 states through Soil Conservation Service programs.

The Watershed and Flood Protection Act of 1956, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, actually accomplishes more for development of water resources on a small scale than does the companion Reclamation Act administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior. While the latter act is concerned with the construction of

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Second. No one would receive free medical help unless his income was less than 90 percent of the State's average income.

Third. The plan would not "impair or discourage the growth and development of private and group medical insurance programs."

I am not wedded to the precise percentage figures included in my bill. Some adjustment may be needed one way or the other. But the principle is the important thing and I believe my figures are at least in the ball park. Certainly the people covered, either directly or indirectly as a result of Federal funds under title XIX, should not constitute more than a minor fraction of the total population. And we certainly should not be paying medical costs under a welfare set-up for people whose incomes are well above the average. Most certainly Congress did not intend that State programs set up under title XIX should undercut the growing system of a self-contributory medical insurance which is represented by medicare itself, and which seems to me to be the soundest way to help people achieve independence in handling medical care problems.

I am happy to bring these amendments to the attention of my colleagues and I believe that our experience with title XIX in New York State may be helpful to them when this matter does come before us, as it surely will, for further deliberation.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include a copy of my bill, H.R. 15917:

H.R. 15917

A bill to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to impose certain limitations with respect to eligibility requirements under State plans for medical assistance, and to require that State medical assistance programs be designed not to discourage the growth and development of private and group medical insurance

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 1902 of the Social Security Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(d) Notwithstanding subsection (b), the Secretary shall not approve any State plan for medical assistance if the eligibility standards for assistance under the plan (1) are such that the number of individuals who are determined to be eligible for such assistance, when added to the number of other individuals who are eligible under any State-financed noncontributory medical assistance program for which Federal funds are not provided, will exceed 20 per centum of the population of the State, or (2) permit the furnishing of assistance to persons whose individual or family income exceeds 90 per centum of the average individual income or average family income (as the case may be) in the State."

Sec. 3. Section 1903(e) of the Social Security Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "To insure that medical assistance programs will enable individuals to attain or retain independence or self-care with respect to medical or remedial care and services, the Secretary shall not make such payments to any State unless such State has made a satisfactory showing that such plan will not impair or discourage the growth and development of private or group medical insurance programs within such State."

CORRECTION OF ROLL CALL

Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 157, a quorum call, I am recorded as absent. I was present and answered to my name. I ask unanimous consent that the permanent Record and Journal be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

[Mr. FEIGHAN addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

THE PRESIDENT ACTS TO SHORTEN THE WAR

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDMONDSON] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, the action of the President of the United States, ordering air strikes to destroy oil storage and pumping facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong, is without any reasonable question a necessary action to safeguard the lives of American troops in South Vietnam.

There is no doubt whatsoever about the importance of oil and gasoline to a major military effort, nor is there any question about the fact that North Vietnamese forces have been engaged in a steadily mounting movement into South Vietnam in recent weeks.

The oil and gasoline supplies which were the prime targets of our planes were destined to be used in aggression against our allies in South Vietnam.

These supplies were destined to be used to bring death and destruction to American soldiers, marines, and airmen in South Vietnam, just as surely as the guns and ammunition being moved to the southward were aimed at death and destruction of our men.

In his capacity as Commander in Chief, the President—with the full support of the best military minds of our country—wisely decided to use American air power to reduce the fuel stocks being used to support North Vietnamese aggression against their neighbors to the south.

It is almost inconceivable to me that any responsible Member of the Congress, on either side of the Capitol, could label this action "an act of outlawry" by our country. Every American family with a man in uniform in the Far East should join in expressing appreciation to the brave pilots of the Navy and Air Force who have so skillfully carried out the mission to strike these military targets in North Vietnam.

Their mission was not only to reduce the aggressive capacity of a ruthless

aggressor nation, but at the same time to avoid civilian casualties and shorten the war by reducing the warmaking capabilities of Hanoi.

The President of the United States, as our Commander in Chief, is also entitled to the appreciation of all Americans in this hour of very difficult decision.

It is heartening to read in today's Baltimore Sun that former President Dwight Eisenhower has expressed his public support of President Johnson's decision to bomb these North Vietnamese oil storage facilities, and has labeled it "a military necessity."

I say the American flag is flying higher today, both at home and all over the world, as a result of the courageous action of our forces and our President this week.

Mr. Speaker, as evidence of the support which is rallying around the President on this decision I will include at this point in the Record several articles and editorials reflecting widely varying political viewpoints.

I have here, for example, a column in today's Washington Star by Mr. David Lawrence entitled "Raid on North Viet Oil Hailed":

RAID ON NORTH VIET OIL HAILED

(By David Lawrence)

The most dangerous development in the Viet Nam war today is not the attack by American planes on oil facilities in North Viet Nam but the speechmaking by a minority of members of Congress who are, in effect, calling for surrender by the United States.

The 280,000 American troops in Viet Nam are entitled to the use of maximum power against military operations of the enemy. But, judging by the comments of some senators, the American forces are not supposed to take the offensive against the enemy or to defend themselves against attack no matter how high our own casualties may go.

Never in history have members of Congress openly interfered in the military conduct of a war by insisting that operations shall be limited while the enemy keeps on killing American troops.

Even Secretary General Thant of the United Nations has issued a surprising statement. It says:

"The secretary general on a number of occasions has indicated that in his view the first step in the search of peace in Viet Nam should be the cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam. He has therefore read with deep regret the reports of the bombing of the heavily populated areas of Haiphong and Hanoi."

But the fact is that the populous areas were not bombed and that the targets were the supply stations where oil-storage facilities have been increasing rapidly in recent months. The secretary general overlooks the fact that the United States ceased its bombing last Christmas for a period of 30 days and begged for peace overtures, all to no avail.

Thant is due to visit Moscow soon. He will have a chance himself to persuade the Communists that they are not fighting a craven enemy and that it's time to be realistic, as it now has been plainly established that the United States will not withdraw its armed forces until the aggression by the Communists against South Viet Nam stops.

Thant might become interested in learning where the North Vietnamese have been getting their oil. Secretary of Defense McNamara says that no Western Nations have been supplying it. This means that the So-

viet Union and the Communist-bloc countries are playing a belligerent role in the war against the troops of the United States. It would, therefore, be logical for the United States to declare an embargo on all trade with countries which are supplying oil to the enemy in North Viet Nam.

Some members of Congress are arguing that, instead of the war now being shortened, it will be expanded by reason of the American bombing and that peace will be more difficult to get. Exactly the contrary view is held by the vast majority in the Senate and the House, who feel that at last the United States is showing its determination to drive the enemy out of South Viet Nam.

The truth is that the appeasers and the advocates of "peace at any price" have really been responsible for prolonging the war. They have misled the enemy into believing that the United States was about to withdraw and would not fight it out. Something had to be done to convince the communists that this is not true. It was natural for the President to order an effective bombardment by air, with little or no damage to civilians in North Viet Nam. Secretary McNamara made a pertinent comment when he said:

"The decision to strike these targets was made to restrict and make more costly the enemy's infiltration efforts. This was essential to help safeguard the freedom of South Viet Nam, and to save the lives of those Vietnamese, American, Australian, New Zealand and Korean men fighting to insure their freedom."

The United States has done the logical thing in bombing the supply lines of the enemy. This has been called for by many American spokesmen for several months. Instead of increasing the intensity of the war, it is likely to end it earlier, for both Communist China and the Soviet Union now know that the United States is not going to withdraw its forces but is, indeed, ready to face whatever contingency may arise. It was precisely such resoluteness at critical stages which enabled the United States and its allies to win World War I and World War II.

The bombing of oil facilities in North Viet Nam, therefore, is perhaps the most encouraging development since the war began. It could mean an early termination of the conflict and a peace conference within the next few months.

Mr. Speaker, to go to the opposite side of the political spectrum I have today's leading editorial in the Washington Post entitled "Oil Targets":

OIL TARGETS

The practical military arguments for bombing the oil storage facilities of North Viet Nam are so compelling and persuasive that the delay in mounting this attack is more surprising than the event. The unwillingness of the Administration to act sooner can be explained only by its reluctance to bear the diplomatic risks. And this reluctance must have been overcome, finally, by the elaborate analysis of the probable civilian casualties which in turn led to the conclusion that these strikes would not alter basically the nature of the air war. All air attack involves jeopardy to civilians close to target areas, and the attack on communications no doubt has been quite as destructive of civilian life as the oil storage attacks.

It is perfectly obvious, from the figures used by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, that the effort to interdict the movement of troops and supplies by air attack has not stopped infiltration from the North. And it is clear that despite a heavy assault on such communications, the North Vietnamese have been able to mount an increasing assault.

It is the lesson of World War II all over again. The British analysis entitled *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany* had to say of the offensive against German communications: "The impression still remains that the immense power of the strategic forces was not used in the attacks on communications in such a manner as to produce the most rapid end to the resistance of the enemy."

The same report said that the attacks on oil depots, on the contrary, had "important results on the last German efforts of resistance." Elsewhere the experts of the British survey concluded that "the attack on oil made a large contribution to the Allied victory." In estimating the strategic air effort as a whole, the British postwar survey concluded that "none of the other means of pressure could have been applied with such success if the attack on oil had not taken place."

Hopes for the success of this attack in a different environment must not be exaggerated. The attack on Germany included assaults on oil production facilities as well as storage. In this case, the production facilities lie outside the target country. In addition, the North Vietnamese have no great mechanized forces to be immobilized by a lack of petrol as the German force of 1500 tanks in Upper Silesia was immobilized, and in the way other German units were deprived of the power of tactical maneuver. Still, although air attack may be less effective than it was in Europe, there is no doubt that the air arm now has struck at the best enemy target at hand.

It is important that the United States forces maintain a clear distinction between the best target for air operations and the worst one. The worst one is clearly civilian populations. It is the worst target not only because military results are not achieved, but, in addition, because the World War II evidence indicates that the effects of area bombing of civilians, far from weakening the will to resist, may strengthen it. And if this was true in Germany, of a sophisticated urban population, it is even more likely to be true of the population of North Vietnam. The loss of the comforts and conveniences of urban society would have even less effect in such a country.

There is not much doubt that Americans will overwhelmingly support the attack upon targets of such obvious military eligibility as oil dumps; and there is not much doubt that opinion in the United States and elsewhere would overwhelmingly oppose deliberate assault on population centers.

Mr. Speaker, I also have here the lead editorial in the Wall Street Journal for today, June 30, 1966:

THE LOGIC OF WAR

So much emotionalism has been generated about so-called hawks and doves that it is difficult to discuss dispassionately the bombing of the oil depots on the fringes of Hanoi and Halphong. Even so, we think a dispassionate observer would have to support the U.S. action.

That is not at all the same thing as offering unqualified support for the U.S. participation in the Vietnam war.

For our part, we have long questioned both the slipshod manner in which the U.S. got progressively involved and the apparently underlying assumption—that this country must fight the Communists anywhere they commit aggression, no matter how remote from direct American interest or how unfavorable the battlefield. We have suggested that the military outlook coupled with the political chaos in Saigon could conceivably force the U.S. to leave the field.

Yet there are many situations in ordinary life where finding oneself in a seemingly

hopeless spot does not automatically argue for withdrawal. To take a homely domestic instance, the realization of an unhappy marriage isn't necessarily proof that the solution is instant divorce; various considerations, including children and religion, may indicate that the best course is to continue.

In Vietnam, each phase of the U.S. involvement has made it harder to contemplate an arbitrary, unilateral pulling out, as distinct from being in effect forced to leave. Especially the big buildup that began some 18 months ago signaled that the U.S., for practical purposes, was taking over the war effort.

That circumstance, whether the decision was right or wrong, created a new situation. Simply to withdraw would not only not be simple in the least; it might have consequences far more disastrous than any resulting from continuation of the struggle. Notably, the Chinese Communists might understandably interpret it as a vindication of their strategy of "wars of national liberation" for the underdeveloped world.

If not withdrawal, then what logical alternative except to prosecute the war in such fashion as to provide hope of ending it reasonably soon?

Alternatives were in fact proposed, but none seemed particularly promising. The most famous, the idea of retreating to coastal enclaves in Vietnam, increasingly came to sound to some people like a disguised or phased withdrawal from the war itself. In any case, it appeared to offer scant prospect of bringing the war to a definitive end.

So Washington has escalated, and gradually with considerable success on the ground in South Vietnam. The bombing raids on North Vietnam, however, were failing to halt the infiltration of North Vietnamese regulars into the South, raising the specter of an indefinitely protracted conflict regardless of how badly we were hurting the Vietcong.

Here another anomaly, in this most anomalous war, intruded: As Defense Secretary McNamara implied yesterday, was it fair to ask Americans and allies to fight and die in the South without doing whatever possible to curb the infiltration from the North? And certainly the oil installations in the Hanoi-Halphong area were a powerful propellant of the infiltration. Why should they be spared, especially since care has been exercised to avoid mass bombing of civilian populations?

Thus the intrinsic logic of the war's progression has come, it would seem, to dictate the bombings in that area. Given the premise of a major effort to bring the war to an end, you could call it all but inevitable.

We do not wish to be dogmatic; we hope we have never been dogmatic about this ugly war. The bombings may not accomplish the purpose. They may, for all anyone knows, finally bring in Red China. We still view America's involvement, in the way it developed over the years, as a dubious enterprise strictly from the standpoint of the national interest. It will be well if the policy-makers learn a lesson for the future about the dangers of a policy of global intervention, however just the cause.

But we also think only the emotionally obsessed, or the friends of the foe, will deny that one proved way to finish a fight is to fight to win.

Mr. Speaker, all of these expressions of editorial opinion in support of the action of the President should be made a part of the RECORD, and accordingly I include them in the RECORD.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I am pleased to yield to my good friend, the gentleman from New York.

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Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I just want to congratulate the gentleman from Oklahoma for taking this time to point out some of the facts with regard to the action that took place yesterday. I subscribe wholeheartedly to what he says. I think it is most important that the point should be made over and over again that this is not any escalation of the war. I saw a big headline yesterday morning in the Washington Daily News, "The War Escalates." This is not escalation. This is precisely the same kind of restrained, careful, calculated action that has been taken by the President and by the Department of Defense with regard to the conduct of this war since we started. We have always from the outset done everything we felt we properly could and should do to restrict, as the gentleman from Oklahoma has already brought out, the infiltration of troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.

I had the honor, Mr. Speaker, of being in Vietnam in April as chairman of a special subcommittee from the House Armed Services Committee to appraise our effort over there. Our group came back and reported to this House our unanimous view that the military effort was going very well and, in fact, much better than any of us would be inclined to think, from reading the day-to-day reports in the newspapers.

I think since we came back in April these facts have clearly been reflected in news stories. And specifically in the past several weeks even the political situation has improved. The difficulty is that while the military situation is improving on the ground it does not help if you are continuing to infiltrate thousands of men and supplies from North Vietnam. We found when we were there, as the gentleman from Oklahoma has already indicated, that what used to be called the coolie trails, or the Ho Chi Minh trails, down which a few of these individuals could come week after week, have now been turned into roads, and instead of coolies bringing this stuff down it is now being brought down in a steady supply by trucks, just as Secretary McNamara indicated in his very brilliant press conference yesterday.

If we are going to protect the men that we send out there we not only have to send them guns, ammunition, and some of the other things that people talk about, but we have to keep to an absolute minimum the number of men and guns on the other side that are brought down to them. And obviously if you have trucks coming down, they need gasoline, and if you are going to stop those trucks you have to knock out the gasoline supplies.

It is just as simple as that. When we went in and knocked those out, we did as Secretary McNamara indicated because, as has already been developed, the North Vietnamese, taking advantage of our restraint and our humane attitude toward the whole conduct of the war in Vietnam, had begun to diversify and disperse these oil storage facilities into a lot of separate individual places that would be very hard to find and very hard to hit. So we had to do it now or never.

I think the American people ought to recognize, as the gentleman from Oklahoma has clearly brought out, that this action is not in escalation of the war, but that the action that we took is in conformity with the policy that we have consistently followed, and that it was designed to protect the 300,000 young men who are out there at the present time.

I am sure all of us in this House would want to support the President in this decision and support our fighting men who are doing such an excellent job in Vietnam.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the gentleman very much for those thoughtful remarks.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I, too, wish to commend my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma and to associate myself with his remarks. I want to commend the President for acting wisely and promptly to save the lives of American men who are actively engaged in combat with the enemy in South Vietnam.

The area affected in Hanoi and Haiphong was as much a military target as an ammunition dump would be at the front. The President acted with alacrity and decision to save the lives of American boys, boys from all over this country, who are fighting and dying in South Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with my friend from Oklahoma and my distinguished and able friend from New York that anyone on either side of the aisle of this House or on either side of the Capitol who disagrees openly with our bombing of military targets is encouraging the enemy in North Vietnam to continue the aggression and encouraging the enemy to negotiate.

I deplore the wild statements and charges which are being made throughout this country by responsible people, or, rather, people in high places acting with irresponsibility, criticizing action in respect to military targets which are essential to the enemy in their combat operations in South Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I do commend my able and beloved friend from Oklahoma, and I commend the President of the United States, of course, on his action.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the gentleman very much.

Along the same lines that the gentleman from South Carolina has just so effectively brought to the attention of the House, I have in my hand an article which Charles Mohr of the New York Times Service wrote and which was published just the other day. It appeared on June 27, 1966, in The Daily Oklahoman. The article points out that North Vietnamese troops and Vietcong troops who are being captured in South Vietnam are conceding that the military course of the war in South Vietnam is going very definitely against them, and expresses the view that the Vietcong's best hope of coming out with any kind of victory in South Vietnam right now is on the home front of the United States, from which they are getting some re-

ports that there is not solid and firm support behind the President of the United States.

I think this article should also be made a part of the RECORD at this point. The article is as follows:

ENEMY AGREES—U.S. FAVORED IN VIETNAM

(By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON.—An American major general was recently interrogating a North Vietnamese captain who had deserted his unit and surrendered to United States troops. The general was curious about Communist rotation policy.

"American troops can go home after 12 months," said the general. "When do your leaders say you can go home?"

"They say we can go home when we win the war," answered the North Vietnamese captain.

"What do you think?" asked the general. "I think we can go home after YOU win the war," said the captain.

Who is winning militarily in Viet Nam today?

The North Vietnamese officer is only one of many persons who think the United States, the South Vietnamese and the Korean, Australian and New Zealand allies are clearly winning.

Hardly anyone on the scene argues that the U.S. is losing or is in any danger of a military fiasco such as Dien Bien Phu.

There is a small, but stubborn, body of men who believe that the U.S. is not losing but is not winning either and will not begin to win until there has been some measure of success in the subtle political battle for the allegiance of now hostile or indifferent parts of the rural population.

The largest body of opinion of all is one that embraces both optimists and pessimists and which feels that the ultimate outcome will be decided by public opinion in the U.S.

In a very real sense, the U.S. forces in Viet Nam are fighting a war while looking backward over their shoulders toward home.

A battalion commander sitting on a case of canned rations and a private picking leeches off his leg on a trail tend to say the same thing—that the war can be won if they are given enough time but they are not sure they will be granted this time.

In one sense it is ironic that the fighting men here should devote so much attention to trying to analyze a question which they are mostly prepared to admit they are unqualified to analyze because of their remoteness from home.

It is, however, understandable because of the crucial nature of the question.

"There's a lot I probably don't know," said a lieutenant colonel recently, "but the one thing I do know after almost a year of fighting here is that it is going to take time."

"I don't personally believe it will take a lot of time, but I'm not sure. That's what makes it hard to know if the public will put up with it long enough."

Since American soldiers correctly believe that patience is the essential quality needed for success in guerrilla warfare and since patience in a democratic society is built on public confidence, public affairs policy in the war in Viet Nam has assumed an importance never seen before in human conflict.

Much of U.S. public affairs policy regarding the war has been built on the insubstantial foundation of statistics.

The rest of it has been built on psychological estimates of the enemy.

Far too little has been built on more substantial factors—the growing American mastery of the terrain and of guerrilla war tactics and the basic courage, anti-communism and tenacity on the allied side.

No discussion of the progress of the war in Viet Nam can progress far without an

examination of statistics, which have become so important for two reasons.

One is that in a war without front lines and territorial gains, statistics are the only concrete measuring rod of success. The other reason is that U.S. officials have made them so important.

Statistically, the war has been won several times already.

According to official figures, about 57,000 Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese army regulars have been killed in action and counted on the battlefield since January, 1965.

Some American officials in Viet Nam have grave doubts about the validity of this figure. The gravest intellectual qualms result, however, not when the figure is discounted but when it is accepted, if only for the purpose of argument.

Statistics on Viet Cong wounded are not released because none are ever seen except a relatively few prisoners. But by the most conservative estimate possible the Viet Cong must suffer two wounded for every man killed in action (a more realistic estimate might range up to five to one).

This would mean that another 114,000 Viet Cong have been wounded, many of which would have died in their primitive field hospitals.

To this total could be added another 20,000 men in the category of "killed but dragged away" and victims of illness such as malaria.

Thus, if the original "body count" statistic is accepted, a conservative conclusion is that in less than 18 months the Viet Cong has suffered at least 200,000 casualties and other troop losses.

The statistics seem, therefore, literally almost too good to be true.

This is not to imply that American military units in Viet Nam are consciously lying. It is far more complex than that. The whole concept of "body count" is an unrealistic one in some circumstances.

A company commander who had been under heavy attack in a tight defense perimeter got a request for a body count figure. He radioed to one of his platoon leaders to ask what the officer could tell him.

"I don't know, captain," said the lieutenant. "Maybe three or five or 15. Put me down for 15 and I'll try to find them for you in the morning."

The most important lesson is not that statistics are unreliable, but that they are meaningless, in themselves.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further at that point?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. DORN. The point which the gentleman has made is well taken. The enemy is finding no encouragement from the action of our men in South Vietnam. But they are finding great encouragement to continue the conflict by many people back home right here in the United States.

Mr. Speaker, the United States is no paper tiger. We are the most powerful military Nation in the world. But the North Vietnamese are being encouraged to continue their combat activities and aggression by certain elements and certain people in the United States. I point out again, they are not being encouraged by our fighting forces. But by statements and speeches by civilians in the United States who should know better.

Mr. EDMONDSON. The gentleman is entirely correct. The overwhelming sentiment of this body, as has been expressed each time a measure on the question has been before it, has been in sup-

port of the President and of the policy that is being pursued in Vietnam today. No one is enthusiastic about fighting a war anywhere. No one has great enthusiasm about the loss of troops, either on our side or on the other side. But when there is a difficult military decision, such as the one that has been made at the very highest level in our country, and when that decision involves the commitment of our troops to battle, certainly it is incumbent upon us as Americans to give, in every way possible, our support to policies designed to assist those men and to enable them to carry out their mission.

MINNESOTA AWAKE TO HATCHETING OF THE FARMER BY THE ADMINISTRATION

(Mr. NELSEN (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. NELSEN. Mr. Speaker, up and down the State of Minnesota, in the cities and out on the farms, there is considerable talk about the massive Government efforts undertaken by the administration to make the American farmer the fall guy for inflation. I include for the RECORD several editorials from big and small newspapers, which generally reflect the growing resentment and disgust these devious and wholly unjustified actions by Orville Freeman and other key members of the administration have caused:

[From the St. Paul Pioneer Press, June 11, 1966]

FREEMAN AND THE BIG BOSS

Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman has been in hot water politically for the past several months. When pork and other food prices were zooming skyward, he tried to appease angry consumers by talking reassuringly of lower prices in the future. At his suggestion, the Defense department cut back on pork purchases for the armed forces to help hold down the market.

These actions infuriated hog growers, who naturally want high prices. Republican congressmen and aspirants for House and Senate seats in the Midwest leaped into the fray with enthusiasm, charging Freeman with selling out the farmers he supposedly represents in his cabinet post.

His next public appearances were designed to offset these attacks, and he backed away from responsibility for the low price policies. Critics began comparing his defensive comments with statements he had made earlier, and these did not jibe. Making another turn in public relations, Freeman then adopted the line that even if food prices have gone up, average earnings of consumers have risen even higher. This approach presumably was supposed to satisfy both farmers and budget conscious housewives. It left out the old people and everyone on fixed incomes and others whose income has not risen.

In trying to satisfy everybody by shifting from one position to another like a man hopping about barefooted on hot coals, Freeman has wound up in an unenviable position. Farm resentment persists and public confidence in the credibility of his statements has been reduced.

In his semantic gyrations, however, Freeman without doubt has been acting on cues from the big boss in the White House, Presi-

dent Johnson. The President in his love of consensus tries to offer a gesture here and a gesture there to damp down signs of political disaffection among farmers, consumers, unions and other groups. L.B.J. has pulled the strings and Freeman has had to react accordingly, even though it puts him in a poor light personally.

He takes the blame for policies which go sour, but leaves the credit for any successes to the man in the White House.

[From the Minneapolis Star, May 5, 1966]

THE FARMERS AND INFLATION

Republican congressmen and farm organizations have been lambasting the administration over attempted cutbacks in the agricultural budget and over some statements by top officials. That many Democrats also are critical was shown last week when the House more than restored the cuts.

Of course, there is sometimes more than meets the eye in Washington. Told by a president to trim a budget, a cabinet officer may reduce popular items in the expectation that the outcry will induce Congress to restore the full amount.

That may not have been Agriculture Secretary Freeman's technique, but anyway the House wanted the full programs for school milk and lunches, research and land grant college instructional aid, soil conservation payments, rural electrification loans, etc. For good measure, the critics continue to denounce tighter control on hide imports, looser control on cheese imports, reduced military buying of pork.

What antagonizes farm spokesmen even more is the alleged effort to make farmers the fall guys for inflation. The President suggested housewives buy cheaper foods; Freeman predicted a drop in food prices by autumn; Economic Adviser Gardner Ackley said the government was selling CCC corn to hold down the price.

Farm income is up. In Minnesota last month the index of prices received was the best for any April since 1954. But it was still only 92 per cent of the 1947-49 average. And in terms of parity, American farm prices last month were only 80 per cent of that magic goal.

What is happening is that demand—domestic and export—is catching up with some lines of farm production. Such conditions tend to improve the farmer's lot. But not very fast.

[From the Rock County Star Herald, June 2, 1966]

FREEMAN LOVES THOSE \$2,400 TELEGRAMS

(By Al McIntosh, editor)

Right now the farmer's prayer should be "Lord preserve us from our friends, we can take care of our enemies."

It seems that those who should be the farmer's friends are ripping him down the middle.

The farmer gets it full blast lately from all his supposed friends.

He wasn't happy about the fact that the new minimum wage coverage has been extended to include 485,000 farm hands, hiking his costs.

He isn't a bit happy that the state agriculture directors and the thousands of committeemen are going to be propaganda mouthpieces in behalf of Freeman and Johnson.

He isn't a bit happy when he notes that Freeman replied to criticism from 30 House members via a seven page telegram.

Freeman's propaganda reply could have been sent via the mails for free. In using the 7 page telegram the cost to the taxpayers was \$2,400.

With this sort of attitude Freeman is not working for the taxpayers anymore than he has been working for the farmers. We have

orders, decisions, rules, and regulations issued pursuant to sections 5(b)(1) and 5(b)(2); and the Board shall also make public (a) every recommendation made to the Secretary, (b) every special study conducted, and (c) every action of the Board requiring the Secretary to take action pursuant to section 5(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (7)."

2. AMENDMENT TO REQUIRE ANNUAL REPORTS BY NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Page 8, lines 13 and 14, strike "two years after the effective date of this Act" and insert in lieu thereof "annually".

Lines 17-19, strike "An interim report shall be submitted to the Congress one year after the effective date of this Act."

3. AMENDMENT TO RETAIN CAR SERVICE FUNCTIONS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

Page 18, line 24 to page 19, line 5, strike all language.

Page 19, lines 11 through 14, strike all language.

4. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT

Page 20, lines 8 and 9, strike "the first paragraph of this subsection." and insert in lieu thereof "subsection (e)."

5. AMENDMENTS TO EXEMPT WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS FROM STANDARDS AND CRITERIA, TO OBTAIN THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL'S CONCURRENCE, AND TO MAKE THE SECRETARY A MEMBER OF THE WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL

Page 24, line 6, strike the word "or" and after the word "assistance" strike the period and add ", or water resource project."

Page 24, line 6, strike out all language following the period through and including the period on line 14.

6. AMENDMENT ON SPECIAL STATISTICAL STUDIES

Page 34, line 19, after the word "and" and before the word "other" insert "special statistical studies relating to".

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, June 28, 1966.

MEMORANDUM ON H.R. 15963 (A CLEAN BILL TO REPLACE H.R. 13200) ESTABLISHING A DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

H.R. 15963 resulted from a recommendation to the Congress by President Lyndon B. Johnson and was introduced in the House by Congressman CHET HOLIFIELD. The bill would establish a new executive Department of Transportation which would consolidate most Federal activities involving transportation promotion and safety but not economic regulation which would remain with the regulatory agencies.

In his Message to Congress on Transportation of March 2, 1966, the President urged the creation of such a Department to serve the growing demands of this great Nation, to satisfy the needs of our expanding industry and to fulfill the rights of our taxpayers to maximum efficiency and frugality in Government operations. The new Department would bring together almost 100,000 employees and almost \$6 billion of Federal funds presently devoted to transportation.

The Department will be headed by a Secretary with four assistant secretaries, an assistant secretary for administration and a general counsel. The principal operating divisions will be a Federal Highway Administration, a Federal Railroad Administration, a Federal Maritime Administration, a Federal Aviation Administration, each headed by an administrator appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and the Coast Guard. There will also be an Office of Accident Investigation, whose major responsibility will be to investigate major aircraft accidents but will be independent of the Federal Aviation Administration.

The bill will create, within the Department, a National Safety Transportation Board to review investigations of accidents and to seek their causes. It will make re-

ports to the Secretary and to Congress, including recommendations for safety legislation. Specifically, the Board will carry out the Secretary's functions to determine probable cause of accidents and to review on appeal certificates or licenses issued by the Secretary. It will make special studies of safety and accident prevention and may arrange for the personal participation of its members or employees in accidents being investigated by the Department.

The following agencies and functions are being transferred to the new Department:

1. The Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, and its Policy, Program, Emergency Transportation and Research staffs.

2. The Bureau of Public Roads and the Federal-Aid-Highway Program it administers—to become the Federal Highway Administration.

3. The Federal Aviation Agency with its functions in aviation safety, promotion and investment—to become the Federal Aviation Administration.

4. The Coast Guard whose principal peacetime activities relate to transportation and marine safety, to be transferred as a unit from the Treasury Department. As in the past, the Coast Guard will operate as part of the Navy in time of war.

5. The Maritime Administration, with its construction and operating subsidy programs—to become the Federal Maritime Administration.

6. The safety functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the responsibility for investigating and determining the probable cause of aircraft accidents and its appellate functions related to safety—to go to the Secretary and then delegated to the National Safety Transportation Board or the Office of Accident Investigation, as appropriate.

7. The safety functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, principally the inspection and enforcement of safety regulations for railroads, motor carriers, and pipelines—to the Secretary and delegated to the Federal Railroad Administration.

The bill will also require the Secretary of Transportation to develop standards and criteria, consistent with national transportation policies, for the formulation and economic evaluation of all proposals for the investment of Federal funds in transportation facilities or equipment with certain exceptions listed in the bill. Standards and criteria involving water resource projects and grant-in-aid programs including highway and airport construction were among those excepted.

Nothing in the bill authorizes the Secretary, without appropriate action by Congress, to adopt or revise a national transportation policy.

Attached hereto is a summary of the changes made by the Subcommittee to the original bill.

SUMMARY OF SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES MADE BY H.R. 15963 IN THE TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT BILL AS ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED (H.R. 13200) (REFERENCES ARE TO H.R. 15963)

I. Authority of the Secretary of Transportation

A. Neither the Secretary nor the President can adopt or change National Transportation Policy without action by Congress. (Sec. 4(e), p. 6, 1. 7).

B. Secretary's recommendations for implementation of National Transportation Policies must be made to President for permissible administrative action within Congressionally approved policies or to Congress for necessary legislative action. (Sec. 4(a) p. 4, 1. 22).

C. Through consultation, is to coordinate transportation activities of other Federal Departments and agencies (Sec. 4(a), p. 5, 1. 4).

II. Continuity of functions and responsibilities

A. Establishes four Administrations (in addition to Coast Guard) in new department for aviation, highways, railroads and maritime. (Sec. 3(e), p. 3, 1. 25).

B. Heads of these Administrations to be appointed by President with approval of Senate; they report directly to Secretary. (Sec. 3(e), p. 4, 1. 3).

III. Investment standards (section 7)

A. Standards cannot be inconsistent with or contrary to law. (Sec. 4(e), p. 6, 1. 9). Must be consistent with Congressionally approved National Transportation Policies. (Sec. 7(a), p. 23, 1. 19).

B. All Congressionally authorized grant-in-aid programs (like highway and airport construction) exempt from standards; cannot touch highway trust fund. (Sec. 7(a), p. 24, 1. 1).

C. Secretary has to get approval of Water Resources Council after he prepares his recommendations (not before) and he is made a member of the Council. (Sec. 7(a), p. 24, 1. 8).

D. Waiting period before the President acts on Secretary's recommendations during which time interested parties can present views on standards published in Federal Register and Congressional Committees can hold hearings. (Sec. 7(a), p. 24, 1. 14).

E. Corps of Engineers' present procedures of sending reports directly to Congress preserved. (Sec. 7(b), p. 25, 1. 12).

IV. Safety

A. Transfers CAB Bureau of Safety to newly established Office of Accident Investigation; preserves present independence from FAA. (Sec. 3(f), p. 4, 1. 9).

B. Strengthens National Transportation Safety Board in its role of determining cause of accidents by giving Board authority to:

1. Receive notification and reports of accidents as it may require. (Sec. 5(c), p. 7, 1. 3).

2. Order investigations and supplementary investigations. (Sec. 5(c), p. 7, 1. 3).

3. Send members and other personnel to participate in investigations. (Sec. 5(c), p. 7, 1. 3).

4. Employ its own hearing examiners. (Sec. 5(m), p. 11, 1. 4).

5. Utilize available services and facilities of all Federal agencies and, on cooperative basis, of State and local agencies. (Sec. 5(n), p. 11, 1. 6).

C. Raises grade level of chairman and members to those of comparable Boards (Sec. 5(1), p. 10, 1. 6).

D. Board also empowered to make special studies and recommendations to Secretary on safety rules and investigation procedures (Sec. 5(c), p. 7, 1. 3); required to report to Congress on effectiveness of accident investigations, including recommendations for new legislation. (Sec. 5(e), p. 8, 1. 13).

V. Rights of parties

Any existing statutory requirement for notice, hearing or other action upon record and for administrative appeal preserved in transfer of functions to new department. (Sec. 4(c), p. 5, 1. 20).

VI. Noise abatement

Research and development shall include noise abatement, particularly aircraft noise. (Sec. 4(a), p. 5, 1. 2).

VII. Super grade positions

Forty-five proposed super grade positions (GS 16, 17 and 18) eliminated. (Formerly in Sec. 9).

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 814

(Mr. FRASER (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to

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be commensurate with his responsibilities. The Secretary will exercise leadership under the direction of the President in transportation matters within the Government. He will develop policies and programs but we added the requirement that he may only recommend the implementation of those policies to the President and Congress.

We also made certain that the Secretary could not bypass Congress in setting transportation policy by adding the provision 4(e):

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, without appropriate action by Congress, the adoption or revision of a national transportation policy. Nor shall the Secretary promulgate investment standards or criteria pursuant to section 7 of this act which are contrary to or inconsistent with Acts of Congress relating to standards or criteria for transportation investments.

STRUCTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT

Section 3 sets up the structure of the Department as follows: It will be headed by a Secretary with an Under Secretary, four Assistant Secretaries, an Assistant Secretary for Administration, and a general counsel.

All of the assistant secretaries will serve in staff capacities. We added to the bill four operating divisions: A Federal Highway Administration, a Federal Railroad Administration, a Federal Maritime Administration, and a Federal Aviation Administration. Though the bill contains a provision requiring the Secretary to give full consideration to the need for operational continuity of transferred functions, we did this to further assure the modal interests that the administration of their activities would not be submerged nor lost in the Department.

The operating heads will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and will report directly to the Secretary. Thus, they will have the status their positions demand. We also added to the bill an Office of Accident Investigation which will initially investigate the major accidents now investigated by the Bureau of Safety in the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Office will be independent of the aviation division of the Department and, hence, is unlikely to be influenced in its investigations to cover up for any shortcomings in the division which might have been a factor in the accident. The establishment of this office should ease fears expressed by the aviation industry during the hearings.

NATIONAL SAFETY TRANSPORTATION BOARD

A principal emphasis of the new Department will be safety and accident prevention. The major instrument to implement this purpose will be the National Safety Transportation Board. The Board will be independent of the Secretary, its members will be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, it will employ its own staff, including hearing examiners, and prepare its own rules, regulations and procedures. It will carry out the Secretary's functions of determining probable cause of transportation accidents and reviewing on appeal actions on certificates or licenses.

The Board will make recommendations to the Secretary and make reports to Congress on the prevention of accidents. It will conduct special safety studies; it may require the Secretary to report on any or all accidents as it may determine and to initiate specific accident investigations. It may arrange for the personal participation of its members or staff in any accident investigation conducted by the Department.

The original bill was somewhat vague on the status of the Board and the functions it would carry out. The committee has made these specific and has conferred upon the Board the powers we feel are necessary to carry out its duties. We also enhanced its status by placing its Chairman at grade levels in the Federal executive salary schedule comparable to those of other boards and commissions.

INVESTMENT STANDARDS AND CRITERIA

As most Members are well aware, section 7 gives the Secretary the duty to develop standards and criteria, consistent with national transportation policies, for the formulation and economic evaluation of all proposals for the investment of Federal funds in transportation facilities or equipment. The magnitude of Federal activities in this area and the billions of dollars expended make it imperative that standards be adopted taking into consideration the various modes of transportation and other factors inevitably involved. We recognize this as an important matter and understand the concern expressed by some Members.

First of all, there are significant activities that are excepted from these standards. They are: grant-in-aid programs such as the construction of highways and airports; defense features of civil transportation; and interoceanic canal; the Government's own transportation facilities and foreign aid programs. These exceptions make it clear that the Highway Trust Fund may not be used for any other purpose.

By amendment in the full committee we also excepted water resource projects from the standards and criteria to be developed by the Secretary. The committee felt that further study should be given to this complex matter. The standards and criteria developed by the Secretary must be approved by the President but beforehand he must publish them in the Federal Register to give interested parties and the Congress an opportunity to study them and present their views to the Secretary.

TRANSFERS TO THE DEPARTMENT

The following agencies and functions are being transferred to the new Department:

First. The Office of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, and its policy, program, emergency transportation and research staffs.

Second. The Bureau of Public Roads and the Federal-aid highway program it administers—to become the Federal Highway Administration.

Third. The Federal Aviation Agency with its functions in aviation safety, promotion and investment—to become the Federal Aviation Administration.

Fourth. The Coast Guard whose principal peacetime activities relate to transportation and marine safety, to be transferred as a unit from the Treasury Department. As in the past, the Coast Guard will operate as part of the Navy in time of war.

Fifth. The Maritime Administration with its construction and operating subsidy programs—to become the Federal Maritime Administration.

Sixth. The safety functions of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the responsibility for investigating and determining the probable cause of aircraft accidents and its appellate functions related to safety—to go to the Secretary and then delegated to the National Safety Transportation Board or the Office of Accident Investigation, as we have outlined above.

Seventh. The safety functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, principally the inspection and enforcement of safety regulations for railroads, motor carriers, and pipelines—to the Secretary and delegated for the most part to the Federal Railroad Administration. By amendment in full committee car service, per diem, and demurrage functions will be retained by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

OTHER FEATURES OF THE BILL

We have made a careful effort to see that the rights of all parties are fully protected including any existing statutory requirement for notice, hearing, administrative appeal or judicial review and that proceedings before agencies on the effective date of the act shall continue before the new Department.

To meet the suggestions of members of the subcommittee, we included among the Secretary's duties that of promoting and undertaking research and development in noise abatement, with particular attention to aircraft noise. We consider this a command to the Secretary to move forward in this important area and expect positive results to be forthcoming.

We agreed to eliminate from the bill a provision to create 45 more supergrade positions. Undoubtedly, these will be necessary to the department but they can be handled better by separate legislation.

We also adopted an amendment to make certain that information compiled by the National Transportation Safety Board was made available to the public.

Creating a new department is a very serious matter and the Committee undertook its obligation in that manner. We held many days of hearings, heard numerous witnesses, and read a large number of communications. The committee has worked its will and we urge the concurrence of the House.

There follows a list of the amendments made to H.R. 15963 and a summary of the provisions of the bill.

AMENDMENTS MADE TO H.R. 15963 DURING FULL COMMITTEE MEETING ON JUNE 29

1. AMENDMENT TO ASSURE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION FROM NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Page 8, following line 7, add the following new subsection and renumber the subsequent subsections accordingly:

"(d) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the Board shall make public all reports,

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extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, elections are scheduled in South Vietnam this year. These elections hold hope as a beginning of organized political expression by the South Vietnamese people. At the same time, the elections contain many potential pitfalls.

The elections will have significance only if they permit meaningful choices. Otherwise they will be a mere sham. Only if South Vietnam begins to develop politically will that troubled country be able to work effectively toward ending its tragic war and establishing peace and stability.

Other resolutions have emphasized the desirability of impartial international observers for the elections. I am wholly in accord with this idea, and it is one of the points of my resolution.

But I believe, Mr. Speaker, that emphasis also should be placed upon the quality of the elections. If the people of South Vietnam are encouraged to develop political processes the prospect for constitutional government will be greatly advanced.

Finally, my resolution pledges that the United States will honor the outcome of the election in South Vietnam.

Following is the full resolution:

H. CON. RES. 814

Whereas the United States seeks to protect the right of the people of South Vietnam to choose their own government free of coercion, and

Whereas the Republic of South Vietnam is actively preparing for elections to choose a constituent assembly to bring about a more representative government; and

Whereas the development of political organization, political dialogue and political choice is essential to the growth of democratic government, and

Whereas the allegiance of the people to the Government of South Vietnam will be strengthened through popular participation in choosing that Government; and

Whereas it is essential to provide the substance as well as the form of free elections to the people of South Vietnam: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress

1. That it welcomes the holding of elections in the territory of South Vietnam.
2. That free elections require that all people of South Vietnam be permitted to take part who are willing to abide by the election results and who are prepared to accept the constitutional processes which flow from such elections.
3. That freedom to discuss and organize by all participants is essential to the holding of free elections.
4. That Congress commends the South Vietnam Government for requesting United Nations observers and suggests that observers be sought from appropriate and impartial international sources to oversee the elections.
5. That the people of the United States of America through the leadership of the President, with the full support of the Congress, will fully honor the election and the aspirations of the people of South Vietnam as expressed by their freely chosen government.

U.S. FOREIGN AID ONLY A FRACTION OF THE RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(Mr. VIVIAN (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. VIVIAN. Mr. Speaker, U.S. foreign aid is only a small measure of the resources which go into modernizing economies of the nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Actually, most of the resources come from the recipient countries themselves, in the form of manpower, materials, public and private initiative, and funds.

Sometimes this is difficult to realize when the Congress is asked for over \$2 billion for economic aid to nations many thousands of miles away. But, put in perspective, these dollars—less than 2 percent of our Federal budget and only about a quarter of 1 percent of the U.S. gross national product—represent less than one-tenth of the real resources which go into the development of the economies of the recipient nations. Most of the remaining nine-tenths comes from the recipient countries themselves.

Foreign aid is a partnership, and the basis of this partnership—self-help—is the subject of the following section from AID's presentation to Congress for fiscal year 1967:

SELF-HELP

"I recommend a Foreign Aid program to help those nations who are determined to help themselves."

This statement by President Johnson, in his 1966 Special Message to the Congress on Foreign Aid pinpoints the importance attached by the Administration to an even more rigorous application of self-help criteria than in the past.

Self-help is the key to successful foreign aid. The United States can only provide a small margin of the human and material resources needed for development. The major effort—the will, the leadership, the labor, and even most of the resources—must come from the recipient nations themselves. In point of fact it does. In money terms alone:

20 countries receiving major U.S. development assistance invest, on the average, six dollars of their own for every one dollar of U.S. assistance received. (Their six dollars represents savings withheld from consumption in countries where gross national product per capita averages \$120 per year. The added AID dollar comes from a nation where per capita GNP now stands at better than \$3,000 per year.)

Foreign aid which is not based on effective country performance will largely be wasted. Yet the job to be done is too important and, in most cases, the time in which to do it is too short to permit waste in foreign aid programs.

Insistence on self-help does not mean interference in the internal affairs of other nations. It does mean, however, that aid recipients:

Should have sensible programs for mobilizing their own resources.

Should be prepared to make and carry out the hard, basic policy decisions for reforms, improvements, and changes which will set a country on its own feet;

Should improve their ability to feed their own people;

Should work to establish conditions which stimulate their own people, as well as investors from abroad, to undertake new and expanded private initiatives;

Should embark upon the difficult task of building democratic institutions to ensure wide participation in the affairs of the nation.

Successful U.S. aid programs in Western Europe, Greece, Taiwan, and elsewhere have been due to a combination of the critical margin of outside help together with major self-help efforts by the nations themselves.

THE TAIWAN EXAMPLE

The example of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 26th country where U.S. economic aid programs under the Foreign Assistance Act have been brought to an end, is a clear illustration of this fact. A recent study concluded that without American assistance, it would have taken Taiwan 40 years to achieve self-supporting growth—instead of the 15 it did. But the same study emphasized that the key element in Taiwan's success was what the country did for itself.

American farm experts and American tools and fertilizer were instrumental in helping Taiwan effect one of the world's most successful land reforms and achieve one of the most productive farm sectors. But it was the Chinese who carried out land reform and who taxed themselves to support a permanent agricultural research and extension service that could channel new methods and new tools to the farmers.

In the same way, the help of American experts and the initial supply of AID-financed American equipment was crucial to the development of Taiwan's thriving private industrial sector. But good advice and good equipment would have been of little use without the willingness of the Republic to break with tradition, change archaic company laws, and open capital sources to its new private industrial entrepreneurs.

Progress on Taiwan's farms and factories depended, in turn, on timely, vigorous action to improve health, education, transport, and electric power supply—and also on the country's ability to achieve competent civil administration on whose stability millions of individual farmers and businessmen could depend in making their own investment decisions.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS

Today's emphasis on self-help in the economic aid program recognizes that successful development is always the product of a partnership. It is not just a question of good aid from one partner. It is equally a question of good use and sensible policies by the other. Without strong self-help efforts by our partners in the developing world, foreign aid would be only a crutch, helping other countries to avoid their problems rather than solve them.

Self-help begins at the individual project level with cost-sharing:

Turkey is financing 60 percent of the \$340 million Keban Dam power-irrigation project on her eastern frontier. AID loans will finance American materials and equipment totalling 12 percent of the project's cost, and the remaining 28 percent will come from other free world donors.

But the partnership understanding must go beyond sharing the costs of the individual project. Before AID agrees to help establish a teachers' college, for example, there must be a clear commitment that once the project is finished and the college is built, staffed, and equipped it will be assured a continuing budget adequate to retain a trained staff,

maintain facilities, and carry out the purpose for which it was established. Increasingly, project agreements go beyond the project itself to insure that a joint investment makes sense:

As a condition for disbursing a \$7.7 million highway construction loan in 1964, AID required that the Government of Afghanistan first establish, equip, and budget funds for a national highway maintenance department.

The agreement governing an AID loan to the Bolivian Mining Bank to finance expansion and modernization of the private mining industry provided that no funds would be disbursed pending major reform of the country's mining code, a reorganization of the Bank itself, and the passage and enforcement of new mineral export tax laws to encourage investment in mining. The new code is now in effect, the new tax law has been passed, and the reorganization is in process of being carried out.

Influencing over-all development policies

Good projects alone are not enough. As shown by the example of every less-developed country making progress today, development is the product of a country's entire effort. It is a matter of doing enough, across the board, and doing the right things in concert.

In tying aid to self-help measures, the United States looks to the level of a nation's total development effort, and to the whole complex of policies that affect development.

The most significant self-help measures taken in Pakistan in recent years, which led to a substantial rise in domestic savings, were the passage in 1963 of the largest tax increase in Pakistan's history and the import reform of 1964. The latter, instituted partly as a result of U.S. initiative, together with increased import taxes, made it possible for Pakistan to remove controls over imports of most raw materials and spare parts, with a resulting spurt in industrial activity.

There are clear limits to the leverage that outside aid can exert on another country's policies. No amount of assistance, however large, can make another independent nation undertake changes it does not want to make. But in practice, the relationship between the United States and the major AID recipients is based on an agreement sufficiently close to leave room for bargaining on how to reach development goals. Here, substantial aid does have leverage. Aid can—and should—be used to persuade other countries to end policies that are not working out, or undertake needed reforms or investments, and to do these things sooner than would otherwise happen.

In the past three years, AID has pioneered agreements under which the United States and its partners the developing nations spell out in specifics the terms of their partnership: precisely what AID will provide and precisely what self-help the developing partner will undertake.

Program loan agreements

Often these agreements are attached to AID program loans. Program loans are made to a limited number of countries to finance the import of a variety of American products needed for general development—such things as steel billets; machine tools and spare parts for a country's industry; and fertilizer, pesticides, and tools for its farm sector.

A recent program loan to an Asian country tied disbursement of the loan to that nation's performance on five financial targets: improved budgeting, better foreign exchange management, restraints on inflationary credit, better domestic revenue collection, and increased domestic savings. The parties agreed on specific goals in each field, with loan disbursements based on actual performance in each sector.

Agreement of this kind has also been attached to the negotiation and disbursement of an entire U.S. assistance "package."

In Brazil and Chile, for example, mutual agreements on the level of AID development loans and technical assistance, and food and fibre assistance under the Food for Peace Program, include mutual agreement on specific steps to be taken in tax and fiscal reform, restraint on inflation, encouragement of the private sector, and the uses to be made of the local currencies generated by the loan.

These agreements have force because AID has stood by them.

The first such agreement in Latin America was the 1963 Bell-Dantas agreement in Brazil, which tied disbursement of a \$400 million AID-Treasury-Export Import-Food for Peace "package" to improved performance on stated reforms including taxation, a reduced budget deficit, and effective monetary control. The Goulart government did not perform, Brazil's economy deteriorated, and the bulk of the U.S. aid was not released.

A 1964 AID program loan agreement with Colombia conditioned disbursement of a \$45 million loan on adequate self-help performance. A marked deterioration in the financial and foreign exchange situation took place in 1964, and disbursements on the loan were suspended in 1965 pending development of adequate Colombian measures to restore financial balance. No new AID loan was negotiated until late in 1965 when the Colombian Government showed renewed commitment to sound economic policies.

A major element in future agreements will be the question of country policy and performance in agricultural development. For many years AID Missions have urged greater emphasis on farm investment and changes in agricultural policy in the developing countries. History has now ended any debate in the less-developed countries about whether this is, in fact, a priority. The size of national investments in agricultural development and the workability of national policies on farm prices, marketing, and farm-related business must be a priority self-help criterion and a major item for agreement in the conditions governing substantial assistance partnerships in the future.

In late 1965, because of India's mounting food problems, AID made a \$50 million loan for the purchase of approximately 250,000 nutrient tons of American fertilizer. Disbursement of the loan was tied to the purchase, with Indian resources, of an additional 300,000 tons of nitrogen nutrient, and to a series of specific steps to streamline fertilizer distribution and to encourage more private Indian and foreign investment in fertilizer production in India.

JOINT EFFORTS WITH IBRD AND IMF

AID works closely with the World Bank (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in determining the most important self-help measures to be included in these agreements. Adherence to the provisions of an IMF standby agreement has been included frequently as a major condition for disbursement of AID loans, as for Afghanistan, Chile, and Tunisia. AID and the IMF are now cooperating on the design of a new stabilization program for Korea.

AID assistance to Ceylon, resumed after that country compensated nationalized American oil firms, is tied closely to stabilization and reform programs policed by the IMF and the World Bank.

Ceylon's pledge to abide by the terms of an IMF standby agreement forms the basis for assistance from a seven-nation consultative group sponsored by the World Bank. The World Bank, in turn, is responsible for evaluating Ceylon's program requirements for the donor group, which includes the United States, the U.K., West Germany, Japan, Australia, India, and Canada.

One of the explicit objectives which AID has encouraged for World Bank consortia

(for India and Pakistan) and consultative groups (for such countries as Colombia, Nigeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Thailand) is to highlight deficiencies or difficulties in the country's over-all economic performance. In so doing, the consortium or consultative group helps bring about remedial action by the developing countries.

THE AID PROGRAM IS CONCENTRATED

Although economic assistance is proposed for some 70 countries in fiscal year 1967, the great bulk of the AID program will be directed to a relatively few countries where the need is greatest or where outstanding self-help performance shows substantial aid can best be used.

92 percent of direct AID country assistance is planned for 20 countries;

84 percent of proposed Development Loans (including loans under the Alliance for Progress) is planned for just eight countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey;

93 percent of the Supporting Assistance proposed for fiscal year 1967 is planned for just five countries: Vietnam, Laos, Korea, Jordan, and the Dominican Republic. Vietnam alone will account for 72 percent of planned Supporting Assistance.

(Mr. VIVIAN (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. VIVIAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. OTTINGER (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. OTTINGER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

CATALOGS AND OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES ON FEDERAL AND STATE AID PROGRAMS

(Mr. REUSS (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the number and scope of Federal and State aid programs in the past 20 years has become enormous and complex.

In 1946, State and local governments spent a total of \$11 billion to meet public needs; this year they will spend \$84 billion. The Federal Government, in 1946, spent \$894 million to help the States and localities augment their public programs.

This year, around 200 separate aid programs administered by some 21 Federal departments and agencies will call for an expenditure of more than \$14 billion.

These programs are designed to help States and localities meet increasing demands for solutions to a variety of social, economic, and physical problems. However, it is the responsibility of State and local officials to select and implement those programs which are most relevant to local needs.

State and local officials determine the success or failure of programs, as they

(Mr. GALLAGHER (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. GALLAGHER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

THE BOMBING OF HANOI AND HAIPHONG

(Mr. CONYERS (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the administration greatly escalated the war in Vietnam by bombing the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. Because of my great concern over the serious implications of this decision I joined with 15 other of my colleagues in urging the President to reconsider this decision. The following is the text of our statement:

We are deeply disturbed by today's escalation of the war in Vietnam. The decision to bomb the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong further commits this country to a profoundly dangerous policy of high risk in Southeast Asia.

By this action, the United States is openly challenging China to raise the level of its commitment in Vietnam. We are jeopardizing continued Soviet restraint. Our forces may soon be encountering expanded Chinese air-power and Russian missile opposition. The prospect of a full-scale war in Asia is no longer remote.

Diplomatically, we are risking alienation of our allies, most particularly the British and those in the United Nations who may previously have been sympathetic to our position. Escalation has not been the answer in the past 18 months. We do not believe it will ever be. We urge the President to return to a policy of restraint.

As a further means of restating my position on the Vietnam war, I am today joining others of my colleagues and many Members of the Senate in introducing a concurrent resolution to support the holding of free elections in South Vietnam under the control of an impartial and respected international body such as the United Nations. Certainly our claimed rationale for our presence in Vietnam depends at the very least on the speedy establishment of a freely elected and representative government in South Vietnam which can determine that beleaguered country's future.

The text of the resolution follows:

H. CON. RES. 812

Whereas the Republic of South Vietnam is actively engaged in making preparations for elections to choose a constituent assembly in a constructive effort to bring about a more representative government; and

Whereas the United States is dedicated to the principle, in the conduct of its foreign affairs, that people everywhere have the right to determine their own destinies through free participation in elected governments; and

Whereas the success of the promised elections in South Vietnam will depend on the assurance that they will be free, fair, and open; and

Whereas an objective and international presence would make a significant contribution to assuring that the promised elections

in South Vietnam are free, fair, and open, and thus help substantially in bringing about political stability and the establishment of effective political institutions: Therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring). That it is the sense of the Congress, the duly and freely elected representatives of the people of the United States of America, that it welcomes the holding of elections in the territory of South Vietnam; that it urges every effort to assure that said elections will determine the full and freely expressed wishes of the people; that it suggests the wisdom of having an appropriate and impartial international agency, such as the United Nations, to supervise the election and to assure the widest acceptance of its results; and that the people of the United States of America through the leadership of the President, with the full support of the Congress, will fully honor the election and the aspirations of the people of South Vietnam as expressed by their freely chosen government.

INDEPENDENCE DAY—CONGO (KINSHASA)

(Mr. CONYERS (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, today, June 30, marks the sixth independence anniversary of the Congo—Kinshasa—formerly Leopoldville, a dynamic and courageous nation located in the heart of the vast African continent. The people of the United States are happy to salute the people and Government of the Congo in their observance of this proud occasion.

Few countries in the world are blessed with such a wealth of natural resources. With a very high literacy and wage rate, production of 8 percent of the world's copper, a large part of the world's cobalt and industrial diamonds, and a progressive agricultural program, the Congo is working to fulfill its great potential through a number of government development programs. The United Nations technical assistance program is a vital part of this effort. In addition, the United States has pledged its support toward these goals through its plan of technical assistance which contributed more than \$400 million in 1964.

Congo—Kinshasa—is almost equal in size to the part of the United States east of the Mississippi River and is located in the south-central part of the continent. Surrounded on the west and north by the Congo Republic—Brazzaville—the Central African Republic, and Sudan, on the east by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and the south by Angola and Zambia, the Congo covers the greater portion of the Congo River Basin. The low, central area of the Congo is a basin-shaped plateau covered by tropical rain forest and surrounded by mountainous terraces, savannas, and dense grasslands.

Many Americans have come to know and appreciate the ancient and rich culture of the Congo. Art exhibitions such as the permanent collection at the African History Museum in Washington and other information programs have provided the American people with a deeper understanding and knowledge of

the outstanding sculpture, painting, craftsmanship that is uniquely Congolese.

Again, we extend heartiest and warm felicitation to the people and leaders of the Congo. To a nation of determination and favored with a bright future of fulfillment and contribution to the African Continent and the world, we wish continued prosperity and progress.

(Mr. CONYERS (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. CONYERS' remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

REALISTIC SOUTHERNER

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, our distinguished colleague from Atlanta, my good friend CHARLIE WELTNER, is the author of a recently published book which tells of his personal struggles with the problems of his region and the evolution of his own attitudes.

An article based upon his book appeared in the May 1966 edition of the Anti-Defamation League bulletin of B'nai B'rith and it is with pleasure that I commend it to the attention of our colleagues:

THE REALISTIC SOUTHERNER

(By CHARLES LONGSTREET WELTNER)

All Southerners have an indefinable pride in the South. It is "a land apart." It is different from the rest of the country. Southerners are fond of each other. We like the way we talk; we like the courtesies that usually abound in Southern society. We like the Southern attitude about many things—a native wit, a personal generosity, a certain earthiness born from a closer association with the soil. We like the easy, friendly relationships that exist between one Southerner and another. We like the "country boy" that is present, in varying degree, in all Southerners. In short, we like the South. And there are not many Southerners, even the most severe critics of their region, who would choose to cast their lot elsewhere.

To view the South realistically does not diminish the affection that Southerners hold for their land. To advocate needful changes and new approaches is not to deny that affection. The Southerner who is devoted to his section should be the one most anxious to see it change for the better.

All Southerners harbor a dream for the South. With some, it is an idealized version of the old planter days, with every man sitting beneath the shade of his own magnolia tree. With others it is a New South.

Whatever his dream, the realistic Southerner knows that we must begin with the South of today, and its strength and weakness, its virtues and faults, its good and its bad. History moves, and it is within the power of men, insofar as it is consistent with the will of Providence, to chart its course. We must ask where we are, and where we are going.

For more than a century the South through adherence to a lost cause, has lost. Mounting relentless resistance to the social and economic betterment of Southern Ne-

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a sizeable number of M.D.'s could be turned out to attack the current pressing health problems.

So the school at Gondar is a sound approach to the problem of raising health standards in Ethiopia today. It fits the conditions there now. But it is also important to recognize that the conditions in Ethiopia are changing, and the school at Gondar has been designed so that it too can change over the years to come. As the general level of education in Ethiopia rises, and as the level of income in Ethiopia rises, there will be more people who are capable of receiving advanced training in medicine, and it will be possible economically to support more better trained health personnel. As that occurs, I expect to see the school at Gondar gradually add higher and professional levels of training until some day it becomes a full-fledged center for advanced education and research in medicine.

Now this too, I believe, is a highly illuminating illustration of how to work in the developing countries by starting where they start, and developing a flexible and realistic plan that meets the present problem and can change and grow over time. You here at Tuskegee can appreciate the significance of this story very well because Tuskegee, like Gondar, in its early years turned out graduates who did not have advanced or professional training. But the training they did have was for them an enormous step forward, which advanced greatly their ability to solve their own problems and those of their communities. And gradually over the years Tuskegee has added advanced and professional training and research until today it is a full-fledged university in all but name.

Let me cite just one more illustration. In a town called Santo Domingo de los Colorados, in Ecuador, a rural electric cooperative was started two years ago. Santo Domingo is a small rural community in which the people are very poor. An American advisor, Mr. John Taylor, who is incidentally manager of the Walton Electric Cooperative in Monroe, Georgia, went down to Santo Domingo for A.I.D. and talked with the people there about what rural electric co-ops were like and what they could mean to the community. The idea caught hold, a co-op was started, and the results have been remarkable. The co-op started with a couple of small diesel generators that were in the community, but had never operated more than 12 hours a day and with frequent breakdowns. The co-op took over these inadequate facilities and obtained some further equipment from the United States, much of it as a donation from the Kentucky State REA Co-op Association. For the last 18 months the co-op in Santo Domingo, Ecuador, has been operating effectively 24 hours a day; it is collecting its bills and making money for its members.

The effect on Santo Domingo has been dramatic. Women are acquiring radios and refrigerators. Electric machines such as water pumps, silage cutters, saw mills are replacing the manually operated tools of yesterday. New small industries are springing up. And around the town well-lighted playgrounds and community meeting rooms are new gathering places, particularly for youth.

This is not an unusual story by American standards. But in Ecuadorian terms it is remarkable. And the reason it is remarkable should be clearly understood. This is not a story which simply describes the benefits that electricity can bring. What is remarkable is that a group of poor people in Ecuador found a means to organize themselves, to pool their energies and their wisdom, and together to broaden and increase the opportunities in their own community. The amount of external aid that went into Santo Domingo was not large. What made the difference was to find a means—in this case a rural electric co-op—by which the

energies and initiative of the people of that town could be harnessed together for their own mutual benefit.

Now this is perhaps the most profound lesson we have learned in these twenty years of foreign aid. The key to social and economic and political change in the developing countries is to find ways and means to release the energy and the ideas of the people of those communities. Over and over again the story has been the same. Whether the unit under consideration is the individual family or farm or business, or a larger grouping such as a co-op, a local government, a labor union, a school district, the essential objective is to find ways to enable people to apply their powerful energies to work for the improvement of their families and their communities.

This again will be no surprise to you here at Tuskegee. It has been your mission and your achievement to open opportunities and release the energies of individuals and local groups in Alabama and throughout the South. And I suspect that this will continue to be the heart of your mission in the future, on an increasingly broad scale, and taking advantage of your unique experience in building multi-racial relations in small groups and local communities on a constructive and democratic basis.

The illustrations I have given relating to Taiwan, to Ethiopia, and to Ecuador show how large are the opportunities in the world today to build constructively toward progress and peace. I could give dozens of other illustrations, many of them based on the work of people from Tuskegee, such as Dr. Ernest Neal who was Director of your Rural Life Council until 1953 and is now Deputy Director of the A.I.D. Mission in the Philippines, or the agricultural expert who is known well and widely all over Eastern Nigeria as "Chicken Charlie" Davis because of the fine work he has done in introducing to the Nigerian farmers better varieties of chickens and better methods of caring for them, but who would be known somewhat more sedately in this community as Charles L. Davis who received a Master's degree in Agriculture at Tuskegee in 1950.

All the illustrations are examples of the ways in which, in spite of the conflicts and difficulties of these last 20 years, we have been learning to contribute to economic and social progress in the developing countries. Even today in Vietnam, in the midst of military hostilities on a sizable scale, we are able to help build toward a better future. In the last three years, our aid program in Vietnam has helped to build over 6,000 school classrooms, and to turn out over 8 million textbooks—the first textbooks ever provided to many Vietnamese village school boys and girls. Our medical assistance is reaching many thousands of rural and small town Vietnamese who have never had access to such help before.

Indeed one can go further. Our help and advice in local government, agriculture, land reform, transportation, and other fields of economic and social improvement, are vital to the success of the struggle in Vietnam. Military action is unavoidable in order to fight off the military attacks of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese troops. But military action by itself could never restore peace in Vietnam. It is essential gradually and step by step to reestablish local security in the villages and hamlets against terrorist assaults by the Viet Cong, to rebuild effective local government responsive to the needs and interests of the people in the rural communities, and to help enlarge their opportunities for progress in education, in health, in agriculture, and in other elements of rural life. This is the focus of A.I.D.'s work in Vietnam. Its importance is attested by President Johnson's personal interest, and by his sending Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, and John Gardner, Secretary of

Health, Education, and Welfare, to Vietnam for personal reviews of our aid work there and recommendations as to how it can be improved.

In summary, then, the economic assistance work of the United States around the world represents a great endeavor to enlarge the opportunities and liberate the minds and energies of our fellow man in many countries. It is a fundamental part of our country's effort to create the conditions of peace in the world.

I do not wish to claim too much. Economic and social progress are not enough to prevent war. Human passion and folly and stubbornness remain. But economic and social progress can eliminate major causes of conflicts and can wipe out the basis for violence based on despair. While they are not sufficient to assure peace, they are necessary to that end.

Sometimes it is asked whether we can afford to help the people of other countries when there is so much to be done here at home. The answer is very clear. There is no reason why we cannot do what is necessary in the United States and also provide strong assistance abroad. You may have seen Secretary McNamara on television recently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when this question was put to him. He replied that as a resident of the District of Columbia he was ashamed of the inadequate budget provided for the schools there. But, he said, this is not a question of limited resources, it is a question of will. We are an affluent nation that could easily put more resources into our own educational system. It is not money we lack, but determination.

Secretary McNamara's view is clearly the correct one. Our economic assistance programs today are costing less than 1 per cent of our national output and less than 5 per cent of our national budget. They are not standing in the way of putting more money into the Great Society programs here at home. We have the resources to do both what is essential to security and peace abroad, and to do what is essential for progress and welfare here in the United States.

But there is still one final point. As we seek to contribute to economic and social change in the developing countries, we are finding more and more that it is a process in which we have much to learn as well as much to give. The American young people who have been abroad under the Peace Corps have come home with a new perspective on how to bring about change in the United States, and they are active by the dozen in the poverty program, in efforts to improve education in slum areas, and in many community development activities in our towns and cities. The same thing is true of the Americans who work for A.I.D. When one gets in the habit of asking how should this society in which I am living be changed for the better—and this is the question that is asked every day by our A.I.D. missions in all the countries where they work—one does not forget that question when he returns home to the U.S. The question is equally relevant in our society, and some of the methods we have developed to bring about change in Calcutta or Monrovia are likely to have application in Cleveland or San Diego.

For these reasons I would urge those of you who are graduating from Tuskegee today to consider seriously the possibility of working, at some stage in your careers, in one part or another of our foreign assistance activities. Those of us in the field now are convinced there is no more challenging or satisfying work to be found. And Tuskegee, with its great tradition of contributing to the development of the United States, has a tremendous amount to contribute to the development of an international community of progress and freedom.

Patrol Division will transmit the above information to Fire Alarm, by dispatch or phone call, prior to 0330 hours daily.

In accordance with departmental orders and the above information, all street lights that are not burning during the night hours will be reported. Those lights mounted on wooden poles in residential areas are to be reported each time they are found to be out of order. Lights burning in business districts and on main thoroughfares or lights mounted on metal poles are staggered to every second light during the early morning hours. The early evening hours (third watch) are considered to be the ideal time of reporting. After midnight a malfunctioning light could conceivably be mistaken for a normal outage and not be reported until the next evening.

Remember: Street lights are tools of your trade. Their burning can only help you in your continued fight against crime.

THE WAR IN VIETNAM

(Mr. REES (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. REES. Mr. Speaker, I join other concerned Members of the House of Representatives in seriously questioning the escalation of the Vietnam war by the bombing of oil depot and port areas in Hanoi and Haiphong. I question the assumption that increased air attacks on North Vietnam can in any way shorten the present conflict or bring the belligerent forces to the conference table.

Rather, Mr. Speaker, I believe that the escalation of the war will have the effect of delaying the possibility of a peaceful solution to this conflict.

Are we building a myth on the effect of air power? Do we feel that saturation bombing of an industrially primitive country will halt its war efforts? If saturation bombing of an industrially sophisticated nation such as Germany in World War II did not destroy German ability or desire to fight, what will be the effect in North Vietnam? The risks, on the other hand, are very grave. The major risk is that acceleration will lead to massive Red Chinese and Soviet participation, a participation that well might lead to World War III. We are also succeeding in alienating our friends throughout the world and in many cases actually building sympathy for the North Vietnamese.

The dilemma we face in Vietnam cannot be resolved by continual escalation in the use of force. We must return to the peace offensive of last January—it must be a continuing effort, no matter how frustrating it may sometimes appear. We must also work constantly to help develop a positive climate for peaceful and honest elections in South Vietnam, preferably supervised by the United Nations.

As a Congressman I am embarrassed when constituents ask me about the war in Vietnam. For the past year Vietnam has been a somewhat forbidden subject. There have been few congressional briefings. The attitude of the executive branch appears to be that the whole Vietnam situation is too serious to discuss with Congress—other than to ask us to vote for additional defense funds—

and that we in Congress had best concern ourselves with domestic policy and not worry over escalations and mounting casualty lists.

Since the Senate hearings on Vietnam and Red China earlier this year, the great dialog as to the purposes and goals of our foreign policy, especially in Asia, has been closed.

As the Congressman from California's 26th District, I do not feel it would be fair to my trust to assume that the experts in the Department of State or the Department of Defense are always right. I question the sincerity of their fragmentary, vague, and self-serving statements, and resent the secrecy surrounding the Vietnam conflict.

I believe my constituents join me in resenting the implication that their elected Representative should play in the sandpile of domestic policy and not ask questions about our involvement in Asia.

It is my hope that in the future the members of the legislative branch of this Government will be brought into the arena of foreign policy—and that we will have the opportunity to question what is being done in Vietnam, and why.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. EDMONDSON, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. HOLIFIELD, for 10 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. RYAN in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HORTON in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois and to include extraneous matter as well as three editorials.

Mr. McCORMACK (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) to include an article entitled "The Massachusetts Committee of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews," notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds two pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$468.

Mr. McMILLAN in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks on his special order today, and to include several news articles and extraneous matter.)

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. HALL.

Mr. RHODES of Arizona in five instances.

Mr. QUILLEN.

Mr. SMITH of New York in two instances.

Mr. YOUNGER.

Mr. PELLY.

Mr. ASHBROOK.

Mr. BOB WILSON in five instances.

Mr. NELSEN.

Mr. DICKINSON.

Mr. CAHILL.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. EDMONDSON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. FRASER in three instances.

Mr. MACKIE in five instances.

Mr. MONAGAN.

Mr. MURPHY of New York.

Mr. COHELAN in two instances.

Mr. CRALEY in two instances.

Mr. HUNGATE in two instances.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.

Mr. FASCELL in seven instances.

Mr. O'HARA of Michigan in two instances.

Mr. WILLIAMS in five instances.

Mr. JOHNSON of California.

Mr. CHARLES H. WILSON in five instances.

Mr. MOORHEAD in six instances.

Mr. MATSUNAGA in six instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in two instances.

Mr. GRIDER.

Mr. MULTER in three instances.

Mr. MARSH in two instances.

Mr. MOELLER in three instances.

Mr. IRWIN in three instances.

SENATE BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 2825. An act to amend the Communications Act of 1934 with respect to obscene or harassing telephone calls in interstate or foreign commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

S. 2974. An act to amend the Wagner-Peyser Act so as to provide for more effective development and utilization of the Nation's manpower resources by expanding, modernizing, and improving operations under such act at both State and Federal levels, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

S. 3106. An act for the relief of Dr. Alberto L. Martinez; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 3110. An act for the relief of Jose R. Cuervo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 3141. An act for the relief of Hom Sheck See and his wife, Hom Mon Hing; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 3222. An act for the relief of Dusko Doder; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S.J. Res. 168. Joint resolution to authorize the President to issue annually a proclamation designating the seven-day period beginning October 2 and ending October 8 of each year as "Spring Garden Planting Week"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled bills and a joint resolution of the Senate of the following titles:

S. 2266. An act to authorize the Attorney General to transfer to the Smithsonian Institution title to certain objects of art;

S. 2999. An act to amend section 6 of the Southern Nevada Project Act (act of October 22, 1965; 79 Stat. 1068); and

S.J. Res. 162. Joint resolution to establish the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. BURLERSON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 1535. An act to amend the Classification Act of 1949 to authorize the establishment of hazardous duty pay in certain cases;

H.R. 2035. An act to provide for cost-of-living adjustments in star route contract prices;

H.R. 6125. An act to amend Public Law 722 of the Seventy-ninth Congress and Public Law 85-935, relating to the National Air Museum of the Smithsonian Institution;

H.R. 7423. An act to permit certain transfers of Post Office Department appropriations;

H.R. 12322. An act to enable cottongrowers to establish, finance, and carry out a coordinated program of research and promotion to improve the competitive position of, and to expand markets for, cotton;

H.R. 13125. An act to amend the provisions of title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended; and

H.R. 14050. An act to extend and amend the Library Services and Construction Act.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. BURLERSON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on June 29, 1966, present to the President for his approval, bills and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 1240. An act for the relief of Harry C. Engle;

H.R. 3788. An act to revive and reenact as amended the act entitled "An act creating the City of Clinton Bridge Commission and authorizing said commission and its successors to acquire by purchase or condemnation and to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge or bridges across the Mississippi River at or near Clinton, Iowa, and at or near Fulton, Ill.," approved December 21, 1944;

H.R. 3976. An act to amend the act of July 26, 1956, to authorize the Muscatine Bridge Commission to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge across the Mississippi River at or near the city of Muscatine, Iowa, and the town of Drury, Ill.;

H.R. 5204. An act for the relief of Joseph K. Bellek;

H.R. 6590. An act for the relief of Arthur Hill;

H.R. 8793. An act for the relief of Eugene J. Bennett;

H.R. 9302. An act for the relief of Lt. Charles W. Pittman, Jr., U.S. Navy;

H.R. 10994. An act for the relief of Charles T. Davis, Jr., Sallie M. Davis, and Nora D. White;

H.R. 12232. An act to amend title 1 of the United States Code to provide for the admissibility in evidence of the slip laws and the Treaties and Other International Acts Series, and for other purposes;

H.R. 14025. An act to extend the Defense Production Act of 1950, and for other purposes; and

H.J. Res. 1180. Joint resolution making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1967, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL JULY 11, 1966

Mr. EDMONDSON, Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn. The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. In accordance with House Concurrent Resolution 804, the Chair declares the House adjourned until 12 o'clock noon on Monday, July 11, 1966.

Thereupon (at 1 o'clock and 6 minutes p.m.), pursuant to House Concurrent Resolution 804, the House adjourned until Monday, July 11, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2527. A letter from the Secretary of the Army transmitting a letter from the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, dated May 12, 1966, submitting a report, together with accompanying papers and an illustration on a letter report on Cedar Keys Harbor, Fla., request by a resolution of the Committee on Public Works, House of Representatives, adopted June 27, 1966. No authorization by Congress is recommended as the desired improvement has been adopted for accomplishment by the Chief of Engineers under the provisions of section 107 of the 1960 River and Harbor Act; to the Committee on Public Works.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. RODINO: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 14765. A bill to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service, to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other public facilities, to provide judicial relief against discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 1678). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina: Committee of Conference. S. 2950. An act to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1967 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes; (Rept. No. 1679). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. BOLLING: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 906. Resolution providing for the consideration of H.R. 15750, a bill to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 1680). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 5380. A bill to provide that the United States shall hold certain Chilocco Indian School lands at Chilocco, Okla., in trust for the Cherokee Nation upon payment by the Cherokee Nation of \$3.75 per acre to the Federal Government; with amendments (Rept. No. 1682). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 14687. A bill to set aside certain lands in Montana for the Indians of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, Mont.; with amendment (Rept. No. 1683). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 10633. A bill to provide for the disposition of funds appropriated to

pay a judgment in favor of the Gulleute Tribe of Indians, including the Hoh Tribe, and for other purposes; with amendments (Rept. No. 1684). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. BARING: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 15566. A bill to amend the act of June 3, 1966 (Public Law 89-441; 80 Stat. 192), relating to the Great Salt Lake relicted lands; with amendment (Rept. No. 1685). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. ROGERS of Texas: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 13419. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to engage in feasibility investigations of certain water resource development proposals; with amendments (Rept. No. 1686). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. BARING: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 5226. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain public land in Wyoming to Clara Dozier Wire; without amendment (Rept. No. 1681). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHLEY:

H.R. 16073. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide an additional income tax exemption for a taxpayer supporting a dependent who is mentally retarded; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ASHMORE:

H.R. 16074. A bill to cancel certain unpaid interest accrued after September 30, 1931, on loans made to World War I veterans upon the security of adjusted-service certificates; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SAYLOR:

H.R. 16075. A bill to authorize the construction, operation and maintenance of the Lower Colorado River Basin project, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BLATNIK:

H.R. 16076. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in order to improve and make more effective certain programs pursuant to such act; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BOGGS:

H.R. 16077. A bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide that dicyandiamide be admitted free of duty; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CLARENCE J. BROWN JR.:

H.R. 16078. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow an incentive tax credit for a part of the cost of constructing or otherwise providing facilities for the control of water or air pollution, and to permit the amortization of such cost within a period of from 1 to 5 years; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CAHILL:

H.R. 16079. A bill to amend title II of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, to create the Federal Maritime Board-Administration, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

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permit such a list of names. Such a list would be of enormous proportions. The people of the entire area have pitched in and together have spent tens of thousands of hours to make Boyertown Centennial celebration one of the finest centennial celebrations ever held in the entire Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. All of the events held so far have been successful beyond our wildest expectations, and we know that the events to come in the future during this week will be as great or greater.

The success of a venture such as this depends not only on a few people but on all of the people. Without the cooperation of the great majority of the persons in this area, this celebration could not be held. I do not wish to overstate the enormity of the task of putting on a celebration such as ours. However, those who have participated in the planning and execution of this centennial fully appreciate my statements in regard to the amount of work which was involved.

It has been stated to me by people from other parts of our county that the spirit of the Boyertown area has always been an amazing thing for them to see. Many people have stated to me that projects in Boyertown and Eastern Berks County are always carried out with vigor, determination and drive; and for this reason, projects undertaken by our people have always surpassed their goal. These observations, made as I say by people from other areas of Berks County, have been once again proven to be valid observations. The people of the Boyertown area do things in a big way!

Now that our celebration is drawing to a close, we can look back to this salute to our heritage as a tremendously beneficial force which has welded our entire area into a community of people whose spirit and determination will carry them through the years to come and will enable them to face the even bigger projects which must come in the future in order for us to fully realize our potential in this area.

We have gathered a feeling of tremendous pride in our community. We know that it is a dynamic community that is proud of its Pennsylvania Dutch heritage, proud of its homes, its schools and its churches. We now will make use of this pride in our glorious past in planning for future growth of industry, commerce and cultural activities. We have harnessed our energies in this celebration and these energies will create for all of us an even greater future. Welded together as a group of people with common interests, common pride and uncommon energy, we will make eastern Berks County an even greater place in which to live, worship, acquire learning and raise our families.

Of course I wish to thank the leadership of the centennial celebration, but just as much I wish to thank all of the many people who have worked so hard to make Boyertown Centennial celebration a time which we will remember throughout our entire lives.

Very truly yours,

E. KENNETH NYCE,
Mayor of Boyertown.

Positive Action in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL G. ROGERS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 7, 1966

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, all thinking Americans applaud the action taken yesterday by our Armed Forces in Vietnam and have confidence

in the administration's policy in the matter.

Strategically, the action was long overdue. Morally, it was the positive support which we owe our fighting men in Vietnam.

I know the families who have men in this conflict commend the action as I do.

Dams That Destroy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, one of nature's greatest masterpieces, the Grand Canyon, is in grave danger of being lost forever, ironically drowned by the waters which created it, the Colorado River. The construction of the Bridge Canyon and Marble Gorge Dams will perfunctorily inundate what has taken the Colorado River 9 million years to carve.

I submit the following editorial from the June 22 Houston Post for our colleagues' consideration, urging that we take no action which would needlessly sacrifice this irreplaceable resource in the name of progress:

THE GRAND CANYON DISPUTE

"That the Canyon is not 'conquered' is one of the most impressive things about it."

Thus writes the distinguished American critic and naturalist, Joseph Wood Krutch, about the Grand Canyon.

Those who have stood on the lip of the Canyon know that no mere photograph can sum it up. It is to immense. And yet man, puny creature that he is in the face of the canyon's grandeur, is now threatening it.

Two dams are now proposed that some say will change forever the very nature of the Grand Canyon, threaten the biological life along its banks and damage the natural geology of the rock itself.

The dams, at Bridge Canyon and Marble Gorge on the Colorado River, are designed to provide much needed hydroelectric power and water for broad areas of the Southwest.

The situation faced by the Grand Canyon perhaps contains in one supremely dramatic example the dilemma of those who wish to effect a compromise between the needs of man to survive, and his needs to be at peace with himself and with nature.

There can be little doubt that the two dams will change the canyon for all time to come.

A raising of the water level along the Colorado within the Grand Canyon will mean that small beaches on the banks will be submerged, leaving no sanctuaries for animals and boaters. Trails to the water will be sealed off, and the natural action of the water of a free river to find and clear its own path will be permanently altered.

Conservationists have rallied to fight the dual project. Their rallying cry was perhaps best expressed recently in the *Sierra Club Bulletin*: "Unused, the Grand Canyon is already being put to its highest and best use."

Balanced against these objections are the never-ending, inexorable needs of a growing population.

Man, to enjoy nature, must also survive. Yet his own presence can destroy.

The public should insist, whenever tough choices are to be made, that all possible alternates have been thoroughly examined.

The public must be assured that it is not lost to expediency.

Culture in Connecticut

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD J. IRWIN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, I should like to take a moment to give a little attention to a new endeavor Connecticut has been formulating over the past year and for which it received a promise of assistance from the National Endowment for the Arts today. Forty-five thousand dollars was granted to the arts in Connecticut for 10 pilot projects which will encourage the participation in, the promotion, and the development of artistic and cultural activities available to the people of Connecticut. The National Endowment has also given the State \$5,000 for study purposes.

On Monday, a conference on the arts was held in Hartford. Representatives from all over the State gave their attention to the potential and future of Connecticut's culture. Howard Taubman in the June 29 New York Times points to the challenge of our resources and our potential for excellence. Mr. Taubman's report on the Monday conference and speculation on what the Commission will do follows:

CULTURE IN CONNECTICUT: ARTS UNIT MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO ASSIST THE SAFE OR THE ADVENTUROUS

(By Howard Taubman)

HARTFORD, June 28.—An aid of hope and goodwill played over the surface of the first statewide conference on the arts in Connecticut through yesterday's morning and afternoon sessions. Delegates from all over the state representing amateurs and professionals in drama, music, dance, photography, painting and sculpture sat in the august, high-ceilinged Legislative Chamber of the State Capitol in the morning and heard warm greetings from Gov. John Dempsey and Ella T. Grasso, the Secretary of State.

They listened to a keynote speech by Marya Mannes, the critic, sensible and hard-hitting even if it was substantially the talk she made some weeks ago to the Arts Councils of America in New York. Then they repaired to the Statler Hilton for lunch and a panel discussion on the future of the Connecticut Arts Commission.

During the day there was a good deal of brave talk, including a projection by Anthony S. Keller, executive director of the commission, of what it hoped to do during its first year of full operation. But underneath the pleasantries and optimism, there was a hard, basic, largely unanswered question: Which way will public patronage of the arts go in Connecticut—toward assistance for existing institutions, good or bad, or toward the promotion of high standards?

How Connecticut attempts to answer this question should be useful to other states new to official support of the arts. To judge by the temper of yesterday's deliberation, Connecticut could go either way.

VAGUE MONEY PLANS

Joseph Verner Reed, chairman of the Connecticut commission, called on various delegates to speak for a minute and to describe what their organizations were doing. There were eager volunteers, who gave proud accounts of their activities. Most of them left the impression that their groups could be more useful if they could obtain some money—from the commission, of course. Mr. Reed got the message. During the afternoon session he told the delegates, "We are going to work with you, but we are not in a position to underwrite your efforts."

The commission's budget at the moment is vague. It received an appropriation of \$20,000 from the state, and much of this money is being used to hire a staff and get organized. It hopes to get from the National Arts Endowment \$5,000 for study purposes and \$45,000 to promote activities, those sums to be matched in the state. Mr. Reed thought that the matching funds would have to be raised from individuals, foundations and business.

At the most the commission is likely to have about \$100,000 for its first full year. According to Mr. Keller, the program will embrace 10 pilot projects, including tours of dancers and a musical group, a touring exhibition devoted to 350 years of Connecticut architecture, modest film festivals in five towns, some technical assistance to theaters and museums, master classes in dance and music and a critics' workshop.

DIVERGENT NEEDS NOTED

The commission plans to establish an information center to provide news of what is happening on the state's cultural scene. It intends to start another center based at the University of Connecticut in Storrs to explore cooperative enterprises with the other New England states.

On paper the first year's program looks as if the commission means to encompass a wide range. Probably it reflects the need to satisfy not only the differing views of a 24-member commission, but also the divergent interests of the state's artistic groups.

It would be unfair to prejudge a state's program before it has been put to the test. One can understand why Mr. Reed asked the indulgence of the delegates for not coming forward with "a blazing program." It will take time for the commission and the state's citizens to appreciate the possibilities of Government concern for the arts.

There are people in the state who believe that Connecticut should aim high. Herbert L. Cohen, a lawyer and a member of the commission, spoke for them when he stressed the central role of the creative artist.

"We cannot make creative artists," he said, "or buy them into existence. We can encourage them with easier access to the materials and facilities which they require in the creative process. We can encourage them by recognizing them as rebels and leaders of protest. This will not always be easy. We hesitate to subsidize revolutionaries and radicals, but we must do that if we are to be true to our commission."

Mr. Cohen went on to say that the truly original composer, playwright, painter and sculptor may "speak only to a limited number of his peers while the artistic Establishment derides him." It will be the function of the commission "to defend and encourage him in the face of the criticism his work invites."

If the Connecticut Arts Commission interprets its function as Mr. Cohen sees it, it will indeed be a force in the artistic life of the nation as well as the state. But it will require political and artistic courage to decide that it should invest its resources in high, adventurous art, not dilettantism.

Miami Students Recognized as Winners in Annual Freedom Shrine Essay Contest

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DANTE B. FASCELL

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I have today brought to the attention of the Congress the annual Freedom Shrine essay competition sponsored by the Exchange Club of Miami.

I take this opportunity to present two more outstanding essays. The first was written by Miss Diana Lynn Weissinger, a student at Kinloch Park Junior High School; the other by Miss Patricia L. Sawyer, who attends Thomas Jefferson Junior High School.

I congratulate each of them on their excellent works which reflect their firm conviction to the principles upon which our Nation was founded.

I am sure my colleagues will be interested and stimulated by the thoughts and words expressed in the following two prize-winning essays written by these junior high school students:

THE FREEDOM SHRINE: ITS MEANING TO ME—
THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

(By Diana Lynn Weissinger, Kinloch Park Junior High School)

A thoughtful mind, when it sees the enshrined treasures of a nation, sees not those objects only but also the nation itself.

Thus, to me, the meaning of the Freedom Shrine is a vivid realization of the ideas, the ideals, the character; the greatness of the nation in which we live. Here are the words that voiced the colonists' resentment at tyranny, culminating in the immortal Declaration of Independence. Here are the arguments that secured freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the right of labor to organize. And finally, here are the important documents of the last fifty years, concerning our entry into two World Wars and our emergence as leaders of the free world.

Every one of the tremendous documents in our Freedom Shrine inspires the deepest feelings of reverence and respect, but without knowledge of the people, the times, and the events leading up to these writings, we often fail to see their full significance.

In this essay I intend to dissect and explain to the best of my ability the Gettysburg Address. I consider this short talk to contain the finest expressions ever presented by an American.

In the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg, in July 1863, the Union losses in killed, wounded, and missing numbered 23,000; the Confederate losses, 28,000. Weeks afterward, thousands of quickly buried bodies still lay in shallow graves, a hazard to the living and a disgrace to the dead.

Motives of health and piety together inspired a Pennsylvania committee to plan a national cemetery. With the cooperation of eighteen other Northern states, seventeen acres were purchased on bloody Cemetery Hill. The dedication was first set for October 23, and the dedication committee asked Edward Everett of Boston to be the chief orator. He accepted, but needed more time to prepare, so the event was delayed a month.

Almost as an afterthought, the committee

decided that it would be appropriate for the President of the United States to be present. Two weeks before the dedication ceremonies, they invited Mr. Lincoln to dignify the occasion by closing the ceremonies. He drafted his two minute speech at once (contrary to the commonly held belief that he composed it on the train at Gettysburg).

Everett, a talented man of awesome attainments, was most famous as an orator, a polished orator for great ceremonial occasions. He was probably the most sought after speaker of the day, but ironically, although for forty years he turned out flawless, finished speeches not one is well-known to Americans today.

At the Gettysburg dedication ceremonies he presented a two hour discourse to the 15,000 assembled people. His speech was forgotten within the year.

The few "appropriate remarks" that President Lincoln had been asked to deliver at the same occasion, though not even applauded warmly at the time, have since been recognized as one of America's greatest contributions to the idealism of democracy. Not only has the Gettysburg Address been enshrined in numberless archives of free nations, but in the hearts of millions all over the world. In endeavoring to understand fully the compacted richness of the Gettysburg Address, let us review Lincoln's concept of a democratic republic.

It seems obvious that Lincoln's most notable characteristics were compassion, humility, and a desire for universal brotherhood. The following passage in the Gettysburg Address may have been an attempt on his part to express that desire: "We cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract."

He could have said "the brave Union men". Was there some purpose in his omitting the word "Union"? Was he keeping himself and his utterance clear of the passion that would not be good to look back on when the time came for peace and reconciliation? Perhaps he meant to leave the implication that there were brave Union men and brave Confederate men, living and dead, who had struggled there, for not once in his entire speech does he stress the superiority of the North over the South, or, what is perhaps more important, the superiority of the men of the North over the men of the South.

Like Washington, Lincoln considered himself part of a magnificent experiment. I think both men were more aware than most people of their times that they were engaged in a new kind of democratic republic; a federation of states which had surrendered a part of their sovereignty to a central government. In turn, the central government answered to the will of the people.

In the last paragraph of the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln indicates that he feared that this new government of the people, by the people, for the people, was in such tender infancy that in the event this experiment should fail, freedom, as we know it, might perish from the earth.

"... it is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

Lincoln, in his honesty, quickly cut to the heart of a problem and was not fooled for a moment by a specious argument, no matter

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Trivial though the subway incident may seem, it bespeaks an attitude which is on the rise throughout local, state and national governments. Less and less civility is found as more and more arbitrary and pointless restrictions or harassments are introduced. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise in view of the tremendous growth of governmental power in recent years.

The Federal Government, being biggest of all, is in some respects the worst offender. Just consider its attitude on taxes, which most Americans are willing to pay while regretting that they are excessive and partly wasted.

What is particularly unpleasant to realize is that not even the most scrupulous honesty will necessarily prevent a summoning at which you must in effect justify your economic life. Short of that the tax-takers are perfectly happy to leave the payers in suspense for the better part of a year, every year.

Each new Federal extension must increase the arrogance of office. As surely as anything, it will presently be encountered by hospitals and patients, schools and scholars, just as it has already reached the victims of urban renewal and the poor. The anti-poverty concept is itself an impertinence, for it presupposes that planners in Washington have the competence to eliminate poverty.

How does the mentality of officialdom tend to get this way? It is not only that giving men power over others can bring out the worst in them, although that often seems to be true. As an illustration, the current talk of setting up a central Federal file on everybody ought to be enough to chill everybody.

There is also, it would appear, a patronizing attitude inherent in vast governmental bureaucracies, here and elsewhere, past and present. Granting the existence of many exceptions, it is nonetheless the case that a civil servant can easily come to think of himself as master and the people he is supposed to be serving as the servants. The kind of restraint which tempers such attitudes and fosters mutual toleration in private undertakings is not present in government.

And that of course is all the more reason for trying to curb the insatiable appetite of government. Individual liberty is a magnificent philosophy; it can also be, however, a very practical and personal daily matter. What it should mean on that level is a minimum of interference from pesky authorities.

Instead, it is a misfortune of the times that the trend is in the opposite direction. Perhaps it is irreversible in any near future, but it deserves some thought. For we may be certain that as the legions of functionaries increase in numbers they will not grow in humility or consideration.

Ah Chong Zane, Leader of Hawaii's AID Team in Pakistan

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, it is with considerable pride that I invite the attention of my colleagues to the remarkable progress being made by the University of Hawaii's AID—U.S. Agency for International Development—team in Dacca, Pakistan. News of its accomplishments were brought home to Hawaii

by Mr. Ah Chong Zane, leader of the university's industrial skills training team in Pakistan.

The former instructor from the Maui Technical School in Hawaii said that the university's industrial training program is probably the most successful AID project that has ever been carried out in Pakistan. He revealed that the industrial training centers at Dacca and Karachi have been so successful that two additional centers are being established in Rashaki and Peshawar. Mr. Zane, who has been in Pakistan since 1961, also pointed out that Pakistan will need continued AID assistance and that its most urgent needs are in education, agriculture, and health.

Mr. Zane's interesting and informative account of Pakistan's progress under the AID programs appeared in the June 25 issue of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. I submit the article for inclusion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

NEED FOR AID CONTINUES, RETURNING ISLE MAN SAYS

The U.S. Agency for International Development should concentrate its efforts in India and Pakistan on education, agriculture and health from now on, says Ah Chong Zane.

Zane, leader of the University of Hawaii's A.I.D. team in Dacca, Pakistan, is now here on home leave. "There is need for many more schools at the elementary and high school levels as well as the university level," he said.

Zane said the quality of local Pakistani education is very poor.

And he added that the caliber of post-junior high school education in the Dacca American Society School is also so poor that he sends his 15-year-old daughter, Penelope, to the American International School in New Delhi, India.

A.I.D. could help the East Asian countries' agriculture by fostering more scientific methods, he said. In health, assistance in family planning is badly needed.

"Medicine is so inadequate that if an American becomes ill, he is not treated there but is immediately evacuated to Beirut, Lebanon."

The United States reinstated plans for full economic assistance to Pakistan and India after the Kashmir war was settled. (Military aid is still suspended.)

"This should mean more A.I.D. projects for the two countries within the next two years," Zane said, although just what the nature of the projects will be is still being negotiated.

Zane has been in Pakistan since 1961 as a member of the university's A.I.D. team to train Pakistanis in industrial skills.

He will be in the Islands for three weeks, after which he and his family will tour Europe for a month and then return to Pakistan for at least another year.

The former Maui Technical School Carpentry instructor said that the university's industrial training project for A.I.D. "is probably the most successful A.I.D. project that has ever been carried out in Pakistan."

"Right now we have about 510 students enrolled at the Dacca Center and some 450 at the Karachi center. We are also in the process of setting up two new centers—one in Rashaki and the other in Peshawar.

The centers' construction is paid for by the Pakistani government, Zane said. "The tools and equipment were gratis from the U.S. for the first two schools, but they will be commodity loans for the two new ones."

The students are all boys between ages 15 and 25, he said.

The biggest obstacle to the Pakistan

project, Zane feels, are the lack of trained teachers and the expediting of consignments to an underdeveloped country. "For example, it takes an average of eight months to ship equipment from the Mainland to Pakistan."

"The hostilities between India and Pakistan did slow up our project's development to a certain extent—especially where budgets were concerned. But, we don't have to worry about that anymore."

Charles Mohr Writes About Situation in South Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. DONALD J. IRWIN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, during the first few days of this week the New York Times has carried a three-part series by Charles Mohr on the military situation in South Vietnam. Mr. Mohr's graphic report of Vietnam's very human struggle punctuated by 20th century technology follows:

MANY IN VIETNAM SAY OPINION IN U.S. IS KEY TO VICTORY: G.I.'S TEND TO FEEL THEY CAN WIN THE WAR IF PERMITTED TO REMAIN LONG ENOUGH

(Following is the first of three articles appraising the military situation in South Vietnam by the chief correspondent of The New York Times in Saigon:)

(By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 26.—An American major general was recently questioning a North Vietnamese captain who had deserted. The general was curious about the enemy's policy on rotation of troops.

"American troops can go home after 12 months," said the general. "When do your leaders say you can go home?"

"They say we can go home when we win the war," answered the captain.

"What do you think?" asked the general.

"I think we can go home after you win the war," said the captain.

Who is winning in Vietnam today?

The North Vietnamese officer is one of many people who think the United States, the South Vietnamese and the South Korean, Australian, and New Zealand allies are clearly winning.

Hardly anyone in Vietnam argues that the United States is losing or is in danger of a military fiasco like the one the French met at Dienbienphu.

POLITICAL BATTLE NOTED

Yet there is a small body of men who believe that the United States is not losing but is not winning either and will not begin to win until there has been some success in the subtle battle to gain the allegiance of hostile or indifferent parts of the rural population.

The widest feeling of all, however, is that the outcome will be decided by public opinion in the United States. In a real sense, the United States forces in Vietnam are fighting a war while looking over their shoulders toward home.

A battalion commander sitting on a case of C rations and a private picking leeches off his leg on a jungle trail tend to say the same thing: The war can be won if the American troops are given enough time, but they are not sure they will be granted this time.

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1905, and was noted as a writer and lecturer in the educational field.

Pioneer of the consolidation of rural schools and the improvement and proper classification of high schools was Ell M. Rapp, who was born in Friedensburg, Oley Township, on March 20, 1865.

Rapp served as county superintendent of schools for 30 years and gave the county educational system a national reputation.

Dr. Spencer Fullerton Baird, developer of the Smithsonian Institution, was born in Reading in 1823.

He was one of the organizers of the U.S. National Museum in Washington, D.C., and was appointed United States Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries in 1871, a job, incidentally, which he created himself.

He authored many scientific books prior to his death in 1887.

A Berks County son who gained fame as a noted entomologist was Levi W. Mengel, who was in charge of the Reading Public Museum and Art Gallery from the time it opened in 1928 until his retirement.

Mengel accompanied Rear Admiral Perry on his trip to Greenland in 1891, and traveled to foreign countries for his collection of insects. His collection of insects and butterflies once was appraised at \$250,000.

Many of the works of renowned landscape painter Christopher High Shearer are found in leading galleries, museums and numerous homes. Born in Berks County in 1846, Shearer spent most of his time on a small farm near Stoudt's Ferry bridge. He died in 1926.

Hawaii Death Toll in Vietnam Rises Sharply

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, it was with extreme sadness that I received reports of the death of four more of Hawaii's soldiers in the war in Vietnam during the last week. The death toll among Islanders fighting in Vietnam has risen sharply to a total of 52 to date.

While there may be those who disagree, I am sure that Sgt. Hachiro Imae, Sgt. Edward K. Peresa, S. Sgt. Kenneth Kaaihue, and Sp. 4 John W. Cabrera will be remembered as four of many Americans who have made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of freedom for all of mankind.

It is my fervent hope and prayer that the war in Vietnam will be brought to an early termination before any more of our young men are killed or disabled. To this end, we who are charged with the responsibility of Government must exert every effort.

While I realize that every other State and area in our Nation must be sharing the heavy burdens of the undeclared war in Vietnam, I submit for the perusal of my colleagues an article which appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of June 28, 1966, which tells the story of Hawaii's four latest war heroes:

HAWAII DEATH TOLL IN WAR CLIMBS SHARPLY

Hawaii has suffered one of its bloodiest weeks in the Viet Nam war with four of its men killed in battles since last Thursday.

The Army today added the name of Sergeant Hachiro Imae of the 25th Division to its list of those killed in action.

Imae, 41, a veteran of more than 16 years of Army service, is the 52nd Islander to die in Viet Nam. He was wounded in the Korean war.

He was killed by Viet Cong small arms fire Sunday.

Yesterday the Army announced the death of Sergeant Edward K. Paresa, another 25th veteran of the Korean War. He was injured fatally by a Viet Cong booby trap.

Peresa, 37, was the third Valley Islander killed in the last week.

Last Friday, Staff Sergeant Kenneth Kaaihue, 29, of Maui was killed in the stepped-up ground warfare involving Tropic Lightning Division troops.

Specialist Four John W. Cabrera, 25, of Kohala, Big Island, was killed last Thursday.

Paresa is survived by his wife, Fukue, who lives at 726 Birch Street in Honolulu. They had no children.

Sergeant Paresa was on patrol at the time of his death. He was with B Company of the Second Battalion, 14th Infantry Caeti of the First Brigade.

The outfit was the last to be moved from Schofield Barracks to the war zone.

In letters home every week he never mentioned the war, a friend said.

Paresa has three sisters living in Honolulu and a younger brother attending school in San Mateo, California.

Paresa saw combat in Korea with the 7th Division, later served in Germany and Japan and with the 4th Division at Fort Lewis, Washington.

Imae, a platoon sergeant, was a member of Company C, First Battalion, Fifth Infantry, 25th Infantry Division.

He was a graduate of Maui High School, and is survived by his wife, Yoshie, of 1128 Beckley Place, Honolulu; his mother, Mrs. Unemo Imae, of 163 West Lanai Street, Kahului, Maui; four brothers, and two sisters.

Sergeant Imae had been awarded the Purple Heart for wounds received in Korea, and the Silver Star and the first Oak Leaf Cluster to the Purple Heart in Viet Nam.

Good Samaritans of Song

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BERNARD F. GRABOWSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 14, 1966

Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I wish to salute those "Good Samaritans of Song," the Riverside Area Chapters of the Society for the Preservation and Encouragement of Barber Shop Quartet Singing in America, Inc., who presented their fifth annual "Harmony Under the Stars" at the Watergate Theater Monday evening. National Capitol Region-National Parks Services cooperated with the Riverside Area Chapters, including the District of Columbia, Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax, and Fredericksburg, Va., Montgomery County, Prince Georges County, and St. Marys, Md.

"We Sing That They Shall Speak" was adopted in 1964 as the community service motto of the SPEBSQSA, which has some 30,000 members affiliated with

700 chapters in the United States and Canada. The Institute of Logopedics at Wichita, Kans., has been adopted as the society's international service project. Since 1934, the center for speech and hearing therapy has treated over 25,000 persons, mostly children, burdened with afflictions which inhibit normal speech and hearing. Also it has trained over 250 students who later became therapists in these fields.

Opening and closing the Watergate concert was the Chorus of the Potomac, around 250 male voices, being made up of six separate and distinctively costumed choruses, all of which performed by themselves. The audience of thousands of music lovers heard the Singing Capital Chorus from the District of Columbia, under Director Lew Sims; the Jubil-Aires of Fairfax, led by Jed Casey; the Arlingtones of Arlington, under Ed Roberson; St. Mary's, under Bing Gardiner; Alexandria Harmonizers, led by Scott Werner; Montgomery Counts, with Orville Luedtke directing. Art Moore was master of ceremonies and Henry Brown, producer. Featured quartets were the Filibusters, Scale Tippers, Potomachords, and Nightcaps.

Next big harmony event to be held in Washington will be the annual Harvest of Harmony of the District of Columbia chapter, scheduled Saturday, November 5, in Constitution Hall.

The Insensitivity of Bureaucracy

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. WILLIAM STANTON

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 15, 1966

Mr. STANTON. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents has called my attention to an editorial which appeared in the Wall Street Journal of June 17. This commentary on the arrogance and insensitivity of bureaucracy deserves the consideration of everyone and therefore I am placing it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

ARROGANCE ON THE SUBWAY

Sometimes the petty annoyances of life tell a lot about what's happening to the country.

In New York City, for a small instance, the change-makers in the municipally operated subway system refuse, usually with great rudeness, to accept a \$5 bill or anything higher. The ostensible theory is that, with a rise in the fare anticipated, people might buy large quantities of the present tokens and hoard them—which in itself is a pretty insulting attitude for officialdom to take toward the citizen.

In any event, a person finding himself with nothing under \$5 has no choice but to trudge back up the stairs and find a store willing to make change. Nine times out of ten the shopkeeper will do so in perfectly friendly fashion.

The contrast is illuminating. The salesman in the store knows his livelihood depends on courtesy and service. To many a minion of bureaucracy, however, people are nuisances at best and to be treated as such.

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"IT'S GOING TO TAKE TIME"

"There's a lot I probably don't know," said a Lieutenant colonel recently, "but the one thing I do know after almost a year of fighting here is that it is going to take time.

"I don't personally believe it will take a lot of time, but I'm not sure. That is what makes it hard to know if the public will put up with it long enough."

Much of America's public affairs policy regarding the war has been built on an insubstantial foundation of statistics and psychological estimates of the enemy.

Far too little of this policy has been built on more substantial factors—the growing American mastery of the terrain and of guerrilla war tactics and the basic courage, anti-Communism and tenacity of the South Vietnamese.

The most important thing to realize is not that statistics are unreliable but that they are meaningless in themselves. Statistically, the entire Vietcong force in South Vietnam has been destroyed and, presumably, replaced with new troops.

The statistics matter little. The fact that more than 200,000 enemy troops are still fighting matters a great deal.

No discussion of the progress of the war in Vietnam can go far without an examination of statistics, which have become so important for two reasons. One is that in a war without front lines or territorial gains, statistics seem to be the only measuring rod of success. The other reason is that United States officials have made them so important.

HOW THE FIGURES ADD UP

Statistically, the war has been won several times already.

According to official figures, about 57,000 Vietcong guerrillas and North Vietnamese army regulars have been killed in action and counted on the battlefield since Jan. 1, 1965.

Some American officials in Vietnam have grave doubts about the validity of this figure. The gravest qualms result, however, not when the figure is discounted but when it is accepted, even if only for the purpose of argument.

Statistics on the Vietcong wounded are not announced because only a relatively few wounded prisoners are ever seen. But, by the most conservative estimate possible, the Vietcong suffer two wounded for every man killed in action. A more realistic estimate might range from 3 to 1 to 5 to 1.

This would mean that 114,000 more of the Vietcong have been wounded, many of whom would have died in their primitive field hospitals. To this total could be added 20,000 men in the category of "killed but dragged away" and victims of illness such as malaria.

COUNTING OFTEN DIFFICULT

If the original "body count" statistic is accepted, a conservative conclusion is that in less than 18 months the Vietcong have suffered a total of at least 200,000 casualties and other troop losses.

The concept of body-count figures is unrealistic in some circumstances.

After certain battles it is possible to count bodies with some accuracy, although anyone who has watched three platoons of one company move out into the scrub can easily believe that duplications in counting may take place.

At other times it is impossible to count bodies. But the pressure from the top to do so continues.

One morning late last year, when the nine-day siege of the Special Forces camp at Pleiku was being lifted, Maj. Charles Beckwith, a grizzled man in a dirty camouflage "tiger suit," was told by his radio operator that the chief of staff in Saigon wanted an immediate body count for a military briefing.

INFLATED FIGURE USED

"We haven't even been outside the wire yet," snapped the major. "Tell them I'm not going to give any figure until I can count."

In the end Maj. Beckwith and his men counted a little more than 40 bodies on one side of the camp, the only area they could cover that day. But the figure already announced in Saigon was about five times that big.

In a more recent action in the Central Highlands, a company commander who had been under heavy attack in a tight defensive perimeter received a request for a body-count figure. He radioed one of his platoon leaders to ask what the officer could tell him.

"I don't know, Captain," said the lieutenant. "Maybe 3 or 5 or 15. Put me down for 15 and I'll try to find them for you in the morning."

VAST U.S. FIREPOWER ARRAYED IN VIETNAM AGAINST GUERRILLAS

(Following is the second of three articles on the military situation in South Vietnam by the chief Times correspondent in Saigon.)

(By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 27.—The weapon's sound is terrifying and stupendous, like a chorus of kettle drums played by giants. Its sight is equally stunning, with hundreds of incandescent bursts of light winking their way up a South Vietnamese mountain ridge.

This is a "C.B.U.," a military abbreviation that stands for "cluster bomb unit," one of the United States weapons that are tending to invalidate some of the axioms of guerrilla warfare.

Military spokesmen in Vietnam are forbidden by Washington to discuss this and other exotic weapons, but journalists in the field know about them from witnessing their use and talking to combat soldiers.

800 BOMBS IN ONE UNIT

A cluster bomb unit is a canister containing more than 800 bomblets with fat orange noses and folding silvery tail fins. As a fighter-bomber sweeps in to attack, compressed air blows the bomblets out of the canister and they fall to earth in a destructive and demoralizing pattern of pyrotechnics.

It is much like throwing 800 hand grenades at the enemy at once, except that the bomblets seem to be more powerful and lethal than hand grenades. The noise alone is overpowering.

Now, a new and better C.B.U. has been developed. It spews both napalm and lethal steel pellets from bomblets. The weapon has been used to silence anti-aircraft positions in North Vietnam.

This new weapon is part of the most impressive arsenal of conventional firepower ever brought to bear in warfare.

The United States forces can shower hundreds of 750- and 500-pound bombs on guerrilla concentrations from flights of heavy B-52 bombers that the Vietcong never see or hear.

Fighter-bombers can supply more power in tactical air-support situation than strategic bombers had in World War II.

'COPTERS MOVE ARTILLERY

Artillery is moved about a roadless wilderness slung from helicopters with great ease and speed, and American infantry companies rarely operate outside the range of supporting guns.

The infantryman himself is well armed. The airborne and cavalry units carry the M-16 rifle, whose .22-caliber high-velocity cartridge, because of low recoil, is easy to fire accurately.

The light weight of ammunition allows one platoon sergeant in the First Brigade of the 101st Airborne to go into battle with 29 magazines, or 580 rounds of ammunition, on his person.

A new "star-light" telescopic sight that gathers and amplifies the dim light of a night scene, has been used by Air Force C-47 planes carrying three guns that can put out a total

of 18,000 machine-gun bullets a minute. In a recent action, such a star-light scope caught 200 troops on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the guns almost annihilated them.

All this firepower does not always work exactly as intended. During a hot battle in Kontum Province, when air support was badly needed Navy jets carrying 1,000-pound bombs missed their target by more than 3,000 yards. Cloud ceilings and terrain offered good reason for this miss.

In Haunghia Province earlier in the year, examination showed that a heavy air strike on a line of enemy foxholes had failed to strike or collapse one Vietcong position.

GUERRILLAS' ADVANTAGE CUT

The main effect of the firepower at the disposal of United States forces is to limit the usual advantages of guerrillas.

Guerrilla doctrine is to avoid contact on unfavorable terms and to concentrate and strike with overwhelming force against weaker enemy units when the time is ripe. This is becoming increasingly difficult for the Vietcong.

In attempting to dodge combat, Vietcong units are harassed, by highly sensitive airborne infra-red devices and other intelligence systems that spot their hidden campsites and leave them open to air attack.

The guerrillas find it dangerous to concentrate their forces for attacks even against ever-extended and outnumbered units.

An important result, psychologically, has been that the rebels have had to fight for about eight months without a proper victory.

Late last year the Vietcong surprised and overran a large part of the South Vietnamese Seventh Regiment in a rubber plantation northwest of Saigon, inflicting heavy casualties, but there has been nothing like that since.

ENEMY HAS OWN DEVICE

The Vietcong and North Vietnamese have a technological device of their own that has proved a surprisingly effective counter-measure to the United States firepower. It is a shovel, about two and one half feet long with a bamboo handle and a steel blade.

"These people are the damndest diggers I ever saw," said an American infantryman recently. "They dig a foxhole straight down and then they hollow out a little chamber back in the side of it to slip into when they hear the jets."

"Nothing but a direct hit will get them. You just can't hurt them too much with bombing and artillery when they are in their holes."

American firepower, most destructive when the enemy comes out into the open, has done a great deal to limit the Vietcong's ability to undertake attacks. It is less effective when the Vietcong stand and fight against American incursions into their base areas.

Attention was recently focused on an action in Kontum Province in which a West Point football hero, Capt. William S. Carpenter, was recommended for the Medal of Honor after directing an air strike on his own position in a desperate effort to break up what seemed to be an overwhelming North Vietnamese assault.

OFFENSIVE POWER CURTAILED

The company and its wounded were successfully extracted 44 hours later, but the enemy positions were not taken until two days later, after a B-52 raid.

"The only trouble is that Victor Charlie [slang for Vietcong] still has the hill," said one man of Captain Carpenter's company.

"We ran into something we couldn't cope with," said a sergeant.

A number of other companies nearby had similar experiences, finding themselves pinned down and unable to move against their foe.

The Americans can always pull back and call for air strikes and then usually go in and take the positions. Heavy casualties are inflicted on the enemy, but in almost every

case substantial numbers of the enemy escape to regroup and fight another day.

In the meantime, the war remains relatively cheap for the United States, but not as cheap as it once was.

In less than six months since the beginning of this year, American forces have suffered 15,000 casualties, more than 2,000 of them killed. The United States must face the prospect that by the end of 1966 casualties may reach more than 30,000, including 5,000 or more dead.

Tomorrow: Political aspects of Vietnamese war.

U.S. FORCES FRUSTRATED IN POLITICAL ASPECTS OF VIETNAMESE WAR

(Following is the last of three articles appraising the military situation in South Vietnam by the chief correspondent of *The New York Times* in Saigon.)

(By Charles Mohr)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 28.—There is wide recognition that ultimate success or victory in the war in Vietnam will depend on political as well as military action.

The necessary political action, however, is difficult to implement.

It is difficult to bring the impressive weight of United States power to bear in rural South Vietnam without killing and maiming civilians as well as the guerrilla enemy.

It is difficult to find the manpower, administrative skill and determination in South Vietnam to carry out all of the desirable social, economic and political programs.

It is even difficult to give South Vietnam assistance without also causing inflation and subsequent public discontent about living costs.

On the purely military side, undeniable progress has been made.

REBELS' LOSSES HIGH

The Vietcong guerrillas still control almost as much territory and population as they did when full-scale United States intervention began last year, but the Vietcong's momentum toward victory has been stopped.

Whether statistics are accurate or not, punishing losses are being inflicted on the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese regulars.

Some persons assume that the enemy cannot sustain such losses much longer. This is, however, only an assumption. As of mid-1966, the guerrillas in South Vietnam remain a formidable force larger than a year ago.

"One of the encouraging trends is the difficulty we are having in getting them to fight recently," said an American general, explaining that this could mean that the effect of United States firepower was denying the enemy any prudent way to employ his troops.

American or South Vietnamese troops increasingly move into enemy base areas and stumble upon surprised guerrillas who, almost instinctively, stand and fight for as long as they can.

This is a complete reversal of the usual situation in guerrilla warfare.

Instead of picking their battleground, the guerrillas are finding it difficult to arrange profitable encounters and are obliged to fight in their own backyard.

VIETCONG HARD TO FIND

However, as the general also noted, the difficulty in engaging the enemy is a discouraging as well as an encouraging trend. Since the main thrust of the American military effort is to find and destroy enemy military units, any impediment to this process is unwelcome.

Progress is less evident on the political side of the war, and problems are abundant.

The United States military commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, has given special attention to the problem of civilian casualties and has admonished his troops

that they must accept severe restraints on the battlefield.

But the high level of military activity and the need to save American lives are not always compatible with this policy. There are no statistics on civilian casualties, but a visit to any provincial hospital reveals many cases of victims of United States air and artillery power.

The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam has had some effect on military progress. For many weeks the Government had more of its elite forces tied up on political duty, and lost control over at least one army division.

The Government of Nguyen Cao Ky has survived these difficulties. But Premier Ky's ability to stay in power through the use of police force poses a question that observers here are reluctant to answer.

Despite United States endorsement of the Premier, few Americans here would contend that he is an ideal instrument with which to wage a guerrilla war.

Enormous attention has been given to the question "Whom do the political Buddhists represent?" but whom, some observers ask, does Premier Ky represent?

In a way, the army. But even this is an oversimplification. The real answer is that South Vietnam does not have a Government closely identified with the mass of the population.

The most promising development of the year has been the rural pacification program. About 80 teams have begun to work in selected villages to root out Vietcong political workers, satisfy village complaints, provide some security and improve the standard of life. Other teams are in training.

TWO KEY FACTORS SEEN

This is only a minuscule beginning in a nation with 15,000 villages. Some Americans see serious flaws in the program and one of them thinks it has no more than 50-percent chance of success. But they find even such a prospect reason for good cheer.

The final outcome of the war will probably be decided by two factors.

One will be the pacification program. By common consensus the United States forces cannot be driven from South Vietnam by any means the North Vietnamese choose to throw against it. But the alien Americans probably cannot drive the Vietcong from the field, either, until the rural population joins in the effort.

The second factor is the determination of the enemy and his allies.

Until now, North Vietnamese infiltration into the South and local recruitment have roughly kept pace with losses suffered.

How long this equilibrium will continue may depend less on United States bombing than on North Vietnamese will power versus American will power. The North Vietnamese still have at their command large reserves to commit in the South. At the extreme, there is the threat of Chinese intervention.

"We've got a winning hand," said one American officer, "but we've got to bet it. It don't think you can bluff these people out of the game."

The University of Wisconsin and the Draft

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 27, 1966

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, the problem of inequities in the Selective Service System is one that has occupied much attention in recent months,

especially here in Congress and on various university campuses, as a result of the increased manpower demands of the Vietnam war.

I would like to draw the attention of the Congress in this regard to a letter I recently received from the distinguished president of the University of Wisconsin, Fred Harvey Harrington, and resolutions passed by the University of Wisconsin faculties at both Madison and Milwaukee, requesting a thorough review of these inequities. These educators are primarily concerned with two faults of the system: the socioeconomic discrimination inherent in the deferment of college students, and the threat to the independence and quality of our educational system posed by incorporating grades into the Selective Service System.

In particular, I would like to draw your attention to the last paragraph of President Harrington's letter in which he points out the need for a study of the present draft and its alternatives in the context of the Nation's total manpower requirements.

Text of letter and resolutions fol-

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN,
Madison, Wis., June 23, 1966.

The Honorable ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KASTENMEIER: Enclosed are copies of resolutions adopted by our Madison and Milwaukee faculties.

I agree with the faculty conclusion that it is time for a major review of the Selective Service System as it relates to the college student.

Student protests, particularly on our Madison campus, brought this issue to a head. Contrary to the impression which some people have, the students were not seeking a blanket exemption from military service. Rather, they were insisting that there were inequities in deferring college students when their less fortunate colleagues of the same age were being drafted. In addition, the students contended that the use of class rank as a criterion for deferring college students intervenes in the educational relationship between teacher and student, heightening the conflict between learning and grade-getting. And they regard rank-in-class criteria as a heavy penalty for experimenting in the choice of a major or exploration of courses.

There is a widespread belief among the faculty that there should be a review of the Nation's manpower needs, with consideration of a system which would remove what many people regard as inequities. It is my personal belief that such a review would be in the best interests of the country, and I therefore hope that it may come about in the very near future.

Sincerely,
FRED HARVEY HARRINGTON,
President.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON FACULTY

The faculty recognizes that any conceivable Selective Service System is likely to contain inequities, but it believes that the time has come to re-evaluate the present System including the following items:

- Special deferment for college students.
- Continued utilization of the rank-in-class criteria.
- The desirability and validity of the testing program.
- Elimination of college or university contacts with Selective Service in favor of in-

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volving simply the student and the Selective Service office.

The President of the University is requested to convey copies of this resolution to members of the Wisconsin Congressional delegation, and ask that they support a re-evaluation of the present System.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE FACULTY

The faculty of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, respectfully urges the Congress of the United States to consider the selection of a special commission with authority to study the nation's manpower needs and the impact of Selective Service in institutions of higher learning and to recommend such new proposals as seem appropriate for providing an equitable and effective means through which service to the nation may be rendered. We further request that the Chancellor and the President of the University convey the views of this Faculty to the President of the United States and to the Wisconsin congressional delegation.

Carl Takamura, 1966 Hawaii Graduate, Explains Why Today's College Grads Shy Away From Business Careers

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA
 OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 Thursday, June 30, 1966

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, it is a tribute to our Nation's young people that the adult American community is lending an increasingly attentive ear to their views. Pursuant to this recognition America's youth has come forth with some startling and thought-provoking observations, as it recently did in my own State of Hawaii.

Mr. Carl Takamura, a 1966 graduate of the University of Hawaii and student body president during the academic year just ended, delivered an informative and straightforward speech at a recent Honolulu Chamber of Commerce luncheon meeting. He gave Honolulu businessmen some pointed reasons why he thought so many college graduates have not selected business as a career. He also discussed improvements which could be made to attract more college graduates to business as a career.

The challenging speech by Mr. Takamura was quoted in a newspaper article written by reporter George West. In the hope that businessmen of the Nation may benefit from his views, I submit the June 25, 1966, Star-Bulletin article for inclusion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
LACKS HIGH PRINCIPLES AND SOCIAL CONCERN: BUSINESS LEARNS WHY GRADUATES SHUN IT

(By George West)

A 1966 University of Hawaii graduate laid it on the line today in telling Honolulu's businessmen why students shun careers in business.

"Business is only concerned with making money and it lacks high principles and social concern," said Carl T. Takamura, 1966-66 student body president.

"Students are interested in lives with purpose, rather than with security spelled with the dollar sign."

Takamura spoke at a quarterly luncheon meeting of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

Takamura's topic was: "Why Students Say No to Business."

He prefaced his talk with the note that his answers were "opinions not facts."

Takamura told the businessmen that he's convinced the men and women of his generation are not seeking a life of security, spelled with a dollar sign, but rather a life of purpose and significance.

He said this is evidenced by the "resounding success" of the Peace Corps and Volunteers In Service to America programs.

"Unfortunately," he added, "in the eyes of many students, the business world appears to be apathetic to the problems of modern society and, which is even worse, refuses to provide the leadership . . . to solve these problems and which it is so uniquely capable of rendering."

He noted: "Students are saying, 'I want to serve,' and business is answering, 'Let me show you how to get rich.'"

Takamura noted that students feel business is drab, more technical than professional.

It attracts only "average-ability" students, students say, and that all businessmen are considered Republicans.

He said that business is also hurt by the concept of the organization man which continues to frighten away the identity-seeking young people "who have no desire to become lost in the nameless conformity of a gray-flannel world."

Robert B. Wolcott, Jr., president of the Public Relations Society of America, also spoke.

He talked of the things that businessmen could do to get students to say yes to occupations in business.

Takamura said he does not believe there is one single factor causing students to say no to business.

"It is my opinion that one major factor is the negative image business has of being a rather unexciting career of somewhat dubious professional status which is designed primarily for the nonintellectual conservative whose ultimate concern is money, rather than principle or values."

He continued: "Perhaps the most damning factor is business's apparent lack of high principles and concern."

He backed up this observation by recalling a training program which a friend attended and those in attendance were told:

"If you want to make money, stick around. If not, get out!"

Editorials by the Detroit Free Press and Publisher John Knight on the War in Vietnam

SPEECH OF

HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 Wednesday, June 29, 1966

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the Detroit morning newspaper, the Detroit Free Press, one of the leading newspapers in the country, has long been an articulate and perceptive critic of American policy in Vietnam. Its editorial pages have consistently provided forceful, thoughtful, and quite literate discussion of the background and effects of our current military involvement in Vietnam.

I have compiled all of the editorials from the Free Press on Vietnam for the 8-week period from May 1 to June 24 which I ask permission to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD immediately following my remarks. In reading these editorials I think my colleagues will find not only informed and perceptive discussion and criticisms of some of the causes and effects of the war but also suggestions of very appropriate alternatives to our current policy.

I also want to include in the RECORD some signed editorials on Vietnam by John Knight, the publisher of the Free Press and various other outstanding newspapers throughout the country. Since 1954 when the French left Vietnam, John Knight has been asking the hard and pertinent questions about America's steadily growing involvement in that country.

I am proud to be a representative of any area which is served by a newspaper which not only provides comprehensive reporting of the news but also informed and perceptive comment on the major foreign problem facing our country today.

The editorials follow:

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 3, 1966]

FATAL PRESUMPTIONS

"I would like to talk with you tonight about the fallout effects of the Vietnamese war," said Sen. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT in a major foreign policy speech the other evening. And he did.

He spoke of the risks of escalation and a wider war, of the strains which the struggle is putting on East-West relations, of the alienation of allies, and of the impossibility of pursuing an open-ended war in Southeast Asia and a poverty war at home. He called this pursuit "a kind of madness."

But he spoke of more than effects, as important as they are; he spoke also of causes.

"America is showing some signs of that fatal presumption, that overextension of power and mission, which brought ruin to ancient Athens, to Napoleonic France and to Nazi Germany," he said. "The process has hardly begun, but the war which we are now fighting can only accelerate it."

And the speech holds a number of values for this nation at this time.

The senator spoke as a critic of policies which presidential opinion polls indicate much of the nation presently supports, and there's always reason for the nation to cheer a responsible public figure willing to buck a consensus. For a consensus might be wrong and there is a desperate need in a democracy for articulate dissent.

There's value, too, in the detached view of this nation which Sen. FULBRIGHT took, looking at America as others in far-away places might look at America. For wrapped in our own pursuits there is the risk of losing objectivity, of adopting a manifest destiny for the globe, of spreading with an evangelical zeal the good as we know it whether others share our view of good or not. Proof of this can be seen in this nation's fumbling attempts to erect instant democracy along with an embassy in other lands.

And because some politicians tend to look only from one election to the next and some men in public life in these troubled times only from one crisis to another, it is valuable to have someone identify the threads of history in the fabric of present day life, to look back and to look ahead.

That "fatal presumption, that overextension of power and mission" of which Sen. FULBRIGHT spoke is ancient to history. But

it is relatively new to the U.S. and it is important for the U.S. to look at history now and profit from its lessons.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 8, 1966]
THE EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK; JOHNSON FAILS TO LEAD UNITED STATES WHEN HE ASKS WHAT TO DO

(By John S. Knight)

Lyndon Baines Johnson is said to be a strong President but he has an irritating habit of saying, "What would you do?" when he gets into trouble.

The war in Vietnam is one example of the President's utter frustration. Another is found in his recent remarks to a top-level labor-management panel currently assessing various ways to combat inflation.

On this occasion, the President said: "I ask you to look at this problem not from the standpoint of labor or business. I want you to ask yourselves: If you were President, what would you do?"

One can be sympathetic with the President's plight. The problems he encounters both at home and abroad are staggering in number and magnitude. They defy easy, simplistic solutions. Nevertheless, many of them are creations of this administration. Others could have been bypassed as having low priority in essentiality.

It seems to this observer that our war policies lack insight, skillful direction and total purpose. There can be no criticism either of our men in the field or of the military command. They have performed magnificently under the most trying conditions. The nation can be proud of their dedication and courage.

The changing emphasis from Washington produces confusion and uncertainty at home. First, it was said that the U.S. is in Vietnam by invitation of the government. Next, we were told that we must resist aggression everywhere. Quite an undertaking, that.

A third explanation suggests that the United States is acting in its national interest which, according to Vice President Hubert Humphrey, includes the "containment without isolation" of Red China.

And now it appears that Washington welcomes "free elections" in Vietnam which, if held, could result in our being asked to leave the country.

But not, I assure you, before the departure is conditioned on promises of vast assistance and the financing of an Asian Great Society.

So the question, "What would you do?" flows from such an intricate and complex background of gradual and unnecessary step-by-step involvement that it must be answered by the architects of these policies.

In fact, this means that only the President can decide. The voices of protest against the insanity of Vietnam have gone unheeded through the years. No one would listen.

Mr. Johnson, though an inheritor of the Vietnam mess, has undertaken to enlarge the conflict while talking of his hopes for peace.

He bears the responsibility. He must therefore answer his own question and provide direction for the future.

[From the Detroit Free Press, Monday, May 9, 1966]

AS WE SEE IT: FULBRIGHT ACTS PROPERLY AS A RESPONSIBLE CRITIC

Barry Goldwater, the spokesman of "a choice, not an echo," is unhappy with some of the choices we've been getting lately.

Specifically, he's lashing out at the choices offered by Sen. J. W. FULBRIGHT and is demanding that he resign as chairman of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

What vexed Goldwater was watching the committee's hearings on Vietnam and China and hearing FULBRIGHT ask questions and

raise issues that weren't wreathed in Goldwater's brand of patriotism.

Questions such as: What are we really trying to accomplish in Vietnam? What is our national interest there? Does the United States have the power to be the policeman of the globe? Are we really facing gallantly the challenge of communism, or are we enmeshed in someone else's civil war? Are we in danger of misinterpreting our awesome power into a universal mission that isn't shared or wanted by the remainder of the world?

Those are vexing questions. They are vexing because they strike at the heart of our foreign policy. They are painful, as a nation, to face. They arouse passion, protests, disagreement.

And for these very reasons, we are better off as a nation for their being raised.

For these questions will be answered either as an outgrowth of vexations debate, or silently by an administration and State Department that drifts into new and expanding crises.

What is our purpose? This simple, direct question is raised by Sen. FULBRIGHT. By raising it, he restored to the Senate some of its basic responsibility to advise the President on foreign affairs.

But Goldwater, the ex-senator and ex-GOP candidate for the presidency, can't see this. He also dissents from the Johnson administration's policies in Vietnam, but on the other side, the side of toughness.

He would close the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong and bomb targets "that really count."

He sees his dissent as patriotic, but says "no American has the right" to dissent in the manner of FULBRIGHT.

And his criticisms were echoed in Michigan last week in a St. Clair speech by Thomas E. Dewey, the ex-New York governor and ex-GOP presidential candidate.

If there seem to be several "ex's" among those making these criticisms, there may be a reason.

Americans are increasingly able to distinguish between that brand of patriotism that says merely, "Charge!" and that which blends loyalty with responsible criticism. In FULBRIGHT we have the second and more valuable kind of patriot.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1966]

KY AND LODGE DON'T HELP

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge is in Washington this week for a round of consultations with administration officials, and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky is in Saigon. Both in recent days have made statements about elections which are bound to raise fresh concern in South Vietnam and in this country.

"I expect to stay in power for at least another year," said Ky, "perhaps until the middle of next year. There is no doubt about that." And if the elections don't turn out the way he wants them to turn out, Ky added: "I and my friends will fight it."

What these statements do, of course, is to undermine the agreement worked out with Buddhist and other elements in Vietnam for free elections and a return to civilian rule. They risk sparking renewed street demonstrations. Secretary of State Rusk has tried to minimize their impact, explaining that "some interpretations may have been overdrawn."

Obviously, the issue needs clarification.

Ambassador Lodge, however, has provided only more confusion. He is quoted as having explained that the Vietnamese, in setting up elections, are embarking upon "an untrod path." He said: "They've never had elections on a national basis and a national question. It's never happened in their whole history."

But it has, as international relations Professor Bernard Fall of Howard University sets forth in a letter to the New York Times.

He reports that a "half-dozen or so nationwide elections" have been held in Vietnam, beginning with the pan-Vietnamese election on Jan. 8, 1946. He ticks off others.

"How well the Vietnamese people are aware, in spite of all the mythology to the contrary, of the issues involved is best shown by their attitude during Diem's reelection as president in 1961, when he had lost most of his prestige," says Fall. "In spite of the population increase, he lost one million votes from 1955 to 1961. And in Saigon, where foreign journalists could watch the polls, Diem got 354,000 votes out of a total of 732,000, while he had gotten 600,000 in 1955."

Professor Fall makes this telling point: "In other words, what has been lacking in Vietnam—both South and North—is not an acquaintance with the election process itself, or with its political meaning, but rather an effective and honest translation of the election mechanism into an unfettered expression of the popular will."

In short, the elections have been phony. The statements by Ambassador Lodge, now in Washington, and Premier Ky, back in Saigon, don't deny that honest elections might be possible, but neither do they encourage the prospect. The American misreads history and reviews obstacles while the Vietnamese hints additional delay.

With the political base on which the U.S. continues its military operations so manifestly shaky, it is important for the Buddhists, the Roman Catholics, the Hao Hao and Cao Dai religious sects and other Vietnamese elements to receive firm assurances that recent pledges of free elections and civilian rule will be kept.

If not, that shaky political base will become untenable, and the United States will either be forced to withdraw or to admit frankly that we, and not the Vietnamese, are running their country.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 12, 1966]

SHOCK WAVE OUT OF CHINA

The device which Red China exploded the other day containing "thermonuclear materials" may or may not have been a hydrogen bomb. And if it was a hydrogen bomb, it may have been a dud, as some speculation now suggests. Information still being gathered, including atmospheric samplings, can be expected to determine these things.

But what is clear now is that the weapon will have its fallout. The Japanese, in particular, and other neighboring Asian nations are now filing protests. What is also clear is that the weapon will have its shock value, and coming as it does with an escalating war in Vietnam it should cause this nation to re-examine its policies there.

For increasingly in recent weeks administration spokesmen have attempted to justify the U.S. role in Vietnam as essential to the containment of Red China. Yet there is considerable feeling among experts that the effect of our Vietnam policy could prove to be the exact reverse.

In its current number, Commentary magazine presents a round-table discussion on the topic of containing China. Those participating included Bernard B. Fall, professor of international relations at Howard University and author of two books on Vietnam; Richard N. Goodwin, former special assistant to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Sen. GEORGE MCGOVERN of South Dakota, and John P. Roche, professor of history and politics at Brandeis University and former national chairman of Americans for Democratic Action.

All, to a greater or lesser degree, criticized aspects of present U.S. policy in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

Prof. Fall noted the increasing references to the Chinese threat in speeches by administration officials and found it "rather curious" that the speeches also often repeated

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"the well known fact that the North Vietnamese hate the Chinese." He said that he felt "only in the worst of circumstances—circumstances . . . that can only be created by our military pressure on North Vietnam—will the Chinese come in; and if they ever should come in, the North Vietnamese will receive them with the greatest misgivings."

This is what Prof. Fall and others call the "inherent contradiction," in the American approach to China and in its role in Vietnam.

Speaking at another point in the discussion of Ho Chi Minh, Fall, who has visited both North and South Vietnam, said he didn't know whether the North Vietnamese leader would have become another Tito with American encouragement, "but what I do know," he said, "is that he has been anti-Chinese ever since the Chinese arrested him in 1941 and kept him in the stocks for 18 months."

The views expressed by Prof. Fall are views held by others participating in the round-table discussion and by many Asian students puzzled by the course of American involvement in Vietnam. For the best way to contain Red China would be to help erect independent states along her border and the best prospects for this in Vietnam have always lain, in the view of many observers, not with any puppet leader hand-picked by the United States, but with the popular leader who drove out the French colonists, the man whom the U.S. now opposes, Ho Chi Minh.

Red China's explosion of another nuclear device—this is its third—holds no immediate threat to the United States. It does, however, raise some fundamental questions which need thorough review.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 12, 1966]

TELL THE STATE DEPARTMENT

"The aims for which we struggle," said President Johnson at Princeton University Tuesday, "are aims which, in the ordinary course of affairs, men of the intellectual world applaud and serve: the principle of choice over coercion, the defense of the weak against the strong and aggressive, the right of a young and frail nation to develop free from the interference of her neighbors, the ability of a people—however inexperienced, however different; however diverse—to fashion a society consistent with their own traditions and values and aspirations."

It was a noble sentiment, and we join the intellectual community in applauding. But nagging questions keep coming back: Why don't we practice these principles? And why isn't the State Department told that these are our policies?

Sen. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT was a lot closer to the truth when he spoke of our "arrogance of power." Instead of giving the frail the right to develop free of interference, to fashion their own society, we seem determined to save them from themselves—even if we crush and coerce them in the process.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 17, 1966]

AS WE SEE IT: KY'S CLANDESTINE STRIKE MAY OFFER U.S. AN OUT

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky quietly loaded units of his troops into planes and flew into Da Nang the other night to take dissident military elements in that northern city utterly by surprise. Ky took American officials utterly by surprise also.

Americans who were asked to board the planes with Ky's men say they kept wholly in the dark about the purpose of the mission. Rather than advisers, they were hostages and when they found themselves at Da Nang they didn't respectfully request permission to drop out; they just headed over the hill and around the corner for the nearest U.S. post.

There is other evidence that Ky acted strictly on his own without consulting American leaders. He struck at a time when Ambassador Lodge is in Washington for con-

sultations and when General Westmoreland is in Hawaii for a brief visit with his family there.

If Ky did act alone and clandestinely, as he clearly appears to have done, then it puts the U.S. in a completely different position in the South Vietnamese struggle. It is both an impossible position and at the same time a promising one.

Not only do we lack the support of much of the civilian population—the recruits still being assembled by the Vietcong from among the South Vietnamese peasants proves this—but also we now can't even rely on the military regime we have installed in power. Helping the South Vietnamese fight one war to the front, we risk being caught in a withering cross-fire from warring elements of the South Vietnamese army to the rear.

Because this would be an absolutely impossible position to be caught in, it offers Washington fresh reason for seeking new ways out of the worsening situation. Buddhist leaders, looking forward to the elections which Ky has openly threatened to postpone and ignore, now charge him with "treachery." It is a strong word, perhaps too strong to apply to our own situation.

But the fact that Ky cut the U.S. out of a major maneuver, which carries palpably dangerous consequences, frees the U.S. from some of its responsibility to him. Now, if not before, the U.S. ought to round up all the support it can get from among the other nations of the world to have the UN intervene in Vietnam to supervise elections. While member nations could not justify any UN military intervention earlier, which left the U.S. virtually alone there, these same nations might try to bring an end to hostilities and prevent the opening of still more fighting on another front.

Many Americans have wondered for some time how the U.S. might extricate itself from the Vietnam morass which has gripped our military establishment like jungle quicksand. However many troops we have sent, there has seemed an open-ended requirement for more. There has been an escalation in weapons used and an expansion in kinds of targets hit. Many have wondered how the U.S. could get out with some degree of grace.

Premier Ky may now have offered a way out and, if so, Washington ought to seize it.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 20, 1966] AS WE SEE IT: THE ORIENTAL MIND ISN'T WHAT MOST PUZZLES U.S.

The greatest obstacle to Americans understanding what's really going on in Vietnam is not the difficulty we have in understanding the Oriental mind, although this presents its obvious problems. For example, when Premier Ky launched his crackdown on the Buddhists in Da Nang, some of them retaliated by stacking kindling and threatening to immolate themselves.

But as odd as this may seem to Americans, other aspects of the Vietnamese war and the desperate current political crisis are more puzzling still.

The proportion of U.S. casualties to South Vietnamese casualties in the war has been rising steadily as, progressively, the war has become more and more our war. Among the South Vietnamese units desertion is high, recruitment low and to fill the breach more Americans clamp on helmets and slog out into the jungles and more fall to return.

At the same time, demands for political reforms and general elections have revealed the government in Saigon to be only a reed and not an oak, without supporting roots among a cross-section of the people. And what the new crisis exposes more clearly than ever before is that Ky not only lacks the cooperation of the Buddhists but also the allegiance of portions of the South Vietnamese army.

The administration was "surprised and dismayed" by Ky's thrust into Da Nang and

simultaneously convinced that Ky's faction of the South Vietnamese army was the most promising unifying force in that fragmented and beleaguered land. It did not rebuke Ky publicly nor, we are told, did it do so privately.

This has caused some to suggest that the administration may not actually have been surprised or dismayed by Ky's maneuver at all and that it recalled Ambassador Lodge from Saigon so Ky would have a clear field to do what he had to do. Removed from the scene, Lodge could more plausibly shrug his shoulders and plead innocence.

This fits with other bits and pieces of information, although the fit may be pure coincidence and without any real substance in fact. Ambassador Lodge is reported as at best lukewarm toward the prospect of elections, fearing that Ky would be toppled in any popular balloting. The timing was considered bad, according to these reports, and at least some within the administration saw value in delay.

However this may be, the U.S. is caught now in a cross-fire between elements of the South Vietnamese army as it fights a bitter two-front war. Our planes have been ferrying around Ky's lieutenants and our troops riding shotgun for them. We have taken a disputed bridge in the Da Nang area. Amid wild cheering, one of our planes buzzing a Buddhist pagoda was shot down by dissident South Vietnamese army units lodged there who may or may not have mistaken it for a South Vietnamese plane which earlier dropped pro-Ky leaflets.

So the mystery lingers: Did Washington know the thrust into Da Nang was coming or didn't it? Was Lodge removed to permit the thrust or wasn't he? What, precisely, was Washington's role in the whole affair and where do we go from here?

All of this is what forms the greatest obstacle to Americans trying to make sense out of the scrambled events in Vietnam. It's not so much that we can't probe the Oriental mind as that we simply can't figure out what our own administration may be up to.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 24, 1966]

A PROMISE IS A PROMISE

Vastly outnumbered, their rifles no match for the tanks arrayed against them, rebel troops holed up in Da Nang pagodas have surrendered. The threat that dissident military elements posed for the Ky regime has diminished.

But other threats remain. The Buddhists continue to oppose the Ky regime and South Vietnam continues to be a nation torn in many directions by many factions. Words spoken by President Johnson during the height of the crisis continue, therefore, to hold profound meaning, not only for the Vietnamese but for our nation as well.

"We believe everything possible should be done," he said over the weekend, "to bring the various factions to an understanding of the need for unity while the constitutional process is moving forward."

For the Buddhists and others outside the Ky government this means cooperation that looks toward elections. For the Ky government it means no wenching on promises to hold these elections.

For the United States doing "everything possible" may mean taking some dramatic new steps to assure holding honest elections. It could mean a direct appeal to the United Nations to interest the international organization in intervention in Vietnam, not to support our military effort there, which would find little favor, but simply to supervise the holding of elections which would look toward the ending of civil hostilities and, ultimately, toward the settlement of differences with the Vietcong and with Hanoi.

Several reasons recommend such a course for the Johnson administration.

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The tanks which ringed the rebel dissidents were U.S. tanks and the planes which buzzed the pagodas were U.S. planes. In the eyes of the Buddhists this nation is tied so closely to the Ky government that elections supervised by the Ky government or by our government would be suspect.

At the same time, the sudden and independent actions taken by the Ky regime to subdue the dissidents in Da Nang have given the Johnson administration more room to maneuver. The responsibility we owe the Ky government, which we established, is not quite so large as it was.

There is, moreover, a growing disquiet among Americans at this nation's ever deepening role in Vietnam, and disquiet suggests a highly practical political reason for the President to make an appeal to the UN.

Elections approach in this country whether they actually approach in Vietnam.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 25, 1966]

DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs William P. Bundy complained good-naturedly that it often seemed to fall his lot to try to explain administration policy at a time "when the situation is less than clear."

Such a time was Monday as he stood before the Detroit Economic Club to talk about Vietnam.

As he spoke, some units of the South Vietnamese army remained arrayed against other units and beyond this immediate confrontation lay the long-term Buddhist opposition to the Ky regime. Out in the bush, in the war against the Vietcong and against Hanoi, U.S. troops continued to sustain heavier battle casualties than South Vietnamese troops, which have been increasingly occupied with internal political difficulties.

Under these circumstances Bundy did an excellent job of defending an indefensible basic policy. But the points he may have piled up during the course of his prepared speech were more than wiped out, in our view, in the question and answer session which followed.

If our position is no noble in Vietnam, someone wanted to know, why aren't we getting any help from our allies?

Bundy ticked off the help which this nation is getting—it didn't take long—and then said that unfortunately our allies aren't supporting our position in Vietnam because they don't have the same sense of responsibility for defending freedom.

It was a remarkable statement, raising as it did a serious charge. For, put in different words, a high American official accused our allies of irresponsibility in the defense of freedom.

These allies include the British, the French, the Canadians, traditional allies who have joined this nation in two great world wars as well as the Korean war. Having fought so well for freedom before, are these nations now irresponsibly shirking a duty to fight some more in Vietnam?

If this is what Bundy would have us believe, then he will have to answer to London, Paris and Ottawa, as well as to informed public opinion here. The hard truth is that our allies simply don't see the Vietnam conflict in the same terms as the administration does, nor, it might be added, do all Americans. Refusing to support our position in Vietnam, many of our friends and allies trade with North Vietnam.

Japan, which certainly can be assumed to have a considerable stake in the outcome of the Vietnam war, and France, which was a colonial power there and certainly knows something about the country, were North Vietnam's chief non-Communist suppliers in 1964, the most recent year for which figures are available. Other major suppliers included Great Britain, West Germany, Italy,

New Zealand, Malaysia and the Netherlands.

Many things, as Bundy himself admits, may be fuzzy and temporarily unclear about the situation in Vietnam, but the position of our allies is not among them. Are all these nations wrong and irresponsible and the United States, alone, in the right?

This is the proposition which Bundy left with his Detroit audience and it is a proposition which neither Detroit nor other sections of the United States is very likely to buy.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 27, 1966]

A ROLE FOR THE UN

To U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, the war in Vietnam is "a tragic situation for all the peoples and governments involved." In a major speech the other day at Atlantic City, he spelled out why.

"As the war worsens," he said, "its justification in terms of a confrontation of ideologies is becoming more and more misleading. For democratic principles which both sides consider to be at stake in Vietnam are already falling victim to the war itself." He called on the parties directly involved, once more, to try to resolve differences through negotiations.

But this raises other elements of tragedy. Past attempts at negotiation have failed and there are no good prospects for successful attempts now.

As U Thant spoke at Atlantic City, Secretary of State Rusk spoke at New York. Rusk said that he remained "prepared to go to Geneva immediately whenever there is anybody with whom to negotiate." North Vietnam, earlier expressing a willingness to negotiate, at the same time insisted on this nation recognizing North Vietnam's so-called four points, which included the withdrawal of U.S. troops and dismantling of U.S. bases.

This impasse persists. There is little prospect of resolving it. And while it persists, as U Thant said, the war worsens.

Add to this the evidence of continued political instability in South Vietnam, and the obligation on the Johnson administration to try something new becomes all the heavier. Viet students in rebel-held Hue sack and burn the U.S. Information Service library and our Don Oberdorfer reports from Saigon citizen sentiment is rising against the government's crackdown on dissidents.

We can stay in South Vietnam—of course, we can. Given enough men and enough bombs, we could probably occupy and defend the cities and much of the countryside. But questions of cost intrude. And questions of purpose as well.

If what this nation seeks for South Vietnam—and for all Vietnam—is the opportunity for its people freely to choose their own government and to go their own way, then another course of action would surely offer better prospects. For too long this nation has been waging a war virtually alone in South Vietnam, without the support of the rest of the free world, without the support even of those nations which are our closest allies. Walter Lippmann in a column elsewhere on today's page suggests that President Johnson reassess the situation, admit a mistake and begin gradual withdrawal. If this is too much to expect, there is something short of this which the President even more certainly ought to try.

It is time for the United States to approach the UN with an appeal for that international organization to assume the responsibility for assuring the elections which both sides seem so earnestly to seek.

The UN may have been unwilling to intervene in Vietnam to support our military role—the Soviet Union for one would surely have blocked such action—but would it be unwilling to serve as the honest broker for elections there?

The alternative to some such peaceful resolution of the conflict looms painfully clear. It is more fighting and escalated fighting which would risk the towering tragedy of a far wider war. The UN has a responsibility for preventing such a catastrophe and the United States, if not North Vietnam, has a responsibility for requesting it to do so.

[From the Detroit Free Press, May 31, 1966]

TOUGH QUESTION

Even some supporters of Senator Fulbright and the intensive hearings he has been holding on this nation's involvement in Vietnam may suspect that he has now gone too far with his questioning of psychology and psychiatry experts.

But certainly at least one of the answers he solicited makes considerable sense.

"Do you really think a human being is a rational being," Senator Fulbright asked Dr. Jerome Frank, professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University.

"That's hard to answer in a hurry," replied Dr. Frank.

It is.

Isn't the most cursory look at recorded history enough to give any man pause?

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 1, 1966]

AS WE SEE IT: THE U.S. MUST REASSESS ITS PLACE IN VIETNAM

They stood before solemn crowds at about the same time in history half a world away, the President of the United States at Arlington Cemetery and a slim, youthful monk at the center of a pagoda in Saigon.

"The conflict in South Vietnam is confusing to many of our people," said President Johnson amid the simple white headstones that stretched in all directions.

Inside the pagoda the drum pounded an eerie quick-time. His face in absolute repose, Thich Giac Tri put his left hand on the wooden drum. With his right hand he raised a meat cleaver and hacked off his little finger at the second joint.

Later he explained the purpose of his act to our Don Oberdorfer.

"I hope that with this sacrifice, Buddha can help Nguyen Cao Ky to think and change his ideas," he said.

The American people are confused about the war in Vietnam, as they have never been confused about an American war before, and they are beginning to question this nation's deepening commitment to that remote land. The sacrifice of the young monk comes in a wave of Buddhist sacrifices, including horrible self-immolations, and exposes the profoundly deep religious and political differences which afflict South Vietnam.

Ky's military crackdown on several areas of discontent hasn't removed this discontent.

Standing amid the rolling hills of green grass and white headstones, President Johnson once more repeated what he has said so many times before, that "we must persevere" in South Vietnam. But the nation—a majority of the nation if recent opinion polls can be believed—asks: Why? At what price, for what purpose?

The United States fights in Vietnam virtually without allies. This might be managed. It fights now, however, virtually without a nation to save. Secretary General U Thant spoke to this point in a major address at Atlantic City only a few days ago, saying that the war in Vietnam had lost all ideological meaning for the South Vietnamese and that "the passion for national identity, perhaps one should say national survival, is the only ideology that may be left to a growing number of Vietnamese."

The U.S. has based its presence in South Vietnam on preserving that nation from communism and protecting the government

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there. But U Thant suggests that the people may not wish to be preserved from communism, not at the risk of annihilation; they'd rather be Red than dead.

And the government in South Vietnam has been no more than a military dictatorship for some time, hardly a noticeable improvement over communism.

These new doubts about the American role in South Vietnam come, of course, on top of a host of old ones which strike to the strategic value of Vietnam and the realistic chances of setting up a pro-Western government in that badly fragmented land on China's edge. Together they argue for a major reappraisal of U.S. policy.

Rather than talk of committing more and more U.S. troops, there ought to be plans laid for withdrawing those already there, caught as they are in an intolerable situation, fighting an enemy to the front and to the rear without any adequate base of support among the people they're supposed to be defending. Instead of raising the military budget because of Vietnam, we ought to begin trimming it.

For the plain truth is that the situation in South Vietnam has so deteriorated that the U.S. presence there becomes a presence by pretense, not a presence with a basis in principle.

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 5, 1966]
THE EDITOR'S NOTEBOOK: CASUALTY LISTS
REMINDE UNITED STATES WE CAN'T POLICE
THE WORLD

"We are alarmingly close to another frustrating fringe war, following the same pattern of gradual involvement that we have seen before. I warn again that military victories alone will not resolve the situation in Southeast Asia."—From The Editor's Notebook of April 25, 1954.

Today—12 years later—the United States is wholly committed to the salvation of South Vietnam.

It seemed so simple at first. A few technicians and military advisers would be needed to show the South Vietnamese how to repulse the Vietcong guerrillas.

No American soldiers, mind you. Just advice and experts for training the Saigon military forces. In fact, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson said in 1954 that he saw no possibility that U.S. troops would have to fight in the jungles of Southeast Asia. In his blunt way, Mr. Wilson announced that "no such plan is even under study."

How wrong he was. For even then, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were taking steps which could lead only to a larger involvement.

When President John F. Kennedy came to power, he conceded frankly that he was dismayed by the extent of our pledges. Mr. Kennedy felt privately that the U.S. had been overcommitted and he saw this development as holding great peril for our country.

Yet the pressures from the military, the CIA and the State Department moved inexorably in the direction of armed conflict. At Kennedy's death, President Johnson assured the nation that "we seek no wider war" but it was then that the real escalation began.

The ensuing years saw a sharp buildup of American forces and the construction of permanent harbors and airfields on Vietnam soil. It was to be an "easy" war in which the sheer might of U.S. military capabilities would soon overwhelm the hungry, poorly equipped guerillas of Ho Chi Minh.

But, as the French had discovered to their sorrow, the guerillas are excellent fighters, completely dedicated to a cause in which they believe. Progress was anything but easy, despite assurances from Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Defense Secretary McNamara that victory was just around the corner.

In 1963, following one of Mr. McNamara's inspection tours, he and Gen. Taylor an-

nounced officially "their judgment that the major part of the (American) military task can be completed by the end of 1965."

That was nearly three years ago. My comment at the time was that such proclamations were not worth reading "since there is not a word of truth in them." Yet the American people did give them credence because of the high authority of those who made them.

The record is replete with similar predictions of a victory which has proved to be elusive and difficult to come by. One Saigon regime after another has failed to build confidence throughout the countryside. South Vietnamese desertions have totalled some 90,000 in the past year.

Gen. Ky, the present head of the Saigon government, is but one of a number of warlords—all vying for power and prestige. He controls no united nation but rules for the time being because of superior firepower.

And yet Vice President Hubert Humphrey solemnly assured a television audience following the Honolulu conference that it resembled the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at which the Atlantic Charter was born. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch has said: "Not even the unctuously thoughtful visage put on by the Vice President can bring us to think of Marshal Ky and Winston Churchill in the same terms, and no matter how hard we try we can't quite bring the Declaration of Honolulu into focus with the Four Freedoms."

At this moment, additional American troops are being rushed into action to fill the void caused by the removal of South Vietnamese forces to cope with Buddhist uprisings. South Vietnamese are shooting at one another to the delight of old Ho Chi Minh who is undoubtedly ready to take advantage of this tragic internal struggle during the monsoon season.

As the New York Times says, "It is paradoxical that as the situation in South Vietnam deteriorates, the American commitment in troops and every other respect escalates." So a reappraisal is in order if the contending factions do not stop fighting each other and hold the promised elections.

Premier Ky can no more win a purely military victory over the Buddhists than the United States can crush communism with force of arms. It is a sorry predicament and no man can foretell the outcome when civil strife outranks in importance the fight against the Vietcong.

"The situation is tragic," says the Observer of London. "In effect, the Americans are caught in a trap. They have increased their commitments in order to strengthen their negotiating position, but by increasing their share in the fighting they have also demonstrated the growing inability and unwillingness of the South Vietnamese to carry on the battle."

Despite his nagging problems, President Johnson continues to exude confidence that "the South Vietnamese are moving forward step by step—and the direction is sound." He dismisses criticism with the oblique observation that "nothing is as dead as yesterday's newspapers."

Yet a study of "yesterday's newspapers" provides a disenchanting compendium of rosy progress reports on Vietnam and the uneasy impression that Johnson is merely feeling his way and waiting for the breaks.

He will need them if a satisfactory solution is to be found.

Without disparaging the good intentions of our President, the indubitable fact is that we blundered into the Vietnam mess and have thus far been unable either to win or to extricate ourselves with honor.

Johnson, of course, is not solely responsible for the unhappy course of events in South Vietnam. The pattern was set long before he assumed office. But one cannot forget that, as Vice President, he once hailed

the late, unlamented dictator Ngo Dinh Diem as the "Winston Churchill of Asia."

One day the people will rebel against wars which do not directly involve our national interest. The cost in blood and treasure is appallingly high when measured against the non-achievement of the unattainable objectives.

But even now, President Johnson is giving strong support to the British blockade of Rhodesia though Britain sells her goods and supplies to our enemies in both Cuba and North Vietnam. And the Republic of South Africa may be next on our list as we seek to "reform" the peoples of other lands even as we fail to cope successfully with our major social and economic problems at home.

It is a simple matter to blunder into a trap as we have done in Vietnam; quite another to free ourselves without being severely lacerated.

Our mounting casualty lists are a grim reminder that no matter how noble our motivations may be, the United States is—as Sec. McNamara said recently at Montreal—in no position to police the world and reshape it in our image.

—JOHN S. KNIGHT.

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 14, 1966]
AS WE SEE IT: ROMNEY'S URGE TO ESCALATE
REFLECTS U.S. FRUSTRATION

George Romney, speaking to a national television audience over the weekend, and JACOB JAVITS, speaking at commencement exercises at Hofstra University, discussed Vietnam and took basically opposite views on what this nation ought to do there now.

To Michigan's governor, our lack of success so far clearly points to the need to escalate the fighting—to bomb the fuel depots in the Haiphong area and to increase our troop commitments so the Vietcong would know they could not win.

To New York's Senator, this same lack of success indicates some fundamental weakness in our policy. Rather than more escalation, he favors de-escalation, saying the U.S. should stop sending additional troops to South Vietnam in exchange for a pledge from North Vietnam to discontinue its infiltration, and that bombing raids on the north ought to be curtailed to get North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front to the conference table.

"The cessation of bombing in the north should provide Hanoi with some face-saving reason for agreeing to talk," explains the Senator. "It would also create a calmer atmosphere for the talks."

Conflicting views on Vietnam are not new among politicians, of course, even among politicians of the same political party. The thing that makes the conflict between Romney and JAVITS of special interest is that they are being mentioned as GOP nominees for President and Vice President respectively.

Previously, Romney and JAVITS disagreed on whether there ought to be some compulsory system of universal military training, with Romney tending to favor a voluntary program of service in various agencies and JAVITS tending to favor compulsory service. Their differences on this issue can probably be ironed out relatively easily. But can a presidential and vice presidential candidate disagree so completely on what course of action their administration would follow in Vietnam?

We don't think so and, for our part, we prefer the JAVITS view. It has the support of an overwhelming number of Asian experts, among them former U.S. Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith, who writes on Vietnam in the current number of Commentary magazine.

Galbraith thinks that this nation ought to go to a holding type of operation looking toward a negotiated settlement. He flatly opposes sending additional U.S. troops to

Vietnam and escalating the fighting and the bombing.

"We must first of all escape from the entrapment of our own propaganda," he advises. "Vietnam is not important to us. Nor is it a bastion of freedom. Nor is it a testing place for democracy. It is none of these things."

And anticipating the frustrations of such men as Romney, as reflected in Sunday's Harris poll of opinion, he wrote:

"Some will certainly suggest covering their disappointments in the south with more muscular action elsewhere. The purpose of this, like the demand for manpower to pacify the whole country, is now, however subjectively, to bail out the reputations of those who for so long have been committed to this ill-starred enterprise."

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 17, 1966]
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR WHOM?

The more Premier Nguyen Cao Ky talks about the coming elections in Vietnam, the more pertinent becomes the question: What are we fighting for?

The Johnson administration has offered a score of different answers, depending on the circumstances, but one is always included in the package. We are there to guarantee self-determination for the South Vietnamese, the right to choose their own form of government.

Aside from the fact that Vietnam made its choice in 1954, when it drove the French colonialists out, and aside from the question of whether we can be policeman to the world, Johnson's answer isn't a bad one. At least it has the merit of nobility.

But Premier Ky sounds as if he'd never heard of it, just as all his predecessors in Saigon had never heard of it.

Ky's 20-man, hand-picked junta declared Wednesday that it will stay in power until at least the middle of next year. The role of the constituent assembly, to be elected Sept. 11, will be limited to writing a new constitution, the junta said. It will have no legislative powers.

This overruled the junta's own electoral commission, which proposed letting the assembly live on as a legislative body.

Further, the junta said, there will be only 123 seats in the assembly, instead of the 159 the commission had proposed. And each delegate will represent approximately 50,000 people, or a total of 6.15 million out of South Vietnam's estimated 15 million people.

This means, already, that the election and the new constitution are rigged. Forty percent of the people will elect 100 percent of the delegates, and the junta will tell the delegates how much power they have.

Members of the Vietcong, who are South Vietnam citizens, will not be allowed to vote. Nor will civilians in areas occupied by the Vietcong.

No wonder American officials say we will abide by the results. If we lose a rigged election like this, even the most hawklike supporter would have to concede we're not wanted.

And if we win, it will hardly be a fair test of self-determination. This kind of democracy the people could have had without us.

[From the Detroit Free Press, June 24, 1966]
AS WE SEE IT: UNITED STATES COULD LOSE A WAR BY WINNING THE BATTLE

Whether the supposed American peace offer to Hanoi was made in good faith or in an attempt to regain the propaganda leadership is a question which cannot be answered. What is clear, though, is Hanoi's rejection. It left no doubt that the North Vietnamese leaders think they are winning and can win.

Before any move is made to the bargaining table, Hanoi said, the United States must stop bombing North Vietnam. It must also signify its willingness, as UN Secretary General Thant proposed, to talk to all those who are "actually fighting," including the Vietcong.

Then Hanoi may be willing to think about it.

This firm answer means that North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh is confident he is dealing from strength, and from this side of the battleground it looks as if he's right.

Ho has seen South Vietnamese troops withdrawn from battle to fight each other. He has seen the Saigon military junta kept in power only with United States support. And Ho has shown us that every escalation on our part can be and is matched by an equal escalation on his part.

In the process, Ho has actually strengthened his military position. He seems to have patched up his differences with Red China so that he is getting more support in money and materiel from Peking than before.

This last fact alone should give the United States serious pause. Our best hope is to keep Southeast Asia out of Red China's hands, to try to establish there an independent, even if communist, nation. If we push Hanoi into the protective embrace of Peking, we might possibly win the battle, but we would certainly lose the war.

How slight is President Johnson's grasp of these facts was shown by his speech to legislative leaders in Washington the other day. We are in Vietnam, he said, to defend our own position as the No. 1 world power and the No. 1 "have" nation against international "gangsterism and aggression."

This can only mean he thinks Red China is the aggressor in South Vietnam, which is flatly not true, or he thinks we must destroy Red China, which he is not seeking to do and would be incredibly reckless to try.

The unemotional fact, as historian J. H. Plumb writes in the new Saturday Review, is that "Sooner or later America must get out of Vietnam, win or lose, and what then will be the meaning of this bloody drain of men and treasure? China will still be there, still communist, and much stronger. And China will have to be lived with."

The sooner the President can absorb these realities, the greater the chances of salvaging something at the bargaining table. To escalate further would only be to seal the doom of Vietnam, and waste the lives of more Americans.

CHANGE OF RESIDENCE

Senators, Representatives, and Delegates who have changed their residences will please give information thereof to the Government Printing Office, that their addresses may be correctly given in the Record.

LAWS RELATIVE TO THE PRINTING OF DOCUMENTS

Either House may order the printing of a document not already provided for by law, but only when the same shall be accompanied by an estimate from the Public Printer as to the probable cost thereof. Any executive department, bureau, board or independent office of the Government submitting reports or documents in response to inquiries from Congress shall submit therewith an estimate of the probable cost of printing the usual number. Nothing in this section relating to estimates shall apply to reports or documents not exceeding 50 pages (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 140, p. 1938).

Resolutions for printing extra copies, when presented to either House, shall be referred immediately to the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate, who, in making their report, shall give the probable cost of the proposed printing upon the estimate of the Public Printer, and no extra copies shall be printed before such committee has reported (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 133, p. 1937).

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS FOR SALE

Additional copies of Government publications are offered for sale to the public by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, at cost thereof as determined by the Public Printer plus 50 percent: *Provided*, That a discount of not to exceed 25 percent may be allowed to authorized bookdealers and quantity purchasers, but such printing shall not interfere with the prompt execution of work for the Government. The Superintendent of Documents shall prescribe the terms and conditions under which he may authorize the resale of Government publications by bookdealers, and he may designate any Government officer his agent for the sale of Government publications under such regulations as shall be agreed upon by the Superintendent of Documents and the head of the respective department or establishment of the Government (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 72a, Supp. 2).

RECORD OFFICE AT THE CAPITOL

An office for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, with Mr. Raymond F. Noyes in charge, is located in room H-112, House wing, where orders will be received for subscriptions to the Record at \$1.50 per month or for single copies at 1 cent for eight pages (minimum charge of 3 cents). Also, orders from Members of Congress to purchase reprints from the Record should be processed through this office.

CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY

The Public Printer, under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, may print for sale, at a price sufficient to reimburse the expenses of such printing, the current Congressional Directory. No sale shall be made on credit (U.S. Code, title 44, sec. 150, p. 1939).