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subject has recently been given to the public in the published hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Laws. Copies of these hearings are available to all schools. The teacher who uses such materials as assigned readings in her classroom gives her pupils the satisfaction of knowing that they are holding in their hands the very latest published information on the subject of subversive activities.

In conclusion, the reports and hearings of the congressional committees furnish materials that are indispensable for an adequate understanding of the ideology and operation of the Communist Party in all countries as well as the United States. Much of this material is available in no other source. The reports conform to the best research standards of scientific method. The information is authentic and fully verified. These reports should be in the hands of every teacher giving instruction relating to communism. And they should also be found in the library of every public and private school.

TRANSPORTATION, SALE, AND HANDLING OF DOGS AND CATS FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES

(Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the request of Mr. McCLODY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I today supported the Helstoski and Bolton amendments to H.R. 13881—Poage bill—and also supported the motion to recommit H.R. 13881—Poage bill—in order to achieve a better bill with more coverage.

Unfortunately, the amendments and the recommittal motion were defeated.

I then reluctantly supported H.R. 13881—Poage bill—on final passage, in order to attain a first step, although imperfect, in the fight for more humane treatment for animals. We must not let the matter rest here.

FREE WORLD TRADE WITH NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (at the request of Mr. McCLODY) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, I have for many months been trying to spotlight the nature and extent of free world trade with North Vietnam. On numerous occasions I have sought to present information about this shocking aid and comfort being given to the war economy of the Hanoi regime. Unfortunately, and I believe unjustifiably, full information about this trade has been kept from the American people. The Government has been keeping two sets of books. For instance, in my report of February 7, I listed 119 free world ship arrivals in North Vietnam during 1965 as made available to me by the Department of Defense. I said then that this was not the true number but was the unclassified number. The true number, I said, was more than double the 119 figures.

After months of prodding, the Defense Department today has finally agreed to begin to release the true figures about this trade which, although it has recently been on the decline, still has not been

stopped. Today's decision, however, was not easily obtained. My repeated pleas for declassification made on the floor of this House met with no response. Finally, last month in the course of hearings before the Armed Services Committee, I pointedly asked Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester why the Department was keeping a secret set of books on this trade. In response, Mr. Sylvester challenged the accuracy of the figures I cited. In my defense, I simply said the source of these figures was the Department of Defense. Days went by without any indication when an answer would be forthcoming as Mr. Sylvester had promised. I, therefore, felt compelled to write the following letter which I ask unanimous consent to be included at this point in the Record:

APRIL 19, 1966.

HON. ARTHUR SYLVESTER,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY SYLVESTER: When you appeared before the House Armed Services Committee with Assistant Secretary Solis Norwitz on March 31, I asked why certain facts and figures with reference to free world shipping with North Vietnam were classified, indicating my belief that the people of our Nation should be fully apprised of this trade.

At that time, you promised to give me a full report about this situation but up to the present date I have not received it. As I am sure you are aware, I am deeply concerned, not only about the extent of such free world trade but about so much of the information being kept from the public.

During our discourse, it appeared that the classified figures you had were at variance with those which had been given me. I am, therefore, anxiously awaiting your report clarifying this matter.

Thanking you for your courtesy, I am,
Sincerely yours,

CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN.

Today, I finally received an answer together with the first set of the declassified statistics concerning free world trade and I ask unanimous consent that this material be inserted in the Record at this point:

Free world ship calls at North Vietnam

Ship registry	4th quarter, 1965	1st quarter, 1966
United Kingdom-flag vessels..	135	29
Norway.....	3	0
Greece.....	3	4
Cyprus.....	2	2
France.....	1	0
Italy.....	0	1
Total.....	44	36

¹ Ownership: Singapore, 1; United Kingdom, 6; Hong Kong, 28.

² Ownership: United Kingdom, 2; Hong Kong, 27

As will be noted, this information goes back only as far as the last 3 months of 1965. To underline the discrepancy that has existed between what the Defense Department has announced to be the truth about this trade up until today with the actual fact, I would merely point out that while the unclassified figure of the total number of arrivals of free world ships during October, November, and December of 1965, was 21, it is now conceded that there were, in fact, 44. And while in the first quarter of 1966 the unclassified

figure was given as 16, the true figure as announced today, is revealed to be 36.

American people have been greatly disturbed by reports of this trade even when told less than half the truth about it. Our efforts to win the struggle in South Vietnam can not be aided here at home by the official dispensing of misinformation which is designed not to protect our security but to cover up ineffective policies.

STATES ARE FINALLY GOING TO BE CONSULTED ON THE AFTER-1972 HIGHWAY NEEDS STUDY TO BE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS JANUARY 1968

(Mr. CRAMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Speaker, on August 28, 1965, the President of the United States signed into law Senate Joint Resolution 81, pertaining to the Federal-aid highway program.

This law, Public Law 89-139, among other things, stated that it was the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Commerce, acting under authority of existing law and through the Bureau of Public Roads, shall report to Congress next January 1968 and in January of every second year thereafter his estimates of the future highway needs of the Nation.

There have been disturbing rumors during the past few months that the States might not be permitted to fully participate in the formulation of the plans for a program for improving the Nation's highway systems after 1972, particularly any possible extension of the Interstate System. This has been a matter of serious concern to many individuals and organizations who are vitally concerned with the proper functioning of the Nation's highway programs and with the States retaining an effective voice in the determination of future highway needs beyond 1972. Others are also concerned that the anticipated January 1968 study of future highway needs might not be sufficiently comprehensive or submitted in sufficient time to permit the Congress to adequately work its will in determining legislation for the future highway programs beyond 1972, when the present highway program is scheduled for completion.

During the first week in March, I received a letter dated February 25, 1966, from Mr. Floyd B. Bowen, chairman of the Florida State Road Department, concerning the participation of that department in the formulation of the Federal-aid highway program after 1972. Chairman Bowen stated in that letter that the Bureau of Public Roads had not requested to that date that his department formulate any recommended future improvement program for Federal-aid highways.

On March 18, 1966, I wrote to the Federal Highway Administrator, Hon. Rex M. Whitton, inquiring as to the progress of preparation of the January 1968 report to Congress and as to the participation of the States in its formulation. I

THE USE OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
MATERIALS

(By Dr. Kenneth Colegrove, professor of political science, C. W. Post College of Long Island University)

Many public schools as well as colleges and universities fail to make adequate use of one of our most important sources of accurate information regarding the Communist international conspiracy.

This source is the large number of reports and hearings on communism published by congressional committees: The two most important of these sources are the reports of the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Internal Security Laws, and the reports of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the U.S. House of Representatives.

From time to time, I have asked teachers who were not using congressional committee materials why such a valuable source was ignored. Sometimes, the answer by even college and university professors indicated an ignorance of the existence of these materials. Sometimes, teachers excused their failure to use these materials by declaring that the committee reports were "mere propaganda" or lacked "objectivity." Most teachers who expressed such a prejudice against the reports admitted that they had never read a report by either one of the two congressional committees.

The widespread propaganda against congressional committee investigations has included the charge that the congressional committee reports lack "objectivity." The accusation of lack of "objectivity" is often bandied by persons who have not even the remotest idea as to the meaning of this technical term in scientific method. Among scholars, it is generally assumed that objectivity is attainable in the physical sciences. At the same time, most scholars seriously doubt whether any studies in the social sciences can ever achieve objectivity, or the complete absence of bias, prejudice, or preconceived notions. Suffice it here to say there are no textbooks, monographs, or treatises in history, political science, economics, or sociology which are "objective" in the same manner as treatises in mathematics or the physical sciences. Perhaps the best that can be attained in all the social sciences is an approximation toward objectivity.

The committee reports, of course, fall in the field of the social sciences. And here the problem is not one of "objectivity," but rather the question whether the report or monograph or findings meet the standards of scientific method in the social sciences.

What are standards of scientific method in the social sciences? These standards include: (1) documentation of sources; (2) accuracy of data and verification of evidence; (3) authenticity of quotations and avoidance of distortion of quotations; (4) scientific analysis of data; and (5) the logical formulation of conclusions.

An honest appraisal of the committee reports will show that they fully meet the canons of scientific method in the social sciences. In fact, the committee reports are deliberately prepared in conformity with the canons of modern scientific method. The research staffs of the committees do not engage in name calling, card stacking, question begging, glittering generalizations, and other propaganda tricks. On the contrary, the research staffs of the committees employ approved standards of research in testing the credibility of evidence, in the verification of sources, in the analysis of data, and in the formulation of conclusions.

Obviously, the committee reports contain a large amount of testimony by experts and eyewitnesses which is derogatory to Communist leaders and Communist regimes. But the research staffs treat such evidence as testimony, the validity of which must be

appraised in a scientific manner. Quotations of Communist leaders are always carefully verified. And they are not distorted or lifted from context. Nothing is stated as a fact, which has not been carefully substantiated. Most of the reports have complete documentation, such as would be found in a treatise by an erudite university professor. Indeed, the staffs of the committees show the same intellectual honesty found in the best research work in American universities and colleges, and in the research institutions supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, or any of the other great foundations. It is naive to assume that the research staff of a governmental agency cannot maintain the same scientific standards as the staff of a private institution.

The reports of the congressional committees contain a vast array of facts carefully verified in thousands of hours of staff research. For instance, the Subcommittee on Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary has issued a committee print on "Soviet Political Agreements and Results." This compilation enumerates (with details covering 100 pages) over 200 violations of treaties and other international agreements by the Soviet Union. I have used this compilation on numerous occasions, and have never found an error of fact. Nor have my students who frequently study this compilation ever reported to me any error of fact.

Not only do the committee reports furnish a vast amount of accurate information but also the information is generally presented in convenient form. For instance, the first volume of "Facts on Communism," issued by the Committee on Un-American Activities in 1960, is devoted to "The Communist Ideology." The volume gives, with proper documentation, the principal Communist doctrines, arranged under 80 topics. With this booklet in her hand, a high school teacher who, for example, is unfamiliar with the history of the Communist doctrine of the "inevitability of war," can promptly inform herself regarding this dogma with very little time and effort. Or again, she can readily ascertain the Communist distinction between "propaganda" and "agitation" or still again, fathom the Marxist-Leninist hocus-poens of "dialectical materialism."

As to documentation, a large part of the contents of the committee reports is based on testimony given under oath in the hearings of the committee and in other authenticated evidence laid before the committee. The reports indicate the sources of such evidence. Many reports, such as the Senate document, prepared by the Subcommittee on Internal Security Laws on "The Communist Party of the United States of America," contain material acquired by research as well as derived from testimony before the several committees. Another example of a completely documented research paper is "The Soviet Empire: Prison House of Nations and Races: A Study in Genocide, Discrimination and Abuse of Power" (S. Doc. 122, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958). In all such cases, the reports indicate the source of all evidence obtained by research. In other words, the research staffs of the committees comply with the standards of scientific method regarding documentation of sources in the social sciences.

It will not be amiss to emphasize again the remarkable convenience of the some of the committee reports. Forty years ago, the standard treatise for studying the inconsistencies and false predictions of communism was Vladimir G. Simkhovitch's "Marxism versus Socialism" (New York, 1913). But that was 40 years ago. Today, where can the student find in systematic and succinct form a review of the inconsistencies of modern Marxism-Leninism and Soviet practice? There are many ponderous tomes. But for brevity and modernity, none of them can hold a candle to the 54 pages of the committee

print of the Subcommittee on Internal Security Laws, published under the title of "Contradictions of Communism." The 172 footnotes in this compilation furnish all that is required in the matter of scholarly documentation.

The reports of the congressional committees, of course, cannot take the place of adequate textbooks, study guides, or syllabuses. Textbooks, of course, must include the pedagogical devices required by educational experts. At the same time, however, the committee reports offer a vast amount of pertinent material to supplement a textbook, or to supply the broad field of information required by a study guide or syllabus.

Again, a textbook, by itself, cannot furnish all of the workshop activities that should accompany studies in the social sciences in the public and private schools. There are problems which the pupil should attempt to solve outside the confines of his textbook. Where did the authors of a textbook obtain the information furnished in the textbook? What are the various sources of information on the subject? Has the textbook failed to present evidence that might conflict with the conclusions of the textbook? What further information should be offered on any subject? These are important questions. And the pupil should be encouraged to test these problems for himself.

With reference to questions which unfortunately have become controversial, the committee reports furnish information that may be difficult to obtain elsewhere. No textbook adequately covers all phases of many of these problems. A case in point is the student riots in San Francisco in May 1960. Incontestable proof shows that a large number of students in the San Francisco area were the dupes of the Communist Party in staging these riots. And, since American youth were involved in this spectacular outburst of violence, boys and girls in our high schools in all States of the Union are particularly interested in this episode. If this case is deliberately omitted from classroom discussion, the chances are that some bright boy or girl will raise the subject. The prudent teacher will take the precaution to arm herself with authentic information. For this purpose, she should study the report entitled "The Communist-Led Riots Against the House Committee on Un-American Activities in San Francisco, Calif., May 12-14, 1960" (House Rept. No. 2228, 86th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 7, 1960). In particular, she should study the report of these riots by J. Edgar Hoover the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, published under the title of "Communist Target—Youth: Communist Infiltration and Agitation Tactics" (July 1960). She should complete this preparation by a study of "The Truth About the Film 'Operation Abolition'" (House Rept. No. 1278, 87th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 5, 1961). The alert teacher will not allow herself to be embarrassed by lack of information on a subject of this character.

The well-informed teacher will also point out to her class that youth has always been a special target of Communist tactics, and that in recent years the Communist Party in all countries has instigated students to mob violence. Where will the teacher find evidence for this conclusion? It will suffice to read the committee print of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, entitled "Communist Anti-American Riots: Mob Violence as an Instrument of Red Diplomacy: Bogota-Caracas-La Paz-Tokyo" (Aug. 26, 1960).

In particular, the committee reports and hearings often present more timely information than can be found in any textbook or study guide. The best textbooks, of course, depend very heavily upon the findings of the committees. But, at the present moment, I know of no textbook that shows the connection of the propaganda organ, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, with the Communist regime of Fidel Castro. Data on this

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OLD SYSTEM'S FAULTS

The complaint against the old "input-oriented" budget is simple. Too many programs, Presidential aids say, are presented for decision to an agency head or the President with objectives unclear, likely benefits vague, costs uncertain, and alternatives lacking. There is little indication of the long-term commitments at stake. Decisions tend to bunch up in November and December, and then are made in a crisis atmosphere. Certain bureaus within an agency operate almost independent of top control, relying on protection from powerful Congressmen or outside pressure groups.

The new system seeks to lay out budget information so clearly that it almost forces close examination of potential alternatives, possible inefficiency and duplication, and long-term consequences.

Each agency now is setting up a number of broad goals it seeks to achieve, and then more specific subcategories. All operating programs with similar purposes are being grouped into the appropriate category or subcategory, no matter which subordinate unit or division does the job.

PPBS then attempts to show the cost of each program and possible alternatives, including pay, research and development, capital investment, operating expenses, and so on. Next comes the most difficult part: an attempt to measure in specific, nonfinancial terms just how much good is expected from the program—how much educational levels will be raised, or poverty reduced, or water pollution abated. For each program all these cost and benefit figures are calculated for 5 years or longer.

Then the benefit-cost analysis for one program will be compared with benefit-cost analyses for other programs serving the same ends, or even completely different ends. Then, it is argued, top Federal officials will be in a good position to make crucial choices.

So far the poverty program, which has used PPBS for over a year has made most progress on the new system. The space and atomic energy programs, Agriculture Department, and parts of the Federal Aviation Agency are well along. Many other agencies are starting slowly.

While the present focus is on getting PPBS going within each agency, eventually the Budget Bureau would stress comparisons between agencies also. Some agencies already are comparing notes to set up similar program categories. The Agriculture and Interior Departments and the Department of Housing and Urban Development are doing rough consultation on categories for recreation programs.

Before the McNamara revolution at the Pentagon, each military service had its own budget, broken down into outlays for pay, operations and maintenance, construction, research, and the like. Mr. McNamara switched to nine major missions: Strategic retaliation, continental defense, airlift and sealift, general-purpose forces, etc. The weapons available for each mission were listed, regardless of which service developed and operated the weapon. To each weapon were allocated all the costs of developing, procuring and operating it. Then the amount of protection or deterrence offered by each system was assessed.

END OF A CARGO PLANE

With such information, it is said, Mr. McNamara recently was able to conclude that the existing C-141 cargo plane wasn't as effective as the proposed, much larger C-5A for carrying the equipment a big military transport probably would have to carry. C-141 procurement accordingly was tapered off.

Last summer Mr. Johnson ordered the entire Government to prepare to shift to the new method. In October the Budget Bureau

issued Bulletin 66-3 to all major agencies, telling them to set up staffs and begin working on program categories for the new system.

All major agencies now have a PPBS staff or the nucleus of one. The Agriculture Department has 12 men working on PPBS in the Secretary's office, plus full or part-time men in each of the Department's eight major divisions. Many of the men putting the system into effect are, expectably, alumni of the Pentagon or of Rand Corp., which supplied many of the McNamara "whiz kids."

There still are many PPBS doubters in and out of the Government. "All 66-3 says," snorts one longtime public official, "is to think things through and get them in on time, something any good man should have been doing all along."

ORGANIZED COMMONSENSE

Budget Bureau men counter that PPBS is needed precisely to require efforts to think things through. "It's really no more than organized commonsense," one official admits, "but that word 'organized' is just as vital as the 'commonsense' part. PPBS forces people to consider costs, to consider alternatives, to look ahead."

Another objection is the difficulty of measuring or "quantifying" results. "It's utter garbage," an agency head declares. "How do you quantify the extent to which pre-kindergarten training now will reduce poverty 15 years from now?"

PPBS backers admit such assessments often will be difficult, especially, say, in foreign affairs or in some basic research program that could lead unpredictably either to a cancer cure or to a new plastic. But they contend that most results can be estimated by making reasonable assumptions.

"The Job Corps is supposed to make kids capable of holding better jobs," says one administration official. "You can look at the jobs obtained by kids who go through the Corps, the jobs obtained by kids who don't, and make some allowance for the fact that the Job Corps staff is working extra hard to get jobs for their kids. Then you have extra values such as a reduction in juvenile delinquency, or better family relationships, or the impact on younger brothers. And you can then say that so many dollars spent on the Job Corps probably will provide this many more kids with decent jobs, and that you'll also be getting some additional benefits you can't measure so precisely."

ROLE OF POLITICS

A far more basic reservation many officials have is whether the economic analysis actually will control major decisions or whether political realities will dominate.

"Suppose we find the Job Corps is doing a much better job than the Neighborhood Youth Corps, or vice versa," one official suggests. "The President and Congress still are going to make a political decision on the basis of what is most popular or the least trouble back home."

But PPBS advocates insist that the new system at least will give agency heads and the President hard facts to back up politically tough decisions—figures to prove the declining value of some older programs, or to show that new program A is actually more valuable than more popular new program B.

HOUSE GIVES OVERWHELMING SUPPORT TO RESTORATION OF SCHOOL MILK FUNDS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHURCH in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the administration's proposal to cut the special milk program by 80 percent and redirect the program to the needy, as well as those in schools without a lunch program, was overwhelmingly repudiated by the House on Tuesday.

The House Appropriations Committee's report on the fiscal 1967 Department of Agriculture and related agencies appropriation bill set the tone. In concise fashion, the report indicated why the committee decided to provide \$103 million for school milk in the fiscal 1967 budget. The report read:

At a time when many young Americans are being turned down for military service because of defects traceable to nutritional deficiencies, it is recommended in the budget that the special milk program be virtually eliminated. * * * The reduction in the special milk program from \$103 million to \$21 million—a cut of \$82 million—would deny supplemental milk to about 80 percent of our schoolchildren who are now benefiting from the program. Further, the reaction of those needy children selected for free milk could result in the complete abandonment of this valuable program. * * * The benefits of this program to the health and dietary habits of schoolchildren of this Nation are well recognized. Many witnesses have testified to the benefits to school attendance and an improved approach to learning by students receiving the milk free or at reduced prices.

When the appropriation bill came to the floor of the House on Tuesday, the Appropriations Committee was highly praised, and rightly so, for adding \$82 million to the budget request for the school milk program. In fact, more favorable comments were made on this item than were voiced on any other item in the bill. Twenty-seven House Members took the floor to commend the committee for providing adequate funds to continue the program at this year's levels.

Mr. President, I know that the Senate shares the other body's concern over the proposed school milk cutback. This is amply attested to by the fact that 67 of my Senate colleagues have cosponsored my bill to make the school milk program permanent. As a member of the Agriculture Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, I intend to do everything in my power not only to avert a big cutback in this program but also to actually increase the program over last year's levels, to bring it more into line with increasing participation as well as the jump in the school-age population.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STUDY SHOWS VIETNAM WAR HAS NEGLECTIBLE IMPACT ON ECONOMY

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, a few weeks ago on this floor, I pointed out that the Vietnam buildup was having a very limited impact on our economy. In fact, I inserted figures in the Record to show that we spent a greater percentage of our gross national product on defense in the years 1956 through 1964 than we, in all likelihood, will spend in fiscal 1967.

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Now the Defense Department has come up with a study which reaches substantially the same conclusions, using slightly different statistical indicators. This study shows that the economic effect of the Vietnam war is less than one-third that of Korea. It points out that whereas the share of gross national product going into defense expenditures increased by 9.1 percentiles during the Korean war, projections for the Vietnam buildup show an increase of only 0.4 percent.

This is an incredible testimonial not only to the strength of our economy but also to the ability of Secretary McNamara to keep our defense apparatus well-oiled and ready for any contingency. It should give the prophets of economic doom and gloom some food for thought. Above all, it shows that our dynamic economy is perfectly capable of providing guns and butter.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the study as well as the study itself be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM BUILDUP IS LESS THAN ONE-THIRD THAT OF KOREA

SUMMARY

Compared to the Korean buildup, the economic impact of the present military buildup for Vietnam is one-fourth to one-third as large.

Defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product were much higher in the Korean period (14 percent as compared to 8.1 percent).

A more significant measure of economic impact is the increase in defense expenditures from the prebuildup years. During the Korean buildup, the share of gross national product going to defense expenditures increased by 9.1 percentiles (4.9 percent to 14 percent of then gross national product). Projections for the Vietnam buildup show an increase of only 0.4 percent (7.7 percent to 8.1 percent of current gross national product).

Although increases in defense spending for Vietnam are much less, they do come at a time of already low unemployment and on top of significant fixed business investment. At the start of the Korean buildup there was 5.2 percent unemployment (as against 4.6 at mid-1965) and 9.6 percent of gross national product was going into business fixed investment (as against 10.2 percent at the start of the present buildup). Making the extreme CEA assumption that 1 percent less unemployment produces across the board 3 percent more gross national product, there was 1.8 percent of gross national product more economic "slack" in mid-1950 than in mid-1965.

Compared to the Korean buildup of 9.1 percent of gross national product, the Vietnam buildup of 4 percent of gross national product comes on a base which is 1.8 percent of gross national product higher. The total impact of the 1965-67 period is then 2.2 percent of gross national product compared to the 9.1 percent of gross national product in the 1950-53 period. (See summary table).

This view suggests that in aggregate terms the economic impact in 1965-67 will be one-fourth that of 1950-53. In specific commodity and labor requirements the impact is somewhat greater.

Summary table—Comparative impact of defense buildup, Korea and Vietnam

	[In percent]	
	Korea	Vietnam
I. Differences in size of buildup:		
Percent of GNP going to defense expenditure:		
Start of buildup.....	4.9	7.7
Peak of buildup.....	14.0	18.1
Increases during buildup.....	+9.1	+4.4
II. Differences in domestic economy at start of buildup; Greater use of resources at start of Vietnam buildup.....		+1.8
III. Comparative impact including the difference in domestic economy.....	+9.1	+2.2

¹ Estimated.

DETAILED COMPARISON OF THE IMPACT OF THE DEFENSE BUILDUP FOR VIETNAM WITH THAT FOR KOREA

A. Aggregate impact:

1. In dollar terms defense outlays today are greater than during the Korean conflict. Annual budget expenditures for national defense reached a peak of just over \$50 billion during the Korean period while for fiscal 1967 the projected national defense expenditures are just over \$60 billion.

2. However, the U.S. economy today is much larger than at the time of Korea. Since the early 1950's 14 million more people have been added to the labor force. Gross national product in constant dollars has risen by over 70 percent. Manufacturing capacity has increased 77 percent. Capacity in some industries—utilities, chemical, petroleum, and rubber products—has more than doubled.

3. This greater capacity means that the U.S. economy today can better absorb the necessary defense outlays than it could at the time of Korea. In the peak year of the Korean conflict, defense expenditures reached 14 percent of GNP while projections into fiscal 1967 show defense expenditures only 8.1 percent of GNP. Even though the dollar amount of defense spending is larger today, defense expenditure as a percentage of total output is smaller.

4. More important from the viewpoint of economic impact, however, is the comparative increases in defense expenditures during the two buildups. Increases in defense expenditures cause shifts in resource allocation and can put a severe strain on the economy's productive capacity. The Korean buildup, following a period of general demobilization and de-emphasis of defense, was accompanied by considerably greater expenditure increases. In 2 years defense expenditures more than tripled (from \$13 billion in fiscal year 1950 to \$44 billion in fiscal year 1952) and the fiscal year 1953 defense expenditures (\$50.4 billion) were nearly four times the fiscal year 1950 level.

The Vietnam buildup, starting from a much higher base, has not had the same sudden impact effect. Projections into fiscal year 1967 show increases in defense expenditure of only 20 percent (from \$50.2 billion in fiscal year 1965 to \$60.5 billion in fiscal year 1967).

5. The impact of the faster Korean buildup was offset only slightly by the fact that there was somewhat more slack in the do-

¹ All calculations are based on defense expenditures and fiscal years.

mestic economy at the time of Korea. The Vietnam buildup in 1965 was preceded by 4 years of steady and fairly regular economic expansion, while the year before the outbreak of the Korean conflict (1949) was a recession year. However, the first two quarters of 1950 brought a very rapid recovery and by the outbreak of the Korean conflict in June 1950 the economy was nearly back to its prerecession level. Nevertheless, in June of 1950 unemployment was 5.2 percent and industry was operating at 83 percent of capacity while in the spring of 1965 unemployment was 4.6 percent and the industry operating rate was 90 percent.

6. In spite of the greater slack in the economy before the Korean buildup, the rate of buildup at the time of Korea and the percentage of GNP going to defense at that time were so great that the Korean impact was much more critical.

B. Specific impacts

1. Manpower

Table 1 shows that the unemployment rates have not yet dipped to the Korean low of 2.9 percent. The projection at the beginning of this calendar year was for unemployment to drop from 4 percent to 3.5 percent in 1966. However, as the rate has already dropped to 3.7 percent in February, this projection is certainly too high. Shortages that now exist in certain skilled labor categories may develop into overall labor scarcity.

Defense is less responsible today for any labor scarcity than at the time of Korea. Even in absolute numbers table 2 projects 3.1 million in the armed services by 1967 as against the Korean war level of 3.5 million men in the armed services. As a percentage of the labor force, today's Armed Forces requirements plus civilian defense requirements are 5 percent as against 7 percent.

In industries heavily oriented toward defense production, increases in employment in the Vietnam buildup have not reached the levels of the Korean buildup. Table 3 shows the figures for two defense-oriented industries—the ordnance and aircraft industries. By December of the build-up year, employment in these two industries had increased by about 39 percent in the Korean period, and only by about 15 percent in the Vietnam period.

2. Copper and Aluminum

Examples of the impact of the defense buildup on materials are taken from the copper and aluminum industries. Both of these materials are used heavily in defense production, both were in short supply in the Korean period and both are in short supply now (copper especially).

The percentage of copper shipments going to military uses is shown in table 4 (not printed on the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD). The set-asides (i.e., the amount of copper set aside by BDSA in anticipation of defense needs) have increased in anticipation of increased defense use in fiscal year 1966. But even the set-asides, which are less than the direct shipments, are only 8 percent of the total shipments, while direct military shipments at the time of Korea reached 17.5 percent of the total.

The pattern is similar for aluminum as shown in table 5 (not printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD). The percentage of shipments going to military uses has recently increased, but is still only about one-third of the percentage which went to military uses at the time of Korea. Table 5 shows also that the dollar value of aluminum shipments used by defense today is

about the same as Korea. The lower percentage is a result of a larger total industry output.

3. The Aircraft Industry

The pattern for the final output aircraft industry is not unlike the pattern for the copper and aluminum materials industries. The percentage of military shipments to total shipments is much lower now than at the time of Korea. This is shown in table 6 [not printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD]. In the aircraft industry, however, the military percentage has continued to drop and, contrary to the copper and aluminum cases, civilian shipments have substantially increased. Since 1964 the heaviest increase in shipments has gone to civilian, not military uses.

C. Civilian impact

1. These examples suggests that other factors, besides the military buildup, are influencing the present shortages. In the Korean period, as the military shipments of these goods increased, civilian shipments either decreased or increased at a lower rate. In the Vietnam buildup, civilian shipments continued and, in the case of aircraft, increased their upward climb.

2. The curtailed civilian shipments during the Korean period were the result of Government controls. Considering the smaller impact of the present buildup, this is not necessary. Since the military sector is now smaller than at the time of Korea and consequently the civilian sector is larger, other methods of decreasing civilian consumption are more appealing and are being considered. Specifically, tighter fiscal and monetary measures may be desirable.

3. One example—the most important example,—of increased pressure from the civilian sector should be mentioned. This is the recent growth in business fixed investment. For the last 2 years (1964 and 1965) business fixed investment has been growing at twice the rate that GNP has grown. Even more significant is that many of the new projections into 1966 show a further increase.

This increase began before the Vietnam buildup and is therefore due less to increases in defense spending than it is to other favorable economic factors—high utilization rates, available financing, and better future returns (i.e., lower corporate rates, liberalized depreciation rules, etc.). In short, this is a very likely target for fiscal and monetary policy aimed at easing demand pressure in the economy.

4. But timing economic policy to coordinate with economic impact is another matter. The impact of defense spending takes place in advance of actual expenditures. It is on the strength of defense contracts let that people are hired, machinery purchased, raw materials accumulated and production started. The later delivery of the defense goods (and expenditures for them) do not indicate an impact on the economy but rather a transfer to the Government of goods in business inventory which had been gradually building in value.

The real economic impact then takes place very early in the buildup. This is what happened in Korea when in fiscal year 1951 total obligational authority increased by 68 percent and the value of DOD prime contract awards was almost six times greater than the previous year. Although the major increases in expenditures did not come until 1952 and 1953, it was in 1951 that the major increase in production of defense equipment took place. This can be seen in table 7.

Turning to the Vietnam buildup, we find roughly the same thing happening. Under present projections, the direct obligations and total obligational authority are highest in fiscal year 1966 while expenditures are not

expected to reach their peak until fiscal year 1967. In other words, if the present projections are correct, we are feeling the major impact of the buildup now and fiscal year 1967 will bring some relief.

For economic policy purposes this means that if the present projections are correct, tighter tax and monetary policy initiated now (because of the usual lags) will not take effect until fiscal year 1967 when the worst may be over. If present projections are not correct and if a new supplemental is needed in fiscal year 1967 the decision on tax increases should wait until some idea of the size and distribution of that supplemental have been determined.

TABLE 1.—Percentage of labor force unemployed before and during Korean and Vietnam buildups

KOREA		Percent
1949	-----	5.9
1950	-----	5.3
1951	-----	3.3
1952	-----	3.1
1953	-----	2.9
1954	-----	5.6
VIETNAM		
1964	-----	5.2
1965	-----	4.6
1966 (January)	-----	4.0
1966 (February)	-----	3.7

TABLE 2.—Manpower requirements of defense (Armed Forces and civilian)

	Total labor force (including Armed Forces)	Defense			Percent total to labor force
		Armed Forces	Civilian	Total	
<i>Millions</i>					
Korean period:		<i>Millions</i>	<i>Millions</i>	<i>Millions</i>	
1950	64.7	1.7	0.7	2.4	3.7
1951	66.0	3.1	1.1	4.2	6.4
1952	66.6	3.6	1.2	4.8	7.2
1953	67.3	3.5	1.2	4.7	7.0
Current period:					
1964	77.0	2.7	.9	3.6	4.7
1965	78.4	2.7	.9	3.6	4.6
1966 (estimated)	80.0	3.0	1.0	4.0	5.0
1967 (estimated)	81.5	3.1	1.0	4.1	5.0

TABLE 3.—Aircraft and ordnance industries—Comparative increases in employment during the buildup year 1950 versus 1965

[January=100]

	Previous year	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Aircraft and parts:													
1950	100	100	100	100	101	101	102	102	108	114	122	130	137
1965	101	100	98	100	101	102	101	104	106	108	110	113	116
Ordnance and accessories:													
1950	100	100	100	106	106	112	112	112	118	130	130	135	141
1965	96	100	100	101	102	102	105	104	106	109	111	112	114

TABLE 7.—Federal Reserve Board index of production of defense equipment during Korean and Vietnam buildups

[1957-59=100]

	Index	Change from previous year
<i>Korean period:</i>		
June 1949	24.2	-----
June 1950	24.5	+0.3
June 1951	67.8	+43.3
June 1952	95.2	+27.4
June 1953	116.2	+21.0
June 1954	100.5	-15.7
<i>Current period:</i>		
June 1964	108.1	-----
June 1965	112.3	+4.2
January 1966	127.6	+15.3

and should not make the tactical decisions for our military forces.

Certainly, when the Secretary of Defense is, as White says, able, devoted, and tireless, he should be allowed to exert the civilian control over this powerful military establishment which is all but impossible if alliances of disgruntled military men and powerful congressional groups are determined to block him.

I ask unanimous consent to have the article written by William S. White, "Should Congress Run the Pentagon?" printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE REAL ISSUE: SHOULD CONGRESS RUN THE PENTAGON?

(By William S. White)

Congressional attacks on Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara are reaching a pitch of violence rarely seen even in that desperately difficult post of Government.

As though the long burdens of the Vietnam war had not already put enough trouble on his plate, McNamara is now being hit from both sides of the Capitol for administrative decisions which are clearly within his proper responsibilities.

A House Armed Services Subcommittee denounces him in the harshest of terms for ordering a cutback in heavy-bomber production—and in the process gives what he de-

McNAMARA, NOT THE CONGRESS, SHOULD RUN THE PENTAGON

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, William White, in this morning's Washington Post, makes one of the most thoughtful and balanced observations I have read on the red-hot controversy between Secretary of Defense McNamara and his congressional critics.

White acknowledges the competence and sincerity of the able men in Congress who have hit the Secretary of Defense with a series of criticisms lately. But he concludes rightly that Congress cannot

clares is a "shockingly distorted picture" of what occurred and why.

The Senate Armed Services Committee follows up with an attack upon him for refusing to push a certain costly antimissile system.

The suggestion in both cases is that he has refused to accept professional military advice; in a word, that he had become an unduly one-man head of the Pentagon.

No outsider, however diligent, however objective, however earnest, can possibly hope to sort out the rights or wrongs of these particular decisions by the Secretary. Nor can it be said by fair men that these congressional groups are irresponsible or mere headline hunters.

Neither committee is, by congressional standards, normally motivated by cheap politics or by the mere thirst for attention. And McNamara, for his part, is totally unpartisan and unpolitical; this nobody really denies.

Brought into the Cabinet by the late President Kennedy, he was beforehand an inactive Republican.

Too, he came into Government at staggering personal sacrifice—a sacrifice involving millions of dollars, as former president of the Ford Motor Co.

The real question, therefore, cannot go to the motives of McNamara's critics, nor to his. The real question is not even whether he is right or wrong in these details of his administrative actions. Truly involved are incomparably larger issues. Can Congress rightfully or usefully interfere in the purely tactical operations of the Pentagon? If so, can any Secretary, however able, however devoted, however tireless (and these three qualities McNamara possesses, by all by common consent) run the Pentagon?

The Constitution empowers Congress to raise armies. But it does not empower Congress to decide precisely how the total military dollar is to be cut up as between one tactical military system and another. This is, for better or worse, the lawful province of the Secretary of Defense, operating under the ultimate authority of the President.

Somebody has got to be trusted to make these decisions; and under our system that somebody is currently McNamara.

Moreover, the same Congress that chivvies McNamara about the hows of dollar-splitting also holds him strictly to account for the total costs of his department. At one and the same time it demands that he practice economy and that he allocate more money to this or that project that he thinks neither desirable or defensible.

Through the whole history of the unified Defense Department there has run a persistent thread of danger. Can any Secretary maintain there the full civilian authority that our Constitution demands so long as disappointed military officers can find congressional support for bucking his orders?

This is, at the end of it all, really the stake in this controversy. This is precisely what has been the real stake in every such congressional controversy that has involved every single strong Secretary we have had. The weak and the complacent ones have had no trouble in Congress.

Now, to speak of the actual or probable destruction of McNamara would be premature in the extreme. But all concerned—and most of all the able Members of Congress themselves—should most carefully ponder whether his row can conceivably be worth its possible ultimate cost.

Already other good heads over the Pentagon have been bloodied—Neil McElroy for the Republicans, James Forrestal for the Democrats. It needs no other victims.

EVEN OUR MOST SUCCESSFUL FARMERS SUFFER SERIOUS IN-COME LOSS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, some time ago, the former Director of the Budget, Kermit Gordon, suggested that the low-income problem of the farms in this country was confined to those farmers with gross—and I emphasize gross—incomes of less than \$100,000 a year.

These farmers, according to Gordon—who, incidentally, is an unusually able and honest man—have no real problem in earning an adequate income. They constitute, according to Gordon, about 40 percent of the farmers in the country and produce the overwhelming majority of the Nation's commercial farm crop.

Many, perhaps most, of the Nation's press and Members of Congress accepted the Budget Director's analysis as right. In doing so, they were wrong.

Up-to-date figures are hard to come by on this score, but I have recently been able to secure some figures that show just how sadly mistaken Mr. Gordon was.

The most recently available figures are from 1959, but I am sure they would be similar for other years—before and after.

These figures show that in 1959, over one-fifth of the class I farms—that is, those with sales of \$40,000 and more—yielded cash incomes of less than \$3,000 to the families operating them. Now, this was a gross of \$40,000, not \$10,000, and \$3,000 is the poverty level. Consider the farms with gross over \$10,000, the 818,000 farms with annual sales of \$10,000 and more, almost a quarter of a million, or almost one-third, returned to their operator families less than \$3,000 in cash.

Mr. President, these are the most efficient producers in our society. These are the farmers who have doubled their productivity in the past 12 years, who have vastly increased their investment; and these are the minority of farmers whose gross income exceeds \$10,000 a year.

The farmer—even the relatively successful farmer—has been and still is being left out of our prosperity. Members of Congress should not deceive themselves on this score.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 39(b) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 1924) to amend section 39b of the Bankruptcy Act so as to prohibit a part-time referee from acting as trustee or receiver in any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act which were, to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That the second and third sentences of paragraph b of section 39 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 67b) are amended to read as follows:

"Active full-time referees shall not exercise the profession or employment of counsel

or attorney, or be engaged in the practice of law; nor act as trustee or receiver in any proceeding under this Act. Active part-time referees, and referees receiving benefits under paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of section 40 of this Act, shall not practice as counsel or attorney nor act as trustee or receiver in any proceeding under this Act."

And to amend the title so as to read: "An Act to amend section 39(b) of the Bankruptcy Act so as to prohibit referees from acting as trustees or receivers in any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act."

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the bill which I introduced in the Senate provided for the amendment of section 39(b) of the Bankruptcy Act so as to prohibit a part-time referee from acting as trustee or receiver in any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act.

The House amended the bill also to prohibit a full-time referee from so acting. While I know of no instance in the past where a full-time referee so acted, there is no objection to the amendment of the bill so as to prohibit the possibility of such a situation in the future.

I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House of Representatives.

The motion was agreed to.

"REVOLUTION ABROAD"—SPEECH BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT OF ARKANSAS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on April 27, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], delivered the second in a series of three addresses—in the Christian Herter series.

This second lecture is entitled, "Revolution Abroad," and was made at the John's Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on yesterday.

I would point out that the series, so far, has caused a good deal of comment and some controversy, but as in all speeches by the distinguished Senator—as is usual—there is much food for thought and consideration.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the second Christian Herter lecture, delivered by the distinguished chairman [Mr. FULBRIGHT], entitled "Revolution Abroad," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the lecture was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REVOLUTION ABROAD

In many parts of the world revolutions are being made and in many still quiet places they are in the making, not by the silent and demoralized poor but by a new generation of powerful and charismatic leaders who are arousing the masses from their inertia, inspiring them with anger and hope, and giving them the discipline that turns numbers into strength. Some of these new revolutionaries are democrats but most of them are not. Their principal purpose in any case is to modernize rather than democratize and they are more interested in material results than in abstract ideals. Whatever ideology they begin with or pro-

Even though those results may not have been contemplated, and surely weren't wished, by those Americans who advocated disobedience of our laws, nevertheless they did advocate that philosophy and they did put its processes into action, and cannot now escape responsibility for the results.

Seeing the appeasements and successes of that process in racial strife, other would-be leaders have now adopted and spread it into many other areas. It has now spread into the campuses of most of our great universities where, as in Berkeley, it has been used to commit assaults, kidnappings, imprisonment of police officers, and commandeering of public-address systems; and their use in spewing over the campus the most filthy four-letter words, and for general breakdown of law and order.

The process is also now progressively employed by radical leftists and those who would give aid and comfort to our enemies, to hinder and impede our Nation's efforts to conscript military personnel, as witness the recent rash of draftcard burners, and to move and supply its troops and generally to weaken its ability to execute its military efforts in this time of war.

The process has now been extended even to efforts to thwart governmental, legislative and executive action. Indeed, it would be hard to name a field that has escaped or is not vulnerable to the process.

These are but recent examples of history's teachings that the toleration of some crime encourages all crime, and that it can hardly be denied that our toleration of these crimes of trespass has been at least a contributing factor to the recent spread of common violence which Mr. J. Edgar Hoover says makes it impossible "for the citizens of this country to * * * walk the streets of our cities without [danger of] being mugged, raped and robbed." He continued: "We can't do that today." And he added: "All through the country, almost without exception, this condition prevails."

HOW MINORITIES HURT THEMSELVES "IN PREACHING DEFIANCE OF LAW"

The great pity is that these minority groups, in preaching and practicing defiance of the law, are in fact eroding our legal structure, which alone can ever assure to them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws, and that can, thus, protect them from discriminations and abuses by majorities.

We have all been often told, and many of us have preached, that crime does not pay. But the recent rash and spread of law defiance—and the successes, however tenuous and temporary, of that philosophy in attaining goals—seems to compel a reappraisal of that concept. For, from what we see currently happening, one could reasonably believe that certain types of crimes are being permitted to pay.

Indeed, official encouragement often has been given, even at times in some high places, to conduct these "demonstrations" which have led to the commission of these criminal trespasses, and it can hardly be denied that they have been rather widely tolerated. It is undoubtedly true as recited in the theme of the presidentially proclaimed Law Day, 1965, that "a citizen's first duty is to uphold the law," but it is also the first duty of Government to enforce the law.

As said in an article in the April 10, 1965, issue of the magazine *America*, "[Government] has no right to turn the cheek of its citizens. Instead it is gravely obligated by the very purpose of its existence to see to their protection."

Surely the great majority of Americans agree with the May 1965, public statement of Mr. Lewis F. Powell, then president of the American Bar Association, that "America needs a genuine revival of respect for law and orderly processes, a reawakening of in-

dividual responsibility, a new impatience with those who violate and circumvent laws, and a determined insistence that laws be enforced, courts respected and due process followed."

I would like to conclude, as I began, with a plea for a return to simple honesty, responsibility and forthrightness in our public speakings and writings, that they may honestly inform and not misinform the people, and for a return to an orderly society by requiring respect for and obedience to our laws by the prompt, impartial, evenhanded, certain and substantial punishment of all persons whose willful conduct violates these laws, and that we do so promptly, and I would hope, before mass crime gets, as it surely can, so far out of hand as to be beyond the curbing capacities of our peacekeeping agencies and authorities.

REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. President, in a recent edition of the *New Yorker* magazine, an article appeared by Mr. Richard Goodwin on the war in Vietnam. I commend this article to my colleagues, for I found it to be a clear and precise description of the situation, its history, and the policy demands that we now face.

Mr. Goodwin speaks from a broad background of experience as Special Assistant on Foreign Affairs during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. He collaborated with both Presidents on speeches which pointed to new directions in foreign policy and was one of the original innovators of such outstanding programs as the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Goodwin is now serving as a research fellow at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Conn. He has had an outstanding career as a lawyer and served as law clerk for Justice Frankfurter.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be included in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM

It must have seemed to the commander who made the choice that Operation White Wing had a faintly lyrical sound, suited to the An Lao Valley, where battle was to be found and fought. Dark-green jungle flows over gentle hills toward flat, still swamps, bursting with rice and separated by the trailing wisps of jungle growth that spring up wherever the hand of man pauses to rest. The river slices south through the center of the valley until, north of Bong Son, it turns east toward the South China Sea. The river was muddy—as it always is at the end of January, when the rains are heavy—perhaps reminding Pfc. James Ricks and Harry Morse of the upper waters of the Potomac, which divides their native States of Maryland and Virginia. It was about as wide, and there were rapids. But there was nothing at home like the soaking heat that crowded their lungs, or the violent nighttime fury that tore about the bunker where they waited for dawn. The two friends had come with the 18th Infantry to help clear An Lao of thousands of Vietcong guerrillas who made their home in the bountiful valley.

Eleven thousand miles away, where the Potomac broadens, Senators and spectators walked into room 4221 of the New Senate Office Building, J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Senator from Arkansas, foe of civil rights, almost Secretary of State, Rhodes scholar, and backwoods politician, hero to some and dem-

agog to others, sat in the center chair behind the raised, arched desk that stretched across the entire front of the rectangular hearing room. The marble margins of the floor touched light wood-paneled walls in an unsuccessful blending of political-traditional and Washington modern. In front of Senator FULBRIGHT were officials and clerks bent over tables piled with papers and documents—the vital substance of government—while about 60 spectators filled rows of harsh straight chairs behind them. On either side of FULBRIGHT were the other members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Among them was Senator BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, of Iowa, tough, narrow, conservative, and, on this day, guardian of the political interests of the Republican Party. Senators FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, and CLAIBORNE PELL, of Rhode Island, were clearly marked, in youth and intelligence, as members of the Kennedy generation of Democrats. There was STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, disappointed presidential hopeful, blending absolute integrity with lifelong sympathy for the aims and outlook of the military. Finally, most vocal in opposition was WAYNE MORSE, cattle breeder, Oregon Republican-turned-Democrat, who had broken all the rules of the "club" and transgressed the tenets of polite political discourse, thus earning the disdain of official Washington, yet still commanding deference as chairman of a powerful Senate subcommittee, and whose stern, shrill, sometimes exasperatingly self-righteous independence had carried further across the country than Washington believed. Most of the 19 members were there. The subject was that confused and violent conflict which in the last year had become the center of American concern, expectation, and fear—the war in Vietnam.

Over the chairman's head was the great seal of the United States, the engine grouping the olive branch of peace and the arrows of war—a sculptured omen of the day. Facing him, in a large red-padded chair, sat the first witness—Dean Rusk, for 5 years Secretary of State of the United States, selected after President-elect Kennedy had reluctantly turned away from FULBRIGHT himself, and the principal advocate of a militant pursuit of the war.

At 9:05 a.m. of Friday, January 28, the Vietnam debate began. Its subject: the history, the wisdom, and the future of American action and policy. Whatever the result, however, discussion might alter the course of events, it would not make any difference to James Ricks, of Cortland, Va., or Harry Morse, of Pasadena, Md. Twenty minutes before, while the first curious arrivals were claiming the scarce seats, a grenade flung anonymously through the jungle-fed night had exploded in their bunker. They were dead—2 more of the almost 400,000 people—yellow, white, and black, who had been killed in the strangest and most complicated war in American history.

Before the month of debate was over, it had moved from the small hearing room into the television-dominated homes of millions of Americans, had caused one of the most respected executives in television, Fred Friendly, to quit in fury because his superiors at CBS refused to show the most important national discussion of all, and had made national celebrities out of a soft-spoken general-turned-businessman named James Gavin and a career-diplomat-turned-scholar named George Kennan. With the echoes of the final Friday hearing still fading, the debate touched the upper reaches of American politics. On the morning of Saturday, February 19, Senator ROBERT KENNEDY discussed the possible outlines of a settlement. He was supported by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Presidential consultant on the war and intellectual leader of the generals, while he was attacked by other officials, some of whom had privately urged the same position they now

acceptance would be a step in the wrong direction and self-defeating.

There are also well-meaning persons among us who argue that the proper concept of "equality" is that all men are entitled to be assured, by and at the expense of the government, which means by their brothers, of permanent economic equality. To argue that all men are entitled at the expense of their brothers to permanent economic equality is to argue for the adoption of communism, which, Webster says, means "a system of social organization in which all goods are held in common" and, hence, in which all men are by law made and kept economically equal.

Do those who so advocate understand this? I doubt that they do, and for obvious reasons I prefer to believe that they do not. But the government established here by our forefathers, and early said to be the finest government ever conceived by the minds of men, is not of that kind. It is instead a democratic republic guaranteeing free enterprise and the right to earn and possess private capital. It is not, and was never intended to be, a leveler of men.

Quite the contrary: It was intended to permit, and permits, the ambitious, energetic, creative and thrifty men to, by honest effort, improve their lot as much as they can even if others choose not to try.

It does not intend to destroy initiative and ambition by holding accomplishments down to the level of the least ambitious. While individuals have their legal right to discriminate between our people, the Government does not. Hence, under our Government, the term "equality" must mean essentially that Government, State and Federal, cannot and must not deny to any citizen: (a) the right to obtain equal learning, (b) the right to equal governmental treatment, (c) the right to equal justice, (d) the equal right of suffrage and (e) the consequent right to equal opportunity.

But the right to equal opportunity, if indeed it is to be equal, must include the opportunity to develop and prove unequal talents. Any other concept would destroy the natural incentive of every man to improve his lot by holding him down to the unambitious level of the mediocre or below, which inevitably would result in the society's decadence.

In the same connection we hear much discussion of "public welfare." Some seem to feel that it is the legal obligation of the Government to finance the needs of every citizen. Some even suggest that our National Constitution so contemplates, but nothing could be further from the truth.

In the preamble of our Constitution, our Founding Fathers, in describing one of the purposes of their efforts, used the term "to promote the general welfare." But this was to be done, as they said, in the ways and by the means set forth in the body of the document, and one will search it in vain for any evidence of any delegation by the States or the people of any power to the National Government to dip into the Federal Treasury for the support of private citizens.

Thus, the privilege and the moral obligation to determine when and how much aid should be given to the deserving needy among them was, like all other privileges and powers that were not delegated to the National Government by the Constitution, reserved to the States and to the people.

I now turn to the misleading, and therefore dangerous, technique of some current argument by clichés. Some would-be leaders have been voicing slogans and clichés which, in instances, appear on the surface to be logical, and some even religious, but which, in truth, are neither. Instead they are dangerously deceptive and destructive.

DEMAND FOR PUBLIC HANDOUTS: "THE FALSE CRY OF THE PRIDELESS LAZY"

One is "Government owes every citizen a living." This is the false cry of the prideless lazy, inasmuch as the food, shelter, and clothing necessary for his "living" can only be produced by the labors of someone. This is a cry for support by the sweat of another man's brow.

A second is "human rights, not property rights." Are these rights in any way inconsistent or mutually destructive? Is not the right to have and be protected in property a valuable "human right"? Are not those rights mutually consistent and even dependent? Any thoughtful observation of history will reveal that, where private-property rights have not been respected and protected, there has not been what we call "human rights." Private-property rights are the soil in which our concept of human rights grows and matures. As long as private-property rights are secure, human rights will be respected and will endure and evolve.

A third is the Russian-coined phrase that "production is for use, not for profits." Must it be wholly for the one or the other? Is it not truly for both? Is there any inconsistency or immorality in producing useful things at a profit? If production is not to yield a profit, there will be no incentive to produce. And if there is no incentive to produce, there will be no production for use. It is the incentive of profits that has produced the plentiful blessings of our Nation and that has enabled it to grow, progress, and develop as it has. Reasonable profits are essential to the survival of free enterprise and, hence, of our society. If the state were to take over under the slogan of "use, not profits," initiative would be destroyed, progress would be halted, and soon stagnation would set in and destroy our society.

A fourth, and of which we hear much these days, is "obey the good laws but not the bad ones."

And a fifth one that should be considered with the fourth is "action now, not the delays of the law."

CLAIMING RIGHT TO VIOLATE LAWS IS "A CALL FOR ANARCHY"

Is not each of these clichés a call for anarchy? Does not the fourth invite men to violate the laws they do not like? And does not the fifth invite men to spurn the courts and all constituted authority and to take the law into their own hands?

If we allow men to disobey with impunity the laws they do not like, or to spurn the courts in all constituted authority by taking the law, or what they think ought to be the law, into their own hands, will we not be inviting anarchy and chaos? Yet, this is precisely what some self-appointed racial leaders, and more recently many others, have been advocating, and it is precisely what their followers have been doing. Aroused by these techniques, those followers frequently have assembled from far and wide, often unfortunately, with the encouragement and even at the expense of well-meaning but legally uninformed and misguided church organizations, into large and loosely assembled groups or mobs to wage what they have called demonstrations to force the grant of what they call rights in defiance of the law, the courts, and all constituted authority.

At the beginning, these "demonstrations" consisted of episodic group invasions and appropriations of private stores, first by sitting down and later by lying down therein, and eventually by blocking the entrances thereto with their bodies. Seeing that those trespassers were often applauded in high places, were generally not stopped or punished, but rather were compelled to be ap-

peased and rewarded, these racial leaders and their groups quickly enlarged the scope of their activity by massing and marching followers on the sidewalks, streets, and highways, frequently blocking and appropriating them to a degree that precluded their intended public uses.

And that conduct, too, being nearly always appeased, the process spread areawise, as might have been expected, from one southern city to another, and then into one northern city after another, and eventually pretty generally throughout the land. These "demonstrations" were conducted under the banner of "peaceable civil disobedience," and under the claim of protection by the peaceable-assembly and petition provisions of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But, in fact, most of these claims were and are untrue. Let me demonstrate this:

"Crime," says Webster, means "an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction." It cannot be denied that many of those trespasses violated at least the criminal-trespass laws of the local jurisdictions involved, nor that those laws impose criminal penalties for their violation, nor, hence, that those trespasses constituted "crimes."

Now, in the first place, that conducted cannot honestly be termed peaceable, for we all know that the assembly and incitement of a large group or mob for the avowed purpose of forcing direct action outside the law amounts to the creation of a mob bent on lawlessness, and inherently disturbs the peace of others.

In the second place, that conduct cannot honestly be termed "civil disobedience" for the simple reason which anyone should be able to understand: that willful violation of the criminal laws is "criminal disobedience," not "civil disobedience."

And lastly, those criminal trespasses were not protected by the peaceable assembly and petition provisions of the first amendment. That provision says: "Congress shall make no law * * * abridging * * * the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Obviously, nothing in that language grants a license to any man or group of men to violate our criminal laws, including those which prohibit trespass upon, and appropriation of, private property, and those prohibiting the willful obstruction of public walks, streets, and highways.

Rather, as Mr. Justice Roberts wrote upon the subject in 1939, "The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions must be regulated in the interest of all. It is not absolute, but is relative and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order."

Surely no thoughtful person will disagree with that statement, nor with the one recently made by the president of Yale University in a speech at Detroit, that the current rash of "demonstrations" make a ludicrous mockery of the democratic debating process."

DEMONSTRATIONS ARE "TAILOR MADE FOR INFILTRATION BY RADICALS"

The philosophy of "obeying only the laws you like," and of attempting to rule by force, has given rise to mobs and mob actions that have proven, as certainly we should have expected to be tailor made for infiltration, take over, and use by rabble-rousers and radicals who are avowedly bent on the breakdown of law, order, and morality in our society, and hence on its destruction. And we now see that virtually all of such "demonstrations" are being infiltrated by rabble-rousers and radicals and, not infrequently, break into open violence.

publicly assaulted. For a moment, a major political skirmish seemed possible, but the President himself refused to attack the Kennedy proposal. He was clearly determined to close no door that might lead to peace and to open no wounds that might further increase domestic division. Then, the debate having run its course in Washington, it moved into the outer arena of national discussion and the inner secret councils of the administration, where it will continue as long as the war itself.

There is something oddly insubstantial about the thousands of pages of hearings, speeches, press conferences, and television interviews—the immense stream of argument, discussion, and declamation. The pages are filled with rhetoric designed to arouse old emotions rather than stir new thoughts; with grand simplicities and sweeping clichés that ignore and blanket the cruel particulars of conflict; and with history that is neither relevant nor, in many cases, true. Men become advocates rather than analysts, seeking to prove every point and answer every argument, even though they must distort or accuse in order to do so. Some must rewrite the events of the past in order to offer a better defense of their own past acts and judgments. Meanwhile, sensed by all but the scholars is the silent and unseen weight of the American electorate, whose ultimate judgment has never been so unclear in any other time of war, and whose decision will shape the personal futures of those who contest before the gaze of the Nation. Each one who speaks is also aware that he speaks across the city to the single man who has the power to gather up all the threads of possibility and belief and weave them into the fabric of decision. Senator ALBERT GORE said of the President, "We are seeking to reach him by way of the people." Yet each also hoped to reach him by way of the television screen or the morning newspaper.

Much of Vietnam is covered with what experts call "three-canopied jungle." Three layers of somber, unrelieved green, block the sun from the earth, which even at noon is often night-dark. The debate that swirls about this jungle country is also triple-layered, and the tangled lines of argument often obscure the light.

Rising above the other debates is the debate over grand strategy, conducted in the fascinating, elusive abstractions of geopolitics: Does America have a vital stake in Asia, and, more specifically, in Vietnam itself?

Next is the debate over the past: What kind of war is it, and how did we become so deeply involved in it?

Closest to the ground of action and decision is the third Vietnam debate: What is our present policy, and what should it be?

In its crudest and simplest form, the first of the three clashes of conviction questions whether the United States would be seriously injured if much of Asia were to be dominated by a hostile power—at this moment in history, by China. For at least a quarter of a century, every American government has believed the answer to be "Yes." On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull handed a series of proposed agreements to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. Japan and the United States would agree that neither would violate "the territorial integrity and sovereignty" of any country in Asia. Both nations would pledge to seek a broad agreement by many powers, including Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands, "to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina [including Vietnam]," and, if that integrity was menaced, to consult "with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet such threat." (A similar agreement, by many of the same powers, was to become the central guarantee of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 14 years later.) Japan, how-

ever, had already determined upon the conquest of Indochina, and 11 days later, attacked the only remaining power both committed and able to bar the way. Since the end of the war that followed, every American President has sent armed forces to Asia: Truman in Korea, Eisenhower at Quemoy and Matsu, Kennedy briefly at the Thai-Laotian border and in Vietnam, Johnson in Vietnam. Deeply rooted in modern experience, asserted in two major wars, the American interest in Asia, and now in Indochina, nevertheless requires evaluation by the light of shifting realities. Although the American stake in Asia is not a new one, is it real?

During several years I spent in Washington—at the State Department and as an assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson—few intellectual tasks were more frustrating than the occasional effort to answer the great, the ultimate questions of foreign policy: Why should we try to contain China? Why should we help the underdeveloped nations? What is the urgency of preventing nuclear spread? Such questions, in fact, are ordinarily raised in argument with critics but rarely in the councils of decision. It is precisely because there is no sure and resistless logic by which such questions can be answered that discussion often dissolves into empty generalities and false scholarship. "Nations must learn to leave their neighbors alone." (Cf. the intervention in the Dominican Republic.) We cannot remain "an oasis of wealth in a worldwide sea of misery." (We have always been one and will be one for a very long time.) "The appetite of aggression is never satisfied." (Cf. the independence of the Philippines, Mexico, and Canada.) Such failures of analysis reflect not our own inadequacies so much as what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., calls "the inscrutability of history." To justify a course of policy in its largest dimension is to predict what will happen if that course is not taken, to prophesy the unknowable turns of history. All that any leader can do is call upon wisdom, judgment, and national principle, a sense of history and a knowledge of present reality, and act on the speculative and intuitive guess that results. This enormous limitation is reflected in Albert Einstein's famous reply when he was asked why the politicians could not catch up with the creations of science—he said that "politics is much harder than physics"—and George Kennan's testimony that "the most important thing a government such as ours can have, as it faces the long-term future of international relations, is right principles rather than the gift of prophecy." The huge and inescapable uncertainties of this process impose on any sensible statesman an essential skepticism, from which flow at least two guiding rules for the conduct of international affairs: to decide as little, in places of danger, as present urgencies require, leaving room for change if events contradict judgment, and to take as few risks as action requires, refusing to hazard enormous consequences on speculation. The most frequent flaw in the Vietnam debate, running through the arguments on all sides, is the recurrent claim that the unknowable can be stated with certainty.

Even with this caution, judgment leans heavily toward protecting Asia from domination or conquest by a hostile power. There is the almost idealistic, compelling conviction that the one nation with the power to prevent it should not stand aside while nations unwillingly submit to foreign domination. To do so would undermine the central world purpose of the United States—the creation of an international order of independent states. Moreover, the impact of a large-scale Chinese expansion would probably radiate across the world, reshaping the politics of the weak and uncertain societies of Africa and Latin America, perhaps further eroding the ties among our Western allies, forcing the

Soviet Union toward increased militance in the competition for leadership of the Communist world. More ominous still would be the likely effect on our own society. As the fall of China itself contributed to McCarthyism, a large expansion of China, soon to hold major North American cities hostage to its nuclear power, thus increasing its willingness to risk conflict on the ground, would inevitably feed the dark undercurrent of repression and militarism never wholly absent from American life.

Our vital concern in Asia cannot be denied by allocating that continent to the abstraction of a Chinese "sphere of influence," if by influence we mean domination or the right to direct policies by coercion. Geography is still important, as the Soviet Union learned in Cuba, and as we rediscovered in Hungary. Yet we are as close to Asia, in terms of swift and effective action, as we were to Europe in the Second World War. We are a Pacific nation, and since the end of the Second World War we have been the only Pacific power of real consequence. Moreover, nations have no natural or God-given right to dominate those close to them.

If they had, the border states of Afghanistan and Iran would be under Soviet rule; Cuba would be in the hands of a friendly president or, more likely, an American trained general; Argentina would never have dared admire and assist the Nazis. The sphere of influence of a great nation extends just as far as its power and ambition go unchecked by its own limitations and by the strength and the interests of others. Its "sphere of influence," as domination, rests on the weakness of those in its path, not on the laws of geography or history. China must always weigh heavily in the calculations of Asian states, but as long as our power stands in the way, there need be no vast and inevitable sphere of influence, although it is hoped that there will one day be fruitful relations of commerce and friendship. Nor can we stand aside in the certainty that, as in Eastern Europe, the spread of Communist influence will be blunted by "polycentrism"—a host of Titos, or even Gomulkas. The underdeveloped societies of Asia lack the structures—the middle class, an educated population, even national traditions—that lend strength to the self-assertions of the countries of Europe. The Asian societies are thin at the top, unstable, and far more vulnerable to control by small well-organized groups assisted from other countries. Nationalist communism may come to Asia, but the experience of Eastern Europe is no guarantee. We do not know whether China will try to expand, or whether it can. It is hard enough to judge the intentions, ambitions, and capacities of our own leaders. How can we hope to penetrate the thoughts of aging leaders whose experience, culture, and convictions are so remote? This does not mean, however, that we should not be prepared to resist expansion if it comes. Yet, even if we accept this basic judgment, we are not compelled to fight for every inch of Asian soil or hazard war each time Chinese influence begins to grow. We stood by while China crushed Tibet, for we lacked both the resources and any compelling reasons to oppose Chinese armies in such a remote and difficult place. Our Government was fully resigned to the potential domination of Indonesia by a Communist Party close to Peking, since armed invasion seemed the only way to prevent it. Nor are American armies likely to rush to the defense of Siberia if Chinese forces move into that vast and tempting area. It is, on the other hand, inconceivable that aggression against India would not be met with—if necessary—the full force of American power. The question always is where, and under what circumstances, we should commit military force to the protection of Asian nations. Is Vietnam such a place?

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Not very many years ago, the answer seemed clear. South Vietnam, a tiny patch of poverty-stricken jungle, populated mostly by simple farmers concerned only with the daily struggle for survival, was not important to our security. President Eisenhower, despite urgent French pleas, refused to intervene in 1954 even if all of Vietnam should fall, declaring himself to be "convinced that the French could not win the war." Had the Communists succeeded in taking over the entire country, as they almost did, no sensible American would now be demanding that we go to war to recapture South Vietnam. It would be another name on the list of half-forgotten lost lands. Today, however, events have overtaken that possibility. American power and wealth are committed to Vietnam on an immense scale. We will soon, in all probability, have half a million men in South Vietnam. Helicopters, air support, and modern firearms give our troops there four or five times the striking power of their Second World War counterparts. We have already dropped the rough equivalent of a ton of bombs for every Vietcong soldier. Our financial assistance since 1954 amounts to over three billion dollars, or more than two hundred dollars for every person in South Vietnam. The records are filled with dozens of statements asserting our determination to use force to halt armed aggression. For the United States, after so overwhelming a commitment, to permit a rapid Communist takeover by withdrawal, or, in the President's words, "under the cloak of a meaningless agreement," would damage the confidence of all Asian nations, and of many other nations, in the willingness and the ability of the United States to protect them against attack. Unpleasant and undesirable as it may be for Americans and Asians both, we are the only power strong enough to offer such protection. On the very day that India and China clashed on their border, representatives of India were in Washington to seek assurances of help. They had nowhere else to go. Had we chosen not to intervene in Vietnam, the credibility of our military power would perhaps not be at stake. But those decisions were made. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia foresaw the way in which increasing American intervention would raise the stakes, telling an interviewer in July, 1965, "It is certain that if the United States provokes a major confrontation in this region—which will inevitably end in [its] humiliating retreat—all the other Asian nations, one after another (beginning with the Allies of the United States), will come to know, if not domination, at least a very strong Communist influence." The battle, therefore, has come to transcend the issue of Vietnam itself, making withdrawal intolerable until we achieve a resolution that does not involve American defeat.

Since there exists such a compelling case, resting, as Dean Rusk testified, "upon policy and strategic and geopolitical considerations that are of the utmost importance," it is baffling to find many supporters of the war offering justifications for our presence which have little foundation in history, reason, law, or the course of events. Perhaps it is simply proof of the saying that in war truth is the first casualty. Most startling of all is the recent claim that the United States has a formal and binding commitment to use its armies to defend Vietnam—a commitment resting on the southeast Asia Treaty, or, alternatively, on presidential statements over more than a decade. Secretary Rusk himself testified, "It is this fundamental SEATO obligation that has from the outset guided our actions in Vietnam." The language of the treaty itself is imprecise. In case of "armed attack" we agreed only "to meet the common danger in accordance with [our] constitutional processes." No nation is specifically required to go to war, although it is true that a skilled lawyer could inter-

pret the language as a commitment or as an excuse for inaction, depending upon his instructions. The conclusive fact, however, is that neither our fellow-signers, including France and Britain, nor John Foster Dulles, who drew up the treaty, nor any American President has believed or been advised that those words required us to send fighting men to Vietnam. Under close questioning by Senator HICKENLOOPER, who was eager to refute the slightest insinuation that this was "Ike's war," General Taylor admitted, "No, sir. Very clearly we made no such commitment. We didn't want such a commitment. This was the last thing we had in mind. * * * Insofar as the use of our combat ground forces are concerned, that [commitment] took place, of course, only in the spring of 1965." One can search the many statements of Presidents and diplomats in vain for any mention of the SEATO Treaty. Time after time, President Johnson set forth the reasons for our presence in Vietnam, but he never spoke of the requirements of the treaty, nor did anyone at the State Department suggest that he should, even though they surely reviewed every draft statement. The treaty argument is, in truth, something a clever advocate conceived a few months ago.

The claim of a SEATO commitment is often buttressed by quotations from the American Presidents concerned—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—used to attribute to them the pledge that, in President Kennedy's words, the Communists shall not win "for lack of any support which the United States might render." But for every statement of this kind there is another, such as the one in the Kennedy interview of September 1963, cautiously warning that "we can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam." President Johnson repeated many times the same careful limitation on American involvement. It is unfortunate that the demands of the modern Presidency require such an enormous, unending flood of words and speeches, inevitably resulting in imprecise and ambiguous language. The meaning rests not on a word-by-word analysis of an old text but on the common assumptions and realities of their setting. No President committed American combat troops to Vietnam before they actually went. No President believed he had made such a commitment. No one ever thought he had. No adviser in the highest councils ever urged action on the basis of the SEATO Treaty or of any other pledge; none, as far as I know, ever mentioned the existence of such a pledge. And in fact, there was no such commitment. Combat troops were sent because our national interest in the judgment of our leaders, required their presence, and for no other reason.

Efforts to justify our presence in Vietnam by elevating it to the grand scale of a decisive "testing ground for the war of liberation," of "another Munich," or of the beginning of a fall of "dominoes" are equally unnecessary and also defective. In large part, the struggle in Vietnam is indeed a war of internal aggression—what Soviet and Chinese leaders call a "war of liberation." It certainly is not the decisive one. Win or lose, we will face similar challenges, just as our success in Greece and Turkey was followed, much later, by Soviet intervention in Cuba. Invasion in Korea was halted, and Quemoy and Matsu were bombarded. Firmness in the Formosa Strait did not halt efforts at subversion in places as remote as the Congo and the Central African Republic. Fighting in Malaya and the Philippines and on the Indian border came to an end, but fighting continues in Vietnam. This war is another episode—a particularly dangerous and bloody one—in a long, continuing conflict. Gen-

eral Taylor has already informed us that "they are beginning in Thailand." Nor is this the Asian equivalent of the decision at Munich. There the Allies yielded to a nation with a timetable for the armed conquest of Europe. Moreover, it is unlikely in the extreme that a firm stand at Munich would have long halted a madman armed with the best military machine in Europe. It might have changed the terms and timing of war but not war itself. Had the time the Allies bought been used to prepare, Munich might be now considered an act of statesmanship. Our refusal to yield in Vietnam stands on its own merits, not on those of a distant and indistinct analogy. Nor would the simple fact of Communist rule set a row of dominoes falling. In 1949, the biggest domino of all, China, fell, and others did not follow. It is the fact of American defeat, the demonstration of American futility, rather than the presence of a Communist government in Vietnam, that would shake uncertain governments in Asia.

The American war in Vietnam flows not from formal commitment or historical theory but from the history of this cruel and confused conflict. The effort to rewrite that history only bewilders the supporters and strengthens the opponents of government policy in Vietnam, carrying the debate into irrelevant dead ends of discussion and contradiction.

The Vietnamese war is 20 years old. It began while Chiang Kai-shek still ruled China and the French owned Indochina. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh issued the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence: "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." On the evening of December 19, the next year, city streets all over Vietnam were instantly cloaked in night by a coordinated attack on power stations across the country. The war had begun. It was first ignored, then shared, by the United States, which gave more than a billion dollars of aid to the beleaguered French. Early in 1954, John Foster Dulles announced that the new French military policy was designed to "break the organized body of Communist aggression by the end of the 1955 fighting season." But in May 1954, before that fighting season came, the great powers assembled at Geneva to work out the terms of a French defeat. The Geneva Conference granted Vietnam independence, prohibited it from forming military alliances or accommodating foreign bases, guaranteed it democratic freedoms, and divided the country into North and South until national elections could be held in 1956, making it clear that the partition was "provisional" and "should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."

At this point, accounts and histories, claims and charges trail off into uncertainty and illusion. The course and nature of the "second" Vietnamese war are cloaked in ignorance, obscured by the diverging views of historians, buried in the archives of Hanoi, Peking, the State Department, and the Quai d'Orsay, interred with the bodies of Dien and his brother.

We do know, however, that the new, semi-official narrative of straightforward Communist duplicity and aggression does not tell the whole story. According to Secretary Rusk, the Communists violated the Geneva agreement at the very beginning by leaving a hard core of agents in the south. Yet, the International Control Commission, including friendly and responsive Canada, found in 1955 that "the provisions of * * * a military or semimilitary nature have on the whole been carried out." It is true that some agents were left. Most of the 5,000 guerrillas still to be found in South Vietnam were

South Vietnamese who had gone home, as they were entitled to do. Then, we are told, during the next 5 years, Hanoi "developed a secret political-military organization in the south," conducted a campaign of terror and assassination, and, like a "typical police state," refused to let the national elections scheduled for 1956 be held. This refusal is surely the greatest political self-denial in history, since President Eisenhower has estimated that "possibly 80 percent of the population [of all Vietnam] would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh." In the late 50's, the new narrative goes on, North Vietnam began to infiltrate the south with "disciplined adherents whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement," and directed them to "form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built." Finally, in 1960, Hanoi created the National Liberation Front, to serve as a "political facade" for the conquest of a people enjoying "substantial progress" under Diem. Infiltration increased. The Army of North Vietnam joined the battle. And, here we are.

The whole of this careful structure, faintly reminiscent of an entry in the Soviet Encyclopedia concerning the American contribution to the Second World War, is designed to prove that the struggle in Vietnam is solely "a systematic aggression by Hanoi against the people of South Vietnam." Some of this account is accurate and some of it is distorted. More often events are described with a certainty and simplicity that do not exist. On February 3, Vice President HUBERT HUMPHREY was more candid about the complexities, telling a New York audience, "Some of these revolutionaries are from the south. Some are from the north. Some are irregulars. Some are regular North Vietnamese soldiers. Some of their supply and direction comes from the south. Some of it comes from Hanoi. Some of it comes from Peking." The President said, more compactly, "Some of the people of South Vietnam are participating in attack on their own government." The reality is that there is aggression and there is also civil war. Some of the revolutionaries are Communists and some are not. Some wish to associate with China and others are passionate nationalists.

From 1954 until 1956, North Vietnam for the most part bided its time, expecting that South Vietnam would soon be under its control. When the time came for the elections required by the treaty, President Diem, with encouragement from the United States, refused to hold them—because he rightly feared defeat—and began a rigorously severe repression against his political enemies, including the small number of Communists who, along with other dissidents, were seeking a foothold in the countryside. Spurred by this repression, by the desire to overthrow Diem, by the failure to hold elections, and by a small but growing amount of help from the north, the revolutionaries organized. They began to terrorize the peasants, propagandize the villages, and even carry out a few small measures of reform. Nor did Diem improve relations by creating, in 1958, a Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam, which parachuted agents into northern areas of discontent, or by refusing to trade badly needed rice. Finally, in 1960, Hanoi called for a National Liberation Front to lead the growing struggle in the south—an organization whose "nominal leader," according to Vice President HUMPHREY, "is not known as a Communist"—which is clearly responsive to Hanoi but whose exact relationship, puppet or partly independent, is certainly unknown and probably mixed.

By 1960, 15 village chiefs a week were being killed by revolutionaries. Infiltration from the north was on the rise. Today, as the President has said, the support and direction from the north are "the heartbeat of the war." But the war never was, and is not now, only a war of north against south.

Secretary McNamara carefully explained in 1964 that even though northern support and direction are "a critical factor * * * the large indigenous support that the Vietcong receives means that solutions must be as political and economic as military," and he added, "Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely 'military' solution." This appraisal is strengthened by the Defense Department estimate that of a total of about 330,000 Vietcong, dead and alive, only 63,000 have been infiltrators. More than a quarter million have been recruited from among the people who live in the south. Our enemies are not only ruthless aggressors and assassins but also men like Do Luc, whose diary, found on his body, contains the lines "Leaving temporarily the beloved north to return to my native south to liberate my compatriots from the yoke of misery imposed by My-Diem [U.S. Diem]. * * * Now my life is full of hardship, not enough rice to eat, not enough salt to give a taste to my tongue, not enough clothing to keep myself warm. But in my heart I keep loyal to the party and to the people. I am proud and happy."

Neither the country nor the President is served by a reduction of the confused and blending tones of history to sharp blacks and whites. President Johnson, with clearer insight, has spoken of "the confused nature of this conflict." It is enough to know, without seeking a consistent and deliberate plot stretching over a dozen years, that there is aggression—in Johnson's words, "an attack by one country on another." Yet at the same time there is also civil war, discontent, unfulfilled aspirations, and violent passions among the people of the south. Any effort at a political solution must take shape from that reality as well, if it is to be accepted or if, once accepted, it is to endure.

Just as our immense and dangerous involvement in this confused conflict does not rest on formal commitment or on resistance to "simple aggression," it did not emerge from a clear and consistent policy, based on a clear consciousness, at every step, of the implications, dangers, and possibilities of the future. As in many great national enterprises, each individual decision seemed reasonable, carefully limited, even necessary. We looked cautiously ahead while the door closed slowly, ponderously behind us.

More important than any other single factor was the hopeful expectation, the wish, deeply grounded in the American character, that victory might come easily and with little pain. In 1954, Eisenhower wrote a letter offering to "examine" a program of aid if needed reforms were carried out in South Vietnam. The object was to build a stable country that could stand on its own feet—nothing more than we were doing, and still are doing, in dozens of countries. In 1955, a few soldiers crossed the Pacific to help train the South Vietnamese Army to do a better job of protecting its own country; this training mission was similar to the missions we have in other parts of Asia and in many countries of South America. Nevertheless, the United States slowly began to replace the French as the dominant foreign power in a weak, unstable, menaced land. Next, as terror and attack mounted—though still on a small scale—under President Kennedy, the American military presence began to increase. It consisted of advisers, instructed to train, help, counsel, but not to fight. Late in 1961, we suffered our first military casualty. By the end of that year, there were 3,000 American troops in South Vietnam; by the end of the next year, 11,000; by the end of 1963, 16,000.

At every step, it seemed to many that the struggle was almost won. Who, in good conscience, and in the interests of the United States, could refuse the small additional help that did not seem to risk major conflict yet might prevent a Communist takeover? In March 1963, our commander in

Vietnam, Gen. Paul Harkins, assured the Nation, and the President, that the South Vietnamese armed forces "had all that was required for victory." That October, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor announced that "the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965." A month later, General Harkins prophesied, even more glowingly, that "victory is * * * just months away." And in the secret meetings of the National Security Council the reports, estimates, and counsel were still more optimistic and assured, although a few advisers were more skeptical. These were the judgments of men of intelligence and force. Robert McNamara is a most brilliant Secretary of Defense and a principal voice of restraint in the administration; Maxwell Taylor is among the most thoughtful and enlightened of generals. The shifting group around the conference table was one of the most luminous ever assembled in government. Why were the estimates so faulty? In part, of course, they were not. The enemy forces were relatively small. The South Vietnamese Army was growing in power and effectiveness. But the reasonable, even brilliant military calculations masked a whole series of erroneous political assumptions. The crucial variables in the equation of victory were not firepower or troops but the will of the Vietcong to fight, the strength and stability of the South Vietnamese Government, the intentions and capacities of North Vietnam. As it turned out, the Vietcong were more determined, and had greater local support, than we thought; the South Vietnamese military was less effective and its Government (soon to be tumbled in a flood of popular discontent) weaker than we thought; North Vietnam was more willing to take risks and better equipped to make war. The estimates were reasoned, but they were based on the wrong evidence or on evidence that was far more uncertain than anyone believed. Added to these critical misjudgments were a certain amount of wishful thinking and, more important, the fact that other problems—Cuba and Berlin and the test-ban treaty—were clamoring for attention. Had we more precisely judged what the future might bring, the same decisions might still have been made, but they would have been made with a clearer awareness of onrushing danger.

In 1964, the process continued assisted and complicated by President Johnson's need to assert his new leadership, map out a program, and prepare for election. We continued to "advise and help," although more of those concerned began to see the dimensions of the approaching crisis. Finally, early in 1965, the President was advised that morale in South Vietnam could be revived only if we bombed military targets in North Vietnam. This would assure Saigon of our determination to stay the course, and perhaps, if we were lucky, would so weaken Hanoi's will to fight that we could avoid the unpleasant, looming need to send in large numbers of combat troops. Thus the most fateful decision of all was made. The war went north. What had been an important but subdued conflict became a major international crisis. In the election of 1964, although Vietnam was occasionally mentioned, not a single complete speech of President Johnson's was devoted to that conflict. (We did not then refer to it as a war.) Opinion polls commissioned by local candidates and the national Democratic Party showed that as few as 4 or 5 percent of the people in many States considered it an issue of major concern; it was ranked distantly behind unemployment, disarmament, and even Cuba. From the day of the bombing, however, Vietnam, rapidly swallowing up all other concerns and dangers, was never to leave the front pages of the world.

By the spring of 1965, it was clear that if American combat troops, in large numbers,

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did not enter the war, defeat was not only likely but imminent. "Early in 1965 * * * it was widely felt on both sides * * * that it was only a matter of time before the Communists would win, unless something was done about it." McGeorge Bundy said in February. After the most painful discussion, a commitment of combat troops was made, limited only by developing military needs, and Vietnam became an irrevocably American war.

Flowing from the cruel necessities of the present, informed by awareness of the past, is the third Vietnam debate: the passionate unresolved clash about the future. Thousands of lives are at hazard, and there are rising risks of war with the entire 300,000-man Army of North Vietnam, of a titanic conflict with the legions of China, and even, in ultimate—decisive—holocaust, of armed conflict with the Soviet Union.

President Johnson, guided by the information he receives, confined and influenced by advisers, swayed by opinion, coerced by events, directed by national tradition and principle, nevertheless holds the vital decisions in his hands alone. Alarmed at this enormous power, some people have denied its existence. "This President of ours cannot justify under the Constitution sending a single American boy to * * * South Vietnam without a declaration of war," Senator Morse said at the hearings. "We are involved illegally in this war." A President's power to involve the country in armed conflict—argued and indecisively compromised at the Constitutional Convention—has been resolved by history. President Polk knowingly brought on the Mexican War by ordering American troops into an area disputed with Mexico (although war was later declared). In 1861, Lincoln established an armed blockade of Southern ports when Congress was not yet in session. Theodore Roosevelt openly boasted, "I took Panama." Truman sent troops to Korea, and Eisenhower to Lebanon, without asking Congress. Kennedy approved the Bay of Pigs invasion and commanded the armed blockade of Cuba on his own. Today, the congressional power to declare war is little more than a ratification of events and acts already past. Congress can censure Presidential action, or even cripple it by refusing to vote money or troops. But this is not being done, partly because many Congressmen support the war, partly because others follow the reasoning attributed by Benjamin Thomas to Representative Abraham Lincoln during the Mexican War—that even though he opposed the war, "whenever supply bills were presented, he, like most other Whigs, voted for them rather than risk popular disfavor." Lincoln himself, his political career seemingly devastated by open opposition to the Mexican War, explained to William Herndon, in terms that might appeal to many men now in Congress, "The Locos are untiring in their efforts to make the impression that all who vote supplies * * * do of necessity approve the President's conduct in the beginning of it; but the Whigs from the beginning made and kept the distinction between the two."

It is not possible to convey the full flavor of a meeting of final resolution conducted by Lyndon Johnson. In the early summer of 1965, following several days of discussion, the President and his advisers—Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William F. Buckley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Earle Wheeler, Under Secretary of State George Ball, and several Presidential assistants—met to discuss the decision that he intended to announce the next morning. It was already clear that combat troops would be sent to Vietnam. The question was whether the reserves should be summoned, a national emergency declared, and the Nation given a serious war warning. Throughout the debate, the President sat slouched and almost unnoticed in his chair, listening, and ask-

ing questions. As debate trailed off, he sat upright, the massive physical presence suddenly dominating the table. "Gentlemen," he said, "here are the alternatives." He carefully listed five choices, the last being to commit only the troops then needed, without calling the reserves. His tone left little doubt of his own choice. He then went back over the alternatives, pausing after each one to ask, unsmiling, "Does anyone favor that?" As No. 4, the most drastic, met the same silence as the others, he turned and, staring at the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rose without putting the fifth, and favored, choice, said "Thank you, gentlemen," and left.

During the night, the President personally inserted in his announcement the most advanced peace proposals we had made—free elections, reunification if this should be voted, a cease-fire, and a clear willingness to hear the Vietcong at the conference table—at one stroke overriding long-held objections. Few incidents better dramatized the painful, consistent Presidential desire to prevent defeat while resisting proposals to enlarge the conflict beyond what the present seemed to demand. The wisdom of such a course can be debated, but I do not doubt Lyndon Johnson's desire to end the war. It is killing Americans and threatening the death of many more. It has already reduced resources for education and housing, for conservation and the war against poverty. It is endangering our prosperity. It is, far more than is yet clear, seriously weakening national support for the Democratic Party and the President himself. The depth of this possible disaffection is hinted at by the recent Gallup poll showing that 67 percent of the people would favor a congressional candidate who advocated that we "try harder to reach a compromise peace settlement." (Fifteen percent would oppose such a candidate, 18 percent had no opinion.)

But how can the war be ended? On that issue, the public record reveals, there is a real and danger-filled clash—unresolved, barely articulated, and now in process of decision. Few wish either withdrawal or what the President called mindless escalation, involving an immediate devastation of North Vietnam or an attack on China. These views have no serious prospects, at least for the moment. There are, rather, two middle grounds, presenting different risks, and leading in different directions. On one side are those who believe we should fight a carefully limited war, restricted to combat in South Vietnam and pacification of the countryside; that we should refuse to expand, and perhaps ever reduce or halt, the bombing of the north; and that we should aggressively seek a compromise political settlement, with the inevitably uncertain risk that the Communists might ultimately win control of the country. On the other side are those who wish to use all the military power needed, in the north as well as in the south, to bring the Vietcong to their knees and break the will of Hanoi to continue the war—who wish to compel the Communists into an unfavorable political settlement or no settlement at all. "I don't think anybody suggests literally exterminating them," General Taylor testified, "but we would like to have them so beaten that they would be glad to come in and accept an amnesty." Our policy today rests precariously on the first alternative—carefully limited conflict, leading to a fair, if risky, compromise. However, the pressures of circumstances and events are urging us imperceptibly toward the second course, exposing us to the steadily enlarging danger of a course that has no logical and certain end except in measureless rivers of blood.

Our future policy in Vietnam must follow two parallel roads—the road of negotiation and the road of combat. Past miscalculation should have humbled us to the awareness that each specific step may have larger consequences than we can foresee. Each should

be tested against a single standard: Does it serve or injure the bedrock vital interest of the United States? That interest is to establish that American military power, once committed to defend another nation, cannot be driven from the field. It is not to guarantee South Vietnam forever against the possibility of a Communist takeover.

Hanoi's unwillingness to negotiate is one of the great mysteries of the war. At best, negotiation would give them a favorable result; at worst, negotiation would make it almost impossible for the United States—compelled to show good faith at the conference table—to step up the war. In fact, some of the more militant members of the Washington community have expressed fearful apprehension lest our offer be accepted. The answer to the mystery is buried in the unknown calculations of enemy leaders, the internal politics of North Vietnam, the obscure relations among the Vietcong, Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. Certainly North Vietnam can no longer hope for victory, either by force of arms or by the failure of will. Yet perhaps it does, knowing so little about the strange stubbornness streaked with violence, of the American mind. Recent proofs of instability and division in South Vietnam may add fuel to that hope. Probably the North Vietnamese also suspect that we are asking them to the negotiating table simply to compel their surrender, that nothing we have yet said assures an acceptable compromise, and that if they talk without such assurance it will destroy the morale of the thousands of guerrillas who have undergone years of cruel hardship and danger. Beyond this is Peking, urging, demanding, warning against discussions, establishing its own direct relations with the Vietcong over the head of Hanoi, seemingly delighted to see Americans involved—without cost to China, though not without risk—in a war that helps feed its hope of wresting world Communist leadership from the Soviet Union.

We have had, as we are often reminded, many communications with Hanoi. The critical question, however, is not how many times we have talked but what we have said, not how many notes we have sent but what they have contained. We cannot know this with certainty, but the vagueness of public discussion strengthens a general conviction that the terms of a realistic political settlement have not yet been communicated—a conviction that is further supported by the suggestion of U Thant, expressed in a January interview with a reliable correspondent for the Washington Post, that "as a next step * * * concrete proposals be made on what type of government in South Vietnam, representative, as far as possible, of all the sections of the South Vietnamese people * * * could take over the responsibility of organizing the exercise by the people of the right to decide their own affairs." Clearly, such proposals must answer at least three basic questions. First, who will shape the terms of settlement? Certainly Hanoi cannot come to the table if the Vietcong, who bear the burden of combat, are excluded. Even if it could, to do so would require its admission that the war of liberation in South Vietnam was "simple aggression," that it had consistently lied to the world. Its own very recent claim that the Vietcong are "the sole legitimate representative" of South Vietnam is surely a response to our own assertions that the Vietcong are, in the Vice President's words, but a "stooge," an "agent," of Hanoi. Stripped of pejoratives, however, our current utterances seem to express willingness to talk to the Vietcong. There is, the President said, "no insuperable problem" to having the Vietcong's views represented at a conference. Ambassador Averell Harriman elaborated this when he said that the Vietcong can come either "as part of the North Vietnamese delegation or as an independent group * * * but not as a government." The paper-thin

problem of formal labels is no formidable barrier to those who really want to talk. The second, and most important, of the three questions concerns the makeup of the ultimate Government of Vietnam. "We are willing to see "free elections" in which the Communists can organize, can campaign, and perhaps can win a voice in government. If this happens—and the popular support of the Vietcong makes it likely that it will—we will "honor their result." Once there is peace, we will support a neutral South Vietnam, without military alliances or foreign bases, and free to choose whether or not to reunite with the Communist north. So, according to their published program, will the Vietcong. The third question has to do with the governing of Vietnam between a final settlement and elections. In a country as weak, unstable, and disorganized as Vietnam, elections will be confused, difficult, and disputed. Clearly, we cannot trust the Communists to run free elections. Nor can they be reasonably expected to rely on the honesty and dispassion of General Ky (or his successor). If elections are to mean anything, the country must be directed in this interim period by a compromise government, trusted by both side, their trust being supported by an effective network of international guarantees, by international supervision, or even by an international armed force sufficient to prevent a repetition of the 1956 refusal to hold elections (made possible, at least in part, by the withdrawal of French forces at the request of Diem). This may mean that some Communists will be allowed to share in the interim government. It may mean a government of Buddhists and neutrals, or even an international trusteeship. There are many in South Vietnam well suited to such a role; the vital matter is the international guarantees and international forces that will insure both free elections and peaceful accession by the victors.

This sine qua non of a negotiated settlement was at the center of the confused debate that raged over the February 19 statement of Senator KENNEDY—a debate that dramatized the impossibility of publicly discussing complex issues, especially amid the intricacies of high politics. KENNEDY stated that an acceptable compromise would involve "a share of power and responsibility" for the Vietcong, shaped to avoid the possibility of "domination or internal conquest," with "international guarantees to back up agreement," while the political process would be placed "under the rigorous supervision of a trusted international body." Our willingness to accept the "uncertainties of election" would be matched by a clear demonstration that we would not permit conquest by force. The record of debate does not sustain the impression that KENNEDY withdrew from this position in the fire that followed. There were, however, misreadings, followed by attacks on the proposals as thus interpreted. In fact, he did little more than elaborate what Senator FULBRIGHT had said unnoticed to Secretary Rusk the day before: "I do not recall * * * we have ever made it crystal clear that we will support an election supervised by an appropriate international body, and that we will accept the results. * * * It is also not clear that we are willing to allow any participation of the National Liberation Front either in a provisional government or at any time and, therefore, there is no alternative for them but surrender or annihilation." When the cannonade of comment is sifted, and then stripped of imprecations, accusations, zeal to be in the front ranks of anticommunism, and the fervent but always risky effort to read the unspoken thoughts of the President, the discussion does not seem to leave the administration position far from this. But the debate did, for just a moment, throw a ray of light on inner differences of temperament and attitude. It seemed that Sec-

retary Rusk closed the door when, the day before the Kennedy statement, in answer to FULBRIGHT's dogged pursuit of the alternative to the "possibility of participation" by the Vietcong, he said, "They do have an alternative. They are the front of Hanoi. They do have an alternative of quitting, of stopping being an agent of Hanoi and receiving men and arms from the north." McGeorge Bundy added to the confusion 2 days later by asserting, "The administration does not take the view that admitting the Communists to a share of power and responsibility would be a useful or helpful step," and then, lapsing into the most painful possible rejoinder, quoted President Kennedy against his brother on the wholly irrelevant problem of popular fronts in Europe. (Closer to the problem—if past heroes are to be invoked—is President Kennedy's response to a question about the dangers of coalition government in Laos: "We are taking a chance in all of southeast Asia. * * * I can assure you that I recognize the risks that are involved. But I also think that we should consider the risks if we fail, and particularly of the possibility of escalation of a military struggle in a place of danger.") Once the verbal torrent diminished, it was clear that the President had not embraced the Bundy view. In public speeches and press conferences, he carefully avoided saying anything against the approach of FULBRIGHT and KENNEDY. We would "honor the result" of an election, the President said—presumably even if the Communists should win. And the makeup of an interim government, according to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and the White House, would "be left to the negotiating parties"—which keeps the door open for compromise. The structure of such a compromise (or the many possible variants of compromise) and our willingness to communicate specific proposals to Hanoi are left to future actions and decisions.

Is there a possibility of such a settlement? Hanoi has proposed four points for negotiation. Secretary Rusk, in setting forth 14 points of his own, said that "the effect of those four points * * * would be to give away the very purposes for which we are fighting and to deliver the people of South Vietnam against their will to the domination of a Communist regime." Yet the substance, if not the intention, of the four points is not impossibly distant from the Secretary's own program. It is generally agreed that only the third point, calling for a settlement of the affairs of South Vietnam "in accordance with the program of the National Liberation Front," is totally unacceptable. Although that program has shifted over the years, its essentials have remained constant. Once past the unflattering references to "gangster-style U.S. culture," it calls, in its fullest 1961 version, for "a new constitution," "a new National Assembly through universal suffrage," "all democratic liberties" (including freedom of speech and worship), land reform through "purchase from landowners," "a foreign policy of peace and neutrality," the elimination of all foreign military bases, close unity with "peace-loving and neutral countries" (first of all, with "neighboring Cambodia and Laos"), the overthrow of the Diem regime (since accomplished), and the establishment of "a national democratic" coalition administration, and so on. Of course, there are hidden traps and dangerous ambiguities, such as a granting of freedom only to "patriotic" political parties, a call for reunification by negotiations rather than through elections (although the negotiating government would be elected, and although this year Hanoi proposed reunification through elections), and an absence of international guarantees for elections. It would be naive to think that the program was not intended to move toward a Communist take-

over. Yet in the main, when the ritual curses have been excised, Hanoi's four points, including the front program, sound much like ours; the expressed differences are no greater than those in many productive cold war negotiations. Perhaps this is all propaganda; perhaps victory, not settlement, is the real goal. Yet, whatever Hanoi's reaction, the time has come for the United States to formulate a fair and detailed outline of settlement. Of course, we cannot, as George Ball has said, "first announce it to a television audience and then * * * sit down at a bargaining table." Fruitful discussion will begin in secrecy, where it can be free from political pressures, from critics, and from the corrosive compulsion toward simplicity which marks public debate. The essentials are there: a cease-fire, a laying down of arms so that the entire country can be governed, and an end to bombing; a structure to guarantee elections and also peaceful accession by the victors; a withdrawal of foreign forces, and neutralization; free elections, with Communist participation. Such proposals, couched in the most specific possible terms, should be communicated to Hanoi, accompanied or quickly followed by a meeting between a high U.S. official and a top North Vietnamese. Negotiations, even in the lofty chambers of international politics, cannot be conducted successfully by notes and messengers. Only men confident of their authority and their ability, and fully aware of the implications of their own proposals and the proposals of others—in other words, no more than half a dozen men in America—can hope to bring such negotiations to a successful conclusion, or even bring an accurate account of them to the President.

It does not illuminate reality to say, as some have said, that we cannot "dictate to South Vietnam" what form a settlement should take. It is not conceivable that the United States should continue a major war simply because the temporary chieftain in Saigon did not agree with our position. Nor can any South Vietnamese leader hope to withstand determined American pressure toward a settlement.

In the inevitable political instability of a peaceful South Vietnam, there is always a risk that the Communists may ultimately win political power—that the fox may insinuate its way, or be voted, into the chicken coop. It is this danger that sifens some people's resistance to negotiations. It would indeed be an unfortunate outcome, but, measured by our vital interest—avoiding military defeat—it would not be fatal. It is no more than the chance we are constantly taking all across the world in cold war competition. The only way to compel the Vietcong to a settlement that does not involve such a risk is to crush them in battle.

That battle now goes on in two wars, separated by the 17th parallel—the war in the north and the war in the south. The northern war carries a far more grave danger of a larger, bloodier, and increasingly devastating struggle. On the objectives of the war there has been a subtle change of direction among many of those responsible for its conduct. Less than a year ago, our objective was "a stalemate." Once the guerrillas were convinced that victory was impossible, they would come to the conference table. Now important voices, publicly and privately, are lifted in favor not of a stand-off but of victory. On March 3, Secretary McNamara told a Senate committee, "We win if North Vietnam leaves South Vietnam alone [translated: if the Vietcong stop fighting] * * *. We believe we can win in the sense I indicated." Two weeks earlier, on February 17, General Taylor testified that the time to negotiate is not "until it is quite clear their course of action is a losing one"—a flat contradiction, as Senator AIKEN reminded the General, of the President's ex-

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pressed desire to negotiate now. Other officials are proclaiming it our intention to "destroy" major enemy units, or to break Hanoi's "will to fight." It is a mistake to read too much into individual statements and speeches, plucked out of the careless and ceaseless verbal flow of official Washington, but the absence of contradiction, the growing lack of caution, the obviously planted news stories, and the other evidence charged with significance for the insider (an official in the highest ranks of foreign policy said that the Life article called "Vietnam: The War Is Worth Winning" was one of the most helpful he had seen) all strongly indicate that a substantial section of the community of power believes that military victory is our principal, perhaps our only, objective. I myself am convinced that this belief is growing, but it is significant, and heartening, that the President has not called for armed triumph.

Victory in the south may be possible, with the major Communist units destroyed or broken up, morale shattered, and the guerrillas laying down their arms, asking for amnesty, or peacefully returning to their homes. We are, after all, killing greater and greater numbers of Vietcong. One high official estimates that the "kill rate" may average a thousand a week throughout the year. (Like nearly all the statistics of this war, such an estimate is necessarily flawed by doubts and inadequate information.) The defection rate is increasing, too (now at a weekly average of three to four hundred), although it does not yet match desertions from the South Vietnamese Army. Areas that once provided the guerrillas with secure sanctuary are now constantly menaced by descending helicopters and mobile troops. Yet many heavy clouds obscure the view toward "victory." Past misjudgments impose a fierce skepticism about promises—however, faint and tentative—of military triumph. Since the early 1950's, they have always been wrong. Recently, we were told that the "tide" was turning—a phrase that accidentally echoed the Pentagon pronouncement of May 1963, that "the corner definitely has been turned" toward victory. In 1962, McNamara said that the "ratio of killed and captured" was much more favorable; while a year later General Harkins proclaimed encouragingly from Saigon, "The Vietcong are losing because we are steadily decreasing their areas of maneuver and the terrain over which they can move at will." With a change in dates, these statements would fit unnoticed into many of today's briefings and releases. It is natural for men whose business is to fight wars to believe they can win, just as any good politician secretly believes he can win an election no matter how unfavorable the odds. Past mistakes are no guarantee of future error. There is a possibility that they may be right this time, but history teaches a reluctance to hazard great things on such predictions.

Moreover, it is unclear what victory means. The Secretary of State has said that our only commitment is to stop armed attack from the north—that if the North Vietnamese "were to show the slightest interest in withdrawing their regular armed forces and infiltrators, we could move to peace very quickly and the United States could withdraw its forces." How easy it is to become captive of the incomplete view that the Vietcong are "simply * * * the military arm of North Vietnam." A withdrawal of all infiltrators would leave more than a hundred thousand trained guerrillas in South Vietnam, and there would be no certainty that Hanoi could completely stop the fighting or that such an order, if it should be obeyed at first, would not soon be ignored. Unless a negotiated settlement gives the dissidents a role in the political life of the country, a peaceful outlet for their ambitions, hopes, and protests, we must remain—as well we may—occupiers for

many years. That possibility, resting on uncertainty about the nature of a victorious or independent South Vietnam, is further strengthened by today's still unsettled turbulence. The demonstrations, many of them conducted by young men who have never lived in a country free of terror, civil strife, and the cruelties of war, remind us that the last few months of political quiet in South Vietnam were a rare interlude. To the extent that Communists have inspired division, the antigovernment protests show alarming influence in cities we have long claimed to control. To the extent that they flow from local discontent, they reflect division about the future of South Vietnam and weariness with war, and indicate the mounting price in anti-American feeling we must inevitably pay for the growing weight of the American presence in that tiny land. Whatever the outcome, however, unless events sweep away our influence altogether, it is unlikely we will permit any government to come to power which would inflict on us what some would see as the "humiliation" of requesting our withdrawal.

Some people justify their optimism about victory in terms of "breaking the will" of the Communists to continue the fight. It is true that there are more and more defectors, and that prisoners arrive more and more tired, dejected, and hungry. But the battle goes on; despite our growing force, Hanoi seems more militant, and infiltration seems to be increasing as our own numbers increase. We cannot know the will of men we do not understand. From Thermopylae to the Japanese-infested islands of the Pacific and Hitler's Berlin bunker, history is full of individuals and fighting forces who chose to fight against impossible odds and accept certain death. Nor can we measure the determination of an aging Communist leader who has been waging war for almost a quarter of a century. It is a guess built on an assumption resting on a hope. Aggressors though they are, many of the Vietcong believe they are enlisted in the ranks of justice. Mai Xuan Phong wrote in his diary, "The most precious thing for a man is his life. * * * My whole life, my whole strength have been devoted to the most elevated and the most beautiful cause—the struggle for the liberation of mankind." The demonstrations in South Vietnam show either an increasing weariness with the war on our side or a far greater Communist penetration of the cities than we have cared to admit. The Communists' will to fight may dissolve tomorrow, but one should not wager many American lives on it.

Even if we win countless battles, our victory will not be assured. Success in a guerrilla war, as our experts have repeatedly told us, is not measured simply in deaths and prisoners but, for the most part, in areas of the country pacified and population controlled. There is no clear proof that our control over the population is increasing. General Taylor, at one point in his testimony, indicated that 60 percent of the people were under friendly control instead of the 53 percent of 6 months before. Other testimony shows this figure to be uncertain, probably unknown, or perhaps completely unjustified. Although the Vietcong controls fewer areas than before, there is no firm evidence that a single square mile has been pacified—that is, cleared of guerrillas, protected against future attack, and set on the road to economic improvement. Nor has the United States reached the end of its commitment. General Taylor admitted 235,000 men are not sufficient. The probable conclusion—the simple arithmetic—of Secretary McNamara's March 3 testimony before the Senate is that the United States plans to have at least 400,000 troops in South Vietnam by the end of the year. They will be needed if we intend to keep up the offensive against enemy forces that can increase

by 8,000 a month while we kill 4,000 or less—and even this estimate of enemy increase rests on the highly speculative belief that no more supplies can be smuggled into the south than these troops require, or about a hundred and fifty tons a day. If we are wrong about this—and we may well be wrong—the number that can infiltrate could grow enormously, along with the number of our own troops. (We need four or five men for every enemy soldier, and South Vietnam is nearing the limit of its manpower.)

The hope of victory, however, is not just a harmless folie of some generals and their few State Department allies. It carries the enormous danger that in pursuit of that shining, elusive prize we will enlarge the war in the north. As the southern conflict continues unabated, pressure for more aggressive attacks on North Vietnam, will steadily mount—pressure from public opinion frustrated by an endless battle, pressure from politicians seeking to discredit the administration's will and courage, pressure from those still searching for that one untaken step which will bring success. I hope, and I believe, that the President will resist such pressure, for no one is more painfully aware than he of the immense hazards of enlarging the war in the north.

Since February 7, 1965, we have been bombing selected military targets in North Vietnam—roads and bridges, ammunition and supply dumps, and gathering points for guerrillas. The bombing began with the aim of restoring crumbling morale in South Vietnam and in the forlorn hope that North Vietnam, quaking under the punishing assault, would come to the conference table. Its present purpose, according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, is "to interdict the infiltration of men and material," or, as it is more expansively viewed by General Taylor, "In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership." There is little evidence that the bombing has either had serious effect on the flow of supplies or eroded the will of the north. Infiltration did increase during the pause in the bombing. It also increased before the pause and it has increased since, and we have no figures to prove that bombing has made any important difference. Bombing, it is claimed, imposes "a higher price" for infiltration. It is unclear what this means. The border between the two Vietnams is mostly jungle crossed by trails and waterways. The price of carrying supplies and of repairing roads and bridges is high in terms of human labor, but there are huge numbers of willing unemployed. The travel of men and supplies since the bombing is longer and more difficult, but the North Vietnamese have time and they are used to discomfort. Of course, the bombing has some effect, but there is no compelling public justification of these costly assaults on military grounds. General Matthew B. Ridgway, our commander in Korea—the last ground war in Asia—has concluded, "It is impossible to interdict the supply routes of an Asian army by air power alone. [In Korea] we had complete air mastery—we clobbered Chinese supply columns unmercifully—but we did not halt their offensive nor materially diminish its strength."

The war in the north has neither halted aggression nor shattered the "will" of the enemy nor "punished Hanoi" beyond the limits of endurance, yet the Alice in Wonderland response of some is to call for a stepping up of the war. "We should go after more meaningful targets on a slow progressive scale," said General Taylor, a highly intelligent military moderate. This will, it is hoped, "provide a sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Vietcong insurgency."

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The President has given a more restricted basis for the bombing—"to slow down aggression," "increase the confidence of * * * South Vietnam," and help "convince the leaders of North Vietnam—and all who seek to share their conquest—[that] we will not be defeated * * * grow tired * * * [or] withdraw." The bombing has helped strengthen Southern resolution, and it has also helped convince any reasonable adversary that armed conquest is inconceivable, though the combat troops we have sent to the South since the bombing began are a more compelling proof.

The objectives set forth by the President are limited ones, and they have largely been accomplished. However, the grander and more spacious desire to end the enemy's capacity for making war, destroy his will to fight, and punish him for wrongdoing opens limitless horizons of expansion. Moreover, this desire invokes judgments that are not military judgments. The will of a nation, the punishment it can take, the strength of national pride and feeling and resistance are not matters that military specialists or computers or the Rand Corp. can assess. They require an intimate knowledge of the culture and thought of alien lands and of obscurely known leaders. It may even be that, as a careful American study of the war against Germany indicated, bombing strengthens the fighting spirit of a people. A leading political figure recently said to me, "After all, if we were being bombed, we'd never give in." Even the purely military justification, unsupported by any civilian * * * if necessary, should assure continued security while we begin the work of social organization and economic investment, along with measures for education and the improvement of health, the harnessing of water power, and an increase in the yield of the land. If we now lack the manpower for this most important task—and we do—then both Americans and Vietnamese might well be recruited, or even conscripted, for it. Such a course might limit our battles and our deaths. It would prove our determination far more effectively than leaping across the country looking for guerrillas to kill, and would clearly demonstrate our willingness to help build a sure base for a society in which, to reverse Mao Tse-tung's famous image, "the fish" of guerrilla armies cannot "swim." Here, too, the President might well tell the American people that the outcome is uncertain—that we may turn a sudden corner and find victory but that it is far more likely that we will see only a long, bloody, inconclusive war of attrition, until returning sanity brings a political settlement. For if the talk of victory is allowed to swell, the political consequences of failure and the pressure to expand the war will also mount.

Secretary Rusk, when he was asked by Senator PELL if he saw any end to the "corridor we are following," replied, "No; I would be misleading you if I told you that I thought that I know where, when, and how this matter will be resolved." A few minutes later, he added, "The nature of a struggle of this sort * * * is, of course, substantially determined by the other side." Such a terrifying admission of futility—an advance absolution—only conceals the truth that this enormous Nation is not helplessly in the grip of events, that the future, like the past, will be shaped largely by our own judgments. It is easy, and it would be wrong, to be apocalyptic about a conflict that is still so strictly limited and so full of hopeful possibilities for settlement. We have emerged safe and strong from many equally dangerous enterprises. Yet not long ago an important politician, intimate with the processes of power, told me he thought that if large-scale war ever comes, it will come not in a burst of Strangelove madness

or a fail-safe accident, but through a long series of acts and decisions, each seemingly reasonable, that will slowly place the great powers in a situation in which they will find it impossible to back down. It will be no one's fault.

LET'S GIVE BUSINESS A SQUARE DEAL

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, in the April issue of Nation's Business there appears an excellent article by former Vice President Richard Nixon entitled "Let's Give Business a Square Deal."

This article calls attention to a dangerous trend of bureaucratic controls and should be read by every American businessman.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LET'S GIVE BUSINESS A SQUARE DEAL (By Richard M. Nixon)

(NOTE.—The former Vice President, in this exclusive article, proposes an anti-inflationary alternative to the Johnson administration's wage-price guidelines, which he says violate our rights to "commercial due process of law.")

The constitutional guarantees of due process of law have an analog in the business field—which I like to call commercial due process. It is found in the framework of statutes, regulations, Executive orders, policy statements, and decisions to which a lawyer refers when counseling a business client.

Although procedures may vary greatly in the many different areas of Government activity, a businessman can usually expect to be put on notice of the procedures to be followed by Government; to know of the sanctions which Government will impose if specified procedures are not followed; and to have an opportunity to be heard before any sanction is imposed. The essence of commercial due process may be described in the same terms as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once used to describe constitutional due process—one has a right to expect "fair play" when dealing with the Government.

The guidelines or guideposts enunciated originally by the President's Council of Economic Advisers in 1962, as they are presently being applied, do great violence to commercial due process. If they continue to be applied in the future as they have been in 1965 and in recent months, they may even transgress the bounds of constitutional due process. One prominent economist has already predicted that the guidelines may, "under the pressure of events, move our Nation's economy in an authoritarian direction." Another has warned of "government by threat, fear, or club."

HOW DUE PROCESS PROTECTS

In order to appreciate fully the perplexities caused the businessman by the Johnsonian application of guidelines, it might be well first to review how constitutional due process operates in the normal Federal regulatory scheme:

Before a regulatory policy is enacted or adopted, a proposal is made by the President or a prominent legislator or group of citizens. This proposal may be debated for months or years. It may never go beyond the debate stage. At some point, however, the public enthusiasm for the proposal may lead to presentation of a bill in Congress.

Here, the debate continues, often with great publicity. Hearings may be held and the many viewpoints on the measure are, again subject to close public scrutiny. After passage by the Congress, the bill must be signed into law by the President. In many instances, the legislation establishes an agency to administer the new law. And the agency in turn promulgates its own regulations to implement the broader statutory direction.

The point is that the businessman who is to be regulated has a number of opportunities to make his opinion known prior to the establishment of the administrative agency. Nor does his opportunity to be heard end there. After the agency has been established, the businessman may appear at the agency's rule-making hearings to present his views. If he is aggrieved by the regulations enforced by the agency, he may again appear before that body in a hearing to present his case. And he may appeal an adverse decision through the courts.

The Federal Constitution guarantees that he shall be accorded due process of law. If the businessman's lawyer counsels him not to risk infraction of a vague regulation of the agency, the businessman may often apply for a ruling or declaratory order before he embarks upon a course of conduct. And here again, an arbitrary decision, one that goes beyond the powers of the agency, or is contrary to law, can be appealed in the courts.

The standard of commercial due process pertains in instances of less formal exercises of governmental power, such as the guidelines. Here, too, we have a right to expect fair play from the Government—including the elements of notice, full disclosure and fair treatment for all. But the guidelines, as presently applied, disregard commercial due process. They not only deprive those covered of any element of certainty upon which to base their plans, but fail to provide a means of obtaining certainty as well.

WHERE GUIDELINES GO WRONG

There are four areas in which the present application of the guidelines violates commercial due process:

1. Coercion: The guidelines, although they have none of the safeguards normally attached to statutes or regulations as described above, are being applied as though they incorporated statutory or regulatory sanctions. Thus, Defense Secretary McNamara's announcement regarding the dumping of stockpiled aluminum, at the time when the administration was demanding that the aluminum industry withdraw price advances in excess of the guidelines, was as forceful a punishment as one might conceive. This was, of course, a marked change in the original concept of the guidelines as voluntary guideposts upon which to base wage-price determinations.

2. Changing rules: AFL-CIO President George Meany has charged that the Council of Economic Advisers has changed the rules for the formulation of the guideposts in the middle of the regulatory process. By keeping the guideposts at 3.2 percent, rather than raising them to 3.6 percent, he maintains, the Council has abandoned the 5-year trend rate of productivity gains originally used as the basis for computing the guideposts. Mr. Meany asks:

"How can union leaders * * * be expected to accept such sudden and one-sided revision of the method of arriving at the wage guidelines? And how can the public accept the credibility of such shifting methods?"

Basic to commercial due process is the principle that rules are changed only upon notice to the parties affected and where an undue hardship does not result because of

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such change of rules in the middle of the game.

3. Lack of candor: George Meany has not been the only one to express concern over the credibility of the administration. Administration officials have been guilty of directly misrepresenting the facts in many areas, including the aluminum and steel settlements and the Federal budget. Of course, one of the crucial elements of the notice requirement under commercial due process is to be accurately informed by the Government of the steps which it plans to take. Misinformation not only thwarts this process, but can raise havoc with corporate planning.

4. Unequal application of the rules: Although the administration has seen fit to level sanctions against certain industries, it has not done so in the case of others. Moreover, its stringent application of the guidelines has not reached wages to the same extent that it has prices in the basic industries. Thus, although the average wage increase negotiated in settlements in 1964 was 3.2 percent, during the first 9 months of 1965—the only period in that year for which we now have records—the average wage increase negotiated in major collective bargaining settlements was 4.2 percent, almost a full third over the wage guidepost.

Perhaps the basic inconsistency in the administration's approach has been to demand stringent application of the guidelines to prices in major industries, with the obvious objective of halting inflation, while continuing to increase the amount of Federal spending on domestic programs. The effect of this policy has been to require certain industries to toe the line, while increasing consumer spending, and with it inflation, in the economy as a whole.

The President seems bound to replace the old law of supply and demand with his own law of comply and expand. And, as we shall see, this is not working.

CHANGING NATURE OF GUIDELINES

As originally enunciated in 1962 by the Council of Economic Advisers, the guidelines were to be a basis of voluntary discussion and decision. Prof. Arthur Burns, who served as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Eisenhower, has compared the 1962 and 1964 reports of the Council, and discerns a noticeable difference between the original approach, and that followed more recently, which amounts to a hardening of the guidelines. He states:

"The report of 1962 had avoided specifying the annual trend increase of national productivity on the ground that this was 'a large and complex subject and there is much still to be learned.'

"The report of 1964, on the other hand, is free from all methodological doubts and presents without qualification a figure of 3.2 percent as the annual trend increase of productivity in the private economy that is currently applicable.

"The report of 1962 had indicated that the 'general guideposts' were 'only first approximations' that would need to be adapted extensively 'to the circumstances of particular industries.' The report of 1964, on the other hand, states flatly that the guideposts 'can cover the vast majority of wage and price decisions' and, while the modifications that had been suggested earlier 'still apply * * * it must be emphasized that they are intended to apply to only a relatively few cases.'"

Thus, the guidelines have become more rigid. The 1964 report now refers to them as a "standard" for price and wage decisions. But, as George Meany notes, they are "rigid guidelines based on shifting methods." They have sanctions in some cases and not in others. They appear to have been applied more to prices than to wages; to some businesses, but not to others. Although their objective is to reduce inflation, the Govern-

ment continues to expand its expenditures on domestic programs.

GUIDELINES TODAY

The administration's random enforcement of guidelines has not worked.

The wholesale price index rose 3.6 points from January 1965 to January 1966, with almost half of this rise (1.5 points) occurring in the 3-month period between November 1965 through January of this year. There is widespread fear of inflation if these policies are permitted to continue.

The reason we do not have the usual regulatory procedure for the Government's attempted regulation of wages and prices by guideline is clear: There has been no public mandate or widespread acceptance of the Government's policy under which a statute or administrative agency might be established. Indeed, I would be the first to oppose such restrictions at this time. Although the Joint Economic Committee of Congress has held hearings on the guidelines, they have been marked by bitter disputes. In the course of these hearings, Chairman Ackley, of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, noted that legislative enactment of the guidelines at this time would be opposed by both labor and management. Recent meetings of economists have also seen widespread criticism of the present guideline approach.

It is not necessary at this time to impose a cumbersome set of wage-price regulations on American business. There are other more traditional and effective methods for dealing with the present threat of inflation which hangs over our economy, which include the broad elements of commercial due process.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

If businessmen are to be able to plan their programs for the coming years, some order must be reestablished in the Government's anti-inflationary program. I would suggest the following:

1. Use of traditional anti-inflationary methods. Initially, I would suggest that the Government curtail domestic spending. No new domestic programs requiring additional expenditures should be submitted to Congress, and spending levels for new domestic programs already adopted by Congress should be cut back where possible. Also, the administration should adopt a policy on interest rates with the objective of checking the rate of expansion of credit. These methods may initially prove less popular than the occasional imposition of rigid guidelines on a few major industries. However, they have been effective in the past and, if the Federal Government wishes seriously to continue its policy of urging that price and wage guidelines be followed, it would do well to set a good example in its own programs.

2. Full notice of the administration's guideline policy should be given. If the administration means seriously to pursue its guideline policy, it must first inform American business and labor of what this policy means. If the policy is to include sanctions, such as have already been imposed, the Federal Government should so inform business and labor. If the policy is going to be imposed upon only some businesses, this should be made known also. If the Government really means to include labor and wages in its guideline policy, it should do so and state that it is doing so. Occasional exceptions should be made where business or labor, after a full hearing, can demonstrate that such exceptional treatment is deserved. Businesses cannot plan within the context of the present vague and inconsistent administration guideline policy.

What is most important, the administration must be entirely candid with the American people. The administration's program must be fully disclosed.

3. Traditional leadership methods must be utilized. The office of the President enjoys

tremendous prestige. By keeping the public fully informed as to his policies, the President can gain the necessary public support to carry them through. Moreover, the office can be used in other ways to accomplish the objectives of the administration. Officials of Cabinet rank, at the direction of the Chief Executive, can work effectively to maintain economic stability.

One might contrast the 1965 aluminum price rollback, induced by the administration's threat to dump stockpiled aluminum on the market if the guideline was exceeded, with the settlement of the 1959 steel strike. In the latter instance, at the direction of the President, Secretary of Labor Mitchell and I offered to mediate the dispute. After a number of unpublicized private conferences with the key parties, the differences which had prevented settlement were resolved. This was not an easy solution to the problem. It was not government by threat or fiat. It required hours of hard work and drew heavily on the prestige of the administration. But it settled a 6-month-old strike and did so without any inflationary rise in prices.

In all of these dealings both sides were kept apprised of our activities. When we consulted with each side individually, we did so only with the permission of the other side. Although we had no formal regulatory mechanism, we observed all of the traditional elements of commercial due process.

THE ALTERNATIVES

We are at a critical turning point in the battle against inflation.

The administration has adopted policies which are both ineffective and contradictory. Instead of cutting nonmilitary expenditures, the administration has added over \$4 billion to domestic spending programs.

To combat the inflationary impact of this budget action, the administration has resorted to renewed insistence on voluntary guidelines, arbitrarily and capriciously administered and flagrantly violating commercial due process.

These self-defeating actions predictably have not only failed to stem the inflationary tide but have escalated it. That is why administration insiders now are talking not only about the possible need for a tax increase but also about the eventual necessity to impose mandatory wage and price controls.

The cost of winning the war against inflation by these weapons would be that we would risk launching a war against prosperity.

I have tried in this article to point out an alternative course—a program which will enable us to win the war against inflation without jeopardizing prosperity.

Instead of raising nonmilitary expenditures in the budget, we should cut them.

Instead of condemning the Federal Reserve Board for raising the discount rate, administration officials should encourage action in all levels of Government which would stem the excessive flow of credit.

Voluntary guidelines should be administered in an orderly and consistent manner. There are two reasons why such guidelines would work better under such a program than at present. First, because the best way for Government to set guidelines is for Government to set an example in the conduct of its own fiscal affairs.

Second, because both business and labor are more likely to accept and adhere to guidelines when the rules of commercial due process are observed in their application.

As the 1959 steel settlement demonstrated, it is possible to observe the prerequisite of elaborate regulatory procedure. The requirements of notice, full disclosure, equal treatment—or fair play—can be observed even if no statute or regulation exists compelling the administrator to so act. The difficulty arises when any governmental pol-

icy is pursued without observing these safeguards.

The greatest value of commercial due process lies in the fact that it permits Government to enunciate policies beneficial to an ordered society, while insuring to American business and labor the maximum freedom to act in our market economy.

A LETTER FROM VIETNAM

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, on April 9, 1966, S. Sgt. David E. Wagner now serving in South Vietnam, addressed a letter to me setting forth his views dealing with the U.S. participation in that conflict.

Mr. David E. Wagner's home address is Bellefontaine, Ohio, and I am certain that it is on the basis of being my constituent that he wrote me. This member of the Army serving in Vietnam has definite views about the justification of our presence in that land.

He asked that I include his letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I believe that it is worthy of being done and I, therefore, Mr. President, ask consent that the letter be printed in today's record of congressional action.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DA NANG AIRBASE, VIETNAM,
April 9, 1966.

DEAR SIR: Having considered the state of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the overall picture of the foreign policy in practice today, I would pose a question to you or to anyone who can answer it. Where does the road lead us? Are we headed for a complete destruction of the American principle, the free world's bulwark against communism's spread over the face of the earth?

Of prime importance to each of us as individuals and to us as a nation is the question concerning the outcome of the war in Vietnam. Here we find two violently opposing ideologies locked together in a contest of force and cunning. The unusual circumstances of the war itself, coupled with the position of the United States, has given birth, and justifiably so, to the phrase, "the new face of war." This is a war entirely new in comparison to those in which we have been involved in the past. Many of us find it difficult to understand the unique aspects and complications here.

In the past we found it necessary to defend our stand of nonaggression to only a very few, the majority of whom were voices of propaganda aimed at undermining our position. The singularly most questionable act on the part of the United States in war must have been our decision to use atomic warheads against cities in Japan during World War II. Yet this, with all its vastly devastating implications, has been accepted as necessary by an overwhelming majority of people the world over.

Although not as wide in scope as the Second World War, this most recent military action cannot be considered less important. The future, not only of the Republic of Vietnam, but also of other nations in southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world, depends to a great degree on the end result of the struggle in Vietnam. Remote as it may seem, the stage has been set here.

What I feel has been a major contribution toward our success in the war has been the relentless bombing of Hanoi's military and industrial lifeline. Yet this, more than most aspects of the war, has come under continued condemnation. Will we be coerced into relinquishing this one vital stranglehold on the aggressor? It was this same military tactic of bombing, on a much larger scale,

which brought Japan to its knees to end the war in the Pacific. Now, at a time when it could prove equally effective, when action is even more of a necessity, we feel it immoral because of the civilian casualties it might incur, even though it could force the enemy to relent and avert a drawn out and costly confrontation.

Certainly, we do not advocate mass annihilation of the defenseless civilian population, as this would be nothing more than a direct reflection of our enemy's lack of consideration for the value of human life, but neither can we condone the attitude of ignoring a situation, unpleasant as it might be.

We pride ourselves on being a nation founded in the spirit of defiance of man's injustice to man. We have now witnessed the disappearance of this spirit. We are willing to accept this injustice because the man in trouble is not a member of our own household. Our foundation of positive affirmation in our principles has given way to a negativism. Instead of fostering our ideology among potentially self-reliant nations in the world, we approach it from the defensive position. The most effective method of dealing with any opposing doctrine is not from the negative position, but from the positive.

There are those of our leaders who feel that the security of Vietnam poses no threat to the defense of the United States or the free world. This viewpoint is fatally shortsighted, and has been demonstrated by similar persons stating that we were not endangered by the actions of Germany, Japan, or Italy during the 1930's.

The questions, the opposition we hear concerning U.S. intervention in Vietnam is healthy and at times necessary in analyzing our system of government. It is not un-American to voice opposition to policies as formulated by our Government, but it becomes much worse when the opposition asks us to turn our backs on individuals being engulfed by a totalitarianism which denies the existence of their right to be individuals. This is betraying the genius of the American principle. Our willingness to step in and use force against actions perpetrated by staged by Communist front organizations is only an indication of our determination not to succumb to an atheistic ideology which strips men of their freedom.

The reluctance and sometimes violent dissonance of the general public can be attributed entirely to the fact that they have not been kept informed on the issues: first, of what is at stake; second, of the reason for the stand we have taken; and last, of our determination to thwart the Communist bid for world domination.

The varying degrees of isolationist theories advocated by many today can be nothing but an invitation to the enemy. The negotiations sought by so many, and the concessions which go along with them would be a compromise to the enemy. Before we accept the compromise suggested by these of our leaders, let us ask what they are actually advocating.

The most notable examples of compromise we have entered into in past years have not, as such, been instances of true compromise, but sacrifice. Consider the meaning of the word "sacrifice": to surrender something of value in favor of that of lesser value or non-value. One of the parties involved gains while the other suffers loss. This would more accurately characterize a compromise made by the United States in its application to foreign affairs. If we lose in the initial compromise, and then, in addition, our partner fails to keep his part of the agreement, we have made a complete concession of our position.

Before we enter into any "deals" with the Communists, it is imperative that we profit by past experience, and admit that we can

attach no guarantee that they will keep their part in any bargain. We have erred in past agreements by naively thinking them as honest as we are, and in all cases they have felt free to violate any agreements they have made.

In this war, as never before, we hear our civilian and military leaders being branded as "warhawks" and accused of saber rattling. We seem to forget the primary role of deterrence in combating aggression. There is a considerable difference between being bloodthirsty and a reasonable exercise of force to deter the motives of greed as shown by the Communists.

Being in the military does not alter my status as a citizen. I volunteered to declare my rights by enlistment. I trust this does not automatically make me a "warhawk" or "militant" individual. I am an American, in uniform, aspiring to protect my rights as such; but, moreover, I am willing to help others attain the same rights which I enjoy.

Several centuries ago, the people of Asia saw the construction of the Great Wall of China. This wall can never compare to the impenetrable wall now existing at the 17th and 38th parallels, or between East and West Berlin. Our military and economic support of nations such as Japan, West Germany, South Korea, and Formosa has always contributed toward the establishment of an autonomous state, whose self-reliance can never be equaled by the puppet governments behind the curtains of iron and bamboo. * * *

A sellout in Vietnam? Who will be sold out? Not just the Vietnamese but you and I along with them. Let communism run rampant and see if it does not end up at our own back door. Who will come to our assistance?

S. Sgt. DAVID E. WAGNER.

ARTICLES ON WYOMING IN THE PLAINSMAN

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the April-May issue of the Plainsman, in which there appeared two articles featuring Wyoming. The first article, "There's No Hole in Jackson, Wyo.'s Plans," contains a very fascinating account of the remarkable efforts of two Jackson Hole businessmen, Mr. Alex Morley and Mr. Paul McCollister, to make the glorious Jackson Hole Valley in Wyoming available as a tourist attraction on a year around basis, rather than limiting its use to summer enjoyment.

These two executives of the Jackson Hole Ski Corp. are currently developing a European-type ski area at the foot of majestic Rendezvous Peak, some 14 miles northwest of the historic town of Jackson. As the article points out:

Jackson Hole is the only area in the country where you can have European skiing because you can get above the timberline for Alpine-type conditions.

In addition to the excellent skiing conditions, the winter season in Jackson Hole also offers ice fishing, dogsled rides, various scenic Snowmobile trips into Yellowstone Park, the elk feeding grounds, and the All-American Cutter Races, all located in the heart of a valley of breathtaking beauty.

The second article in the Plainsman, "Travel and Tourism in Mid-America," provides a definitive view of the steadily growing tourist industry in Wyoming, which incidentally, is the third largest and fastest growing segment of the State's economy. With a population of

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only 340,000 people distributed over 98,000 square miles, Wyoming's wide-open spaces and spectacular mountain scenery are indeed alluring to the stifled city dwellers of America. The Wyoming Travel Commission estimates that approximately 8 million travelers move through Wyoming each year.

Mr. President, I request that these articles, to which I have alluded, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JACKSON, WYO., IS ACQUIRING AN ALPINE AIR?

JACKSON, WYO.—"This valley never can be spoiled."

John Colter, a trapper and trader, might have said that in 1808 when he trudged through Jackson Hole in an attempt to do business with the Crow Indian tribes. Colter probably was the first white man to travel along Wyoming's great Teton Range and to be struck by the absolutely magnificent beauty of the area.

The quote, however, belongs to a modern-day businessman, Alex Morley, a retired Cheyenne contractor who, along with his partner, Paul McCollister, has embarked on an ambitious venture to turn Jackson Hole into one of the world's finest, year-around playgrounds.

Mr. McCollister, as president, and Mr. Morley, as vice president, have created the Jackson Hole Ski Corp. and currently are developing a European-type ski area at the foot of majestic Rendezvous Peak, some 14 miles northwest of the historic town of Jackson.

CONTAGIOUS ZEAL

If enthusiasm was the sole ingredient for success, Messrs. Morley and McCollister already would have achieved their goal. Despite bitter reverses that would have crushed the desire of many developers to continue, Mr. Morley discusses the area's future with a zeal that is quite contagious.

"You really should talk to Paul. 'He's even more excited about this than I am,' he remarked. Yet it hardly seems possible that anyone could surpass the enthusiasm of the 47-year-old Mr. Morley:

"This country is prettier than anywhere else in the United States and it will never be spoiled because 97 percent of the land is owned by the Federal Government.

The skiing is the greatest I've ever had in my life. Jackson Hole is the only area in the country where you can have European skiing because you can get above the timberline for Alpine-type conditions. We're patterning this area after Bierbia, in the French portion of Switzerland."

To prove their point, the partners are creating Teton Village at the foot of the 10,924-foot Rendezvous Peak, and at an estimated cost of \$54 million. Thirty-five commercial and 135 residential sites now have been plotted for the village itself. Three lodges, the Seven Levels Inn, the Alpenhof, and the Sojourner, have been completed and are operating, and construction will begin on six more lodges this spring.

REAL ESTATE MARKET

The designated 2½-acre residential lots are selling well, according to Mr. Morley, despite the fact that real estate here comes relatively high (from \$12,000 to \$15,000 a site, with a \$20,000 minimum for the dwelling).

The ski areas spread out above the village and are reached by three double chairlifts, two of which rise 2,150 vertical feet to Apres-Vous Peak. The third chairlift is used exclusively for the ski school, commanded by 28-year-old Pepi Stiegler, a former Austrian national and an Olympic ski champion.

The key to the area, however, is an aerial tramway that will transport skiers to the top of Rendezvous in 8 minutes. Rising 4,135 feet over its 2½-mile length, the 63-passenger tram is expected to handle 3,000 skiers an hour. But problems have enveloped the tramway for the time being.

The main drum of the tram's construction hoist ruptured last fall during the installation of the tramway and it has remained idle ever since. The Ski Corp. hopes that it will be in operation by April, but the partners admit that they have encountered considerable difficulties in making the absolutely necessary repairs.

A ROUGH SETBACK

The setback with the tram not only cost the Ski Corp. a sizable amount of revenue in canceled room reservations, lift ticket fees, and afterdark activities, but it also has dimmed the area's reputation. It certainly caused some travelers to pause.

Frontier Airlines, the sole commercial airline serving Jackson Airport, originally delayed putting winter service in from Denver, considered a vital gateway to Jackson Hole for the booming ski traffic from the Midwest and east coast, but it finally gained approval by the Civil Aeronautics Board to begin experimental service between the two points in March.

Jackson Hole also has had to counter a reputation as a cold place to ski. But Mr. Morley reacts strongly to such a suggestion:

"Sure we get cold temperatures from time to time, but they're no worse than at most of the major ski areas around the country. I've skied in a sweater at Jackson Hole many times in January and February. Cold weather is not our problem here."

Shrugging off such adversities, Messrs. Morley and McCollister meanwhile have plunged ahead with their development of Teton Village. At the same time, they have developed the \$1-million Jackson Hole Golf and Country Club, about 6 miles from the city. Nine holes of the 6,780-yard championship course opened to the public early last fall; the remainder of the holes will be ready for play this summer.

NEVER UNPOPULAR

The tramway and golf course are certain to be popular with summer visitors around the area, but Jackson Hole never has been ignored as a summer tourist mecca. Grand Teton National Park is synonymous with campers, hunters, and sightseers. Fishermen, swimmers, and beaters have a choice of lakes, including Jackson and Jenny, or the curling Snake River.

The Teton Range provides an unlimited challenge for mountain climbers and pack trips. The town of Jackson has a personality all its own, and it's one worth cultivating. Summers in Jackson have been enhanced by the Jackson Hole Fine Arts Festival, a 6-week series of art films, exhibits and concerts by outstanding musicians from all over the Nation.

Today the ski area not only is providing a new dimension for winter sports enthusiasts, but it also is taking the lead in promoting Jackson Hole as a family vacation center. "You don't have to ski to justify a visit to Jackson Hole," Mr. Morley grinned.

Visitors can ride the feed sleds through the 24,000-acre National Elk Refuge, where thousands of the animals seek shelter each winter. Moose, mountain sheep and bear are among the wildlife that are easy to spot throughout the area.

There is ice fishing for the unusually hardy sportman, dogsled rides for the children, and various scenic snowmobile trips into the park. For the sports fan who's seen just about everything competition around Jackson Lake includes ski-doo races, snowplanning on Jackson Lake and the all-American cutter races, in which chariotlike cutters,

drawn by two-horse teams, race through the streets of Jackson.

GOOD THING GOING?

Alex Morley seems absolutely convinced that he and Paul McCollister have a good thing going. As for the future, Mr. Morley doesn't mind discussing another village complex south of Teton Village. This village would contain a series of interconnecting lodges so that guests would never have to be subjected to the weather until they headed for the ski slopes. The partners also envisage a third village, which would be situated about half way up on Rendezvous Mountain.

Gorden Wren, former U.S. ski jumping and cross-country champion, and now general manager of the Jackson Hole Ski Corp., calls the new vacation complex a "great challenge." Just chat with any of the 41 employees of the corporation and you'll detect the same enthusiasm.

"Fun is found the year around in Jackson Hole" is the new cry for this famed area. And individuals such as Morley and McCollister today help to provide the vision and the facilities for thousands of others who some day will share in the recreational wealth of this once-hidden, yet glorious valley.

WYOMING

Wyoming's fastest-growing industry is neither represented by smokestacks nor bustling factories. Yet tourism is the segment of the State's economy that shows a steady upcurve and has been estimated to have risen from 6 to 7 percent in 1965. Ranked third in the State, it is topped only by mineral production (including petroleum) and by livestock.

In these days of a burgeoning national population, all too frequently concentrated in large metropolitan areas, Wyoming's wide-open spaces, spectacular mountains and "living room" are factors that increasingly have attracted the visitor. With only 340,000 living permanently in a land area of 98,000 square miles, Wyoming easily demonstrates that it's a long way between people in this particular State.

Hunters come to Wyoming in the fall in pursuit of elk, deer, antelope, moose, big-horn sheep, wild turkey, and other challenging game targets. Ever-improving ski facilities lure devotees of that sport each winter, and they are now being joined by advocates of a new activity called snowmobiling.

Two great magnets to the summer visitor are Yellowstone and Teton National Parks. And summertime temperatures are air-conditioned in contrast to the humidity and the greater heat of much of the remainder of the Nation.

STEADY INCREASE

Wyoming's highways have always been good, but they are even better today with the completion of about 470 miles of 4-lane interstate routes. For several years, tourism had increased by a steady 5 percent annually, but last year appears to have exceeded all expectations by 1 or 2 percentage points.

In terms of dollars 1965 tourism brought a probable \$107 million to the State. While final figures are not yet available, an application of a 7-percent hike to the \$100 million estimated for 1964 would produce that total. Frank Norris, Jr., director of the Wyoming Travel Commission, termed 1965 a "tremendous year."

Even members of the Wyoming Highway Patrol now are serving as ambassadors of good will in cooperation with the travel commission. Patrolmen have been provided with travel kits to help them to give accurate information to motorists. Each travel kit carries data on accommodations, resorts, out-

This year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff again unanimously recommended that an authorization and appropriation of funds to accomplish preproduction engineering on the Nike X system be included in the budget request, but, as I have pointed out, the Secretary of Defense once again rejected the recommendation.

This year the Armed Services Committee of the Senate decided without a dissenting vote that the time had come to fund preproduction engineering on the Nike X system; and, accordingly, the authorization was amended to include \$167.9 million for that purpose.

The performance of the preproduction engineering on the Nike X system is the first step or commitment toward deployment by the United States of a defense against ballistic missiles. Conducting the preproduction engineering on the Nike X system in the fiscal 1967 program, although it will reduce by approximately 1 year the period before deployment can be begun, will not in any way restrict the options as to the type of deployment ultimately undertaken, nor will it preclude the incorporation in the system of changes developed in subsequent research and development.

Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee has acted most wisely, in my opinion, in adding this amendment. I hope that the Senate and the House of Representatives also will concur in the authorization of these funds and subsequently that they will appropriate the funds also.

It is true that the system will ultimately cost approximately \$20 billion. This cost will be spread over several years. Even if coupled with a shelter program, the cost will probably not exceed about \$5 billion a year. An anti-ballistic-missile system is well worth the cost, however, for in the event of a missile attack on the United States, many millions of lives of Americans would be saved.

For this purpose, we can afford the resources. We do have the technical and industrial capability. We have, for instance, far greater resources than do the Soviets. As pointed out by General Wheeler in his testimony to the committee, "The Soviets are already very heavily committed."

Mr. President, we do not, of course, have any assurance that even should the Congress authorize and appropriate the funds for preproduction engineering in the Nike X system on the fiscal 1967 program that the administration would accept this recommendation of Congress to permit the funds to be utilized for this purpose. The Secretary of Defense, speaking for the administration, opposed the action, and in doing so, rejected the unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our Nation's top military advisers. It is quite possible that the administration will also reject the advice of Congress. We have an obligation, however, to do everything in our power to see that American lives are protected and that obligation requires no less action than is proposed by the Armed Services Committee recommendation. I hope that the Senate will concur in the inclusion of the funds for preproduction engineering on

the Nike X system and that this will be the first step toward the earliest possible deployment of the Nike X anti-ballistic-missile system and an end to our total nakedness to the potential enemy ballistic-missile attack.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

So the bill (S. 2950) was passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, once again the great chairman of the Armed Services Committee has served this body, indeed has served the entire Nation, with unsurpassed honor. The senior Georgia Senator has long devoted his indefatigable energies, his astute talents, and his broad and profound military expertise to achieving unequalled greatness for America's defense activities. So he did today. Perhaps no other individual in the history of this body has earned so well or deserved more justly the highest respect and admiration of his colleagues for his selfless contributions to this Nation's security requirements.

I join with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] in saying it is always a great privilege to be in this Chamber during the chairman's presentation of Armed Forces authorization measures. His remarks are always enlightening and always inspiring. It is regrettable that all we can offer in return for his unparalleled efforts on behalf of our Nation and particularly on behalf of her fighting men is our sincere and abiding gratitude for a job well done.

There are others to whom we are grateful for today's success. Particularly noteworthy were the splendid efforts by the ranking minority member of the committee, the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL]. Of course, his highly able assistance and cooperative leadership are always appreciated. It was with deep sorrow that I learned of his personal tragedy in the loss of his son and namesake. It could be only an event of this grievous magnitude, however, which would prevent the senior Massachusetts Senator from being in the Chamber today. I know the Senate as a whole joins with me in expressing sincere condolence and in wishing comfort and solace to the Saltonstall family at this time of loss.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] is to be thanked for his strong cooperative efforts in assuring today's success. His support is always appreciated. And too, we appreciate the contributions of the distinguished Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH]. Her typically capable advocacy was most welcomed.

The senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE] is to be commended for choosing today to report on his recent travels to southeast Asia. Both his report and the discussions engaged in during its presentation were provocative and enlightening. We are thankful.

Finally, to the Senate as a whole, the leadership wishes to express its gratitude for today's swift and orderly action on the military authorization.

VISIT TO VIETNAM

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, my speech is not without its appropriate frame of

reference for the military authorization measure we have been considering today. I wish to report on a trip I made a few days ago to Vietnam. Because the many uncertainties that swirl around that part of the troubled world clearly and directly affect the judgment of this body in regard to the military appropriations, hardware in particular, which we were asked to consider here today, it seemed to me that this, too, is a special reason for passing along at least my observations as a result of that particular measure at this special time.

I do make an apology to my colleagues to this extent, that I have not yet had time to reduce this material to a formal report. I impose upon their courtesy in speaking rather informally about it.

My presence in Vietnam was from the 28th of March to the 7th of April, roughly a 10-day interval. It could not have been at a more fluid moment, or at a time of more tempestuous surface change.

We arrived there at the time the Victoria Hotel was blown up. We were present in Saigon at the time of the first of the very large demonstrations when more than 10,000 people tried to seize the radio station. We were there when the curfews were imposed and the rioting took place.

We then proceeded from the south of Vietnam into the north of South Vietnam to Danang. We arrived at the moment when the military confrontation within the ranks of the South Vietnamese was at its peak. We hoped to get to Hue where the great university is located. This was impossible because of the demonstrations there.

I hasten to add that this was the third of my visits to Vietnam, and thus this represents a sort of accumulative and sequential series of experiences for me.

It has been my opportunity to visit personally 16 different South Vietnamese Provinces.

Having said that, I would add that, given the momentum of the change now under way, the restlessness and the frustration and the unpredictability of it all, I doubt that anywhere, even among the Vietnamese, is there a man or an oracle who knows what tomorrow holds. While no one dare predict with certainty the time will not wait for a suspended judgment. History is never that kind to us.

We are compelled to make the best guess we can, the nearest to an educated judgment that rational people can put together; and it is within that spirit that I should like to contribute the observations that occur to me in regard to our present position in Vietnam.

The tendency, Mr. President, has been for us too hastily and too quickly to apply judgments to be turmoil there on the basis of our own national experience. This warning has been issued by many others many times before. But nothing could miss the mark further than to try to draw parallels from our own American history or experience and apply them to Vietnam. The change that seemed to be reaching a peak of ferment in those early days in April reflected, it seemed to me, far less significance than we sometimes had a tendency to attach to it from over here. Likewise, our hopes for po-

sive" than the same size conventional task group.

Cost is not the only factor being stressed by the Congressmen intent on forcing McNamara to go nuclear.

"Nuclear propulsion," says the Joint Committee in the foreword to its hearings, "has the fundamental advantage of permitting our warships to go anywhere in the world, to deliver their combat load and to return—all without logistic support. Oil-fired warships must be refueled every few days. This requires a vulnerable worldwide distribution system to provide fuel oil for conventional ships."

Said Joint Committee Chairman Representative CHET HOLIFIELD, Democrat of California, recalling past naval disputes between Congress and the Pentagon:

"It is apparent that the Congress must take the initiative to get nuclear-powered escorts built as they did in the case of submarines and aircraft carriers."

[From the Washington Star, Apr. 24, 1966]
LEGISLATORS URGE NUCLEAR SHIPS DESPITE
MCNAMARA STAND
(By William Hines)

The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy yesterday urged the Congress to override Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and order two new destroyers equipped with nuclear powerplants.

The action "will be in consonance with the constitutional responsibility of Congress to provide and maintain a Navy," the committee said in releasing the text of hearings held January 26 on the Navy's nuclear propulsion program.

Influential Congressmen are advocating that all major Navy ships from now on be powered by atomic fission. McNamara is on record as needing two destroyer starts in fiscal 1967 but favoring oil-fired propulsion systems on a "cost-effectiveness" basis.

In a sharply worded preface to the hearing transcript, the committee charged that the Pentagon's cost-effectiveness studies "are based on false assumptions and do not place proper emphasis on military effectiveness."

ASSUMPTIONS MADE

McNamara's analysis, the committee said, assumed that "tankers and oilers will operate unhampered by the enemy and suffer no losses (and) that the fuel oil needed to run our conventional surface warships will be readily available wherever and whenever needed."

A single torpedo, fired at just the right place and time could invalidate this cost-effectiveness argument and tilt the scales heavily in favor of an all-nuclear surface force, a source close to the committee said.

In conjunction with the hearing transcript, the committee made public a detailed report on comparative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional surface ships in the combat area off Vietnam. The report was prepared by Rear Adm. Henry L. Miller, commander of Carrier Division 3.

VERDICT FOR A-CRAFT

With atomic as well as conventional vessels of both aircraft carrier and destroyer size in his force, Miller found the nuclear craft clearly superior in carrying out difficult combat assignments.

He disputed Pentagon studies indicating great disparity in costs of nuclear versus conventional ships and said that, over the lifetime of vessels, the nuclear would cost only 6 percent more than the conventional.

Pointing out that ships built now will still be active in the 21st century, Miller said:

"We are buying time if we build nuclear-powered ships. We are buying reduced effectiveness if we purchase oil-burning warships."

The Joint Committee's recommendation that Congress stipulate nuclear power for the new destroyers was viewed on Capitol Hill as

a way to force McNamara into accepting the atomic Navy concept being pushed by legislative branch leaders.

Under the separation of powers concept of the Federal Government, Congress cannot mandate the expenditure of money by the Executive.

In other words, McNamara could not be forced by Congress to spend money for ships he did not want to build, but if he does want certain vessels, Congress can then authorize the kind of ship—atomic or conventional—to be built and he must follow those instructions.

In addition to Representative CHET HOLIFIELD, Democrat, of California, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, leaders in the new nuclear Navy fight include Representative L. MENDEL RIVERS, Democrat, of South Carolina, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, an influential member of both the Atomic Energy Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

RIVERS' committee opens hearings on the administration's defense budget this week. Action in the Senate committee last week included approval of money for the second of two nuclear frigates, which are vessels slightly larger than destroyers but with greater firepower. They are also considerably more expensive.

[From Time magazine, Apr. 29, 1966]

DEFENSE—A'S FOR THE E

As high as a 23-story building, longer than three football fields, the U.S.S. *Enterprise* is the world's biggest military ship and its only nuclear aircraft carrier. She is also a resounding success.

When the 85,350-ton flattop was christened in 1960, skeptics questioned whether the *Enterprise's* atomic propulsion could justify the added cost (\$150 million). Last week, after 4½ months of combat duty off Vietnam, the Big E—along with the only other nuclear vessel in the war, the destroyer *Bainbridge*—won straight A's from the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee. Both ships' performances had amply demonstrated the tactical advantages envisioned by their planners: high speed and the priceless asset of being able to cruise as long as 4 years without refueling. Because the Big E is nuclear-powered, says Rear Adm. Henry L. Miller, who commanded the ship's task force until mid-February, she "can do just about everything better, easier, and faster."

NO SMOG

Late last year, Miller pointed out, the Big E raced urgently from the U.S. east coast to Vietnam under orders "to maintain a speed in excess of 20 knots the entire 16,000-mile trip. This was accomplished with ease." With refueling delays, a conventional carrier could not have made the voyage at any such forced pace. One night, shortly after arriving in the war theater last December, the *Enterprise* was told that South Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay airfield had been made inoperable by rains, and that the carrier's planes were needed for a strike in that region—175 miles away—the next morning. Wrote Miller: "Because of her capability for sustained high speed, *Enterprise* was launching support operations in less than 9 hours after the initial message."

Another big asset is that the *Enterprise* has no smogstacks. On oil-burning carriers, acidic smog combined with salt-air corrosion necessitates ceaseless cleaning of aircraft and equipment. On the clinically antiseptic nuclear carrier, 15 to 20 percent fewer man-hours are required for corrosion control. The lack of stacks also gives the Big E space for an additional squadron in her "bird farm." On her second day in combat, the ship launched 134 sorties, more than any carrier had ever previously flown; it has since set a new record of 165.

TWO A DAY

To keep them flying, the ship operates on a 24-hour schedule. The morning "plan of the day" says flatly: "If you aren't working 14 hours a day, you aren't doing your job." *Enterprise* squadrons fly two missions daily, each requiring 2 hours of briefings, 2 hours in the air, and an hour's debriefing. After a 2-hour break, off they go again.

In all, the *Enterprise* has accounted for 20 percent more attack sorties than her conventional sisters, and at an operating cost only 3 percent higher. Thanks to the recent development of a fuel core that can perform for 13 years, the nuclear carriers of the future will be even more tactically revolutionary than their conventional counterparts. The most significant tribute to the concept of an atomic-powered surface fleet came this year when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reversed his longtime opposition to additional nuclear carriers, requested another in his 1966-67 budget and announced that he planned to ask for two more later.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in connection with the pending bill, the Senate will today vote on one of the most momentous issues related to national defense which has come before the Senate in recent years.

Today, many years after development was commenced on a defense against antiballistic missiles, the United States is still without such a defense. We have no defense against enemy ballistic missiles. Even more alarming, production lead times are such that it will necessarily be several years longer even before beginning of a deployment can take place.

This is by no means the first time that the Senate has had the matter squarely before it. In 1963, I offered an amendment to authorize funds in the fiscal 1964 authorization bill to accomplish preproduction engineering on an ABM system, then called Nike-Zeus, and the doors of the Senate were closed at my request in order that the debate might be full and free. The Secretary of Defense opposed taking steps toward deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system at that time, but it was then indicated that a follow-on system would be developed in order that a deployment decision could be made in the near future.

That was 3 years ago and the Secretary of Defense, when he testified before the Armed Services and Appropriations Committee earlier this year, was still opposed to undertaking preproduction engineering on the follow-on system, the Nike X, as is indicated by his statement, and I quote:

I do not believe we should deploy a missile system, an antiballistic system against the Soviet threat.

Last year, according to the testimony, the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended to the Secretary of Defense that funds be requested for preproduction engineering on the Nike X antiballistic-missile system in order that the production lead time could be reduced by approximately one year. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation. I offered an amendment in the Armed Services Committee to authorize preproduction engineering for Nike X in the fiscal 1966 program, but the committee decided to abide by the judgment of the Secretary of Defense.

litical sophistication, political change, political progress, tend to reflect the state of our own political maturity in the United States; and we fail to make adequate allowances for the prevailing profile and set of experiences there.

For example, how do you assess the political groupings in Vietnam?

It has been possible—I have had occasion, at least—to talk to some individuals in nearly every one of the groups. There are about as many feelings and about as many interpretations as there are individuals. This includes the Buddhists, it includes the political Buddhists, it includes the Cao Dai—another very interesting religious group that has political impact in the country; a group, incidentally, that has been rather loyal to the present government—it includes the Catholics, the Montagnards, the military, the students.

It likewise includes the geographical demarcations that also reflect the differences of Vietnam, the rivalries between the northern provinces of South Vietnam, the central plateau, and the Mekong Delta areas; all of those are separate from the capital, Saigon, itself.

So it is not possible, in the present context to add up a political configuration that even approximates an American experience politically, anywhere in our past. The closest to a national political organization that exists, for better or for worse, is in the military context. The closest to a national patriotism, if you wish to call it that, is in the military context. And yet to say that runs counter to the feelings of most Americans, because we are a nation of citizen soldiers. Our Constitution is dedicated to civilian Government, and only in extreme emergencies conceives of military regulations in time of crisis; and even then always under the supreme command of the President of the United States, not under that of a military personality.

This in itself at once poses problems of communication and comprehension between those of us in our country who believe in democracy and freedom and wish it so much for others, and those people in Vietnam who think that they are working toward that end, but within a quite different context than that we can easily understand.

Finally, let me suggest on that point, Mr. President, that most of the talent, a very large majority of the talent, the young minds and young capabilities of any country in that part of the world have, by the very force of the type of world in which they live, already been channeled through the military; and that leaves very little outside the military that is yet intact.

So we have to make, somewhere in our equation of judgments, an allowance for that.

All of this brings us to three real, critical question of elections now. It would be easy to argue that they should have waited. It would be easy to suggest, as many of us have, that they are not ready for it.

But who is to say who is ready for what at any given time? Readiness, on any of these questions, it seems to me, is a state of mind. And these people are

convinced that they are ready; and to them, this assumes a priority that we have sometimes wished was not so prevailing.

I think we fail to allow for the experiences that this generation of South Vietnamese young people have had, the kinds of experiences within which their entire lives have been lived. I can illustrate the point best with a simple conversation that I had with one of their security police, one of the white duck boys, as they call them, wearing a white uniform.

He was a lad 21 years of age. I struck up a chance conversation with him while waiting for a taxi on a corner in Saigon, and tried to pull him out on his view of the then difficult questions that were popping right and left in the country.

I asked him what he thought of what was going on. "Well," he said, "I'll tell you first what I think. I am against the government."

This was one of the security police whose job it was to try to hold the demonstrations in an orderly context, to try to keep law and order in the city. And he said, "I am opposed to the Government." I asked him why. His reply was, "Well, sir, this Government promised me an 8-hour day if I would join the police, and I haven't had an 8-hour day. It has been 16 hours, and more often 20 hours."

It was my suggestion to him that there was a war on; and his reply really makes the point. He said, "Sir, since the day I was born my country has been at war. War," he said, "is a way of life here and now, and probably will be for many years to come."

"But," he said, "a fellow like myself has a right to expect some change, even against the backdrop of war." He said, "We are a little different than you. Over in your country, from what I read, you have had wars and you have had peace, and you have made great progress, and thus you are able to catch up with changes that you feel are your right and your due. But here," he said, "we can no longer accept excuses that just because there is a war on, we have to wait still longer."

Well, I was willing, in my own mind, to make a little allowance for that; but I think it makes a point that we sometimes are impatient with them about, and that is, indeed, that war is a way of life with them. They are learning to live with it, have lived with it all of the lives of the current generation in South Vietnam, and for that reason, they make demands and they expect changes that most of us here would regard as a bit out of line at the time of great national crisis.

I inject that, not to agree with it or support it, but to indicate that it suggests a possibility of understanding some of the things taking place there that do not fit the precise context of what our reactions under those circumstances would be.

I even reminded him that we had a lot of American young men over there, too, and that they were not living an 8-hour day, that many of them had been drafted and that they were on a 24-hour-

day basis, half way around the world from home.

He said, "Believe me, we appreciate that, too." But he said, "You asked me a question about me, and I am talking about myself. I think I can have an 8-hour day and still win a war, and I think I have a right to expect something a little better, even if we are trying to hold the front against the outside."

Mr. President, the other suggestion I would make in regard to demonstrations going on there at the time was that that was reflected in the price of success. Let me explain that. For the first time in a very long while in Vietnam, the military situation begins to look a little more hopeful. For the first time, it begins to appear that there might even be a civilian government in Vietnam. For the first time, the many political segments which prevail there have discovered that there is a political prize worth contending for.

A year ago, such was not the case. A year ago, about now in fact, it looked like South Vietnam was gone. It looked like, militarily at least, there was no hope. It was only with the quick injection of the buildup from this country that the tide was turned at all.

Thus, I believe that we should not lose sight of the fact, the moment we begin to achieve, out of desperation, the kinds of goals we are aiming toward, at that moment we are due to be confronted by new problems that did not face us at the moment when the crisis was at its worst.

If I may interject a parallel there with Western Europe—because it is equally valid although on another plane—that our difficulties with the Western alliance in Europe at the time that Soviet expansion in Europe was the overriding threat, were not those that we have today. The moment that threat was eased, the moment a balance was struck, friends and allies began to surface with secondary and third-rate quarrels, jealousies, and rivalries, which otherwise had been submerged because of the concentrated priority of stopping the threat of expansion by the Soviets in Western Europe. That is one of the things we are committed to preventing in that part of the world. It is not without its parallel in Vietnam. I submit, in all seriousness, that this is one of the real motivations that accounts for what is taking place there right now. Things that baffle us, things that trouble us, in a way reflect the success of a short-range segment of our policy which we have been working hard at during the past 12 months.

The American buildup there, in fact, it seemed to me, was so considerable that we are on the verge of substantial military breakthroughs. I think this is reflected in many ways and that consequently it makes a difference to the political Buddhists, it makes a difference to the Cao Dai, it makes a difference to all political segments that they have as influential a role in this new political opening as possible. Thus, much of what has been taking place has been, surprisingly, shrewd political maneuvering for as advantageous a political position as could be achieved.

This is not the only explanation, but it is a major explanation. There is a second explanation as well—that is, that never has there been in Vietnamese history, really, a solid, national image, of national aspirations, of national patriotism, if we will; for in past unfortunate colonial generations, one of the cruelest of tactics employed by the colonial powers was to divide and rule. That is an old colonial tactic, to divide and rule. These multitudinous political sections within Vietnam were exploited by those who occupied the country in order to make easier the task of maintaining some kind of law and order. Thus, to that extent they are paying a price right now for their colonial heritage.

In one measure, we can say that this is one of the lessons they learned from their immediate colonial protector only too well, and that was to fragmentize governmental political organizations. It is not altogether unlike the years we passed through, when one of our allies in Western Europe had a change of government which was routine every 3 or 4 or 6 months during some of its more troubled times. So, perhaps, here is a legacy from a country which has carried through too accurately. The point is, it still has its antecedents and still needs to be understood, and to that extent contributes a more fundamental realization on our part of what is taking place there at the present time.

The election that now faces us in Vietnam in August is fraught with rather serious risks. This is very obvious. We tend to dwell more on those risks, I suspect, at least in what we see here from day to day, than their likelihood really commands.

For that reason I think it important that we think a little more of the probabilities, and that we think a little less about the possibilities. One can scare himself to death about any question today if he ranges over all the possibilities that may happen.

The lack of orderly political experience over there in the past really gives understandable qualms about what kind of an election they can pull off in August, but we ought to recognize the fact that last year a grassroots election was held in the provinces and villages. So, they have had experience with elections. They ran those elections at a time when the Vietcong and others did their very best to destroy the chances of an election taking place. I am sure that this is going to be one of the great hazards at the present time.

Likewise, the new government that may come in that says, "Americans go home," surely is a possibility. However, nowhere was I able to determine among any one of the segments there that any one of them was asking, expecting, or insisting that that be a criteria of a new government's position or its policy.

I say no one, not a soul, and I think it is important that we keep that in mind.

I now turn away from the elections and to two very hopeful programs that I studied in detail on the spot in Vietnam, programs which I think augur well for the days ahead of us. They have to do with what we do behind the military. What do we do after the military?

In other words, we cannot fight wars forever. There is no real military victory per se that can solve the problem in Vietnam. We all know that. Military success only wins for use the chance to solve some of those problems with the help of many others, including the Vietnamese in particular.

The problems I wish to allude to are exciting. One of them is called the revolutionary development program. That name in itself makes a point. It started out by being a counterinsurgency program; then it was changed into a public PAT program; and then it was changed into a rural development program. Finally, the Vietnamese got smart and stole the language that the Communists are so adept at stealing—revolutionary development program. It is the same thing in many ways, except that it looks ahead to the days when the military is less and less necessary and people are increasingly important.

This program takes young men at the age of 17. It takes veterans who have already completed their military service in Vietnam and trains them in politics, in government administration, in nursing, in teaching, in community improvement, in economic involvement—in all the things, in other words, that make up the warp and woof of a hamlet or a village. It trains them, in addition, to use a gun as a security factor in policing and stabilizing an area.

I cannot express too strongly the importance of this group. It is relatively new. It is only now beginning to get off the ground. Its importance is this: As our military successes may increase, as the search and security actions may sweep more areas—clean them out—the job is only partially complete at that stage. To stop with that, it may be necessary next Tuesday or a week from Thursday to go back and do it over again.

The cadres of this revolutionary development program are designed to move immediately into the vacuums behind the military, to get things going again, in a civilian way. They are paramilitary types, with a capability of policing the perimeter of the hamlet or the village at night and of maintaining law and order. But more than that, they have a capability to establish normal community relations once again.

The real crisis that is facing us, in my judgment, one which in fact operates around this new movement, is that there are still too few men in that movement. The demands for it are rapidly outrunning the supply of the personnel of cadres. As the military posture continues to improve, we shall face even more startling crises than have occurred up to now, if we cannot secure much larger manpower in these paramilitary groups—and I mean much larger in very substantial dimensions.

Originally there were a hundred or two hundred of them. When I was there, they were getting ready to graduate their first class of about 4,800 at Vung Tau, in the Delta. These men take a 13-week course in how to defend themselves and how to do the other nonmilitary things I have just described. Then they are put together in 59-man teams. Where

possible, they are sent back to their home areas, to their hamlet or their village complex, or at least their province, if it has been cleared, and that is where they go to work.

However, 4,800 in this class right now is a drop in the bucket in regard to the need, because there are 14,000 or 15,000 village complexes around South Vietnam, and a great deal of manpower will be required to follow through behind the military successes wherever they occur.

We will have to readjust the manpower priority, so that we can hit a target of many more thousands every 13 weeks, in order to meet the demand in time. If we meet it too late, everything has been wasted.

One of the real problems in Vietnam is that everybody there needs the same 20-year-old man. They are all after the same guy. The regular army wants him, the agricultural experiment station wants him, the school teachers want him, the medical corps want him. He is a bright young guy. Yet, there is only one man in that body. Thus, the priorities will have to be very carefully drawn.

In my judgment the revolutionary development program ought to receive the top priority, No. 1. It ought to take precedence even over the demands of the Vietnamese Army. I think this is important, because the regulars in the Vietnamese Army are as nothing, if they cannot sustain the consequences of their military successes.

American troops could do some of that, I suppose. In fact, the marines around Da Nang and Chu Lai already are doing it. They are doing it not because that is their mission, but because these kinds of trained cadres are not yet ready in sufficient numbers. So marines are doing this in the villages and hamlets in that area. But it takes a lot of them to do it.

That is not the job for which they were trained. The Vietnamese themselves are the ones most properly to reconstitute the normal facets of life in their hamlets and villages, not the American soldiers. This in itself should make it possible to maximize the utility of the manpower available in Vietnam. In my judgment, it would even reduce some of the pressures on manpower and would even contribute to a lessening of casualties. Casualties are not reduced by risking lives by having soldiers run through the Hobo Woods on a drive, and then having to go back and cover the ground again next month in the same region, and again the next month. That only increases casualties.

If teams can move through an area, pacify it, and hold it after its pacification, that must then, in my judgment, contribute to a lessening of casualties.

Likewise, there are problems of desertion in Vietnam. Fellows who have been fighting wars all their lives are tired; they want to go home; they are homesick. They are not defecting to the Vietcong. They are leaving the ranks of the regular military in one guise or another.

The kind of program I found was a revolutionary type. It was once called the PAT. It offers a chance to capitalize more fully on ability of men that feel

they have already been fighting a war too long, so far as their own personal activities are concerned. As a result, we would capitalize completely on its availability. If these men could be retrained and sent back—and to carry a gun, to be sure—as security officers in their home hamlets, they would be making an equally important contribution to the ultimate goal in South Vietnam.

I urge that every possible priority and every conceivable emphasis be applied to this program. As a matter of fact, a companion program to it is what I want to describe now for a moment. It is called the Chieu Hoi program. That is the forgiveness program, as some call it, the open-arms program. It states that when one captures an enemy, he does not shoot him or put him in a harness and make him part of a labor battalion to carry ammunition. One treats him like a human being.

I visited one of those programs north of Saigon. It also operates in every one of the 43 provinces. They place in those camps the defectors who want to give up and come over to the other side from the Vietcong or the North Vietnamese.

The people are fed well and for 45 days they are put through a retraining course. In that retraining, they are taught a trade, if that is what they want. They are given clothing and a very small amount of money to help them get started again.

If it is possible, they finally are sent back as near to their home area as is feasible, if that area has been cleared. By checking back, it has been discovered that some of these people have become among the more effective propagandists in eroding the morale of the other side.

Those who are more articulate or better trained are put to use on broadcasts or in taping replies to their families or in writing letters to their home district. Some few are expert enough to be used in many other ways. As a result, the innovation has caught on until this spring the defectors from the Vietcong, as nearly as we could tell, were approximately 2,000 a month.

This program reached its first quick impact early this spring. The defections nearly doubled in the month's interval that was completed while I was there inspecting the camp. It nearly doubled and it is indeed an infectious and a constructive idea. It is a companion to the revolutionary development program that augurs well for something more than merely military strength in Vietnam. These are the cadres that are convinced that indeed there will be a tomorrow and a reasonable tomorrow and that it is worth working for.

I had a chance to address several hundred of these Vietcong and, interspersed among them, some regular North Vietnamese. This is one of the few instances in which an American politician had a Vietcong constituency.

I personally interviewed nearly 2 dozen of them whom I selected myself at random. I am convinced that it is a very effective program and that we ought

to give every stress and emphasis that we find possible to this approach.

This brings me to the close of my comments on my recent mission to Vietnam. I should like to state two or three reminders in conclusion. First, we must not confuse the two wars in Vietnam.

It was so clearly obvious in the minds of the people there, among those whom we interviewed and questioned and challenged, that there is a very clear concept that the war from the outside must not be lost and that it in no real sense is playing a basic role in the protests that come from within.

The second war is a political war on the domestic front in Vietnam. That is quite another kettle of political fish, but it may be in fact reflecting, as I have suggested, the imminence of military success that it makes it politically possible to contend for in Vietnam.

Likewise, I should like to leave the thought that we ourselves have to be willing to pay the price of the harsh decisions to be made in keeping those two wars separated, to sustain our fullest effort on the war, and to try to understand as best we can the many variations of the political contests and disputes on the other.

There is a two-way street. Not only do we separate, as they have, the two wars that are being waged, but also we must separate them equally and indispensably as a matter of formulating our own judgments on what we say here at home. Too often we catch ourselves taking something from one of the wars and blaming it on the consequences at the other level. It is this that contributes again and again to understandable confusion in the public mind.

It is not only important that we be more sympathetic and understanding of the processes of change over there, but also that we make sure that we do not stand in the way of this process of change even though it is inconvenient, even though it is a little bit frightening, and even though it is totally unpredictable. This remains an important must for us from this side.

I suggest that we could be a little less sensitive to criticism. I hope we understand that, much as it is nice to be loved, there are some things that are even more important than getting all the credit or getting patted on the back or getting praised, and that is to complete successfully what you consider to be the proper job.

I believe it is also important that we understand the Vietnamese attitude toward us as Americans and as individuals. Many of their criticisms are at the level of logistical problems, human relations problems on their Main Street, rather than fundamental problems in terms of war itself.

Finally, I suggest that in the pursuit of what I regard as the war from the outside, we not permit any of the other criticisms and questions here to deter us from achieving that goal. I am firmly convinced that our presence there is dictated by the balance of forces in Asia, and that it might have happened else-

where in southeast Asia. It happened to reach its critical point in Vietnam. That is the No. 1 reason that compels us to see it through.

I believe the secondary reason that the aggression infringes upon the independence of a clearly defined entity now is that the common denominator that is understood in any part of the world, in any language—is the right of any peoples to achieve their independence free from the outside interference of their neighbors or aggression of another type.

I believe that we have some moral obligations as Americans and some feelings as a matter of principle, likewise, to help where we can other peoples to achieve a higher sense of their own being, a higher level of their own living, and a better share of the fruits of God's earth. So no one can say, as we leave this question at rest for the moment, and no one knows what August holds in those elections.

I am one of those who believe that we are not going to have the satisfaction of settling the question in Vietnam around a table and that it is not going to be a clear-cut verdict that is signed on a piece of paper. I believe that it is probably going to be instead simply a diminishing of the intensity of the conflict on that front. This seems more and more to be the more likely probability. I believe that, as that intensity lessens, the feelings in the war will likewise ease somewhat and that out of it will still emerge a better chance for that day to come for the achievement of the long-delayed constructive programs in economic development, in social growth, and in political advancement that we get so impatient about from day to day here because of the realization of so many failures.

I state as I conclude this most informal assessment of my recent foray into Vietnam that I hope to put it together a little more succinctly and formally in the form of a report within the next few days.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McGEE. Yes, I am happy to yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. What did the Senator take the White Duck boy to mean when he said, "We have a right to expect a shift toward something better"?

Mr. McGEE. I took it to mean that, speaking of his own aspiration for an 8-hour day, he was voicing his hope for a little better share of the fruits of the earth, a little better standard of living—whatever all peoples dream about when they try to make progress for themselves as a group. I took it to mean that, rather than in a narrow political context.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Did it also imply that in spite of failure to get these things of a better character, this young man at least was intent in the judgment that he would not achieve those things if the Communists, the Vietcong won?

Mr. McGEE. He made no bones about the Vietcong. He said he would be the first one to be destroyed if the Vietcong

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were to prevail, or the gentleman from the north of Vietnam were to prevail.

But it was a matter of where his timing lay, and where his priorities lay. He felt, in other words, where we might disagree with him, that you could do both and must do both, and he had a right to think about both simultaneously.

Mr. LAUSCHE. But over and above everything else he felt that the thought to achieve a better life had to have removed from it the impediment of the restraints and the stifling of the character of the individual that is communism?

(At this point Mr. RIBICOFF took the chair as Presiding Officer).

Mr. MCGEE. He started with that assumption and, therefore, having started with that assumption he hoped everything else would fit in beneath it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator. Intermittently, either by implication or by direct expression, charges have been made by some of our Members that we, in effect, are trying to impose colonial domination upon South Vietnam, intending to exploit their human and natural resources.

Of course, I reject that argument in full. My question is: Did the Senator, while he was there, hear from any of those with whom he was in contact who are fighting the Vietcong Communists who believe that the United States is in South Vietnam to exploit colonially the people and the resources of that country?

Mr. MCGEE. First, let me say to my colleague, that I, too, reject that argument. It is surprising that it comes so freely from among our own ranks. I believe that it is totally unfair, totally untrue—and it is understandably resented by some.

However, let me say to the Senator that I encountered no direct confirmation of that kind. We did encounter some of the bitterest criticism in radio propaganda from the other side which preyed on this concept; namely, that the Americans were going to be there forever, that they were going to dominate and rule the country.

Understandably, it is that kind of thing which the other side is going to exploit. But not here, of course. Let me hasten to qualify that with one experience; namely the rather static criticisms that had to do with, let us say, the presence of some allied troops on a Saturday night in a given area or, some discipline problems which occurred somewhere. But these are problems which can occur at any base near Chicago, or any base near Houston, or any base in almost any country in the world we could name. That should not be interpreted outside the context of the normal problems experienced in human relations.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator know whether the Vietcong and the Communists, in their radio broadcasts, quoted any of these implied or direct expressions made in the Foreign Relations Committee and on the floor of the Senate, that the United States is seeking to colonially exploit Vietnam?

Mr. MCGEE. I did not hear any, but I did not have an opportunity to listen to enough radio broadcasts to hear any such criticism, actually. I know of some reports which stated that this has been done. But let me hasten to add there that the Communist will quote anything they can find, provided they can turn it to their own advantage, even though they will exploit this kind of comment which might come from someone in our own ranks. That should not deter any of us in our own ranks from speaking out, let me hasten to add.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with that. But I do not agree that speaking out and blackening the character of the United States and whitening the character of the Communist on a false basis is justified.

Mr. MCGEE. I confess some amazement that everything that goes wrong is our fault, and somehow the other side, really, does not make any bad judgments or mistakes. I do not understand that lack of balance. But it does occur here and there.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I say this with a great deal of confidence: All of the condemnation that came was directed to our Government and not at the Vietcong or the Communists.

Mr. MCGEE. I believe that is part of the price a big power has to pay, that it is always going to be exposed to that sort of thing, and it should be prepared for it.

We remember "perfidious Albion," which was the appellation given to the British during the 19th century. Most of us realize today that the British did a rather successful job, in handling many of the great burdens of that century which rested substantially on their shoulders.

I do not believe that we can conduct ourselves responsibly in the modern world with a thin skin. I do not believe that we can conduct ourselves as though we were in a popularity contest. That is why I have opposed taking polls all the time as to what the rest of the world or other people may think of us. There is a difference between being popular and leading. Leadership requires criticism. Otherwise, it probably is not doing a very good job of leading.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I concur with the Senator from Wyoming that in this modern world, to meet with the problems which confront us, we must have a thick skin; but that does not negate the expectation, especially in dealing with our own country, that we will follow the course of truth rather than the course of falsehood in determining whether the Communists are the aggressors or whether the United States is the aggressor in that country.

Mr. MCGEE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Yesterday I attended a luncheon in the Capitol to listen to a writer from the French newspaper *La Mond*. He was presented to us as an expert. Senator FULBRIGHT made the presentation.

In the question period he was asked whether the result is likely at the election that the victorious group would ask our country to leave. His answer was

that it makes no difference who wins, they will want us to stay to insure that there shall be stabilization of conditions in the country.

It seems to me that what the Senator from Wyoming has just said is confirmed by what was said by the French writer.

Mr. MCGEE. I thank the Senator. I am happy to have that added here, because honestly it does confirm, if confirmation is what this requires. I am not sure that that is the right word.

I am reflecting that among the many types of individuals I had a chance to confront, not one expressed the hope, "Americans go home."

As a matter of fact, most of them were very candid in saying, "We are finished if you do. We are finished if you do."

I think that we should keep our sense of balance about that as we try to go ahead in connection with the unpredictable days that lie ahead in August.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCGEE. I am happy to yield to my colleague from Wyoming.

Mr. SIMPSON. My colleague, the senior Senator from Wyoming, has said things of great interest to the American people.

I would like to ask a question of my colleague from Wyoming.

What is the attitude of the people there with respect to the allied groups coming in, like New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines? Are they welcome?

Mr. MCGEE. They are in every case that I was able to observe. We met some troops from New Zealand, Australia, and Korean troops. All of the help they can get is welcome. I encountered no hostility.

Mr. SIMPSON. I am reminded by the majority leader that Korea is also a contributor of troops.

Mr. MCGEE. They have made one of the heaviest contributions.

Mr. SIMPSON. I recently returned from a trip down under in connection with the Interparliamentary Union Conference at Canberra. We had six representatives from the Senate and six representatives from the House of Representatives. It was one of the hardest working groups that I ever say. There were 49 nations in attendance.

The American delegation decided for once to be "hard nosed" with respect to the attitude of the Russians, who are always castigating us and heaping vituperation upon us. It is the "big lie" but they want it heard.

The first confrontation came before my committee, the Economic and Social Committee. The Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH] put the matter in proper perspective concerning who was the aggressor in Vietnam; and by historical tracing—disclosed to the members of the committee that both Russia and China were vying with each other to see who could make the biggest contribution in Vietnam.

Did the Senator's contacts confirm this?

Mr. MCGEE. In most instances where we had contact, and even outside of Vietnam, this was readily recognized.

I repeat one conversation with an official of another government than ours who said sincerely:

Bless you; you serve us all.

He said:

There are some things we find it very delicate to talk about in public in our part of the world that we can support privately more effectively.

He added the thought:

You Americans sometimes give us the impression that what you really want is applause; that somebody ought to give you accolades rather than to get on with the job.

Mr. SIMPSON. I think the Senator knows we would like applause. That is my next observation. At the meeting in Canberra, the allies flocked around us. The Russians proposed a resolution condemning the United States for aggression, and said that we were murderers of women and children—they proceeded to go through the propaganda outline. The interesting thing was that when we met head on, the "paper-thin tiger" disappeared and the other countries supported us on the censorship resolution. A substitute resolution was presented. By a vote of 60 to 0 the substitute resolution was passed with 11 abstentions.

The Russians abstained from voting, along with their Red satellite. They got the propaganda and we won the victory.

Mr. MCGEE. I appreciate the injection of this footnote to history by my colleague from Wyoming.

The Senator reminds me of another incident that I think has some meaning, one that reflects itself in these demonstrations that we have been rightfully concerned about in Vietnam.

Sometimes the excitement of an incident runs away from the motivation or the hard facts behind it. We all experience that sort of thing.

I talked to two young Buddhists who were involved in a demonstration. They carried a banner and they passed it along to another team to carry for a while. One was able to speak good English, and the other was able to speak broken English.

I asked them the meaning of all of the banners. Did they want us to get out?

One of the Buddhists was a sophisticated fellow in his twenties. He said:

Of course not. You people are politicians. You know that we are trying to change the Government, and we think the best way to do it is to pick on you, although we do not mean it.

That was his speech to me.

I do not know how one equates that in terms of hard intelligence, but he was talking in a forthright manner about it. That casts another kind of atmosphere over some of those who are making all of this noise.

I am hopeful that we do not exaggerate the implications of those demonstrations; that we do not overdraw and try to come as close to the central mark in time as we possibly can.

The elections are probably going to take place whether we like it or not, so it makes it quite an academic speculation.

But it seems to me that there is reflected in Vietnam a kind of moving

along, even a growing up in the conviction that they can have some kind of more meaningful government, and that it is time to get working on it now.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCGEE. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. SIMPSON. Will the Senator tell the Senate his attitude with respect to the morale of our troops in Vietnam? I am sure that I know what his answer is going to be but it should be heard.

Mr. MCGEE. I visited an American installation of marines around Da Nang and in the eastern part of the country, and the newly arrived 25th Division west of Saigon. In the most critical areas around Chu Lai they have been carrying on the offensive in the Hobo Woods which is one of the ugliest areas to be camping in.

Everywhere that I went the story was the same with no exception. The spirit was high and the dedication to duty was strong. It is conspicuous in another way. There are few incidents among our personnel, such as became a worry in the Korean conflict. This does not exist. It is reflected by clear understanding, and what it means to be there, and by the fact that they are getting somewhere with it.

Mr. SIMPSON. I have received letters from relatives and friends of men in the service. I have a letter from a captain in the infantry who is from my State, and who said:

We will either stop this thing here, in this part of the world, or we will fight it out in the mountains in Wyoming. He wants to stay there and do it.

Mr. MCGEE. I have had many letters, too.

As a matter of fact, I would like to inject a thought here, because the Senator has brought it up. I had begun to sense why everything was going so well on the military front. I saw 30 or 40 young men from Wyoming, and I thought that that accounted for it. As a matter of fact, there were many men there who were deeply convinced that they were on the right track; that the war is going well. And I add the other side of the situation: They were receiving a liberal education in their contacts with the Vietnamese. I do not mean the Vietnamese army. I am talking about the Vietnamese people in the villages, the hamlets, and the rice paddies. It was a two-way street. Not only were these fellows marvelous soldiers; they were also superb ambassadors, doctors, nurses, or whatever the specialty might be. They were marvelous in human relations. This is one of the real byproducts we should not lose sight of among our forces over there at present.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming has made a very interesting and important report to the Senate. It certainly updates my own impressions which were gained in January. I am very pleased to say two things about it.

He and I may not necessarily agree on every phase of our policy in Vietnam, but we basically agree on purposes. It is unnecessary that we should concur

on every phase of it. I have, for example, made some recommendations about opening negotiations with the National Liberation Front as well as to Communist China.

But there are two things he does show upon which I am delighted to say that we are together. One, he shows resolution.

Now, my colleague and friend from New York the other day made a speech here on the floor about the "no sanctuary" policy of the United States. Senator KENNEDY's objections to this policy can be debated at another time—but the problem, is, do his objections show resolution?

It seems to me that the least we can do in this situation, if we back the President's policy of limited means and limited purposes as—expressed by Johnson, Rusk, and everybody else that is concerned—is to show some resolution. You cannot tie your hands behind your back and give a feeling of resolution to the men who are dying there.

I am not for bombing Hanoi and I am not for bombing or mining Haiphong; and we are not doing any such thing. But we are bombing the supply lines, because it is indispensable to the security of our forces to bomb those supply lines. So let us not inhibit that effort by showing irresolution on that score.

The second thing that is so important is that we have to keep our eye on the ball. We are there because we are trying to help the South Vietnamese people to decide freely for themselves, and we are trying to help them realize the aspirations for which they ousted the French in 1954—a government of their own choosing. Let us all remember that is what we are there for.

I agree with the Senator about Chu Hoi and about the cadres which are training young South Vietnamese people. It is a very inspiring project. Let us have our boys share that inspiration. We are not doing that yet. We are not adequately organized; we are not well consolidated; we are not well coordinated in terms of the realization of these social and economic goals.

Resolution is also needed in these socio-economic areas.

Let me raise another subject. We are in Vietnam because the people of that country want us there, and because they are ready to carry the primary burden of the struggle. I think we have to make it clear, in connection these August elections, that if they do not want us there because their elected government says no, or they do not wish to carry the burden of the struggle because their elected government says no, that we must conform to those decisions. Doing so at their request will not be a disaster. It would be, in a sense, a form of success, because they will have, at least, decided what they want. It may not be what we think is good for them, but it is implicit in the fact that we are there because we want them to decide what they want, that even if they vote thus, we will have abided by it.

But again, I wish to tell the Senator that I support his resolution; however, we may disagree on a particular complexion or detail. He has shown a sense of resolution, and that, to me,

stands above everything else, and I am delighted by it and compliment him upon it.

Mr. McGEE. May I say to my friend, the Senator from New York, I appreciate his comments. He has contributed a great deal to the dialog on this question constantly since we have been deeply concerned about the ramifications of our position in southeast Asia.

But may I say to him in all candor that I think there is very little prospect of any kind of a government coming in August that will say, "Get out." Among the Vietnamese of all segments we have found a unity of intentions on that question; and I think that sometimes we have been too hasty here to speculate over that possibility, even though I always will readily admit that is one of the position papers we ought to have ready, tucked in the files, so that we can move fast if we have to.

But sometimes I think we tend to exaggerate or to overstress the prospect; and again I would urge that we much better should deal with probabilities rather than some of the more remote possibilities, quite as continuously as we sometimes do.

I have been a little disappointed at the numbers of spokesmen in our own country who seem more or less to have thrown up their hands in despair, in the last couple of weeks, and I think this is part of the point the Senator from New York is getting at. A kind of despondency has come over them, largely because of the demonstrations and the protests, I assume, in Vietnam; when, as a matter of fact, that is merely a surface manifestation; for the most part, that is really not at the root of what is motivating them or what is motivating us. I would hope that people in public life in our own country would be very, very slow to rush into the conclusion, from an earlier position that they may have had, that the situation is about to go down the drain. As I was suggesting just before the Senator came in, as a matter of fact things are beginning to look so good in some contexts, militarily notably, that that is reflected in some of the demonstrations going on over there. There is now something worth demonstrating about. There is now a political future that may be worth fighting for, and that is why they are all trying to get in line first, to get as big a piece of that as they possibly can.

So I would join the Senator in the hope that the resolution, in all of this, ought to continue to be very strong that we do have a reason, we do have a laudable motivation, and we do have to achieve the minimums of those goals if we are going to win the chance to arrive at the maximum of the hopes that these people and all the rest of us really have.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to hear what the position of the Senator from New York is with respect to the arguments made by some that we ought to

pull out, and that if we do pull out, that will be the end of our troubles, and that we ought not to bomb the military equipment and personnel that is being brought in from Hanoi, and other such arguments which challenge the position we have taken.

Mr. JAVITS. I do not believe, Mr. President, that we ought to pull out. The point I expressed to Senator McGEE is that if we are asked to pull out by a duly constituted, freely elected government, then I think we will have to do it. I certainly do not think we should pull out otherwise. I think we ought to persist in our present course, and I think it is going to be successful. And, it can be successful, without bombing heavy population centers.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator for making that statement, because it is very important, having in mind the large State which he represents. I anticipated that that would be his answer. I concur with him that we cannot afford to pull out, in the maintenance of our honor and also in the preservation of our security.

Mr. JAVITS. The latter point, Mr. President, I am in agreement with. I think that if we follow the course of unilateral withdrawal, we will invite other so-called wars of national liberation which are really wars of aggression.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Yes; and I agree that if the elected government says, "We don't want you here," we should pull out.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank my colleague.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I do sometimes think that if we could possibly work it out to have some international agency like the United Nations or some other newly designated agency supervise the vote, it would be a helpful thing. But I do not care to get into that.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I wish to say I am glad that the Senator from New York and the Senator from Wyoming have discussed this matter this morning rationally and logically; and I have this thought which I would like to further develop briefly by asking the Senator a question.

A lady said to me the other day, "If they don't want us in Vietnam, why don't we get out?"

I said, "I am afraid that that is exactly what the Communist aggressor wants Americans to begin saying."

It is my impression—and I should like to know the Senator's reaction—that these various demonstrations within South Vietnam are nationalistic, in the sense that, as the Senator from Wyoming said, now that it seems safer to do so, each group is seeking a greater say in the future freely elected government of South Vietnam; that the Communists may, of course, take part in inspiring disorder and civil commotion, but that the Communists, in my judgment, are not succeeding in their efforts to weaken the resolution of the people of South Vietnam, but they may be having a certain success in leading some Americans of good will to conclude that all these demonstrations, on the contrary, are an

indication that the people of South Vietnam wish us to pull out.

What is the Senator's reaction to that?

Mr. JAVITS. My feeling is that we cannot judge the quality of these demonstrations, and that if we try to, we would lose ourselves in a labyrinth.

I think we have to judge on the end point: Is there a government which is working with us? Is the position of our forces tenable?

Is South Vietnam carrying the primary burden of the struggle? These are the three questions to ask.

As long as answers to these are positive, then we should persevere with the limited means and the limited policies we are pursuing.

No American should be taken in by the fact that there is or is not a demonstration on a Wednesday, on a Friday, or a Saturday. This is a problem which is not peculiar to Vietnam. For instance, the students in Mexico just seized the university in Mexico City. Does that mean that the Mexican Government has been overthrown because it could not deal immediately with the situation? Of course not. In other words, it is a question of the overall effectiveness of a government. As long as the demonstrations do not stifle the general effectiveness of the government, we can carry on.

Mr. SCOTT. I have been talking to South Vietnamese who tell me that they have fought for 25 years for freedom, first from the French and now from the menace of the Chinese and the North Vietnamese Communists. Also, that the temper of the people is overwhelmingly to continue the struggle. From all that I have heard from those returning from Vietnam, that seems to be the overwhelming sentiment. I would, therefore, hope that those of us in positions of responsibility in Congress, for example, would not give an additional cause to the Communists for hope that they are infiltrating our people by continuing to say, "Well, if they do not like us, we should pull out."

I agree with the Senator from New York that it is the end result we are looking at. The Government of South Vietnam clearly wants us there. The Government agrees to free elections. It is my hope and judgment, therefore, assuming the elections will be held, whether they be Buddhist, Catholic, or whatever, that equally they would want to preserve the viability of their government and freedom from those who are bent on massacring large numbers of them.

Therefore, I see no merit in our impatiently jumping to conclusions for which I see no rational basis, that because of Vietnamese riots we should get out. It is like saying that if the students at the University of California in Berkeley are rioting, we should close the university. It is no more logical than that.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator for his observations. I believe that I have stated my views as to the proper test. I believe, generally speaking, that is pretty much the sentiments of the Senate.

Mr. SCOTT. I congratulate the Senator from New York and thank him for yielding to me.

contrary on the individual concerned—just as is done under the tax law in the case of all other taxpayers. There is nothing in the office of a member of Congress which should grant him immunity from the treatment extended to all other taxpayers.

Finally, I was shocked to read in another article appearing in the Washington Post under date of April 20 that "associates" of my Senate colleague were quoted as saying that "it is well known that a Senator's salary is inadequate and that for most men in Washington the 'break-even' point on expenses are about \$50,000 a year." I want to make it clear that such knowledge is not "well known" as far as the junior Senator from Iowa is concerned. It is certainly true that the Washington cost of living is high, and, especially when one has a family with children to educate, the salary of a Member of Congress does not permit so-called high living—especially when one considers that the \$30,000 salary is substantially reduced by Federal and State income taxes, contributions to the retirement fund, and the cost of health and accident insurance. I would guess that the great majority of those Members of Congress who are not independently wealthy manage to take care of their personal expenses without resorting to money raised by testimonial dinners, and that very few Members, except those who are independently wealthy, incur personal expenses of \$50,000 a year.

I suppose that one of the byproducts of the current investigation will be renewed calls for all Members of Congress to publicly disclose the sources and amounts of their income. This may make good reading for the general public, but I believe the public should be warned not to fall for any halfway measures. The only way to satisfy the public's right to know would be to require a disclosure of not only the sources and amounts of income of the individual Member, but also, and equally important, the Member's wife, his parents, his children, and his brothers and sisters. Only by doing this can the entire picture be obtained, for it is well known that an individual can easily divert income to close relatives in an effort to cover up the sources and true amount of his actual income. I might point out that I gave my colleagues an opportunity to support just such a provision nearly 2 years ago, and I refer them to page 15289 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of July 2, 1964. I offered this proposal to the Senate at that time and the Senate voted it down. And so I say to my colleagues, do not support any halfway measures, because the public will not be and should not be satisfied by them.

POLICY OF NO SANCTUARY IN VIETNAM

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in today's Washington Evening Star, on the front page, appears an article captioned "No Sanctuary Policy a Threat, FULBRIGHT SAYS," with comments by some of my colleagues. I ask unanimous consent that an excerpt of this article, as designated be placed in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"NO SANCTUARY" POLICY A THREAT, FULBRIGHT SAYS BUT DIRKSEN CALLS PURSUIT OF RED PLANES A DOCTRINE OF WAR, SEES NO DANGER

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas, hung a "very dangerous" label today on the administration's "no sanctuary" policy of hot pursuit of enemy fighters over Vietnam.

But Senate Republican Leader EVERETT M. DIRKSEN said in a separate interview this is a "recognized doctrine" of warfare which he does not believe invites the danger of Red China's intervention in the conflict.

Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said it is "sound policy to let the Chinese know in advance what is in store for them if they attack our planes over North Vietnam."

FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted that there has been no official pronouncement telling where the advanced Mig-21s, which have engaged U.S. planes in dogfights, came from.

"COULD ESCALATE WAR"

"But if they come from China and we follow them into China to attack their air fields, I think we are pursuing a very dangerous course," he said. "It could escalate the war."

The issue was brought to the forefront when Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, Democrat, of New York, told the Senate yesterday that the developments must be viewed with gravest concern.

"What will be the Chinese response if her territory is bombed or her airspace invaded?" he asked. "Will the Chinese seek to strike at our bases—in Vietnam or Thailand, or aboard our aircraft carriers?"

HOW WILL WE RESPOND?

"And if they do, what then will our response be—further bombing? And if the scale of bombing increases, will China confine herself to air fighting—or will it send its troops to engage ours on the ground in South Vietnam?"

DIRKSEN noted in an Associated Press interview that hot pursuit of the enemy by U.S. planes had not been permitted in the Korean war, a decision he said may have lengthened that conflict.

JACKSON said that while there might have been sufficient reason not to have such a pursuit in Korea, conditions have changed.

LACKS RUSSIA ALIGNMENT

"Communist China no longer has the advantage it had then of alignment with Russia," he said. "Lack of this alignment makes China relatively weak military power when compared to the United States."

"We must avoid any action that might bring Russia and China together again. While hot pursuit involves a calculated risk, I do not believe it is such an action that would bring Peking and Moscow together."

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I wish to comment on the idea that the no-sanctuary policy is a threat. I am afraid there is a misuse of the term. Possibly, this policy is a risk, but it is not a threat. I suggest that while Senators are entitled to their own opinions and while those who think the no-sanctuary policy is a threat are certainly entitled to their opinions, their opinions are not shared by any responsible military leader presently on duty in the United States. I think that might put the matter in perspective.

There are many people who think that the sanctuary policy of this country during the Korean war was responsible for

the sad results that occurred there—the loss of thousands of lives and the casualties. We now have many troops tied up in Korea, together with South Korean troops, and I hope we will not find ourselves in a similar situation with respect to what might occur in the case of the war in Vietnam.

When I read statements in which it is said that the no-sanctuary policy is a threat, I am mystified as to why there never is any suggestion by those making the statements as to what they would recommend in place of it. Do they recommend that we announce to Red China that there is to be a sanctuary and that if they send their Mig fighters out of their country into North Vietnam or into South Vietnam, we will let them operate at will? The people who say that the no-sanctuary policy is a threat do not answer that question. Before we pay much attention to their comments, they had better answer it, and then we shall see what they have to say.

I hope that until they get ready to answer this question, they will have nothing further to say on the subject, because I find it highly unresponsive to the situation. As I said before, their opinion is not shared by those who have the responsibility for helping in the defense of our country.

ROBERT LYNN DOWNEY AWARDED FOURTH PLACE IN 1966 NATIONAL "ABILITY COUNTS" CONTEST

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, an Iowan, Robert Lynn Downey, of Preston, today was honored by the President's Committee and cooperating State Governors' Committees on Employment of the Handicapped.

The honor came from his winning of fourth place in the 1966 national "ability counts" contest sponsored by the previously named committees.

In his winning entry, Robert vividly sets forth how handicapped people are contributing to the community of Preston.

I shall read his concluding paragraph, because I believe he has caught the essence—the purposes—of the programs for the handicapped:

These people of my community—a nurse, a teacher, a carpenter, a farmer—are all strong links in the chain of our society. They have conquered their handicap to the extent that it is almost no longer a handicap. And, certainly, people in years to come will be handicapped—this we know. But if they are encouraged and given equal opportunities I feel sure that they, too, will be an asset to their community.

As young Mr. Downey realizes, individuals are capable of many things. Although we can categorize a man's disability, we certainly cannot and should not stereotype the man. Educating the community is part of the process of removing the barriers for the handicapped; and by focusing his essay on what is being done, Robert Downey is aiding in this process.

I ask unanimous consent that the essay entitled "What Handicapped Workers Are Contributing to My Community" be printed in the Record.

But previously the U.S. Court of Appeals in San Francisco had upheld a decision fining a woman and giving her suspended prison sentences for making two trips to Cuba without permission. It is this California case that the Supreme Court will now review. A ludicrous situation would be created if the Court held that the Secretary of State could prohibit such travel but that no criminal penalties could be assessed for violation of his order. The sensible solution has long been clear:

The Secretary of State should have the right to warn citizens against travel in places where the United States cannot give them normal protection. That should be the limit of his authority. It should also be the limit of U.S. responsibility. A citizen bent on peaceful pursuits should be free to travel wherever he likes—at his own risk. The Congress should reaffirm this freedom to travel once and for all. Legislation on this point will be more clear cut than any court ruling.

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I do not think American citizens should have to be cleared to travel abroad, any more than they should be followed when they are abroad. Nor do I believe that any nonelected official should have the power to declare certain countries off limits except in cases of the utmost gravity and under clear standards set by Congress.

At present, area restrictions are in effect for North Vietnam, Cuba, Albania, China, and North Korea. Albania, China, and North Korea, as I understand it, are restricted because they are not recognized by the U.S. Government. But that it itself is scant justification for restricting the freedom of American citizens to travel to these areas. It is argued that the area restrictions now in effect protect our citizens by restricting them to countries where we have consular representation. But the fact is that there are remote areas of some countries, in which we have embassies and in which travel is permitted, which are much more risky for an American traveler than China or North Korea, where any American is closely watched and his movements carefully regulated.

There may be certain exceptional situations where foreign policy considerations are so important that an area restriction would be justified. Possible examples are war zones or areas where a travel ban on our part is necessary to the successful working of arrangements with other countries which are important to their security. For these reasons the justifications offered for restricting travel to North Vietnam and Cuba are more complex, and of greater weight. But whether they are of sufficient substance to overshadow the individual's right to travel is another complex question.

And it is precisely this question which Congress, not the State Department, must properly face. We now delegate a large and undefined lawmaking power in this area to the Secretary of State, and give to him and his subordinates almost unlimited discretion to decide where and when American citizens may travel. This is a troubling situation. I feel that Congress must consider the complex problems involved in restricting the right of U.S. citizens to travel, and must at-

tempt to formulate specific policies which in each instance will reconcile the citizen's right to travel with the legitimate needs of our foreign policy.

I would like to pose some questions which I think we must consider in anticipation of congressional action on this matter:

First. Is there a need for any area restrictions at all on travel?

Second. If there is such a need, does it outweigh, with respect to any particular area restriction, the precious right to travel which we should try to preserve?

Third. If area restrictions are justified in some instances, cannot Congress draft language describing those instances, thereby limiting executive discretionary power to restrict travel, and provide for congressional reviews of the exercise of that discretion?

And finally,

Fourth. Assuming some area restrictions should be imposed, must they be enforced by criminal penalties? And if some sanction is necessary, would not a misdemeanor penalty of say a \$1,000 fine be more appropriate than a felony penalty of \$5,000 or 5 years in prison?

Let me point out that area restrictions under the present system have severely curtailed travel to those areas involved, but very few cases have been brought against the hundreds of travelers who over the years have violated the restrictions. This could imply that the mere withdrawal of protection and the statement of restrictions may be enough to deter a large majority of Americans from traveling to these areas.

Mr. President, the countries of Western Europe—our fellow democracies—do not impose area restrictions on their citizens' travel. It is rather the Communist countries who tell their citizens they cannot travel without a permit. It is the totalitarian states, and not countries like the United States, which say to their citizens "We cannot trust you to leave the country, we are afraid of how you might behave in certain areas, we are not confident enough of your loyalty to let you out without careful screening."

I realize that some of the support for legislation to be considered by the Judiciary Committee next week has arisen out of situations in which some Americans have gone to North Vietnam and Cuba to oppose American policies. This is indeed unfortunate, but I believe that this country is strong enough and our cause is just enough that we can easily survive the consequences of a few misguided people who go abroad to embarrass our Government. We base the appeal of our system on the fact that we are an open society which tolerates expressions of individual freedom. We will be much more true to what we stand for in the world if we tolerate these activities than if we restrict the travel of all of our people for fear of what a few may do.

For these reasons I intend to examine carefully the legislative proposals to be considered in the committee of which I am a member. I intend to question the State Department on its position and try to bring about a statutory clarification

which maximizes the right to travel consistent with the legitimate needs of government.

AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MESSAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN BILLS

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the adjournment of the Senate following today's session until noon on Monday next, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States and the House of Representatives; that the Vice President or President pro tempore be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills; and that committees be authorized to file reports.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ordered.

DISCLOSURE AND SOURCES OF AMOUNTS OF INCOME

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in today's edition of the Washington Post appears an article relating to the tax treatment of proceeds from the testimonial dinners of one of my colleagues. The article states that within the past week it has been disclosed that several Congressmen "have been the beneficiaries of political contributions not earmarked for campaign purposes" and that more disclosures of this nature are expected.

I believe this article requires that I make it clear to my colleagues and the people whom I represent that the junior Senator from Iowa has never used to his personal benefit any funds raised by his political supporters—whether through a testimonial dinner or campaign fund solicitation. Moreover, as a tax lawyer by profession, I believe I should state that it would be obvious to me that the tax law would require the taxation of any such moneys if they were used for one's personal use. I find it difficult to understand that there should be any question about such tax treatment.

Not long ago, there appeared in the newspapers a story of a dinner being held for the benefit of one of the Members of the House of Representatives, the proceeds of which were to be used to help pay off a legal liability this Member has incurred. It was made clear, from the press, that the proceeds had nothing to do with the Member's campaign expenditures, and I would assume that those who purchased tickets for the dinner intended that the proceeds be used to help pay off this legal liability. I recall at the time I read about this that it occurred to me that the Member concerned might well have to pay income tax on such money, because it was used to take care of a personal expense. This would be particularly true if those who purchased the tickets were motivated by the services rendered in their behalf by the Member of Congress. In any event, when such income is used for a personal purpose, it seems to me that the Internal Revenue Service would treat it as taxable and place the burden of proving to the

PRO AND CON VOICES

Whether privately or officially sponsored, any move by the American people to seriously challenge the Lenin Institute pattern for global political warfare training will trigger characteristic Sino-Soviet reactions. After denouncing such an Academy as "a provocative cold war aggression," the Communist world will probably find it as handy a permanent propaganda target as the CIA. That possibility has struck some administration worriers as sufficient reason for opposing the idea. However, it is anticipated that the legislation proposing a Government-operated Academy will get serious consideration from President Johnson, despite long-standing State Department resistance. Secretary of State Dean Rusk is not himself responsible for that resistance. In a 1963 conference with this reporter, he revealed an openminded unawareness of the scope and purpose of the legislation his department had been officially opposing for years.

Many individuals in the Department quietly endorse the Freedom Academy concept. Among those emphatically advocating it before congressional committees were such foreign service veterans as Adolf A. Berle and Robert C. Hill, former Ambassador to three Latin American nations. A total of 59 witnesses familiar with cold war problems have testified in favor of the bill at congressional hearings. The only opposition voices were those of Walt W. Rostow and W. Averill Harriman, both of whom revealed a misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of the bills under consideration.

Whatever the outcome of the pending legislation, it becomes increasingly clear that the American people must begin to build a more adequate political defense structure for the free world. A substantial part of the foundation for such a structure can be provided by a Freedom Academy, official or private.—HENRY MAYERS, guest editor.

Do Not Negotiate Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES B. UTT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, I would like to include the following letter which was written to the Saturday Evening Post. It is a strong reply to proposals for negotiating peace in Vietnam, as published in the Saturday Evening Post's "Speaking Out" column on April 9, 1966. The letter was written by one of my constituents, Dr. Arthur Shoemaker, a distinguished scholar who lived, taught in college, and conducted business in Peking, China, for over 40 years. His former students and their families keep in touch with him, and have kept him closely informed of events and attitudes in Communist China:

DO NOT NEGOTIATE VIETNAM

The Editor,
Saturday Evening Post,
Independence Square,
Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR SIR: In the "Speaking Out" pages of your issue of April 9, 1966, a U.S. Senator makes statements and draws conclusions which I believe deserve comment. In some of his statements, he is in error; in some of his conclusions, he is, at best, misled. Be-

cause he was speaking in his official capacity as a U.S. Senator, it seems doubly important that his mistakes be pointed out.

I lived, taught in college, and conducted business in Peking, China, from 1911 to 1962. I have some knowledge of the history of the country and the character of its people; today, many of my former students—all of them Chinese—and their relatives continue to keep in touch with me from the free areas of southeast Asia to which they fled when the Communists took over mainland China. They, in turn, keep in touch with their relatives and friends who have not yet escaped from Communist China; their reports have been invaluable in keeping me informed on what is going on in China and much of southeast Asia.

The Senator advocates the negotiation of a peace in Vietnam. His argument is clear: "The legal basis of American involvement," he says, "is dubious * * * Prior to American intervention, the war in South Vietnam was essentially a civil war. This war was brought about, he continues, by "the refusal of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam to allow the election (in 1955) provided for at Geneva to take place, and America's complicity in that refusal." The Vietcong, he states, is "a genuinely nationalist as well as a Communist movement," whom we should "recognize as a belligerent with whom we are prepared to negotiate peace." As a prelude to such negotiations, the Senator recommends the United States go on record that "we are prepared to conclude a peace agreement providing for an internationally supervised election * * * [in] South Vietnam, and, further, that we are prepared to accept the outcome of such an election, whatever that outcome might be."

In other words: The United States encouraged Premier Diem not to hold the promised election in 1955; the Communist Vietcong rose in revolt and a civil war resulted; the United States must now arrange to hold the election and must promise to abide by the result. On the surface, this appears a most fairminded solution, particularly since the United States does bear some considerable responsibility for the election refusal which appears to have brought on the war.

But here, the Senator is guilty of suppression of evidence. Under conditions as they existed in South Vietnam in 1955, an election would have given the Communists a hands-down victory, by figures which have been estimated as high as 90 percent. That is why neither Diem nor the United States wanted that election to be held; instead, it was "postponed" in the hope that Diem's government could weaken the Communist influence so that a later election might give the desired, anti-Communist result. That hope was not realized then and is not realized now.

After making his proposal for peace, the Senator goes on to say, "we wage war against the Vietcong and North Vietnam, but we regard them as instruments of China, and it is China that we consider to be the real threat to the security of southeast Asia."

If China is the real threat, and if the Cong and North Vietnam are instruments of China, it follows that a victory for them is victory for Communist China. Under the Senator's proposal, then, South Vietnam would be delivered into Communist arms not by bullets but by the ballot box; Communist China would not only get what she wanted but would enjoy a tremendous propaganda victory as well. If China is a threat now, she would be a far greater one then.

Such thoughts as these may have crossed the Senator's mind, for he attempts to justify his position by asserting that the United States should "treat China as a respected member of the world community now going through a period of dangerous chauvinism and warranting our best efforts to rehabili-

tate her to the world community." We must do this because, he says, it is impossible to describe the deep and bitter humiliation inflicted upon the Chinese * * * by imperialist nations, including Russia and, to a degree, America."

Unless the Senator is referring to our betrayal of Chiang Kai-shek and our abandonment of China to the Communists, that statement is not true. No major power has assisted China more, and demanded less, than the United States. To mention only a few examples, with which I am personally familiar: The United States returned to China the indemnities paid to them after the Boxer Rebellion; in reciprocal spirit, the Chinese established Tsing Hua College, to be staffed by a faculty of Americans until Chinese educators could take over. I was fortunate enough to be chosen as a member of that faculty. All our students were Chinese and were selected from every province in China; after 4 years at Tsing Hua, they were sent to the United States for higher, postgraduate education. These students have always held a warm friendship for all Americans; in Hong Kong, not long ago and 40 years after I had served in Tsing Hua, a Chinese stopped me in the street and reminded me that he had been one of my students.

At a cost of \$10 million, America's Rockefeller Foundation built a medical college and hospital in Peking, open to all patients and staffed by Chinese and Americans in equal numbers and equal responsibility.

The citizens of the United States resident in Peking established and supported the Peking American School; during its years of operation, more than half its students were Chinese. My own children went to school there; today, many of their closest friends are Chinese with whom they attended classes.

These are examples of American generosity to China, not of American humiliations.

In a further effort to support his position, this time with the popular cry of anti-segregation, the Senator cites the case of a native-born Chinese, married to a Belgian, who returned to his homeland, landing in Shanghai. The Senator quotes him as saying, "I had no rights on the soil of a Chinese city which did not belong to the Chinese; my wife had rights by reason of something called skin * * *. We boarded the English steamer * * * first class was for Europeans only * * * I went second class."

The Senator implies that the United States should be ashamed of itself for so treating a Chinese in China. Here, he is again guilty of suppressing evidence: at the time of his story, Shanghai was in the British sphere of influence; the parks and the better restaurants and hotels were in the British concession and were owned by them, as was the steamer. The United States never had any concessions or spheres of influence in China.

In continuing his argument that we should "treat China as a respected member of the world community," the Senator describes the Chinese as "a great and civilized people." This is indeed true of the Chinese people; it is not true of China's Communist rulers, whom he wants to treat so gently.

For example: One afternoon, shortly after the Communists had taken over Peking, an old Chinese friend of ours came by our house for tea. He had come, he said, to assure us that we need not worry about the Communist takeover and that there was no need for us to be afraid of them. Several days later, after we had not seen him or heard from him, we sent word to his house to find out where he was. His wife told our messenger that the Communists had taken him to the Temple of Heaven and shot him because he had been a friend of Americans.

Our Chinese secretary, worried about us and wanting to help us if he could, told the Communist authorities that he disliked us very much and asked to be appointed an official spy to keep an eye on us. The authori-

an unusually heroic event in the history of the Jews in Poland. In mid-April 1943, some 50,000 Jews in Warsaw resolved to defy their Nazi foes and began their fight for freedom. In that struggle these gallant souls, who had no chance for survival, fought their ruthless foes for 42 days, until finally nearly all of them made the supreme sacrifice for freedom. Only a handful of these fighters managed to escape death, and today they are rebuilding their reborn ancient homeland, the State of Israel. On the observance of this historic anniversary I join all lovers of freedom in paying my tribute to the memory of innocent and gallant victims of the Warsaw ghetto uprising.

The Need for Education in the Field of Political Warfare

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. E. ROSS ADAIR

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, since the end of World War II, the United States has met and mastered every Communist military challenge, whether it has been actual warfare or the threat of armed conflict. This has been true in the cases of Iran, Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Lebanon, the Quemoy Straits, and the Cuban missile crisis, to name a few. In every case we either exposed the Communist military bluff for what it was or defeated them militarily. However, in the field of political warfare we have not been so successful. Time after time, situations have arisen that demanded political warfare expertise and here our record is very spotty. The reason for this, in my view, is that we have neither the appreciation of this form of warfare, nor sufficient people trained in its subtleties. One possible solution to this problem is a U.S. Freedom Academy. Another approach would be a private freedom school. Washington Report, the weekly newsletter of the American Security Council, has an excellent discussion of this important issue in their March 14, 1966, issue and I wish to commend it to the attention of my colleagues.

THE NEED FOR POLITICAL WARFARE EDUCATION

Ever since Vietnam became the major overseas concern of the American people, skilled observers have reported on our inability to come to grips with the political aspects of the conflict. In the fall 1964 issue of the quarterly Foreign Affairs, Maj. Gen. Edward G. Fausdale, U.S. Air Force (retired), emphasizes the U.S. failure to fully understand the Vietnam struggle. He advocates direct organizational opposition to "the political base which the Communists set up in 1960, in their hope to gain control of 14 million people living in North Vietnam through a wide assortment of 'fronts' to appeal politically to the farmers, the workers, the youth, the intellectuals, and even the civil servants and military."

The U.S. Government spokesmen readily concede that the political front in Vietnam is of paramount importance. Every administration since Truman's has recognized, in theory, that the capacity of any developing nation to cope with Red nonmilitary warfare

is as essential as its armed capacity to quell Communist insurgency.

WE ARE STILL AMATEURS

Although ex-Ambassador George Kennan appears to have lost his grip on today's realities in Vietnam, he once made an appraisal of the Communist nonmilitary challenge that still has validity. Expansion of Kremlin power, he noted after the end of World War II, was due "on part to Soviet resourcefulness and singlemindedness of purpose, two parts to the disunity, complacency, and amateurishness of the West."

Today's Communist world has its own problems of disunity, and today's Washington may have lost some of its complacency. But amateurishness remains the outstanding characteristic of the U.S. response to the challenge of Red political warfare. And Communist leaders remain resourceful and singleminded in their global pursuit of political power. They also have an ominous capacity for developing and increasing their trained manpower in all countries. Their constantly renewed strength comes from the annual output of graduates from "Lenin institutes" in Moscow, Peking, Prague, Havana and scores of other cities, some outside Communist-bloc countries.

Trainees spend from a few months to 7 years learning various aspects of the business that has been the backbone of Communist singlemindedness ever since Lenin wrote "What Must Be Done." Although the studies include guerrilla warfare, bombmaking, sabotage, etc., the major training is in non-violent tactics and nonmilitary conflict management, with emphasis on propaganda and infiltration techniques.

The revolutionary idea behind Communist political aggressions cannot be bombed out of existence in Vietnam or anywhere else. But it can be successfully opposed by equally revolutionary political goals. "To start the Vietnamese moving realistically toward those political goals" says General Lansdale, requires "an aggressive commitment of organizations and resources. In essence, this is revolutionary warfare in the spirit of the British Magna Carta, the French 'Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite' and our own Declaration of Independence. [Although] the United States has felt inhibited about trying to make a contribution in areas in which it feels that the chief responsibility must rest with the Vietnamese themselves, Americans cannot escape responsibility in this area either."

That responsibility has also been emphasized by native Vietnamese leaders. In July 1963 the patriot Dan Van Sung wrote: "In order to make sure that an emergent people really control their own destiny, the United States is expected to make positive efforts helping them develop control of themselves."

MASSIVE CHALLENGE, FRAIL RESPONSE

To date, U.S. "positive efforts" and "commitment of organization and resources" have been limited to such overseas undertakings as the foreign aid programs, the U.S. Information Service and the Peace Corps. These efforts have been but pinpricks in the political hide of the bear and the dragon. They cannot forestall the kind of conspiratorial aggressions that result in a Cuba, a Vietnam, or a Dominican Republic. Despite years of such efforts, involving expenditures of billions, U.S. missions still operate under Red-streaked horizons today in many areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

TO CLOSE THE EDUCATIONAL GAP

U.S. Freedom Academy

The need for a political warfare training academy on a scale commensurate with the challenge has long been recognized by far-seeing Members of Congress. Convinced that neither the Department of State nor the Pentagon are equipped to counteract non-military aggression, these legislators advocate an independent agency to organize, research, and develop a training program for

U.S. personnel and for citizens of other free world nations who are possible targets for Communist political and psychological warfare. On the one hand their bill aims to adequately train U.S. personnel serving overseas. On the other, to improve the political skills of non-Communist citizens of emerging nations.

The legislation they propose would establish a U.S.-sponsored free world counterforce to the Lenin Institutes. The concept has been variously called a cold war West Point, a political warfare training center, and a freedom academy. The formal name for the legislation is the Freedom Commission bill. It would establish not merely an academy, but a full-time, seven-man bipartisan Commission appointed by the President and approved by Congress, to guide the needed research and administer the dual training programs. Structured like the Atomic Energy Commission, this one would cooperate with the Department of State, but operate independent of it. Such detachment permits the training of natives of emerging nations in meeting problems of modern political development without being committed to current U.S. foreign policy. The academy can develop techniques of mass communication and instruct foreign students in related political skills. A separate branch can train personnel of the State Department, USAID, AID, and other overseas agencies in greater depth than their present limited briefings on the Communist challenge.

In the development of an academy curriculum and the staffing of a faculty, there is no reason why a Freedom Commission need confine itself to the services of American citizens. At its disposal are brilliant, politically experienced citizens of other nations who are articulate champions of the open society and keenly perceptive of the Communist threat to it. Some may be more effective than any American in convincing foreign students and the world at large that the academy's basic concern is for the advance of free societies everywhere, and that its teachings are in no way circumscribed by U.S. national interests.

With that concept clearly developed in hearings on the Freedom Commission bill, in 1960 the Senate Judiciary Committee urged its immediate passage as "one of the most important bills ever to come before the Congress." The Senate accepted that committee recommendation by a voice vote but it did not reach the House during that session. * * * However, it cleared the House Committee on Un-American Activities last year and because the Vietnam situation focuses increased attention on political warfare, sponsors of the bill believe it will come to a vote in both Houses during the present session.

The Freedom Studies Center

Senators DODD, MUNDT, DOUGLAS, and TAMM are among many congressional advocates of a U.S.-sponsored Freedom Academy who also encourage private citizen initiative in the same area. "Since governments move so slowly," says Senator THOMAS DODD, "it is my conviction that an effort should be made on a private basis to make serious cold war education more generally available than it is today, to all those who can make use of it."

Forty-two senior Members of the Congress and 10 State Governors serve on the advisory board for the Freedom Studies Center, a privately financed freedom academy soon to be launched. The center recently acquired a 671-acre estate campus near Culpeper, Va., 1½ hours from Washington, D.C. Some initial courses for members of congressional staffs are scheduled for late summer 1966.

The Freedom Studies Center is administered by the Institute for American Strategy, Chicago, Ill., with the cooperation of 40 other organizations, many of which are universities. It is 100 percent privately financed by foundations, corporations, and individuals.

April 28, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

ties, perhaps hoping for an excuse to take us to the temple too, readily agreed and gave him the appointment. Armed with it, our Chinese friend was able to come to our home every day and give invaluable assistance in protecting us against our common enemy. He was a very brave man; our debt to him cannot be measured.

An Italian citizen, living in Peking, was married to an American and had four children. The Communists seized him, paraded him through the streets, took him to the Temple of Heaven and shot him. The official charge against him was never made public; it was enough for the Communists that he had an American wife and was American-tainted.

The Communist rulers of China are totally unworthy of the respect of the rest of the world. They know it and they don't care, because they have a very simple and workable plan for Communist domination of all Asia and all of the western Pacific, including Japan. They plan to continue their pressure upon areas of southeast Asia such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia so that the free world can be kept occupied and off balance until Red China's nuclear capacity can be developed. As soon as nuclear weapons and delivery systems are available, Communist China will blackmail into the Communist orbit, under threat of destruction, the nations of southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Japan. Because the Government and Army of Nationalist China, on the island of Formosa, are a constant threat to communism, Formosa will not be blackmailed. It will be destroyed.

Meantime, the people of mainland China must be kept quiet and under control. They are a great and civilized people: proud, reliant, independent individuals who resent being herded and whose patience, though proverbial, does have its end. They are not Communists and are not likely ever to be Communists, for they have too much self-respect. The sole source of present Communist control of them is Communist China's Army. In that army, today, there is great and growing dissatisfaction with the ruling regime and an intense, personal and growing dislike for the entire military hierarchy—a condition which may well account for the present emphasis on the development of "volunteer forces." The troops now in service are underfed, undersupplied and under-led. They were ripe for revolt 6 months ago; they are even more ready now, and when they revolt, the people of China will revolt with them.

All that is needed is a spark. This is why Red China fears the government and the army on Formosa; this is why, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk has said, "whenever the United States suggests serious talks, the Chinese Reds say there is nothing to discuss until the United States recognizes Peking and abandons the Nationalists on Formosa." Mao Tse-tung has said he would accept the loss of half the population of China in order to defeat "capitalist imperialism;" if we were to abandon Formosa, there is little doubt of what the fate of our friends there would be.

The Communists and their sympathizers in the United States are working very hard to persuade us to surrender southeast Asia to them as we once surrendered mainland China; they suggest all kinds of sugar-coated "withdrawals with honor." Quite apart from the moral issues involved, this is something the United States cannot afford to do.

Today, Red China is not a major power. By holding firm in southeast Asia and on Formosa, we can restrain her ambitions for the moment—until such time as she herself possesses nuclear weaponry. When that time comes, the United States and the free world will be able to hold southeast Asia and the western Pacific only at the risk of

a major nuclear war. The American people and their Government should be aware of this and should prepare to act before the situation gets completely out of control.

Without the nuclear capability she hopes for, Red China cannot overrun Asia or seriously retaliate against the free world; without relative peace and quiet at home, Communist control of China cannot be maintained. To restore China to her rightful place as a free nation, we must do two things.

First, we must destroy or seriously impair Red China's nuclear development, while such action is still possible. A delay in that program, even if only of a few years, will be invaluable to us.

Second, we must provide support to the Nationalist Government of Formosa in its action to spark the revolt of China's army and China's people, so that the mainland may be recovered and China's territorial sovereignty restored. Freed from communism, China can be one of the greatest powers for world peace. The people of Formosa have proved that Chinese can create and maintain a stable, sound, democratic government; China's manpower, coupled with American technology, can create in China an impregnable bulwark against any and all enemies of freedom. The United States need only give its support.

The American people are slowly beginning to realize that the prime cause of the world's fear and conflict today is communism as China knows it. It is an evil that must be dealt with sternly; it is not an issue to be debated but a danger to be opposed and destroyed while it is still in its weaker stages. There is not much time left, but there is still time. Red China can be stopped and its people can be freed—if we have the courage and the daring to do it.

Sincerely,

DR. ARTHUR SHOEMAKER.

Loyalty Day 1966

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK ANNUNZIO

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, on Sunday, May 1, we celebrate both Loyalty Day and Law Day. It is not without meaning that we celebrate loyalty and law at the same time, because law represents and safeguards the highest values to which our country is dedicated: the inherent rights of the individual. To express one's loyalty to the United States is to affirm one's fidelity to these values.

It is significant that Loyalty Day was first conceived by an outstanding organization—the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This organization proudly lists as its members men who had the courage, born of fidelity to country, to stake their lives in battle for the preservation of the rights and liberties of all Americans.

It was the Communists who first paraded through New York City on May Day to proclaim the advent of a Marxist-Leninist revolution in America. So repugnant to American ideals would such a revolution be, and so offensive to loyal Americans is the announcement of its alleged coming, that the Veterans of Foreign Wars called for a counterparade on May Day to demonstrate their enduring fidelity to our Constitution and to the rights and liberties which it protects.

The inalienable rights, for which the first patriots pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, would cease entirely to be recognized under the regime of communism.

A right defines what belongs to a person. Our Constitution and laws secure to every person what truly belongs to him. Freedom of religion, the inviolable integrity of the family, freedom of thought and expression, private property, freedom of occupational choice and equality of opportunity—these are among the precious things which belong to all Americans because the principles which this country was founded upon upheld the inherent dignity of man.

And because law is meant to define and to safeguard what belongs to people themselves, our Constitution establishes representative democracy as the form of government which befits the dignity of a free people. Our Constitution also provides that the people's own representatives make the laws which are meant to secure and safeguard their rights.

The Communists declare that according to their order of things all rights are attributed to what they call "the people." But they do not mean by "the people" a community of freemen related to each other by mutual rights and duties. By "the people" they mean, not people, but an abstract and collective entity which is represented by a dictatorial government. To this entity—and therefore to the state—everything belongs. To it, everything is owed. To it, all rights are alienated. Nothing remains to the individual person—he is subject entirely to total control by the state.

And so it is appropriate for us, Mr. Speaker, to celebrate Loyalty Day by reaffirming our adherence to the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Constitution and laws of our great Nation are of priceless worth for they have sustained and preserved our individual liberties over a span of almost two centuries. Only by adhering to the lofty principles of democracy on which America was founded can we insure for our descendants the same rights and privileges we now enjoy.

Anniversary of Israel's Independence

SPEECH

OF

HON. JAMES M. HANLEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 25, 1966

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, this week we are celebrating the anniversary of Israel's independence proclaimed in 1948 in Tel Aviv after the British mandate of Palestine had ended.

As we observe this 18th anniversary, it gives each of us great pride to see this nation flourish in democracy within its Middle Eastern feudal environment. Israel, enslaved for over 2,000 years, has made great progress in the past 18 years. The people of Israel have made fantastic

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social and economic strides. They are successfully developing their economic capabilities to the fullest degree possible.

Not only do we observe their progress this week, but we look with pride to their unselfishness. Persons of Jewish ancestry scattered for centuries have not let miles divide their allegiance to one another. Since Israel's independence, this nation has received over 1½ million people of Jewish heritage into their common homeland. We can look to these brave people and learn from them. Their examples of patience, courage, and perseverance are unmatched in the history of the world.

Standard for Daylight Saving Time

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROBERT C. McEWEN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the following editorial entitled "Congress Should Cure This Confusion on Time," appearing in the March 22, 1966, issue of the Massena Observer, Massena, N.Y., relating to the need for a uniform system for establishment of daylight saving time:

CONGRESS SHOULD CURE THIS CONFUSION ON TIME

(By Leonard H. Prince, editor)

This utterly senseless confusion over time should be eliminated in this new day when we are making plans to go to the moon.

The Federal Government should regulate the date of time changes from standard to daylight, and that changeover should be on the same day from east to west and north to south.

In the United States during 1965, according to the World Almanac, daylight saving time was observed in 31 States, 15 of them on a statewide basis and by local option in the remaining 16. The 19 other States had no provision for daylight saving time or barred any change from standard time.

Of the 31 States observing daylight saving time, 20 of them started it on the last Sunday in April and 15 ended it on the last Sunday in October. In the other States there was wide variance in the dates of starting and ending daylight time. Legislation was introduced in Congress during the year to make the duration of daylight saving time uniform in those States and cities observing it.

The Minneapolis Tribune took an opinion poll in Minnesota and found that 58 percent of the people interviewed favor having Congress establish uniform dates for daylight time. The switchover in Minnesota last year was complicated because some communities started 4 weeks ahead of the official date.

Best thing would be to have all States adopt daylight saving time, under the Federal plan, and this means each and every single State, or to ban any tampering with clocks in each and every State and have standard time throughout the entire year.

It's ridiculous to have each State decide its own time, even though it may be States rights.

Standard time is reckoned from Greenwich, England, recognized as the prime meridian of longitude. The world is divided into 24 time

zones, each 15 degrees of arc, or 1 hour in time apart. The meridian of Greenwich (0) extends through the center of the initial zone, and the zones to the eastward are numbered from 1 to 12 with the prefix minus indicating the number of hours to be subtracted to obtain Greenwich time. Zones to the westward are similarly numbered, with the prefix plus showing the number of hours that must be added to get Greenwich time.

Now that's a beautiful setup, just as plain as it can be, and was calculated centuries ago by the greatest mathematicians and astronomers ever born. It still works; it will always work as long as the sun shines.

But from then on in, lesser minds, biased folks, politicians out to win votes, people who don't want to get up in the morning, people who want to play golf in the afternoon—all get into the act and turn this great country of ours into a modern day Babel.

And thus if you want to call your Congressman in Washington and give him the benefit of your views on important legislation, you have to figure out first what time it is in Washington, whether his office is open. If you place any long distance calls, you need to know what time is being used at the place you are calling. And if you are traveling, by plane, train, or bus, you have to figure out schedules complicated with different time used from State to State.

Oldtime protests from the farmers should be getting weaker and weaker. They claimed that fast time was a great hindrance; they could not start haying until the sun had been up for hours. That extra hour in the morning came while the meadows were wet with dew. In this day, farmers don't depend so much on a precocious sun to do this and that. They have the equipment to harvest the hay quickly, they may dry it with powerful blowers, or chop it and want to keep it green. Every dairyman knows that milking should be about 12 hours apart for the comfort of the cows with heavy udders. As long as this schedule is maintained, the cow does not care what the clock says. Milking time can be 6 in the morning and 6 at night, or high noon and midnight, for all the difference it will make to the cow.

Tearful mothers sending their little tots out in the cold to wait for the schoolbus in early mornings but realize that unless the schoolday is shortened, the children will be going to school in the dark or else coming home in the dark during these winter days.

The U.S. Congress can gain everlasting glory if it will straighten out this mess about time.

It is time something is done about this.

East Tennesseans Speak Out on Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES H. (JIMMY) QUILLEN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, two very provocative editorials, concerning the situation in Vietnam, appeared in newspapers in my district recently.

The first editorial, from the Morristown, Tenn., Gazette-Mail, was written by the publisher of the paper, Mr. John Helms III. The second is taken from the Tomahawk of Mountain City, Tenn.

Both of these articles raise questions that are worthy of discussion, and I insert them at this point in the RECORD for the information of all:

[From the Morristown (Tenn.) Gazette-Mail, Apr. 17, 1966]

FACING FACTS

(By John Helms III)

An air of unreality hangs over the events in South Vietnam these days. Despite the bitter anti-Government, anti-American demonstrations, the United States has doggedly, obstinately refused to face facts.

As the riots, undoubtedly in the main Red inspired, flared in Saigon, Da Nang and other cities, threatening to topple the General Ky regime if not total anarchy, the reaction of the United States has been to keep a stiff upper lip and hands off.

Instead of backing Ky's military government resolutely, Washington made clear that whether the South Vietnamese Premier stays or goes really isn't very important. The Johnson administration, through the person of Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, revealed that Washington is getting ready to acquiesce to the scuttling of Ky.

What really counts, Ball said on a recent TV interview, "is insuring to the South Vietnamese people the kind of government which will enable them * * * to maintain their freedom, and to determine their own future. This may change, from time to time, as they decide that they would like a different form of government."

Our Under Secretary of State repeatedly insisted that the recent Honolulu conference, at which President Johnson embraced General Ky before TV cameras, did not symbolize U.S. support for the embattled Premier, but was only "to give its support to the Government of South Vietnam, which is, at the moment, a government in which Prime Minister Ky is the head of the government."

These statements, if truly representative of official U.S. policy, should cause any still friendly ally to shy away from us and should increase the growing demand in this country to pull completely out of Vietnam.

General Ky might well complain that he was given the Judas kiss in Honolulu, but, alas, he is not the only U.S. ally to suffer the changing whims of our irresolute foreign policy, as the late Rhee of South Korea and Diem of South Vietnam could tell him.

Ky's "fault," he himself pinpointed: "I am being attacked," he said, "because I have worked well with the Americans. Because of this the Communists want to split us up."

Ky recognizes what Washington cannot or will not, and because of our official stupidity—the same kind of official U.S. stupidity which following World War II viewed Mao Tse-tung's Chinese Communists as simple "agrarian reformers"—we are doomed to an apparently endless repetition of our agonizing costly mistakes.

When our Under Secretary of State says that "what we are trying to do is to help the people of South Vietnam attain a self-sufficiency so that they can make their own choice," when George Ball says that, does he really mean that if right now an election in South Vietnam were held and the Communists won overwhelmingly, the United States would forthwith abandon its investment of thousands of American lives and billions of dollars and go home?

If we are not in Vietnam selfishly, for our own future well-being, to keep the Communists out, our enormous investment there is unjustified. It is just such fuzziness of purpose as enunciated by Ball that makes this war which is not a war increasingly less understood and less supported here at home.

[From the Mountain City (Tenn.) Tomahawk, Apr. 20, 1966]

UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The debate over the role of the United States in Asia, and more specifically in Vietnam, raises strong passions in this country and around the world. There is little wonder that this should be so when peace is at stake.

In assessing the actions of this country, one fact must be considered. The United States holds the balance of power in the world.

In a recent issue of U.S. News & World Report, the dimension of this power was stated: "The United States has more strategic missiles, nuclear weapons, missile-firing submarines, heavy bombers, aircraft carriers, long-range transport planes and helicopters than all the rest of the world combined. American land armies, though small by comparison with those of Russia and China, have greater mobility and firepower per division. Backing these military forces in the field are a huge military reserve, and the world's greatest industrial establishment. It is America's ability to place vast armed forces thousands of miles beyond its shores that makes the United States the key to the world balance of power."

It can be argued that this country is in much the same position as England was during a good part of the 19th century. The British fleet patrolled the world unchallenged, master of the seas. The weight of this power, thrown to one side or the other, prevented the dominance of any other nation or group of nations. For the most part, there was peace between European countries whose colonial empires extended over much of the world. Can the United States assume a less responsible role today in using its vast resources on the side of stability by seeking a balance of power that would limit the expansionist aims of the Communist countries? It seems, to many, that since the shoe fits, it must be worn.

The goal of the United States in southeast Asia should be to make of that area a strong point rather than a threat to peace. Vietnam itself has the resources to be a successful country—with an energetic people, food, and timber resources, hydroelectric potential, unlimited water, fine beaches, and scenery. As a result of U.S. action there Vietnam is gaining modern jet airfields and the finest harbor facilities between Hong Kong and Singapore. The United States has offered to aid in the development of the Mekong Valley which Vietnam shares with Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos.

China, held back now by U.S. military force, must ultimately be restrained by her own self-interest, rooted in the need for profitable commercial ties with strong, independent Asian neighbors—Japan to the northeast and, it is hoped, the potentially effective countries of southeast Asia to the south.

Finally, the inevitability of change in Chinese leadership must be considered. All of the hard-line revolutionaries now in power are in their late sixties and seventies. A recent Life magazine article observed that Mao Tse-tung, now 72, " * * * has expressed with startling frankness his doubts as to the revolutionary militance of the next Chinese generation. They might even be men with whom the West could attempt a comprehensive settlement of the major issues dividing us * * *."

And so, there are two sides to the coin. The United States inherited responsibilities in Asia, but with them perhaps also the leverage to help foster the kind of cooperation between eastern nations that would permit peace and a possibility of a better life for all.

Clifford Durr

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, in the April 18 issue of the Nation, Justice Hugo L.

Black described Clifford Durr as "one of the best men I have ever known." "His course in life," wrote Justice Black, "has been marked by courage, not by expediency." He is a man who has not only done good works, but whose own steady courage has served as a conscience for his contemporaries.

He reminds me, in a way, of Thoreau. In 1851, as schoolchildren are now taught, Henry David Thoreau went to prison rather than pay taxes for a war in which he did not believe. While in prison, he was visited by his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson, who did not believe in the war either.

"What are you doing in there, David?" Emerson asked Thoreau.

"What are you doing out there, Waldo?" Thoreau replied.

Clifford Durr, of Montgomery, Ala., attorney and former Commissioner of the FCC, has followed the dictates of his conscience. By doing so, he often chose an unpopular course. In 1948 he refused reappointment to the FCC in protest over President Truman's Loyalty Review Board. In 1956, when Rosa Parks sat down on a Montgomery bus, Clifford Durr became her attorney.

Since the early days of the New Deal, in Montgomery and in Washington, he has constantly confronted his contemporaries with the question: "What are you doing out there?"

Mr. Speaker, in February the New York Civil Liberties Union presented Clifford Durr with its Florence Lasker Civil Liberties Award. Later that month, the Nation of February 21 paid him tribute in an editorial entitled "Conscience of a Lawyer." It was followed in the Nation of April 18 by the tribute from Justice Black.

The Nation editorial, and the letter from Justice Black follow:

[From the Nation, Feb. 21, 1966]

CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER

The New York Civil Liberties Union this month gave its 1966 Florence Lasker Civil Liberties Award to Clifford Durr, a man well known in the days of Franklin Roosevelt as the conscience of the Federal Communications Commission. He was responsible for issuance of the Commission's "Blue Book," a report that criticized broadcasting for excessive commercialization and tried to impress on the industry its responsibility for serving "the public interest, convenience, and necessity," as the law provides. It was Durr, also, who put through what became known as the "AVCO rule"—prompted by the Aviation Corporation's attempt to buy radio stations—which provided that a station owner wishing to sell his property must advertise for bids and not make private deals (a rule that has not been enforced as well as it might have been). Durr fought against advertising agency control of broadcasting and pushed FM, insisting that at least some of the new channels be reserved for educational purposes. He stood up against encroachment by the big newspaper publishers into broadcasting.

Durr's career in Washington came to an end when he boldly quoted the Constitution to Harry Truman, who was then setting up his Loyalty Review Board and creating a temper in the country that encouraged Senator Joseph McCarthy to scramble for power across the reputations of his fellow citizens. He denounced McCarthyism even before the term was invented. In recent years, Durr has been practicing law (he has recently retired) in his hometown of Montgomery, Ala. It has been a quiet practice, primarily the

crises and tragedies of the very poor. None of the big civil rights cases have come his way—perhaps because he is a brother-in-law of Justice Hugo Black, and potential clients have feared that if their cases were to reach the Supreme Court their warmest friend on that bench might have to disqualify himself. Or perhaps clients wanted a less controversial lawyer; Durr has never been orthodox, in Washington or in Alabama.

The Lasker citation refers to "consistent and outstanding courage and integrity in the defense of civil liberties whether in the performance of duty or above and beyond the requirements of duty." Clifford Durr would agree that he has tried to do his duty, but nothing he has ever said suggests that he feels he has done more than his personal integrity and professional skill have required of him. It would not have occurred to him that there was anything unusual in that, and we are particularly happy, therefore, that the Civil Liberties Union has obliged him at last to see himself as his admiring contemporaries see him.

[From the Nation, Apr. 18, 1966]

LETTER FROM JUSTICE BLACK

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR: I am writing you to express my own appreciation for the editorial that appeared in the Nation concerning Clifford Durr ["Conscience of a Lawyer," Feb. 21]. Cliff is one of the best men I have ever known. All of his life he has been the personification of gentleness, kindness, and tolerance. His course in life has been marked by courage, not by expediency. He has never been afraid to advocate what he believed to be right or to oppose what he believed to be wrong. He has never compromised with what he believed to be evil and against the best interests of his country. As a public servant he fought valiantly for the public interest and not for what he thought was the best interest of Cliff Durr. I join you and others in paying tribute to Clifford Durr—a man without greed and without guile—and without ambition except an ambition to help promote equal justice for all men and women without regard to their race, creed, faith or their position in society.

In your editorial you state that "Durr's career in Washington came to an end when he boldly quoted the Constitution to Harry Truman, who was then setting up his Loyalty Review Board." This implies that President Truman refused to let Cliff stay in Government service. President Truman did his best to persuade Cliff to accept reappointment to the Federal Communications Commission. He did this with full knowledge that Cliff was opposed to the loyalty program.

The President talked to me in an effort to get Cliff to accept the reappointment. When I told the President that Cliff felt he should not accept reappointment because he was opposed to the loyalty program, the President said that made no difference. When told that Cliff's views were so strongly against the program that he might not even vote the Democratic ticket, the President again told me that that made no difference in this appointment. He said that whatever his views, he knew Cliff was a man of sturdy honesty and courage, and for that reason alone he wanted him to continue serving as a member of the Communications Commission. The President not only said that he would reappoint Cliff despite his views but added that he would fight to the last ditch for his confirmation by the Senate. Cliff's refusal to serve, as I understood it, was not due to any lack of respect or admiration for President Truman, but rather to his belief that it would somehow be wrong for him to accept the Presidential appointment and then fight the loyalty program policies as he was determined to do. I came out of this experience with the belief that there was something strikingly alike in the character of these two men—that both profoundly

believed in plain, simple, homey honesty, and that neither could be swerved from doing that which he thought would best serve the public interest.

HUGO BLACK,
U.S. Supreme Court.

Down on the Farm

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, as an example of the length to which the Johnson administration has gone to insure that the American farmer will not realize his fair share of our Nation's economic growth, I wish to include at the conclusion of my remarks an editorial from the New York Times which describes the folly of the administrative action taken by the Johnson administration to impose quota controls on cattle hides. Seemingly, the administration has taken the attitude that there shall be free trade for everyone except the American farmer.

This is an illustration of how our farmers are being made into whipping boy for the Johnson administration's inflation.

As if that were not enough, the administration has heaped insult upon injury by dumping Government grain in the marketplace, tripling cheese imports and ordering Pentagon cutbacks in pork purchases.

The Secretary of Agriculture, in describing the success that the Johnson administration is achieving in depressing farm prices and income, reported at a press conference that he was "pleased to report" that farm prices for meat and vegetables were starting to moderate.

At a time when our Nation's farmers are expected to incur higher-than-usual production costs, and when you consider that the farm economy is still found to be greatly lagging the advances being made by other sectors in the Nation's economy, it becomes increasingly clear that the Johnson administration has purposely decided to treat the farmer as a second class citizen.

Mr. Speaker, the article from the New York Times follows:

QUOTA ON HIDES

In placing quotas on exports of American livestock hides, the Johnson administration hoped to strike a blow against domestic inflation. Instead, the administration has been taking a beating—domestically and internationally.

Its troubles started when shoe manufacturers complained about the rising prices for hides. The Commerce Department came up with the solution of placing controls on exports. This move had the effect of checking hide prices. But shoe manufacturers have decided to increase their prices anyway, while meatpackers and hide exporters complain that curbing their foreign sales will serve to increase the deficit in the Nation's balance of payments.

Meat and hide interests are particularly incensed that the Commerce Department

heeded the pleas of the shoe industry at their expense. They point out that they have been under pressure from the administration to expand their export markets. Their reward for doing so is a restrictive quota.

Commerce has now decided to listen to complaints, but the damage has been done. Shoe manufacturers have raised their prices. Exporters report that they have had to cut back on their foreign orders. Packers are talking of slowing the rate of cattle slaughter, which might mean higher prices for hides and for meat. And the establishment of a quota system on exports to keep prices artificially low is no more in keeping with the administration's objective of trade liberalization than the imposition of import quotas to keep prices artificially high.

The decision is as wrong in principle as it was in procedure. It is time for the administration to take the curbs off hide exports by junking the quota system.

Onondaga Lake Scientific Council

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES M. HANLEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, recently, I made a speech on the floor praising the work of the Onondaga Lake Scientific Council. This council, made up of distinguished private citizens, presented the Onondaga County executive with an excellent report on the polluted condition of Onondaga Lake and its tributaries. While the council has been formally dissolved, its members have indicated an interest in seeing that a comprehensive plan of action will result from their efforts which were freely given.

One of the most important elements in any campaign to eradicate a public disgrace is the continuing firm support of the local press. In this connection, Gene Goshorn, the county editor of the Syracuse Herald-Journal, prepared a series of six articles which summarized the important aspects of the council report. The articles follow:

[From the Syracuse (N.Y.) Herald-American, Mar. 20, 1966]

WASTE LAGOON URGED FOR ONONDAGA LAKE (By Gene Goshorn)

With large amounts of human wastes overflowing into Onondaga Lake from Harbor Brook and Onondaga Creek, the lake scientific council suggests that a large lagoon be installed in the end of the lake beside the metropolitan sewage treatment plant to catch the overflow.

The council, a group of 18 experts proposing a \$25.5 million lake cleanup program, also suggests that an electronic alarm system be installed along the brook and creek to alert public work crews when sewage is overflowing from the city sewer system.

The estimated cost for all of this is \$2 million. The council estimates up to \$1 million or half of this cost would come from Federal aid for the control of storm water.

The development of a lagoon as a waste stabilization pond, as it is called in the council report, is a "novel idea," the council said. But it is one that Syracuse University studies show to be practical, according to the council.

The electronic alarm system idea is working in Cincinnati, Ohio, with "excellent results." The system is important in Syracuse, the

council said, because "very little maintenance work" has been done on the city regular inspection."

The city sewer system overflows about 48 times a year, the council said, and during storms the overflowing water contains "as much as 95 percent of untreated sewage."

With a lagoon, the council said, the overflow would be held until it could be slowly run through the Metropolitan Syracuse sewage treatment plant.

"From discussions with the State health department," the council reports, "it was determined that the overflows from Erie Boulevard on down toward the lake are the most troublesome."

"The cross section of the Onondaga Creek channel has a shelf above normal water level. This shelf could be used to construct a pipeline to the lagoon from each overflow pipe.

"At each overflow, a west well and pumps could be installed to pump the overflowing waste to the lagoon." The Harbor Brook overflow would flow by gravity without pumps to the lagoon.

"To carry out properly the operation, maintenance and cleaning program (of the city sewers) to prevent pollution from reaching the streams, we also recommended an overflow alarm system," the council said.

"This will allow maintenance crews to be dispatched to clear clogged lines and to prevent overflows of sewage."

"Such a system would provide electric sensors at each overflow pipe with a central panel which would flash alarm lights and record any overflow * * *. Approximately 30 electric sensors would be needed."

[From the Syracuse (N.Y.) Herald-Journal, Mar. 21, 1966]

COUNCIL PROPOSES \$2.7 MILLION TO CLEAN UP NINE MILE CREEK (By Gene Goshorn)

The Onondaga Lake Scientific Council recommends \$2.75 million in public and private spending to cure the "individually small but (together) significant" waste discharges in Nine Mile Creek.

"From source to mouth, Nine Mile Creek shows a steady decline in water quality," the council says in its 60-page report on Onondaga Lake pollution, and "the present condition of the creek below Camillus is a deterrent to urban and industrial development of the area."

"Economic considerations alone should warrant a considerable investment in a treatment program to improve stream conditions," the 18-member council says.

The council outlines a stream cleanup program although it notes a declaration by a State health department officials that all "parties discharging wastes" into the creek are "conforming" to a State cleanup schedule.

The program calls for a \$2.5 million project to improve public sewage plants along the creek and \$250,000 in spending by some industries along the creek above Amboy.

"Recreational and esthetic value of Nine Mile Creek above the village of Camillus should be given special consideration in pollution control," the council said, as "this section of the stream is potentially excellent trout water and its [nearness] to urban areas would result in intensive use."

The council report, which is being studied by county officials and others, says one commercial plant near the stream source periodically releases wastes into the stream.

"Some domestic wastes from individual homes probably enter the stream between Otisco Lake and Marcellus since the section of the stream passing through Marcellus Park has been closed to wading and swimming by the public health officer.

"Sewage from the village of Marcellus is discharged into Nine Mile Creek after receiving primary treatment," the council says, but "organic enrichment" of the stream is notice-

to let each commissioner serve in turn as chairman. But under a rotation system, it's difficult to fix responsibility. A feature of the present setup is that the President's control over the Commission is limited to pretty much his statutory authority to appoint members originally to fill vacancies as they occur. Congress, in creating the ICC, sought to make it quasi-judicial, above partisan control, and thus truly independent. On the other hand, certain advantages of a permanent chairman under the reorganization plan are obvious. For one thing the line of command would be clearly defined and responsibility fixed. Many Members of Congress feel that there should be one man who is minding the store, one who has the authority and responsibility. This theory is in line with sound management and good business practice.

Question. What, in your opinion, is the new proposal going to do for the railroads in connection with regulation and the many problems they face?

Answer. The railroads are the backbone of our Nation's transportation and they will continue to hold that key role. They still lead in the volume of traffic moved and in total revenue. The railroads aren't as bad shape as some of them would have us believe.

Question. Don't the railroads need and deserve some special consideration, like tax relief, perhaps?

Answer. The railroads have a long and impressive record of generous treatment at the hands of Congress and the Government—from land grants to tax reductions and liberal Government loans for lines in distress. I recall an incident, not too long ago, of large Government loans going to a bankrupt railroad. The railroads have been helped and are being helped.

Question. I gather you would be for more self-help?

Answer. I'm hopeful that the railroads will show more interest in research and more imagination and enterprise in improving equipment and services—more high-speed trains and better passenger service. I've long been a friend of the railroads and have urged them to provide better passenger service, but without much success. Most of them have neglected passenger traffic to concentrate on the more profitable freight business. There are a few excellent passenger trains. They demonstrate what enterprise will accomplish when there is a desire to go after the business. All the prizes for the railroads are not confined to long hauls and the heavy freight runs. Some railroad managements are recapturing the competitive spirit of the early-day railroad builders and are discovering that profits can still be made in passenger transportation.

Question. What about more freedom for railroads in mergers and competitive rate making?

Answer. The issue of railroad consolidation today naturally is different from what it was in the years when railroads were handling virtually all the traffic. Competing carriers have added new dimensions to the problem. What is needed is a study in depth, looking toward the maximum development and utilization of all kinds of transportation, not just mergers and monopoly. This could be greatly advanced under President Johnson's new program. And we may just make some suggestions along this line when we have the ICC before us.

Question. What else can and does a committee of Congress like Appropriations do with respect to conveying your ideas and suggestions to agency officials?

Answer. We can recommend. We can suggest. We confer and communicate with the heads of different agencies. They call us about their problems and we make recommendations. My Appropriations Subcommittee has a large responsibility in transportation. We look on the national aspect of the

various issues that come up. We try to look at the big picture—the public interest. The Commissioners are the experts, of course, and we look to them for the decisions.

Question. Unlike the Senate, House Appropriations Committee hearings have for years been closed to the public and the press. Could transportation be helped in any way by perhaps opening up these "executive" sessions?

Answer. The basic reason for our procedure is to get the job done. As you know, all Federal spending measures must originate in the House. The proper screening of appropriations for our vast Federal establishment is always a painstaking and time-consuming operation. Actually, it couldn't be accomplished or at least the work wouldn't be completed as effectively and in reasonable time, without executive sessions. If we made a practice of holding open hearings, we'd be overrun. We couldn't accommodate the overflow of witnesses and observers. I'm reminded particularly of the situation in connection with appropriations for water projects and other public works—witnesses coming in with their Congressmen to testify in behalf of a project frequently overrun committee rooms, and standing room only is available. It's been found that these funding proposals can be heard better and more fully and in more orderly manner under the executive procedure. After that, open hearings are held in the Senate for the second view. All subjects are aired extensively and the public interest is protected and considered under the prevailing system.

Question. One final question, Mr. EVINS: Isn't Federal regulation, along with public services provided by the Government generally, costing too much?

Answer. Always too much in some ways, perhaps not enough in others. That is what we find year after year. The appropriations committee reduces or rejects many budget proposals. The over-all trend is certainly toward greater Federal appropriations, and this undoubtedly will continue as long as the country grows. But we endeavor to hold down unnecessary appropriations and limit increases without affecting vital services. The best answer I can give you on this point is to cite the remarks of the Honorable GEORGE H. MAHON, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the full House Appropriations Committee, who on the 100th anniversary of the Committee discussed this trend in growth of Federal appropriations. Chairman MAHON pointed out that our committee has consistently given equal emphasis to the "two great musts" of its responsibility—one to provide sufficient funds for vital and needed services of the Government and, secondly, to practice economy and fiscal responsibility. There is no question but that this Nation, with its exploding population in people and vehicles, faces staggering and complex problems in the field of transportation. We'll certainly do what we can to help.

various alternatives now under discussion. The Chicago Sun-Times has performed a laudable public service by raising these questions; and I include the editorial in the RECORD today:

WHAT COURSE IN VIETNAM?

The division of opinion over the U.S. course in Vietnam is increasing. It ranges from the international level down to State contests for Congress. It crosses party lines and exists within the parties themselves. The congressional leaders of the Republican Party, Senator EVERETT M. DRINSEN, of Illinois, and Representative GERALD R. FORD, of Michigan, are at some odds over the conduct of the war in Vietnam. Two powerful Democratic leaders, Vice President HUMBERT H. HUMPHREY and Senator RICHARD B. RUSSELL, of Georgia, express differences of opinion on the same issue.

On Monday HUMPHREY said he saw signs of considerable progress in Vietnam. He thought it significant that despite Saigon's internal dissension not a single South Vietnam leader had defected to the Communists. He said there was great interest in South Vietnam about the new constitution and in what kind of government would come out of the upcoming elections. HUMPHREY also said that the United States would honor its commitment to fight for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam although it must be prepared for "frustrating and perhaps heart-breaking" times ahead.

RUSSELL, who is chairman of the Armed Forces Committee of the Senate, has supported President Johnson's course in Vietnam without reservation. He now says the United States should go in to win in South Vietnam or it should get out. He said that getting out of South Vietnam, if it became necessary, would not be damaging to the United States.

The differences of opinion are healthy. Government, like business, must constantly reexamine its position and policies if it is to progress. Such reexamination now seems to be in order. South Vietnam will soon hold elections in those areas free of Communist domination. There has been no indication of what the new government might ask of the United States or its allies in South Vietnam.

The newly elected government could ask for continued assistance in resisting the Communist aggression. Or it could ask the United States to get out. Whatever the decision might be, the United States is committed to abide by it and must, therefore, be prepared to meet any eventuality.

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Marine Achievements Are Unprecedented

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JAMES C. CORMAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Lew Walt, ranking Marine officer now serving in Vietnam, has directed my attention to a recent article by Mr. Michael Wall entitled "Marines Winning Battle for Villagers' Trust." This article describes the incredibly difficult dual mission which we have assigned the U.S. Marines in Vietnam—the suppression of Communist aggression and a responsibility for civic action and a rebuilding of the villages.

What Course in Vietnam?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 26, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the Chicago Sun-Times has raised an excellent series of questions regarding our course in Vietnam. The following editorial which appeared in the Sun-Times this morning places most succinctly the

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April 28, 1966

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**Traffic World Interviews Representative
 Joe Evins**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
 OF**

HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, earlier this year my very good friend and distinguished colleague, the very capable gentleman who represents the Fourth Congressional District of Tennessee, the Honorable JOE L. EVINS, was named chairman of the Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations.

I am sure my colleagues in the House share my pleasure that JOE EVINS was selected to fill this vital post. Not only is he held in the highest esteem by all of us because of his keen legal mind and his ability as a legislator and statesman, but he also has the affection of all who have the privilege of knowing him.

The Subcommittee on Independent Offices Appropriations is unquestionably among the most important in the Congress because it handles requests for funds for 27 different agencies of our Government. Last year that subcommittee approved over \$15 million in funds for these independent agencies, many of which have jurisdiction over transportation matters.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, which handles the authorizing legislation for many of these agencies dealing with transportation, I am always interested in the views of my colleagues on the Appropriations Committee and JOE EVINS is a particularly able spokesman.

The weekly news magazine of transportation management Traffic World recently interviewed our colleague to obtain his views on transportation matters and the April 2 issue contains a partial account of this interview. Because of the obvious importance of transportation to our Nation's economy, I think the Members of the House and the general public will be very much interested in his remarks and under unanimous consent I place the article at this point in the RECORD.

It is as follows:

REPRESENTATIVE EVINS CONTEMPLATES HIS
 NEW ROLE OF CONTROL OVER SPENDING ON
 TRANSPORT

(NOTE.—Tennessee Congressman, new head of Independent Offices Subcommittee on Appropriations, indicates he will do best to promote a sound transport system. Sees Department of Transportation as a good step.)

(By Stanley Hamilton)

Overlooked by many persons when they consider Federal checkreins on transportation is the House Appropriations Committee, which literally wields a life-or-death hold on the transportation regulators.

Bringing figures and statements of justification with them, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the others must go at least once a year for their

money to the Appropriations Committee's Independent Offices Subcommittee, which for the first time in a number of years has a new chairman.

He is Representative JOE L. EVINS, Democrat, of Tennessee, who succeeded 10 weeks ago to this post—unquestionably one of the most powerful in the entire Congress—on the death of Representative Albert Thomas, Democrat, of Texas.

Representative EVINS, 55, personable and plain spoken and a lawyer by training, and not come to the Appropriations Committee by accident. Shortly after entering Congress in 1947, he seized a chance to get on the committee and also the select House Small Business Committee, of which, through the seniority system, he also has become chairman.

Now, as new chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee that handles the Budget Bureau's requests for money for 27 agencies that last year received appropriations exceeding \$15 billion, what does Representative EVINS see as his role? What does he believe should be done in transportation? How does he view the proposals in the President's transportation message? To let Traffic World's readers know, Representative EVINS consented to a lengthy interview, highlights of which follow:

Question. Traffic World is particularly interested, of course, in your subcommittee's work with the transportation and transportation-related agencies. How many of these report to you?

Answer. Perhaps as many as a dozen of these agencies are concerned with transportation. The ICC, FAA, and CAB, of course, are the major ones and are involved in President Johnson's proposal to create a new Department of Transportation. Then there are other agencies that touch on transportation, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Emergency Planning, General Services Administration, Office of Science and Technology and Appalachian Regional Commission.

Question. Since you mentioned it, do you favor the changes in the regulatory agencies the President is proposing?

Answer. I believe a need exists for coordination and consolidation of functions of the various and diverse Federal agencies and offices in this field. The newly proposed Department of Transportation would be helpful and I support the President's plan.

Question. Have you any serious reservations with respect to this legislation?

Answer. Along with many other Members of Congress, I have questions concerning some features. These issues, of course, will come up for full discussion in the hearings and debates on the administration's proposals. Most of these questions will be resolved and I believe agreement will be reached during this session on a measure establishing a Transportation Department.

Question. As President Johnson said, there are some 35 Federal agencies concerned with transportation. Isn't there too much regulation? Wouldn't this new Department bring on more regulation of private industry?

Answer. Concerning the first part of your question, yes, I feel that perhaps there is too much regulation, some of it ill advised and cumbersome. As to the second part, no, there is not enough well-planned and effective regulation in the public interest. The increasing magnitude and complexity of our industrial system create new regulatory problems faster than we keep up with them. As our space age industrial society continues to grow and become more complex, some regulation is needed. But we need to strive for improvement with respect to the manner and character of this regulation.

Question. Isn't the developmental aspect of Federal agency operations becoming as large as the regulatory side?

Answer. There is a trend, certainly. For example, there's the new Appalachian Regional Development Commission, which has a budget in excess of \$1 billion for new highway construction in the 11 Appalachian States. This includes the building of developmental corridors and interconnecting routes, with the purpose of opening up areas whose growth has been retarded by the absence of adequate transportation facilities. This attack on the isolation of many remote and underdeveloped areas is a long forward step toward realization of the goal of industrial decentralization and regional development.

Question. What do you consider the main feature of the administration's overall program?

Answer. There are a number of desirable objectives. Besides promoting economy and efficiency, a particular feature is the comprehensive dealing with the matter of safety. New techniques will be brought to bear to effect transportation safety. The Federal Government has a big responsibility as the partner with private enterprise in promoting safety in the public interest.

Question. Speaking of safety, the President proposes transferring the FAA to the new Department. Do you see any particular problem here?

Answer. FAA will be a key part of the new Department, concerned with safety and promotion of air transportation. The safety factor is one of the major considerations in support of a centralized Transportation Department. It's logical and desirable that FAA's functions and activities be a major part of the new Department.

Question. Another aviation agency that reports to your committee is the CAB, some functions of which would be moved into the new Department. What is the distinction in this instance?

Answer. CAB's regulatory function and the subsidy program wouldn't be transferred to the new Department. CAB's safety functions, however, like the activities in this field of other Federal agencies, would be. Under the CAB as now constituted, notable progress has been made in the promotion and development of all airline industries in the United States, both trunk and local service. These airlines have shown excellent growth.

Question. How about that airline subsidy picture?

Answer. Subsidy to air transportation has been authorized by Congress to promote and develop a system of efficient air transportation for the country—as we did for the railroads in the early history of our Nation's development. The CAB and FAA, through support of local airline service and municipal airports, are engaged in a historic pioneering development effort. I'm among those in Congress who are hopeful that the new Department will put more emphasis on promoting air transport for smalltown and rural America. Industrial decentralization and a broader base for growth and progress are one of the country's crying needs. A back-to-the-smalltown movement is a logical answer to the overcrowding and paralysis of our congested cities. While we must preserve, improve, and even rebuild in part our great cities, we should also give every possible encouragement to the economic growth and development of communities and regions outside the overgrown metropolitan centers. Better transportation can help bring this about.

Question. One particular question in connection with the new transportation program concerns the ICC. Under a reorganization plan to be proposed by the administration, the ICC will have a permanent chairman, selected by the President. Will Congress go along with this?

Answer. There are two sides to this. The current rotating chairmanship was designed

Mr. Wall concludes that:

For the politicians and the generals the war here is complex enough. For the ordinary soldier it is deeply perplexing. To be expected to kill and to risk being killed and at the same time to be an ambassador of goodwill and a social worker among the people one is killing is to ask a great deal. From what I have seen of the American marines in the field they seem to be attempting, and indeed achieving, something which has never been demanded of soldiers before.

Mr. Wall's article follows:

MARINES WINNING BATTLE FOR VILLAGER'S TRUST

(By Michael Wall)

"The people in the village are beginning to learn that if they are in real trouble they can turn to the Marines." This was how the U.S. Marine company commander saw the beginnings of another small victory—not in terms of ground captured or enemy killed, but because some simple villagers were hesitantly starting to trust him and his men.

For the past 4 weeks the company has been patrolling a complex of six hamlets known as Cam Ne, 6 miles from the U.S. airbase at Da Nang. Cam Ne has been firmly controlled by the Vietcong for the past 12 years.

The villagers have been well indoctrinated with Communist theories, the village was organized in various liberation associations; the young men joined the regular Vietcong units, the older men were trained as guerrillas and village defence forces.

In July last year the Marines tried to sweep through the village. They succeeded after some fierce fighting. Every house had its dugout, and in the thick bushes and banana tree groves which surround the small bamboo houses were trenches and weapon pits. The Marines took casualties; some of the houses were set on fire. The Vietcong fled and the Marines left the village. But in this war that was no sort of victory.

A month ago the Marines returned to Cam Ne. There was no organized resistance this time, but the Communist slogans were hanging over the tracks, the old people, the women and the children were sullenly silent. It was obvious that by night at least the Vietcong were still firmly in control.

"The first day we started to fill in the trenches," the captain said. "We tried to get the villagers to help but only one or two did. The next day we brought in food. Those who had helped got more than the others. The next day more began to help." Then the battalion medical officer and his corpsmen moved in.

At first only a few families brought their children. They were in a poor state with pneumonia, worms, and skin diseases. Later more and more came and today there is probably no one in Cam Ne who will refuse medical aid. A platoon of the Vietnamese Army joined the Marines. They seemed surprised at what the Americans were doing for the villagers, but the Marine company commander got them to make the food and clothing distributions.

But the real breakthrough came with the children. At first silent and fearful they stared at the troopers and resisted their advances at friendliness. The men gave them sweets, bought them toys; within days they were smiling and shouting "OK." Now old, bent women will raise a hand in a timorous wave.

Four times in the last month the company has found Vietcong members in the village. Two have been killed and two captured. One was wearing three outfits of clothes—black pajamas, uniform, and civilian clothes. A civilian pacification team is now in the village, talking to the villagers, trying to find out who are the committed Communists, urging the villagers to trust the American and Government forces.

A new village chief has been appointed. One night the Vietcong began to fire on the village. The Marine captain, through a loudspeaker, had his interpreter tell the village and the firers that the Vietcong were murderers firing at defenseless villagers. He invited them to attack the American positions instead. The firing stopped and the squad disappeared.

Thus, day by day, the myths, pumped into the villagers over the years, and now by Hanoi radio, that the Americans are rapists and murderers and that the Vietcong are invincible are being destroyed little by little. Cam Ne can not yet be said to be pacified. It is still one of the "twilight" villages but as the inhabitants feel secure again and find that they are allowed to work their fields in peace they will be reluctant to let back the Vietcong squads which could bring further fighting and death.

At the northern end of the Marines' perimeter is a group of villages where the atmosphere is entirely different. The children rush out waving and shouting at every passing vehicle, the peasants wave from the paddy-fields, the open stalls in the markets are full of bright, cheap goods. Barbers shave Marine heads, home laundries abound, the schools are open. Yet a mile away across the river the Vietcong remains in control.

These were largely Roman Catholic villages where the Vietcong had little success in winning the sympathy of the villagers. The Marines were welcomed for they offered security. But the battalion in this area has not been inactive in the do-gooder's field. Refugees came in from across the river and through the village chiefs houses were built, markets were constructed, and the Marines were encouraged to buy from the refugees. The Marine medical teams have been continuously at work.

In the refugee hamlet of Le My a child tugged at the trousers of a Marine officer. We went into a dark hut and at the back, lying on the wide wooden boards which serve as family beds, was a woman with deep festering burns on her legs and thighs. Within 5 minutes the medical corpsmen had arrived and were treating the burns.

"It's a frustrating job," the officer said. "The doctor has been coming here twice a week for the past few months and no one has brought this woman to him." Three weeks ago the refugees asked to go back to their village to collect rice, firewood, and personal belongings. They were taken in an armored amphibious tractor. On the way back it blew up on a mine which the Vietcong had planted on the riverbank. Six women were killed and many badly burned. All had been treated at the time, but this woman had never been brought to the doctor since.

At the battalion headquarters the medical officer has set up a children's hospital in a tent. Three orderlies look after the children who need constant attention. They themselves are paying out of their own pockets the wages of two Vietnamese girls who help in the hospital and whom they are training to be nurses. At Hoa Vinh village the Government built a new school but there was not enough money for the desks. The marines have clubbed together to buy them.

We found countless cases of marines writing home to their families for toys and clothes to be sent out for the children, and of marines buying clothes for poor families. On Da Nang waterfront where two young marines keep a 24-hour radio vigil, three orphan children were sharing their tent with them.

A company commander said: "In the end it is what the individual does out there that matters. But it is hard on the troopers. One minute they are playing with the children, the next they are fighting. But each one of them knows that to win we have to win over the people. They are doing it by treating them like people."

The Marine role here is not one of glory. The defense of the Da Nang base is vital, but it means living in the field, making long patrols of up to 5 days in length through the heavily wooded hills that almost have their feet in the sea. It means splashing for hours through paddy up to the waist in water; it means leeches and mosquitoes; dysentery and prickly heat; and sudden death from snipers and boobytraps. Yet men are volunteering to stay on after they are due to go home. Why? "Because I feel I can do some good out here."

There is, of course, the other side to the picture. Marine units, and others, have set fire needlessly to villages from which they have come under fire. "When five of your buddies are killed you do all you can to get the fellows who killed them," one marine said. "You don't give a damn for their houses or anything."

Innocent civilians have been, and are, being shot down as Vietcong when all they have been doing is to run back to the safety of their homes. But there is another side to this too. "My men have become so hesitant in shooting anyone," an officer told me, "that I've seen Vietcong getting away from them. They really don't want to hurt anyone who is not a Vietcong and unless they are actually fired on it is impossible for them to tell who is a Vietcong and who is not. I guess we make mistakes both ways."

For the politicians and the generals the war here is complex enough. For the ordinary soldier it is deeply perplexing. To be expected to kill and to risk being killed and at the same time to be an ambassador of goodwill and a social worker among the people one is killing is to ask a great deal. From what I have seen of the American marines in the field they seem to be attempting, and indeed achieving, something which has never been demanded of soldiers before.

U.S. Wheat Stalled by India's Primitive Ways

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my colleagues an article pertaining to the distribution of U.S. wheat in India. This article appeared in the April 2 edition of the Fairfield Daily Ledger, Fairfield, Iowa. I recently proposed to the President that the United States move ahead more rapidly in the development of the piggyback barge system to facilitate distribution of our grain in foreign countries. I believe this system, which greatly reduces the handling and loading process, would contribute greatly to the attainment of a solution of the existing problem.

The article follows:

U.S. WHEAT STALLED BY INDIA'S PRIMITIVE WAYS

NEW DELHI, INDIA.—Completing a journey half way around the world, an American freighter tied up at Alexandria dock in Bombay with thousands of tons of golden Midwestern wheat to feed India's hungry millions.

Long black suction tubes bearing the hand-clasp sign of the U.S. aid program snaked down into the ship's holds. Engines made is

Wisconsin started with a roar and the grain began pouring into a dockside warehouse.

It was an example of 20th century America delivering the goods—harnessing the scientific wonder of its farms to the world's best transportation system in a campaign against famine in India.

At the discharge end of the suction tubes, the fast-moving 20th century ran smack into the 18th century, faltered, slowed and all but stopped.

On the receiving end were Indian longshoremen wielding tinpans and burlap bags. They stooped, laboriously scooped, bagged, and weighed the grain.

Then, as their forefathers did centuries ago, the longshoremen hoisted 200-pound bags onto their heads and trotted outside.

The grain was en route to villages in the interior—by rickety truck, train, oxcart, and riverboat. It often takes longer than the 30-day voyage from U.S. ports to dockside in India.

Rail shipment is limited. Lightweight rails prevent maximum loading of available freight cars or fast movement of trains.

At Phalodi, an oasis city at the end of the northern railway line in the Indian desert in Rajasthan State, six freight cars brought some 400 tons of American wheat which had been unloaded at the Gulf of Kutch 450 miles south.

The cars spent 1 day on the siding. When unloading started it took 2 days for barefoot laborers to haul the bags of wheat onto the platform. Crows flew down and thrust their beaks into the bags, gobbling grain.

On the fourth morning, two-wheel carts pulled by pairs of Brahma bulls lined up and the bags were loaded, nine bags to a cart. Then they were carted about four blocks to a lease warehouse—that lacked poisons, traps, or other rodent preventives.

Each time the bags were moved, grain seeped from the seams, and one or two split open.

No provision had been made for distributing the wheat, although the Phalodi area was described as the most seriously affected of the state's hunger areas.

Government officials said they were at work organizing a half dozen or so ration shops in the outlying villages. First they had to find a merchant in each village who would agree to handle the wheat, sell it at the prescribed rate, and settle for the decreed profit.

Once the shops were established the grain would move by truck or jeep—or perhaps carried on camel back—across the sand dunes to villages.

This spectacle, repeated all over India, has brought home to American officials a startling fact: it is not enough to grow wheat and deliver it to India. If widespread hunger is to be averted, American techniques also must be applied to moving the people.

In normal times, American grain arrived at dockside in India at the rate of 600,000 tons monthly. Emergency shipments last year hit about 850,000 tons in 1 month and strained India's internal distribution facilities to the limit.

The Fraud of Canned News—Continued

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FRANK THOMPSON, JR.

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, April 28, 1966

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, on April 6 last, I called to the

attention of the House an article on "canned" editorials that appeared in the March issue of the American Federationist, the official magazine of the AFL-CIO. At the same time, I presented an editorial from the March 26 edition of Publishers' Auxiliary deploring the use of canned editorials as a practice that cheats and betrays the reader. And with these two articles, I placed into the RECORD promotion material from a firm that specializes in publicity placements.

In my commentary prefacing these materials, I called attention to the fact that postal law punishes the editor or publisher who deliberately misleads his readers by failure to brand advertising content as such; and I posed the question that if it be in the public interest to prevent deceit in a periodical's news columns, would it not also be in the public interest to prevent deceit on the editorial page. In posing the question, I suggested that serious consideration be given a requirement that canned editorials be labeled as such and that those who have paid for the use of the editorial space be identified.

My purpose in bringing the subject to the attention of the House was to stimulate discussion on the issue of canned editorials, the abuse of which I consider to be a fraud on the first amendment. I am pleased to note that Mr. Robert U. Brown, publisher of Editor and Publisher, has, in the edition of April 23, launched such a discussion by suggesting that each State publishers' press association take a public stand on the issue. I think this is an excellent suggestion and one that merits the most serious consideration by each and every one of our State press associations. The freedom of the press is so precious a right that I should think that those who are privileged to exercise it would be the first to insist that an abuse of that right be expunged from our national scene. We shall all be the better for it if this can be accomplished by the profession itself.

Mr. Speaker, I submit herewith Mr. Brown's commentary:

CANNED EDITORIALS

(By Robert U. Brown)

Readers of the weekly Forsythe (Mont.) Independent and the Winona (Miss.) Times, have something in common. They have been the unknowing victims of a fraud perpetrated on them in the name of objective journalism.

They and tens of thousands of other readers of small town daily and weekly newspapers have been fed a steady diet of identical "canned copy" directed against the repeal of section 14(b)—all of it written, paid for, and distributed in behalf of the right-to-work advocates under the guise of news.

What subscribers to the Independent and Times paid for and believed to be news from recognized and responsible sources, or to be the creation of their local editor's mind and typewriter, actually has been the slick writing of right-to-work lobbyists in Washington, D.C.

The barrage of editorials and news on 14(b) which occupied the news and editorial pages of hundreds of American small town daily and weekly newspapers got there because the lobbyists paid Washington news services a fee to send them to editors. They appeared in content or headline in virtually every State of the Union.

The reader could be expected to assume

that the editorial was the conclusion of the local editor—respected Rotarian, community leader and doting parent—who had examined facts and figures and the economic climate around him (most of the stories appeared in the right-to-work States).

This editorial, however, was the product of National News-Research, a "boilerroom" operation in Washington, and had been distributed to hundreds of weekly and small town dailies.

The cost to the local editor was nothing. The tab had been picked up by the right-to-work sponsor, as was the cost of the steady stream of similar outpourings by other "news services."

If we had lifted (stolen) the above words from somebody else and use them in this way we would be accused of plagiarism. If we had accepted these same words knowing they came from another source but used them without attribution or identification we could be accused of using canned editorials.

There are legal restraints against the first. There are only moral and ethical restraints against the second but even these may have their qualifications in the mind of the editor. Regardless of what others may say, he might feel naively that "regardless of authorship, regardless of the source, if these words express a point of view that coincides with mine and say it better than I could say it then I see nothing wrong with embracing them as my own."

This isn't fair to the reader who credits the editor with undeserved authorship and erudition. It doesn't take into account, either, the persuasiveness of the original author who may convince an editor unable to make up his mind that "this is the way I really feel about it." And it doesn't credit the design and motives of the authors and distributors who do so for a price.

Actually, the first part of this piece was quoted (reprinted) from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 6. The words were written by Ray Denison of the public relations department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and appeared originally in the March issue of the American Federationist magazine of the AFL-CIO. They were placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Representative FRANK THOMPSON, JR., of New Jersey.

Mr. Denison's article had a lot more to say on the subject of the canned editorial and publicity drive in behalf of the right-to-work movement which we won't go into here.

Representative THOMPSON, however, inserted into the RECORD some promotional material distributed by one of the publicity factories or boilerrooms. This one specializes in "mass-media publicity placements—for public relations firms, advertising agencies, companies, associations, and nonprofit organizations." Its list of clients, also in the RECORD, reads like a "Who's Who" of American business.

This outfit has "five supplementary services"—an editor's digest which is a source of feature stories, selected news features which supplies editorial mats, a division that supplies taped material to radio stations, another that provides scripts and stills to television stations, also films and "featurettes." All these devices are used to plug the sponsor's name and product surreptitiously.

Broadcast editors must be giving time away free, as print editors give space away, to these enticing tidbits otherwise no one would be buying the services of an outfit like this.

As E. & P has said many times: "Why should anyone buy it (advertising space) if you are going to give it away free?"

In introducing all this material into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Representative THOMPSON said:

"Our postal law provides rather severe penalties for the editor or publisher who