

rule while only a negligible number of Poles remained within the German borders (pp. 85 and 88).

The basis of Germany's title to the East German provinces in accordance with present-day international law is lawfully spelled out (pp. 45-50) and the legal position of Berlin is likewise explained (pp. 98-100). The great principles of U.S. foreign policy applying to this crucial question are cited and forcefully expounded. No responsible statesman will disregard those principles and go unchallenged (pp. 50-60). The early testimony of our sixth President, John Quincy Adams, and a statement in the 1920's of the hero of Polish liberation, Josef Pilsudski, attesting to the German character of Silesia and East Prussia respectively, is quoted (pp. 32-33 and 104-105). Mr. Reece also calls to our attention the fantastic demands after World War II of Polish (Soviet inspired) chauvinists claiming all of Germany east of the Elbe and bridgeheads west of that river around Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Dresden (pp. 37-38).

Mr. Reece points to an interesting lesson of history: Only a peace treaty which restores the "status quo ante" and refrains from stealing the land of a defeated nation can have a more nearly lasting effect. In this connection he mentions the Westphalian Treaty of 1648 and the Treaty of Vienna and Paris in 1815, the latter ending the Napoleonic wars of conquest in Europe by not taking one square foot of pre-Napoleonic France (pp. 102-104). He then quotes from the prophetic warnings of the South African Statesman Jan Smuts and the American Scholar-Diplomat Archibald Coolidge against the consequences of injustices about to be imposed upon the defeated Germans in the treaties ending World War I (pp. 34, 36-37, and 75-76).

Mr. Reece suggests a realistic solution of the Eastern problem along the line in which the same problem has been satisfactorily solved on Germany's western boundaries and also perhaps with the Jewish nation of Israel (pp. 67-68 and 109-110). Finally he pleads that we make the rule of law the kernel of U.S. foreign policy and, thus, unfold a banner around which many nations and all men of good will can unite, and which by its very moral strength will make American leadership in the world a reality (pp. 111-112).

Our policymakers will be well advised to weigh these words of one of the most highly respected legislators of our time, the true American patriot, Carroll Reece.

L.B.J. MODERATION IN VIETNAM WAR

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, yesterday, Roscoe Drummond, the nationally syndicated columnist, paid a richly earned tribute to the moderation and restraint of the Johnson administration in waging the terribly trying and difficult war in Vietnam.

Mr. Drummond concludes, in referring to President Johnson:

And to make it least likely that Red China will enter the war, he is not using U.S. air power to bomb cities in the north; not sending U.S. ground troops to occupy North Vietnam; not seeking the downfall of the Hanoi regime; not asking for the unconditional surrender of Hanoi. He is asking only for an unconditional end to aggression against its neighbor.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article written by Roscoe Drummond be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A GOOD WORD FOR L.B.J.

(By Roscoe Drummond)

I would like to say a good word about President Johnson's management of the Vietnam war. Obviously there is a great risk of timidly doing too little to arrest the aggression and a great danger of recklessly doing so much that Red China enters the fighting.

With these two opposite perils in mind, I cannot escape the feeling that many more Americans will come to see that the President is bringing wisdom, caution and determination to bear on the conduct of the war.

Surely the touchstone of wisdom in our role in Vietnam is to do whatever is needed to secure South Vietnam from conquest and to use our massive military power in such a prudent and measured manner that Peiping is given no legitimate reason to enter the war.

Such a course will not get the easy plaudits of those who want to win quickly at any cost by bombing North Vietnam to bits; will not get the praise of those who want to quit at any cost by pulling out; and will not get a high Gallup rating from those who suggest we haven't the resources to defend South Vietnam and that, anyway, a little aggression in southeast Asia is no concern to the United States.

As these conflicting views find their level in public opinion, I believe that the Nation, on reflection, will feel even more reassured that Gen. Curtis Lemay is not deciding the bombing over North Vietnam, that Senator WAYNE MORSE is not managing the defense of South Vietnam and that Senator FULBRIGHT is not deciding where aggression concerns the United States and where it doesn't.

During the period when he was determining how the mounting attacks directed from Hanoi should be met, President Johnson—as reported by Charles Roberts in his book, "L.B.J.'s Inner Circle"—remarked to his intimates: "I'm not going north with Curtis Lemay, and I'm not going south with WAYNE MORSE."

Fortunately, the President is not easily pressured either by events or by extremist advice.

He did not act hastily, but deliberately; not recklessly, but with great care; not timidly—he committed the United States to do whatever is necessary to defend South Vietnam successfully, but no more.

These ingredients of mind have marked the President's course in Vietnam: deliberateness, prudence, and determination.

They have produced a clear and properly limited objective: to keep South Vietnam from being taken over by force.

And to make it least likely that Red China will enter the war, he is not using U.S. air power to bomb cities in the North; not sending U.S. ground troops to occupy North Vietnam; not seeking the downfall of the Hanoi regime; not asking for the unconditional surrender of Hanoi. He is asking only for an unconditional end to aggression against its neighbor.

SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK WINNING RICHLY DESERVED POPULAR SUPPORT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, few public officials occupy a post as subject to criticism as the Secretary of State. One has only to recall the ordeal of Dean Acheson, or the drumfire of criticism directed at John Foster Dulles, as examples of the abuse visited upon a Secretary of State.

Dean Rusk is no exception. He has now occupied his great office longer than any man in this century except for Cordell Hull and John Foster Dulles. He has occupied it in the middle of a trying

period in American foreign relations, throughout one of the most distant, difficult to understand, and frustrating wars in our history.

He has become the No. 1 security officer of our Government—a position no other Secretary of State has so clearly occupied. He has crisply and clearly defined our cause in South Vietnam.

He finally appears to be emerging as a Secretary of State who can do something rarely achieved in our history; namely, he is winning popular support. If this is so, Mr. President, Dean Rusk richly deserves it.

I ask unanimous consent that a recent article written by Carl Rowan discussing this new public appreciation of Mr. Rusk be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RUSK EMERGES AS A PERSONALITY

(By Carl T. Rowan)

Adversity has done for Secretary of State Dean Rusk what 5 years of prodding by his advisers failed to do.

The ordeal of congressional and press criticisms on the Vietnam issue has drawn Rusk out to the point where he is developing a public image. He seems suddenly to be acquiring the reputation of a man who has strong and laudable convictions.

His recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has pulled in what State Department officials say is the largest volume of mail ever received on a single event—with the exception of the announcement of the fatal illness of John Foster Dulles.

I examined hundreds of the letters, which are running 10 to 1 in Rusk's favor, and they clearly indicate that Rusk emerged from the hearing as a personality with whom the public could identify.

Previously he has been regarded as so lackluster, so unassertive, that even after 5 years in office most Americans did not identify him with any aspect of foreign policy.

But the recent mail praises his "great knowledge, deep understanding—and tremendous patience." It calls him "a wonderful partner to our boys in Vietnam." It says Rusk was "forceful and made sense." A housewife in Winnetka, Ill., stated the essence of hundreds of the letters about his testimony by writing on a postcard: "Never in all my life have I been so proud to be an American."

One of Rusk's aids asked proudly: "Would you ever have believed the public would write letters like these to Dean Rusk? The Secretary has finally won the people's confidence."

It is risky to try to read too much into the flow of mail from the public. One of Rusk's main antagonists in those hearings, Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, says his mail has been overwhelmingly favorable, too.

Yet, the mail to Rusk must have meaning because it is so unprecedented. And this will surely enhance his position with President Johnson, who only recently reiterated the view that "Rusk sits first in the Cabinet and he is first with me."

Because the President has a strong aversion to criticism, some observers speculate that he has embraced Rusk all the harder because of attacks on the Secretary and predictions that he will be replaced.

If there is anything that the President reacts more strongly to than criticism, it is praise; so these public tributes are likely to put Rusk in the strongest position he has been in since 1961.

In fact, last Friday's Presidential decree giving Rusk unprecedented authority over all U.S. Government activities in the foreign

enrolled bill (H.R. 12889) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, research, development, test, evaluation, and military construction for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, and it was signed by the Vice President.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. YARBOROUGH:

Editorial entitled "J. S. Bracewell, A Great Houstonian," published in the Houston Chronicle of December 3, 1965, and a memorial article on page 136 of the Texas Bar Journal of February 1966, in tribute to J. Searcy Bracewell, Sr.

By Mr. COOPER:

Resolution in memory of Kenneth G. Whitaker adopted by Kentucky Motor Transport Association, Inc.

ASSESSING THE COST OF MEAT INSPECTION

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, the proposal to assess the cost of meat inspection to the packing plants to whom this service is rendered has developed a number of editorial comments, particularly in the Midwest and the Western press. There was published in the February 14 issue of the Chicago Sun Times an editorial on this subject, and still another editorial in the Chicago Tribune on February 14.

I ask unanimous consent to have both these editorials printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Sun Times, Feb. 14, 1966]

PAYING FOR MEAT INSPECTION

Since 1906, all meat moving in interstate commerce must pass Federal inspection. The Government employs about 3,400 inspectors who examine all meat processed in some 1,740 establishments in 720 cities. This inspection is intended to protect the health of the general public and to guarantee the quality of American meat anywhere in the world.

The meat inspectors work for the Government and are paid by it the same as other Federal employees who police drugs, foods, railroads, radio and TV, the stock market, and other industries. One year, 1947, swayed by economy arguments, Congress passed the cost of Federal inspection along to the meat-packing industry. But after 1 year of experience, Congress reverted to the traditional practice of paying representatives of the public out of the Public Treasury.

Last month, at the request of the administration, Senator ALLEN J. ELLENDER, Democrat, of Louisiana, introduced S. 2820 which would revert to the short-lived 1947 practice. The administration argues that this would save the Government \$40 million a year. Some industries, such as the seafood industry, do pay for Federal inspection but it is voluntary; it is requested by them. Meat inspection is compulsory.

All taxpayers favor Government economy.

But economy should not be practiced at the sacrifice of principle. Compulsory meat inspection can be justified only if it is in the interest of the general public, not just the meat-buying public. It then falls in the category of a public health measure. When the first meat inspection bill was passed in 1906, public against private financing of its provisions was argued. It is as true now as it was true then, as one Congressman of that time argued, "No government has the right to legislate in the interests of the people and then require some special interest to bear the burden of executing its legislation.

The 1906 Congress turned down the suggestion that those inspected pay the costs of inspection because such an arrangement would "discredit the inspector and cast suspicion upon it." It is a felony for a meat-packer to pay an inspector directly or indirectly to influence him. The administration suggests that the packer can pay indirectly and the operation remain above suspicion. The meat inspection department has a fine record for honesty and efficiency. For \$40 million a year it is worth the cost to keep it that way.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, Feb. 14, 1966]

ANOTHER MEAT AX?

If President Johnson has his way, the cost of paying the Federal inspector who puts his stamp of approval on the steak the housewife puts on her broiler will be borne by the meatpackers and processors and not the Federal Government.

Except for 1947, the appropriation for Federal meat inspection has been an item of the Federal budget since inspection began in 1906. In his budget message, Mr. Johnson proposed to shift this cost to the meat industry. A bill embodying the change is now before the Senate agricultural committee and the meat industry is in full cry to kill it on the ground that requiring the meat industry to pay for being inspected is not in the public interest.

This is the position taken jointly by the American Meat Institute, the National Independent Meat Packers Association, the Western States Meat Packers Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and virtually every other major meat, live stock, and farm group. Even the National Farmers Union, which generally flies the house flag of Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, has lined up against the bill.

At first blush, it might appear that the administration had found a reasonable budget item to cut. If inspection of meat redounded only to the benefit of the meat industry it might well be expected that industry should pick up the tab.

But Federal meat inspection did not come into being at the request of the meatpackers. Inspection started as an essential public health service, to protect the public. It has been so regarded in every debate in Congress since the first inspection bill was approved in 1906, even while the cost of the service mounted. For the 1967 budget the cost is estimated at \$42 million.

"It is wrong in principle and contrary to the public interest when a regulatory agency of the Government is paid for by the industry it regulates," said a statement by leaders of the meat industry.

If Federal inspection of meat is essential to public health, as Congress has repeatedly maintained, then the cost of this service would seem to be a legitimate charge of Government. Asking the meat industry to pay for its own inspection makes as much sense as taxing the railroads to support the Interstate Commerce Commission which regulates them.

B. CARROLL REECE ON SETTLING INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, for 25 years or more, B. Carroll Reece, of Tennessee, served in the House of Representatives, and I regarded him as a longtime personal friend. He also served as chairman of the Republican National Committee and filled that position with honor and distinction.

In the course of his public service, he became vastly interested in a basis for the settlement of international differences between the East and the West and made this the object of a series of speeches and statements which were delivered in the years from 1956 to 1960. These have been collected and edited by his widow, Louise G. Reece, who succeeded her distinguished husband in the Congress. The book deals with an area which is the very center of the partition of Germany and Europe and the confrontation scene of Soviet and free world power.

To this series of speeches and statements Mrs. Reece has given the title "Peace Through Law," and it is published by Longhouse, Inc. In connection with these remarks, I want to include a somewhat more expanded statement which was prepared by the editor of the Steuben News in New York at the request of the National Council of the Steuben Society of America of which Mr. Ward Lange is the national chairman. I ask unanimous consent, therefore, to have these additional remarks printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

As to its content, Mr. Reece begins with a statement on East Prussia, enlarges the theme by statements on other areas of Germany now under Red Polish and Soviet Russian administration, remarks about the legally different position of the Sudeten land, and finally envisages a general settlement to include the border countries from Finland to the Black Sea, west of the Soviet Russian legal boundary; that is, before Stalin—much like Hitler—went on a rampage of lawless expansion by aggression and subversion.

The compilation in a single volume of the speeches and statements is a particularly happy thought for which Mrs. Reece is to be commended, and its publication at this hour is most timely. The title of the book indicates its tenor. A lasting peace will never be found by trifling with truth, juggling with facts, and sweeping ugly problems under the rug. It cannot be built on the quicksand of expediency. It must have the firm basis of international law and justice.

The five chapters reveal a wealth of information, little known and frequently overlooked facts. Each East German province is individually treated as Mr. Reece presents the case for their return into German administration: Pomerania has been part of Germany for 800 years; the boundaries of Silesia and East Prussia with Poland have stood unchanged for 600 and, respectively, 500 years (pp. 27, 29-30). Defeated in World War I, Germany was forced to cede to Poland the province of Posen, most of West Prussia, part of Upper Silesia, and one county of East Prussia; 1.5 million Germans domiciled in the ceded area were turned over to alien

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hospital care in the country is now about \$42 per person, pre day. We can only hope to hold back these rising costs by modernizing obsolete facilities and making them more efficient to operate. We must also step up our research to find better and more efficient ways to provide health care.

Mr. President, I hope that Congress will act quickly on this program to modernize our hospitals. We have waited too long already. The need grows more acute each day.

AUTOMATION AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, some days ago Congress received the report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress. When we consider the monumental mandate which Congress laid before the Commission when it began its work only a year ago, I am doubly impressed by their efforts. The findings and recommendations of the Commission deserve serious congressional exploration and consideration.

Its most important finding, the full meaning of which has been brought home during the past year, is that the high levels of unemployment which we experienced from the mid-fifties to the early sixties were the result of inadequate rates of economic growth. Thus, while automation and other technological changes may eliminate jobs, this Nation possesses the needed monetary and fiscal tools to maintain a rate of growth sufficient to encourage high levels of employment with reasonably stable prices in spite of increases in productivity and the labor force.

Spurred first by the 1964 tax cut, and then by the increase in Federal defense spending necessitated by our enlarged commitment in Vietnam, we have reduced unemployment to its current low level of 4.1 percent. Although this may be startling to some—especially to those who only a short time ago were predicting that automation and technological change would make much of the work force obsolete—it is not startling to those of us who over the years have stressed the importance of increased Federal spending in generating rapid economic growth and full employment. It is unfortunate that so much of the stimulus has had to come from increased military spending, but it is instructive to note the effect of such spending.

The report also finds that while the Nation as a whole possesses the tools necessary to solve its problems, many individuals lack the needed skills, training, education, or mobility to get and keep jobs in the face of labor displacements necessitated by technological changes. The Commission recommends many important programs to help these individuals to enter and reenter the labor force to upgrade their skills through education and training.

The Commission also recommends a program of public service employment which would provide many hard-core unemployed with rewarding work opportunities, while at the same time provid-

ing society with some of the human resources needed to meet our unmet individual and community needs. This proposal deserves strong and immediate consideration by Congress both in the light of the emerging labor shortages in some areas and occupations, and in light of the continuing high unemployment among teenagers and Negroes.

The Commission's proposals for 14 years of free education, for improvement of the employment service, and for better matching our technological capabilities and human needs also deserve serious consideration.

The Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare will be holding hearings shortly on this report.

I should like to offer my thanks to the members of the Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress for their dedicated and successful efforts to acquaint our Nation with what needs to be done to make technological advancement a national asset instead of a national liability.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an editorial published in the New York Times recently.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FACTS ON AUTOMATION

The report of the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress turns out to be an encouraging blueprint for national greatness rather than an essay on gloomy foreboding.

The Commission finds no evidence that technological change in the coming decade will be more rapid than the growth of demand for new goods and services, both public and private, will be able to offset. Computers and automated factories will not lead to mass unemployment and social disruption, provided social imagination does not lag in dealing with the tribulations of change.

Up to now, weedy myths have flowered faster than facts in this field. The report represents the first exhaustive joint study of all the implications of automation by businessmen, labor leaders and academic specialists. Out of their research has come agreement on the scope and nature of the problem and, in most respects, on what should be done about it. Three union leaders on the panel did enter a dissenting footnote to complain that the report lacked a "tone of urgency." But this criticism does not detract from their agreement with their business and public colleagues on the essential issues.

The Commission recognizes that unemployment is simply a waste. It recommends that the Federal Government becomes employer of last resort for the hardcore jobless, putting them to work in parks, hospitals, and other places where useful work now goes undone for lack of funds. Along with a related proposal to provide a floor under family income, this proposal will require detailed evaluation to guard against chronic welfareism.

Many of the Commission's other recommendations can be acted upon promptly. Among those with obvious merit are the federalization of the Federal-State Employment Service to increase its effectiveness, a program tailored to the needs of Negroes whose skills and education have been crippled by past discrimination, establishment of a national model building code and extension of free education through the first 2 years of college.

The report is essentially an avowal of faith

in the Nation's flexibility and imagination. Automation can mean hardships for particular workers and dislocations in specific industries, but it holds the potentiality for increased abundance, more leisure and improved public services if Americans have the wisdom to act and plan together. The report is a welcome addition to the Nation's common fund of wisdom on the complexities of change.

ROBERT KENNEDY'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE DEBATE ON VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the junior Senator from New York, ROBERT KENNEDY, has played a highly constructive role in the debate on Vietnam. In particular, Senator KENNEDY's thoughtful statement of February 19, 1966, emphasizing the need for realism in defining our objectives in Vietnam, merits the close study of all persons, in private life as well as in the Government, who are concerned about the problem of achieving an honorable peace in southeast Asia.

I ask unanimous consent that this statement be printed in the Record, together with a series of editorials and articles commenting upon it.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY ON VIETNAM, FEBRUARY 19, 1966

This week has been another chapter in a great tradition. For the Senate Chamber still echoes the distant ringing of the great issues of our past. War and westward growth, civil strife and the rights of man have been argued on its floor; and from those debates have emerged the shaping events and judgments of American history.

The greater the issue, the larger the stakes, the more passionately debate has raged, in the Senate and across the land. Abraham Lincoln was reviled for opposing the war of 1848. The citizens of his own State called Daniel Webster traitor for proposing a compromise to avoid civil war. Those who saw the storm, and tried desperately to prepare the Nation for World War II, were cursed as warmongers, enemies of mankind, subverters of democracy—and worse.

Yet despite the condemnations and the violent recriminations, there have always been within the Senate enough men of courage and conviction to triumph in the end over those who would stifle free discussion and action. There are hazards in debating American policy in the face of a stern and dangerous enemy. But that hazard is the essence of our democracy. Democracy is no easy form of government. Few nations have been able to sustain it. For it requires that we take the chances of freedom; that the liberating play of reason be brought to bear on events filled with passion; that dissent be allowed to make its appeal for acceptance; that men chance error in their search for the truth.

"The best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace," said Justice Holmes. "That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based on imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with depth."

Our Constitution imposes on the Senate the most heavy and grave independent re-

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policy field was a bigger vote of confidence than anything the President has said.

The President is known to hold some of the same misgivings about the State Department as an institution that caused the late President Kennedy to throw his hands up in disgust.

The President apparently believes that Rusk can effectively alter a situation where Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. Information Agency each exercises a degree of initiative and autonomy in foreign policy matters.

Some have acted more independently than others. Thus the fighting in Vietnam could be labeled "McNamara's war," after the Defense Secretary. Thus the view can be widely held abroad that the CIA is overthrowing governments without State Department knowledge and is generally pursuing its own foreign policy.

However, the initiative of some departments and agencies was laudable in the sense that they could act speedily without the interminable delays so often imposed by State's bureaucracy.

The new system promises a speedy and systematic hearing for other agencies, with the Under Secretary of State empowered to make and execute immediate decisions. The other agencies would have the right to appeal to "higher authority," which really means the President.

If Rusk's stature in Johnson's eyes is as high as it now seems to be, there will be few successful appeals.

And if Rusk is now as boldly assertive as some letterwriters think, the Secretary of State will really be running American foreign policy. That, to his credit or discredit, is just how it ought to be.

NATIONAL DAIRY COUNCIL OPPOSES CUTS IN SCHOOL MILK, LUNCH PROGRAMS

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, since I began my fight to save the special milk program for schoolchildren from virtual extinction, I have received literally hundreds of letters of support for my efforts. Many of these letters have provided me with a demonstration of just how disastrous an 80-percent cut in the school milk program would be. Whenever possible, I have quoted schoolteachers, parents, and administrators to show the devastating impact which the proposed slash could have.

Just last week, the National Dairy Council indicated its opposition to the proposed cutback. Although I am sure that this comes as no great surprise to my colleagues, I think that the resolution passed by the National Dairy Council deserves careful consideration. The National Dairy Council was one of the prime movers behind the school lunch and special milk programs. In its role of sponsoring nutrition research and education programs in cooperation with recognized health leaders, it has made a great contribution to the work being done in this area.

In its resolution the National Dairy Council commends the Government, for proposing to extend the health benefits of the school lunch and special milk programs to all needy children. However, it then goes on to say that the nutritionally needy are found at all economic levels. In other words, that it is impos-

sible to determine the need for "nature's perfect food" on the basis of a parent's income alone.

I would like to read into the RECORD one paragraph of the resolution which, in my estimation, beautifully states the case for a continuation and expansion of the school milk program on nutritional grounds.

America's children, regardless of economic status, are the hope for the Nation's future. We must strive to make the children of today healthy and strong, better prepared to build a stronger nation tomorrow. This cannot be done through false economies. It can be done through assistance to improve their nutritional health and well-being by extending the educational values of school lunch and special milk programs to reach all of the Nation's children.

Mr. President, too little notice has been taken of the fact that the administration's Child Nutrition Act will lower rather than raise the nutritional standards of our Nation's schoolchildren. The National Dairy Council's resolution makes this point abundantly clear, and I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY NATIONAL DAIRY COUNCIL ON PROPOSED BUDGET APPROPRIATION FOR 1966-67 SCHOOL LUNCH AND SPECIAL MILK PROGRAMS

National Dairy Council commends the proposals, in the proposed 1966-67 Federal Government budget, to extend the proven health benefits of the school lunch and special milk programs to all needy children. We recommend, however, that determination of need be arrived at in terms of nutrition and health, rather than in terms of economics alone. The nutritionally needy are found at all economic levels.

America's children, regardless of economic status, are the hope for the Nation's future. We must strive to make the children of today healthy and strong, better prepared to build a stronger nation tomorrow. This cannot be done through false economies. It can be done through assistance to improve their nutritional health and well-being by extending the educational values of school lunch and special milk programs to reach all of the Nation's children.

National Dairy Council strongly opposes certain contemplated reductions of \$14.5 million in the school lunch program, and as much as \$82 million in the special milk program. The proposed reductions represent a retreat from the well-established concept of the programs as a means to further sound nutrition education for all children.

The proposed budget reductions are inconsistent with the goal established by the 1946 School Lunch Act which, in its declaration of policy, describes school lunch "as a measure of national security to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's children." The same philosophy has been applied in the special milk program. In a statement in connection with this program, the U.S. Department of Agriculture said, in 1965: "Whenever or wherever it's (milk) served; the goal is the same—to put abundant supplies of U.S. dairy products to good use boosting the nutritional quality of our children's diets."

When viewed in proper perspective with the proposed total national budget, the proposed budget for the war on poverty or the proposed budget for foreign aid, the contemplated dollar savings are incalculably small.

Offsetting them would be the irretrievable loss to the nutritional health and well-being of the great majority of the Nation's children, at a critical time when the Nation needs to give all possible assistance to help them develop into healthy and strong men and women.

MODERNIZING OUR OLDER HOSPITALS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the President's message on domestic health and education certainly indicates that he intends no slackening in our efforts to improve the health of every American. I am particularly pleased that the administration has endorsed a major drive to promote the modernization of our older hospitals through a program of Federal grants and loans.

I introduced such proposed legislation as far back as the 87th Congress. The need is critical. There are an estimated 260,000 hospital beds in this country that are obsolete. Hospital capacity equivalent to 13,000 beds becomes obsolete each and every year we wait.

The need is especially pressing in our urban areas. In these areas we have hospital facilities that are much the same as they were 50 or 60 years ago. These are our teaching and research hospitals. Thus, their deterioration affects not only the medical care of the patients they serve, but the medical care of the entire Nation as well.

My own State of Pennsylvania is a good example the magnitude of urban hospital obsolescence. The State government has estimated that in 1966, hospital capacity equivalent to more than 25,000 beds is in need of modernization. Of this amount nearly 21,000 beds are in the State's 12 major urban areas.

Over the past 19 years, the Hill-Burton program has been very successful in meeting a large part of the need for hospital facilities where we had none, particularly in rural areas and small towns. Because it has been so successful we now can turn our efforts to rebuilding and renewing the health care facilities and we already have.

The heart of the proposed modernization program is a financing mechanism that is new to hospital construction—the amortization grant. Under this system, the Federal Government will pay up to 40 percent of the principal and interest on loans secured by hospital from private lenders. This will be a tremendous lever and will stimulate construction many times greater than the Federal contribution. The Surgeon General can also make the loans where none are available from private sources.

Another important part of the program is an expansion of Federal research on health care. This will make available to our hospitals the most up to date information on good hospital design and organization.

We certainly cannot afford to wait any longer in initiating this important hospital modernization program. Hospital costs have been increasing at a rate of from 5 to 7 percent a year for the past 20 years. The average cost of general

sponsibilities. We ourselves owe to the people of 50 States the burden of independent thought and action. Our whole system of government rests on a complex structure of independence and cooperation among the branches; a structure which requires that we make our own judgments about events, giving due weight to the reason and responsibility of others.

Shall we then debate with force and passion the issues of labor relations and housing and trade—while the great issues of peace and war are allowed to pass in silence? Shall we discuss the standard of living of our constituents—while policies which affect their very existence go undiscussed? To do so would be the gravest departure from our duties as representatives of the people of the American States.

Full and informing debate rests upon moderation and mutual indulgence. Men must seek acceptance of their views through reason, and not through intimidation; through argument, and not through accusation. We are all patriots here. We are all defenders of freedom. We are all Americans. To attack the motives of those who express concern about our present course—to challenge their very right to speak freely—is to strike at the foundations of the democratic process which our fellow citizens, even today, are dying in order to protect.

I suggest that the Senate, and this entire Nation, might well adopt for its own guidance the personal creed of Thomas Jefferson. He said:

"I tolerate with the utmost latitude the right of others to differ from me in opinion without imputing to them criminality. I know too well the weakness and uncertainty of human reason to wonder at its different result. Both of our political parties agree conscientiously in the same object—the public good; but they differ essentially in what they deem the means of promoting that good—which is right, time and experience will prove—with whatever opinion the body of the Nation concurs, that must prevail. My anxieties on this subject will never tarry beyond the use of fair and honorable means of truth and reason; nor have they ever lessened my esteem for moral worth, nor alienated my affections from a single friend, who did not first withdraw himself."

The discussions which have been taking place in recent days are therefore worthwhile and important. But we must do all we can to make certain that the exchange of views accomplishes the most for our country—moving our policy toward the goal we all want to achieve. All of us are concerned, as the American people are concerned, about the progress of the struggle in Vietnam.

There are several aspects to this concern.

We are concerned at the casualties, the death and suffering, of our young men in South Vietnam.

We are concerned over the effect of some of our military action on the people of South Vietnam—whether more cannot be done to lessen the death and destruction of the innocent that comes with war. For a military victory at the cost of a completely destroyed South Vietnam would be a defeat for our larger purposes.

We are concerned whether the people of South Vietnam are being offered something positive to live and fight for—something beyond negative anticommunism. The President's recent initiatives are to be applauded and welcomed; but it is now incumbent on the Government of South Vietnam to make good at last on promises which the people of that unhappy country have heard for many years.

We are concerned over our relationship with Communist China—not just concern to avoid a deadly war, but also concern lest the Vietnam struggle make any reasonable accommodation with China impossible in the

future. The events of the coming decade will determine whether our relations with mainland China will change for the better or for the worse. But they will change and we can influence that change; and the direction of change must receive the earnest attention of the Senate.

And we are concerned about the effect of the war on our domestic efforts to conquer ignorance and disease and unemployment—the problems of the cities—problems which, warned the McCone Commission, could split our society irretrievably. And this concern is heightened by the way in which the war perpetuates discrimination—for the poor and the less fortunate serve in Vietnam out of all proportion to their numbers in the United States as a whole.

But the central question before us now—the area of greatest present concern for the Senate, and what we must discuss at all levels of government—is our political strategy in the war in Vietnam; not simply how to move, but in what direction we wish to move.

At the outset, it must be realized that negotiations are not an ultimate goal. Negotiations or discussions are only a means by which ultimate goals may be reached. Our arrival at the bargaining table will not make the struggle disappear. Even if we arrive at the bargaining table, the real question is what goals we will seek there. Without clear goals in mind, negotiations are pointless. And without clear goals and realistic objectives, it is doubtful whether the bargaining table will ever be reached.

What, then, are our goals in Vietnam?

The Secretary of State and others have stated objectives in general terms. They are the independence of South Vietnam—or, at least, its independent right to determine its own future. They are to halt the aggression from the north and to prove to China that a policy of subversion in other lands will not work. These are worthy objectives. All are important. The question remains, however, under what realistic terms and conditions they can be advanced in Vietnam.

There are three routes before us: military victory, a peaceful settlement, or withdrawal.

The last is impossible for this country. For the United States to withdraw now, as I said last May, would be a repudiation of commitments undertaken and confirmed by three administrations. It would flatly betray those in Vietnam whom we have encouraged by our support to resist the forces of Hanoi and the Vietcong. Unilateral withdrawal would injury, perhaps irreparably, the principle of collective security, and undermine the independence of small nations everywhere in the world. And it would offer no hope for a reasonable accommodation with China in the future. There are reasonable and responsible steps which we can take to raise the possibility of improved relations with China in the future. But unilateral withdrawal would only reward aggression and could offer China no inducement to reach accommodation in a peaceful world.

I now turn to the open avenues—military victory or a peaceful settlement.

Military victory requires that we crush both our adversary's strength and his will to continue the battle; that the forces from the north be compelled to withdraw beyond the border; that much of Vietnam be destroyed and its people killed; that we continue to occupy South Vietnam as long as our presence is required to insure that hostilities, including insurgency, will not be resumed. And this will be a very long time indeed.

I cannot say with certainty that such an outcome is beyond our reach. We do know, however, that it would mean rapidly increasing commitments of American forces. It would mean a growing risk of widening war—with North Vietnam, with China, even with the Soviet Union. It would lead, in-

deed already has led thoughtless people to advocate the use of nuclear weapons. And it would involve all these things—commitment, risk, and spreading destruction—in pursuit of a goal which is at best uncertain, and at worst unattainable.

Despite all these dangers, we may yet come to this course. The intransigence of our adversaries may leave us no alternative. There should be no misunderstanding or miscalculation of this point in either Hanoi or Peiping. The American people possess the bravery and the will to follow such a course if others force it upon us. I also believe, however, that given the opportunity by our adversaries, we possess the wisdom and skill to avoid such a grim necessity.

And President Johnson has made clear, on behalf of the United States, in every forum of the world, that this country seeks the other road: the road to negotiated settlement.

In this pursuit we have asked for unconditional discussions. This means simply that we will neither demand nor yield specific formal commitments before bargaining begins. In fact, both sides must come to any discussion with at least one basic condition; one irreducible demand; one point they will not yield. For the United States it must be that we will not turn South Vietnam over to the North. For North Vietnam it must be that they will not accept a settlement which leaves in the south a hostile government, dedicated to the final physical destruction of all Communist elements, refusing any economic cooperation with the North, dependent upon the continued presence of American military power.

These conditions, these minimum terms, can be breached only at sword's point; only by driving the adversary's forces from the field. For either side to yield its minimum conditions would be in fact to accept to defeat. If we intend to deny these minimum conditions to our adversaries, then we must defeat them completely. If this is what we intend, we should understand it clearly—and undertake it with resolution.

But if negotiation is our aim, as we have so clearly said it is, we must seek a middle ground. A negotiated settlement means that each side must concede matters that are important in order to preserve positions that are essential.

It may be that negotiation is not possible in this war because our political aims are irreconcilable; because one side, or both sides, are not willing to accept anything less than the fruits of victory. If that is so, then we must reluctantly let slip the hope of reasoned discussion and proceed to the uncertain, uncharted course of war.

I believe there is a middle way, that an end to the fighting and a peaceful settlement can be achieved. It must be said, before all else, that the middle way—the way of negotiation—involves risks. An adversary who lives may perhaps fight another day. And a government which is not continuously sheltered by American military power may be again attacked or subverted or overthrown.

These risks, I believe, we are courageous enough to undertake. They are risks, in fact, which we do take everyday in a hundred countries in every corner of every continent. There are dozens of countries which might be the target of Communist aggression or subversion. If we were unwilling to take any risk that they might be subverted or conquered by the Communists, we might simply have occupied all of them. But clearly, we would rather live with such risks than attempt to occupy these nations. We take these risks because we believe men and nations will not willingly choose to submit to other men from other lands.

If we are wrong in this basic faith, then Vietnam will be but a flicker in the conflagration which is to come. But in Indo-

nesia, in Algeria, and in the Central African Republic the Chinese have suffered enormous defeats—not because we are stronger or more skilled than they—not because we defeated them. They were defeated because the people of these lands preferred to run their affairs in their own way—and our faith was justified. This basic faith may not be borne out on every occasion in every land. But in the past when the question has been clearly presented, men have chosen independence and freedom.

With this basic faith in the aspirations of man, what are the elements of a settlement in Vietnam?

Whatever the exact status of the National Liberation Front—puppet or partly independent—any negotiated settlement must accept the fact that there are discontented elements in South Vietnam, Communist and non-Communist, who desire to change the existing political and economic system of the country. There are three things you can do with such groups: kill or repress them, turn the country over to them, or admit them to a share of power and responsibility. The first two are now possible only through force of arms.

The last—to admit them to a share of power and responsibility—is at the heart of the hope for a negotiated settlement. It is not the easy way or the sure way; nor can the manner or the degree of participation now be described with any precision. It may come about through a single conference or many meetings, or by a slow, undramatic process of gradual accommodation. It will require enormous skill and political wisdom to find the point at which participation does not bring domination or internal conquest. It will take statesmanship willing to exploit the very real differences of ambition and intention and interest between Hanoi and Peiping and the Soviet Union. It may mean a compromise government fully acceptable to neither side. It certainly means that we must take considerable risks in the expectation that social and economic success will weaken the appeal of communism—and that sharing the burden and the satisfaction of helping to guide a nation will attract hostile elements toward a solution which will preserve both the independence of their country and their new-found share of power. And we must be willing to face the uncertainties of election, and the possibility of an eventual vote on reunification. We must be prepared to think about what kind of relationship such a reunified country would have to the United States, to Communist China, to the Soviet Union.

If we are willing to accept these uncertainties and run the risks—and if our adversaries are willing to submit their cause to the same arbitration, the same peaceful choice—then a settlement may be possible; and the other hazards, the hazards of widening conflict and devastation, may be ended.

Of course, such a road toward solution must be protected from sudden and violent upheaval. There must be international guarantees to back up agreement, good faith, and mutual self-interest. Foreign forces must be withdrawn, by balanced and verified stages. And we must insist that the political process go forward under the rigorous supervision of a trusted international body.

I would stress that such a settlement would not end our burden or our vigilance in Vietnam. President Johnson has made clear that we are ready to help with economic aid for North Vietnam. Further, if South Vietnam is to remain free to determine its own destiny and to live in harmony with the north, then we must help repair the ravages of 20 years of war. Our reconstruction effort may be nearly as costly, and more demanding of care and intelligence, than is our present military effort. And we must continue to stand guard against any violation

of the agreement, which must make clear that the United States would not permit the country or the Government to be seized by an outside power.

There will be many other difficulties and problems. I do not pretend to be able to forecast all the details of a final settlement, or the process by which it may be reached. That is the task of statesmanship, in full command of all the channels of communication. But we must have our terms set firmly in our own minds. And we must reveal enough of our intentions to Hanoi to eliminate any reasonable fear that we ask them to talk only to demand their surrender.

And they must be given to understand as well that their present public demands are in fact a bid for us to surrender a vital national interest—but that, as a far larger and more powerful nation learned in October of 1962, surrender of a vital interest of the United States is an objective which cannot be achieved.

I am aware that the United States cannot proclaim in advance the precise terms of an acceptable political settlement. We cannot show all our cards before we get to the bargaining table. Nor can we make all our concessions before receiving concessions from the other side. To so commit ourselves would be to show a weakness which could not serve the cause of justice or the cause of peace.

But we ourselves must look at our own cards. And we must show enough of them to persuade our adversaries that a settlement is in their interests as well as our own.

The Senate could serve no higher function than to discuss—for the benefit of our own people, for our adversaries, and for the people of the world—a framework within which a settlement would be acceptable.

That is why discussion and debate in the Senate are now so important. We stand at the doorway of great decisions and fateful action. To decide in ignorance is to risk disaster. But if we now can clearly define our ends in South Vietnam, if we can at least begin discussing what our future relations with mainland China are to be, if we can adapt our means to those ends, and, most important, if we can use only that force—and no more—that is needed to accomplish these objectives, then there is hope that they may be achieved without prohibitive cost to ourselves, to the people of Vietnam, or to the peace of the world.

And if this debate can reach such a definition, we will know at least that we have followed the path of reason and realism as far as it now can lead.

And we will have worked to meet our responsibilities to our posterity—to walk the final mile toward peace, not so much for ourselves, as for those who will come after.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 22, 1966]

ROBERT KENNEDY'S POINT

(By Walter Lippmann)

The key question in the Senate hearings has been whether the administration, which says that it wants a negotiated settlement has in fact committed itself to a policy which requires the unconditional surrender of the enemy. This is the question which is at the root of the profound concern of the Senators. It is also, most certainly, the question which is worrying the country. The question was not answered definitively in the hearings. General Taylor and Secretary Rusk kept insisting that the administration was fighting a limited war, that its objectives and its targets were limited, and that it is earnestly seeking to engage Hanoi in discussions and negotiations.

It has remained for Senator ROBERT KENNEDY to raise the decisive question about a negotiated settlement, which is whether the administration is prepared to negotiate

with its adversaries in the field. We have learned promptly from the immediate reactions of Messrs. Bundy, Ball and HUMPHREY that the administration is not prepared to negotiate with its adversaries in the field. It does want to negotiate with Hanoi but not with the Vietcong unless the Vietcong is acknowledged to be nothing more than the instrument of the Hanoi government. This position is in fact a demand for the unconditional surrender of the Vietcong which constitutes at least three-quarters of the military forces arrayed against us in the field, and it is a demand for the unconditional recognition of General Ky's government as the only political power in South Vietnam.

No one is entitled to claim that he is in favor of a negotiated settlement of the war unless he is prepared to negotiate with all his important adversaries who are engaged in fighting. Senator KENNEDY has gone to the heart of the matter in fixing public attention on the simple truth that if the administration wants to negotiate, it will have to negotiate with the enemy who is in fact arrayed against us.

This does not mean, it seems to me, that the United States itself should negotiate with the Vietcong for the purpose of forming a coalition government in South Vietnam. A negotiated settlement of the war in South Vietnam will have to be negotiated by the South Vietnamese, and our policy should be to refrain from vetoing it. We shall have to cease putting our whole influence and support behind General Ky, who refuses to negotiate. The makings of a South Vietnamese negotiated settlement have long been present just under the surface in South Vietnam.

The outcome would probably be some kind of coalition government formed for the purpose of organizing a general election. Such a government would, of course, be vulnerable to the machinations of the hard-line Communists in Hanoi and Peiping. Difficult and unattractive as this may be, it would be a great deal better than an unlimited war to achieve unconditional surrender. Moreover, there would still be open to us what in my own view is the only live option we have ever had in southeast Asia. It is to help provide the material means by which a united Vietnam—probably under the rule of Ho Chi Minh, who is the one national leader of that country—could be neutral and militarily independent as regards China.

The partisans of our present course will do well to study carefully Mr. Hanson Baldwin's article in Monday's New York Times. It deals with the present condition of our combat forces. Mr. Baldwin is not only the leading military correspondent in contemporary journalism, but has always been, and probably still is, a hawk in the Vietnamese debate. He tells us that "the Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere. The commitment of more than 200,000 men to Vietnam, supported by strong air and naval forces, and the maintenance of two divisions in Korea, more than five in Europe and of smaller units elsewhere, including the Dominican Republic, have reduced the forces in the United States to a training establishment."

This report poses for the President the enormously difficult question of how much longer he can overrule the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a limited mobilization of Reserve forces. It also poses the question of whether Secretary Rusk realizes what he is saying when he tells us we have some 40 unilateral military commitments and that we must be prepared to fulfill them all. How can the American people have confidence in an administration which expands its commitments to the extent that Secretary Rusk expands them in the face of the condition of the military forces?

March 14, 1966

Mr. Baldwin's article raises the question, too, whether Secretary Rusk realizes what he is saying when he keeps telling us that the credibility of all our alliances all over the world is at stake in South Vietnam. Can he really believe that our value as an ally in Europe rises when we have to draw more and more trained men out of our Armed Forces in Europe and replace them with untrained men? Mr. Rusk has entangled himself in the error of failing to realize that it is not what the United States is willing to do but what in fact it is willing and able to do which determines the credibility of any one of its alliances.

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Feb. 2, 1966]

ROBERT KENNEDY'S STAND

Considering how often the President challenges his critics to offer ideas for peace in Vietnam, it is regrettable that his advisers moved so quickly to shoot down the ideas suggested by Senator ROBERT KENNEDY. We hope that Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor's more receptive attitude, contrasting with that of Messrs. HUMPHREY, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, heralds some sober second thought in administration ranks.

In proposing that the United States halt the troop buildup and prepare to accept Vietcong participation in a provisional government for South Vietnam, Senator KENNEDY was adopting a position already taken by Senator FULBRIGHT, and other thoughtful critics of administration policy. That he did so has highly interesting political implications, but the important thing is that these proposals go to the heart of the administration's professed eagerness for a negotiated settlement.

Unless we are ready to consider a temporary compromise government that would represent all elements in South Vietnam, we are really saying that we are only willing to negotiate a surrender by the Vietcong. Negotiations are obviously not going to get started on that basis, any more than they can get started on the basis of a Hanoi demand that the Vietcong be recognized as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people. The administration is right to reject this demand, but its own position in the quest for peace is weakened by insisting in effect that the Saigon generals be recognized as the sole representative of the people.

Admittedly a coalition government would present difficulties, as Senator KENNEDY recognizes, and would be far from an ideal solution. But it is hard to imagine a practical alternative. To say simply that we are willing to let South Vietnam decide its own future in a free election at some unspecified date ignores the crucial problem of how a divided country would be governed during the period between a cease-fire and the election. Conceivably some solution might be worked out without setting up any central political authority, but on the basis of experience this seems unlikely. In such circumstances, to exclude the very possibility of a coalition government amounts to erecting a major barrier, or condition, to negotiations.

When President Kennedy wanted negotiations on Laos he obtained them by agreeing to accept a coalition government. True, the Laos settlement has not worked well. But that is not because it provided for a coalition government. The reason for its failure was that geographically Laos could not be separated from the struggle for Vietnam and it was unrealistic to expect peace in Laos alongside an expanding war next door.

President Johnson also has used the coalition device in his efforts to solve problems arising from an unwise military intervention in the Dominican Republic. The Garcia-Godoy provisional government, which is trying under grave handicaps to run the country until elections can be held, offers a close

parallel to what Senator KENNEDY proposes for South Vietnam. If the Johnson administration can support the device in the Caribbean, there should be no reason in principle for rejecting it in southeast Asia—if the administration really wants a negotiable peace.

Basically the problem is to find workable methods by which, after years of civil war, the Vietnamese people can make their own decisions on their political future. This would be the proper business of peace negotiations; not all the decisions can or should be made in advance, or by the United States alone. Yet we cannot fairly expect negotiations even to open if we rule out, in advance, any Vietcong participation in South Vietnam's political future. By taking his stand on this clear reality, Senator KENNEDY has proved himself an effective advocate of peace.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 22, 1966]

COALITION IN VIETNAM

The essence of Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY's proposal for bringing about a Vietnam settlement—which, if negotiated rather than imposed by force, inevitably must include some Vietcong participation in the provisional Saigon government—is this:

"We cannot show all our cards before we get to the bargaining table. But we must have our terms set firmly in our own minds. And we must reveal enough of our intentions to Hanoi to eliminate any reasonable fear that we ask them to talk now only to demand their surrender."

The insurrection in South Vietnam represents a political force that escalation shows no signs of destroying by military means. To face up to this fact of life, as the Times has pointed out for many weeks, requires acceptance of Vietcong participation both in negotiations and in the future political life of South Vietnam. The ultimate Vietcong role, Washington and Hanoi agree, will be determined by elections under international supervision. But there must be agreement first on the provisional Saigon government that will preside over the country from the time of cease-fire until free elections are held. In the absence of leaders capable of forming a neutral administration, such a government in Saigon will have to include all the main factions: the South Vietnamese Army, the Vietcong, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the Cao Dai and other elements. It is self-deception to talk of a negotiated settlement without, at least implicitly, accepting this as one of the results.

The real question—and the primary one, to which Senator KENNEDY courageously addressed himself—is whether to concede this point in principle now to obtain a peace conference, as President Kennedy did to obtain a Laotian Conference and settlement. Secretary General Thant, the French Government, and others in contact with Hanoi believe such a concession is essential to enable pro-negotiation forces in the Communist world—within Hanoi and the Vietcong, as well as in Moscow and Eastern Europe—to carry the day.

Communist participation in a coalition government in Saigon would involve many risks. Senator KENNEDY made no attempt to gloss the dangers. But there is no basis for the widespread assumption that a coalition government inevitably means a Communist takeover. Neither the Laotian experience nor those of postwar France and Italy justify that conclusion. The outcome was different in Eastern Europe. But, interestingly enough, one of the chief victims there—former Premier Ferenc Nagy of Hungary—now has joined those who believe that, if the most detailed safeguards are provided, a coalition government could be "a temporary solution for Vietnam."

The decision President Johnson faces is not an easy one. He already has made many concessions with little response from Hanoi. He is prepared—as White House security ad-

viser McGeorge Bundy has said—to abide by the results of free elections. The administration is also prepared to accept a coalition government after elections, as one of its highest officials recently told the House Foreign Affairs Committee in executive session.

But in the American political context it is one thing to accept the results of elections—or even to yield on a provisional government after prolonged negotiations and mounting casualties bring general acceptance of this outcome. It is another thing to make this concession, even in principle, in advance.

Public discussion of this unattractive, risky, yet inescapable decision is vital to help the President act, as sooner or later he must. In that sense, Senator KENNEDY's proposal—which many other Senators and Congressmen support—is less a criticism of the President's policies than an invaluable contribution to the decisionmaking process.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Star,
Feb. 25, 1966]

THE RECORD ON KENNEDY'S PROPOSAL

(By Clayton Fritchey)

Despite all the hair splitting of the last few days, the administration is fundamentally opposed to the proposal by Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, Democrat, of New York, of a negotiated peace in Vietnam based on a coalition government, including Communists. It is now suggested that the administration's objections center more on timing than on principle. But that is not what the record shows:

To Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, permitting a coalition government would be the same as putting "a fox in a chicken coop or an arsonist in a fire department."

To Under Secretary of State George W. Ball it would be not only unacceptable, but "our experience with coalition governments hasn't been very good, you know, in which the Communists have played a significant role."

To McGeorge Bundy, the President's principal White House adviser on foreign affairs, the KENNEDY proposal was neither useful nor helpful. He also said that President Kennedy was opposed to coalition governments. That is not an accurate reflection of the late President's actual policy. John F. Kennedy did not think coalitions were ideal, but in a dour world of limited choices he preferred such compromises to war.

The most puzzling aspect of the violent reaction to Senator KENNEDY's proposal is that his administration critics were all in favor of coalition when President Kennedy sought peace in Laos on just that basis.

Back in 1961, when the situation in Laos was even more critical than in Vietnam next door, a compromise solution (based on bringing the Communists into the Laos government) was developed at a series of National Security Council meetings.

Among the participants were President Johnson, then Vice President, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ball, and Bundy, then special assistant to Kennedy. HUMPHREY, then the assistant majority leader to the Senate, was kept advised, of course.

All of them went along with the President's efforts (irrespective of elections) to establish a popular front in Laos. If any of them were opposed to it, or felt it would play into the hands of the Communists, they kept it to themselves.

Why did President Kennedy and his principal advisers favor coalition as a solution to Laos? The answer may help leaders understand why Senator KENNEDY now wants to extend this formula to Vietnam.

At the time President Kennedy came to power, the Communist forces in Laos were close to complete military victory. There were some, like Richard Nixon, who urged Kennedy to intervene, but, after the Bay of Pigs disaster, he had learned that military adventures are risky enterprises.

Nixon quotes Kennedy as saying to him, "I just don't think we ought to get involved in Laos, particularly where we might find ourselves fighting millions of Chinese troops in the jungles. In any event, I don't see how we can make any move in Laos which is 5,000 miles away, if we don't make a move in Cuba, which is only 90 miles away."

Even before he took office, Kennedy thought that, "without support of the native population there is no hope of success in any of the countries of southeast Asia." He also had said, "for the United States to * * * send troops into the most difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited manpower, would mean that we would face a situation far more difficult than Korea."

He was troubled that other major powers, even in the East, did not share our alarm over Indochina. As President, he said to Arthur Schlesinger, "India is more directly threatened than we are; and, if they are not wildly excited, why should we be?"

All of this led him to the conclusion that whatever the shortcomings of a coalition government, it was better than the risk of large military intervention. This political solution in Laos has had its ups and downs, but after 4 years the Communists have not yet swallowed the country and no Americans have been killed. That, in the view of Senator KENNEDY, would not be a bad deal for Vietnam.

[From U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 14, 1966]

SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY EXPLAINS HIS POSITION

(Exactly what is Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY proposing about dealing with the South Vietnamese Reds? Does he have a formula for getting the war to the conference table? To explain his position, the Senator visited the conference room of U.S. News & World Report for this interview with members of the magazine's staff.)

Question. Senator, just what do you propose in Vietnam?

Answer. I favor continuing our military commitment with the objective of getting a settlement in Vietnam which would prevent North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front from taking over South Vietnam by force, free the people of South Vietnam from terror and intimidation and from the destruction of war, preserve our honor and our commitment, and end as quickly as possible the loss of American lives and the strain on our resources.

Question. Isn't that what the Johnson administration has been after?

Answer. I therefore support the objectives of the administration. I think there are three alternatives in Vietnam:

One, we can pull out, which would be catastrophic for American interests. That's so unacceptable that it hardly needs to be discussed.

Two, have a complete military victory. We could accomplish that. We could win, militarily, if we decided that was what our policy should be. But I think there are dangers in an expanded war. There are the heavy casualties that would be suffered by American troops. There would be great loss of life within South Vietnam. Here at home, domestic programs would not receive the attention that they should receive. So, for various reasons, I don't accept that course of action—and I gather it also is turned down by the administration, and for the same reasons.

So that leaves a negotiated settlement. Now, if you're going to talk about that, you should talk about it realistically. Those who argue for a negotiated settlement without facing up to the implications of what that means are, I think, being less than realistic and less than candid.

Question. So you feel that this is the heart of the matter?

Answer. Somebody who analyzes the course of negotiated settlement might reach the conclusion that the dangers are too great—that what we're going to undertake in a negotiated settlement is a situation that you really can't live with. But if you go down the road for a negotiated settlement—which I favor—I think we can deal with the problems, although they are going to be very, very difficult.

Question. In what way?

Answer. One of the facts of life that you have to face up to is that the Communists, or dissident elements, will play some role in the Government at some point as the result of a negotiated settlement in which both sides make some concessions. If we're going to have a negotiated settlement, what that means—what we have to be prepared for—is the sharing of power with them in South Vietnam. They've been around a long time and they have considerable support in the villages, and they have continued to raise a substantial body of troops.

So I think you have to recognize these facts. The situation isn't very satisfactory—and certainly no one wants to help the Communists, or condone or excuse them—but these are the facts.

Now, if they're going to share in the political processes of the country, we'll want them to concede some things, too—to lay down their arms and return the area and people now under their control to the Central Government, and to refrain from interfering with the freedom of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own destiny. But we can't get these concessions, and thereby shorten the war, without being prepared ourselves for a settlement that brings them into the governmental structure and society in South Vietnam.

Question. Even if the declared policy should be to negotiate with the South Vietnamese Communists, how do you get them to the negotiating table?

Answer. I don't have any magic formula for that, but I think there are two ways:

First, and most important, is to demonstrate to them that they're not going to win, militarily; that they're not going to drive the United States out of Vietnam, and they're not going to be able to take over by force.

Second, if you're going to have negotiations, you've got to show them that it's worthwhile coming to the negotiating table—that we're going to negotiate and that concessions are going to be made on both sides.

I'm convinced there is tremendous pressure on them from China not to come to the negotiating table. If they do come, they are going to impair their own relationships with Communist China. So I think, first, they have to be hurt enough to know that they aren't going to win and, second, they have to feel that there is enough reason for them to negotiate to make it worth their while.

Question. Are you saying the administration is not realistic?

Answer. They've talked and stressed negotiations, but I don't think there has been a wide discussion in this country—at least, I haven't been aware of it—of the facts of life in connection with negotiations.

Now, we all hope that, at some point, you're going to have elections in South Vietnam—and there's some chance that, as a result, you're going to have some Communists within the Government. But, clearly, that will be decided by the people of South Vietnam in the elections.

Even before that, you're going to have to face up to the fact that, in the interim period, the dissident elements—those who are opposed to the Saigon government—are not going to let General Ky run the elections any more than we would want to have the Communists running them.

Now, I'm not suggesting that we go in and say to the Vietcong or the Communists: "You can have a role in the Government, and then we'll start to negotiate." As I said on February 19, "We will neither demand nor yield specific formal commitments before bargaining begins."

I'm saying to them: "The door is open to you to have a role in the future government as long as we get serious concessions from you. You might play a role during the interim period and, if you win popular support in elections, later on."

IF GENERAL KY OBJECTS

Question. What are you going to do about General Ky, who says he won't do business with them?

Answer. Obviously we're not going to turn our backs on the people of South Vietnam, but, as far as General Ky is concerned, the policies of the United States should just as obviously take into account what is in our best interest. General Ky has said he has complete control over only 25 percent of the population at the present time.

Question. Do you think the President can go over Ky's head?

Answer. We haven't always agreed with General Ky. For example, General Ky feels that all of us should extend our bombing efforts in North Vietnam, and we have not agreed with him about that. And the administration has said that the presence of the dissident elements—Communists and others—at the negotiating table is not an insurmountable problem.

All I'm saying is that we've taken a step to open the door, and the Communists have done nothing yet. If we show them what we're interested in—although we don't spell it all out in advance—we've opened a door for them, and we see if they put their foot in. If they do put their foot in, and say, "We're willing to come in, but you've got to do something worthwhile," then we can face that problem.

Now the interim period—between negotiations and eventual elections—is itself subject to negotiation. If they come to the negotiations in good faith they could expect, in return for concessions made by them, to share in the governmental processes. But that would still be a negotiable point. They don't get it in advance of negotiations, and it doesn't come to them without concessions. But if they make the right kinds of concessions, then they can share in the governmental and political process.

Question. There has been talk that you're trying to stake out a position to the left of the President and Mr. HUMPHREY—

Answer. I know there has been such talk. It probably is based on an assumption some people make on their own that I expect to run for the Presidency, and would be involved with HUBERT HUMPHREY. My own experience in the past in these matters is that it is empty to speculate about what one is going to be doing 5 or 6 years from now—or even whether one is going to be here then.

Question. Do you have any political plans for 1968 or 1972?

Answer. No, I don't.

KEEPING PRESSURE ON REDS

Question. Senator, what do you say to people who feel that Senators ought to avoid such discussions as Vietnam while the Government is engaged in delicate negotiations?

Answer. Certainly we want Hanoi and the Vietcong to understand our resolve. That is why I favor continued military action until they show that they want to bargain in good faith. To some extent, discussion raises a problem. But I think our military action should prevent any misconceptions about our resolve.

Question. Does the necessity of open discussion outweigh the risk that the enemy may misunderstand?

Answer. Well, obviously, I think that it does. And that's why we must make our resolve clear to our adversaries. But I felt that our attention should now be focused on the real problems that are going to have to be faced by the country. So, I felt I had a responsibility.

Maybe the discussion will bring more people to think that we have to win the war, rather than convince them that we should have negotiations. But, at least, everybody is going to be honestly going down the road in which they believe, and we won't be deluding ourselves into thinking that we can have the best of both worlds.

Question. Isn't the administration saying now that the tide of battle out there has turned in our favor?

Answer. Yes.

Question. But you're talking about offering the Communists a deal. Don't you agree there's a chance we can win, militarily?

Answer. Let me say this. If this tide is turning and we can win, then I think that's what we should say. Let's say, openly, that we can win in Vietnam, and not say that we're trying—so hard to get the enemy to the negotiating table.

If we have the power, and we can win without destroying everybody in Vietnam, and we don't increase the risk, materially, of a war with China—that's one thing.

But the more the war expands, the more our own casualties go up, the more destruction there is in South Vietnam, the less chance there is, it seems to me, that expanded military efforts can bring any long-term stability in that area.

Question. Isn't the argument made that the more the Vietcong is hurt, the better our average will be in negotiations?

Answer. Yes. So I think we should do whatever needs to be done, militarily. But it comes to this: What price are we willing to pay to defeat them totally?

If we can defeat them without paying a great price, an overwhelming price, then that's what I'd like to do. But if we're going to cause tremendous destruction to the people of Vietnam, including innocent civilian women and children; and if we're going to have tremendous—very, very, very high—casualties; and if we're going to take some of these other dangers, such as war with China and even beyond, then we get to the fact that—because of these dangers—we have to try, at least, as the administration has said, to negotiate. My judgment is, therefore, that the deaths, destruction, and risks involved in trying to destroy the Vietcong completely make a negotiated settlement advisable if it can be done honorably. It was my judgment that this was also the policy of the administration.

Question. Senator KENNEDY, does all this talk about what we will do and what we won't do—doesn't that pretty much expose our hand to the Communists?

Answer. I am convinced that the Chinese Communists do not want the Vietnamese Communists to negotiate. That's clear. The Chinese want this war to go on, so they're putting all sorts of pressure on Hanoi to keep going. Now, if they—I'm talking about the Vietnamese Communists—if they're going to come to the negotiating table, they are going to have to cut their bridgess with China, somewhat. There has to be, therefore, a reason for them to come to the negotiating table—a reason other than just to come in to surrender.

All I'm suggesting is that we show them that we're offering them genuine negotiations—not that they just come in and surrender, sign on the dotted line. We have to convince them that there is some reason for them to come to a meeting with the United States. If we don't hold that open to them, then, no matter how much we hurt them militarily, there's nothing that makes it worthwhile for them to negotiate. They

might just as well continue to fight and die because when they come to the table, anyway, they're going to cut themselves off from China, and they're going to get nothing. That must be the way they think about all this.

Now, we shouldn't expose our whole hand to them. Committing ourselves to any specific terms would show a weakness that wouldn't serve the cause of peace. But we have to show enough of our cards to persuade them that a settlement is in their interests as well as ours.

HOW COALITION MIGHT WORK

Question. If the Reds agreed to negotiations and, through them, got assurance that they would be represented in the governing power in Vietnam, how would such a coalition work?

Answer. I take it that you're talking now about the interim period—after negotiations and before elections. Whatever government there is during that period would have to be subject to international guarantees. And the fact is that you might have a wholly international operation during that period of time. But the international operation would have to be satisfactory to both sides, not just our side. You might have one man who was satisfactory to everybody to run the government during the period before elections. You might have something like the Organization of American States force that is in the Dominican Republic.

And, under international guarantees, we may well have an interim government in which the National Liberation Front has a role. This is a factor that we ought to be thinking about. That is my point.

There's concern that any coalition government, for example, might be taken over by the Communists. That's certainly a risk and a danger, and I said, when I made my statement, that we should focus on those risks and plan for them.

Ferenc Nagy, who was the Premier of Hungary when the Russians took it over in 1948, was asked about my statement. He said that the outcome and the safety of any coalition government depends on the support that outside powers give. He said the Communists could take over in Hungary because Russia dominated the country militarily. Obviously, we shouldn't allow North Vietnam—now or after a settlement—to exercise that kind of military predominance in South Vietnam. So I think if the United States, or the U.N., or some other authority, protects a settlement from being upset by North Vietnam, that the Communists won't be able to seize power in South Vietnam.

Question. Would you require the South Vietnamese Army to lay down its arms in order to get the Communists to bargain?

Answer. No. As I said, I wouldn't make any specific concessions prior to the negotiations. And I don't think anybody can spell out what all the terms are going to be. I'm just saying what some of the things are that we're going to have to deal with in a realistic way.

We, in turn, are going to try to end the casualties, and the aggression—end the war. We, in turn, are going to try to bring peace to South Vietnam.

If we don't get that, we're not getting anything. And we will have to keep on fighting.

PROTECTING U.S. INTERESTS

Question. Isn't negotiating with the Vietcong like letting them shoot their way to the conference table?

Answer. Well, we've made it clear that we're willing to negotiate with Hanoi. They are as much "murders and killers" as those operating in the south. Wouldn't you say Hanoi is shooting its way in? We're trying to negotiate with assassins and all the rest of it. They—the North Vietnamese Communists—they're the ones that are directing all this, as we say, and we're willing to sit down

with them and negotiate. They're certainly as bad as the ones who are doing the actual fighting in South Vietnam.

And we have discussions with the Communist Chinese continuously, even at all the present time.

But, most important, I don't think adjectives help us decide the vital questions of our national interest. No one likes the Communists. No one wants them to win, or to dominate any nation. But the question is how we best prevent them from dominating South Vietnam—and, in the last analysis, what's best for the United States. What's best for the United States, in my judgment, is not an all-out war with Communist China, or a greatly expanded war throughout Indochina.

What we do want is not to let North Vietnam or the NLF just take over. What we want is a settlement which stops the fighting, and saves American and South Vietnamese lives, and preserves the free choice of the people of South Vietnam.

I think, if we continue our military effort, and pursue the social, economic, and political efforts which I've talked about repeatedly and which President Johnson emphasized at Honolulu, and pursue our diplomatic effort along the lines I suggest, we will at least know that we have done all that's now possible to obtain the kind of settlement we want.

I think it is awfully important in our own country that we know what our objective is, so that we'll know what price in blood and anguish and money we're willing to pay to accomplish that objective.

It's a different military objective to destroy the Communists within Vietnam. It's a different military objective to try to bring them to the negotiating table. And, from the recent statements that have been made, there is some confusion among various spokesmen for our own Government as to exactly what our objectives are in Vietnam.

But I do think we have brains, we have talent, and we have imagination in this country—and, if we can fight a war, then we can also work as diligently and as effectively to find a peaceful answer to it.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 27, 1966]

THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON DEBATE

Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY has helped to bring about a clarification of American thinking on Vietnam. The idea of Communist participation in a coalition government in Saigon is so unwelcome that until Senator KENNEDY forced it into the realm of public discussion it had been shunted aside in Washington—although a great deal of private discussion had already come to focus on it. The thought was considered so "far out" that when Senator MCCARTHY, of Minnesota, advanced it recently, as he commented ruefully last week, nobody noticed. Eight liberal House Democrats had much the same experience.

President Johnson now, in his Freedom House speech, has committed himself explicitly to abide by the results of elections in Vietnam, no matter how distasteful they may be. As his press secretary, Bill D. Moyers, has made clear, that includes acceptance of Communist participation in the Saigon Government, if the vote so mandates. Mr. Moyers has specified further that a coalition government prior to elections is not excluded, but "should be left to the negotiating parties." Frank recognition of this possibility, as Senator KENNEDY said and as the Times has urged for some time, lies "at the heart of a hope for a negotiated settlement" and even of the hope for negotiation.

In effect, the administration now is facing more frankly some of the implications of its July proposal for free elections as one element in a negotiated settlement. The American objective in South Vietnam has been defined by President Johnson as self-determination, whatever that produces—not the

destruction of the Vietcong. Most important the nature of the interim Saigon regime that will govern between a cease-fire and elections is admitted to be a proper subject to be decided in the peace negotiations.

If this means anything, it means a commitment that American influence will be used to assure bargaining in good faith between the Vietnamese factions to form an interim national government acceptable to both sides. The distinction between such a policy and a refusal to recognize it as a possibility is the distinction between a policy of negotiation in which both sides are willing to compromise and a policy of unconditional surrender. There would, of course, be risks in any coalition regime but the alternative of expanded war is riskier still.

Theoretically, an agreed central government prior to elections could be made up of neutral Vietnamese or international personnel. But it is unlikely that either the Saigon leaders or the Vietcong would prefer joint exclusion from such an interim government to joint participation. It would be a major accomplishment if both sides could be brought to agree on the inclusion of some neutral or international officials in important posts.

All of this may seem to be academic until Hanoi shows some interest in a peace conference. Until that point, President Johnson remains reluctant to agree to an independent conference status for the Vietcong delegation—a suggestion that obviously would be repugnant to Saigon.

Nevertheless, the Kennedy-Johnson controversy—despite the domestic political byplay—has brought a significant step forward in administration policy. By defining sharper limits to American war aims, it may help limit the military forces sent to achieve them. By removing taboos on what can be negotiated, it may advance the efforts of pro-negotiation forces in the Communist world—in Hanoi and within the Vietcong, as well as in Moscow and Eastern Europe—to bring about a conference.

Most important, the first serious public debate by responsible men on the Vietnam issue—as initiated in the Fulbright hearings and carried forward by Senator KENNEDY—undoubtedly has set a precedent that will play an important role as the problem evolves.

EX-HUNGARIAN PREMIER VIEWS KENNEDY'S IDEA—OUTSIDE POWERS ARE KEY TO COALITION, NAGY SAYS OF NEW YORK SENATOR'S PROPOSAL

(By Ferenc Nagy)

(Ferenc Nagy was Prime Minister of Hungary in 1946-47. Nagy, who now lives in Virginia, shared his government with Communists and offered these views on Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY's proposal for a coalition government in Vietnam.)

WASHINGTON.—As far as I know I am the only former political leader in exile in America who was the head of a coalition government in central eastern Europe after World War II.

On the basis of my experiences in my own country and observations in the whole central and eastern European area I would like to comment on Senator ROBERT KENNEDY's proposition.

The first thing to know is that if a coalition in an ideologically troubled country is established with the assistance of outside power or powers, then the strength and endurance of the participating political parties or groups is not dependent at all on domestic popular support but on the help of the outside great powers which are behind them politically.

In my government the Communist Party had only 17 percent of popular support while my party alone was supported by more than 60 percent of the voters and the Parliament.

Still the Communist Party could get in power in 2 years because they were supported by the Soviet Union and I was overthrown because no outside power gave me any help.

I would not say that a coalition government could not be a temporary solution for Vietnam but I would like to call the attention of those who are dealing with this ideal to certain basic rules that should be followed very carefully.

First of all, the goal, the composition, and the time of service of the coalition government must be made clear to the last details.

In the case of Vietnam the main goals of a coalition should be, besides ending the war, the pacification, democratization, and economic reconstruction of the country.

There must be a detailed plan for the disarmament of the fighting forces.

It is very important to decide in advance which party or coalition group will get those government posts controlling the police force and the military forces.

But the main thing is that those who would like to save the neutrality and independence of Vietnam through a coalition government should not be too tired to fight for a clear agreement in the last details, and should be determined to protect even the seemingly unimportant points of the agreement.

Otherwise, the coalition will be just a transition for a Communist takeover or the hotbed of another military conflict.

THE ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the American people have a right to know how the taxpayers' money is being spent on any Great Society program although obtaining such information is oftentimes rather difficult.

Over the past several months information has been sought as to how the money under the poverty program is being spent. Many questions have been raised as to whether or not those for whom the benefits were intended were in reality being helped.

In this connection I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the RECORD an article appearing in the New York Daily News of February 28, 1966, entitled "Thirty-seven Now Living on Suite Charity at the Astor."

Following this I ask unanimous consent that there be printed a letter which I addressed to Mr. Sargent Shriver, the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, under date of February 9. I regret that I cannot follow this insertion with a reply thereto, but as yet none has been received.

There being no objection, the article and letter were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THIRTY-SEVEN NOW LIVING ON SUITE CHARITY AT THE ASTOR

(By William Federici)

For at least 37 persons, the city's anti-poverty program is successful beyond their dreams. For more than a month they have been provided with posh accommodations in one of the city's finest hotels and given food allowances beyond the reach of all but the richest of the taxpaying citizens, the News learned yesterday.

Eleven families, consisting of 20 adults and 17 children, have been enjoying all the services of the elegant Hotel Astor and collecting \$9 a day food allowances per person since January 28, when they went to the anti-poverty people to complain of lack of heat and the like.

LIVING IN SUITES

Ever since, they have been living in suites up to three rooms. They have had their beds made by chambermaids, avoided the drudgery of housework and have had their room tabs, averaging \$5.75 a day a person, picked up by Mayor Lindsay's antipoverty program.

The only comfort missing was cooking privileges. Hence, the allowance for meals. And all is paid by city, State, and Federal funds earmarked to erase poverty.

It all started during last month's cold spell. Antipoverty program mobile units were dispatched to slum areas throughout the city to help tenants who were suffering because of lack of heat, water failures and other conditions which made their apartments uninhabitable during the freeze.

MOST PUT UP IN ARMORIES

Most were put up overnight in armories. Some, where it would take a couple of days to correct the conditions, were put up at the Astor. For those in the armories, the stay was short. For 37, the Astor became home.

All that was necessary, the News learned, was for a person to go to the mobile unit and register his complaint. Some cases received a brief investigation, others none.

CASEWORKER ASSIGNED

The families were given letters from the unit's caseworker which were presented to antipoverty program headquarters. There they got a second letter, signed by Mrs. Anne M. Roberts, temporary executive director of the economic opportunity committee and the antipoverty operations board, which enabled them to take up digs in the Astor.

Although the operation had no connection with the welfare department and many of the recipients were wage earners, a department caseworker was assigned as a liaison man to see they got everything they needed. He was identified as George Johnson, living in Astor's room 562.

It also was learned that welfare department employees—from caseworkers to the brass—are highly critical of the situation. One person, who did not wish to be identified, explained that this was not their way of doing things.

MAIDS, CLERKS UNHAPPY

Also voicing criticism were the hotel's maids, clerks, and the like. One thing, to them, distinguished the new guests from the rest. Not used to such living, they were stingy with tips.

All they did, said one maid, was get up, get dressed and take off. They don't straighten up the rooms. That's for the hired help, she said.

The situation came to light yesterday after a city ambulance was called for one of the children put up in the Astor, identified by police as Gloria Ramos, 3. Gloria, police reported, fell Saturday night in the bathroom of her two-room suite, in which she is staying with her parents and two other children, and awoke with a high fever.

The hotel physician suggested hospitalization and the ambulance was called.

A spokesman for the Astor, when asked about his new guests, answered:

"Well, I thought we were doing the right thing when we did this, but I'm beginning to have my doubts now."

FEBRUARY 9, 1966.

Mr. SARGENT SHRIVER, Director, Office of Economic Opportunity, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SHRIVER: On February 3, 1966, there appeared in the Journal-American an article alleging that there is a shortage of approximately \$800,000 in the accounts of Harry Act in New York City.

Please advise me whether or not there is a shortage of accounts in this particular pro-

March 14, 1966

Schwartz on a clumsy breakdown in internal diplomacy.

Schwartz, according to the authoritative Department version, returned from a 3-week trip to Geneva, Switzerland, at midnight last Friday. He was met at the airport by a journalist who informed him that his job as Administrator of the Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs was being abolished.

The next day—Saturday—Schwartz appeared at the State Department in an agitated frame of mind. He met separately with Secretary Dean Rusk and Under Secretary George Ball, who explained that in his absence the Bureau of the Budget had unexpectedly given its approval to a reorganization plan affecting Schwartz's Bureau.

Rusk had laid the plan aside, pending Schwartz's return. It had been his intention, according to the Department, to discuss it with Schwartz before any other steps were taken. The premature leak at the airport had been an unfortunate slip-up.

During this Saturday discussion, Ball asked Schwartz to remain in the Department in the same rank (equivalent to Assistant Secretary of State) as a Special Assistant to Rusk. His new duties would have encompassed immigration and refugee affairs which, Rusk has said, Schwartz had handled superbly since 1962.

But Schwartz, the Department maintains, was in no mood to take a new job. He turned down the Ball offer and expressed no interest in any other assignment.

Rusk, accordingly, made no effort to dissuade him from resigning and on Sunday Schwartz announced that he had quit.

This version of the Schwartz affair, which has aroused political liberals in and out of Congress, is likely to be disputed in the days ahead, by Schwartz, among others. The dates, the sequence of events, and the new job offer are among the matters at issue.

In any case, both the White House and the State Department were perturbed yesterday over the repercussions of his resignation. From both quarters came firm denials that Presidential Assistant Marvin Watson had played any part in the matter and equally firm denials that the departure of Schwartz signaled any change in the liberal policies he had pursued with respect to the issuance of passports and visas and the administration of immigrant affairs.

The Department's managers and the White House both insisted that the abolition of the 27-man Bureau that Schwartz had headed was being recommended for only two reasons. The first was that the Bureau was an unnecessary appendage of the Department's bureaucracy. The second was that its elimination was an economy move that would save \$248,000, with no loss of departmental efficiency.

It was pointed out that last year Rusk had abolished the job of Assistant Secretary Dwight Porter, who was an Administrator, and had combined the Bureau of American Republic Affairs with another departmental unit. There was not a word of protest, according to the Department, and the result of those and other shifts has been a worthwhile reduction in jobs and an elimination of unnecessary way stations in the chain of command.

Schwartz, in his resignation announcement on Sunday, implied strongly that his leaving was related to policy disagreements with Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett. He said Crockett had not been "one of the most enthusiastic supporters of our policy of maintaining a free and open society."

This explanation has been accepted by liberals who have described the Schwartz departure as an effort by the administration to appease conservatives, mainly in Congress, who were disenchanted with Schwartz and his "liberal" ideas.

Rumors to this effect in Congress were brought to the attention of White House Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers yesterday. He replied: "The worst source (of information) in Washington is obstreperous Members of Congress."

Congress, in any case, will have the final say on whether Schwartz's old Bureau will be abolished.

The Bureau was created by Congress and can be abolished only by Congress through approval of the reorganization plan which the President will submit.

There are already indications that the plan will be closely scrutinized by Government Operations Committees in both Houses.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR MANSFIELD

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in yesterday's Parade magazine Reporter Jack Anderson speaks of Senator MIKE MANSFIELD as "one of those rare politicians who cares nothing for power or publicity."

As we all know, and as Anderson has written:

He is guided only by conscience and duty, and in politics the demands of one do not always coincide with the demands of the other.

Senator MANSFIELD's manner of responding to conscience and duty—so much admired by his colleagues—is illustrated by the article he has written in the same magazine issue, "What's Going To Happen in Vietnam?" With typical honesty the majority leader says conditions have not changed since last fall when he reported:

The situation as it now appears, offers only a very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of the continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland.

Yet he recognizes how earnestly President Johnson pursues those very slim prospects while confronting problems more complex and difficult than those facing any American President in this century. He speaks of the President's "intense preference for the works of peace" and concludes on the hopeful note that, although the eagle in the Great Seal of the United States holds both the olive branch and the arrow, "his head is inclined toward the olive branch."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this richly deserved tribute to Senator MANSFIELD, and the excellent article he has authored himself, both from the March 13 issue of Parade, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Parade magazine, Mar. 13, 1966]

THE AGONY OF DISSENT

(By Jack Anderson)

WASHINGTON.—In this city of awesome decisions, most leaders search their souls before plunging ahead on a course that could take the Nation to the edge of a nuclear holocaust. But few go through the agony that MIKE MANSFIELD suffers. For the 62-year-old Senate majority leader, a key figure in the great debate now raging over President Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam war, is one of those rare politicians who cares nothing for power or publicity. He is guided only by conscience and duty, and in politics the demands of the one do not al-

ways coincide with the demands of the other.

The lean, 6-foot Montanan with the gentle manner and quiet voice, whose tanned, lined face shows the somberness of his mood, his misgivings about the war. Yet duty and loyalty require that he give maximum support to Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policies. If MANSFIELD allows the voice of his conscience to speak too loudly, it might be interpreted abroad as a dramatic division in the top policymaking councils, thus weakening the President in whatever action he ultimately may be forced to take.

MANSFIELD himself, puffing slowly on the pipe that is rarely out of his hand, explained to Parade: "I have a responsibility as Senate majority leader which I intend to uphold. I have a responsibility as Senator for Montana which I intend to uphold. I also appreciate the difficulties confronting the President. I have probably seen the President on Vietnam more than any other Senator. All I can tell you is that I do the best I can in line with my conscience."

Though they may differ in style and occasionally in opinion, the President has the highest regard for MANSFIELD's integrity. It was Lyndon Johnson who urged MANSFIELD to accept the Senate leadership. "I didn't want the job," MANSFIELD later confided to an intimate, "but I felt I couldn't say no." However, he did say no—quietly but firmly—in 1964 when President Johnson began telling people that MANSFIELD was the best man for the Vice-Presidency. The thought of becoming the man second in line for the White House was too much for the modest Montanan.

After the ironfisted Senate rule of Lyndon Johnson, many considered the choice of the retiring MANSFIELD an error. One newspaper went so far as to call it "a tragic mistake." MANSFIELD retorted mildly, "If that means I am not a circus ringmaster, the master of ceremonies of a Senate nightclub, a tamer of Senate lions, or a wheeler and dealer, then I must accept the words."

Though his predecessor had been all these things, MANSFIELD was not hitting at Johnson, whom he admires. It was merely MANSFIELD's way of asserting that he intended to be himself. He relies on persuasion, accommodation and understanding. He doesn't try to run the Senate himself, as Johnson did, but urges committee chairmen to take the lead. He gives them all the credit and glory. When the flashbulbs begin to explode and the TV cameras to whir, he steps back and pushes others to the front.

In every poll that has been taken, MANSFIELD has been voted by Democratic and Republican Senators alike as the colleague they most admire. "He doesn't have a single enemy in the place," says Senator RUSSELL LONG, the No. 2 Democrat. And the dean of the Republicans, Vermont Senator GEORGE AIKEN, declares: "There isn't a Republican Senator who would raise a finger to hurt Mike." In short, MANSFIELD is living evidence that in politics, if not in baseball, nice guys can win.

MANSFIELD is by no means a peace-at-any-price man. But he does believe that every effort should be made to moderate hostilities in Vietnam while the search for peace is pursued. His views, written exclusively for Parade, are printed here.

President Johnson asked him to head a Senate delegation last fall to call on world leaders about Vietnam. Though the President turned his personal plane over to them and gave them a big sendoff, MANSFIELD didn't report back what the President wanted to hear. In grim language, most of it still secret, the report questioned the wisdom of some of Johnson's policies.

Asian leaders who met MANSFIELD responded to his obvious honesty and fairness with a warmth that surprised American

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The spokesman noted that Schwartz had contributed much to the liberalized immigration bill adopted last fall, which had the full support of the President, the Secretary of State and the Department.

Late yesterday, Senator KENNEDY issued a statement praising Schwartz as a "direct action, liberal public servant." KENNEDY said he is "reserving judgment on the reorganization and how it will affect our refugee and immigration policies until details of the plan are made clear."

KENNEDY is chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and was floor manager of the new immigration bill. He has been critical of the American and Vietnamese handling of the refugee problems in South Vietnam.

Robert J. McCloskey, the Department's spokesman, said that the reorganization was in compliance with a Presidential directive to all departments to streamline.

He said that this is the second major change since July, 1965, when the Bureau of Administration was abolished. No further major changes are believed contemplated at present.

Both the White House and the State Department said that Schwartz had been offered a new position as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Refugee and Migration Affairs but that he had declined.

Three of the four offices now under Schwartz will be moved directly under Crockett's jurisdiction. They include the Passport Office of Special Consular Services. Where the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs will go has not been decided, the Department said.

The Office of Security, which was part of Schwartz' bureau until 1962, is now under Crockett's direct supervision and will not be affected by the proposed change.

The reorganization plan must be submitted to Congress for approval.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
March 9, 1966]

STATE'S NEW ROLE (By Joseph Kraft)

The alltime world's record for smooth orchestration of different views was probably set by General Eisenhower in the great war against the Germans. It was therefore assumed that as President Eisenhower he would coordinate the various agencies of American foreign policy—the more so as he spoke of the need and acted to buttress the coordinating machinery of the National Security Council.

But Mr. Eisenhower named as his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. By force of conviction and mind, Mr. Dulles ran his own show. Thus despite the President's intentions, foreign policy in the Eisenhower era was only dimly harmonized.

That famous mismatch of procedure and personality is relevant to the foreign policy reorganization announced here over the weekend. For while the change looks good on paper, it is a question whether enough of the right men are in enough of the right spots for the new arrangement to work in practice.

The main feature of the new approach is the reassertion of the primacy of the State Department in foreign affairs. The Secretary of State is assigned "overall direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government abroad (less exempted military activities)." For decision just below the Cabinet level there is set up a new Senior Interdepartmental Group (already baptized SIG) chaired by the Under Secretary of State, and including representatives of the military, intelligence aid and information services. Similar committees are set up for each geographical region, with the regional Assistant Secretaries of State acting as chairmen.

When these tasks are matched against the

men on the job, problems show up immediately. For examples, the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, Ray Hare, is a Foreign Service officer who has been looking to retirement for years, and who lacks the stamina to align other agencies with State's view.

Moving up to the Under Secretary level, George Ball undoubtedly has the brains and energy to run the senior interdepartmental group. But Mr. Ball, like most lawyers in government, is not notably a team player. His most important contributions have been one-man operations—chiefly his role as devil's advocate on Vietnam. Under the new setup there is a danger that Mr. Ball will bog down in coordination, thus draining away energy from the kind of thing he does best. Certainly, he is not now going to be in a stronger position to hold the President's coattails on Vietnam.

As to the Secretary, Dean Rusk has repeatedly favored the most mediocre members of the Department against its strongest people—witness, now, his part in pushing for the resignation of Abba Schwartz as Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Mr. Rusk has also seemed far more partial to the intense cold war view of the military services, where he spent his early years in Government, than to the more moderate conviction of his own Department. Vesting overall supervision with Mr. Rusk, accordingly, seems to tilt the balance even more strongly toward the military.

Lastly, there is the position of the President himself. Currently, the most serious procedural trouble in American foreign policy arises from the disposition of Lyndon Johnson to pay attention only to Vietnam. The new setup will not disrupt that habit in the slightest. If anything, the Senior Interdepartmental Group, by fostering the illusion that it can handle all other matters, may make it even easier for President Johnson to act as though Vietnam was the center of the world.

The point, of course, is that an organizational arrangement is not better than the people in it. Asserting the primacy of the State Department cannot be accomplished by fiat. There must be changes of attitude and of people. And if the changes are not forthcoming, then the coordinating function will slip back to the White House.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Mar. 9, 1966]

THE WATSON TOUCH

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

To oust a middle-level official in the State Department, top figures in the Government—including Presidential intimate W. Marvin Watson, Jr.—plotted for months in secrecy matching the wartime atom bomb project.

Deep White House involvement is the untold story in the forced resignation of Assistant Secretary of State Abba Schwartz, a champion of liberal immigration policies and prime target of conservatives on Capitol Hill.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk knew only the barest outlines of what was happening. Detailed planning was handled by William Crockett, his deputy for administration.

Crockett's partner in drawing up a reorganization plan that abolished Schwartz' Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs was Watson, President Johnson's appointments secretary and confidential detail man. The distinctive Watson touch, which led earlier this year to monitoring White House phone calls, is in evidence here.

The Watson-Crockett team worked in total secrecy completing the reorganization plan last September 20, and obtaining Rusk's final approval.

The Department's legal officer, Leonard C. Meeker, learned of it by chance in January. Seeking a copy of the plan in State De-

partment files, he found none existed. He finally obtained a photostatic copy from the White House, under a strict secrecy edict. Even more surprising, President Johnson's personnel chief, John Macy (an old friend of Schwartz) was totally unaware of the plan.

In contrast, Government reorganization plans usually are debated for weeks before going to Congress, where they can be vetoed by either House within 60 days. Why, then, was this plan, abolishing Schwartz' bureau as an "economy" measure (saving \$250,000 a year), drawn up under such elaborate secrecy?

Behind the answer lies one of the official Washington's bitterest perennial wars: the emotion-charged struggle over immigration policy.

Schwartz, a controversial liberal Democrat, was handpicked by President Kennedy to take control of immigration policy after 8 years of restrictive immigration in the Eisenhower administration. He has operated under this open-door policy: Grant visitor visas to anyone wanting to come to the United States to lecture, teach, or even agitate.

For example, in 1963 Schwartz had no hesitation in admitting an international law professor from Japan to lecture around the United States although he was a Communist and a winner of the Lenin Peace Prize at that. By the same token, Schwartz unsuccessfully favored admitting Moise Tshombe, then head of the split off Congo state of Katanga, although Tshombe then was regarded by liberals here as a far right-winger.

Schwartz' open door infuriated conservative Democrats on Capitol Hill, notably Representative MICHAEL FEIGHAN, of Ohio, and members of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.

For months, these conservative Democrats have plotted to have Schwartz removed. In the White House, Watson was unhappy about Schwartz as a Kennedy man. The result was the reorganization plan. Total secrecy was supposed to prevent Schwartz' liberal allies from starting a backfire.

Watson's feeling about Schwartz was shown late last fall when he interceded at the last moment with the State Department to prevent Schwartz from heading a U.S. delegation to an immigration conference abroad?

Why didn't the President just ask for Schwartz's resignation?

If forced out, President Johnson would have had difficulty replacing him. An Assistant Secretary acceptable to FEIGHAN and company would be bitterly attacked by the liberals in Congress.

When Schwartz first heard about his fate last Friday, he offered to resign, if that would save the Bureau. Rusk turned him down flat, citing Watson and Crockett.

By abolishing the Bureau outright, policy-making is handed to Crockett, who is expected to give enlarged immigration duties to Frances G. Knight, head of the Passport Office. She and Crockett both are close to the Feighan Democrats.

Yet the Watson touch may backfire in the Schwartz affair just as it did in the White House telephone scheme. Hard opposition to the plan from the liberal-packed Senate Government Operations Subcommittee that will consider it, is certain. The Schwartz case is not yet over.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post,
Mar. 11, 1966]

STATE EXPLAINS RESIGNATION OF SCHWARTZ— PUTS BLAME ON LEAK—SAYS BALL OFFERED NEW JOB TO HIM

(By Richard Harwood)

The State Department's management yesterday blamed the resignation of Abba P.

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diplomats. Even in Burma and Cambodia, whose leaders have been hostile to the United States, his sincerity was never questioned. Red-leaning Cambodia, for example, described him as "a man of great justice."

If MANSFIELD had his choice, he would prefer to go down in Senate history as a foreign affairs expert rather than a great leader. That he reached the Senate at all is an accolade for the son of poor Irish immigrants. Born on the edge of New York's Hell's Kitchen, MICHAEL JOSEPH MANSFIELD didn't get his high school diploma until he was 30. Through extra courses, he got his college degree at the same time and became an assistant history professor at Montana University.

If this was a sheltered life, he had already seen it in the raw. The least combative of men, he has served in three of the four armed services. During World War I, as a boy of 14, he lied about his age and enlisted in the Navy. By the time he was 19 he had also served in the Army and the Marines. He still wears the Marines' discharge button in his lapel.

After his military service he returned to Montana and dug his way up through the copper mines, where he earned \$4.25 a day as a mucker and ore sampler. It was while he was at the bottom, literally, that he married his wife, Maureen. They have one daughter, Anne.

MANSFIELD entered politics in 1940 and 2 years later gained a seat in the House. After five terms he was elected to the Senate in 1952. He has specialized, as a professor, Congressman, and Senator, in Far Eastern affairs.

HIS FRIEND AIKEN

In a Senate full of friends, MANSFIELD'S closest companion is Senator AIKEN, and the contrast between the two men is dramatic. The Democrat from the West, tall, spare, and solemn, towers over the Republican from the East, who is short, gnarled, and elfish. The two have been eating breakfast together almost every morning for 15 years. When MANSFIELD occasionally arrives 5 minutes late, AIKEN greets him with a dry "Where have you been this forenoon?"

Though MANSFIELD scorns the flexible morality of many politicians, he is an excellent politician himself. He considers being a U.S. Senator "the finest job in the world" and is in his office every day at 7 a.m. to catch the first mail delivery from Montana. He sees as many of his constituents as he possibly can and, while wrestling with the problems of the Senate leadership, still finds time for the details that win votes. "If I forget Montana, then Montana will forget me," he explains.

Some men seek power and enjoy and employ it. Some have power thrust upon them and accept it only from a sense of duty. Frequently they find its exercise painful in the extreme. Such a man is MIKE MANSFIELD. He is a worrier but a worrier for the best.

WHAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN IN VIETNAM?

(By Senator MIKE MANSFIELD)

On the Great Seal of the United States, the eagle holds an olive branch in one claw. In the other there is a bunch of arrows. That is as near to an expression of current U.S. policy on Vietnam as is likely to be found.

If we are on an escalator in Vietnam, it is one in which both sides go up. Our military efforts climb rapidly. Also on the rise are the efforts to find a way to peace.

Clearly in 1 year we have put to use more military power in Vietnam than has been brought to bear on any one place at any time since Korea. This great strength blunted the thrust of the Vietcong drive for the conquest of the south. It undoubtedly saved the Vietnamese Government from collapse a year ago.

With armed forces of 600,000—half of whom are regulars—the government of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky in Saigon has managed to hold its political position somewhat more firmly than any of its many predecessors since Ngo Dinh Diem. But there is no blinking the fact that after the assassination of President Diem a great deal in the way of popular support and terrain was lost by Saigon. The terrain has not been recovered, and popular support can hardly be expected for military leaders whose names are probably better known in this country than to the people of Vietnam. To be sure Saigon has many plans to alter this situation. With U.S. aid-backing, programs of political, social, and economic development are being developed. It may be that the Honolulu Conference in February will have spurred these plans into practice. Certainly, President Johnson has laid great stress on this aspect of the Vietnamese problem, even sending the Vice President to southeast Asia.

However hopeful the plans may be, the fact is that no significant reversal of the situation has yet been brought about in South Vietnam. The sooner we face that fact the better off we are going to be. General Westmoreland put it well at the end of the President's meeting with the Vietnamese leaders in Honolulu recently when he stated: "I do feel we must be prepared for a long war. The nature of the enemy is such that we cannot expect him to be defeated by a single battle or series of battles."

That more has not been achieved during the past years is no fault of the American forces in South Vietnam. They have fought with courage, skill, and great dedication. They have taken many casualties in the bitter, brutal struggle in the jungles, swamps, and mountains. But the grim truth is that these forces were injected into a political situation which, after repeated coups, was in an advanced stage of disintegration. Moreover, they have had to face a brave, cunning, and tenacious foe who has a fighting tradition going back decades and in a setting in which he is thoroughly at home.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that our forces are in an open-ended war. In 1 year the conflict has already spread by air from South Vietnam to North Vietnam. By air it has already spilled over the borders of Laos. There is a constant threat of a further expansion into Cambodia and Thailand.

So far the North Vietnamese have been able and willing to escalate their commitment of men and material sufficiently to neutralize our increased aid and prevent any fundamental change in the basic situation in South Vietnam. It is no wonder that further escalation of the U.S. commitment has been under consideration for some time in Saigon and Washington. The Defense Department has been budgeted for a \$1.7 billion increase, most of it earmarked for Vietnam. More and more there is talk of doubling the 200,000-man U.S. force in Vietnam before the end of 1966 and of redoubling the total in 1967.

If present trends continue, the need for additional military strength in Vietnam is inescapable. What is uncertain, however, is whether the increase will alter the fundamental situation or merely spread the devastation in South Vietnam and push the ground war beyond its borders. The fact is that the Communists in Asia remain in a position to raise the ante in Vietnam and southeast Asia as our commitment rises. To date, that is precisely what they have been doing, and they still have scarcely touched General Giap's North Vietnamese main force.

The U.S. military effort is already so great in Vietnam as almost to overshadow that of the Vietnamese forces themselves. If it grows much heavier serious questions may well arise in Vietnam and elsewhere as to

the nature of the war and of its relation to the Vietnamese people.

Considerations of this sort obviously are of great military significance. That is why men of the caliber of Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (retired) recently counseled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to "Stop, look, and listen," to "Take a look at the alternative realistically and in light of our total global commitment."

Beyond military realities, President Johnson's research for an end to the war by negotiations is also a response to the overwhelming desire of the American people for peace. It is an expression of an abhorrence for modern war's inevitable and massive devastation, especially as it is visited on a primitive country that has seen and suffered little but war for decades. It is a reflection of the President's intense preference for the works of peace.

Even as our military efforts have gone up, therefore, our diplomatic search for peace has also escalated. The peace drive began in earnest with the President's Johns Hopkins speech in Baltimore on April 7, 1965. It has grown steadily, reaching a climax in the great midwinter peace offensive.

THE JOHNSON MESSAGE

In his state of the Union message on January 12, 1966, President Johnson spelled out in the clearest detail the lengths to which the United States is willing to go to initiate negotiations. He stated: "There are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, discuss any proposals—4 points or 14 or 40—and consider the views of any group."

The North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front have shown no interest in negotiations except on terms that mean the total scrapping of the government of the republic. The Saigon Government, with our continued support, on the other hand, is just as determined that its authority shall not be jeopardized by any discussions of peace with the National Liberation Front. That appears to be the nub of the issue of peace in Vietnam. Until and unless it begins to yield to solution, there is no reason to alter the conclusion that four colleagues and I reached after an extended visit in southeast Asia and Europe last fall:

"The situation, as it now appears, offers only a very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland."

The situation that confronts President Johnson in Vietnam is, in fact, more complex and difficult than that which faced Woodrow Wilson in World War I, Franklin D. Roosevelt in World War II or Harry Truman during the Korean conflict.

One thing is certain: Slim as the prospect of reaching peace through negotiations may be, President Johnson will continue to press for it. That is as it should be with respect to Vietnam. Indeed, it would be well to remember that while the eagle on the great seal of the United States holds both arrows and olive branch, his head is inclined toward the olive branch.

THE THREAT OF INFLATION

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, Richard M. Nixon is one of the most able and articulate public servants of this generation. He has served his Nation and the Republican Party in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and for 8 years as Vice President of the United States.

Few Americans of our time are so qualified to address themselves to the great issues confronting this Nation.

In a series of newspaper columns, distributed throughout the United States, Mr. Nixon is speaking out on these issues.

The first column, carried in the Los Angeles Times, deals with the ominous threat of inflation, a threat to the paycheck of every American worker and the budget of every American housewife.

In the tradition of the loyal opposition, Mr. Nixon has held out an alternative course of action for our Government to avert this danger of inflation.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Nixon's comments be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOHNSON INFLATION MAJOR ISSUE OF 1966: NIXON ACCUSES PRESIDENT OF WAGING WAR ON PROSPERITY

(By Richard M. Nixon)

(NOTE.—With this article Richard M. Nixon begins a series of monthly columns which will appear in the Times. The former Vice President outlined his objectives in this letter:

"In the forthcoming months I will have the opportunity to be writing a series of columns discussing the great issues that will be debated in the 1966 campaign.

"It is the tradition of the loyal opposition in this country to support the President when his policy is in the best interests of the American people, and to oppose and constructively criticize those administration programs or policies which we believe to be misdirected or wrong.

"These columns will remain in that tradition.

"As you are aware, I have supported the actions President Johnson has taken to assist the people of South Vietnam to defend their national independence from Communist aggression. His efforts to secure a just and honorable peace and to guarantee the freedom of the Vietnamese people will continue to receive that support.

"This first column, however, deals with a great domestic issue where the President and I do not agree. That is the issue of inflation.

"I do not believe the course of action the President has chosen is a wise one; I do not believe it will successfully meet this growing domestic peril.

"Therefore, I am taking this occasion to criticize the administration's program and to hold out an alternative course of action which I believe must be taken to remove this threat to the well-being of every American."

Johnson inflation will be the major domestic issue of the 1966 congressional campaign. The President's deceptive guns-and-butter budget, which just a month ago was hailed as a political masterpiece, has turned out to be his first major political blunder.

His irresponsible refusal to face up to the danger of economic escalation at home at a time when we have military escalation abroad will cost his party scores of House and Senate seats in November; more important, it will cost those Americans who can least afford it billions of dollars in higher taxes and higher prices.

His budget message should have been a declaration of war against inflation. Instead it was a declaration of Mr. Johnson's "war on prosperity"—a war in which the casualties will be the family budgets of millions of Americans.

The American people are entitled to have the answers to two questions: How did we get into this "war on prosperity?" And, how can we get out of it?

CLEAR ANSWER

The answer to the first question is clear. As prices and taxes rise, administration spokesmen will try to blame labor for demanding higher wages, they will try to blame business for asking for higher prices, they will try to blame the war in Vietnam.

There is only one place to put the blame—the budget-brinkmanship of the Johnson administration.

There were plenty of early warning signals. There was the highest December rise in the cost of living in 15 years.

There was the yearend report that wholesale prices went up more in 1965 than they had in the last 8 years.

There were the accumulated deficits of 6 years of unbalanced budgets of the administration.

There were the demands of the war in Vietnam.

In a speech on December 3, I warned: "The American economy is on a collision course with inflation. Unless strong corrective action is taken dealing with causes rather than symptoms, the American people face higher prices, higher taxes, and wage and price controls in the next 2 years."

Along with many others in the loyal opposition, I recommend cutting nondefense spending and checking the expansion of credit. Instead of using these weapons, which could have won the war against inflation, President Johnson moved in exactly the opposite direction.

Instead of moving to check the expansion of credit, he criticized William McChesney Martin for raising the Federal Reserve Board discount rate.

Instead of cutting nonmilitary expenditures, he raised them.

Instead of presenting an honest budget his administration overestimated revenues, underestimated expenditures, and threw in some one-shot accounting gimmicks to disguise a \$9 billion budget deficit as a cash surplus.

Instead of using these battle-tested weapons to fight the war against inflation, he relied on new, untried weapons which proved to be duds—so-called "voluntary" guidelines for prices and wages. These weapons were too little, too late, and aimed at the wrong target.

He failed to recognize that the best way for Government to set guidelines is for Government to set an example. Instead he demanded that business slam on the price brakes while Government stepped on the spending accelerator.

Now with the war on inflation being lost and Mr. Johnson's "war on prosperity" launched, the casualties are beginning to mount.

In his state of the Union message, the President asked of those who recommended budget cuts: "Whom will they sacrifice?"

His question has turned out to be a deadly boomerang. As the Johnson inflation begins to eat into family budgets all over the Nation, millions of Americans are asking, Whom will he sacrifice?

If prices continue to rise at the December rate there will be a 5-percent increase in the cost of living in 1966. This is like imposing a 5-percent sales tax across the board on food, clothing, and all the necessities of life.

Whom then will he sacrifice? Not the rich, who can hedge against inflation, but the poor; the 20 million retired Americans living on social security who have no pay raise coming; the 3 million Americans in the armed services and the millions more working in Federal, State and local governments who have no clause in their contracts to compensate them for rising prices.

The 16 million union workers will suffer as well. If the Johnson guidelines hold their wage increases to only 3.2 percent while the Johnson inflation raises the prices of what they buy by 5 percent, their real wages, measured in purchasing power, will actually be cut by 2 percent in 1966.

Losing the war against inflation will also mean another battle lost in the war against poverty. If the Johnson inflation is not checked it will succeed in creating a new class of poor. Among the new poor will be millions of retired citizens. They will see their life insurance, their pensions, their social security, and their savings eaten up by the hidden tax of inflation.

Here is the ultimate tragedy: As we continue to lose the war against inflation we shall become hopelessly bogged down in the war nobody wants—the "war on prosperity."

TAX RAISE POSSIBLE

Because it failed to cut nonmilitary expenditures, the administration has now indicated that it may soon have to raise taxes. And lurking just around the corner is prosperity's most deadly enemy—compulsory wage and price control. As Dr. Arthur Burns said recently: "Such controls might suppress inflation for a time but at the cost of impairing efficiency and destroying economic freedom."

How can we start winning the war against inflation and end this "war against prosperity?"

It is time for the administration to adopt as its guideline not politics as usual but economic statesmanship of the highest order.

It is time for the President to level with the American people and to tell them that in a period when we are spending billions more for military expenditures abroad, it is necessary to cut nonmilitary expenditures at home.

Instead of condemning Chairman Martin for his courageous farsighted action, the administration should encourage action in the public and private sector which will check the rate of expansion of credit.

If these major weapons are not thrown into the battle immediately, the war against inflation will be lost and Mr. Johnson's ill-advised war against prosperity will escalate.

Normally we could rely on the Congress to restore responsibility to the budget. However, the Democrats with their current 2-to-1 majority in the House and Senate are creating such a racket bickering with each other and the President over Vietnam and shouting through approval of every new domestic spending program coming down from the White House that the voice of the responsible Republican opposition is lost in the chorus.

What this country needs, what the President needs, is a Congress that will stand up to him in defense of the dollar at home and stand up with him in defense of freedom abroad.

SENATOR SYMINGTON SPEAKS OUT

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, my colleague on the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Honorable STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, has energetically and effectively rebutted some of the assertions of critics of the administration's southeast Asia policies. On February 23, he appeared with me on a radio program for broadcast in my home State of West Virginia, and he emphasized that the American people want peace but they want it with honor. He further pointed out that many of the statements by administration critics are undoubtedly giving aid and comfort to the Communist aggressors in Asia.

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Senator SYMINGTON has continued his efforts to rebut some of the claims of administration critics of the U.S. Asian policies. The article, "A Rebuttal of a Rebuttal of Vietnam Policy," published in the Sunday, March 13, issue of the Washington, D.C., Post, is an eloquent statement of his views.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

A REBUTTAL OF A REBUTTAL OF VIETNAM POLICY
(By STUART SYMINGTON, Democratic Senator from Missouri, and former Air Force Secretary)

Within the past several weeks, the Washington Post has published an address by Under Secretary of State George Ball defending the Johnson administration's position on Vietnam and a rebuttal article by Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, headed, "The Basic Flaw in Our Asian Strategy."

The following thoughts have to do with certain basic views presented by Senator CHURCH; later I make some observations of my own concerning the relationship of history to the Vietnam problem we face today.

The Senator brings up three main points in his disagreement with Secretary Ball: first, that Asia and the other less-developed continents are different from Europe; second, that there is a sizable and significant difference between "Chinese aggression" and "Communist expansionism," and third, that the concept of spheres of influence is still a logical and useful way to come to grips with the problems of international order.

From these premises, Senator CHURCH concludes that our present Vietnam policy is unwise and unworkable although with candor he acknowledges the difficulty that lies in the way of embarking on an alternative one.

The Senator disagrees with those who believe that the war in Vietnam is a test case of our ability to resist the accepted Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation." He views this struggle as basically the working out of anticommunist and nationalist resultants left over from the end of French rule in 1954.

REVERSE DOMINO

Before examining his argument in detail, let us note the wider implications of his analysis. He does far more than merely question the policy of this administration: assisting the people of South Vietnam in resisting the attack that has been mounted against them. He attacks the foundations of U.S. policy throughout the less developed world—the so-called southern two-thirds of the globe, wherein live four-fifths of the world's population.

Were it not a metaphor that has been gravely weakened by misuse, one could describe his position as the "reverse domino" theory; because if United States overall policy in Vietnam is as wrong as the Senator suggests, its policy is likely to be mistaken in other areas as well. If the "policy domino" falls in Vietnam, it will carry down with it a number of policy principles that are being applied in the rest of the world.

The first contention of the Senator is that the rest of this world is not like Europe in the sense that Europe, after World War II, was composed of well-established governments able to resist either internal subversion or Communist political takeovers. The problem facing Europe, he suggests, was the threat of Soviet military aggression, and in order to halt and contain this threat, we cooperated in the formation of NATO.

This "stopped the westward movement of Russian aggression," not "the spread of

communism," a phrase in the Ball speech which he rejects because he believes it an unsatisfactory description of Soviet ambitions. But to describe the problem of Europe after World War II as being no more than the prevention of Soviet tanks from rolling westward is oversimplifying history to the point of distortion.

BUILDING FROM SCRATCH

In 1945, the countries of Europe were on their knees economically, and it took sizable amounts of American aid to start them on the road to recovery. The war left behind the remnants of discredited political arrangements, and not just in the defeated countries of the Axis. Political stability was an elusive goal in some countries.

Large Communist elements existed in France, Italy, and elsewhere. Their continued existence to this day apparently would lead Senator CHURCH to his conclusion that Soviet aggression, not communism expansion, was what was contained by American forces.

Surely the situation allows of another explanation which to me is both more plausible and more pertinent to what is now happening in Vietnam. The vital point is not that there were strong Communist parties in Western Europe but rather that they did not move to take power as they did in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.

The explanation may be that Communists west of the Danube are benign, parliamentarily and morally opposed to the use of force. In that case, the Communists now fighting to export North Vietnam's way of life into South Vietnam are different from those in Italy and France—but surely in ways that entitle South Vietnam to greater, not less, American assistance.

It would seem that a more likely explanation, and one with equal or greater pertinence to the current situation in Vietnam, is that the Communist elements in Western Europe were restrained by the presence of Western forces both before and after the formation of NATO. The Communist parties of Western Europe protested with all their resources of propaganda and disorder at what they described as an assertion of American hegemony in Europe.

THE GREEK AFTERMATH

The Senator's argument ends on a curious note, for he concludes that even though we succeeded in Europe, we are likely to fail in Asia. The success in Europe that we now take for granted was hardly evident during the grim winter of 1946-47.

Let us remember that in 1947, Communist forces in Greece were just 20 miles from Athens. That war was halted by sizable injections of American assistance, including military personnel, and later by the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Soviet orbit, leaving the Communists without that secure base.

What happened in Greece yields clear lessons for today's struggle in Vietnam, and the analogy is not destroyed by the fact that, as Senator CHURCH puts it, "we did not intervene with troops." Neither did we intervene with troops for the first several years of the Communist attack against Vietnam. Only when the infiltration of Communist military forces from outside became obvious, and beyond the capabilities of the South Vietnamese to resist adequately on their own, did we begin to put American fighting forces into Vietnam.

In Senator CHURCH's opinion, the analogy between Europe and Asia, and between Greece and Vietnam, also breaks down on the point that we and the Europeans share a common culture and civilization, including a common experience of freedom. Surely the concept of cultural spheres of influence depends on who is drawing the lines.

Greece has cultural links with France, England, and the United States, but its ties

to the East and South are not insignificant. The Eastern Orthodox Church belongs as much to Russia as to Greece. Conversely, Vietnam, after 80 years under French domination, may have earned some title to a common heritage, with a cultural and way of life that Westerners are quick to appreciate and admire.

I do not mean to press the point, but in this nuclear space age, the concept of mutual cultural interests is to me a much too narrow basis for determining where and when we should make our presence felt in assisting independent nations in their effort to preserve freedom from Communist exploitation.

By his emphasis on this point, Senator CHURCH comes perilously close to limiting our protective role to a "seamless web," to use his phrase, of Western civilization. He may protest this interpretation of his argument, but it is no more incorrect than his charge that our Government fails to see the differences between and within Communist countries.

There is nothing in the reasoned argument of Secretary Ball, or, as far as I know, in any statement by any administration spokesman, to suggest that the State Department does not recognize the important differences between the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, for example, on the one hand, and those of mainland China or North Korea on the other. In fact, the administration has shown itself to be clearly conscious not only of the differences between the various Communist camps but, perhaps more significantly—for this is a point left out of the argument of my colleague—it recognizes that communism itself changes with the passage of time.

The Soviet Union of today is not the Soviet Union that suffered under the nightmare rule of Stalin in his final, paranoid years. It is as great a mistake to fail to note the differences between the shrewd and flexible line of a Khrushchev preaching peaceful coexistence and the strictures of a Stalin as it is to overlook the differences between national varieties of communism.

A HOPE FOR ASIA

The changed conditions that now enable the President to proclaim a policy of "building bridges" to Eastern Europe also point in the direction of a future solution to the problems posed by Communist expansionism and Chinese aggression in Asia. For it is in the possibility of an eventual change within the regimes now leading the Asian Communist nations that hope lies for the future peace, freedom and development of the countries of Asia.

In the Communist world today, China leads the militant camp, preaching a doctrine of continuous and violent revolution directed at the less developed nations of the world. Its form of aggression has been the export of subversion, and whether this should be characterized as expansionism or aggression is to mine words. Either way, it seeks to advance the coming to power of Communist governments.

In seeking to acknowledge the correctness of a geopolitical claim to spheres of influence by China, Senator CHURCH in effect consigns a number of neighboring countries to the tender mercies of the commissars—not just Vietnam, but also Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines—and possibly one should add Korea and Japan. They are located within the Chinese range of power and thus, by his logic, would not be entitled to our assistance to resist Communist encroachment.

The Senator feels that China does not need to use open military methods in order to achieve its aim. Yet in Vietnam, the Communists sought for several years to achieve their purpose by techniques of subversion and propaganda. Only when these means were frustrated did they move to a more active stage of military effort.

The United States successfully aided South Vietnam during the earlier 1956-59 period. Only when the Communists escalated their attack by the introduction of large numbers of cadres and weapons from North Vietnam did we begin to provide military forces, first as advisers, then in combat strength.

It is the Communists who shaped the nature of that attack; we did not. I would like to ask Senator CHURCH: At what point in the shift from what he might call "expansionism" to what is plainly today a case of aggression would we have halted American assistance to South Vietnam?

COMPARING SPHERES

A final point about spheres of influence: The Senator concludes in a most curious fashion that we and the Chinese have similar rights to "spheres of influence": we in this hemisphere, they in the countries on their periphery.

Such a view cannot be left unchallenged. Surely the Senator does not mean to suggest that the Communist Chinese policy of exported subversion is similar to the voluntary and cooperative relationship that exists among the countries of this hemisphere and ourselves, as expressed in the OAS and the Alliance for Progress.

The Senator cites Cuba. But when that country allowed itself to become a base for Soviet missiles, the countries of Latin America voted 20 to 0 to condemn this action and support the blockade.

The Senator uses an analogy from the game of chess. Each "piece"—pawn or king—represents large numbers of people in important parts of the world. Surely one man's pawn is another man's king or queen. It all depends where they, and the observer, are located.

We heard Neville Chamberlain state in the late 1930's that Czechoslovakia was "a far-away country of which we know little." But to the people who wept in Prague when German tanks rolled in, that country was not far away but right there.

Should we not consider that today, in military time, Red China is far closer to all of America than Czechoslovakia was to Britain? This telescoping of time and space, along with the development of megaton weapons, can only change radically the "spheres of influence" concept. From the standpoint of national security, in effect every country is now in the next county.

LATE HOUR INDEED

And so it would seem to me that if one accepts the position of Senator CHURCH and his supporters, the claim can be made that we have lost some money and, what is more important, some lives. If these people are wrong, however, and if we do not recognize our responsibility as the only Nation left capable of resisting such aggression, tomorrow we could be fighting for more than justice; we could be fighting for survival.

In his "total disagreement" with the views of the State Department as to the importance of early deterrence of further Communist aggression, Senator CHURCH holds that the Department's position "is a myopia reminiscent of the Bourbon kings of whom it was said, 'They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing.'"

Earlier this year, it was Dean Acheson who said: "The fate of the people of Vietnam is of the same vital concern to the United States as that of those whom in the past we have helped to resist subjugation. Indeed, the situation in Asia today is reminiscent of the problems the United States confronted in Europe in 1947."

The last line of Senator CHURCH's article reads, "And the hour is late." With that I fully agree. It is not as late as it was for the French after Munich, but if it is important to liberty that Communist world aggression be resisted with unity in the free world, it is becoming very late indeed.

Mr. RANDOLPH subsequently said: My colleague from West Virginia [Mr. BYRD] has performed a timely service in bringing to the attention of the Senate and in presenting for publication in the RECORD the Washington Post article of Sunday, March 13, 1966, entitled "A Rebuttal of a Rebuttal of Vietnam Policy," by the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON].

The Senator now speaking was impressed by the basic article by Under Secretary of State George Ball, which was published in the Washington Post of Sunday, February 6, 1966, and which was republished the following day in the RECORD under my auspices.

I believe, too, that the able senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], in his Washington Post article of Sunday, February 20, 1966, and in his remarks the next day in the Senate were thought-provoking rebuttal.

Now, Mr. President, we have—in Senator SYMINGTON's rebuttal to the Senator CHURCH rebuttal to Under Secretary Ball's searching analysis of our involvement and efforts in Vietnam—a penetrating discussion which adds both facts and dignity to the debate.

The senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] addresses the issue persuasively and from a remarkable background. He draws upon knowledge and experience based on years of service on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and upon prior distinguished service as one of the Nation's most capable Air Force Secretaries.

Because of Senator SYMINGTON's credentials and his qualities of statesmanship, I consider him to be one of the most expert of Americans—whether in, or outside of, the field of public affairs—on the subject of our involvement in southeast Asia and what should be done as a consequence of this vexing condition.

Mr. President, I have associated myself generally with the position statement by Under Secretary of State Ball. I have read the rebuttal by Senator CHURCH and commend him for having forthrightly expressed his views. I have studied carefully the Symington rebuttal to the Church rebuttal, and I am convinced that Senator SYMINGTON's position is a realistic one.

West Virginians join their fellow Americans in being understandably concerned with the problems we face in southeast Asia. They realize that the changing, yet ever-real, struggle against communistic aggression must be counteracted as we are opposing it in South Vietnam.

IMPACTED AREAS SCHOOL-AID CUTS

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, I am very much concerned about the drastic reduction proposed by President Johnson in his 1967 budget for Federal financial aid to schools in impacted areas.

Under Public Law 874, the 1967 entitlements for Hawaii would be an estimated \$7,828,897.

Under the President's proposed amendments, Hawaii's estimated entitlements

would be only \$4,609,128, a reduction of \$3,219,769.

This is a cut of approximately 41 percent—a very severe cut to impose, especially since the cut occurs in one year.

This means that the people of Hawaii will somehow have to make up this \$3.2 million loss.

Yet the people of Hawaii already are making strenuous efforts to provide more and more funds for our schools. Improving school buildings, facilities, opportunities for teacher improvement, special services, greater opportunities for students—in short, a better school system is one of the highest priority programs in Hawaii.

Although ours is an Island State, we have a single education district organized under the Hawaii State Department of Education. It is a fine school system and we are proud of it. But there are many needed improvements and changes to keep our school system abreast of the knowledge explosion.

The people of Hawaii want good schools. They fully realize how important a good education is to their children, to their own future, and to the future of our State. This is why the people of Hawaii, through their State legislature, have agreed to substantially higher school budgets in recent years.

The loss of \$3.2 million in Federal school assistance would put a very heavy unexpected burden on the people of Hawaii.

Since 1950, Hawaii has received Federal school aid under Public Law 874 to help cover operating costs involved in education of federally connected children. Congress enacted this law, and Public Law 815 for construction assistance, in recognition of that fact that Federal installations, agencies, and activities have many times caused a mushrooming of school enrollments. To help offset the financial burden this imposes on local school districts, Congress has provided by formula for Federal financial assistance.

Where these Federal agencies and activities continue, the local school districts had every reason to expect that Federal financial aid would continue to be forthcoming.

In Hawaii, there are many Federal activities, of which the military establishment is the largest. The entire Nation knows how important Hawaii is to our Pacific defenses and to our effort in Vietnam. School plans have been made in anticipation of continued Federal assistance on the same basis as heretofore for federally connected children in Hawaii's school system.

A reduction such as the President proposed in his 1967 budget would really upset the school appletart.

I know a great many other school districts in America will also be adversely affected if these budget cuts remain.

Mr. President, the Third Legislature of the State of Hawaii recently adopted a concurrent resolution protesting the President's proposed cut in impacted areas aid and requesting the President to withdraw these cuts. I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks the text of the resolution be printed in full.

March 14, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Americans and the highland tribesmen clinging to the northern rim of the camp were ready to stage a counterattack against the enemy trench line along the southern barbed-wire perimeter. But the attack was postponed, and then canceled, when the weather turned bad and the planes could not strike.

One group of 19 survivors climbed out of helicopters in Da Nang, and others went in bases in the northern sector of the country. The group that arrived at Da Nang, in a gloomy drizzle, included three Americans. They were carried to ambulances.

A Marine spokesman said that two of 18 helicopters involved in the evacuation had been shot down. The crew of one was picked up, but the four men aboard the second were missing.

Four times during the day, as enemy troops massed along the broken south wall of the camp and then near the airstrip to the east, C-123 transport planes parachuted supplies and ammunition to the troops inside.

Some packages landed inside the enemy lines.

REDUCTION IN SCHOOL MILK FUNDS

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, by recommending a drastic cut in funds for the school milk program in the same budget that calls for grandiose new spending schemes, this administration has exposed the insincerity of its alleged commitment to economy in government.

We have been asked to cut the school milk fund from \$103 million down to \$21 million—a reduction of some 80 percent.

Yet in the same budget we are asked to appropriate billions to expand Great Society programs, such as the war on poverty, where the weapons are mostly rapid-fire mimeograph machines for publicity releases.

This is only one of many areas where prudent budget cuts can and should be made.

To my knowledge the administration has never voiced any concern about the \$115 billion in foreign aid we have showered upon the world during the last 20 years.

Instead, we are told this should be continued but our own school children should be made victims of a phony economy move.

I am gratified that a majority of the Members of the Senate have expressed opposition to this unjustified proposal by supporting S. 2921. I strongly support the aim of this legislation to establish funding for the school milk program at a reasonable level.

RETIREMENT OF SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD OF VIRGINIA

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I regret that because of the necessity of presiding at a meeting of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I was unable to be in the Chamber last Tuesday when my Finance Committee colleagues paid tribute to Harry Byrd.

As a junior member of that committee I hope I will be allowed to second everything they said at that time about our good friend. He served his people, his State, and his Nation well for nearly 33 years in this body. No man in Virginia's history served in higher office longer

than Harry Byrd. He was a credit to this body and I join my colleagues in wishing him many happy, peaceful years of observing the public scene from the sidelines. The peace and rest he is now enjoying have been well deserved.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, Senator Harry Flood Byrd has retired from the U.S. Senate after a lifetime of public service. He stands as a unique figure in our country's public life. As Governor of his home State at an early age, he built an administration based on integrity, efficiency, and service to the people of Virginia. His term of service endeared him to the people of his State so that when he became a candidate for the Senate he received an overwhelming endorsement, and this endorsement carried through five terms. In fact, when in 1960 he announced his intention to retire from this body, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Virginia unanimously requested him to serve again. He and Mrs. Byrd were so moved by this expression of confidence that they agreed that he should carry forward the mandate.

It has been my honor to serve with Senator Byrd for 22 years, and like all other Members of our body, I recognize and respect his steadfastness, his courage, and his forthrightness in speaking and voting for what he believed to be in the best interest of the United States. Throughout the period of our service he was one of the most influential Members of the Senate, not because of the important positions he held, but also because of his strength of character. As chairman of the Finance Committee and as a colleague on the Armed Services Committee, he was always fair, always thoughtful, always concerned about the welfare of our Nation. Everyone recognized that and respected him for it. At times—sometimes when when it was difficult to do so—he put our country ahead of his State. Certainly to his colleagues he exemplified the real essence of a legislator in the best sense of that word.

I know him as a friend. My four grandchildren are his great-nephews, and I have always enjoyed showing him their pictures and telling him that they, like him, stand firmly for what they believe in.

We always knew where Senator Harry Flood Byrd stood. All the positions he took in this body were based on his objective analysis of the situation and were never personal. In that way he retained as friends and admirers those with whom he did not agree.

We have always enjoyed our visits to Senator Byrd's home in Berryville, especially in the spring when his well-kept apple trees are in full bloom, and we look forward to visiting him there in the future. We shall all miss him in the Senate, and we wish him many years of happy life.

ALF M. LANDON SPEAKS ON VIETNAM

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, once again the Honorable Alf M. Landon has made a substantial and enlightening contribution to the dialog concerning

one of the great issues which face our Nation and this generation.

His speech delivered on March 7 in Topeka, Kans., concerning the Vietnam war represents, I think, an understanding of an incredibly complex problem and a clarity of thought which has long been absent in the Vietnam debate.

Mr. Whitley Austin of the Salina Journal commented upon this address in an editorial in the Salina Journal on March 10, 1966, entitled, "Containment Now May Stop World War Later." As Mr. Austin observes:

No one puts the pieces of the Vietnam puzzle together more clearly than Alf Landon, the former Governor, who has become as much of a fox at international relationships as he once was at Kansas politics.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address by Governor Landon and the editorial herein noted be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM

(Address by Alf M. Landon, Kiwanis Clubs meeting, Topeka, Kans., Mar. 7, 1966)

As the Vietnam war pressure mounts on our manpower and our economy—two questions are being asked by Americans.

First, how did we get into this war—and, second, how do we get out?

The first leads to the second, and that has long range impact on the entire world's governments' domestic and foreign policies.

The genesis of our being in South Vietnam is the Truman containment policy and the failure of the Marx-Lenin theories to work in practice in any of the Communist countries. The Communists have found it necessary to steadily water down their theories by increasing individual incentive motives. That varies from country to country. Red China has just barely started on that capitalistic principle—while Yugoslavia has gone farther than probably any other Communist country in departing from the Marx-Lenin dogmas.

It is evident from this record that the only chance any form of communism has to conquer and dominate the world is by military force. They never will bury us economically, as Khrushchev once boasted. Therefore, Mao is probably brutally right—as far as Communist domination is concerned—when he told Nehru that he was planning a nuclear war because—with the size of their population—there would be more Chinese left than any other peoples in the world.

However, that does not suit the Russian hierarchy in the Kremlin. Therefore, the pulling in opposite directions by China and Russia that is splitting the Communist parties in every country in the world. That split may reach a climax in the coming late March meeting of the Communist countries. Right in the midst of these contradictions is Vietnam that is spurring a hard line by the Soviet military.

The Truman containment policy—as Secretary Rusk said in his honest, clear, detailed, and sound testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—is also at stake in the Communist attack on South Vietnam.

The Secretary said simply and clearly that we are fighting a big war there to maintain the Truman containment policy in the interest and security of the United States of America and the free world, and to keep our commitment under the SEATO Treaty.

Here is the truth at last from our national administration's spokesmen.

It's a continuation of 20 years of world-wide nibbling here and fighting there by Communist countries on the Truman containment policy that was first adopted to protect Greece and Turkey from Communist subversion when President Truman was informed by England that it was no longer able to.

When Secretary of State Dean Acheson practically invited China into Korea by publicly saying it was "beyond the periphery of our defenses," the Chinese—taking him at his word—invaded Korea. Mr. Truman then promptly acted courageously and correctly—between night and morning—opposing with our Armed Forces their invasion.

There was the bombardment of Taiwan by China—which Mr. Eisenhower answered with the concentration of our 7th Fleet in the strait between Taiwan and China.

There was the threat by Russia on Tunisia—which Mr. Eisenhower answered with the concentration of the 6th Fleet there.

There were Laos and Cuba.

Then there was Guatemala—and now Santo Domingo.

So little Vietnam—practically unheard of and unnoticed until 5 years ago—is today the center of the nervous attention of the world governments. It can well become the great test of the Truman doctrine. I do not mean that is immutable. I do say it has not served its useful purpose until and unless Russia and China change their proclaimed intention of conquering the world.

Little South Vietnam—a country of only 15 or so million population—with absolutely no strategic military or economic value—no transportation to speak of outside of water—no natural resources outside of agriculture, principally in the rice-rich Mekong Delta—no popular interest in their country or Government—was probably chosen by China as the most likely place to weaken the Truman doctrine.

The Vietcong has been organized and trained by North Vietnam in starting liberation fronts in the traditional Communist underground way of creating terror by murder and kidnaping. Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently called the Vietcong "an invention of the Communist Party of North Vietnam to serve as a political cloak for its activities in the south."

Our national administration is no longer describing it as a brush war—no longer describing our soldiers as advisers. However, it is still incorrectly describing it as a limited war, because it is not a limited war. As the North Vietnamese feed in more troops—America feeds in more troops.

Our President said, on Saturday, February 26, that there were no requests for additional troops on his desk. On the following Monday, the top U.S. marine in South Vietnam told President Johnson, "We need more marines there to drive out Communist forces and make sure they stay out."

All that clatter and chatter has weakened the confidence of the American public in the credibility of our national administration—destroyed by a long record of unrealistic optimism as to the size—the length—of a war that we were first told was to be won by American bombers and Vietnamese ground troops.

This loss of confidence in what we have been—and are being—told by our national administration is bad for our country. The grim factual report by Senator MANSFIELD of actual conditions in South Vietnam shocked Americans.

Roving Ambassador Averell Harriman said that Vice President HUMPHREY's swing around the Asiatic circle to line up stronger allied force to meet the threat of China was timely, in that he was able to offset misunderstandings of Vietnam policy debates in the Senate and public hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, coupled with editorials and commentaries that

"might have caused some real concern as to whether we will stick in South Vietnam." That is questionable.

However, that real concern is very definitely encouraged by our President's characteristic involved, circuitous, steering line of action. That is the way he operates from beginning to end. It permeates his whole political career—his Great Society program here at home—and all his foreign policy. I must say, that is true of most foreign offices in the world. And, by the same token, that same policy has resulted in bringing about many of the wars humanity has suffered.

Mr. Johnson got away with his long practiced put-and-take procedure masterfully last year in his domestic program. Whether he can get away with it in foreign policy on Vietnam is the big question.

It is a stupendous calculated risk. Don't ever delude yourself that Mr. Johnson does not know what he is doing. The risk is that other peoples and their governments may delude themselves as to what our President is up to and what is the real policy that motivates him and that he is pursuing. In the history of mankind, many wars—that were to be short range and turned into long range ones—were stumbled and fumbled into this way.

I quote John S. Knight in Editor's Notebook: "Only now and far too late are we hearing any debate on Vietnam. The handful of U.S. Senators who dare to question Government policies are treated with studied contempt."

"So at least it is clear that the President has assumed all responsibility for the conduct of the war."

Senator JOHN STENNIS, chairman of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, has said, "this is no longer peacetime, and disaster may lie around the corner if we continue to conduct a war under peacetime policies and funding."

That brings me to the second question—how do we get out of South Vietnam? There are two ways.

One is to go all out and fight to the bitter end with everything we have got until China is no longer able to support the Communist Vietcong and they are driven out of South Vietnam.

We are failing to do that. We are still trying to scare the North Vietnamese with threats and they don't scare—alternating with offers of economic assistance. We were still not bombing military strategic places in North Vietnam until last Friday when, for the first time, we destroyed 100 miles of a railroad military supply line.

The other way to get out of South Vietnam is to phase out—as Senator ROBERT KENNEDY advocates—by negotiations based on the Vietcong being in a coalition government.

Two days later, Mr. Johnson's press secretary announced there was no conflict with the Senator's position and the President's. They both agreed such an "accommodation"—that is a weasel-word for coalition—with the Vietcong would have to be agreed to first by the South Vietnamese in a free election.

All right, what are we waiting for and what are we continuing to fight for? Let's hold the general election right away—if that's neocolonialism, as far as the so-called Government of South Vietnam is concerned—it is realistic—even though Marshal Ky stood up to President Johnson before the ink was dry on the pact of Honolulu on the section relating to the Vietcong participating in any negotiations.

The point is that there never has been a free election in South Vietnam. There is not any possibility of holding one now or for a long time. The world governments know there will not be any Communist representation in the South Vietnamese Government except by America's advice and consent. Therefore, why all this weasel-worded talk

about a free election in South Vietnam to ratify a Communist coalition government?

Any government in position at the time of that election is going to control it. That is why the North Vietnamese will not accept it as a peace solution unless the makeup of the South Vietnamese Government is first determined ahead of time. I quote from an AP story dated February 24 from Saigon:

"Washington talk of free elections in Vietnam 'with all of us abiding by the consequences of those elections, whatever they may be' (quoting the President here) is another area that gets increasingly complex closer to the scene.

"The Ky government is talking of elections. There are plans to name an advisory council for the building of democracy that would work out a draft constitution. It has been said that such a constitution would be submitted to a referendum late this year and that general elections would be held next year.

"With the amount of land and the number of people the Communists control, it hardly seems likely that voting booths are about to spring up.

"The outlook is that there is a lot of war to be fought first."

There is the sound statement of our Vice President on the matter of accommodating the Vietcong—who likened that to admitting a fox to the chicken coop—after a while, there would be no chickens left—or an arsonist to a fire department. That is the 100 percent record of Communist participation to an extent in any government anywhere in the world. I quote from the February 25 "Research Institute Recommendations":

"ROBERT KENNEDY's coalition with the Vietcong recommendation is a Rubicon in the U.S. policy debate that can't be recrossed. Despite his 'explanations' and backtracking since he proposed it, the 'coalition' idea has found its inevitable place in the debate."

"There's a faint chance that a coalition with Reds would work, that the Communists wouldn't turn it into an eventual takeover. A detailed RIA study of past coalitions with Reds shows that they have not been able to seize power in every situation.

"1. For example, the Reds had posts in the 'popular front' government in France in the mid-1930's, also under De Gaulle in 1946. They've been in the Parliaments of Britain, Luxembourg, and Italy, even were elected to a few places in U.S. localities in the thirties.

"These were situations where they had no chance of taking over. They settled for what influence they could exert on foreign policy, usually in furtherance of Soviet world objectives of the moment. When Moscow's aims changed, the popular fronts were all junked, as when Stalin decided to woo Hitler, rather than fight him.

"2. Where Reds had power positions, the story was different. They turned every coalition in Eastern Europe into a takeover after World War II, ruthlessly disregarded solemn wartime promises not to. They controlled the key ministries, had Soviet power behind them.

"3. There's a third category of Red 'collaboration': Paralysis. Where they could neither rule nor ruin, they went in for blocking. The classic case is Laos. From 1954 on, their Pathet Lao troops have kept every government hog tied through active military terrorism.

"In 1962, they reaffirmed the 'coalition' principle in Laos, but the Pathet Lao has yet to enter the central government peacefully. Only the diversion of Hanoi's aid to the war in South Vietnam, plus U.S. force in Thailand, has kept them from taking over.

"Conclusion: There's small hope they'd regard a coalition in South Vietnam as any-

thing but another invitation to seizure of power.

"Their model, in fact, is already set and waiting—in Hanoi. For years before he took over, Ho Chi Minh insisted his Vietnam wasn't Communist dominated. He made the same claims at the time that Liberation Front backers are making in today's conflict—that it included non-Reds, nationalists, Socialists, Trotskyites.

"But once Ho came to Hanoi as 'coalition' chief in 1954, he turned on the non-Communists, exterminated them ruthlessly. France's expert Bernard Fall, a staunch critic of U.S. policy, estimates that Ho killed 10,000 to 100,000 opponents after 1954. Ho's defense chief, General Giap, has boasted openly how he did it."

There is no prospect of the short and easy victory for America and her allies that we were first assured would be the case. To those who object to the term "victory," my answer is that if President Eisenhower had not made the Korean truce when he did 13 years ago—with 50,000 American soldiers still stationed in Korea to maintain it—Mr. Kennedy probably would not have been confronted with Russia in Laos. If we had not helped to establish Castro in the face of warnings by three American ambassadors to Cuba that he is a Communist—Mr. Kennedy would not have been confronted with the Russians in Cuba. We probably would not be fighting today in South Vietnam, and, if we were not fighting today in South Vietnam—China's devastating political defeats in Asia and Africa probably would not have occurred.

How we settle the Vietnamese war is of international interest and concern. There is not any question anywhere of America's winning our South Vietnamese war. The only question in the foreign offices is whether the United States is willing to pay the cost of ultimately obtaining its objective—that is, to make the Truman doctrine for containment of communism stick in South Vietnam, a bitter and unwelcome task that may threaten the disintegration of the world—or whether we are going to phase out by abandoning South Vietnam ultimately to the Communists, at a cost also that really threatens the disintegration of world resistance to Chinese or Russian Communist encroachment.

Either way, it will affect our relations with every government in the world.

There is no war psychology in the United States now. As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese war is not popular.

Therefore, let us look with unemotional foresight where either settlement leaves us.

The first—that is, clearing the Communists out of South Vietnam and clearing out ourselves, adding that little underdeveloped country to a higher standard of living, including education—leaves free America in a strong balance of power position militarily—and what's of great importance in this modern world—politically.

That means an increasing economic loss and—what is of infinitely more importance—loss of American blood.

The second—admitting Communists to a coalition South Vietnamese Government—over the strongly expressed position of the South Vietnamese Government—even though it is in name only—means the weakening of our balance-of-power position and the strengthening of the Communist position in every government in the world.

We become somewhat isolated. President de Gaulle—who believes we haven't the patience and the determination to win in South Vietnam—is already anticipating that in his French policy of establishing better relations between China and France. It's the old principle—if you can't lick them, join them.

In England, the leftwing of the British Labor Party favors the same policy. If we weaken, we cut the ground out from under a staunch supporter of the United States of America, Prime Minister Wilson.

West Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Japan will be forced to establish new relations with all the Communist bloc.

Will the failure of the Marx-Lenin theories to work economically force the Communist bloc to attempt to conquer the world by armed force or subversion?

We must be prepared in our thinking for all those possibilities. Those who advocate a settlement in South Vietnam with "accommodation" to the Vietcong Communists have not come up with any answers to what then should be our policy.

I am no Johnny-come-lately, at least, in discussing some of these key questions. Where were they when I was urging admission in 1944 of Red China to the United Nations—trade with Communist countries—criticized John Foster Dulles' brinkmanship—promptly urged accepting Chou en lai's proposal for a world conference to abolish nuclear weapons—which U Thant as Secretary General of the United Nations unprecedentedly endorsed the next day—for discussion, and France and Russia subsequently accepted.

Those could have led to hard-headed discussions and negotiations between Communist countries and the free world. "Accommodation" in Vietnam is not negotiation for peace—but surrender to terror.

If we settle in South Vietnam for a Communist victory through a coalition government—that means the fragmentation of our Truman containment policy—that has been a massive force in protecting the interests of free countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa from the neocolonialism of China and Russia. Therefore, our foreign policy and other nations' international relations will be forced into a new pattern.

China will recover some of the political ground it has recently lost.

That may launch Russia into a hard line in its relations with our country, as Premier Kosygin's recent tirades against America seem to mean. Although it is possible that the increased threat of China may turn Russia toward better relations with the West. That coming March 29 Communist caucus in Moscow may throw some light on the Soviets' intentions.

Elsewhere in the world, and on this hemisphere in particular, more Communist self-styled liberation fronts will explode.

In other words—it is not only that world war III might come from the escalation of the war in Vietnam. It is more likely a world war might come from the escalation of appeasement by Americans.

Be that as it may—for better or for worse—we must back our President's decisions in this critical state of world affairs. His strength is in an informed people.

I am confident that I speak for many Americans in asking him to keep us better informed.

[From the Salina (Kans.) Journal,
Mar. 10, 1966]

CONTAINMENT NOW MAY STOP WORLD WAR LATER

No one puts the pieces of the Vietnam puzzle together more clearly than Alf Landon, the former Governor, who has become as much of a fox at international relations as he once was at Kansas politics.

When Landon speaks today he is heard. Here is a quick synopsis of what he said this week:

Communist failure is at the root of the trouble. Marxian theories of economics don't work. Russian and western Reds are

edging into profit capitalism. The only chance for communism to dominate the world is by military force. This is Red China's objective, in Vietnam and elsewhere.

To contain Communist expansion has been our purpose since Harry Truman first put forth that doctrine. Containment has worked wherever vigorously pursued. Now the doctrine is being tested again in Asia.

This hasn't been made clear to Americans until now. The Government has made contradictory statements. We have tried to scare the Reds with threats. We have confused ourselves. Johnson's technique of taking one step backward for every two forward hasn't been understood.

Now we are in the war, how do we get out? A free election under South Vietnam auspices is unacceptable to the north. To accommodate the Vietcong and North Vietnamese by a coalition government, as the brothers KENNEDY suggest, can result only in a Communist seizure of power. This is what has happened when Communists have been accommodated in the past.

If we abandon the doctrine of containment in this fashion, China will recover some of the political ground it has lost. Russia may be expected to take a harder line toward us. Elsewhere in the world, more Communist self-styled liberation fronts will explode. The Reds will be on the march.

While it is possible World War III might come from escalation of fighting in Vietnam, it is more likely a world war might come from the escalation of appeasement by Americans. It would invite Communist imperialism to expand.

Our other choice is to clear the Communists out of South Vietnam and then clear out ourselves, after giving that little country a higher standard of living. To do so would put America in the position of strong balance of power, militarily and politically. Communism would be contained again.

But such a choice means an increasing economic loss—and what is more important—a greater loss of American blood.

Yet containment now may prevent a much heavier loss of blood later on.

It is a hard choice. For better or worse, Landon concludes, we must back our President's decisions in this critical state of world affairs. But if we are to back him, we must be better informed.

We must understand what containment is about and how it operates. Landon has contributed to this understanding.

THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT AS THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may include in the RECORD at this point a speech which I delivered on the evening of Saturday, March 12, before the 56th anniversary dinner of the Federation of Citizens Associations of the District of Columbia. The dinner was held at the Mayflower Hotel.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT AS THE NATION'S CAPITAL

Washington belongs to the Nation.

When the Congress was sitting in Philadelphia near the end of the Revolutionary War, a mob of disgruntled soldiers marched upon the Congress, surrounded the meeting hall, and threatened and interrupted the business of the National Legislature. Appeals by the Congress to the officials of the city of Philadelphia and to the officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania brought no

assistance to the Congress. Lacking the power of control, the Congress removed to Princeton, N.J., to reconvene and get on with the execution of the Revolutionary War.

The genius of the framers of the Constitution found a solution to such a problem by providing for the establishment of the seat of the National Government at some location which was not a part of a city nor a part of a State, but an area ceded to the Federal Government and completely under the control of the Federal Government to serve for the sole purpose of becoming the seat of the National Government.

This concept was put into language by the framers of the Constitution, which provision was part of the Constitution ratified by the people of the States, in article I, section 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, which provided, among other powers of the Congress, that it "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding 10 miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States."

The Founding Fathers gave the District a unique role in that they did not ordain it as a seat of the Government, but, rather, as the seat of the Government—the one and only seat of the Government of the United States.

Clause 17, section 8, article I is, therefore, the source of Congress' power to govern the District of Columbia. Congress, itself, however, is not required to exercise this power, but may at any time create a government for the District and vest in it the same range of lawmaking power as it has always customarily vested in territories of the United States. In 1871, it did, in fact, do so; and while this Government was later (1878) abolished and the present system instituted, certain of its legislative acts are still in force.

The District of Columbia was established solely, therefore, for the purpose of being the seat of Government of the United States, and it is first and foremost the Federal City. It belongs to every American citizen no matter where he lives. This is a city *sui generis*, and we want the District of Columbia to remain the unique city that it is.

Granted that there are many features of the present running of the District of Columbia which can and ought to be improved, there is no ground for assuming that the governmental purposes and functions would be better served or as well served if the United States abrogated to the residents its duty of providing a safe center of government. They should, however, have their own duly elected representation in Congress.

As the home of the Federal Government, the District stands in a profoundly and magnificently unique role. As the Federal City, of course, the District commands a prestigious position unequalled by any other American city and, in many respects, by any other city in the world.

Here it is that the three great coordinate branches of government of this Republic have their seats. The Congress meets annually here; the President and the Executive family live and function here; and the judiciary, represented by the highest court of the land, holds its sessions here. The eyes of the Nation and the world look toward Washington so named for the first President of our country.

No other American city is so richly endowed by history, so favored with Federal largesse and payroll, so courted by student and diplomat, so blessed with museums and memorials—in truth it is the Athens, the Rome, and the Constantinople of the modern world—a city like him for which it was named: first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen.

Homer, of old, wrote of Mount Olympus, in northern Thessaly, where Zeus, king of the gods, and arbiter of human destiny, sat upon its topmost ridges, and made or marred the fortunes of human beings. Washington, like Mount Olympus, often decides the interests of the state and determines the destinies of men. It marks their futures, for war or for peace, deciding whether they shall lift or lay down the sword, and its influence upon the fortunes of old and young, rich and poor, rustic and urbane, is felt from the cradle to the shroud.

President, Shah, and King; Senator and Governor; scientists, inventor, and astronaut; lawyer, merchant, and priest; artist and singer of joy—the paths of all cross here—the Capital of the Nation, the hub of the world, the heart of the universe.

What is the District's role of responsibility? The city which is the home of the Federal Government should, first of all, be representative of the country and of the people served by that Government. But the city is not truly representative of the country. Perhaps the greatest underlying problem of this city is the problem of population distribution, which is not representative of the population throughout the country. Rooted in this problem is a kind of inherent weakness foredooming, I fear, any effort toward making this a representative seat of Government. In reality, if we are to have a good National Capital, the Federal Government itself ought to do something about studying population mobility and its causes, and this city might become a laboratory for such a study.

It is a pathetic thing to see Negro families crowded five and six in a room, coming from Mississippi, Ohio, or anywhere, where at least they had open space and a shack to live in. The place to get at their problem is right there. Notwithstanding this terrible problem of population imbalance, we should all bend every effort, as best we can, toward making this a model city, one which will attract not only the eyes but also the admiration of the rest of the Nation and of the world.

In asserting that it should be a model city, one readily assigns to the Nation's Capital many roles—the role of leadership in art, music, and culture; the role of leadership in cleanliness and beauty; the role of leadership in recreation; the role of leadership in learning; the role of leadership in health and medical programs and facilities. Add to these the role of leadership in peace, prosperity, and safety for its citizens, for boycotts and money collections by agitators and extremists can hardly be representative of the Nation's Capital.

As a matter of fact, they are not representative and do irreparable harm to the legitimate objectives, of the responsible people of the community, for better living conditions and better schools.

The city as the Nation's Capital should be a place where family life is emphasized as against highly sophisticated social activities. But, like all national capitals, the city is presently one of social activity with emphasis on cocktail parties and society affairs which draw not only the rich and those who are well to do, but also those who do well to make ends meet. In this regard, the city is not really American in the traditional sense of moderation and modesty. But this is something that will never be changed and one might seriously question whether or not the average American citizen would expect or want it to be otherwise.

But in other respects there is much to be desired if the city is to fulfill its proper role.

PUBLIC WORKS

For example, there is no question but that we should build freeways in the District of Columbia. There are strong opponents to this. Not only should we build them, but we should go to great lengths to make sure

that they represent the very best. We should set the pattern.

In urban communities, the basic problem of construction of a freeway system is in making long-range benefits outweigh short-range adversities. Everything must be done to minimize the impact upon the community with respect to breaking up neighborhoods and displacing people.

With regard to the construction of public works—whether it be a freeway, a library or a school building—there are probably more objections raised in this community than in any other because of problems of relocation, particularly when overcrowding of families is involved, and because of the destruction of historic landmarks. The basic principle that must be kept in mind here, particularly here, is that the facility is constructed to serve the people and, once a decision is made in the affirmative that the facility is required, then all efforts should be placed toward minimizing any of the normal adversities of construction.

In the next 6 years of construction in the District of Columbia, the number of families displaced by freeways, I am advised, will be roughly two-thirds of the displacements occasioned by other District of Columbia construction. In other words, although most people associate the adversities of public works construction with the freeway program, the future construction plans of the District indicate that the construction of schools, libraries and other similar District facilities, will displace 50 percent more families than the planned freeway program.

The subway system which Congress has recently authorized is under design at the moment. The latest plans indicate that the first construction of this system will probably come about in the early fall of 1967. This is another and very good example of a major public works project which undoubtedly will cause extreme problems both to District inhabitants and to District business during construction. But its construction is so urgently needed by the entire metropolitan area that these adversities must be accommodated and accepted by all concerned, and extraordinary measures should be taken to minimize the impact during construction.

EDUCATION

Washington should be a city in which education is geared to the maximum level attainable, so that every youngster has a chance to fulfill the utmost of his potential. The school system should be one to which the Nation could point with pride—a school system where no one is left out; a system with the finest buildings, the best equipped classrooms, and well-paid and highly competent teachers.

It must also be a system which will prepare its outgoing students to take their place in society, to go on to college or to make a living. Every child must be prepared to later support himself so that he will contribute to society and not be a drain upon it.

We often hear it said that this school facility or that school facility in the District of Columbia is a disgrace. Members of Congress annually take tours through the city and splash into print by pointing to this or that building as outmoded, antiquated, and disgraceful. And in the context of the Nation's Capital, there is much validity in the adjectives used.

Nevertheless, the citizens of the District of Columbia have a responsibility to themselves even if they disregard their responsibilities to their neighbors and to the Nation. They should take pride in whatever facilities are present and strive to protect and improve these. They, themselves, for example, should take strong action against vandalism and wanton destruction of school properties.

Community responsibility must start at the precinct level, and the nearby residents should share responsibility for their schools.

than \$3,000. At the other end of the distribution, annual income of \$7,000 or more was reported by 24.5 percent of Anglo men, but only 8.9 percent of Spanish-American men, and 2.8 percent of Negro men earned \$7,000 or above.

NATIVITY, PARENTAGE, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Of all Spanish-Americans in the Southwest, according to the 1960 census, 84.6 percent were born in the United States. Only 15.4 percent were born elsewhere: the majority 13.5 percent, in Mexico, and only 1.9 percent in other countries (table 7). Of the total Spanish-American population, 54.8 percent were native born of native parentage, and 29.8 percent, of Mexican parentage.

TABLE 7.—Nativity and parentage: Spanish-Americans

	Number	Percent
Total.....	3,464,999	100.0
Native born.....	2,930,185	84.6
Native parentage.....	1,894,402	54.8
Foreign or mixed parentage.....	1,030,783	29.8
Mexican parentage.....	917,614	26.5
Other.....	113,167	3.3
Foreign born.....	534,814	15.4
In Mexico.....	468,684	13.5
Elsewhere.....	66,130	1.9

Source: U.S. Census, 1960, Subject Rept. PC(2) 1B table 1.

Data from the most recent census, from earlier census tabulations, and from migration records support the conclusion that a high proportion of the Spanish-American group under study migrated from Mexico or are descendants of such migrants.

URBAN-RURAL RESIDENCE

Much the same as other Americans throughout the Nation, Spanish-Americans are tending to concentrate in urban areas in the Southwest. This is also true of the Negroes of this area (table 8).

TABLE 8

Ethnic group	Year	Residence		Total
		Urban	Rural	
Spanish-American...	1960	79.1	20.9	100.0
Do.....	1950	66.4	33.6	100.0
Negro.....	1960	83.5	16.5	100.0
Do.....	1950	72.4	27.6	100.0

Source: "U.S. Census of the Population: 1960," Vol. 1, PC(1)-1B, U.S. Summary, table 47: Age by color and sex for the United States. Subject reports: PC(2)-1B, "Persons of Spanish Surname," table 2; Age of white persons of Spanish surname, PC(2)-1C, nonwhite population by race, table 50; Social characteristics of the Negro population.

NEXT STEPS

Findings to date indicate that Spanish-Americans rate lowest in education as it is measured by years of school completed. To be explored further in the literature is the extent to which members of this group continue to hold to Spanish as the language of home and community and how this practice limits learning in a land where English is so vitally important.

The fact that Spanish-Americans have to a considerable degree found their way into technical, clerical, and skilled occupations offers promise for their further escalation, as opportunities are afforded them. The relative cohesiveness of Spanish-American families would also seem to be reassuring for the future progress of this group.

But many Spanish-Americans have far to go. This is conclusively demonstrated by the fact that 53 percent of Spanish-American men had incomes of less than \$3,000 in 1959. Given the preponderance of large, young families and the apparent tendency of Spanish-American mothers to stay out of the

work force when their children are young, it seems unlikely that this low income could be increased to any meaningful degree without increasing substantially the earning capacity and opportunity of the men.

With a substantial proportion of incomes below the poverty line figure, the problems of Spanish-Americans are further compounded by the fact that their education is limited. At the same time, it is not a simple matter to extend necessary services to this group since they tend to live apart from the mainstream of American life.

Whatever programs may be suggested to help meet the needs of this largely underprivileged group will depend on the outcome of continued analysis of relevant information.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MORALE IS HIGH

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in a letter dated March 7 from a friend of mine serving with the military in Vietnam, I read with such gratification a personal report on the attitudes and the determination of our men in Vietnam that I desire to share those inspiring sentiments with the Congress and with the country.

The young man reporting to me is a typical South Dakotan and I dare to believe he is also a typical American. His brave words and his inspiring report should give greater confidence and more realism to those in our country who proclaim that our cause in Vietnam is hopeless and perhaps induce them to refrain from expressing sentiments of disunity and dissent.

I offer this letter for the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in the hope others may receive from it the same inspiration that it has provided me. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DA NANG AIR BASE,
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,
 March 7, 1966.

While I have only been here in this country a little over a month, I can honestly say I have been most impressed with what I've seen here. This is a most unusual yet interesting country, and by custom, it is so much different from our way of life in the United States. Yet it is quite easy to learn to appreciate the Vietnam old and ancient way of life. * * * I am an intelligence adviser. * * * I have found these military men to be true workers and they, like we Americans, have a like devotion to country and duty, so it is a real challenge for Americans to offer as much assistance as we can.

Living conditions here for the American military man is not up to stateside conditions, naturally—however in a war situation every man realizes that we have it as best can be provided by the United States. Mail coming in has improved greatly, food is very fine, living conditions are being made better daily, and our commanders are showing greater concern toward their men than was shown in World War II or in Korea. This is most gratifying. I see men from all branches of service daily, eat with them, live with them, and spirits are high, morale is good, and naturally both of these are most important.

Before closing my letter to you, sir, I should like to share an experience with you, which I feel will clearly show what type of men are here in Vietnam today. We have

a port of embarkation at McGuire Air Force Base on the east coast and one at Travis Air Force Base in California. In 1960 I left from McGuire Air Force Base for a tour to Germany. While waiting for my flight there I'll simply say the air was filled with much happiness. Fellow military men were anxious for their departure and looking forward to seeing a lovely old country, of young foreign girls, the taste of a new and different life for the duration of each man's tour in Europe. All of us were dressed in class A uniforms, spotlessly clean and all thoughts were gay and happy. Naturally there was a note of sadness, leaving loved ones, family, wives, but a situation of war did not then exist and fear was not a consideration. Turn now to February 1966, to Travis Air Force Base, and we find a different situation, a different condition in general. There I saw men in green shaded fatigues, field packs on some, men carrying weapons, uniforms not so neatly pressed, and faces were not smiling, voices were not gay. Here was an air of anticipation, of concern, what lies ahead for us, and on that day, many questions still remained unanswered. After a time of listening and watching, talking with other fellows, I found that though this feeling was present, never were ill words spoken, no one said, "Why are we going over to fight their war," these men were military men, with a true devotion for duty, a high ideal toward honor and men seemed to gather around the older soldiers, or men who were returning to Vietnam for a second tour, asking questions. The answers were serious ones, not of foreign girls this time, of gay places to visit, only answers to how best avoid dangers of war, to avoid the enemy, and most of all, how to stay alive, keep from getting injured, and placing strong emphasis on learning about the people and the country. It was a true experience for me, one I'll not soon forget.

One fact I have learned over here is that the United States does not hope to win this war; we hope only to win the hearts of the people, and in doing this, the proud people of this country will surely win the war for themselves. It is obvious that the United States is highly respected by the people of Vietnam, the military man is an ambassador of goodwill, one to advise and direct these people, not to shove and push them into any situation. I say the United States can well be proud of the men serving in Vietnam, and each man can be proud of the part he is playing here to bring a quick peace to this land and its determined people.

Well Senator MUNDT, sir, I have rambled on here much too much, but I feel in my heart that what I've said to be true, and I know that the United States is just as proud of its military might as are the men who serve her with honor and dignity.

THE STATE OF THE ARTS IN MONTANA

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, a few weeks ago it was my privilege to view the Foote collection of Montana historic artifacts on display at the Department of Commerce. The Foote collection has now moved on to the Galeries Lafayette in Paris. I know that Members of this body, of the President's Cabinet and many others enjoyed the privilege of viewing this fine collection.

Last November, thousands of Washingtonians, and visitors from around the Nation and overseas, viewed the exhibition of Montana arts and crafts in the caucus room of the Old Senate Office Building. The works of some 55 Montana artists were exhibited there in a

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display arranged by one of Montana's artists now residing in Washington, Mr. Raymond Dockstader, legislative assistant to the majority leader.

These two displays of Montana art before approving national and international audiences are but the latest examples of distinguished art among residents of a State which chose, as its representative in Statuary Hall, the great western painter and illustrator, Charles Russell.

Recently articles appearing in the New York Times and Saturday Review indicated that Montana and its sister State, Wyoming, are so bereft of artistic talent that they cannot provide needed leadership in the field. The articles, which I shall insert in the Record at the conclusion of these remarks, quote Governors' representatives of those two States as saying that they had no cities with the talent and facilities to provide vigorous leadership in artistic affairs.

Montana has in fact extraordinary local leadership in artistic affairs, not only in several cities but in small towns which regular produce historical dramas, and on Indian reservations such as the Crow, whose annual enactment of the Custer battle attracts national attention. The University of Montana at Missoula and Montana State University at Bozeman, the Montana Arts Council, the Montana Institute of the Arts, and the Community Concert Association provide leadership and incentive for both amateur and professional artists in the Northwest. The State capital, Helena, is the home of the Archie Bray Foundation whose creative potters—Peter Voulkus, Rudy Autio, Ken Ferguson, and now Dave Shaner are well-known ceramic artists. The Montana Historical Museum in Helena and the Charles Russell Gallery in Great Falls house displays not only of regional significance but are also host to many well-installed displays of contemporary artists. Most recently the Montana Historical Museum was the recipient of a large gift of contemporary art from the Poindexter collection in New York.

Billings is one example of a city that has shown magnificent leadership in artistic affairs. Several years ago a small group of public spirited individuals decided that Billings needed an art gallery. A fund-raising campaign was successful and they took over the old city jail, renovated it into a modern gallery with excellent display space and facilities for instruction and storage. This Yellowstone Arts Center has been open to the public since October 1964. It has had a number of fine exhibitions from throughout the country and more are scheduled. The gallery promotes local talent, has a full-time director. This local effort has been a great success; the dream of a few has become a source of pleasure to thousands.

Arlene Francis of the National Broadcasting Co. featured the Yellowstone Arts Center on her radio program, "Emphasis." I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to insert in the Record immediately following these remarks the text of her program, and the Saturday Re-

view and New York Times articles to which I referred earlier.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Arlene Francis radio program "Emphasis," Nov. 12, 1964]

This is Arlene Francis, emphasis, women. What does one do with an old, leftover county jail? Now, admittedly, that isn't a question that confronts many people. But if it did, I'll bet the standard answer would be something like, "tear it down, and maybe we can sell the real estate." Well, not so with the townspeople of Billings, Mont. The good people of Billings have set us all a proud example of community spirit that I want to tell you about.

Several years ago the Yellowstone County jail was abandoned for more modern accommodations. For a long while it sat empty and deteriorating, a situation that would have been ignored by many less inventive towns. But 2 years ago, when a Billings architect found the building to be still structurally sound, he and some fellow-townspeople hit upon what may seem to be a far-fetched idea: they wanted to turn the old jail into a fine arts center. They encountered the same old problems: stirring up enthusiasm among the County Commissioners and the community at large; facing the fact that there were no tax moneys available for renovation or maintenance. Sounds familiar, doesn't it? Well, they set out to raise the necessary \$25,000 and not only succeeded, but also received offers of volunteer labor, equipment, and materials which eventually were just as important as the money.

Even with all that behind them, their problems were far from solved. They were faced with the prospect of removing from the jail 150 tons of steel cell blocks. And they removed them—and sold the steel. Much of it was brought by Montana ranchers to use as cattle guards. Where there's a will, there's a way.

From there on in, everybody helped. Men and women from all walks of life—professional people, housewives, officeworkers—everybody pitched in and built, repaired, cleaned, and painted the building into the fine arts center they wanted for their town. And here is the result.

On October 18 a two-story brick building in downtown Billings—still looking rather like a jail—opened its doors for an exhibition of paintings by American artists from the year 1875—a year when Billings was pretty much the wild and woolly West. The collection was on loan from the Walker Art Institute and the national collection of fine arts of the Smithsonian Institute and from private collections and neighboring historical societies.

In the Billings Fine Arts Center, there are smaller galleries devoted to exhibits of pottery, weaving, graphic arts, sculpture, architecture, photography, and industrial design. And they haven't stopped there. The second floor of their center is reserved for children's art classes, musical ensembles, little theater productions, lectures, and films.

Billings, a town of 75,000 people, has shown us democracy in action. Has shown us what the American people, with their unquenchable thirst for culture, can do with just their heads, their hands, and their hearts. I hereby invite everybody else in the country to join me in taking off my hat to the people of Billings, Mont.

This is Arlene Francis, NDC, "Emphasis."

[From the Saturday Review, Mar. 5, 1966]

FIRST OF THE MONTH
(By Cleveland Amory)

On a happier note, our favorite sign of the month was one on New York's 57th Street, "Culture Clearance," it said, "80 percent off."

And, as if that weren't enough, there was quite a clearing of the culture air out in Chicago during the month, when the National Conference of Governors' Representatives of State Art Agencies met to consider, among other things, how to spend the Federal Government's \$50,000 per State matching grants. Two speakers, for example, Governors' representatives from Montana and Wyoming, said that their States were so sparsely populated that there wasn't "one city with the talent and facilities to provide art leadership."

What they needed, it seemed, wasn't kind of art-lift—to depopulate, say Greenwich Village and uppopulate, say Butte.

On the other hand, the art representative from New Jersey declared that his State was "a keg being tapped at other ends—New York in the north, and Philadelphia in the south." The reason, he felt, "that most residents with interests in the arts gravitated toward the cities for their gratifications."

Next came the representative from West Virginia. His State, he felt, "could benefit greatly from access to artists and institutions in such bordering States as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky."

That certainly was more like it. Never mind the measly \$50,000. Go all out—build Art Throughways, Culture Expressways, Free Thought Freeways.

But the really good news came from the Governors' art representatives from Massachusetts. He remarked quietly that "the resources of Boston" were so varied and satisfying that the State "seemed hardly aware," as he put it, that "other communities," were "gravely neglected."

It gives you a tingle—a statement like that. But perhaps this writer should not be the one to comment. Perhaps it would be better if the compliment came from one of you out-of-towners.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 1, 1966]
NEW BREED IN THE ARTS—MANAGERS OF OPPORTUNITY ARE URGED TO BRING REWARDS OF TALENT TO PUBLIC

(By Howard Taubman)

In his keynote address to last week's National Conference of Governors' Representatives of State Arts Agencies in Chicago, John M. MacFadyen had some stirring words of advice to all those about to plunge into the burgeoning field of State support of the arts. "Remember," the former executive director of the New York State Council on the Arts told about 200 representatives from all the States, "it is not incumbent on you to establish or represent an official taste. Look for and explore all possible avenues of opportunity."

Speaking of the members and executive directors of arts councils and commissions now spreading from the States, Mr. MacFadyen described them as a new breed—"managers of opportunity," not artists or managers of the arts.

On these managers of opportunity, Mr. MacFadyen went on, "as with no other group, rests the responsibility to improve and expand the opportunity for our creative artists to work and to have their work heard and seen; the responsibility to provide our talented interpreters of the arts with more and better opportunities to be properly trained and to bring the rewards of that talent and training to the public and the responsibility to provide improved and increased opportunities for a growing audience to receive and respond to the communication of the arts."

THE HAVE-NOT STATES

To most of the States' representatives gathered in Chicago, the overriding question was how to go about organizing these opportunities with the limited means at their disposal. For the truth is that in the arts there are many more have-not than have States.

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cles are really needed if they are to fulfill roles as wives, mothers, and wage earners in a society that now is strange to them.

Answers Given

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. RICHARD FULTON

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 21, 1966

Mr. FULTON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, in his hard-hitting Freedom House dinner address, President Johnson "restated the case for Vietnam and the U.S. commitment to the cause of freedom. He was eloquent in restating this country's longer commitment to the principles of free debate, saying 'that the strength of America will never be sapped by discussion,'"

I have quoted from a recent editorial in the Nashville Tennessean, which believes that events and discussions of the past couple of weeks and the President's New York speech "have helped clear the air."

Because others will find the editorial illuminating, I have the permission of my colleagues to have it inserted in the RECORD:

PRESIDENT HAS ANSWERED SOME OF VIETNAM QUESTIONS

Whatever else may have been accomplished by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and by Senator ROBERT KENNEDY's recent statement on Vietnam, they most certainly have brought President Johnson forward with some answers.

In a hard-hitting Freedom House dinner address the President asserted that the United States is not caught in a blind escalation of force that is pulling it into a wider war; that it is using only necessary force and he assured his critics that never by any act of ours would there be a widening of the war.

The President denied that it is a war of unlimited objectives, saying that the U.S. goal is to prevent the success of aggression, and that this Nation seeks no bases or domination.

In what could be construed as an answer to Senator KENNEDY's proposal that the Vietcong be admitted to a "share of power and responsibility" in any postwar government, President Johnson said:

"Men ask who has a right to rule in Vietnam. Our answer there is what it has been here for 200 years: The people must have this right—the South Vietnamese people—and no one else.

"We stand," the President said, "for self-determination—for free elections—and we will honor their result." At the same time the President did not say whether—and if so, how—the South Vietnamese who support the Vietcong would participate in self-determination.

The Senate hearings nibbled at the edges of the question whether this country is fighting to secure and maintain a non-Red government in South Vietnam, or whether the end objective is to give the Vietnamese people the right to decide their own destiny.

Mr. Johnson said the administration is willing to accept the decision of the South Vietnamese, "Washington will not impose upon the people of South Vietnam a government not of their own choice. Hanoi shall

not impose on the South Vietnamese a government not of their choice."

The President did not get into the question whether the representatives of the Vietcong might be included in any conference or preconference respecting negotiations on peace in Vietnam, if such negotiations were possible.

One more question which President Johnson did not answer was how long the war might last, or the question of what limit can be put on the military commitment there. The answer to the first part lies with Hanoi. The President said only that "if the aggressor persists * * * the struggle may be long."

The answer to the second part is probably not something that can or should be answered publicly and officially. To do so would not only telegraph U.S. intentions to the enemy, it could very well result in Hanoi miscalculating the future.

President Johnson restated the case for Vietnam and the U.S. commitment to the cause of freedom. He was eloquent in restating this country's longer commitment to the principles of free debate, saying that the strength of America will never be sapped by discussion.

There are still perplexities about the war in Vietnam and questions which perhaps have no immediate answers. But the events and discussions of the past couple of weeks, and the President's speech Wednesday night, have helped clear the air.

No to De Gaulle

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JOHN A. RACE

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, for a decade and a half the keystone of free world security has been the NATO alliance. It is a bulwark that has weathered threats from without and doubts from within.

Today that great alliance is under assault from an old ally who appears to have lost his sense of direction. We regret the shortsightedness of General de Gaulle. But we can be sure that the common purpose of free nations will prevail over the obstinateness of one man.

The struggle for NATO unity requires the patience and cooperation. Sometimes it also requires blunt talk.

Last week was a time for blunt talk. And all Americans can be proud that our President responded without mincing words.

I am sure that all Americans will appreciate the New York Journal-American's praise of our President's plain talk to the general, and under unanimous request consent, I insert the editorial, "No to De Gaulle," in the RECORD:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Journal-American, Mar. 10, 1966]

NO TO DE GAULLE

Diplomatic niceties often dictate a polite pause in the exchange of messages between chiefs of state. We are glad to note, however, that no such protocol was observed in the latest exchange between President Johnson and President Charles de Gaulle of France.

De Gaulle sent L.B.J. a letter regarding his views on reorganization of NATO. It re-

portedly requested talks between the United States and France to accomplish that end.

Four hours later President Johnson's reply was in Paris. Nothing doing, it said. There will be no bilateral deals on NATO made by the United States with any one member of the Organization. Discussions on NATO require consultation among all its members, L.B.J. pointed out, and De Gaulle had better ponder that fact.

De Gaulle had made it clear that he considers NATO washed up and that he wants France out of it by 1969, at which time any foreign troops remaining on French soil would have to submit to French command.

Fine. This is his right. But it is also characteristic of the great Frenchman that he would, in a manner that disdainfully disregards the rights and sensitivities of his allies, seek to place himself above them on an issue that directly affects their security.

President Johnson has correctly put the French President in his place.

Hartford Times Endorses Transportation Department

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. BERNARD F. GRABOWSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 2, 1966

Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, to those of us who live in New England the question of how we create a unified, efficient, low-fare, swift, and safe system of transportation is of prime importance. It pleases me to see that one of Connecticut's most distinguished newspapers has endorsed the President's plan for a Cabinet-level Department of Transportation. Their lucid appraisal will, I think, be of interest to all Members of the House:

MODERN TRANSPORTATION

The President's proposal to establish a Federal Department of Transportation introduces hope of efficiency for a field in which, through lack of consistent policies and coordination, great national abilities and large sums of money are dissipated without sound result.

One thinks of the plight of the region's railroads and of the merchant marine particularly. But all of our systems of transport that should be closely allied and integrated can be brought into better conditions of public service by sounder administration.

Ideas of the relative values and importance of the various systems need to be assessed for the good of the Federal Treasury, which must provide huge subsidizations, and for the factor of usefulness on which the traveling and trading public depends.

The plan to bring transportation into a single agency does not itself set up the policies through which our facilities can be made more useful and more stable. Such policies will be the later developments of study.

But a large step will have been taken with the consolidation of authority and responsibility into one department. Few doubt that the new Department will have a troubled birth. A tremendous range of interests, competition, and priorities must be reconciled.

Yet it has been apparent for some time that indecision and conflicting policies, or lack of any policy, have hampered adequate and economical transportation. And such important side considerations as highway safety and the provision of modern, efficient mass transit have been neglected.

Like the Department of Commerce, the Department of Transportation would be a business-oriented agency. However, it should be expected that the public would be very strongly represented because it is so directly affected. In this aspect, transportation administration becomes a function as close to the people as those of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

It would be a mere bureaucratic misadventure were all the activities enumerated by the President only to be dumped together and left at that. The job is to bring order out of what has become in many respects a costly mess.

North Vietnamese Control of the Vietcong

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JIM WRIGHT

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, in view of some of the naive and misleading statements that have been made concerning the nature of the so-called National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong, it is revealing to read the report of an experienced foreign newspaperman on this subject.

In an article published in the February 3 edition of the Manchester Guardian Weekly, one of Britain's oldest and most respected journals, Michael Wall clearly documents the fact that the so-called NLF and the Vietcong are, in reality, the creation of the North Vietnamese Communists who control their military and political activities.

I insert Mr. Wall's article to be printed in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

Vietcong Changes Its Methods

(By Michael Wall)

In Saigon there is a whole language of initials, and out of initials have come new, strange words. The American military setup is Macvee, Military Advisory Command, Vietnam. Arvin, one soon learns, covers the Vietnamese Government forces, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. USOM, U.S. operations mission, is the American civil aid program. The enemy in this war for the control of South Vietnam has but two letters, VC, standing for Vietcong, which in turn means simply Vietnamese Communists. What follows is a view of the war as presented to me by people in authority here in Saigon.

The Vietcong is a faceless enemy. It has its tentacles stretching out and touching every village and town in the country. Its agents have infiltrated the Government and the administration, the Vietnamese Government forces, the universities and schools, the professions and the unions. Yet relatively little is known about it and it has not thrown up a Grivas, a Castro, or a Ho Chi Minh of its own.

One reason for the fact that no South Vietnamese Communist leader has emerged is because the Vietcong is under the direct and close control of the Hanoi government. Ho Chi Minh and General Giap are the real leaders of this war as they were of the war by the Vietminh against the French.

The war in South Vietnam is represented by the Communists as being a war of national liberation such as was fought by the Vietminh against the French. The difference today is that it is now a battle to throw

out the American aggressors and overthrow their South Vietnamese puppets. This is the line that is drummed into the villagers by the Communist agents. This is what motivates the majority of the Vietcong forces who believe passionately that they are fighting to liberate their country from foreign domination.

However, the fundamental differences between the Vietminh and the Vietcong campaigns are clearly understood by the educated classes in South Vietnam. This war, which the Communists anticipated after the signing of the Geneva agreements in 1954 and actively prepared for from 1956, is clearly seen as the Communist revolutionary war being waged in the guise of the continuation of the nationalist struggle for liberation.

One of the most astounding aspects of the South Vietnamese situation in the estimation of observers here is that the Communists have not already achieved their aim in taking over the whole of South Vietnam. If indeed the struggle is for liberation why has there been no uprising on a national scale by a proud and highly intelligent people? Why have all attempts to paralyze Saigon by strike action dismally failed? Why has the Vietnamese Army continued the struggle after appalling losses and moreover still managed to attract volunteers?

These are among the questions that drum through the minds of newcomers to the Vietnam scene. The answers certainly do not lie in any devotion to the successive Saigon governments, in any wish to defend what has been a corrupt, inefficient administration, nor in any desire to adhere to the so-called Western way of life. The answer commonly given is that the war is understood to be what it is—a Communist attempt to unify Vietnam under Communist administration—and the majority of the people here are ready to fight to prevent its success. Those people who understand what communism is are not attracted by its ideology and are repelled by its methods. They do not believe the lot of those in North Vietnam is better than their own.

The groundwork of building up the Communist infrastructure in the countryside has been long and arduous. Although under the Geneva agreements the Vietminh was to withdraw its forces north of the 17th parallel, and indeed 80,000 who lived in what is now South Vietnam went north, there was left behind a skeleton organization which continued to exist in the 5 Vietminh "war zones" from which the Vietminh had operated against the French.

Over the next 4 years the Vietnamese who had moved to the north were organized and trained as military and political cadres which would become the hard core of the Vietcong battle for the south. The hard-core Vietcong units, formed and trained in the north, consist of highly professional soldiers, many of whom have 15 years' experience of war.

The political cadres are equally highly organized, training with great thoroughness in the methods of winning over the allegiance of the villagers and in organizing the infrastructure of the Communist society. The infiltration south of the military units and the political cadres began in earnest in 1959. Estimates of the actual number of infiltrators vary greatly, but the most conservative puts it between 19,000 and 25,000 since 1959.

There is evidence to suggest that in fact the number may be considerably higher and that while the official estimate of the total hard-core, full-time, Vietcong forces now in South Vietnam is 33,000, one American source said that it was certainly no less than 45,000. At the end of last year units of the People's Army of North Vietnam were identified in battle and it is possible that 10,000 of the North Vietnamese Army are in the country.

One of the prime tasks of the political and military cadres is to recruit, organize, and train local guerrilla forces. Over the last 6 years this has continued and there are at least 80,000, and probably many more, who are farmers and fishermen by day and guerrillas by night. At a still lower level is the unknown, anonymous mass of village people who are used as carriers of information and supplies, and who in totally committed villages can be relied on to use arms to prevent the incursion of government forces.

The Vietcong organization is its greatest strength, not its mystique, ideology, or its spirit. The infiltration into the villages has been a long process. The pattern of the operation is laid down in every detail from the first arrival of the political cadre of perhaps two or three men to the final arm of a fully committed combat village.

After the initial contacts the first stage is to sow seeds of discontent and to discredit the Saigon government and the village and hamlet chiefs. It is fertile ground, for the villagers know about the corruption of local officials, resent paying fees to absent landlords, and can easily be influenced by the promise of land of their own. The removal of the discredited chiefs by assassination is the next step. Last year alone 6,000 district officials and village headmen were murdered, many after ghastly torture.

With uncooperative village leaders out of the way the work of forming the various liberation associations in the village begins. The farmers, the women, the youths, the schoolboys are persuaded to join their respective movement; the farmers are given land, the women have their social status raised, new wells are sunk, a schoolhouse and teacher are provided and political indoctrination gets underway.

Captured documents have shown that it seldom works according to plan and there are many reports of self-criticism from political cadres which indicate that often, having received the material advantages, the villagers reveal a bourgeois frame of mind which has no interest in political ideology and no wish to take part in combative action.

The American and Vietnamese air strikes, the use of napalm and defoliation agents are used by the Vietcong to prove to the villagers that the real battle is against the foreign invader. In well-infiltrated villages the determination to resist the American and government forces is increased, but in others the Vietcong finds that fear of counteraction makes the villagers unwilling to have Vietcong forces in the vicinity.

In the past, the Vietcong has worn kid gloves in its work in the countryside. The political cadres have shown infinite patience, the military units have behaved with decorum, and food and supplies were paid for and not taken. In marked contrast has been the ruthless behavior of government troops.

But over the past 6 months the pattern has been changing. In the densely populated Mekong Delta, south of Saigon, there is increasing evidence that the Vietcong is now using harsh, brutal methods against the villagers to get their money, supplies, and recruits. The American military authorities put this down to their own actions in harrying the enemy, who no longer can feel quite safe in any area.

Other observers suspect that owing to severe losses among both political and military cadres the replacements are of poorer quality, less thoroughly trained, and in consequence hampered in their work. At the same time the behavior of government troops has improved and great efforts are being made to impress on them the importance of not alienating the villagers. The inevitable development within the Vietcong is that the North Vietnamese will play an increasingly important role both by having to provide more of the military and political leaders

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and the troops to make up the hard-core units.

Students of past guerrilla campaigns have estimated that the defenders require 10 men for every one of the guerrillas to achieve victory on the ground. On this reckoning the Vietcong is still vastly superior in numbers to the government and Americans. But the helicopter has brought a new mobility to war and the classic guerrilla tactics may prove no longer viable.

The National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong, is completely dominated by the recently formed People's Revolutionary Party which in turn is controlled by the Vietnam Workers' Party in North Vietnam. Thus, politically and militarily the Vietcong is controlled from the north and has small right to its claim that it represents the people of South Vietnam alone.

The chairman of the NLF, Nguyen Huu Tho, a Saigon lawyer, and the secretary-general of the party, Huynh Tan Phat, an architect, had no standing in Saigon before they disappeared to form their headquarters in the highlands near the Cambodian border. Some American observers believe that captured documents reveal a certain degree of tension within the NLF ranks between those who see victory coming only through military action and those who would like to see negotiations leading to a coalition government in the south and through that a complete takeover. But other observers discount this theory on the grounds that negotiations now would carry the smell of defeat.

The War on Poverty Examined

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JAMES H. (JIMMY) QUILLEN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, it has become increasingly evident that the lofty goals of the war on poverty are finding the road to reality a very rocky one.

I feel that now is definitely the time to examine this program and to catch the snags, before more harm than good is done.

An editorial, which recently appeared in the Knoxville News-Sentinel, comments favorably on this reappraisal of the war on poverty, and I include it at this point in the RECORD and call it to the attention of my colleagues.

LOOK AT THE POVERTY WAR

Recent headlines from our war on poverty have not been hopeful.

Poverty elections flop in nine cities: 700 poor housed at the Hotel Astor on antipov-erty funds, Job Corps youths in riot, anti-poverty aid indicted in payroll embezzle-ment, and so on.

Small wonder that congressional Republi-cants want an investigation. Significantly, they do not condemn the idea of a poverty program; they just do not think the pres-ent one is being run right.

The investigation is a good idea. More than \$1,400 million has been appropriated for the economic-opportunity program and another \$1,600 million is sought for the next fiscal year. That is big money.

Republicans charge there is a lack of ef-fective guidelines: "The approach contin-ues to be hit and miss and let us try any-thing once." Rebuttal could be that there can be no guidelines for a job that has never

been done before. The Office of Economic Opportunity admittedly is moving across an uncharted field.

But if, as the Republican Party says, tax payers are "being cheated by poor planning and inefficiency, we have a right to know about it. And to demand correction.

If a new bureaucracy has sprung up, con-trolled by political bosses, while the poor are still hungry and lacking in opportunities, we have a right to demand reforms.

Only a halfhearted study, authorized by Representative ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, has been made of the OEO. This report is still suspiciously locked up.

A broad new investigation should give the taxpayers an unvarnished look. Successes should be acknowledged as well as failures. The inquiry should be supported honestly by Democrats as well as Republicans. OEO Director Sargent Shriver should cooperate and not camouflage.

Let us really see how we are doing.

Purity of Motive in Washington

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, a re-cent speech by Presidential Aid Bill D. Moyers admonished the Nation's news-men to appreciate that only the "purest motives" govern the actions and state-ments of the executive branch of the Federal Government. Such advice, if heeded, would be heeded by the naive and nondiscriminating. Citizens and the press will continue to question, to investigate, to doubt, and to seek the truth. They will not simply swallow all Government pronouncements as facts.

The following editorial from the Chi-cago Tribune of Sunday, March 6, 1966, comments aptly on Mr. Moyers' admoni-tion to journalists:

PURITY OF MOTIVE IN WASHINGTON

Bill D. Moyers, who gave up the ministry years ago to bring some light into the life of Lyndon Johnson, reverted to type the other day. Unloading a sermon on Wash-ington alumni of Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, the White House press secretary adjured the sinners of the press to have faith.

"You are unable," he said, "to accept moti-vation in quite the same way we in the Gov-ernment believe are motivated. We so often do things out of the purest motives. The heart of the tension is that it is difficult for you to understand our motives have been as pure as they are."

We are afraid that the Tribune will have to plead guilty to the soft impeachment. Yes, to be frank, it sometimes has been diffi-cult for us to appreciate that only the "purest motives" govern the actions and statements of an administration so wholly political as this one is.

For have we not been warned out of its own mouth so often that the buyer must be-ware its pronouncements? For instance, there are the cautionary remarks of Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Information, who introduced the con-cept of "news management" during the Ken-nedy administration. The news became managed under a man whose theme in the 1960 campaign was "the people's right to know."

Mr. Sylvester first announced that news is part of the "arsenal of weaponry" available to a President and that it was the inherent right of a government, "if necessary, to lie to save itself." He qualified the right to lie by saying that prevarication was appropriate "in an international crisis when nuclear war threatens."

But the record demonstrates that officials and agents of Government have not confined their lying to such circumstances, but do it automatically in any context. The suspi-cion arises that these spokesmen are not lying to save the Government from the Com-munists but to save the administration from the displeasure of the public.

The respected Arthur Krock, Washington commentator of the New York Times, an old friend of the late Mr. Kennedy, said the ad-ministration sought to envelop the people in a massive propaganda "in behalf of the establishment, to inflate success or gloss over error." This, he said, it was done "more cynically and boldly" than any other ad-ministration had ever done.

It was pointed out by Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the Times, that the admin-istration launched this campaign because of its "sensitivity to criticism, its readiness to resent it, and a willingness to use unortho-dox methods to meet it." That is still the motive under the Johnson administration.

Mr. Moyers, when asked if he believes in honest journalism, replied, "I think there are honest journalists like there are honest poli-ticians. When bought, they stay bought." Speak for yourself, Bill.

State Department Declares War on Rhodesians in United States

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JACK EDWARDS

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the State Department's ap-proach to recent events in Rhodesia would be laughable if the results were not so unfortunate. The weird thinking which evidently is going on within the L.B.J. administration over Rhodesia is described in the following article taken from "Human Events" for March 19, 1966:

STATE DEPARTMENT DECLARES WAR ON RHODESIANS IN UNITED STATES

By Ralph de Toledano)

With sanctimoniousness not seen since the days of Uriah Heep, the State Depart-ment has argued that it joined Great Brit-ain in its sanctions against the legitimately elected and constitutional Government of Rhodesia on the legal ground that it had declared its independence unilaterally. For a nation that did the same—and by force of arms—this is a rather disingenuous posi-tion to take.

But since legality is the State Depart-ment's gage these days, there is more than slight interest in its present careening course against Rhodesia. For what the De-partment is now preparing to do is not only illegal but also morally reprehensible and downright vindictive. These are strong words, but they are justified by the facts.

Since the United States hastily and obse-quitously bowed low to the British by order-ing sanctions against Rhodesia, a tiny mis-sion of diplomatic representatives of that country—now without official status—has

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attempted to carry on their duties here. At the same time, a U.S. consul, similarly bereft of diplomatic prerogatives, has remained in Rhodesia. Recently, the Rhodesian Government set up an information office in Washington to service those interested in more than the statements dispensed by British propagandists.

(Among the lies being spread by British officials here is the singularly effective one that Americans—newspapermen included—cannot travel to Rhodesia without a British visa, which they refuse to issue. This is patently false, as I know from firsthand experience.)

Now, the State Department has moved to silence the Rhodesian Information Office, presumably fearful that the American people may discover that the official administration line is based on nothing but subservience to Britain and ideological pique. This is indirect censorship of the worst order.

In a letter to Henry J. C. Hooper, director of the Information Office, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann states that Mr. Hooper, in properly registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, had noted as his principal "the Department of External Affairs, Ministry of Information, Government of Rhodesia." He then states that since the United States does not recognize the authority of Rhodesia, Mr. Hooper has "no official capacity in this country." The United States, therefore, is "not prepared to accord to you a continuing residence in this country."

In short, having learned that Mr. Hooper registered as a foreign agent for Rhodesia, the State Department is planning to deport him. Though he has been here in an unofficial diplomatic status for some months, the department did not move against him until it discovered that he was legally attempting to present his country's views to Americans.

This is plain vindictiveness, as witness the report to Congress of the U.S. Attorney General in 1964: "Registration under the [Foreign Agents Registration] Act does not imply recognition by the U.S. Government either of de jure existence or legality of the foreign principal, nor does it indicate approval by the U.S. Government of the propaganda material disseminated by the registered agent."

Mr. Mann, who seems to be trying to atone for his firmness and good sense in the Dominican crisis, chooses to overlook this statement in attempting to oust Rhodesia's information officer and suppress views contrary to those of the State Department. He also sweeps under the carpet the fact that on the list of acceptable foreign agents are representatives of an Angolan government-in-exile, a handful of terrorists outside that Portuguese possession, and an Azad Kashmiri government, existing only on a letterhead.

The United States recognizes Portugal's full and complete control over Angola, yet it has allowed members of its so-called government-in-exile to remain in this country and to propagandize for its extreme-left activism. The United States recognizes India and Pakistan as having domain over a split Kashmir, but it allows a Kashmiri "government" to have its say without harassment.

In the case of Rhodesia, the State Department, in declaring war on Rhodesia, is acting against a government which is admittedly in complete control and whose status would be de jure except for the weird thinking of this administration.

In another day, the Senate would have been up in arms about this. But with the Fulbright-Kennedy axis in possession of the headlines, U.S. policy is increasingly oriented to a leftward course. And Rhodesia, unfortunately, both believes in and practices a free enterprise economy—and has no truck with Communists. Q.E.D.

As further comment in this issue I recommend the following editorial from the Mobile, Ala., Press for March 8, 1966:

ONE MAN, ONE VOTE FOR RHODESIA

In slightly more than three lines of type, the Register recently carried the significant announcement that the United States is moving toward the closure of an "information office opened in Washington by the white-minority government of Rhodesia."

At the same time our Government is denying white Rhodesians the right to tell their story to Americans, it allows Communists, Socialists, and African dictators to flood our Nation with their propaganda.

This is part of the implementation of the one-world philosophy, one objective of which is the one-man, one-vote system to which our national leaders subscribe.

It is all part of the drive that includes action by the U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg to set up a congressional investigation of the question of whether the United States should interfere with the Government of South Africa and tell it how it should run its affairs.

Members of the one-man, one-vote crusade talk of "broadening the power base," and of making "leaders responsible to the people's needs."

If they sincerely support governments which have the "broadest possible participation by citizens," they should be supporting Rhodesia instead of suppressing it.

They cannot deny today the number of Rhodesians actively participating in their Government as voters is greater than the number of voting citizens in all 30 black African nations combined.

That is because all these tribal states have succumbed either to one party, one leader rule or to military strong man dictatorship.

While they prattle and fume over alleged censorship of inflammatory reporting, and of the detention of Moscow trained revolutionaries as denials of freedom in Rhodesia, these one man, one vote partisans have no criticism for the atrocities committed in the black African nations.

All this is creating in Africa and elsewhere the kind of turmoil in which Communist subversion thrives.

Fino Introduces Bonus Bill for America's First Asian Veterans

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL A. FINO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, today I introduced legislation to provide for a bonus to veterans of the early 20th century campaigns in the Philippine Islands, who received the Philippine campaign medal.

I have received a number of letters from aging veterans of the Philippines campaigns of the early 1900's. These veterans, few and far between, are for the most part in their eighties and nineties. They badly need this money because of rising and other expenses.

These men are veterans of a war America has long forgotten, a war in which America pacified the Philippine Islands after taking them from Spain in the Spanish-American War. Throughout the islands, our soldiers fought head-

hunting and cannibalistic tribes—men who fought well and fiercely for years with the weird, curved Malay and Philippine bolo knives. It was a type of war that our American soldiers were not used to, just as today's soldiers are finding Vietnam a new kind of war.

Our Philippine veterans fought a tough enemy who believed he was fighting for independence. It was a hard fight, and in the end it was not so much won with weapons as with policies of respect for the people. Our soldiers in the Philippines suffered fiercely from tropical diseases we had not yet learned how to deal with.

Today, with our minds so much on the war in southeast Asia, I think we should take time out to think of the men who fought and died for America's toehold in the Pacific in the days of the Great White Fleet and the "big stick." I urge this bonus as a tribute to the first American southeast Asian veterans, now forgotten.

There are under 500 of these veterans, perhaps far fewer. This bonus program will cost very little. We should act immediately.

Save the Children Federation: Helping the Poor To Fight Poverty—Part II

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. DUNCAN

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. DUNCAN of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, today I want to continue the story of the Save the Children Federation, a unique program to help the less fortunate which started more than a quarter of a century ago.

Young people engaged in self-help projects are their own best champions in the fight against poverty. Save the Children Federation activities for American Indians make this point.

For the past 5 years, summer camp programs for Indian youth have offered self-help training in building skills, ranch improvement, herd operations and craft work; classes in health and grooming; recreation; and field trips. One hundred federation-sponsored Indian young people were placed as volunteers in hospitals, clinics, and in-the-field health groups where they learned good health habits, supported medical techniques and practiced simple nursing skills. Sixty-three of the participants who represent the potential leadership of four reservations now expect to train for a career in public health.

From its early efforts in Appalachia, SCF has grown into a worldwide organization advocating the principles of self-help. In times of emergency or disaster, the federation carries on special programs of relief, as it did during the war years to help refugee children. Since that time, the overseas sponsorship plan providing cash and needed commodities to relieve hunger and shortage, gradually changed to emphasize payments which

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would allow children whose parents could not afford the cost to receive basic education, or sponsorships which enabled the purchase of seed, tools, or equipment to raise the family's food production or increase its regular cash income.

To help parents realize their dreams of a better life for their children, SCF has long encouraged families to plan and carry out their own solutions for raising annual income. Wherever possible, this encouragement comes in the form of interest-free loans instead of grants. The federation's loans, supplemented by sound counseling, stimulate greater family self-reliance, influence more practical goals, and strengthen the chances of success. With such loans fishermen in Brittany bought nets and a boat to catch and sell more fish. Korean farmers purchased improved rice seed and fertilizers for more abundant crops. A Lebanese shoemaker purchased leather and tools to double his business. A Greek widow bought a sewing machine to make clothes for her children and to add a little cash by sewing for others.

Helping families to develop their earning potentials so they themselves can more quickly assume the responsibilities for their children is another strong feature of the federation's self-help program.

Recognizing that the community as well as the family can take a more responsible share in child development, the Federation takes a positive interest in upgrading neighborhoods and improving community services for the health, education, and welfare of all children. Child-family-community sponsorships overseas and for American Indians reach beyond the child to give the family a greater security and the communities a new strength.

This dynamic program offers a three-fold way of accelerating child growth toward self-sufficiency, for the welfare of a child and his family is inextricably woven into the welfare of the community. This direction of federation effort provides people with an opportunity to shape a better future for themselves and their children within the framework of a healthy community of interdependent and forward-looking citizens.

These self-help sponsorships, recently introduced in the American Indian program, support long-range goals worked out by the federation with Hopi tribal officials to encourage more participation by parents and neighbors in community improvements. Many American Indian boys and girls today attend schools away from the reservation where they may enlarge their circle of friends, find courses to prepare them for contemporary vocations, and effect an adjustment to the non-Indian world. The SCF sponsorships which provide funds for school supplies, personal books and spending money help children in their new relationships and encourage wider social participation and a greater fluency with the English language.

For the families of these children, the new sponsorships provide small grants to improve sanitary conditions of each home—to repair, screen and paint windows and doors to keep out flies, and to

build supports to hold water tanks provided by the U.S. Public Service, so that each household will have safe water. Sponsorships like these are a major breakthrough toward a more wholesome environment for American Indians.

VN
An Irrelevant Opposition

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, the following editorial from the Wall Street Journal of March 8 brings to focus some of the irrelevant activities of the Congress in regard to Vietnam:

AN IRRELEVANT OPPOSITION

The Senate gaggled for about 2 weeks over the \$4.8 billion authorization for the Vietnamese war, then passed it with only two dissenting votes. The performance is not without its lessons.

The lengthy debate measures the misgivings the course of war stirs in an onlooker. The overwhelming vote largely measures how little the administration's critics have offered as alternatives which appeal when the moment arrives to assume responsibility. It would seem to follow that the critics have been talking mostly beside the point.

There was an abortive movement by 17 Democratic Senators, for instance, for an amendment saying the authorization did not imply approval of a wider war. Some 78 Democratic Representatives made similar declarations as the bill passed the House, 392 to 4. Obviously, these were less attempts to make policy than to avoid responsibility.

There was WAYNE MORSE, made of sterner stuff at least, relentlessly following his opposition to the war to the logical conclusion of voting against the authorization. Senator Morse builds his case against our involvements from the legalisms of international law. Unfortunately, any such case will remain at best marginally relevant until some court can enforce that law against China and North Vietnam.

There was ROBERT KENNEDY, for reasons which presumably seemed good to him at the time, first offering the Vietcong "a share of responsibility" in the South Vietnamese Government, then backing and filling till no one really knew what he did mean. He served mostly to clarify that the United States, even if it should foolishly decide to, has scant right to force coalition on the unwilling South Vietnamese.

Then there was the most prestigious critic of all, J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate's august Foreign Relations Committee. Senator FULBRIGHT seems to profess that Red China is naughty mainly because it "is profoundly fearful of American bases" on its periphery. He says "history suggests" that military power cannot enforce peace, and that "accommodation * * * is the only course with demonstrated promise of being able to bring about a lasting and honorable peace."

As we recall history, accommodation at Munich and Yalta didn't automatically bring "lasting and honorable peace." Nor do we remember the total failure of intelligent military measures in Greece, the Philippines, Lebanon, or the Cuban missile crisis.

We are hardly serene, either, about the "impregnable" bases the Senator would establish in South Vietnam, then bargain away

to get China to agree on a "neutralized" southeast Asia. Militarily, such a strategy would allow the enemy to concentrate against each base in turn, and would present tempting targets as China develops its nuclear potential. Politically, we cannot see where the Senator finds the faintest indication China would agree to neutralization any time in the foreseeable future.

It is equally difficult to understand Mr. FULBRIGHT's blithe confidence about enforcing any neutralization with the threat of "reintroduction" of U.S. power. The threat alone would not prevent China from overrunning its neighbors and presenting us with a fait accompli. It also could not effectively deter China's proven talent at conducting war by proxy. And we can cite few, if any, precedents offering much hope for enforcement by "major powers."

Senator FULBRIGHT and his followers might make a more lucid contribution to the debate if they met administration policy head on, dropping their dogged refusal to acknowledge precisely what that policy is. The Senator and some others insist on labeling that policy one of "unconditional surrender." Yet it does not seek, as that phrase has historically implied, the destruction of any government with international standing.

All the United States wants of Hanoi is for it to stop fomenting and supporting insurrection in the south. For that matter, all the United States wants of the Vietcong is that they stop trying to take over the nation by force. Sticking to these minimum goals, according to the critics' curious contention, is demanding surrender because we will not meet the enemy halfway—presumably letting them support a small insurrection or use terror to take part of South Vietnam.

The administration has made it plain, we think, that it is not crusading to stamp out communism. Rather, it is trying to contain communism in Asia much as it was contained in Europe. American policymakers are attempting to deny Asian communism small initial conquests; this denial is intended to curb militant appetites before they provoke war in truth waged for unconditional surrender.

That may be a slender hope; certainly it is a tricky and taxing policy that raises questions in many minds, ours included. Yet its critics have said little relevant to decisions which must be made here and now. It's easy to understand why, whatever its difficulties, containment remains the refuge of those who must not only speculate but decide.

Rogers, Ark., DeMolay

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JAMES W. TRIMBLE

OF ARKANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Speaker, Hugh Grimm, whom I have known since our boyhood, has been one of the leaders in DeMolay since his early years. His lodge, 460, which sponsors the DeMolays of Rogers, Ark., and the DeMolays of Rogers are celebrating International DeMolay Week March 13 through 20.

I know no one who has done more to help the boys of the area than Hugh Grimm. He is a leader not only in leading boys to a better understanding of their responsibilities in life but in all other fields of community activities.

To him and to the DeMolays, my heartiest greetings.

March 14, 1966

President's E Award to Mr. Curt G. Joa

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JOHN A. RACE

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. RACE. Mr. Speaker, on February 22 of this year, on the anniversary of the birth of our first President, George Washington, I had the happy privilege of presenting the President's E Award to Mr. Curt G. Joa, of Sheboygan Falls, Wis.

Mr. Joa founded and heads a firm that presently has its machinery in 17 world markets and is in negotiations in 26 other countries. He and his firm truly deserved recognition by the President of this country and presentation of the E Award.

An even more amazing story, Mr. Speaker, is Mr. Joa's own reflections on his life, occasioned by the presentation of this E Award. These reflections are told by Mr. Joa in a letter to his daughter, Mrs. Ruth Kiehl.

I feel privileged to have obtained a copy of this letter and under unanimous consent insert it in the RECORD. It has a beautiful lesson and story to tell to the world. The letter follows:

BOYNTON BEACH, FLA.,

March 7, 1966.

DEAR RUTH: Time has passed since we had the presentation of the E Award in Sheboygan Falls, and I have had a lot of opportunity to think about the day, the evening, and to reminisce about the talk I meant to give and the ideas I thought I wanted to get across to the people present.

I meant to write to you before this, but when I arrived in Florida after those very strenuous weeks in Wisconsin, I took quite sick. I have been on antibiotics for 10 days; I had a final examination today and got a clean bill of health from my doctor, although I have to continue with the antibiotics until they are gone, since my infection was real severe.

As I said during the presentation when I was called upon to give a talk, maybe for the first time in my life I was nearly speechless, since my mind was so occupied with the experiences and the history of the past 52 years of my life. I felt that the E Award given by the President of the United States to our company, and the presentation of the plaque by the mayor of Sheboygan Falls, was the climax of acceptance and the height of my desire to be a good citizen of the United States.

Before I was 11 years old, on August 2, 1914, the guns were booming along the east coast of Germany, where I had been sent as a last attempt to cure me of a bronchial disease, which was the aftermath of whooping cough and diphtheria that I had since I was 6 years old. The last resort the doctors recommended in those days was sea air and outdoor living. From the first day of World War I, I had been dreaming and thinking about the United States of America. During my illness I read a great deal of Cooper's "Leatherstocking Tales," and I dreamed about the largess and the greatness of the country beyond the sea, and I had made up my mind that some day I was going to cross the sea and explore the open spaces of America.

With the beginning of World War I, my health apparently was regained. The outdoor and ocean living had done the work it was intended to, and with ardor and enthusiasm I went through some of the finest

schooling that youth could have. Always in the back of my mind I wanted to be prepared to at least know the language of the country where I was going to make my home. Therefore, instead of studying in what we call in Germany the humanistic gymnasium, I preferred the equivalent, the oberreal school. The difference between these two institutions is solely that one is a preparatory school for the medical and legal profession, where greater emphasis was put on the Greek and Latin languages, in contrast to the school of my choice, where emphasis was placed on modern languages—English and French—chemistry, physics, and mathematics, which I felt would serve me better in foreign lands.

My mother's brothers and sisters had migrated to the United States in the 1860's and 1870's and settled in Philadelphia and Terre Haute, and I can remember the holiday when the letters came from my uncles and cousins describing their lot and freedom and their reward for hard work in glowing letters about the United States that they, too, had chosen as their home.

I remembered all this quite well, and upon graduation from the university, Frankfurt and Wurzburg, with intense technical as well as economic training, I solicited the help of the cousins for a visa and ticket to the United States. After receipt of my diploma and doctor's degree, within 3 days, on August 11, 1924, I sailed on the SS *Arabic* of the Cunard White Star Line.

My cousins had seen to it that I traveled first class, which was an unusual treat and created even more the desire to show myself worthy of such accommodations, and when I went aboard the ship in Hamburg, I felt my goal was nearly achieved, but nothing in this life comes easy. Off the coast of Nova Scotia, near Halifax, we were caught in one of the worst hurricanes of the century.

Our ship was badly damaged, a hundred people were killed or injured, the water was running into the staterooms from the top, the lifeboats were smashed, the smokestacks were gone, and the engines drowned. I will never forget the violence of that storm that began at 7 in the morning and reached its height about 4 in the afternoon.

We were spun around, and since it was an old-time steamship that used coal as fuel, the fuel shifted and we had a 40° list—a rather marginal situation—and the sinking of the ship was imminent. Those that were alive prayed and prayed hard, and finally the winds abated at 8 in the evening and we were a drifting wreck on the ocean. Eventually we were removed and taken to New York, where we landed with much humility, and when we stepped on land, we felt that life from that day on would be a bonus.

And so the years went by, and always having in mind that I have everything to gain and nothing to lose and being so utterly appreciative of the opportunities that offered themselves, work became a pleasure. My acquisitions were sufficient to send my children to the best of schools, and I surrounded myself with capable, honest, hardworking people. Our roots were firmly grounded in Sheboygan Falls.

When disaster struck and my only son was killed, I walked down the street and Mayor Houwers said, "Curt, I want to talk to you. I know how you feel, because my son also was killed in an airplane accident. We have to make the best of it, and we have to be thankful for having had our sons, and life must go on." These were the words that gave me new inspiration, and all self-pity left me. I went to the office and the young men that Curt had engaged were called in; I asked them if they would stay with me and carry on. Their strong affirmative reply inspired me to do more work than ever and to overcome my grief in my occupation.

These were the thoughts that went through my mind when Congressman Race and Direc-

tor Howe made their illustrious comments about Curt G. Joa, Inc. Nothing could have made me feel more honored, and it could not have struck me more deeply, than when Congressman RACE compared me and the likes of me with George Washington, the Founder and Father of our great country. He, too, had to struggle and surround himself with people when in direst need. They had faith in his leadership, and only as a community of faithful and honest people can success be attained.

When I had to talk, I could only say, "With deep humility and sincere respect, on behalf of my family and all of our employees, I accept this award," and this is the moment when I had to combat the tears—not tears of sadness, but tears as a result of shock through joy.

As to the celebration and the party proper, I was extremely pleased that this was all done by men that had grown with me, and it was truly a remarkable piece of work when I saw the countries in which we had sold machines represented by the girls in our offices and wives of our employees and others, because with each costume I had a mental picture of the task that had to be done, not only to sell the machines, in Greece, Nicaragua, Germany, Belgium, France, and many other countries, but to instill in the people that bought the equipment the faith they had to have to make them a success. Only because I had faith in the capabilities of our workers at Sheboygan Falls, and in the United States of America, could we transmit a spirit of enthusiasm and help our customers with their difficulties in the beginning, because all beginnings are difficult.

As we all know, life begins with a cry, and life ends that way. I could go on forever and tell you about the details of the experiences we have had in each and every one of our travels that always meant another block for the house we were building. There are the days of Gustafors in Sweden, the weeks of suspicion in Denmark, the examination of our baggage by the customs officers when our samples were scattered on the tables and we had to explain the product the machines were to make. Now, since we are making baby diapers, it is a bit easier. There were problems of financing, problems of taxes, difference in taxes in each and every country, the training of the supervisors in the factories where a different language was being spoken, and thanks to my early training, I could handle a few.

I am thankful that in my early youth I had a goal and that the attaining of this goal made me waste few moments. Even today I continue to study, be it languages, the weather for flying, new motors or engines, because it is a fast moving time and moments are precious. One gets only as much out of life as one has used these moments well.

I will never forget the parting words my father gave me. He was not enthusiastic about America, and he tied a strap around my neck with a leather bag containing \$200, which was a fortune for him, with the words, "You will be lonesome, you will be in a strange land with no friends, and when you want to come home, this is your return fare." Six weeks after I was in the United States, I wrote him, "Dear father, it is truly a strange land, but its strangeness is enticing, its greatness is encouraging, and my one aim is to become part of this land," and I returned his leather bag.

I believe the E Award meant to be a recognition in my mind of 52 years of striving first to go to the United States, and then to be adopted by that country as a citizen as I have adopted her. My pride as a father was crowned by being able to award a pin to both of my daughters, as well as my wife, who have been so active and so enthusiastic

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In addition the shelter provides the University of Tennessee with 4,800 dogs, Kennedy Hospital 319.

Caldwell said 4,800 dogs, those which were badly injured or diseased were gassed. He said the center handled 18,000 dogs last year.

PERSIAN CAT

One dealer told me he had a "nice Persian cat" in the truck and would try to find it for me. He told me this while he was prodding and stuffing a pregnant boxer dog, obviously a former pet, into the already bulging jam.

The wire-haired terrier I rescued is a well-trained male dog. I took him home with me. He was starved for food and water and would wince every time you touched him for fear of being hit.

One of the sellers in Ripley said they didn't get enough money for the dogs to "waste money on food" for them. Sometimes they carry the animals they have picked up around in trucks and cages for 2 or 3 days until they sell them to dealers.

SICK PET

My terrier may be your dog. If you can identify him, he's yours. I took him to Foote Animal Clinic where Dr. W. B. Miesse is trying to restore him to health. Dr. Miesse said the dog has suffered. He's ill and needs attention. He's been needing it.

The terrier had obviously been a pet. He obeys orders and responds to commands. I almost cried as the dejected dog I call "Scottie," ate an egg fixed for his breakfast. When he finished, he weakly raised his head, licked my hand and feebly wagged his tail, his first show of animation or affection in 24 hours.

SASSY

Almost as much as a child, the domestic dog is part of the human heart and the human home for reasons no one need explain.

I know because I have a 2-year-old "cockerpoo" (half cocker, half poodle) dog named Sassy. She is my 7-year-old daughter's favorite playmate and almost another child to me.

I saw Sassy's face in the face of every dog at Ripley.

I was sorry that I didn't have enough money to buy all of the dogs.

And I was thankful that Sassy, a happy pet who sleeps on the foot of the bed and demands her morning coffee like a dictator, does not have to wake up such horror.

I hope she never strays.

THE MARKET IN DOGS

It's one thing to use in medical research a homeless dog from a public pound. It's another thing—and a vicious one—to use somebody's beloved pet which has been stolen from a front lawn.

A dramatic revelation of the latter type of operations here in the Midsouth was given in a story by staff writer Kay Pittman in yesterday's Press-Scimitar. Because so much of this has been going on over the country, both houses of Congress are concerning themselves with legislation to regulate the sale of such animals in interstate commerce. The lawmakers don't have in mind making dognaping a Federal crime, although many pet owners would like it to be. Some of them suggest hanging as an appropriate penalty.

We all know that medical schools and some research laboratories need dogs and other animals for experiments that may benefit man. It can also be conceded that these scientists are not out to hurt the animals.

But they have apparently not been careful enough about their suppliers.

Scores of animal welfare groups appeared before a House subcommittee this week to protest that pet theft for research is widespread. Yet it was also testified that thou-

sands of unwanted cats and dogs are put to death annually in municipal pounds. If this is true, both labs and pounds have been overlooking a beneficial arrangement. We were glad to report yesterday that the Memphis Pound seems to be operating humanely and sensibly in this respect.

Anyway, don't be surprised if some law gets passed in the field. Pet owners are voters as well and all Congressmen know the adage, "He who loves me, loves my dog."

Role Is Praised

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, Secretary McNamara's report that our Armed Forces can meet the Vietnam demands without weakening our position in other areas is "welcome assurance," the Denver Post says editorially.

The paper believes the Secretary deserves much credit for "the tremendous feat of deploying within a matter of months a combat ready force of 300,000 men some 10,000 miles away and supporting them in combat."

The editorial is concise, and in the belief that others will want to see it, I am offering it for the RECORD:

WELCOME ASSURANCE FROM McNAMARA

Secretary of Defense McNamara has given the Nation powerful assurance that our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the war in Vietnam without weakening our military position in other areas of the world.

McNamara himself has played the major role in building up those forces since 1961, and the statistics he released this week on the buildup of our military forces during the last 5 years are impressive.

He deserves a good deal of the credit for "the tremendous feat of deploying within a matter of months a combat ready force of 300,000 men some 10,000 miles away and supporting them in combat—without calling up the Reserve forces, without a general extension of tours on an involuntary basis and without invoking the usual economic controls."

This force of 300,000—215,000 on land—represents about 10 percent of our "total active duty military strength," McNamara said. There is obviously a good deal left to meet problems in other areas and a good deal more that could be mobilized.

In describing our strength, its mobility, its capability and its adequacy to meet the challenges ahead, McNamara is on sound ground. As long as our policy to provide whatever it takes to protect South Vietnam, we have confidence that policy will not fail for any lack of men or supplies from McNamara's department.

We feel less certain, however, about McNamara's analysis of what the Communists will try to do or be able to do. Too many faulty predictions along that line still echo throughout southeast Asia and haunt the men who made them.

We hope McNamara is right when he says the Communist buildup of manpower will have to come to a peak sometime this year because it will not be possible for Hanoi to support any more men in South Vietnam.

If that is so, it will be possible for the United States to set a limit to its own manpower buildup. Under present conditions,

with 215,000 men on hand and another 20,000 on the way, it is not possible to tell how many men we will need. Our strength for this year is expected to rise to 350,000 or 400,000, but it may have to go higher.

No one can tell for sure how far the Communists will be willing to go or what new assistance Hanoi may receive from Peiping or Moscow. We will simply have to be ready for anything, including an unreasonable response from the other side. Despite his measured optimism at this stage, we're sure that is what the Secretary intends.

The War on Poverty: Boon or Boondoggle?—No. 5

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. LUCIEN N. NEDZI

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, the fifth article of a series written by Washington reporter of the Detroit News, Tom Joyce, discussing war on poverty follows:

COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE WAR ON POVERTY: MAKE THESE PEOPLE ASHAMED TO STAND IN A WELFARE LINE

(By Tom Joyce)

WASHINGTON, March 3.—A Los Angeles Negro who softens his militancy with a smile was asked what he was trying to accomplish through a war on poverty community-action program.

The scene was a sparsely furnished office on the second floor of an old frame building precisely in the geographical center of Watts, the ghetto scorched and bloodied last August.

Ocie Pastard, the 28-year-old Negro, leaned over his desk and replied in a firm voice to the question:

"To make these people ashamed to stand in a welfare line."

The answer came like a splash of cold water in the face of this reporter, who had been asking the same question from the Nation's Capital to San Francisco and receiving answers couched in the poverty war's new jargon.

The most frequently heard explanations: "To organize the poor," "to get them thinking about their problems," "to inspire them to action," "to promote self-help."

Many poverty experts disagree with Pastard's cold, frank way of putting it. They would phrase it differently, saying the goal is to motivate the poor to do something about their own poverty.

But it always seems to come out much the same way.

And the overriding question is always the same: how do you inspire the poor, people frozen in poverty, inured to its misery and without means of escape?

STIR INTEREST

The philosophy of community-action programs, viewed by many as the heart of the battle against poverty, is to arouse their interests and imagination by demonstrating that there are ways of breaking the stranglehold.

Pastard is community-actions program director for Westminster Neighborhood Association Inc., financed by a \$982,000 anti-poverty grant.

It is on such programs that the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) is spending \$685 million of the \$1.5 billion set aside for poverty-war programs this year.

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in the business we are in, and had attained a right and the privilege to be on the board of directors of Curt G. Joa, Inc.

May you never forget that you, too, must have a goal, and your goal must be to carry on. You have a wonderful family, and in this pall-mall life, with its millions of temptations, it is your great responsibility to navigate a course so that 52 years hence, your sons and daughters can speak of an attainment of citizenship, which is the most valuable thing for us all.

CURT G. JOA.

**Packed in Cages: No Water, No Food—
Dogs for Sale in Ripley, Miss., Shock
Animal-Loving Reporter**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. GEORGE W. GRIDER

OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. GRIDER. Mr. Speaker, I spent the weekend in my district, and rarely have I seen the people so aroused. On Thursday afternoon in a front-page, copyrighted story, the Memphis Press-Scimitar reported in story and picture the activities of a dog auction in nearby Ripley, Miss.

The newspaper's switchboard was jammed throughout the day; my Memphis office telephone rang constantly. I was stopped on the street by all sorts of people and asked, "Why can't something be done about it?"

Our colleague the gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE] has made an excellent beginning with hearings on bills designed to end this traffic in stolen pets and the inhumane treatment rendered by many dealers. The Congress can do something about this problem.

As evidence that Federal legislation is needed, I call to the attention of my colleagues the newspaper article and an editorial which appeared the following day: [From the Memphis (Tenn.) Press-Scimitar, Mar. 10, 1966]

**PACKED IN CAGES: NO WATER, NO FOOD—DOGS
FOR SALE IN RIPLEY, MISS., SHOCK ANIMAL-
LOVING REPORTER**

(By Kay Pittman)

The magnificent looking black collie with a shiny coat and thoroughbred lines wagged his tail as a child patted his head.

"Nice doggie," the little boy said. Then his mother tugged at his hand and the boy walked away. The collie leaped to run after the child.

That's when a rope attached to a long steel prodding bar was tightened to the strangulation point around his neck, jerking the dog upwards. His tongue hung out and the dog made gagging noises.

SPIRIT BROKEN

Then the steel bar came down hard on his nose. Blood spurted from the wound. The dog whimpered and cowered to the ground, his spirit broken.

Moments later, the collie was loaded onto a four-tiered truck with no ventilation, no water, no food—packed in with about 200 other dogs and numerous cats.

The truck belonged to a dog dealer, who bought the expensive collie for \$3. He would sell the dog to a big hospital or research cen-

ter for \$50. The collie was on his way to possible lingering torture and certain death.

FAIRGROUNDS

I saw the collie, formerly someone's cherished pet, at the fairgrounds in Ripley, Miss. Accompanied by a Press-Scimitar photographer, I went to Ripley for trade and auction day, which is held once a month.

Although everything from fishing tackle to grandfather clocks is auctioned or traded, the biggest single commodity is dogs. There were about 1,000 dogs there this month. Many of them, perhaps half, had apparently been pets.

Dognapping has become a serious business in the United States, and bills are now before Congress to make it an interstate offense to steal a pet and sell it for research.

DEALERS

Dog dealers are taking advantage of the growing demand for dogs that are used in vital medical research. Laboratories now need almost 2 million dogs a year.

To cash in on this need, dealers rove the country, paying a buck or two to anyone who comes forward with a dog, and no questions are asked. Family pets, trained to obedience and easy to handle, are especially prized, and the Humane Society of the United States estimates that 50 percent of all missing pets have been stolen by dognappers, who in turn sell them to dealers.

Dealers sell to laboratories. There are many Ripleys dotted across the Midsouth and the Nation.

Some of the men at Ripley freely admitted to me that they scoured the countryside picking up dogs. Pets.

One dognapper, with an Alabama license, asked me what kind of pet I wanted. "Just tell me, and I can have it for you next month." Humane Society people say Tennessee and Virginia are happy pet-hunting grounds for Pennsylvania and New York dealers.

WIRE CAGES

The Ripley trade day opens at 8:30 a.m. Panel trucks start arriving with chicken wire cages only big enough to hold one dog. Sometimes these cages are made to hold 20 dogs. Others start arriving with car trunks filled with animals of all description. Out of such a cage came the big collie. There wasn't room enough for him to stand. There were six other big dogs in the cage with him.

Putting on my best accent, I asked one dealer who was buying hundreds of dogs what would happen to the animals. He had started loading dogs on his truck at 9 a.m.

He said, "Well, little lady, I'll leave here tonight and get to my farm about midnight, then start out for a long drive up north in the morning."

And what would happen to the dogs on the truck, many of which were the pets of some heartbroken, still searching owners?

The dealer said the dogs would stay on the truck during the whole process, from Ripley onward, without food or water or exercise.

SELLERS

Many, under such crowded conditions, would probably die during the 24- to 36-hour imprisonment before arriving at their destination.

The dog dealers were buying animals from various men, most of whom were clad in overalls. Most of the men carried shotguns. I saw collars and license tags removed from some of the dogs' necks before they were sold.

I caught a glimpse of one dog bearing a Kentucky license tag, another wearing the name "Sonny Boy" around his neck.

I saw dogs beaten, kicked, and tied out behind cars and along fences for hours without food or water. I saw a nightmare of man's cruelty to living creatures.

INCOGNITO

I went to the trade day incognito having been warned by Memphis Humane Society

officials that game and fish commission officers, who were evidently on the fairgrounds complex, would run off any newspaper reporters or photographer. State troopers were there too.

Just by ambling around and saying I was "looking for a good hunting dog and a house pet," I was able to observe the trades firsthand.

HUNTING DOGS

There were a number of good hunting dogs and house pets there. Men who had as many as 20 dogs in a chicken wire cage would come to me and say, "I've got a nice dog here. He belonged to my grandson. I'll sell him to you for \$3."

One nice dog that belonged to a grandson was a fine looking Airedale. Another was a rare and expensive white German shepherd. He was sold to Roy Hargrove of Medina and loaded on the Hargrove truck, which bears a Cicero, Ill., sign on its three-tiered side. The truck was so crammed with animals by noon that you couldn't have squeezed a squirrel into it.

DOG FARM

Yet more dogs were thrown into it. Hargrove and his son, William Hargrove, 40, of Cicero, Ill., operate a dog farm in Medina.

The Hargroves, like other dealers, collect dogs and sell them to laboratories and medical schools, some in the Chicago and St. Louis area. They were indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury in December on a charge of cruelty to animals.

Circuit Judge Dick Jerman of Alamo will hear the case on May 4, a case which has attracted national attention to practices involved in the handling and sales of dogs and cats.

RESCUE

I rescued a wirehaired terrier, usually an expensive dog, from one seller with a Tipton County, Tenn., tag on his car. He had no license plate on the back of the car. He pulled the dog out of the trunk and sold it to me for \$5.

I also bought an emaciated, but still proud looking, English setter from another Tennessee dealer for \$4. The setter was nothing but a boneyard.

TOTE BAGS

I noticed that the dealers with the largest trucks bought few small dogs. They purchased mostly large dogs—shepherds, collies, hounds, and the like.

People also brought tote bags crammed with cats, some selling for 10 cents a pound, to them. Puppies were also bought by the pound.

They bought large dogs because beagles, retrievers, and German shepherds are ranked high on the labs "most wanted" list. These dogs are purchased for \$2 or \$3 and sold to the labs for \$30 to \$50. Cats sell to labs anywhere from \$1 to \$4.50.

MEDIC CENTER

The Memphis Medical Center buys no dogs from dealers. It purchases dogs, under contract, from the city dog shelter. Director Otis Caldwell said a shelter board, many of whom are members of the Humane Society, sets the policy for operation of the city-operated pound.

Caldwell said any dog that is picked up and not wearing a license is held for 3 days. If he is not claimed he is put up for adoption.

Dogs that are sick are gassed.

Dogs that are never claimed or that no one seems to want are sold, under contract, to the Memphis Medical Center.

No dogs in the Memphis hospital operation are bought from dog dealers.

REGULAR FEE

Dogs sold to the medical center are purchased for the regular \$2 pound fee.

Last year 7,634 dogs were redeemed or adopted.

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And Haryou, the biggest single antipoverty project in America, with hundreds of jobs to be filled, offers an inviting piece of machinery with which to reward political supporters.

Nobody has to point this out to ADAM CLAYTON POWELL who installed his own lieutenant as Haryou Director even though the consensus seemed to indicate there were more qualified candidates.

In the beginning, POWELL was a fiery critic of city hall control of the war. But not too long ago he moderated his position, saying that probably there should be some sort of middle ground between "unfortunate extremes."

He cited Chicago to illustrate what he called "minimum feasible participation of the poor" and characterized Newark as being "so politically pure that it has antagonized all the city councilmen and ignored the mayor."

NEWARK ISSUE

He alluded to the fact that in Newark politicians and appointed city officials, not the poor, have been denied anything approaching what might be called "maximum feasible political participation."

With few exceptions, city officials were virtually excluded from the umbrella agency, called the United Community Corp.

And while OEO officials in Washington were busy praising Newark as an outstanding example of "maximum feasible participation," sulking city officials were thinking about ways to get in on the action.

A solution that has gained wide support, however, is expansion of the board to seat 26 officials of city agencies, including the 9 members of the city council.

Newark's \$9 million program was never really in control of the poor anyway. While city officials largely were excluded, real control rested in the hands of established leaders of social agencies, civil rights groups, and community organizations.

LIVES IN NEW YORK

One thing that irks city officials is the fact that the \$23,000-a-year director of the umbrella agency, 37-year-old Cyril D. Tyson, is a former Haryou-Act, worker who continues to live in New York.

Many of the headaches over participation of the poor have developed by the very way the city boards had to be set up in the beginning.

Generally there were no ready-built organizations to take on the work of the war against poverty. And they just grew, in a rather logical way.

In many cases city officials and representatives of welfare agencies and established community services got together with businessmen and others and set up shop. Then they picked delegates to represent the poor.

And as was, and still is the case, these representatives themselves were not poor but supposedly either lived in the neighborhoods or had some kind of interest in the people who did.

One of San Francisco's representatives of the poor, for instance, is a Catholic priest in Chinatown.

POLITICAL HEAT

Now, more and more, spokesmen for the poor are being named in neighborhood elections.

But the elections themselves generate a lot of political heat. In Los Angeles, for instance, there are charges that people responsible to Mayor Samuel Yorty have gerrymandered the election districts.

Because of political fighting, Los Angeles County so far has made little real progress in its antipoverty programs even though it has received about \$40 million.

There is constant bickering between minority groups. Residents of the Spanish-speaking community complain loudly that, since last summer's riot, OEO officials have

channeled most of the money into Watts because of pressures from civil rights groups. Many Mexicans say they feel they are being punished for not rioting.

A COMPLAINT

One to register such a complaint is Mrs. Rosita Moreno, a representative of the poor on the central board. She and her husband live on a retirement income of \$3,300 a year. "All the attention," she says, "is on Watts. They tell us to wait. But we are tired of waiting—tired of hearing manana. It is no longer good enough."

Shriver himself has not escaped political barbs. There have been charges that he has dealt too easily with Daley because he has political ambitions in his home State of Illinois, where the Chicago mayor wields powerful influence.

New power struggles are certain to develop. But the direction of the war now seems away from any notion that maximum participation of the poor means control of community action programs by the poor. Experience is not on the side of those who would have it that way.

Confusion Over Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ELMER J. HOLLAND

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. Speaker, the Pittsburgh Press, last week had an excellent editorial on the "Confusion Over Vietnam."

It explains very clearly, I think, the need for our active participation in South Vietnam. It states President Johnson is deserving of "the most determined support we can muster for him" while performing this most difficult task of accomplishing the containment of communism in North Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I insert this in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as I feel it will help some who may be confused.

CONFUSION OVER VIETNAM

It is quite evident to anyone with ears that public opinion about the Vietnam war is in some disarray. And that confusion about this struggle, more than anything else, contributes to differences of opinion and most of all to uncertainty.

This need not be surprising, since the Vietnam conflict is not like any other war in which this country has engaged, not even like Korea which also generated some confusion and split opinions.

In Korea, there was a frontal attack by Communist armies. We can understand that as war. World War II, once it started, clearly united the country—because we were directly attacked without provocation.

But Vietnam is something else. It began with the Communist attempt to take over South Vietnam by subversion.

By skillful trickery, the Communists were able to make their grab for power appear as an insurrection from within the country. When that didn't fully work, they went on to terrorism. (In 1960, Secretary McNamara has said, more than 2,000 Vietnamese officials and civilians were murdered or kidnaped.)

Later the Communists began pouring trained guerrillas and organized military units into South Vietnam.

So the war has grown, not because the South Vietnamese or the United States sought to "escalate" it, but because the

Communists, as they were frustrated in their indirect attempts to seize the country, went on to more forceful, more direct and more obvious stages.

In such circumstances, people in this country and elsewhere couldn't easily recognize that the seemingly disorganized, bewildering turmoil in a far-off Asian country was, indeed, a frightful case of Communist aggression.

The Communists had failed, in Korea and elsewhere, to achieve their ends by sudden, explosive attack. So in Vietnam they tried more subtle means. But the purpose was the same, to conquer an independent nation for their own domination.

Senators in Washington should know all this. That is their responsibility. Instead, many of them have been indulging in a rambling, endless and belated dispute over policies—the result, if any, being simply more confusion.

Samuel Lubell, the eminent pollster, reported after 3 weeks of interviewing people around the country that the Senate debate had changed the minds of almost nobody. But about two-thirds of the people he interviewed, he said, simply want to step up the fighting and force the Communists to quit.

What is hard for people to understand, obviously, is President Johnson's effort to keep the war contained. But his purpose is to avoid, if possible, a much wider war, involving Red China in force, which would cost us much more dearly in lives. This purpose amply justifies his effort, gamble that it may be.

So, altogether, the nature of the war and the bewildering manner in which it developed were bound to produce confusion which the Johnson administration simply will have to tolerate.

In turn, the President, in this most delicate and difficult task, deserves the most determined support we can muster for him, even if at times we are perplexed.

Los Angeles Antipoverty Election

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. HAWKINS. Mr. Speaker, the recently held election in Los Angeles designed to elect representatives of the poor to the local antipoverty board has raised a number of questions about the failure of the vast number of eligible voters to participate.

In the following article from the Christian Science Monitor some of the answers are given. This is not the whole story, but the article does accurately indicate some of the basic underlying causes of the election's failure in the city of Los Angeles.

The article follows:

DISCONTENT TRACED IN POVERTY WAR VOTING
(By Curtis J. Sitomer)

LOS ANGELES.—In terms of cast ballots, Los Angeles's antipoverty election was something of a fizzle.

It seems to indicate widespread disenchantment among affected citizens with the local administration of the War on Poverty program. Minority leaders confirm this disenchantment.

Only 1 percent of the county's 300,000 eligible voters from poverty pockets turned

of a series written by Washington reporter of the Detroit News, Tom Joyce, discussing war on poverty, follows:

OUR CITY HALLS ARE TAKING A BEATING: THE POLITICS OF POVERTY
(By Tom Joyce)

WASHINGTON, March 4.—The city halls of America have become battered bastions in the war against poverty.

They have been assaulted by the poor—and their newly emerging leaders—from Boston to Los Angeles. Few have been spared, and a lot of political blood already has been spilled.

For one thing, the poor themselves are being driven into politics by the assault on poverty.

For another, fast-growing cadres of civil rights leaders, arguing that they represent the poor in whose name the war is being fought, are discovering that the antipoverty campaign has created convenient machinery for them.

City hall establishments, on the other hand, have a natural political interest in the growing antipoverty war chests, the big organizations that are being built and the rich new crop of voters the program is expected to engender.

PROGRAM HURT

The political skirmishes are working against the war. In some cities and towns the fight against poverty has given way completely to the battle of political forces.

At the heart of the controversy is the first general order of the poverty war—the one that dictates maximum feasible participation of the poor in community-action programs.

Other phases of the war—like the Job Corps—have been spared the political infighting, because they are not covered by edict.

Complicating things is the fact that no one really knows how much participation of the poor is really possible in programs where they are supposed to propose and help develop their own devices to break the cycle of poverty.

What it boils down to is how many representatives of the poor should be included on the boards that run the citywide or umbrella community-action programs.

In the South there is an additional problem, since participation of the poor also means participation of Negroes.

POOR IN CONTROL

San Francisco is the only major city where spokesmen for the poor have actually won control of antipoverty machinery from city hall. That was 6 months ago, and despite grants totaling \$1.8 million in community-action funds, not a single significant program is in motion.

Mayor John Francis Shelley, a big, affable Irishman, seems to be enjoying the struggle that the victors are having in trying to put the program into effect.

Asked how his city's antipoverty program was going, he chortled and replied: "What program?"

Under pressure from representatives of the poor, some of them self-styled, Shelley agreed to an open meeting and election to settle the issue. The poor representatives ended up with a 51 percent majority on the board of the umbrella agency.

"I have just sat back since then," Shelley said. "They haven't contacted me, and I haven't contacted them. Let's see what they do now."

"I hear a storm is blowing up inside the council about leadership. What will come of it I don't know. We have given them their reins, and the wagon hasn't moved."

Ghetto leaders, who led the battle against Shelley, concede that San Francisco now represents a supreme test in the controversy over whether the poor are equipped to devise and develop their own means of escaping poverty.

DETROIT PRAISED

But they say they are willing to take the responsibility.

In Detroit, Mayor Cavanagh has handled the issue so skillfully that some antipoverty experts wonder if the Detroit programs really deserve the constant praise they get from Washington. Could it be, they ask, a case where defects in the program have been covered over by avoiding an open conflict on the representation issue?

But there is no evidence to support the question, and the consensus in poverty war circles is that Detroit's operation is an outstanding one.

Detroit's total action against poverty (TAP) policy advisory committee is made up of 26 members appointed by the mayor and 16 elected from the city's 4 designated poverty areas. But there are plans to increase the poor representation to 24 when new poverty districts, termed target areas, are funded.

The mayor's appointees had numbered only 23 until he recently named 3 new ones—to satisfy a requirement that the committee include spokesmen for city departments of housing, welfare, and health.

There have been no public charges that Cavanagh was acting to block a majority of the poor from gaining control when delegates from the new poverty areas are seated.

There is reason to believe that he feels strongly that if the programs are to work, the poor must be substantially represented.

OTHER PROBLEMS

He thinks it would be absurd, however, for the poor to have control of the machinery—as in San Francisco.

Neither does he think that only the poor can best determine their needs and cures. "This," he says, "is like saying that if I had a malady, only I would know the cure." There are some other problems.

Cavanagh, for instance, feels that the poverty war is spawning new leaders who think city hall is some kind of monolith to be torpedoes.

And he has told OEO Director Sargent Shriver that big cities are having trouble because the poverty war has helped create a sociology that city hall has to be torn down.

In Chicago, a bitter political battle is going on between Mayor Richard Daley, frequently described even by fellow Democrats as the arch-type political boss, and followers of Saul Alinsky, self-appointed spokesman for the poor everywhere.

The fuss has seriously impeded, but not halted, Chicago's antipoverty projects.

ONE APPROACH

Daley sees city hall as the rightful source of leadership in the war on poverty.

A Daley spokesman does not deny that there are political advantages to be derived from running the show. "But what is wrong," he asks, "with political control of a program if it is a good program?"

The Daley approach is aimed at jobs and job training. There is no strong objection to projects fostering an understanding of art and culture, but they are regarded only as subsidiaries.

A central theme is that the poor must organize to develop leaders, talents, and incentives.

"Organize for what?" Daley's top lieutenants ask. "So they can develop community leaders who are only out to break the power structure?"

The question articulates a fear that many big city administrations have about the antipoverty fight. They ask if the Federal Government should be financing attempts to batter down city hall.

A CRITIC

It is because of such concern, and pressures generated by it, that Shriver and the

OEO have retreated on the question of maximum feasible participation.

The consensus now seems to be that if the war on poverty has a chance of succeeding, the local programs must be in the hands of established forces—city governments, business, labor, and proven welfare and service agencies—with the poor represented but not in control.

One who disagrees is Alinsky, who is making a career of organizing the poor and assaulting power structures.

Alinsky-inspired organizations are at work across the Nation, in cities like Detroit, Chicago, and Syracuse.

Cavanagh has had to run hard and fast to keep ahead of one such outfit in Detroit—the West Central Organization.

Alinsky is one of the chief critics of the war on poverty, describing it as a big "hoax" aimed at stifling the voices of the poor.

He is convinced that the poor can get the things they need—like better housing and better jobs and more services—only through organized power.

Alinsky's home-base operation is The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), probably sharpest thorn in Daley's side.

Woodlawn is a sprawling ghetto, one that presents a somber panorama of squalor and despair as it is viewed from the elevated trains that rumble over it.

The man who runs TWO is the Reverend Lynward Stevenson, pastor of the Bethlehem Covenant Presbyterian Church. His philosophy:

"The only way you get things is through the use of power. And power comes from two sources—money and people. And we don't have any money in this neighborhood." How is such power employed?

CRITICIZES DALEY

As an example, Stevenson says TWO forced slumlords to make \$1,475,000 in building improvements. TWO members staged surprise marches in well-to-do neighborhoods of slumlords passing out handbills like this:

"Did you know one of your neighbors runs a slum building? He is ——. He owns and operates one of the filthiest buildings in Woodlawn at ——. This dump is not fit for human beings to live in."

There also have been marches on city hall and boycotts of merchants.

Like Alinsky, Stevenson is a critic of the poverty war, saying: "It is making the same mistake welfare always has, creating a dependency. We are still just putting bandages on people to cover up the wounds. The only thing that will solve the problems is social change and the war refuses to deal with people who can bring it about."

CALLS FOR FACTS

Stevenson charges that Daley blocks any meaningful participation by TWO in the city's antipoverty fight. And he says that Daley is forcing projects down the throats of people, using party precinct captains to "intimidate poor representatives on the advisory council."

He especially attacked a slum-beautification plan, arguing that "a slum cannot be beautified."

Daley vehemently denies the charges, saying Stevenson has been unable to offer a single name or a single solid case to support his accusations.

In New York, the central political rub is with Haryou-Act, the big antipoverty project in Harlem. Officials of the citywide umbrella agency complain bitterly that "there is a wall around Haryou." They say they cannot penetrate the wall for a real look at what is going on.

POWELL WINS

There was a bitter fight for control of the program and few people were really surprised when it was won by Representative ANAM CLAYTON POWELL, who has a sharp eye for situations that offer political advantage.