

March 21, 1966

between French and Communist forces had finally dropped to 1.2 to 1 in a situation where (as is visible today) a 5-to-1 ratio even with all the firepower in the world gives rise to little optimism, and 10 or even 20 to 1 is considered a useful superiority level.

By that time also (spring 1953) the Vietminh had conquered all of Tonking (North Vietnam) shy of the Red River Delta, a fortified "enclave" in which the French controlled 1,800 villages out of 5,000. All of northern Laos had fallen to Giap in one swift offensive.

VIETMINH HOLDINGS

In South Vietnam an unbroken expanse of Vietminh territory existed from a few miles south of Danang to almost the gates of Saigon save for yet another French "enclave" in the mountain plateau area. Beyond the Mekong Delta, Camau Peninsula, and the whole Cardamom Mountain chain of Cambodia were in Vietminh hands.

The French Army had failed in every one of its offensives in which it attempted to "find, fix, and destroy" the enemy—although it, too, could point to reassuring casualty statistics. A 25,000-man stab into the northern hinterland netted a few hundred dead in late 1952; an airborne attack on the Chinese border in 1953 found a few tons of weapons but no troops; a 20,000-man operation near Hué brought in 76 weapons.

By 1954 the French Army had lost 1,500 officers (including over 1,100 platoon commanders) and was exhausted—even without the Dienbienphu disaster. No French politician did that; the war did it, because it's that kind of war.

In fact, year after year, the Communists and a few of their associates excepted, the French Parliament voted the credits for the war and voted for the reinforcements which could be squeezed out of a weakened postwar France.

I have read every French parliamentary debate on Indochina since 1945, and they make instructive reading as bewildered but honest men were faced, on one hand, with glowing reports that the war was being won and, on the other, with new requests for more funds and troops. Even when the United States made available to the French in 1953-54 almost unlimited funds and in many fields, more equipment than they could usefully handle, the war was not being won on the battlefield.

ONLY ARMY LIMITATION

The only political limitation on the French Army was that it could not, after 1950, use draftees in Vietnam until the much-maligned Mendès-France, after Dienbienphu, threatened to use two divisions with draftees from France. And considering that the French, like King Canute, were fighting the combined waves of Vietnamese nationalism and communism, a Parisian show of unity or even the sending of draftees would have made little difference.

It is rather curious, finally, to see observers who, for two decades, have berated the French Army for all sorts of true or imagined failings, now resort to the German stab-in-the-back myth to club their own opposition here. Surely there must be better arguments than that to justify the war in Vietnam.

BERNARD B. FALL.

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1966.

THE PEIPING ENIGMA

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, the March 11 issue of the New York Times contained an article by Mr. Tom Wicker entitled "The Peiping Enigma." In the article Mr. Wicker commented on the fundamental contradiction between the statements of administration officials on

China and the statements of the renowned China experts before the Foreign Relations Committee last week. Mr. Wicker remarked that the recent statements by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense "have pictured a relentlessly expansionist China, dedicated to spreading communism and Chinese power throughout the world, advancing toward threatening nuclear strength, and needing to be stopped now—in Vietnam—as the world should have stopped Hitler on the Rhine." Thus, Mr. Wicker continued:

The United States not only refuses to recognize Peiping and accede to her membership in the United Nations but also regards China as a pentup aggressor waiting to spring upon the world.

On the other hand, Mr. Wicker pointed out:

Quite a different picture of China is being painted, however, by American scholars in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. Wicker said that these scholars "saw the policy of isolating China as working against the sensible long range objective of bringing her into peaceful relations with the world."

He noted that Professor Fairbank "pictured China as more Chinese than Communist, more frustrated than expansionist, seeking leadership and the world's deference more than new territory and using Communist rhetoric and theory to explain how the imperialist had destroyed what ancient China considered for hundreds of years her rightful preeminence in the world." Professor John Fairbank and Professor Barnett advocated "a policy of drawing China into international affairs, from sports to the United Nations, while the United States competed sharply with her over the model to be followed by developing nations and met any military adventures with adequate force." In short, as Mr. Wicker commented in his concluding paragraph, the view expressed by Professors Fairbank and Barnett "suggests that an effective approach to the conflict in Vietnam can only grow out of a hard-eyed resolution of the question of whether modern China represents aggressive, expansionist communism or an ancient culture seeking to reestablish itself and its influence."

Mr. President, I have never been to China and I do not pretend to be an expert on China. I do not think that any of us in the Senate can claim to be. It is for this reason, because all of us in the Senate and I believe all but a few Americans need to be educated on the subject of China, that the Foreign Relations Committee is holding hearings.

But it has struck me forcefully, as it has struck Mr. Wicker, that the experts on China have a view of China, and of what would constitute a wise policy toward that country, that is totally different from the view of our senior administration officials. It seems to me that if the experts are right about China, and their opinions are based after all on profound knowledge of the country, our leading officials must be wrong. They

both cannot be right because they disagree fundamentally. I would hope that this fact would give the administration some cause for concern. It certainly disturbs me.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Wicker's article of March 11 from the Times be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 11, 1966]
THE PEIPING ENIGMA—ADMINISTRATION AND SCHOLARS EMBRACE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF CHINA'S INTENTIONS

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, March 10.—Will the real Communist China please stand up?

That question has suddenly arisen here, providing a welcome intellectual diversion from the Capital's fixation on the war in South Vietnam and, for those willing to accept it, a new perspective on that war. On the one hand, recent statements by President Johnson, Vice President HUMPHREY, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara have pictured a relentlessly expansionist China, dedicated to spreading communism and Chinese power throughout the world, advancing toward threatening nuclear strength, and needing to be stopped now—in Vietnam—as the world should have stopped Hitler on the Rhine.

In Honolulu, for instance, Mr. Johnson said, "In the forties and fifties, we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression. Now the center of attention has shifted to another part of the world where aggression is on the march. Our stand must be as firm as ever."

A PLEDGE AGAINST PEIPING

Mr. McNamara, in Senate testimony, described the Vietnamese war as "a test case of the Chinese Communist version of the so-called 'wars of national liberation,' one of a series of conflicts the Chinese hope will sweep the world."

Mr. Rusk called a recent speech by Lin Biao, Peiping's Minister of Defense, "as candid as Hitler's 'Mein Kampf.'" And in Australia, Mr. HUMPHREY made a ringing pledge that Chinese expansionism would be halted because "the United States of America and its allies will not let it win."

Thus, the United States not only refuses to recognize Peiping and accede to her membership in the United Nations but also regards China as a pent-up aggressor, waiting to spring upon the world, and has openly expressed the determination to stop her with as much force as necessary, in Vietnam, Korea or elsewhere.

Quite a different picture of China is being painted, however, by American scholars in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

OPPOSITION TO U.S. POLICY

Both A. Doak Barnett of the East Asian Institute at Columbia University and John K. Fairbank of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard saw the policy of isolating China as working against the sensible long-range objective of bringing her into peaceful relations with the world.

Mr. Fairbank, an outstanding Asian scholar, testified today and pictured China as more Chinese than Communist, more frustrated than expansionist, seeking leadership and the world's deference more than new territory, and using Communist rhetoric and theory to explain how the "imperialists" had destroyed what ancient China considered for hundreds of years her rightful preeminence in the world.

March 21, 1966

6101

the influence of water quality on these plants, Clarkson.

A-006-WVA: Influence of topographic features on rainfall in West Virginia, Dickerson.

A-007-WVA: Algal relationships to the recovery of acid mine streams, Bennett.

A-008-WVA: Geochemical behavior of iron and manganese in a reservoir (Lake Lynn, W. Va.) fed by streams containing acid mine drainage, Corbett.

A-009-WVA: Geochemical and sedimentological analysis of the Tygart River Reservoir, Collin.

WISCONSIN

A-001-WIS: Use of lake sediment cores to estimate the rate of eutrophication of lakes, Lee.

A-002-WIS: Biological aspects of eutrophication on Lake Mendota, Crystall, and Trout Lake, Wis., Hasler.

A-003-WIS: Methods for harvesting or control, aquatic plants, Grant.

A-004-WIS: Circulation and mixing processes in lakes, Hoopse.

A-005-WIS: Unsteady flow of ground water and dispersion in ground water movement, Monkmeier.

A-006-WIS: An investigation of the relationship between the filtering properties of particulates in water and the filter medium as applied in water reuse system, Polkowski.

A-007-WIS: A model to estimate the economic effects, water-based recreation projects, on local political subdivisions, Lord.

A-008-WIS: Legal-economic analysis of irrigation in Wisconsin, Rose.

A-009-WIS: Water quality management on the Wisconsin River, a model study of the technical, economic, legal, financial, and administrative aspects, Beuscher.

WYOMING

A-001-WYO: Water resource operations study, Bellamy.

EDWIN CHRISTIANSON ELECTED VICE PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the delegates at the annual convention of the National Farmers Union, held last week in Denver, elected Mr. Edwin Christianson as the new vice president of the organization.

I have known Ed Christianson for many years. He has been president of the Minnesota Farmers Union since 1950 and he is one of the distinguished farm leaders of the State. I know of his concern for the welfare of farm families and of his many efforts to develop practical programs, both within his own organization and also at the national level, to improve economic and social conditions for farm families and rural communities.

The election of Ed Christianson is a tribute to his record, and it is an honor for him and for the farm families he has worked with in Minnesota for many years. I am sure that he will bring to the National Farmers Union, as its new vice president, the same enthusiasm and dedication for improving farm and rural conditions as he has demonstrated over the years in Minnesota.

WILL CLAYTON

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, when Will Clayton died last February 8, the Nation lost one of its greatest men.

Will Clayton had that rare combination of qualities which enabled him to succeed in all his endeavors and to retain the respect and high regard of all who ever knew him.

He succeeded in his role as father of a fine family. He succeeded in the development of an enormously profitable business establishment. He succeeded as a statesman and a servant of his country in many difficult and challenging assignments. No man could have been more faithful and diligent in the use of his talents and in the devotion of his efforts to the building of a better world.

Will Clayton was still at work at the time of his sudden and fatal illness. During the week prior to his death, he participated in conferences of the Atlantic Council and the U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO. Both of these organizations seek the further development of ideas and programs conceived by Will Clayton during his service as Assistant Secretary of Commerce and as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs over 20 years ago.

I considered Will Clayton a friend since the day I met him in the forties. I knew him as a private citizen and as a Federal official. I knew him as a selfless servant of his country, always eager to share his time, his talent, and his personal fortune in the interest of his fellowmen and in the interest of international peace and prosperity. The Nation will not soon replace Will Clayton.

Will Clayton had an unusual talent in dealing with people. He was soft spoken, pleasant, and unobtrusively persuasive. I have a personal reason to be in his debt. But for his assistance in persuading a reluctant and obtuse Member of the other body, the Student Exchange Act of 1946 probably would not have been enacted. His talent for reconciling different views, of achieving agreement among men of diverse opinions was unsurpassed. In a word, he understood human beings and knew how to lead them to cooperation rather than conflict.

Will Clayton's children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren have a proud heritage. I extend to them my profound sympathy in this time of grief. All the Nation grieves with them. All the Nation is grateful for the life and work of Will Clayton. May we all be worthy heirs of the contributions of this great man.

VIETNAM—LETTER BY PROF. BERNARD FALL

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in the March 11 issue of the New York Times there appeared a letter to the editor by Bernard Fall. Professor Fall, a French citizen now a resident in Washington, is a renowned expert on Vietnam. He has written extensively on the subject and has appeared recently on many television programs. Few men, if indeed there are any at all, know more than he does about the past and present of this embattled land.

During the recent hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on the war in

Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell Taylor appeared as a witness. He testified on February 17. In his prepared statement read at the beginning of the hearing he said:

The Vietnam won more in Paris than in Dienbienphu and believe that the Vietcong may be as fortunate in Washington.

Now this remark of General Taylor was important because it implied that the French lost the war in Indochina because of political dissension at home and that, consequently, dissension in Washington was dangerous because it could have the same effect.

Professor Fall's letter disputes General Taylor's statement. Professor Fall states categorically:

The hard and brutal fact is the French lost the Indochina war in the field.

He then describes the military situation in which the French found themselves despite the fact, and it is an important fact in the context of the subject of the letter that—

Year after year, the Communists and a few of their associates excepted, the French Parliament voted the credits for the war and voted for the reinforcements which could be squeezed out of a weakened postwar France.

There are two other sentences in Professor Fall's letter which I would like to quote. The first is the following:

I have read every French parliamentary debate on Indochina since 1945 and they make instructive reading as bewildered but honest men were faced, on one hand, with glowing reports that the war was being won and, on the other, with new requests for more funds and troops.

I have only one comment, perhaps an obvious comment, to offer on this sentence. We are also bewildered but honest men. We are faced with reports that the war is being won and with simultaneous requests for more funds and troops. Let us hope, and pray, that this is where the analogy ends.

The second sentence in the letter that I would like to quote reads as follows:

It is rather curious, finally, to see observers who, for two decades, have berated the French Army for all sorts of true or imagined failings, now resort to the German stab-in-the-back myth to club their own opposition here.

I think that this sentence can stand without comment as the last word on General Taylor's remark.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Professor Fall's letter to the editor in the March 11 issue of the Times be inserted at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FRENCH IN INDOCHINA

To the Editor.

C. L. Sulzberger's editorial page column of February 25 somewhat lacks the serenity and even urbanity which I have come to associate with him. But the point which concerns us here is whether such a war as that in Vietnam can be lost by debate, and whether—as Gen. Maxwell Taylor said, and Mr. Sulzberger says is true—the French lost the Indochina war in Paris, or in the field.

The hard and brutal fact is the French lost the Indochina war in the field. One year before the battle of Dienbienphu the ratio

March 21, 1966

6106

but left out by the conferees in the authorization bill. This is a correct statement, is it not?

Mr. PASTORE. That is absolutely correct, and I thank my distinguished friend and colleague, the Senator from Massachusetts, for his fine contribution.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, as will appear from the bill which is on the desk of each Member, the Subcommittee on Appropriations considering the budget request for the Department of Defense has considered supplemental estimates totaling \$12,720,719,000 and has approved these estimates in toto.

Of this amount \$12,345,719,000 is for military functions of the Department of Defense and \$375 million is for military assistance.

This is a considerable sum of money but I do not believe that any Member of this body could claim surprise at this amount of these supplemental requests.

During the last session of Congress smaller supplemental estimates for southeast Asia were submitted and approved. In discussing one of these supplementals for \$1,700 million for the cost of operations in southeast Asia, the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] stated that it must be recognized unless the situation changes suddenly and drastically, next January will find us faced with substantially larger requests for supplemental funding.

I had the temerity on one occasion on a television program to suggest that the estimate would run more than \$10 billion. I was criticized for making such extravagant predictions.

It appears now that my predictions were on the conservative side, because even the amounts that have been heretofore appropriated, added to the amount that is contained in this bill, may not be adequate to defray the costs that have been incurred by our military actions in southeast Asia.

The \$12.3 billion is for the following purposes: Military personnel, \$1,620 million; operation and maintenance, \$2,316,269,000; procurement, \$7,019,400,000; research, development, test, and evaluation, \$151,650,000; military construction, \$1,238,400,000; and \$375 million to reimburse the Department of Defense for stocks transferred to the military assistance program from the regular stocks of the Department of Defense during fiscal years 1965 and 1966.

During the course of my discussion of the bill, if any Member of the Senate has a question with respect to any of them, I shall be happy to undertake to answer him.

As is well known, there has been a considerable increase—453,000—in the

overall military strength of our active Armed Forces. The largest item of increase is 281,000 in the Department of the Army. The next largest increase is 85,000 additional members of the Marine Corps.

Provision is made for \$440 million in new obligational authority, in lieu of a transfer of a like amount from the various working capital funds of the Department of Defense. As is customary, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for 1966 authorized the transfer of \$470 million from the working capital funds to the military personal appropriations, in lieu of new obligational authority. However, the additional requirements imposed on these working capital funds by combat operations in southeast Asia have allowed the transfer of only \$30 million of the \$470 million authorized. Money simply was not available to make the transfers, so we must therefore make these additional appropriations, which amount to \$440 million.

It might be well to invite the attention of the Senate to a recent development with respect to the strength of the Army and the Marine Corps. It now appears that the Army and the Marine Corps will be able to increase their strengths faster than was originally planned, and the Secretary of Defense has authorized them to do so. However, it is possible that the faster buildup will require some additional funding during the current fiscal year.

I should also invite the attention of the Senate to the fact that the estimates and the funds carried in the bill do not include the \$761.1 million required for increases in military pay, authorized in the Uniform Services Pay Act of 1965. These funds were requested in House Document 405 and will be considered in connection with the next general supplemental bill.

The supplemental estimates provided by the bill for operation and maintenance total \$2,316,269,000. These funds will be used to meet the following actual costs:

Costs relating to the increase of strength of the Active and Reserve Forces, such as unit activation costs; induction center costs; training costs; personnel processing costs; and items of that nature.

Funds are also included to cover costs relating to increases in the number of personnel deployed in southeast Asia, such as transportation of equipment and supplies, overhaul and rebuilding of equipment and weapons, additional medical costs, and additional civilian personnel to support these forces. The logistics of supporting a large number of armed men 10,000 miles from our shores becomes a very expensive procedure.

We also are involved in the support of the South Vietnamese and other free world forces that are employed in South Vietnam. That subject may be discussed in more detail before this bill has been passed.

I should also state that these estimates do not include the \$102,400,000 required for civilian pay increases under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1965. These

funds, likewise, are requested in House Document 405 and will be included in the next supplemental appropriation bill.

By all odds, the largest single item of this \$12,750,000,000 appropriation is for procurement. It is for the procurement of ammunition, aircraft, vehicles, electronics, communications, and a vast number of incidental items that are necessary for the support of troops in today's modern warfare. A further breakdown of these figures will be found on page 12 of the committee report.

The bill provides considerable funds for research and development, tests, and evaluation. That amounts to \$151,600,000. Generally speaking, all of these funds are requested for programs related to our operations in southeast Asia. They include such programs as malaria research undertaken to deal with a new and very virulent form of malaria which has incapacitated a number of our fighting men. It includes limited war laboratory programs, the development of light-armored assault vehicles, and the development and improvement of aircraft and missiles for the Navy and the Air Force.

The bill contains supplemental estimates for military construction totalling \$1,238,400,000.

The committee report also contains a breakdown indicating where these funds will be expended among the several services.

It will be noted that the total requests indicate that \$561,600,000 will be spent for construction in South Vietnam and that \$63,400,000 is for construction in the United States.

That is dealt with in more detail on page 18 of the committee report.

The supplemental estimate of \$375 million for military assistance is to reimburse the Department of Defense for the amount transferred to the military assistance program during the fiscal years of 1965 and 1966.

Section 510 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides that up to \$300 million worth of defense articles, to be found in the military stocks and defense services, may be ordered in any one fiscal year for military assistance purposes, subject to reimbursement from subsequent appropriations made available for military assistance in the event the President determines such orders to be vital to the security of the United States.

The President made two such determinations with respect to this power. He authorized \$75 million to be made available in the fiscal year 1965, and \$300 million to be made available during the fiscal year 1966. The item of \$375 million is to reimburse the Department for these orders. There are some general provisions of the bill that I should perhaps discuss very briefly.

Section 101 contains a provision dealing with the working capital fund cash balances. The pending bill amends the existing law with respect to the cash balances that must be maintained in the various working capital funds of the Department of Defense. At the present time adequate cash must be maintained to cover accounts payable. Under this

March 21, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

6105

SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, 1966

The **PRESIDING OFFICER**. Under the order entered on Thursday, March 17, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H.R. 13546) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes, which had been reported from the Committee on Appropriations with amendments.

Mr. **HAYDEN**. Mr. President, the Committee on Appropriations recommends concurrence in the House allowance of the budget requests totaling \$13.1 billion for those programs included in the supplemental defense appropriation bill, 1966. Of this amount \$12.7 billion is for programs and activities of the Department of Defense directly related with combat operations in southeast Asia. The balance of \$415 million is for economic aid.

The requests of the Department of Defense were considered by the Department of Defense Subcommittee under the chairmanship of the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. **RUSSELL**] and the economic aid requests were considered by the Deficiencies and Supplemental Subcommittee under the chairmanship of the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. **PASTORE**]. These gentlemen will explain their respective sections of the bill.

Mr. President, there are two committee amendments which will restrict the availability of special authorities to the current fiscal year. Under the House bill one of these special authorities was made permanent law and the other was made applicable to fiscal year 1967. These provisions are discussed on pages 25 and 26 of the report.

I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be agreed to en bloc.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER**. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The committee amendments, agreed to en bloc, are as follows:

On page 7, line 15, after "Sec. 101.", to strike out "After June 30, 1966" and insert "During the current fiscal year".

On page 8, line 4, after the word "fiscal", to strike out "years" and insert "year", and in the same line, after "1966", to strike out "and 1967".

Mr. **SALTONSTALL**. Mr. President, the chairman of the committee has made only a very brief report, and I know that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. **RUSSELL**] has a more detailed report.

Therefore, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER**. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. **PASTORE**. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The **PRESIDING OFFICER**. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. **PASTORE**. Mr. President, I should like to make a statement with regard to the economic aspects of the bill now pending before the Senate.

The portion of the bill for which I am responsible contains two items; namely, supporting assistance and the general contingency fund.

For these items, the President requested \$415 million, of which \$315 million is for supporting assistance and the remainder of \$100 million for the general contingency fund. The House has allowed the full amount of the budget estimate for both items, and the Committee on Appropriations recommends that the Senate concur with the House.

The funds appropriated for supporting assistance are being provided for four countries; namely, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and the Dominican Republic. Almost 90 percent of the \$315 million, or \$275 million, will be used in South Vietnam. Laos and Thailand will each obtain \$7,500,000 and the Dominican Republic will be the beneficiary of \$25 million.

Mr. President, supporting assistance funds are used primarily for the purchase of raw materials and other essential imports which the recipient country is unable to finance from its own foreign exchange earnings. The private exporter, which normally will be a U.S. firm, provides the commodities and is paid in dollars. The local importer pays the full value in local currency to his government, which then uses the funds to finance defense or other programs of mutual benefit to the recipient country and our own country. In this bill, \$175 million of the amount provided for South Vietnam will be used to acquire essential imports. In this connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have a list of the commodities that will be imported by South Vietnam printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Commodity list for South Vietnam funded in supplemental defense appropriation bill, 1966

	(In thousands)	
Rice	21,000	\$21,000
Raw sugar	600	600
Fertilizer	4,500	4,500
Medicines and pharmaceuticals	9,000	9,000
Chemicals	2,500	2,500
Yarn and fabrics	7,400	7,400
Pulp and paper	500	500
Coal	8,000	8,000
Petroleum products	12,000	12,000
Nonmetallic minerals	21,000	21,000
Iron and steel	50,000	50,000
Nonferrous metals	1,000	1,000
Industrial machinery	16,000	16,000
Vehicles and parts	9,000	9,000
Tires and tubes	3,000	3,000
Other	9,500	9,500
Total	175,000	175,000

Mr. **PASTORE**. Mr. President, in addition to financing commodity imports, supporting assistance funds are also used for the direct financing of specific projects. In these instances, it is similar to technical cooperation and development grants in that it finances technicians, training, and other project costs. The difference is that supporting assistance projects are primarily for security or political purposes, while technical cooperation and development grants projects are for economic develop-

ment. In the pending bill, \$100 million of supporting assistance funds is being furnished South Vietnam to finance such projects, which embrace public safety activities, logistics management, public works, refugee relief, construction, welfare, and development.

Mr. President, I do not believe it is necessary for me to comment extensively on the general contingency fund. As everyone knows, this fund enables the President to meet emergency requirements that occur fortuitously in any area of the world. I believe that there is no better testimony, attesting to the need for a \$100 million contingency fund, than that presented in the schedule I hold in my hand, and I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the schedule was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Agency for International Development schedule of uses—Fiscal year 1966 contingency fund to date programmed through Mar. 10, 1966

[In thousands of dollars]		
Country	Amount	Purpose
Total	1 55, 978	
Africa	1, 419	
Somali Republic	264	Public safety (grant).
Zambia	1, 000	Airlift of petrol and oil products (grant).
Do.	155	Road maintenance.
NESA: Ceylon	7, 500	Commodity financing (loan).
Latin America	44, 725	
Bolivia	1, 000	Public safety (grant).
British Guiana	528	Do.
Colombia	1, 475	Do.
Dominican Republic	300	
Do.	35, 859	Budgetary support (grant).
Do.	1, 163	Commodity procurement (grant).
Panama	3, 500	Budgetary support (loan).
Peru	900	
Nonregional	2, 334	
W. W. disaster relief	1, 405	Includes 250 for Ambassador's fund and 50 allocated to State/IO for pledge to ICRC.
Reserve	929	Current unprogramed balance of the contingency fund.

¹ Represents total estimated availability for the year. Actual availability as of this date is \$54,314,000 against which \$53,345,000 has been allotted and allocated.

Mr. **PASTORE**. Mr. President, this schedule shows the uses to which the President has put the moneys appropriated to him in the contingency fund thus far this year, thus indicating possible future uses during the balance of this fiscal year.

Mr. President, that concludes my formal remarks. If there are any questions, I shall be glad to answer them.

Mr. **SALTONSTALL**. Mr. President, will the Senator from Rhode Island yield?

Mr. **PASTORE**. I yield.

Mr. **SALTONSTALL**. This report, which the Senator is submitting, is a unanimous report. We had a rather full discussion in the executive session of the committee on certain pros and cons, and we had quite a long explanation of the original amendment which was put in

March 21, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

6107

provision a cash requirement will be maintained at the level required to cover cash disbursements.

This provision also authorizes unlimited transfers between these funds. The purpose of the provision is to obtain a greater use of our cash available. The Secretary of Defense has stated that if this provision is not adopted, it will be necessary to appropriate at least \$325 million in addition to provide capital for these working funds. The House bill authorizes this change on a permanent basis.

However, the committee recommends to the Senate that the provision be adopted so as to be applicable only to the current fiscal year in order that the operations of these funds under this new procedure may be reviewed annually.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, is it not the opinion of the chairman of this extremely important committee that if we were to do otherwise Congress would lose practically all control of the capital funds if the Secretary of Defense were able to move them anywhere he wanted?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think if Congress is undertaking to supervise to any degree the expenditure of these vast funds and all the ramifications of the transfers, it is absolutely necessary that this not be made permanent legislation. It would be very unfortunate for that to be done. There should at least be the most thorough and exhausting hearings so that the entire Congress would be apprised as to what the effect of that transfer would be.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. We set up the capital funds a comparatively few years ago with the idea of having a more efficient and quicker action, because the money was appropriated for these purposes and came back into the account. Those are very substantial sums of money.

If we were to give the Secretary this authority, we would lose control of very large funds for all of the three services.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think we would lose control of very large sums and it is altogether possible that even larger sums would be involved in future years.

I would be very much opposed to this being made permanent legislation in the absence of the most thorough and careful scrutiny by the proper committees of Congress. Though I am a member of the Committee on Appropriations and happen to be chairman of the subcommittee which handled the bill, I do not think that this should be done without apprising the other committees of this fact.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. As the senior Republican member of the committee, I agree with the chairman.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I noted that the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee called to the attention of the Senate that a major portion of the funds sought in the bill, over \$7 billion,

was to provide needed aircraft and weapons and ammunition.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct. That would be military hardware that would be mainly utilized in the prosecution of the war.

Mr. COOPER. Considering the fact that it will take a considerable time to procure all the equipment that will be needed, would there be any period of time when there would be a shortage of the needed equipment in Vietnam?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We were assured that there would not be. The contracts for a great deal of this procurement, particularly of ammunition and weapons, have already been negotiated. We have done everything we could to assure that adequate supplies of all kinds, medical, sustenance, ammunition, and weapons, would be available to those who are serving our country so far from home, to maintain this country's position is an very unusual, dirty war.

I would be very much disappointed if those assurances did not prove to be accurate. I will not say that there may not be shortages, but we have had more trouble in distribution really than in shortages with respect to a great many of these items. We did not have the facilities in South Vietnam to unload the ships rapidly enough. When we did have the facilities, we did not have warehouses in which to store the equipment, but had to stack the equipment on the shore.

There was naturally a great deal of confusion and some loss; and even in such rudimentary and essential items as cleaning oil and patches for cleaning rifles, losses were involved and we had to fly the material out there for the Marine Corps.

Mr. COOPER. I had an opportunity to be in Vietnam in December and in January. I took note of the supply situation when I was there.

Statements have been made in the newspapers that there have been shortages of needed aircraft, particularly helicopters, and that there have been shortages of spare parts and of ordinary ammunition for rifles, and other weapons.

These matters are of concern to all and I have received letters from parents of soldiers fighting in Vietnam. Does the Senator believe, from his wide knowledge in this field and from facts adduced in the hearings, that with this appropriation, the Department of Defense can provide the equipment anticipated to be necessary?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not think there is any question that we will have ample supplies. However, whether there will be complete and perfect distribution of the supplies is another matter.

We have had some shortages of helicopter parts. I understand that has now been remedied. We are greatly increasing the number of helicopters being employed in Vietnam. Were it not for these helicopters, we would have had more difficulty in seeing that our men were supplied with food and ammunition.

Mr. COOPER. I am not much interested in trying to place the blame on

what has been done in the past. We are interested now in seeing to it that there is sufficient equipment for our forces.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. COOPER. There have been shortages. I have read statements made by responsible Members of Congress to the effect that last year the Defense Department reviewed and rejected the efforts of the Senators of the committee to provide helicopters and other needed aircraft and weapons.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. There was a small reduction in the procurement of helicopters in 1965. That could have affected the situation there. But the First Cavalry Division had more helicopters when they went into Vietnam than the entire U.S. Army had some 10 or 12 years ago; and those have been supplemented by procurement of a number of others. The number of helicopters assigned to each military unit on a permanent basis is being increased.

Mr. COOPER. I know the Senator is always very tough with the Defense Department if it does not recommend what he believes to be sufficient equipment and ammunition. Does the Senator feel comfortable about the sufficiency of the proposed procurement?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. My primary concern, as to the Department of Defense, the taxpayers, or anything else, is to see that we do not send one American boy out to fight under the flag of the richest nation on earth without his being better supplied than a soldier of any other nation.

Mr. COOPER. I agree. Let me ask the Senator one more question: Can he give figures on the strength of the forces, say, what they were 1 year ago, what they are today, and what is projected for the end of the current calendar year, to show the buildup?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes, we have that.

Mr. COOPER. What are the numbers?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We plan to increase the Army by a net total of 280,589, the Navy by 43,025, the Marine Corps by 84,994, the Air Force by 44,225. That is an overall net increase in strength of 452,833 personnel.

It is estimated that these goals will be practically met by June 30 of this year.

Mr. COOPER. I ask the Senator, does the administration intend to secure the additional strength by means of voluntary enlistment and the draft alone?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator from Kentucky knows, of course, that every time you increase the draft by one, you bring 3 or 4 volunteers into either the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Air Force, because the young men like to select the branch of service in which they are to perform their duty; and when they see the draft approaching, it has a very salutary effect on increasing enlistments in all branches of the service.

For that reason, there has been a slight reduction in the quota of draftees for next month, because enlistments

March 21, 1966

were greater than had been anticipated.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. I must say, for myself, that I feel very safe with the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts handling this bill.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am sure the Senator from Massachusetts and I will do everything within our power and within our knowledge to see that our fighting men have everything in the way of equipment and supplies that they may need. It is not always possible to get it to them in exact amounts and on exact schedules; and, of course, the ration is not the most palatable dish for human consumption over a period of time—it is all right for a day or two, but can get extremely tiresome.

But we are certainly doing all that we can to measure up to our responsibilities to the Senate, to give the Senate a chance to vote for adequate funds to take care of these men, who are not in Vietnam of their own volition, but who are there under the command of the properly constituted authorities of this country.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief additional statement?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have listened to what the chairman of our committee has said, and agree with him entirely.

I would simply add this: The Preparedness Committee, of which I am a member, under the chairmanship of the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], has heard from the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force on their supplies and equipment in Vietnam today. I think especially as to ammunition, which the Senator from Kentucky mentioned, there are ample supplies, and there is simple build-up going on now behind the lines to keep the supplies adequate.

To add further to what the Senator from Georgia has said, I call to the attention of Senators that the so-called Red Ball Express has been rejuvenated and is now in operation, and is making it possible to repair an ordinary helicopter and put it back in service again, I believe, well within 48 hours from the time it needs repair.

Mr. COOPER. My inquiries are prompted, of course, by my own desire for information and assurance, but they have also been sparked by a remark the distinguished Senator made on the floor this morning at the time the proposed order of the President to dispose of some copper from the stockpiles was discussed. The Senator stated, I recall, that he did not like it, because the supplies were not very large, and that the disposal of scarce copper at this time could be a very critical matter if fighting should be extended.

In the event of an extended war, does the Senator believe that there are critical materials available to manufacture the weapons which unfortunately will be needed?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I have stated, I have made no exhaustive study of this question, but testimony has been given us in years past that about 800,000 tons of copper was a reasonable stock-

pile, and, since the President's order would decrease the stockpile to 400,000 tons, I feared, if there should be some escalation of this war, or another war of similar nature were to break out elsewhere, that we would be hard pressed for copper.

I have made no study of it. I intend to, because I am certainly as anxious to maintain adequate raw material reserves—and it is just as important—as to have the ammunition itself.

I am sure that, so far as the fighting in Vietnam is concerned, we have an adequate stockpile of copper; but if difficulty should break out elsewhere, I think we might be in a very shaky position with respect to our copper reserves. I say that without having studied the matter, merely because we have been told in the past that about 800,000 tons was a proper amount of reserve for us to maintain.

Mr. COOPER. I am sure the Senator and his committee will look into this question and others dealing with critical materials.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I was dealing with the question of military assistance. Section 102 of the bill is in accord with a similar provision in the recently approved authorization act to authorize the use of funds appropriated for the support of U.S. forces to support the South Vietnamese and other military assistance recipients fighting in South Vietnam.

The House bill authorized this change on a permanent basis. However, the Committee has recommended that the provisions be amended so as to be applicable only to the "current fiscal year" in order that the operations of these funds under this near procedure can be reviewed annually.

SEC. 102—SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES

This provision is in accord with a similar provision in the recently approved Authorized Act to authorize the use of funds appropriated for the support of the South Vietnamese and other military assistance forces fighting in South Vietnam. The budget estimates include \$203.7 million for this purpose. However, under this authority more could be used if it is determined that it is in our interest to do so.

The purpose of including these funds in this bill is to eliminate the requirement for separate accounting of military equipment purchased with Military Assistance appropriations. Under this provision, General Westmoreland can provide equipment to our forces and the South Vietnamese without regard to the source of funding.

The House bill included this authority for the current fiscal year and fiscal year 1967. The committee recommends that the provision be restricted to the current fiscal year.

SEC. 103—INCLUSION OF THE VALUE OF "EXCESS MILK" IN THE COMMUTED RATION ALLOWANCE

Prior to fiscal year 1966, milk served to enlisted personnel in excess of the statutory and executive order ration of 8 ounces was paid for with funds appropriated to the Department of Agriculture. During this time the value of the

excess milk was not included in the "commuted ration" allowance that is paid to enlisted men who are authorized to mess separately or who are on leave. The Department of Agriculture Budget for fiscal 1966 did not include funds for this excess milk, and the Department of Defense appropriation was amended to authorize the Department of Defense to purchase the excess milk. The amendment in the 1966 act was written so as to exclude the value of this milk from the commuted ration allowance. Section 103 would include the value of the excess milk in the commuted ration allowance. Under this amendment the commuted ration allowance in the United States will increase from \$1.10 to \$1.17 per day. Overseas it will increase from \$1.14 to \$1.17 per day. While these are small increases, the Department of Defense has advised that the estimated cost of this amendment for a full fiscal year is \$19.7 million.

Mr. President, I will be glad to respond to any questions that Members might have with respect to the Committee's recommendations totaling \$12.3 billion for the Department of Defense.

I believe that is all I have to say at this time with respect to the bill.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). Does the Senator from Georgia yield to the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am happy to yield now to the Senator from Massachusetts, the ranking minority member of the committee.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has yielded to me at this time. Let me add that the committee was unanimous in making this additional money available during this fiscal year.

As we proceed with the consideration of this proposed legislation I think it is imperative that we all remember what this legislation would do and what it would not do. H.R. 13546 provides supplemental appropriations for the Defense Department totaling \$13,135,719,000; \$12,345,719,000 for military functions, including items for military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research and development test and evaluation amounting to \$11,107,219,000. In addition, it includes for military construction of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense agencies a total of \$1,238,400,000, the amount of the budget estimates for the military. There is also included in the bill, \$375 million for military assistance and \$415 million for economic assistance programs directly connected with our operations in southeast Asia.

It will be recalled that in the first session of this Congress, funds were provided especially for southeast Asia in the amount of \$700 million in the form of a defense supplemental for the fiscal year 1965, and amendments or supplements to the 1966 budget for both military functions and such civilian operations as economic assistance, USIA activities, and so forth. As recently as September 21,

March 21, 1966

1965, Congress completed action on the regular Defense Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1966, which included \$1.7 billion for the special cost of our military operations in South Vietnam. At that time, it was understood that additional funds would be needed. However, it was not then possible to make any reasonable, accurate forecast of specific requirements. Last year, when we considered the regular Department of Defense appropriation bill, I estimated that the military would request between \$10 and \$12 billion in additional funds early in the calendar year 1966. The accompanying bill represents the present estimate of the additional needs for fiscal year 1966. Perhaps some of these funds might have been deferred to the regular fiscal year 1967 estimates without adverse effect.

I believe that the chairman would agree with me we felt that time was of the essence, as was pointed out in colloquy with the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER], and that, therefore, it would be better to go ahead with these appropriations now rather than wait for the regular appropriation bill which might be delayed until next August or September.

However, total requirements are so evidently large that they should be provided promptly. The major items provided in the bill are:

First. Increases in numbers of both military and civilian personnel and increases in the operation and maintenance cost of men, machines and structures.

I would agree, as the Senator from Georgia has stated, that there is no money in this bill for the increased pay. It is my understanding that it will be in the next supplemental bill, in an amount approximating \$751 million more. That is the only item, I am informed, for military purposes in the next supplemental bill, although I believe that the chairman will agree with me that possibly another supplemental bill will be submitted before the first of July for additional expenses in this fiscal year.

Second. Production of aircraft, ordnance, ammunition, and other materiel.

Third. Military construction projects.

Fourth. Selected and specialized research and development programs.

Fifth. Economic assistance.

The budget estimates for the military operations of the Defense Department amount to \$12,345,719,000. The majority of the amounts provided outside of personnel requirement will be devoted to the procurement of military hardware with short leadtime items, such as ammunition, as well as long lead items, such as jet aircraft.

Mr. President, the proposed legislation should be supported by every Member of the Senate, and I so urge. I join the chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriation in urging the passage of this legislation. I feel that the funds are urgently needed to back up the over 200,000 American fighting men now engaged in military operations in southeast Asia. I believe that we should provide this support for our fighting men

as soon as possible. We will have ample opportunity to review the request for new obligational authority for the fiscal year 1967, but I believe that the immediate passage of this supplemental appropriation bill should be expedited.

Mr. President, I join wholeheartedly with the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who has gone into this subject with a great deal of care. As I say, it was a unanimous report of the Appropriations Committee. It was also a unanimous report of the Committee on Armed Services on the military authority required for the bill, and I hope that it will be passed immediately.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I have a number of questions I should like to develop. It occurred to me that since the Senator from Massachusetts and the Senator from Georgia are both in the Chamber, the Senator from Massachusetts would be willing to answer some questions with the help of the staff. I do not wish unduly to fatigue anyone.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should be very glad to try to answer them, but the chairman of the committee is here. Perhaps I should join with him in any answers, but I am always sensitive to the fact that the Democrats are in control of the Senate and therefore the immediate responsibility is with the Senator from Georgia, but I will be glad to try to answer any questions the Senator may have.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. After that "nonpartisan" statement, I suppose I should undertake to answer them.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. We will both do it.

Mr. CLARK. I know that I am rash to undertake to take on both Senators at once. I am perfectly happy to try, because really what I am trying to do is elicit information.

Let me ask my good friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, perhaps first—although if he chooses, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and it is quite all right with me—concerning the committee report, on page 4, which states in part as follows:

The planned end strength increase over the original fiscal year 1966 submission is 452,833 for the active forces, and 41,000 for the Reserve forces.

Mention is also made of the substitution of civilian for military personnel. Then, as the Senator knows, this is broken down into succeeding sections, into increases for the Army, for the Navy, for the Marine Corps, for the Air Force, and to some extent for the Reserves.

I do not think it is necessary to stop on those more specific increases, because my first question is, can the Senator relate that 452,000—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator means 452,000 men, does he not?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, the increase in men. Can the Senator relate that to the potential buildup of our strength in South Vietnam? In other words, out of

that number of 452,000, how many does the Pentagon estimate could be put into South Vietnam and increase our present force there?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. My understanding is—and it is only my personal understanding—that there are some 220,000 men there, or over 200,000. I will not state an exact figure.

Mr. CLARK. That is only the Army; is it not?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is all military, I am informed—Army, Marines, and so forth.

Mr. CLARK. Does that include the Air Force and the Navy?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. So that is the total military—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; this 235,000 figure is in the U.S. Forces in South Vietnam. There are some large contingents in other, surrounding areas. They consist of 35,000 to 50,000 of our personnel. So that there are almost 300,000 there.

Mr. CLARK. Does that include the Navy and the Air Force?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. That is close to 300,000.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. It might be slightly more than that.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I was going to say it is my personal understanding that there is a hint—and I want to say it is only a hint—that the buildup will be substantially more than it is at present.

Mr. CLARK. It is my understanding that when and if the bill passes—and I shall vote for it—there will be 452,000 additional personnel.

My question is, is it our best judgment that they will be used to build up the force in South Vietnam if it became desirable to do that?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I will try to answer that question on my own personal judgment. There are available a number of divisions in the United States and there are available a number of divisions in deployment in other overseas areas.

Mr. CLARK. And two in Korea.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. And two in Korea. I know what we are trying to do is to get some assistance from other countries.

Mr. CLARK. I know—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. One division has just come in from Korea. The Australians are building up their force. We read in the newspapers—and there is some testimony to that effect, although it is not firm—that the Philippines may send some troops. So we are trying to get more help from allies rather than send in more of our own men.

Mr. CLARK. I understand, and I am very sympathetic with that effort; but if we have 300,000 men there and we are providing now for 452,000 more—that would set a ceiling—assuming movements among divisions in Germany and possibly Japan—of about 750,000 troops for South Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As a matter of mathematics, the Senator may be correct, but that is not the idea of the buildup. The idea of the buildup is to replace men who have gone out of this country and to make allowance for ad-

March 21, 1966

ditional personnel who may go. As a practical matter, we have practically denuded our strategic reserve of trained combat troops. But the main purpose of this increase, as I see it, is to replace the strike forces that have been practically eliminated from this continent. Their assigned purpose is to put out fires, and they have been employed against the fire in Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. But essentially it is to build up the Ready Reserve primarily in this country?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is to replace combat-trained men in this country who have been sent to Vietnam, because we have the cream of the crop there. We have the 1st Cavalry there. We have the 1st Infantry Division there. We have a marine division. The 25th Division, which was stationed in Hawaii, is there. I do not recall the others that we have there. This proposed increase is to get trained men to replace them and be available here.

Frankly, it may be said, in all candor, they will not only be replaced, but there will be a margin to be used for our depleted strike forces in the United States. We could never pin the officials down as to how many they were going to send out there or how many they needed. They said they were going to send as many as they needed. That was as near as we could get to a definite number. But we can say that the purpose is to supply replacements for forces that are out of the country, so that units can be trained as speedily as possible to be available in this country for any contingency elsewhere in the world.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I am glad to call the Senator's attention to the testimony of Secretary McNamara before the Committee on Appropriations and Armed Services Committee.

Mr. CLARK. To what page does the Senator refer?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Page 7 of the hearings of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services. I will read only this portion. Secretary McNamara said:

Since my appearance here last August, our requirements in support of the military effort in Vietnam have continued to grow. We have already deployed a total of about 190,000 U.S. military personnel to South Vietnam. And we must be prepared to deploy even more forces if the Communists choose to expand their operations in South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. This was back in January.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. On January 20, 1966.

Mr. CLARK. We have had a buildup since then.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We have sent nearly two divisions out there since then.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I ask unanimous consent to put in the Record that part of Secretary McNamara's statement which appears on page 7 of the hearings.

Mr. CLARK. Should not that request include over to the top of page 8, to complete the statement?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that extract from Secretary McNamara's statement from the hearings be placed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AUGUST 1965 FORCE AUGMENTATIONS

Since my appearance here last August, our requirements in support of the military effort in Vietnam have continued to grow. We have already deployed a total of about 190,000 U.S. military personnel to South Vietnam, excluding the elements of the 7th Fleet now operating off the coast of Vietnam. And we must be prepared to deploy even more forces if the Communists choose to expand their operations in South Vietnam.

The force augmentations approved in August included—

For the Army: An increase of one division force, three brigade forces, and a large number of aviation companies.

For the Marine Corps: An increase of two helicopter training squadrons and additional communications, engineer, and military police battalions.

For the Navy: An increase of 25 active ships in the fleet plus 4 for MSTs, for a total of 29.

For the Air Force: An increase in airlift aircraft utilization rates, from 5 to 8 hours per day for Military Airlift Command (formerly MATS) aircraft, and from 1.5 to 5 hours per day for C-130E's in other commands.

For all the active forces: Additional personnel to round out the manning of units to be deployed in Vietnam and for increased training and logistic support.

For the Reserve components: Additional drill pay space to raise the manning and readiness levels of 3 divisions and 6 brigades and necessary supporting forces in the Army Reserve components, 24 squadrons in the Air Force Reserve components, and the Marine Corps Reserve division-aircraft wing.

An additional 340,000 military and 36,000 direct hire civilian personnel were approved to support these force increases.

Mr. CLARK. My question is designed to try to find out—and, from what the Senator from Georgia said, I have an idea that maybe cannot—what is the ceiling, if the bill is adopted and implemented, in the number of men that we might expect to go to South Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I could not supply that information, because we could not get any definite estimate from the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They did state they were going to supply what General Westmoreland needed.

Mr. CLARK. And he did not say what is needed.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They did not tell us what he needed.

Mr. CLARK. Maybe he does not know.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course, they are available. If you want to strip other places you can send 1 million additional men to South Vietnam, but I have no idea on earth there will be any such buildup as that. I have personally, as an amateur, never thought the total number of men we would have there would run over 400,000.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator will recall that one of his colleagues on the committee was asked how many additional men would be needed, and he was quoted as

saying he thought it might go as high as 600,000.

I take it the Senator thinks that that is high.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is somewhat high. It was the highest maximum fixed by one witness, but that witness was not one who makes policy, I might say.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I might add that I heard no testimony that I would have confidence in that would lead, at the present time to our having anything like 600,000 men in Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not see that now, but I do not want to be put in the position of excluding that possibility.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not either, but not now.

Mr. CLARK. Is there a logistical limitation on the number of troops we could adequately support in South Vietnam?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We are rapidly remedying that. We are building large harbor facilities there at a tremendous cost. I think we will be able to support a much larger force with these new facilities.

Mr. CLARK. Would it be a fair summary of the views of the two Senators as of now, recognizing that the military situation might change, that we can look forward with reasonable confidence to a ceiling of not more than 400,000 on the number of troops in the four armed services which will be deployed in South Vietnam?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I speak only for myself. I would not wish to put that ceiling on it if the Senator is going to include all four armed services, the Navy at sea, the Air Force, and the adjacent areas. I do not think it will. But in any one of a number of contingencies, depending on what will happen, it might exceed that.

Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator from Massachusetts care to add to that?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. No. I agree with the Chairman. We cannot definitely foresee what is going to happen, but at the present time I would agree with what the Chairman said.

Mr. CLARK. Essentially, we have an open-ended situation, do we not, as perhaps the majority leader indicated in his report?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think any war is open ended, as far as I have ever been able to ascertain.

Mr. CLARK. And so this one is, too.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not know of any way you can prescribe rules of war, or whether the other side is going to expand; but until you do that, any war is open ended.

Mr. CLARK. Does the Senator have any idea as to the amount of uncommitted PAVN forces there are in the North? How many trained divisions do they have in reserve, not committed? Does the Senator have any idea?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We received some testimony as to that, but it was classified when it was given to us. I do not know why. Certainly Hanoi knows how many divisions they have. They have a large number of divisions,

March 21, 1966

greater than they have already committed.

Mr. CLARK. That is good enough for me.

I have a good many questions, but the Senator from Rhode Island may wish to ask a question.

Mr. PELL. No. I was listening.

Mr. CLARK. In the opinion of the two Senators, are we going to be able to commit this large sum of money before the end of this fiscal year?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It will be obligated. It will not be expended, but the Secretary of Defense testified it would be all obligated or programed before the end of this fiscal year.

Mr. CLARK. And it cannot be obligated before it is appropriated.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is correct. So, if we are going to supply these goods and furnish these supplies to the men in South Vietnam, it is necessary that these appropriations be made.

Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator from Georgia agree with me that the comments made by some of our friends on the other side of the aisle that some of this money was put into the fiscal year 1966 to make the deficit less in 1967 is not correct?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not agree with that statement. I have scanned this budget estimate with great care. There was one item for development of a ship I believe, \$10 million that might be carried over. But out of a \$13 billion appropriation that is insignificant.

This whole idea comes out of a very vague statement in the report of the committee of the other body which says there was the feeling on the part of some of the members that there was a possibility some of these funds could be carried over. I think that is splitting hairs.

We are either going to support these men in Vietnam or bring them back, and bring them home.

Here is the language:

If there is one reservation felt by many members of the committee regarding the necessity for this legislation, it arises from the possibility that many of the items involved, in all three categories of procurement, research and development, and construction, may simply have been moved from the regular 1967 authorization to this supplemental 1966 authorization without any real program for acceleration.

It goes on to say:

Obviously no military advantage would be gained by such a bookkeeping situation.

But it is an "iffy" statement unless based on hard testimony.

As I say, if there is any one man who is careful about scrutinizing the budget it is my distinguished friend from Massachusetts with whom I have been honored to work for so many years. He did not come up with any specific item that he thought could go over, other than this \$10 million vessel.

I agree it was possible that could go over but I saw no real reason for carrying it over.

In my opinion all of this appropriation is absolutely necessary. Some of these items have a very long leadtime. It

takes months to construct some of these items, and I think we would be derelict in our duty if we did not vote for this appropriation. If we are not going to support those men, we should bring them home.

Mr. CLARK. Does the Senator from Massachusetts wish to add to that?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes. The implication is that colleagues on my side—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I did not say that.

Mr. CLARK. In the other body.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. In the other body. I beg your pardon. I agree with what the chairman said.

In addition, the chairman and I went over these appropriations requested before we went to the full committee. We went in there heartily in accord with each other that we should appropriate the full amount.

The \$10 million which the chairman described I brought up in that committee, we agreed it should go in. That \$10 million is for the planning and designing of a new logistical ship. To hold it over would delay construction of the ship which is a new type and a way of doing it. Outside of that, I would say all of these items were necessary.

I personally asked the question whether any of these items should go over, and I determined, in my opinion, speaking as one individual, that they should not go over because they were long leadtime items. It was essential that we should get started.

Mr. CLARK. I thought Secretary McNamara's testimony on that was very convincing.

Would the two Senators mind turning to page 56 of the hearings, where Secretary McNamara stated that South Vietnam has about 640,000 total effectives in Regular and paramilitary activities.

I believe that goes all the way down to the local police whose duties are much less onerous in terms of the chances of their getting shot than the Regular Army.

I take it that figure is pretty well substantiated in the minds of the two Senators. That is on page 56.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is the best testimony we could get. That is the opinion of the intelligence sources and includes not only those on full-time duty but also the regular militia who guard the villagers.

Mr. CLARK. I imagine that the method of keeping a census of military personnel in South Vietnam is not too highly developed. Would the Senator agree?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is true. I must say that there has been quite a high turnover in some of the combat areas.

Mr. CLARK. What information did the committee receive about the desertion rate among the South Vietnamese? It has been published in the newspapers, and I wonder if this is substantially in accord with the testimony that the committee received, that in 1965 there were, as I recall, a gross number of 113,000 desertions from the South Vietnamese armed forces. Many of them, of course,

were paramilitary troops, a good many were draftees, and so forth. Nevertheless, if that figure is anywhere near correct—and I ask the two Senators if it is—it seems to me that that is a desertion rate high enough to give us much concern. I wonder if either Senator would comment on that statement.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not recall that that figure was included in the testimony. I have read it in the press. The desertion rate has been quite high. There is no blinking at that fact. It is most remarkable that most of the desertions do not occur at the height of the fighting, according to the uncontradicted testimony. It is at times when the men are in rest camps, or similar areas, that they leave. Some of them come back in a short time; some of them are gone for a number of months before they report back to their units.

Mr. CLARK. Perhaps it is a little easier to get away when one is in a rest camp than when he is under the eye of a sergeant.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I should say that is true. Sometimes men have great reluctance to leave those with whom they have been trained, especially when they are under fire. The Senator knows that from his own experience. A man wants to stay with his own unit.

General Johnson testified that in the course of the last year there had been an improvement in the desertion rate; but unquestionably, it has been high.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield.

Mr. COOPER. When I was in Saigon, I spoke with the military staff about this very issue—the rate of desertions. I was told that the rate was high, but a part of the explanation given my staff may be of interest.

I was told that the South Vietnamese forces have no regulation that deals with men absent without leave, such as is applied to our own forces. And, furloughs or leaves of absence are not granted.

Mr. CLARK. Certainly the men are paid very little.

Mr. COOPER. They are fighting, anyway. But when the men enlist or are drafted, they are not given leaves or furloughs; they are in for the duration. As a result, there are many cases of men absent without leave. I was told that men absent themselves in these circumstances to go home to help with the crops and be with their families. Sometimes they return to the same unit; sometimes to another unit.

Mr. CLARK. Sometimes they stay home.

Mr. COOPER. Sometimes they stay home.

But the point was made that despite the high rate of desertion there had been no known defectors of a military unit, even of a squadron or a platoon, of South Vietnamese forces to the North Vietnamese forces. I thought that was a rather significant statement.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I find that the Secretary did delete the number of desertions that occurred in 1965, out of the total force of more than 640,000.

March 21, 1966

The number was omitted as being classified. However, it involves a large number of men.

As I have said, the South Vietnamese military organization is not identical with ours. It would be a mistake to write off the courage and the fighting power of those troops, because at times they have shown themselves to be superior in combat. They have demonstrated great valor and ability.

Going home to see one's family is not a new thing. Neither is it confined to the Vietnamese Army. Some of the best soldiers in the Civil War left their organizations and went home to see their wives and children and to help to gather the crops. For a while, some of them were shot; but eventually the point was reached where their punishment was mitigated, so as to induce them to return.

Mr. CLARK. Someone told me that the total number of desertions on both the Union and Confederate sides during the Civil War was 2 million.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I have read that figure somewhere, but I believe that those who were absent without leave were included.

Mr. CLARK. The purpose of raising this particular line of questions was to get the judgment of the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts as to whether the high rate of desertions—and I am taking my figures from the newspapers; I suspect they are not very different from the figure deleted from the testimony—raises any concern in the minds of the two Senators as to whether the fighting effectiveness and the morale of the South Vietnamese forces is increasing or decreasing, or is remaining about what it was when the South Vietnamese were on the verge of defeat, and we really went in and saved them.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I concur in the Senator's last statement. At the time our troops went into action in South Vietnam, I do not believe the South Vietnamese forces would have lasted another month, because they were on the verge of disintegration.

It is difficult to answer the Senator's question categorically, but I should say that all the evidence tends to show that the South Vietnamese have been fighting much better since we sent considerable forces of our own into South Vietnam. Certainly they are fighting much better than they were just before our troops arrived there.

Mr. CLARK. A very ugly story was published in the newspapers a few days ago. When the Vietcong overran one of our special forces camps, it was stated that the officers actually had to shoot some of the South Vietnamese troops to prevent them from hanging on to the helicopters that were trying to remove the wounded from the scene. I suspect that that incident occurred after the hearings were closed. But it was a disturbing story.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I read that article in the press. It was indeed a most disturbing story. I intend to examine into it fully and ascertain the facts. I have not had an opportunity

to do so until now. I know that the Senator from Massachusetts has read it and is likewise concerned about it. That occurred at one of the special forces camps, where we were trying to train the Vietnamese. I do not know the degree of training they had received.

Mr. CLARK. As I understand, it was quite far out in the jungle.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It was.

The Senator asked about morale. General McConnell testified:

The Vietnamese Air Force is very high. Since we started pretty extensive bombings over there, the Vietnamese ground forces morale has continually gone up, and I think they are in much better shape now than they were 5 or 6 months ago.

That would have been about the time that we went into Vietnam in force. There is no question in my mind that the morale of the South Vietnamese forces has improved.

There are many reasons why the average Vietnamese soldier should not have felt enthusiastic about the war. Much favoritism had been displayed in taking men into the forces and commissioning them as officers. There was irregularity in the pay, and the food was of poor quality. On top of that, there was a good deal of tough fighting.

Mr. CLARK. And some corruption.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is what I meant to imply by referring to the food and to the pay. A number of things have tended to shake the morale of the very best fighting troops. Nothing in the world is more destructive of morale in any armed force in the course of history than the feeling that one group is being given favoritism and soft jobs while another group must do the dirty work.

I think that feeling was prevalent at one time in the South Vietnamese forces. I understand that the Vietnamese leaders are making every effort to straighten that out.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Perhaps this is not pertinent. However, it was my feeling from the testimony we received that improving the social and economic conditions in the villages and giving some confidence to the leaders that they will not have their heads chopped off has increased the spirit of the fighting men.

Mr. CLARK. I hope that is true. However, the number of villages which we completely control is subject to some question. It was only about a month ago that I read about a splendid village leader who had been enticed to return to his home village and the Vietcong surrounded him and promptly killed him.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. He was attending a funeral.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct. He was attending a funeral. I wonder in that regard whether the Senators have any information as to whether we have not about reached the bottom of the barrel as far as increasing the number of effectives is concerned and whether we would not be fortunate if we were able to hold the total of effectives to the figure of 630,000.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The testimony tended to support an affirmative answer to the question of the Senator. But in all fairness it is inconceivable to me that they have reached the bottom of the barrel in a nation having from 14 to 15 million people.

I think that if the Vietnamese will go back over all of their rolls and get all of those who have avoided duty, and who should be doing duty, and get all of them into the service the South Vietnamese can not only maintain this ratio but also increase it.

It must be said that a number of the so-called militia and paramilitary men are over the suitable age for active duty in the field of battle day and night. They are defense troops. However, there have also been stories about the number of young men in the two or three cities of the country who have seen no duty and have not yet been called on.

In my opinion, if they really summon their people to the colors without any partiality and distribute the burden of this war equally among all the South Vietnamese, probably two or three additional divisions of young men could be brought into their armed forces.

Mr. CLARK. We must remember that the amount of actual real estate which we control, as opposed to that which is either held by the Vietcong or is contested, puts some limitation on the power to draft people outside of the area which is secured.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is the view of the Vietcong that they can take people who are able to walk and put them at some kind of duty, digging tunnels, if nothing else.

Mr. CLARK. It occurs to me that one test of the effectiveness and morale of the South Vietnamese Army might come from taking a look at the situation in the Mekong Delta as it is today, as opposed to what it was a year ago.

It is my understanding that we do not have any American troops of any number in the Mekong Delta and that that operation is being conducted almost entirely by the South Vietnamese Army.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Very few troops, other than South Vietnamese, have been in the Mekong Delta according to my best information.

Mr. CLARK. The Senators have seen the rather unsatisfactory maps in the newspapers and in the Defense Department. They would not declassify them, and they said they were no good.

As shown on page 145, 146, and 147 of the hearings, Secretary McNamara did finally present a map before the committee.

The map did not show much as to whether the situation in the Mekong Delta had improved. According to the newspaper, the situation is not any better than it was a year ago.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I cannot say that it is any better throughout the country as far as the territory we are permanently holding is concerned. We have not undertaken to fight that kind of war. We have not enough soldiers with which to fight that kind of war. We are not able to garrison a locality and then move on to another place.

That is the reason that the so-called search-and-destroy tactics are employed. They try to find the enemy and destroy his forces and sources of support. They have not undertaken to hold the ground that they have taken. We have taken some areas two or three times.

Mr. CLARK. We move out and do not garrison it.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. CLARK. Do we not always turn it over to the South Vietnamese in the hope that they can garrison it, and too often they do not?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We turn it over to the South Vietnamese, but sometimes the forces are not very formidable. We appoint the Governor of a village and give him a half dozen armed villages, and they do no last too long if the Vietcong come back.

The Senator from Massachusetts has shown me some of the testimony. The Senator has read the testimony and is familiar with the testimony of the Secretary of Defense in which he said:

I think if you applied the definition of control that our field representatives do, both the political and military representatives in South Vietnam, they would say that the Government controls today 53 percent of the population of the country, the Vietcong control about 23 percent. That makes a total of around 76 percent, and the remaining 24 percent is in the disputed areas. I think that Ky's estimate is a much more realistic appraisal of Government control than is the 53 percent.

I would say with all candor that I think the numerical superiority we enjoy is due to the fact that we hold the large cities.

Mr. CLARK. General Ky said that only about 25 percent of the population was sufficiently free from coercion as to be able to engage in free elections without intimidation. I think that is what the Secretary was referring to when he referred to General Ky's statement. It is contained on page 109.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is also on page 146. Secretary McNamara testified:

However, this morning, earlier, I gave an estimate of Prime Minister Ky to the effect that his government controls only 25 percent of the population. Now, these figures are not necessarily contradictory because of the difference in the definition of "control." Prime Minister Ky, when he gave the figure 25 percent as being controlled by the government, was thinking of the population that could participate freely and without coercion.

Mr. CLARK. "Could vote freely."

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. "Participate freely" means "vote freely."

Mr. CLARK. The same testimony appears on page 109.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was a repetition of something that he testified that morning.

Mr. CLARK. Secretary McNamara testified on page 144, that of the 235,000 enemy effectives in South Vietnam, only 15,000 were PAVN or North Vietnamese regulars.

I take it that the Senator has no reason to question the testimony of the Secretary of Defense in that regard.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do not. That has been increased somewhat since this testimony was given, but I doubt if it has increased more than enough to replenish the losses they have suffered in battle.

Mr. CLARK. It is probably less than 10 percent of the total effectiveness, is it not, that is, 15,000 out of 235,000?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that is correct. Understand, of course, they sent down the best troops they had.

Mr. CLARK. I understand.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. These were the best they had available.

Mr. CLARK. There are no Russians and no Chinese fighting in South Vietnam, as far as the Senator knows?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. None. I have asked that question. They have never found a dead Chinese or a dead Russian in any of the death counts they have made after any of the conflicts.

I may say, there has been testimony that a number of Chinese engineer forces have been engaged in North Vietnam, repairing railroad and highway bridges. But as far as combat is concerned, there has been no indication of any Chinese participation.

Mr. CLARK. So that actually, the number of North Vietnamese troops, while it represents, of course, the best they have, is a pretty small percentage of the total force.

If the Senator will look at page 62 of the committee hearings, he will note that Secretary McNamara stated that a majority of the Vietcong are individuals who were born in South Vietnam, or who came there as part of the Viet Minh during the war with the French.

Then, if the Senator will turn to page 341, he will see that Secretary McNamara testified that 80 percent of the Vietcong are recruited in the South.

I take it the Senator has no reason to question that testimony, does he?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No, I am not in a position to question that.

Mr. CLARK. The thing that concerns me—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not know. The Secretary of Defense should have better means of information that I have.

Mr. CLARK. Than any Member of the Senate.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. There is no question but that a tremendous number of South Vietnamese are fighting under almost incredible odds, not having any air force whatever to protect them, but they are fighting, and fighting very bravely.

Mr. CLARK. My understanding is also that the strength of the Vietcong has more than doubled during the last 12 months, from 103,000 to over 235,000. If we subtract the casualties and the desertion of defectors, and if we add the infiltrators and the 15,000, more or less, in their regular forces, it would seem to me that Secretary McNamara's conclusion that 80 percent of the recruits in the Vietcong forces come from South Vietnam is pretty well substantiated.

That causes me to raise the question—and I should like the Senator's observation on it—that perhaps the Secretary of State is not entirely correct when he says this is not a civil war. In large part,

it looks very much like a civil war to me—a civil war which is supported on one side by the United States of America, and on another side with troops from Hanoi, with material and equipment from China, and with some help from Russia; but that fundamentally it is a civil war. I wonder if my friends will comment on that.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. This war does have a great many of the aspects of a civil war. But I am sure that it is a civil war that could be brought to a conclusion if the Vietcong would be willing to arrange some reasonable plan of elections in South Vietnam that would enable us to determine the relative strength of allegiance to either the Saigon government or the Communist government.

Of course, there is a long history involved, as the Senator well knows. There is the background of the long struggle that took place for several years between all of the forces, whether they were North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, or Vietcong—they were all called Vietminh back in those days—against the French. Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and General Giap, they finally defeated the French at Dienbienphu; the French people were tired of the war and wanted to get out of it, and they withdrew their forces from southeast Asia, and agreed to the Geneva accords.

One group undoubtedly wished to follow the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He was the popular idol of the hour when the French were defeated. The French had selected about as poor a character as they could have, in Bao Dai, to rule over the country; he was ruling from Cannes or somewhere on the French Riviera, and naturally had no chance on earth of capturing any respect of his people.

I think that a good deal of the Vietcong affiliation is a legacy from the war against the French, where Ho Chi Minh was the leader of what they believed, with considerable reason, was a call of liberation.

Of course, we supported the efforts of the French with substantial funds for military assistance. But I do not know just how much the Vietcong support is because of a firm belief in communism as a system of government, or even any understanding of communism, and how much of it is really dedication to Ho Chi Minh. I rather believe that a greater part of it is personal affection, respect, and admiration for and belief in Ho Chi Minh, rather than any set of political principles.

Mr. CLARK. Does not the Senator think that at least until a few months ago, both the Vietcong and Hanoi were convinced they were going to win, and drive us out?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not think there is any question about that.

Mr. CLARK. That is one reason why they fought so well.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. And there is no question in my mind that whatever the genesis of these Vietcong troops, wherever they may have originated, that the war is being directed out of Hanoi.

Mr. CLARK. But the Senator will agree, will he not, that if our pounding of those people with our enormously severe firepower, particularly since we

March 21, 1966

have built up our forces, has had any effect at all—and I would think it would have—the conviction that they are going to win must be slowly but surely ebbing from the minds of the Vietcong?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would think their leadership, at least, would begin to doubt it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator permit an interruption at that point?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Carrying forward what the Senator from Georgia has said regarding control of the Vietcong from the north, one thing that has appealed to me all through this matter, as I have stated when I have been asked that question a number of times, is the fact that we do not know today—unless the Senator from Pennsylvania knows through his Foreign Relations Committee—who the leader of the Vietcong is.

How are we ever going to get to him? I do not wish to get into a diversion, but how can we arrange for peaceful negotiations with the Vietcong, when we do not know where their leadership is? Everything we have read indicates that their leadership is coming from the north.

Let me quote one paragraph, one point Secretary McNamara made, shown on page 343 of the hearings:

It may have some of the aspects of a civil war but, in my opinion, these are of little importance compared to the initiatives taken by the North Vietnamese Government to organize the movement, to supply it, to expand it, and to turn it into a military aggression against the political institutions of the South. These facts we have documented through prisoner reports and through other forms of intelligence and through, as a matter of fact, the oral and written statements of the political leaders of the North.

Again he said, as shown on page 344:

There is no individual in this Government that I know of, who has studied the relationship between the Vietcong and the associated forces in the South and the North Vietnamese, who believes other than: (1) that they are under the direct supervision and hour-to-hour control of the North; (2) that without that control, they could not possibly accomplish militarily what they are presently capable of; (3) that without the North's support of the Vietcong, the South Vietnamese Government forces would be capable over a reasonable period of time, of suppressing the aggression being directed against it. I think this is such an important subject that, if there is any doubt on this question, I would hope that the committee would call on those who are experts in this field.

Again I repeat, out of my own personal knowledge—and that is all, and I do not say that I am thoroughly informed—who is the Vietcong leader we can say is leading the civil war, or who could end the civil war by sitting down at the negotiating table? In all the testimony to which I have listened, I have not heard that statement answered. If I may proceed—

Mr. CLARK. Yes, indeed.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would invite the attention of the Senate to page 25 of Secretary McNamara's testimony on the subject of desertions of the Vietcong. Let me say to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I do not know

whether he wishes to read it into the Record at this time, but I believe it would be a good quotation.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would be glad to have the Senator from Massachusetts read it. It shows that there has been an increase in desertions in the Vietcong, but it also shows that there has been an increase in desertions in the South Vietnamese Army, too.

Mr. CLARK. I do not believe that is a very happy statement to make, but I have no objection to having it included in the Record.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I will not take the time of the Senate to read it into the Record.

Mr. CLARK. I should like to make this observation, with respect to what the Senator from Massachusetts has just stated: I would, with deep regret, take issue with him about the situation respecting the Vietcong. This does not come from anything I have learned—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Will the Senator from Pennsylvania kindly repeat that?

Mr. CLARK. With all deference to the Senator, I would take issue with him on the statement he has just made, about our not knowing who is running the Vietcong.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. We have heard that the Foreign Relations Committee does know, but I make that statement because I have never heard it said before our committee, and I have never seen any sign sign of it in the newspapers.

Mr. CLARK. If the committee knows, it has not told me.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. There we are.

Mr. CLARK. And I am a member of the committee. But, I have heard it said by individuals who I believe know something about the situation, and whose veracity I have no reason to doubt, that there are at least six Vietcong missions in various European and African capitals with whom we not only could talk but also, in fact, have been talking off the record from time to time, and that the Vietcong have had three separate leaders in the last year or so. One of them, I believe, was killed. The next one was dismissed because his wife had fallen into the hands of the South Vietnamese and he was therefore thought to have somewhat of a conflict of interest. The third, whose name I do not have or I would be happy to give it to the Senator right now, is a relatively—and I use that word "relatively" with great emphasis—reasonable fellow with whom, if he could be convinced that their side is not going to win, and that we are not going to let them throw us out, it might be possible to do some business.

I would make this comment and then ask for observations and from my friends: I believe that everyone in the Armed Services Committee, and everyone in the Senate, would like to see this war over with just as quickly as possible on some honorable basis. I do not believe there is a single Senator who wishes to fight this war to total victory and the complete destruction of Vietnam.

The way I would analyze the situation—on which I should like to have the comments of my more experienced

friends—is that Peiping is never going to talk, because Peiping will fight to the last Vietcong and the last American. Hanoi appears to be, at the moment, rather under the domination of Peiping, although we would hope that there might be some slippage there. My understanding is that there is a "dove" party in Hanoi, just as there is a "hawk" party in Hanoi. But the much more belligerent group is in control. We had hoped that Russia might help. There was a period when it looked as though Russia would help, but recently they have taken the line that they do not wish to join with England in calling the Geneva Conference back into session.

Thus, it seems to me that the only way we will ever get peace in South Vietnam will be to talk to the Vietcong. But that is the one thing we will not do. I cannot see why we are so unwilling to talk to these people on what seems to me to be the legalistic ground that they are not a government, that no one has recognized them as a government, that they are the arm of Hanoi. I do not deny that Hanoi has given enormous assistance to the Vietcong, but I also suspect that they have not given the Vietcong anything like as much assistance as we have given to the Army of South Vietnam and its people.

As I stated earlier, Russia, China, and Hanoi are helping the Vietcong, and we are helping the Vietnamese Army; but the soldiers who are killing our boys are largely, although not entirely—because there are some regular North Vietnamese troops there—South Vietnamese.

Many a guerrilla war has been ended in the past by getting into communication with the enemy at battalion level. I believe that we are making a grave mistake in this insistence by the Department of State asserting that under no circumstances will we negotiate or talk with the Vietcong.

I point out that, of course, the Vietcong are disreputable characters. I have no doubt that they have their fair share of murderers and unreliable individuals. This was true in North Korea. With all due deference to the Senator from Georgia, I suspect that during the Civil War the same was thought to be true of Union forces by the Confederate forces, and vice versa; but in the end, if we wish to stop this war, we have got to talk with those who are doing the shooting. I hope the Senator would respond to that observation.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the observation was directed to the Senator from Georgia, I will not speak. If it was directed to me—

Mr. CLARK. Both Senators.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would just say that—

Mr. CLARK. The twins—the bipartisan twins.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield there?

Mr. CLARK. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. The two Senators from Georgia and Massachusetts, I am sure, are tired. Perhaps I should get into this colloquy and make an observation.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator should.

Mr. PASTORE. What does the Senator from Pennsylvania believe the President means when he says that this issue is not insurmountable?

Mr. CLARK. Personally, let me say to my good friend, the Senator from Rhode Island, that I have some confidence that in the not too distant future—and this is not based on any inside information—the President will come around to the point of view which I have expressed, and which the Senator from Rhode Island has expressed. My controversy—if it is a controversy—is with the Secretary of State.

Mr. PASTORE. I make the point to the Senator that I do not believe we should be picayune concerning those with whom we are willing to talk. But, to come back to what the Senator from Massachusetts said about our contacts, we will get a response from Hanoi. For instance, when Linus Pauling, the great pacifist and physicist who had so much to do with the development of the atomic bomb, made a direct appeal to Ho Chi Minh—I believe it was the latter part of last year—an authoritative answer came back from Ho Chi Minh. He did not say, "Now take this up with the Vietcong." He did not say that. He enunciated, I believe at that time, his four points—

Mr. CLARK. That is right.

Mr. PASTORE. One of the major points was that there would be no discussion of the whole matter unless we recognize the Vietcong as the sole spokesmen for South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. That is absurd. We will never do that.

Mr. PASTORE. The point I am making is rather subtle, that every time we get a response from the other side, the answer comes from Hanoi—it comes from Ho Chi Minh. I might say that I am one of those who feel that the Vietcong should be invited to the conference table, if we can ever find who the responsible authority is. I believe that we should talk to anyone, provided we can reach a peace agreement predicated upon nobility. It must always be upon that basis. There is no question about that. I am inclined to feel, no matter what has been said heretofore, that there is a strong inclination on the part of this Government to sit down as responsible people and talk with those who have the responsibility in this whole matter, in the hope that we can resolve it.

Mr. CLARK. I quite agree with the Senator from Rhode Island, but the factual question is whether control of Hanoi over the Vietcong is as absolute as we have been told by the State Department. Before the Senator from Rhode Island came into the Chamber we had observed that 80 percent of the members of the Vietcong army are South Vietnamese.

Mr. PASTORE. I was here. I was in the Chamber. I have been here for a long while.

Mr. CLARK. I am glad to be corrected. The Senator has been very quiet.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. If I may interpolate here, I merely wish to say this, in reply to the Senator's observation, it seems to me that the President of the United States has done almost everything he can possibly do to find a responsible person with whom to discuss an honorable settlement of the conflict in South Vietnam.

Starting with his Johns Hopkins speech, and repeated time and again since then, he has said the question is open for discussion; that he will discuss it with anyone who is in a position of responsibility that will enable us to bring this matter to an honorable conclusion.

Mr. CLARK. I agree.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not see how the President can go further than that. He cannot bring in some little Vietcong prisoner in black pajamas and say to him, "I want to talk to you about ending the war in Vietnam." This prisoner, who may be a private first class in the 3d squad in the 2d Company, may say, "I cannot do anything about it. You have taken me as a prisoner, and the war is ended as far as I am concerned."

Until the President can get someone to sit down and talk, who has enough influence to deliver whatever he agrees to, I do not see how the President can proceed any further.

Ho Chi Minh has said this country must withdraw. We have to even get out of the country before he will talk. He said we must abandon those people to their fate and bring all of our people home. Then he might, if we conform to the other three conditions, deign to talk about peace.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. PASTORE. Ho Chi Minh has never said, "Talk to so and so, who is the head of the Vietcong." He has never said that. He has always answered. He is acting as the kingpin. As the President said, "I am a pretty good cowboy from Texas, but I cannot lasso anybody to talk to."

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I assume every normal person in this country wants to bring this war to a conclusion as soon as it can be done honorably. Certainly, we do not stand to gain one thing over continuing the war. We cannot possibly enhance our wealth, prestige, or position internationally, by carrying the war on any further or by completely destroying both North and South Vietnam. It would not help us. In fact, it would injure our cause and all we stand for.

But here is the President of the United States, who is really, in a way, not authorized to speak for General Ky and the South Vietnamese Government; but he says that so far as our position is concerned and our participation in the war is concerned, we are willing to talk to anyone, anywhere, anytime, and he repeated it recently in a speech in New York.

So, until someone is willing to talk, other than our surrendering unconditionally before they will discuss it, we are somewhat handicapped in our efforts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, assuming for the purpose of the question that someone could sit down and talk, is Ho Chi Minh going to be bound by what that man says for the Vietcong? As a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Subcommittee on Appropriations, I listened for days to the testimony. We still do not know who the Vietcong are. In answer to questions by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Young], Secretary McNamara said:

Well, again this is a foreign policy question I think should be addressed to the Secretary of State. The President and the Secretary of State have both made public statements on this matter.

The chairman of the committee brought that out.

They have said that we would deal with any government that is represented in the conflict and that other parties could find means of being represented.

What is "any government?" Is the Vietcong a government, and if so, who are its leaders?

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will permit me to answer the question somewhat obliquely, in the first place, I do not disagree with a single word that any one of my three distinguished colleagues has said about the attitude of the President of the United States, and particularly what was so eloquently said by my friend the Senator from Georgia. I agree with that 100 percent, but in the meanwhile the Secretary of State is saying we will never talk with the Vietcong because they are only the tools or instruments of Ho Chi Minh. The Vice President has said we will never sit down with those murderers and talk with them.

My point is that the only avenue we have not explored, and which I urge be explored—and I think our intelligence sources know this already—is whether there is not some method by which we could get the leadership in the Vietcong divorced from Ho Chi Minh, in view of the fact that his interest is in a united Vietnam, while the others want an independent South Vietnam. I do not think we have explored the possibility of getting next to the Vietcong, and bypassing North Vietnam, China, and Russia. At this time we find great difficulty with the Government of South Vietnam, which is even more belligerent than the Secretary of State, because General Ky is strongly of the view that he will never sit down and talk with the Vietcong.

I wonder if the Senator has any thoughts on that aspect.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I cannot answer the question. I do not want to say anything here that is likely to cause embarrassment to our allies in this war. Some of us have had a specific interest in the war there, other than a general, patriotic interest. But I do not, for the life of me, see how we can deal with anyone to bring this war to a conclusion unless Hanoi is willing to participate. We do not know who the Vietcong are. I think the Vietcong are somewhat in the position of General Ky, and that if we wanted to make peace on certain terms over there, General Ky would eventually see the light and go along and agree with what we found was an honorable peace.

March 21, 1966

I think if Hanoi would agree to something, the Vietcong would then see the light and would say it was an honorable peace. But I do not think there is anyone we can talk to in the Vietcong, if we made an agreement, that will take the hand of Ho Chi Minh off a majority of the Vietcong. I do not know with whom we could deal. If he was willing to sit down and talk, I do not think he could deliver on anything, when it came to the point of delivery, because these people are attuned to Hanoi, which they have been for 20 years, to the people running North Vietnam.

Russia at one time indicated it was interested in bringing this matter to a conclusion, but then the Chinese made a renewal of their charges that Russia had sold out on them; that it had gone back on the principles of Marxism and Leninism, and Russia withdraw such good offices as she had extended.

We cannot as a Nation unite South Vietnam. That has got to be done by the forces of that contiguous area and the people of that nationality. We cannot do it.

This matter of people coming in from the outside and imposing their will is gone. I think sometimes it is a little too fast in some areas of colonialism, but when we went in the business of getting the world out of colonialism we moved with tremendous rapidity and effectiveness, and we got them out.

I think perhaps in Sukarno's Indonesia and perhaps the Congo we would have done well to let them stay there a few more years. We would not have had as much trouble.

I will say to the Senator from Pennsylvania that I do not yield to anyone in wanting to bring this matter to a conclusion. But for the life of me I cannot see any reasonable prospect of ending that war over there by talking to the Vietcong when we do not know who they are, where they are, or what they are or how that can bring into reality any agreement they might sign.

Mr. CLARK. In the last analysis this is a matter of judgment and I have no assurance that my view is correct.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is our trouble about the entire matter. We do not know the facts about who is in control of the Vietcong.

Mr. CLARK. My own view would be that Ho Chi Minh would be quite reluctant to make peace now.

My view would be that if we had a government in Saigon more interested in bringing the war to an end instead of saving face—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Did it ever occur to the Senator that those in control in Saigon might be in the same predicament as those in Hanoi, or the same predicament as Ho Chi Minh? They have people on both sides of the issue there, and some power over and above General Ky or whoever succeeds him as the head of their government. Someone else is going to take the initiative in bringing this war to a conclusion because some of the leaders of their military forces are not too anxious to bring it to a conclusion.

Mr. CLARK. This is what concerns me. Some of the military leaders are not interested in bringing it to a conclusion.

Perhaps other Senators wish to interject further.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. I would like to make a comment.

After I went to Vietnam in December and January, I felt, as the Senator feels today the Vietcong should be included in negotiations. The main bulk of the forces fighting against our forces are the Vietcong and South Vietnamese, even though trained in the north, and brought back to the south, they are chiefly South Vietnamese and do the fighting.

It is my view, as I said on January 10, and later in the Senate, that if we can reach negotiations, that the Vietcong would have to be included.

That is entirely different from talking about the National Liberation Front.

The National Liberation Front is an arm of North Vietnam, it is a political and propaganda front attempting to speak for the Vietcong.

If we negotiated with them it will be because we are negotiating with North Vietnam.

But when I was there I found it was very difficult to find out who the leaders of the Vietcong are.

So I would say to my good friend who serves on the Foreign Relations Committee, and has every opportunity to secure all information, to find out if he can, if anyone knows who these leaders are.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. If anyone knows who they are, it would be valuable in any approach to negotiations.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, would the Senator yield?

I am in favor of any additional effective action on our part.

Mr. CLARK. That is the problem. Look at the test ban treaty. In the end we seemed to work it out.

Mr. PASTORE. I agree the commitment in Vietnam is great on the part of America. I think we are being picayune when we say we will talk to A but will not talk to B.

I agree, although I must say in sincerity it strikes me that the strategists of the north are in Hanoi. There is no doubt about it.

I think it is just as much a mistake to leave the impression with the American people that because we have not come out categorically and said we will deal with the Vietcong that that is the reason why this struggle continues.

I think that we simplify it too much. I take the position if President Johnson will say tomorrow, "I will talk to the Vietcong," that will not be the end of it.

I think that would be too naive.

Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. I think stories are being exaggerated in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh is doing it. He has indicated it in everything he has done.

I agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania that we ought to take a more flexible position in saying "Yes, we will deal with Hanoi and they can bring along whomever they want." I think the President has said that. He said that the problem is not insurmountable. I do not know how else he can say it.

Mr. CLARK. I am not asking the President to say anything other than what he said. I am asking the Secretary of State to change his tune. I am saying there is a potential which has not been adequately explored at the grass roots in South Vietnam. This must be a question of judgment. I have no reason to contend that I am right and that anyone else is wrong. The Senators are 3 to 1 against me. Maybe they are right.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is correct. It would be naive. I would go further and say if the President of the United States said that it would be an interpretation that all we have done over there is of no avail.

I am sure that the Senator from Pennsylvania has read it, but I believe the President's speech in the Heritage of Freedom in New York, was the best expression of our position in this country that I have seen.

He said he would sit down with the leadership. He said he would sit down with the leadership of the North Vietnamese and they could bring whom they wanted, which the Senator from Rhode Island said.

But to sit down with the Vietcong without the North Vietnamese, it would seem to me, using the word of the Senator, naive.

Mr. CLARK. Naive is a very good word in that institution of higher learning to which we both went. It is a sophisticated word.

Mr. PASTORE. The Senator did not include the Senator from Rhode Island in that category. I never went to college.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator used the word.

Mr. PASTORE. I read the dictionary, not at Yale or Harvard, but I read it.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator read it well, too. The Senator is one of our most eloquent orators.

I believe we should try to see what can be done. Some of our intelligence people might explore this matter further.

I would like to turn to the problem of what territory in South Vietnam is still sufficiently under our control and the control of the South Vietnamese Government, to make it possible to promote and carry into effect social and economic programs, of which so much was made at Honolulu.

The other day the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare returned from Vietnam. I read his statement as indicating substantial reservations as to whether much could be done with this program in the foreseeable future.

This gets back to the maps, about which I have had a friendly disagreement with Mr. Bell and Secretary Mc-

sion—and the reason, Mr. Gershen points out, lies with a few of the members of the press themselves. During my recent trip to South Vietnam, I had occasion to discuss this problem with some of our military commanders. Their comments were uniformly to the effect that the great majority of members of the press handled themselves and their reporting commendably, but there were always a few who had to abuse the situation. Mr. Gershen's article gives examples of the "abuse." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PRESS VERSUS MILITARY IN VIETNAM: A FURTHER VIEW

(NOTE.—Martin Gershen, who wrote the following observations, is a feature writer-photographer for the Newark Star-Ledger, on leave to study in Columbia's advanced international reporting program. He covered the war in Vietnam last summer.)

There is a basic law of journalism which says that every story should have at least two sides.

Yet, in too many reports involving censorship in Vietnam, the press seems to have the last word.

And that word leaves the reader—or viewer—at home no alternative but to assume that the American war in southeast Asia not only is against communism, but against the entire U.S. Military Establishment.

In an article, "Censorship and Cam Ne," by Richard Rustin, which appeared in the fall, 1965, issue of the Columbia Journalism Review, the writer made some attempt at giving both sides of the controversy that continues between the press and the brass. But one had to read carefully and dig deeply to learn that the possibility exists that the press may be partly to blame for its troubles with the censors.

Edward P. Morgan suggested this possibility when he was quoted as saying there was a "passel" of young stringers in Vietnam who are trying to become the Ernie Pyles of this war by baiting military officials at press briefings.

But generally the article seemed to consist of quotations from one famous byliner after another who self-righteously attacked censorship in Vietnam and blamed the military for shackling the free press.

One of the more disturbing quotations was reported to have been made by UPI foreign news analyst Phil Newsom, who said: "It is doubtful * * * if the story of U.S. Marines burning a village near Da Nang ever would have come out if newsmen had not seen it."

Newsom, of course, was referring to a CBS television report of the burning of Cam Ne—a report which aroused much controversy at home because it suggested that marines arbitrarily burn Vietnamese villages. He implied that a hard-digging U.S. press corps took on a hard-to-get-along-with U.S. Marine Corps and uncovered a terrible secret.

If this were true, then bully for the newsmen.

But it wasn't true. The fact is that it is doubtful if newsmen ever would have seen the village razed if it weren't for the U.S. Marines inviting them to the burning.

I was at the Da Nang press camp when the marine invitation was extended. I turned it down because I had a previous commitment to go on an air raid aboard a B-57 fighter bomber. The squadron took newsmen on flights only 1 day a week.

The real reason for burning Cam Ne, of course, was that it was a Vietcong stronghold and William F. Buckley, Jr., who also

was quoted in the Rustin article, made this point clear.

To report properly the story of the Marine operation at Cam Ne would have meant explaining that villages and their civilian populations play a key role in guerrilla warfare.

This is the why of the story, which of course is too complicated to make a good lead.

One of the major problems facing U.S. forces in Vietnam is being able to distinguish friend from foe.

The Marines, like all the services there, are aware too that they must win the people if they are to win the war and they lean over backward to avoid antagonizing local populations.

It must have taken Marine intelligence a long time to determine for certain that Cam Ne was a Vietcong stronghold.

Then, when they decided to destroy the village, they invited the press to come along.

Is it any wonder that they became annoyed when stories of their operation depicted Marines as no better than SS troops who burned villages and pushed around women, children, and old men?

But even more annoying to military men in Vietnam is the caliber of many of the correspondents out there.

A ranking Pentagon officer observed recently that editors told him they were having difficulty getting good newsmen to cover Vietnam.

The problem, he said, was money. It costs about \$1,300 round trip to fly a newsman to the other end of the world and for that amount of cash you would expect him to stay for a while.

But if he is an experienced newsman he has a wife and family so the news service would have to bring them along and settle them in Hong Kong or Bangkok.

Add periodic trips for the newsman to his family, additional life and accident insurance, education expenses for the kids and war becomes an unprofitable news story.

As a result, the Pentagon officer said, "American news services are hiring people out there they would never touch at home."

It's obviously cheaper to pick up a "passel" of young stringers who have already paid their way to Vietnam and who will work for peanuts.

In an effort to encourage the U.S. press to cover the war in Vietnam, the Defense Department last year flew 84 newsmen to southeast Asia.

"We did it, frankly, to prime the pump," the Pentagon officer said.

The military believed that by encouraging more newsmen to come to Vietnam, competition would become keener, resulting in less sensational stories and in more straight reporting.

The project was discontinued last summer as escalation of the war began in earnest because "we reasoned the American press was interested enough to pay its own way to Vietnam."

It didn't work out that way.

Of the 106 civilian news organizations from around the world who were represented in Vietnam last August, about 40 were American. Of the 260 newsmen present, approximately 175 were American.

Three months later, in November, the number of news organizations in Vietnam had increased to 136 but the proportion of U.S. services to the total rose less than 10 percent while U.S. troop strength had increased by the tens of thousands.

Of the 296 accredited newsmen covering the war, fewer than half were Americans. Foreign newsmen were hired by nearly all the American media. In some of the larger organizations 20 to 60 percent of the staff was foreign.

In the last 2 weeks of 1965, the number of U.S. services and staffers had begun to in-

crease slightly, according to a Pentagon official.

Obviously, a certain number of foreign newsmen are needed on American staffs to overcome language barriers. The rest probably are hired to overcome budgetary problems.

I remember meeting one of these non-American U.S. correspondents the day after the Cam Ne incident. We both were leaving Da Nang. He was carrying a pouch of television film, which he was bringing to Saigon. I was returning to Pleiku.

We were picked up at the press camp by two U.S. enlisted men who were ordered to drive us to the airfield where we were to catch a military flight south.

On the way to the airfield my colleague began berating the two enlisted men over the Cam Ne operation.

He implied that the Marines were no better than the Gestapo.

"Imagine you Yanks burning a village. I never saw anything like that in my life," said this correspondent, who obviously was too young ever to have covered a war before.

Enlisted men are taught to treat civilians with respect, especially if they are from the press. The two GI's looked at each other but said nothing.

I tried, at first, to keep from getting involved, because we newspapermen have to stick together even if we're wrong.

But his criticism continued and finally I said, "For Christ's sake, shut up."

He looked at me in surprise. Then he said, partly as an explanation, partly as an appeal to my journalistic loyalties and partly to get the last word in:

"But I actually saw a Marine push an old man around."

I thought of the night I had spent with a Marine company surrounded in a jungle outpost by 300 Vietcong. I remembered the next morning walking down a road with a Marine sergeant who smiled at all the villagers he met because he couldn't tell the good guys from the bad guys and he didn't want to antagonize friendly Vietnamese.

I thought what a crazy, mixed-up war this is, where you can't tell the front from the rear, Vietcong from Vietnamese, civilians from soldiers. I turned to this young correspondent and very gently said:

"Look, it was a Vietcong village. How did you expect the Marines to handle that situation?"

He hesitated for a moment, then said, "Why don't you Yanks get out of Vietnam?"

And if he is typical of U.S. press representation in Vietnam, then the military people there have been very kind to us.

—MARTIN GERSHEN.

A BUSINESSMAN'S FORMULA TO HEAD OFF INFLATION

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the March 7 issue of U.S. News & World Report appears a timely article entitled "A Businessman's Formula To Head Off Inflation." This contains excerpts from a recent address by Roger Blough, chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp. and one of the most progressive, clearest thinking members of the business community. Mr. Blough points out precisely what the Republican section of the Joint Senate-House Economic Report for 1966 points out; namely: that restraint in spending on the part of Congress holds the key to stopping inflation.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOW CONGRESS CAN EASE THE PRESSURE

But restraint is not a one-way street, and no matter how diligently and patriotically business and labor may try to plug the leaks in the economic boiler, they cannot succeed unless someone stops pouring on the coal. And that, I believe, is where Congress comes in. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve Board is authorized and equipped to retard the expansion of currency and credit; and I would not anticipate that Congress would seek to oppose the necessary exercise of these powers.

On the fiscal side, Congress can ease the pressure by the judicious use of taxation; and the President has already recommended the reinstatement of certain excise taxes and a speedup in the payments of personal and corporate income taxes.

But it is in the area of restraint in appropriations and other legislation that the hardworking "men on the Hill" (Congress) face both their most difficult problems and their greatest opportunity to prevent a further heating up of the economy; for it is they who control the purse strings.

It is their prerogative to authorize expenditures. It is their obligation to view the economic picture as a whole and act in their own best wisdom.

This is a plea to recognize the free-market economy for what it is—the most efficient, productive source of our material freedom; and to acknowledge that interference with the market's operation leads to inefficiency, inequity, and to shortages. In a word, it is a plea to defend freedom with freedom.

VIETNAM AND RED CHINA

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the Des Moines Register for March 17 appears an excellent and timely article by the knowledgeable and able columnist, Richard Wilson, entitled "Fulbright's China Hearings Give Viet Policy a Boost." I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD so that the readers will have a better perspective of the scare talk which has been making the rounds over the threat of Red China coming into the war in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FULBRIGHT'S CHINA HEARINGS GIVE VIET POLICY A BOOST
(By Richard Wilson)

WASHINGTON, D.C.—An unexpected byproduct of Senator FULBRIGHT'S China hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee has been an expression of academic and intellectual support for American policy in Vietnam.

What is being brought into focus is the war in Vietnam as an essential element in containing China, the reasons for doing that the importance of it. Senator FULBRIGHT perhaps did not anticipate this result. His emphasis has all been on the risk of war with China, and the undesirability of taking that risk.

DIGNIFY, CLOTHE

Vice President HUMPHREY, as the administration's most articulate spokesman in this field, has taken advantage of this turn of events to dignify and clothe in logic a policy of containing China without isolating the Communist government.

There is nothing new in this. It represents no shift in policy. The Vice President's words do not change any of the realities of the problem, which remain about the same as they were when John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State.

But the words the Vice President is using

apparently fall softer on doubtful ears and this makes possible a rational discussion of the risk we are taking in Asia, and why we are taking it.

HISTORICAL CONSISTENCY

Asian specialists and students from both Harvard and Columbia Universities have found a historical consistency in American action in Asia with that of other great powers in the past which have sought to enforce political stability so that economic expansion might be carried on.

These experts—A. Doak Barnett, of Columbia, John K. Fairbank, of Harvard, and now also A. M. Halpern, of Harvard—have their differing ideas on how China might be handled, but they all seem to agree that it is in the interest of the United States to contain China.

Thus there emerges from a respected academic world quite a different attitude than that expressed by Senators FULBRIGHT, MORSE, GRUENING, MCCARTHY, HARTKE, and a few others. No resemblance at all is found between the views of these experts and those of various poets, liberalists, humanists, drama critics, novelists, and columnists who have been expressing their abhorrence of any kind of ground-based intervention in Asia.

INTELLECTUAL RATIONALE

The result is that President Johnson is finally getting his intellectual rationale for the war in Vietnam from highly qualified sources in the academic world. This corresponds roughly to what samplings of opinion show to be the majority sentiment of the country, and it sounds also as if it might come from the lips of those well-indoctrinated American soldiers in Vietnam who simply cannot understand the protest movement at home.

From now on it appears that the argument will veer into the field of whether or not we are doing enough to draw the Red Chinese into respectable world society. This concerns both Barnett and Fairbank. Far Eastern Expert Halpern thinks there is a good chance that Asia is settling down, and dramatic changes might make possible a military disengagement in a few years—but not now.

To those who say that we must now approach China with the olive branch, Vice President HUMPHREY has an impregnable answer. We have. We do so every month or two in talks with the Red Chinese representative in Warsaw. The answer is always the same: Support the surrender of the Government of Formosa to the rule of Peiping. When we say, "No," to that, the conversations come to an end.

DOESN'T WISH IT

To those who say let Red China into the United Nations, HUMPHREY'S answer is also impregnable. Red China does not wish to join the United Nations as it is presently constituted. The charter must be amended and the Republic of China must be excluded before Peiping would accept an invitation to join. On the question of diplomatic recognition of Red China, the Formosa problem again intervenes.

All the probes for a new understanding with China, like the President's peace overtures of earlier in the year, lead down a blind alley.

These aspects of the problem are now coming to the fore for closer public scrutiny as the dimensions of the risk of war with China are being measured. What the administration is getting out of the current debate is a better public understanding of what it is trying to do, and why.

The China hearings are therefore a definite plus for the administration so far, much to the discomfort of Senator FULBRIGHT and the others.

POEM BY MARINE LANCE CPL. CHARLES R. ALLEN

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the anguish of Vietnam is felt in many homes throughout this Nation.

There have been families who have lost a son, a husband, a father, or a relative in that far-off land. And there are others with someone near and dear to them fighting there.

A great debate has been and is being waged over why we are there, why so many have to give their lives for a cause, ie seems, so little understood by so many.

Why are we there?

One youth who knew was Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen, whose mother lives in St. Louis, Mo., and whose aunt, Mildred L. Davis, lives in Sioux City, Iowa.

In a poem written by his mother last Thanksgiving, Corporal Allen said:

And as long as freedom rings in hearts of men,
South Vietnam freedom we will help defend.

To this man—and he was a man—freedom meant the opportunity to live in peace, but he knew that peace could not be unless one was willing to lay down his life so that all could enjoy it.

For as he wrote:

For men who died here didn't die in vain,
But, died for freedom and died in fame.

And as this Marine declared:

To preserve world freedom we must pay the price.

Mr. President, Marine Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen paid that price.

On January 1, a few hours after the birth of a new year and only a few days after he turned 21, Corporal Allen was killed in action in that far-off land where he felt a stand had to be taken to preserve freedom.

Did he die in vain?

I do not think so for he knew that—

Even our forefathers died to keep freedom alive,

And in Vietnam we will make sure it survive.

I think the draft-card burners, the demonstrators, and others could learn a lesson from Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire poem, entitled "The U.S. Forces in Vietnam," be placed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the poem was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

(By Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen)

Some people think to fight here is wrong.
But, we must fight here or fight at home.
For Communist Victory in this torn land.

Will encourage them to fight in other lands.
Many people talk about our dying sacrifice.

But, to preserve world freedom we must pay the price.

Just look at the accidents on a holiday.
Then our total dead won't seem bad in any way.

For men who died here didn't die in vain.
But, died for freedom and died in fame.

Even our forefathers died to keep freedom alive.

And in Vietnam we will make sure it survive.
To Vietnam the President has given his word.

And this message all the world has heard.

A BUSINESSMAN'S FORMULA TO HEAD OFF INFLATION

(Can the United States fight the war in Vietnam and still avoid shackling industry and labor with controls over prices, wages, and materials? Yes, says one of this country's business leaders—but only if Congress "stops pouring on the coal" under the economic boiler. Roger M. Blough, chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp., calls for efforts to hold prices and wages in check, and for postponement of some nonmilitary programs that would involve billions of dollars in new spending at a time when inflation threatens.)

(Excerpts from an address by Roger M. Blough, chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp., delivered in St. Louis, Mo., February 19, 1966)

There is one basic point, I believe, upon which true Americans can never disagree: that everything needed to protect the lives of our soldiers in Vietnam shall be provided to the limit of our national resources, both material and human. If the sacrifice of economic freedom will, in fact, hasten the winning of the peace in Vietnam and reduce our casualties there, there can hardly be any "loyal opposition" to such a sacrifice. But if, on the other hand, the economic freedoms which have made this Nation the most productive in the world are—as I believe them to be—a unique source of our military and economic strength, then we should, and must, defend and preserve them in the national interest.

In short, the question before us is: To what degree may we assist in the fight for freedom by relying upon freedom—freedom in production, freedom to buy and sell and freedom in occupation? Or must we revert to wartime types of wage controls, or price controls, material controls and even controls of movement among occupations, in order, as a nation, to wage the defense of freedom?

In World War II and again during the Korean conflict, controls were imposed upon production, distribution, wages and prices in order to channel the necessary portion of our gross national product into the war effort. How then do conditions today compare with those that existed before?

Well, at the peak of World War II, defense expenditures averaged about 84 billion dollars a year and exceeded 40 percent of the total gross national product. At the height of the Korean war, they were almost 49 billion and accounted for 13½ percent of the gross national product.

During the present year it is estimated that our total defense expenditures may rise to \$60 billion, which would still be less than 8½ percent of the anticipated gross national product; and they would have to mount to an astronomical \$100 billion in order to reach the 13½ percent rate that prevailed at the height of the Korean war. That is far beyond any projected requirement of the action in Vietnam.

As for manpower, it must be noted here also that the national labor force has substantially increased in numbers during the past 20 years.

At the end of World War II, there were 11.5 million men in our Armed Forces—or 17½ percent of the total labor supply. During Korea, there were 3.5 million men in the military, representing over 5 percent of the labor force, and about 475,000 of these were actually engaged in Korea.

Last year, some 2.8 million men were in the Armed Forces, and this accounted for only 3.6 percent of the labor supply. Future requirements, as presently projected, could call for an additional 300,000 men in the services; but even if that number were to rise to 500,000, the military drain on the national labor force would amount to only about 4 percent as compared to more than 5 percent during the Korean conflict.

So it is evident, I think, that Vietnam is not the primary source of the economic pressures we are experiencing. Vietnam may provide an excuse for the advocacy of controls. But it is not a reason for them; and if we seek out the major cause of these pressures, we must look to the unusually rapid rate of our economic growth in the nonmilitary areas.

Last year, the American economy grew at a greater rate than that of any other major industrial nation in the world. After correcting for rising prices, the "real" rate of growth was 5½ percent; and all of this new activity increased the demand for manpower, and the upward pressure on wages and prices.

During the 1960's, the expansion of the supply of money and credit has been at twice the rate prevailing in the late 1950's. Government expenditures at all levels—Federal, State, and local—have increased 65 percent since Korea, even though there has been no appreciable rise in military outlays. Thus, virtually all of this increase has occurred on the nondefense side of the ledger.

As a result, a head of economic steam is building up to a point which is beginning to cause national concern lest it break out in a burst of rising wages and prices.

Trying to find out how long we can contain this mounting head of steam while continuing to heat up the boiler is something like playing Russian roulette. Certainly we cannot continue indefinitely, no matter how hard we try, to hold back the hand on the pressure gage. For the present, we are pinning our faith upon the willingness and the ability of both industry and labor to comply voluntarily with the governmental guideposts established some years ago; and while a considerable degree of price stability has been achieved during this period—especially in the more "visible" industries where a certain amount of "persuasion" could be applied—the boiler is clearly beginning to leak.

For the entire nongovernmental sector of the economy, employee compensation per man-hour has risen more than output per man-hour in each of the past 3 years; so unit labor costs have kept mounting.

Under the pressure of these rising costs and of the increased economic activity generally, the consumer price index has risen 11 percent since 1957-59, and the tempo has accelerated recently.

Further energizing this trend toward higher wages and consequent rising prices is the fact that we now have practically full employment, and there is an actual shortage of skilled workers * * *. Among married men, unemployment is now down to 2 percent and is still declining.

Under all of these circumstances, it will clearly become increasingly difficult to maintain an acceptable degree of wage and price stability through the publication of guideposts and the powers of presidential persuasion; and the question arises: "What next?"

THE ROAD TO CONTROLS

So the situation that confronts us today is much like that which prevailed at the end of 1950, when the United States had started down the road to wage and price controls. Then, as now, the road was paved with requests for a voluntary freeze; and standards for the freeze were being drawn up. Under the pressures of that day, the prices of many products were rising; and the prospect of price control, itself, added greatly to these pressures, as producers and merchants sought to cover their rising costs before the freeze hit them. Production shifted from lower price lines to more expensive, and more profitable, goods; and retailers built their inventories to a record high, thus adding to demand in an already over-heated economy.

But before we travel that road again, let us stop, look and listen, for it is one thing to talk of controls and quite another thing

to survive them. There is no doubt that for a limited period they can and do hold down the lid on prices. There is also no doubt, however, that they create scarcity and thus add to the economic pressures that caused their adoption in the first place.

Some of us whose memory goes back to the controls of 20 years ago will recall the butter that was sold from under the counter to favored customers, and the deterioration in the quality of merchandise that occurred as producers and merchants were often forced—at the peril of their own survival—to pay higher-than-ceiling prices on purchases in order to get the materials to keep their businesses running.

Then, too, there is the wasteful deployment of manpower at a time when a shortage of manpower already exists. Under the normal operation of a free market, the people themselves—as buyers—determine what manpower will be allocated to what production. If they do not choose to buy a certain product, then that product will no longer be made and the manpower will go elsewhere to produce what is wanted and needed.

Controls not only wipe out this self-adjusting, competitive mechanism, but—by their almost unbelievable complexity—they create enormous new manpower demands in the administration and the application of the regulations.

But, you may ask, can the Defense Department—in the absence of controls—get what it needs to carry on its military efforts? The answer is that it can and it does. We already have a system of priorities under which defense has first claim on essential production.

But will not the Government have to pay more than it should? And the answer to that is also simple; for the Government is the sole buyer of war material, while there are many sellers competing for its business. Thus we have the opposite of a monopoly—a monopsony. And as a monopsony, the Government imposes conditions of purchase under which it exercises the right to renegotiate contracts and to reclaim an adjudicated part of the purchase price if the profits on the sale are deemed too large.

But then, you may ask: How about the average fellow, the pensioner, or widow living on a fixed income? Without controls, is there any better way of keeping prices from skyrocketing? * * * There must be better solutions; and I believe that there are.

In the first place we must recognize that our productive capacity in America is expanding substantially every year; so there is an ever-increasing supply of goods and services to meet our Nation's demands, both military and civilian.

The President has called upon business to exercise restraint in its pricing policies; and has asked labor unions to keep their demands within certain bounds. Here it must be said that the two problems are somewhat different. Among businesses there is a high degree of competition which tends to repress prices; but among unions there is also a high degree of competition—more in the nature of political competition—which tends conversely to escalate wages.

It is the inescapable obligation of business managers to keep their enterprises healthy and to generate the profit necessary to keep America's industrial facilities modern and competitive—not only in the interest of the owners, but in the national interest as well. So there must be some wage and price flexibility to accommodate the myriad changes that occur from day to day. Yet I believe that the wiser heads in the leadership of both labor and business will recognize that the exercise of restraint in the highest possible degree is imperative at a time when the probable alternatives are rising costs and runaway prices or disruptive controls.

Namara. However, they finally displayed a map in the Committee on Armed Services. I had been told that the Vietcong control a substantial amount of the real estate, but that the real estate is not heavily populated; and that also there are other areas where the Vietcong are in control at night, and we are in control in the daytime. I should think it would be difficult, indeed, to make a social and economic program work if we hold territory only during the daytime.

I ask the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts if they can give us any information as to the areas in South Vietnam, outside of Saigon, outside of Danang, and outside of Cam Ranh Bay, in which we can really put substantial amounts of money to work to turn the minds and hearts of the South Vietnamese people our way, through taking care of their basic physical needs.

My suggestion is—and perhaps the Senators will rebut it—that not much terrain is really that secure and that we are not going to be able to do a great deal to keep the South Vietnamese economy from collapsing, under the threat of inflation and the shortage of rice and of other items, and to help the people who are still under the control of our allies.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator's committee reported the authorization for the economic aid in the bill; it did not come from the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. CLARK. We could not get anything out of that committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. In my judgment, while I do not question at all the good faith of the offer, there is a great deal of psychological warfare involved in all of these commitments. That is true with respect to the President's offer of \$1 billion to remake North Vietnam, as well as South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. Through the Asian Development Bank.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It has a great deal to do with the Asian Bank. We have put some hard money in Vietnam, and it will do great good in some areas.

But so far as making permanent investments in outlying villages in Vietnam is concerned, I think that would be foolhardiness on our part, because we would really be helping our enemies, the Vietcong.

As the Senator from Pennsylvania well says, we do not now have adequate forces to hold the different areas. I do think that we can offer medical aid and provide food for those who are starving, and in that way generate, perhaps, some appreciation and gratitude, although that is something we do not even find, as we go through this life, in other areas. Even within this country, it is a rather scarce commodity at times. But we are dealing with human beings; certainly we can bind up their wounds; we can provide assistance to their children; we can cure many of the diseases. That is about all we can do there now, in my opinion, in the way of rebuilding, because we have no

firm base on which to start to rebuild. So I believe that a good deal of psychological warfare is involved.

We should tell the Vietnamese to come in and help us to clean up their country; to get the people to understand that they must work with them; that in many instances, the people whom they are fighting are their blood brothers; that they all ought to work together; and that the United States will help them—and we will. We have helped everybody else in the world; there is no reason why we should draw any line where the Vietnamese are involved.

Very frankly, I consider this to be an activity in the nature of psychological warfare. We will deliver when we have a place to spend the money and know that it will reach those who are trying to help themselves. But I would not advocate spending money on permanent improvements now.

Mr. CLARK. In the foreign aid authorization bill, which is funded in the bill which the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts are presenting to the Senate today, \$175 million was authorized for expenditures which, in my judgment, although Mr. Bell did not entirely agree, were to bolster the South Vietnamese economy. Mr. Bell told us in the opening session that inflation since the first of this year had increased the price level in Saigon by about 10 percent, and that most of the \$175 million was really a rescue operation to keep the South Vietnamese economy from collapsing. The other \$100 million was supposed to go into rural areas and into villages.

A number of us raised a serious question as to how that money could be spent. We tried to get Mr. Bell to show us some maps which might be of use in deciding that question. He was not willing to do that, so we had to take his statement on faith.

I supported that bill. Indeed, I shall support this bill. But I am worried about whether we are appropriating large sums of money that cannot be spent, so far as aid is concerned.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to add to what the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has said. I listened to Ambassador Lodge several times when he spoke on this subject. I feel certain that the Senator from Pennsylvania believes that Ambassador Lodge feels we should go into the communities and give the people confidence and help them socially and economically.

I shall quote a statement by General Greene of the Marine Corps. We are all proud of the Marine Corps. In response to a question by me, which appears on page 275 of the hearings, General Greene said:

Well, taking our own area as a specific example, the I Corps area, we have three perimeters there established now, as you know, sir. These three perimeters actually only encompass a small portion of the total population in I Corps area. Some 2 million Vietnamese live in that area.

Within the enclaves that have been established by our forces in the I Corps, pacification is well underway. In other words, we

have separated the Vietcong from the villages in which they have been living for years and we have pushed them outside, either into the unoccupied territory outside of the perimeters or into the mountains and jungles back from the coastal plain, and they don't want to be pushed into these areas, because their entire concept or philosophy is based on mingling with the people, getting the people's support, getting their rice and food from the people, putting taxes on the people, and organizing them as Communists, and we are separating them from the people, Senator, like fish from the sea.

General Greene also said, as appears on page 278 of the testimony:

Well, we aren't executing this program by the rifle and the sword as far as the civic action program is concerned. Right today we are treating in our frontline aid stations over 2,000 cases every single 24 hours, Senator. These are the cases in which we are curing skin diseases, eye diseases, among the men, women, and children that are within our area. That is the sort of program, just one part of it, that we are doing.

There is no gun or sword attached to this. We are distributing food, we are distributing clothing, we are distributing tools. We are helping these people to help themselves to restore their villages and to rebuild their economy and some sort of a political entity.

That is some of the best and most helpful testimony that the committee received. As I recall—and I hope the Senator from Georgia will check me on this—the marines control about 100 square miles of territory. That is the area or district for which the marines are responsible.

Mr. CLARK. I yield to no man in my admiration for the U.S. Marines. I have no doubt that wherever they have the opportunity, they are doing magnificent work. The Senator from Massachusetts just read a very appealing excerpt from General Greene's testimony.

But I pointed out that the South Vietnamese general in charge of the First Corps area has been dismissed. One must only assume that the dismissal was for incompetence. He almost started a revolution to overturn the Ky Government, but finally decided not to. If he had been an effective military man, I should think he would still be commanding the First Corps.

More than that, if the Senator from Massachusetts will look at a map of the terrain, he will find that a majority of the individuals who are being cared for, as the General said, are refugees who came in off the land, such as Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, which we control. I doubt whether there is much of an area in which we could place a school or a housing development. What does the Senator say about that?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I think that we must make haste slowly. We must get the people to be sympathetic with us. There is no better way to get people on our side than to treat their skin diseases and eye troubles and make them healthy.

I think that a well person is a happy person. If the people are happy, they will be on our side and this will be accomplished in a very simple manner.

Mr. CLARK. If we can get to them.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If we can get to them. We must get to them.

Mr. CLARK. That is my problem. If the Vietcong controls so much of the real estate, how will we get to them?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I state to the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Pennsylvania that I appreciate very much this opportunity to engage in colloquy with them. I always try to work with the chairman of the committee in an effective and nonpartisan manner at all times.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should be terribly disappointed if the Senator from Massachusetts were to leave. I have a few more questions.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would not think of leaving.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senators will look at page 116 of the hearing, they will see that General Wheeler testified, in the presence of Secretary McNamara, that the object of the war is to cause the Vietcong and primarily Hanoi to cease and desist their aggression in South Vietnam.

Secretary McNamara said that our policy is to achieve our limited objective with the fewest personnel losses possible.

Then, on page 171, General Wheeler said:

I believe that this is a war that we can win. I believe this, and if I did not believe it, I never would have recommended it to the Commander in Chief that we put our ground forces in there, or any forces, for that matter, at the beginning.

I wonder if the Senators would agree with me that General Wheeler is using the word "win" in connection with our policy and our objective, which is to cause the Vietcong and primarily Hanoi to cease and desist their aggression. He does not mean total victory resulting in the destruction of the enemy. Would the Senators agree?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think in the whole context of his testimony, and the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, it is quite clear that when the general uses the expression "win the war," he means to force Hanoi or any other proper and responsible representatives of the enemy forces in Vietnam to come to the conference table and agree on an honorable peace.

Mr. CLARK. I would agree with that objective.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was the tenor of their testimony throughout. Nobody ever talked about going in there and destroying North Vietnam or South Vietnam. Of course, as long as the war is being waged over any piece of ground, there will be terrible destruction and a good many innocent people will be killed.

There is one difference, however. The people whom we kill are killed by accident. The people who are killed by the Vietcong are killed with premeditated brutality.

Mr. CLARK. The statement which I read from page 120 of Secretary McNamara's testimony refers to achieving a limited objective with the fewest personnel losses possible.

My understanding is that our present military policy—and I ask the Senators to comment on this—is to engage in a series of operations known as search and destroy, in the carrying out of which we

place large numbers of American troops in the field with their magnificent firepower in an effort to search out and kill Vietcong, to destroy their morale, and to cut their fighting effectiveness. However, this inevitably has resulted, I should think, in a very substantial increase in the rate of American casualties. This has been more and more obvious in the last 2 months. Our casualty rate has accelerated quite substantially.

I appreciate that nobody in the Pentagon Building or on the Armed Services Committee agrees with General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan that the proper policy would be to stay where we are and make do with what we have.

I recall that the Senator from Georgia made a comment in the testimony. I do not have the page number at this time, but perhaps he will recall his statement in which he indicated, at least in part, that such a policy would substantially decrease our casualties.

Frankly, I am very concerned over the way in which the American casualty rate is increasing. I am concerned as to how long the American people will stand for an increasing casualty rate.

I ask the Senators whether, in their opinion, there is not some way in which our limited objective could be achieved with the fewest possible personnel losses, as Secretary McNamara has said, without sending our boys into the elephant grass and jungle, and incurring casualties, from the 3d of January 1966 to the 7th of March 1966, of 848 combat deaths, and 139 deaths from accidents which resulted outside of combat. That is a total of 987 casualties in 2 months.

The casualty rate seems to be increasing as our search and destroy policy takes hold. I wonder if the Senators would comment on my concern over the heavy rate of American casualties.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I sincerely regret the American casualties. So far as the Massachusetts boys are concerned, it hurts me every time I write a letter to the parent or wife of a boy who has been killed.

It is not our objective in using the words "win the war" to do nothing other than to make sure that the representatives of North Vietnam and Hanoi will sit down at the conference table. At the present time that has not been done. With regard to holding these areas along the seacoast, as General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan have mentioned, I think from everything I have heard that Gavin has been misinterpreted.

It seems to me that we must carry on the fight. We must make it clear that we are there to force these people to come to the conference table.

We are in the effort so far now that we cannot turn around, even with the increased casualties and the increasing amount of materiel that we bring to Vietnam, but the most serious thing is the increased casualties.

Mr. CLARK. The figures which I quoted did not include the wounded, which are usually far greater in number than those who have been killed.

Turning to page 266 of the testimony, I find myself in complete accord with what the Senator from Georgia said.

I read from the testimony:

General JOHNSON. I do not believe that what General Gavin proposed would accomplish anything beyond what Senator SYMINGTON said, tying down forces.

I interpolate that Senator SYMINGTON is a strong, and from his point of view, quite effective opponent of General Gavin's theory.

I continue to read from page 266:

Chairman RUSSELL. Our people would not be captured and killed if they had these enclaves there and could defend them by air and by artillery and by the Navy.

General JOHNSON. But we would be serving no useful purpose in enclaves.

Chairman RUSSELL. No. We would be serving no useful purpose, but we would be serving a useful purpose in saving our people from being killed—

There is then a security deletion, as is so often the case when the testimony begins to get interesting.

I continue to read—

and our forces who were there would think that was a pretty useful purpose.

I remember when I first came here, I was talking big to Senator Gore, the blind Senator from Oklahoma, and something came up about the Spanish-American War. I said that wasn't much of a war. There were 748 people killed in the whole war.

I interpolate that there were 987 Americans killed in the last 2 months in South Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I said 348. That was the number that was killed in the Spanish-American War.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the RECORD be corrected accordingly.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I continue to read from the statement of Senator RUSSELL:

There were 748 people killed in the whole war, and there were more than that killed at Manassas.

Manassas is sometimes known, north of the Mason-Dixon Line, as Bull Run.

I continue to read:

Old Senator Gore said: "Well, I guess that 748 thought it was a pretty big war." Since then I have been more careful about my estimate of things.

I must say that I find myself in accord with the statement of the Senator from Georgia, who may or may not want to make any further comment. If not, I shall go on to something else.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I was being more or less a Devil's advocate there, in seeing what General Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the Army, thought about that situation.

Of course, I do not want one, single American boy to spill one drop of blood over there unnecessarily; and I grieve with those who do, and particularly with their families, especially of those who leave young ones behind.

When we talk about search and destroy, I think the whole purpose of that is to make this war so unpopular and so devastating for the Vietcong that they will eventually be compelled to quit it.

We cannot wage any other kind of war, unless we go into the enclaves. We do not have the men or the equipment to hold the territory that we take. We can

take it all right, but we cannot hold it, because we do not have a sufficient number of men there.

But when we search and destroy, that does not mean just destroy the Vietcong; that means destroy their system of tunnels, it means destroy their rice supplies, it means destroy their munition dumps, and the things with which they wage war.

I have concluded that the American people will not tolerate indefinitely the kind of war that we are waging over there now. I think we must hit the North Vietnamese hard enough to make them come to the conference table, whether they want to or not—to make them forget those four conditions they have imposed.

Personally, I have come to the conclusion that we should close the port of Haiphong, and that we should push this war until the North Vietnamese would be willing at least to permit their alter egos or "Charlie McCarthys," or whoever they are, in the National Liberation Front, to join them at the conference table and bring this war to a conclusion.

If they are correct in their insistence that a majority of the people in South Vietnam want their form of government, let them come and have an election, and, if the majority of the people there vote for that form of government, I say let them have it, because, if there is any one principle to which this Nation has been dedicated in its relations with all other countries on earth since our very beginning, it is the principle of self-determination.

But I do not think we can afford to let this war drift on and on as it is now. Search-and-destroy tactics may, after 10 or 12 years, bring the Vietcong to their knees; but the American people are going to be very unhappy about it, and someone who comes along and says, "I will go in there and clean this thing up in 6 months," will, I am afraid, have some advantage over the Senators who say, "Let's play this thing along for 10 or 12 years, as we are going now."

Because this is not a popular war, gentlemen; we can bear that in mind right now. The average American has a sense of national pride that will not let him tuck in his tail and run there in South Vietnam, but he wonders, every time he thinks about it, why we are there; and I must confess that I share that feeling at times myself.

It is going to be necessary to have a change in policy in some direction in the very near future, in my opinion, or this war will assume political proportions that will absolutely force it upon any man who has to go before the electorate of this country and seek public office.

Mr. CLARK. Two things concern me about the position taken by the Senator from Georgia, with which I would ordinarily have great sympathy, because I, like most Americans, tend to be impatient and wish to get things over with pretty quickly, and do not like these halfway measures.

But I would be concerned, with respect to the Senator's view, with two things: First, how much longer will the American people be content to put up with the

present casualty rate? I remind the Senator that, while we like to be statesmen while discussing this sort of matter, there is an election coming up in November, with which we should naturally be concerned.

After all, in the case of Korea, the people got pretty tired of that war, and many people believe President Eisenhower was elected because he undertook to go to Korea and stop it, and he did.

The other thing that concerns me is whether the more provocative policy which the Senator from Georgia thinks we may have to follow involving an escalation and acceleration of the war might bring the Chinese into the war against us.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course that would be most unfortunate, and I should hope that would not happen. But, as the Senator from Pennsylvania knows, we took a calculated risk when we put the first man in uniform in South Vietnam. We did not know what the response of the Chinese would be. We did not know what it would be when we added to that, and built our airbases in surrounding areas. We did not know what the response of the Chinese would be when we started bombing North Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. And we do not know yet.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. But my own opinion—and not as one posing as an expert, by any means, on Chinese affairs—is that as long as we do not land forces near the Chinese border, we will probably not bring the Chinese into the war. If we were to land forces near the Chinese border, I think we would undoubtedly bring them in. If we were to attack China somewhere, I think we would undoubtedly bring them in. But I cannot set why the Chinese would permit us to bomb up to within 2 or 3 miles of their borders, and knock out railroad bridges and road bridges, and not come into the war, and then come into the war because of something that is clear across North Vietnam from the Chinese boundary.

I concede it is a calculated risk, but we have taken calculated risks before, and we will be compelled to take calculated risks if we are ever to bring this war to a conclusion.

I am in favor of taking the next step now, and closing Haiphong, saying, "We are going to put a stopper on this bottle; you are not going to pour any more munitions in there to go down through the many prongs of the Ho Chi Minh trail and kill American boys."

That is my own individual view, and I have urged it at the very highest levels. If we cannot, in any other way, get these people to do the very elementary thing that has prevailed since the stone age, of men who are at loggerheads sitting down and discussing their differences—if they are not willing to do that, I do not see that we have any other option but to try and put them in such a position that they are compelled to.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Senator from South Dakota has a few remarks he wishes to make on the pending bill. I have a few more questions

I should like to put to my friend, the Senator from Massachusetts, but I should like to yield to the Senator from South Dakota for that purpose.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I had no particular remarks I wished to make. I did have a few more questions that I should like to have raised, either for the Senator from Massachusetts or the Senator from Georgia, with reference to the bill.

One question relates to the proposal that has been made by a number of people about the possible sealing of the port of Haiphong.

It has been my understanding that the Senator from Massachusetts would know more about this than I would: that there is a sense in which both the major cities in the south and those in the north are held hostage by the other side. In other words, the Vietcong, with the help of North Vietnam, are in a position to do great damage to the port of Saigon. It is my understanding that that port is reached through a river that it would be quite possible to close off by the sinking of a single ship.

Various other things could be done, through terror, to cause great difficulty in Saigon. We have also understood that one of the reasons why steps of that kind have not been taken is the fact that, so far, we have stayed away from bombing or mining Haiphong, or other principal cities in North Vietnam. I am wondering whether—if we were to take that step, let us say, to mine or bomb the key port of Haiphong—we could not anticipate severe reprisals on the part of the other side against Saigon, which is an essential port in terms of our supply situation.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say that my knowledge of this subject is not completely fundamental, but it is my understanding that Saigon harbor has a channel which could be mined very easily, but that it has not been mined. The ship which was hit the other day went out of the channel in order to keep the channel clear. We did receive testimony that if we mined Haiphong—and it would have to be done by mines, not by a blockade or other way—there could be an opportunity for the opposition to drop mines and make it more difficult for us on the scene. There was general and little testimony, really, on this subject. I know that some military chiefs feel we could go further regarding the mining or bombing of Haiphong; but, of course, there is a difference of opinion on that subject. They have to take their orders from the Commander in Chief.

Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator from Massachusetts believe that might be a possible response which we would have to anticipate, if we were to extend the war by attacking Haiphong or other principal cities of North Vietnam, that there would then be an increase in the activities of the other side in reprisals?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Just speaking as one individual—for myself, and myself alone, and that is all I can speak for—that is probably the reason the present administration has not allowed the military chiefs to go as far as they might like to go. However, I emphasize

that I am speaking only for myself when I say that.

Mr. McGOVERN. With regard to the general policy of bombardment in the North, there has been a considerable amount of discussion on that question.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Senator will yield right there, it has been called to my attention that the feeling is we would not gain enough by mining Hai-phong to make it worth while.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator.

In addition to possible reprisals against Saigon, would not it also raise all kinds of problems with reference to some of our allies—

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It might very well.

Mr. McGOVERN. And other international problems?

With regard to the overall policy of bombing, particularly the bombing of the north, this has been going on now, as I understand it, for a year. It began in February of 1965, I believe. It is my further understanding that the theory behind the bombing was possibly two-fold; one, that it would interdict the flow of manpower and supplies from North Vietnam into the South; and, two, it might bring the kind of pressure to bear on Hanoi which would lead them to the negotiating table.

If I properly state the purpose of the bombing—and I am not sure that that is the reason for it, having watched that as a member of the Armed Services Committee for the past year—would the Senator say that, in general, the bombing has been a success, judged by any reasonable standards?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe that we could say the testimony we have heard shows it to be a reasonable success. I would not say it has been a tremendous success. It is my understanding that there is a great difference between bombing Hanoi and the bombing of Germany in World War II. During World War II, Germany's industrial facilities were in an area which, by bombing, prevented the Germans from building materials of war. In the case of Hanoi, very little materiel goes to the Vietcong and into South Vietnam from Hanoi which is built or made there. I believe they have a steel plant in that area. How big it is, I do not know. I believe that there is a difference of opinion, there again, about the oil fields around the outskirts of Hanoi. The feeling has been not to bomb Hanoi and kill and mutilate civilians. What we wish to do is bomb the Ho Chi Minh trail and the railroads that come from China into North Vietnam. In other words, to bomb the areas of transportation.

As Secretary McNamara pointed out, it is almost impossible to bomb successfully a comparatively small number of tons of supplies coming down the roads. But now the supplies for the Vietcong being built up are between, I believe it is 12 to 18 tons a day—perhaps more. Therefore, we can successfully bomb the roads by making the Ho Chi Minh Trail inoperable and preventing the movement of the railroads. In other words, Viet-

cong supplies have been built up as they come down, and now it is worth while to try to stop them on the roads. That is the essential goal of our bombing, as I understand it, at the present time.

Mr. McGOVERN. Can the Senator from Massachusetts tell me whether there is anything in the supplemental bill which would lead anyone who would vote for it, or who supports it, into the position that he would seem to be endorsing an increase or an acceleration of the bombing attacks, and other efforts of that kind which we are carrying on in Vietnam?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not believe that we could answer that question categorically. I believe that what we are trying to do in this bill is to supply enough ammunition, supply enough planes, supply enough manpower, if we will, and operation and maintenance, to carry on the Vietnamese war in the way the leadership of our country and the chiefs of staff believe to be the wisest under the determinations which they may make from time to time.

Mr. McGOVERN. If I could be a little more specific about that, one of the things I have been very much concerned about is trying to do whatever I can, as one Senator—and I know there are other Senators who feel the same way—to stop this war from widening.

The President has stated that he seeks no wider war, that he wants to do what he can to restrict it. Could it be said that the funds contained in the bill, or any of the funds in the bill, will be earmarked, let us say, for extending the bombing attacks into Cambodia, sending troops into Laos, or bombing the mainland of China and hitting areas which would significantly expand the theater of operations?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. No. Let me say again that we cannot be categorical on this point, but the purpose of the bill is essentially to supply our 200,000-odd men in Vietnam, and to make it possible for them to gain victory.

Mr. McGOVERN. But it does not constitute, in the Senator's view, funds for a major buildup, that it is something in the nature of a holding operation—and I am not referring to the "enclave theory"—but to holding the present level of military activity, or at least not to expand it in any major or substantial way?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I could not truthfully answer that question by the Senator in a way which he would want; namely, as a "No, it does not" answer. I do not believe that today the Senator or I, the Chiefs of Staff, or the President of the United States could say that that was the fact. We have got to be guided by circumstances. We have got to do what we believe to be necessary. I do not believe that we can be categorical in saying what the pending bill will do, and what it will not do.

What it will do, in effect, is make it possible for our men who are over there to fight to the best of their ability and as safely as possible to bring about the results that we want.

Mr. McGOVERN. If I read the report and bill correctly, there is a considerable amount of funds provided both for in-

creased artillery shells and bombs. I think I remember the figure of about \$100 million a month in ammunition and artillery of different kinds, and perhaps \$110 million a month in bombs. So there is something like \$200 million a month every month spent for those purposes at the present level.

I am wondering whether, in the kind of guerilla war we are now engaged in, where the enemy and soldiers are intermingled with civilian population, how we can use that kind of firepower without killing many civilians, children and defenseless men and women, who I think would become the victims of firepower on that scale.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. In the first place, a substantial amount of ammunition is being used. I do not have the figure per month in mind with respect to what is being used.

Mr. McGOVERN. These are Secretary McNamara's figures.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Then I would say what the Senator has quoted is correct.

I may mention that in the Preparedness Subcommittee, under the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], as I said before the Senator from South Dakota entered the Chamber, we have received testimony which seemed to indicate that there was enough ammunition over there to supply our needs in all forms and that we were building up our supplies at home to keep them up to what we need.

So far as concerns killing civilians, I have never seen any figures of the number of South Vietnamese civilians who have been injured or killed as a result of our bombing or shooting.

I think the Senator is making an understatement of the activities involved in South Vietnam when he says it is guerilla warfare. I think it ceased to be guerrilla warfare with the number of regiments that have come down into South Vietnam from the North, and with our search and destroy activities, going into underground trenches, to destroy tons of rice, and so forth. I hope I have answered the Senator's question. I have tried to the best of my ability to do so.

Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the Senator's statement.

One further question. Up until about a year ago, the estimates—and I think these estimates came out of the Defense Department as well as from other sources—were that about 80 percent of the weapons that were used by the Vietcong were American weapons that they had captured or stolen or bought in the black market or obtained in various fashions from the troops we had equipped in Vietnam. I am talking about a year or a year and a half ago. In other words, in a sense, we were acting as a supply source for both sides.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think that is one statement I can categorically deny—

Mr. McGOVERN. As far as today is concerned?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes, because weapons made in China or Russia were brought into our committee. As far as could be determined, the enemy did not have any of our weapons. I will not say

March 21, 1966

6121

that they do not have, because they must have, but I think essentially they are being supplied from those other two sources.

Mr. McGOVERN. I wish to thank the Senator for his patience in answering these questions as a member of the committee.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is a subject matter we are all interested in. We all ought to know as much as we can about it. I appreciate the questions of the Senator. I have tried to answer to the best of my ability.

Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the pending bill. My vote will be cast against this legislation because it provides the means of conducting a war that is unauthorized through our constitutional processes.

We are not acting in immediate self-defense in Vietnam; we are not in a condition where the President must act precipitately to repel a sudden armed attack. We are planning, managing, organizing, and conducting a war effort of a magnitude exceeded only a few times in our history. To do that requires a declaration of war by Congress, under our Constitution.

Supporters of the war who seek to justify an exclusively executive war fall back upon the old saw: Who would we declare war on? My answer is, whoever we are fighting, and that surely is the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.

The only reasons given for not declaring war on them are that it would be degrading for the United States to declare war formally on such puny adversaries, and secondly, that our relations with other countries would suffer. But we are making war and the same disadvantages are accruing to us, anyway.

I am not for a declaration of war in Vietnam. I do not believe there are sufficient grounds for it.

I do not think there is any justification for an executive war in Vietnam. But neither are there grounds for an American war to destroy the Vietcong and reestablish General Ky and his cronies as the undisputed masters of South Vietnam. To the extent that we continue to do that, we are only replacing the French in Vietnam and will suffer all the disadvantages and debilities that the French suffered.

However different our motives may be from those of postwar France, we still are trying to remake a country to suit our hollow interests. How hollow our purposes are. We say first we are there to preserve the blessings of freedom for the people of South Vietnam, and then we announce a vast program to reshape

the political, social, and economic institutions of that sad, unfortunate, war-torn country.

The plain fact is we are in South Vietnam for purely American interests and no one else's. We will remain as long as necessary to protect U.S. interests as we see them, and we are not interested in any cessation of the fighting unless American security interests are first guaranteed, irrespective of what happens to the people of South Vietnam.

My objection to this bill go to the objectives for which we say we are in South Vietnam, and the fact that we are pursuing them without regard for the constitutional processes which are supposed to govern the conduct of war by the United States.

The bill carries the money not only to hold on where we are in South Vietnam, but to expand the war into Thailand, Laos, and elsewhere in southeast Asia where the Defense Department sees fit. We are doing all this in the name of containing Communist China. But China has no men in Vietnam, and has expended little money, relatively speaking, in support of the fighting.

Indeed, once we began in 1962 to build up our airbases deep in the heart of Thailand and naval bases on her sea-coast, the threat of guerrilla subversion of Thailand began to grow. Prior to 1962, there was virtually no mention of any subversive or guerrilla threat to Thailand. Today in this bill, we are called upon to provide tens of millions of dollars to forestall a threat to Thailand that we did as much as anyone to investigate and create in the first place.

Thailand has become an American military sanctuary and we had no right in the first place to turn it into an American military sanctuary. Neither had we any right to send a single boy to South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva accords of 1954; nor any legal or moral right to send a single tank, a single airplane, a single piece of war-making materiel into South Vietnam, to say nothing of establishing in South Vietnam our first puppet, by the name of Diem, and each and every puppet we have financed and militarized since we proceeded to violate the Geneva accords of 1954, section after section, article after article.

The \$13.1 billion of this bill, plus the \$1.7 billion of last year, is all for expenses for the Vietnam war for fiscal year 1966. This total of \$14.8 billion is in addition to the regular Defense Department budget. As described by the committee report, the money is needed not only for what it calls "continued support of operations in southeast Asia." The committee says:

It includes increases in the size of our Armed Forces; additional funds for the maintenance and operation of new and enlarged bases; stepped-up supply and depot operations; procurement of a variety of aircraft, missiles, munitions, vehicles, and other equipment; increased research activities related to the Vietnamese requirement; construction of bases, depots, troop housing facilities, airfields, and other facilities both in the United States and abroad; military assistance funds to reimburse the military services for the procurement of goods pro-

vided, and economic assistance to foreign countries.

This money will carry us until June 30, 1966.

It is impossible to find any witnesses from the administration who are willing to say what the costs will be next year. It is impossible to find any witness from the administration who is willing to say what the cost will be less next year.

Let me say to the American taxpayers: Get ready for more. Let me say to the American taxpayers: As this administration, outside the Constitution, escalates this war and sends additional thousands of American boys to be slaughtered in South Vietnam, the war bill will go up.

That is why I said last Thursday, in preparation for this speech today, that the American people are the only ones left to check this administration, for I am satisfied that Congress never will. I am still waiting for my colleagues in Congress, who keep telling me that they are waiting for the proper vehicle to check this administration, for the proper vehicle in which they can express themselves. The country is still waiting for them to name what they consider to be the proper vehicle to check this President.

I say regretfully that, in my opinion, they are never going to find such a vehicle; they are never going to name one. They are just going to hope and hope that in some way, somehow, this ungodly slaughter will disappear from the face of the earth. In my judgment, it will not disappear until we formally change America's policies. That is why we ought to proceed, legislatively, to exercise those checks that our constitutional forefathers left to us to exercise when a President proceeds to follow a course of action that this President has followed since he was elected in 1964 on pledge after pledge, and on the representation to millions of Americans who voted for him, that he opposed the warmaking policies of Barry Goldwater. As I said last Thursday, he has out-Goldwatered Goldwater.

In my judgment, the American people now have to check the President, they are going to have the check him by exercising the precious right that they have—the free ballot. They are going to have to hold politically responsible those who are not willing to check him, and to proceed to demonstrate their disapproval of the slaughter that is taking place in southeast Asia.

This fund is necessary to carry out a war effort said to be mounted by North Vietnam, whose annual gross national product has been estimated at under \$1 billion. It has been stated in the Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on China that the real challenge to us in Vietnam is to find the ways and means to bring together the factions that could provide it with a stable government. But that challenge is derided by administration spokesmen as being tantamount to putting a fox in charge of the chicken coop—which was an insult to our intelligence, by the way. No doubt it is undiplomatic to point out that the fox is already in charge of most of the area of the chicken coop, and in charge of many of its people. It is also undiplomatic

these days to point out that South Vietnam is apparently regarded by the administration as "our chicken coop" for they take upon themselves the right to say who shall run it and who shall not.

If that is not a substitution of American interests for French interests, I do not know what is. If General Ky is a more viable head of state than Bao Dai was, there is no evidence to support it. Ky consumes vastly more American financial and military support to hang on even to a vestige of authority than Bao Dai required of the French.

Today's New York Times carries a letter to the editor by Robert S. Browne, a one-time American aid official in South Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Browne's letter be printed in full at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. In his letter, Mr. Browne points out:

If the administration were really interested in an honorable solution in Vietnam it would revise its 11-year-old policy of blind and total support for tyrannical Vietnamese opportunists and have the courage to throw its support behind some sort of coalition government of popular groupings in South Vietnam. If we would permit such a government truly to assume the reins of power (a reasonably satisfactory method of selecting representatives could be worked out) we might have, for the first time since Vietnam has been independent, some effective channel for the expression and assessment of popular feeling in South Vietnam. It would be the proper province for such a government, rather than for ill-formed U.S. politicians, to decide whether or not it wished to go into coalition with the National Liberation Front.

The Ky government, which rules only because of its unlimited support from the United States, unabashedly denies any expression of Vietnamese popular feeling as regards the question of war or negotiations. Yet the President of the United States chooses to fly 7,000 miles to demonstrate his support of this tyranny, while straightfacedly proclaiming our objective as being that of self-determination for the people of Vietnam.

I point out that Mr. Browne was one of the men in charge for a good many years of our aid program to South Vietnam. He is aware of the tyranny that we have supported with the expenditure of millions of American taxpayers' dollars. He is aware of the duplicity of our whole American program in southeast Asia. He is aware of the difference between the talk of our Government leaders and their acts. He is aware of the speech of the President of the United States at the so-called freedom banquet in New York in which he said to the American people, and through that program, to the world, that we seek no American base in southeast Asia. Is that so? Well, I want to say that will be surprising news to the major Asian powers and, for that matter, to the leaders of the governments of the world.

As I went with a Senate delegation through Asia last fall, I soon discovered that the Asian leaders are well aware of the bases that the United States has built and is building in southeast Asia.

We are not going to spend these hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars for American bases in southeast Asia and walk out on them, and everybody knows it.

These bases are being built for U.S. military presence in southeast Asia for years to come, until finally Asia throws us out, which is what will happen in the due course of time. For, as I have said so many times in my speeches here on the floor of the Senate, no Western power is going to be allowed to maintain and dominate footholds in Asia. All the other Western powers that have tried it have learned through bloodletting that sad lesson, except the United States.

We are apparently slow learners, we Americans. Apparently it is going to take us a much longer time than it took the other powers who have already learned this blood lesson, that Asia is not going to let the United States maintain and dominate for long a military foothold, or, for that matter, economic foothold in Asia.

We do not like to talk about colonial policies. We like to attach that term only to European nations. But come with me through Asia, and when we talk about the imperialistic policies of the United States in Asia, that means the new kind of colonialism that the United States seeks to impose upon Asia, a military and economic colonialism in form after form.

Mr. President, the repeated claim by the U.S. Government that we are in South Vietnam to preserve freedom of self-determination for its people is perhaps the most patently farcical of all our public pronouncements on that subject, and there are many. We have the Vice President's word for it that we—the United States, the administration, the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department—do not intend to let anyone into the Government of South Vietnam who does not have our blessing.

Where did we get that power from on high? The United States should stop playing God in Asia. The leaders of our Government should stop playing God in Asia. We ought to recognize also that most Asians do not have faith in our God.

Mr. President, the determination for South Vietnam lies with Government officials in Washington, D.C., and not among the people of South Vietnam. It is our chicken coop, said the Vice President in his unfortunate use of that figure of speech, and we will have in charge whom we please, no matter how long it takes.

That is the story of this administration. But it does not make it right. It does not make it defensible. It does not make it justifiable, for it is a wrong policy.

This unilateral, American dictatorial attitude toward southeast Asia cannot be reconciled with the glorious, historic record of this Republic.

That is why I find myself so completely at a loss to understand what has happened to our ideals in America. What has happened to our professions about believing in the application of the

principles of morality to our relationship with foreign peoples.

Mr. President, we cannot square our course of action in southeast Asia with principles of morality. As the American people come to understand it, they are going to make very clear to this administration that it had better get back inside of the framework of the Constitution and the framework of our country's morals.

Mr. President, I do not doubt that out of our wealth and power we can sustain this war in South Vietnam, and probably in North Vietnam, too, so long as there are any people left to fight in either place. But we are not creating anything, even with the billions we are being asked to spend to remake the social structure of South Vietnam. What we are creating is a social and political desert that the United States will have to occupy and govern for the foreseeable future.

This is now being elevated into an elegant new version of the "white man's burden." It is talked up as an obligation to the yellow races of Asia that are as deserving of American help as are the white races of Europe. But it is not help in a common purpose. It is the enforcement of American goals upon people who have little or nothing to say in the matter. Our commitment to South Vietnam was made in Washington to people in Washington who were then sent to South Vietnam to enforce it, and who are still being sent there to enforce it. That is a commitment to ourselves, not to the people of South Vietnam.

No doubt Ho Chi Minh says with equal fervor that he, too, has a commitment to the people of South Vietnam to finish the unifying of Vietnam that was short-circuited by the halt in the election in 1956. I do not know of any opportunity the people of the south have had to make themselves heard or to manage their own affairs at all.

For the people of South Vietnam, there is no hope of peace in this bill. There is no hope of an end to war, only the promise of more war. We are told in support of mass bombing by B-52's that it was good for the morale of the Ky government; but the introduction of helicopters in 1961 did wonders for the morale of the Diem government for a few months, and the introduction of American jet bombers into the fighting did a lot for the morale of the government that preceded General Ky's. Somehow the morale always needs a new shot in the arm, like a drug addict who requires bigger and bigger doses to get the same lift.

This bill will increase the level of the fighting, the number of Americans to do the fighting, and the extent of the territory made subject to warfare.

There is no declaration of war, which could state the objectives and purposes of the United States in fighting, even as Woodrow Wilson asked for a declaration of war "to bring the Imperial Government of Germany to terms and end the war."

We have no such objective or purpose in Vietnam. No one in the administration is talking about ending the war or how it can be ended. We are being told only of how it can be prosecuted, not how

it can be either won or ended. It is increasingly fashionable, too, to berate Americans for wanting quick solutions, as though to drag on a war for 5 or 10 or 20 years is more likely to secure the peace of Asia than a settlement would.

As a final exhibit to these remarks, I call attention to the article appearing in the current issue of *Frontier* magazine by Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho. It is a review of "Vietnam and the United States," by Prof. Hans Morgenthau, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed as exhibit 2 at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the *Record* as exhibit 3 to my remarks an editorial from the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* of March 19, entitled: "Congressional Abdication."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 3.)

Mr. MORSE. As exhibit 4, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the close of my speech this afternoon, from today's issue of the *New York Times*, a statement of outstanding scholars and authorities on China, signed by 180 of them, proposing drastic changes in American foreign policy toward Communist China.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 4.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I know full well that voting against this appropriation bill will stir up the superpatriots in this country, all those who seem to think that flag waving is a substitute for reason, those who feel that the best way to show your patriotism is to drain, several times a day, your adrenal glands and respond emotionally—I full well know the tactics they resort to. They have used them on the senior Senator from Oregon before. They are using them now in my State, Mr. President. In fact, I think when I finish this speech, I shall call the Chief Justice of the United States and godnaturally suggest to him that he move over; because those superpatriots are circulating buttons, on which there is printed, "Impeach Morse."

Mr. President, they are also circulating petitions in my State. They started with petitions to recall me, not knowing anything about constitutional law—which is so characteristic of this breed of patriots. They learned from their legal advisers that they were without legal authority to recall a U.S. Senator, so they changed the petition and are circulating them now, to be sent to the Senate, to have me expelled from the Senate.

Many of my friends have called and asked me if there was anything I wanted them to do. I said, "There is nothing I want you to do." I said, "Let those people do it. They have the right, and I would staunchly defend their right to get up any petitions they wish. It is a constitutional right; let them exercise it. I am perfectly willing to let the people of Oregon answer them."

But their line is based upon the charge that those of us who are opposed to this legislation are in some way, somehow, supposed to be letting down the boys in southeast Asia. They say, "They propose to vote against the appropriation to escalate and expand the war." And that is exactly what I propose to do, as a constitutionalist.

A Hamilton, a Madison, a Gerry—all the great constitutional fathers of this form of government, Mr. President—wrote that check into the Constitution. It is known as the check of the purse strings. They wrote check after check into the Constitution, to check a President of the United States when he seeks to exercise such unchecked power as this President is exercising, and has succeeded thus far in getting the Congress to go along with him in exercising. They wrote into the Constitution the check of the purse strings, which means, Mr. President, that no President of the United States can initiate a foreign policy that requires funding without an authorization bill. He cannot implement and effectuate such a foreign policy without the appropriation to carry it out. To deny him the authorization is what two of us sought to do on this floor not so many days ago, when we voted against that \$4.8 billion proposal for supplementary authority to expand this war in southeast Asia.

Some of my colleagues tried to argue that it authorized no new policy. I could not believe my ears. To rebut them, all one had to do was read the bill and the committee report.

That bill authorized the sending of more than 452,000 additional boys into southeast Asia, whenever the President should decide to exercise the discretion of doing it. I said then and repeat today, I would never vote to give that arbitrary discretionary power to any President, I do not care who he is. It takes a President only 20 minutes or less to get up here from the White House to present his proof of the need for any specific amount that he needs from time to time.

I warn the American people again, "If you don't stop your Congress from abdicating their checking responsibilities under the Constitution, you will be led into a government of executive supremacy in this country."

That great basic abstract principle of freedom is pretty vital in these critical days.

But that is not the only new policy in that \$4,800 million bill.

As I pointed out in that debate that bill provided new policy in the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars for the building of permanent military bases throughout southeast Asia, Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and any place else the Secretary of Defense, in his discretion, decided it was necessary to build them.

What unchecked power? The constitutional fathers wrote the authorizing bill procedure into the Constitution, to check that kind of discretion. Congress waived it, in effect. But that is not the only thing the bill did.

That bill also authorized payment by the American taxpayers of the costs of

all the military mercenaries being supplied to the United States by South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and—as I said in debate—if Australia and New Zealand decide to submit a bill, the Government can pay for its soldiers, too. This is a blanket coverage for the cost of the military operations of these so-called allies in South Vietnam, not one of them a major power, not one of them an independent power; each and every one of them, really little but a dependency of the United States. It is the U.S. taxpayer who is paying their bills. That new policy was authorized in the bill.

Then, to my great regret, the bill also provided \$100 million in a supplemental authorization—\$100 million as a contingency fund for the President of the United States, granting him vast discretion and the unchecked power which goes with a contingency fund where, last year, in the general bill, the President received \$50 million for the contingency fund. That was \$50 million because I, assisted by 2 or 3 other Senators in the Committee on Foreign Relations, presented a case that caused the majority on the Foreign Relations Committee to cut the contingency fund to \$50 million.

Oh, Mr. President, we did not exercise that check which the Founding Fathers wrote into the Constitution with regard to authorization legislation. Thus, today, I talk about the check of the purse strings.

Who is letting our boys down in South Vietnam?

Not those of us who are making the argument that we should exercise the check on the purse strings.

Do not forget that the funds are there to protect the boys as of now, until the President has time to follow a course to action of restriction in South Vietnam, which would be necessary if we denied him the funds under the appropriation bill, or cut them back.

That means, in my judgment, that this check is important because, as I have been heard to say before—as I said in New Hampshire this morning, and in Manchester, N.H., last night—if we follow the course of action that I am proposing, we will provide that lull period. We will provide the necessary procedure to make it possible for the noncombatant nations of the world to give further consideration to an obligation of theirs of making clear to the combatants that the war must be stopped. To that end, they should propose to enforce the stopping of it, propose a fair cease-fire order and assure the combatants in the war, including the United States, that they will enforce it and send over whatever divisions of men necessary to enforce it, as they mark out in South Vietnam the buffer zones necessary to separate the combating forces.

I know that it will be said it will not work. Whenever we do not wish to meet an issue on its merits, it is easy to say that it will not work. But there is no question as to what the commitment of the noncombatant nations is. The signatories to the United Nations Charter assumed the responsibility, when they

signed it, to meet a threat to the peace of the world, no matter what nation or combination of nations joined in creating that threat to the peace of the world.

In this instance, the United States is one of those nations.

That is why I have been heard to say on the floor of the Senate, and across the country, that there is a great speech which I should like to hear by President make. I should like to have my President make perfectly clear to our Ambassador at the United Nations that all the influence and prestige of this great country shall be brought to bear on the Security Council to have it proceed with the world debate necessary on this issue, and then come to a vote and find out who it is in the Security Council that might veto it—and put that country, or countries, on the spot, and take my country off the spot.

But I would also have my President make clear to our Ambassador at the United Nations that he should make clear to the members of the Security Council that we are not going to wait indefinitely, that we are going to clear up the reports coming out of New York City that no real serious attempt is being made by any country, including our own, to force a consideration of this matter before the Security Council and bring it to a vote.

Thus, I would have my President make clear to our Ambassador at the United Nations that we are not going to wait indefinitely, that we are going to exercise the rights we have under sections of the Charter. If the Security Council is not going to face the issue, then we are going to call upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to proceed to carry out the commitment and the obligation of each signatory to the Charter to enforce the peace and to lay down a cease-fire order.

I would have my President then go to an extraordinary session the General Assembly and pledge to the world that this great and powerful Nation of ours will cooperate in carrying out that cease-fire order.

If the world were assured that the United States really wants a cease-fire order enforced, then, for the first time, as the President is so prone to quote, the nations of the world might sit down at the United Nations and reason together. For there is a growing recognition on the part of the nations of the world that the holocaust in southeast Asia cannot continue to expand to an even greater and greater holocaust, because if it is not stopped, it can end only in a massive war in Asia.

Already, we have Mr. Maxwell Taylor—who has ill advised our Presidents for a long time in this country—without even a declaration of war, taking the position last week that the United States should mine the Haiphong Harbor.

Well, Mr. President, we cannot mine the Haiphong Harbor without greatly increasing the risk of world war III.

In my judgment, we cannot mine the Haiphong Harbor and have the flags of many nations respect the mining.

I wish to say, as I proceed to close my speech, that I would have the American

people watch the propaganda coming out of the Pentagon, for it usually is the first signal of what the administration is up to.

What is the latest propaganda coming out of the Pentagon?

Why are they trying to poison further the thinking of the American people?

Why is the Pentagon seeking to mislead the American people once again, as Secretary McNamara has so many times?

Some way, somehow, they must find some propaganda that can meet the undeniable fact that up until now this Government cannot produce a top military adviser of this country in the years gone by who will testify that we can successfully fight a war against China.

The testimony, without exception, is that we must not bog down an American ground force in Asia. Generals MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Vandenberg, Marshall, and Ridgway—great military leaders of this Republic—have warned the American people that we must not bog down American ground forces in Asia. This administration is doing it. This administration already has a minimum of 235,000 American boys in southeast Asia, with an additional 100,000 American boys in that area when we take into account Thailand, the naval forces off the area, and the soldiers who are waiting for orders.

The body of evidence against fighting a war with China has to be answered by propaganda, and the Pentagon Building is busy with the propaganda. So last week we got the first installment.

But let me tell the American people, it is only the beginning. The first installment says China is an aggressor.

It was not so many years ago that the German people were fed the big lie technique, and that technique led them into a holocaust, with all the terrible consequences that history records.

Let me say from the floor of the Senate this afternoon that the big lie technique of the Pentagon Building and the State Department, if the American people do not negate it, will lead millions of Americans to their death in a massive war that will result from the conduct of the warmongers in the Pentagon Building and the State Department.

Mr. President, who is letting down the boys in southeast Asia? The officials of this administration who are proposing to send thousands more there to die. They are the ones who are letting down the boys.

I would not think of trading the objective judgment and clearheadedness of a General Gavin, of a General Ridgway, and of a George Kennan for the whole caboodle of the military advisers of the President of the United States at the present time, adding to them his Secretary of Defense, his Secretary of State, and his Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr. Lodge.

I am not happy to find myself in such irreconcilable disagreement with my President and his advisers.

In 1964 I was proud to urge his election because, as I said across the country, the election of Goldwater, in my judgment, would endanger the security of my country and augured a massive war in Asia.

I quoted the President's statements in that campaign. They left no room for doubt of his complete and total disagreement with the foreign policy of Goldwater.

I pray that my President returns to the policy that he enunciated from coast to coast, from north to south, which, in my judgment was the primary issue of the campaign, and because of which, in support of his representations, millions of Americans voted for him for President and gave him a mandate.

It is not too late for either the majority party in the Congress or the President of the United States to carry out that mandate.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
Mar. 21, 1966]

SETTLEMENT WITH VIETNAM, NOT CHINA

To the Editor:

All the thinking Americans must certainly welcome the belated attention the Senate is directing toward our China policy, exemplified by the recent hearings with Prof. A. Doak Barnett and John K. Fairbank.

Nevertheless, there is a danger that this focusing of public attention on China will further strengthen the erroneous belief that the cessation of the Vietnamese war must somehow depend on our reaching an overall accommodation with China.

Despite the widespread acceptance of this view, which has been assiduously propagated by the administration, there is little evidence to support it. It is certainly not the view articulated by the Vietnamese people generally, nor even by so responsibly situated a person as Tran Van Do, the current Foreign Minister of the Saigon government.

Despite Washington disclaimers, the basic quarrel in Vietnam remains an all-Vietnamese dispute, with the United States present esse dispute, with the U.S. presence creating the sole significant internationalization of the conflict. Any lasting settlement of this quarrel must of necessity be a Vietnamese settlement, not one manufactured in Washington or Peiping.

SUPPORT FOR COALITION

If the administration were really interested in an honorable solution in Vietnam, it would revise its 11-year-old policy of blind and total support for tyrannical Vietnamese opportunists and have the courage to throw its support behind some sort of coalition government of popular groupings in South Vietnam.

If we would permit such a government truly to assume the reins of power (a reasonably satisfactory method of selecting representatives could be worked out), we might have, for the first time since Vietnam has been independent, some effective channel for the expression and assessment of popular feeling in South Vietnam. It would be the proper province for such a government, rather than for ill-informed U.S. politicians, to decide whether or not it wished to go into coalition with the National Liberation Front.

POPULAR FEELING IGNORED

The Ky government, which rules only because of its unlimited support from the United States, unabashedly denies any expression of Vietnamese popular feeling as regards the question of war or negotiations. Yet the President of the United States chooses to fly 7,000 miles to demonstrate his support of this tyranny, while straightforwardly proclaiming our objective as being that of "self-determination" for the people of Vietnam.

I submit that if we took steps to permit the Vietnamese people genuinely to say what

March 21, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

they want, the war could begin to move toward a settlement—quite independently of any grand design on the part of either Washington or Peiping. Indeed, any "deal" struck by the United States and China can hardly be considered as self-determination for the Vietnamese, nor is it likely to bring any real stability within Vietnam itself.

ROBERT S. BROWNE,

Assistant Program Officer, U.S. Economic Aid Mission to Vietnam, 1958-1961.

TEANECK, N.J., March 11, 1966.

EXHIBIT 2

[From Frontier, March 1966]

ON THE ROAD TO NOWHERE IN VIETNAM

(By Senator FRANK CHURCH)

("Vietnam and the United States" by Hans Morgenthau. Public Affairs Press. 112 pp. \$2.)

Hans J. Morgenthau must be a lonely man. His dissenter's role is not to be coveted in these drab days of consensus and conformity. With criticism of American foreign policy confined mostly to the campuses, debate over the basic premises underlying our posture in Asia has all but disappeared within the Government.

The cloak of "bipartisanship" has smothered organized dissent; it is no longer fashionable for the opposition party to oppose. The American people have been pretty much persuaded that, whatever differences may exist between the two political parties on domestic questions, they should stand together where foreign policy is concerned. Constantly we are admonished that argument among us must stop at the water's edge.

The desultory effect of all this has been to transform Washington into what Mr. Patrick O'Donovan, a keen British observer, has called a "one-man, one-policy town," where any discussion on the only topic that really matters can be stopped dead with the question, "Well, what else would you do?"

In "Vietnam and the United States," Professor Morgenthau defines what else we might have done to have avoided the present tragedy in southeast Asia. Anyone looking for that elusive escape hatch through which we might now catapult ourselves free from the consequences of our past mistakes, will not find it in this book—or any other. But those who search for the fundamental fallacy in our Asian policy will find this book illuminating and instructive.

As Morgenthau sees it, we have been the bull in the Asia ring, while China has played the matador. Charging furiously into the red cape dangled before us, we pursue a mistaken target. We confuse the suppression of communism in South Vietnam with the containment of China. "The United States can no more contain Chinese influence in Asia by arming South Vietnam and Thailand," Morgenthau writes, "than China could contain American influence in the Western Hemisphere by arming, say, Nicaragua and Costa Rica."

We would do well, in this regard, to reflect upon the direction of Russian diplomacy in Asia. The Soviet Union, with even greater reason to fear Chinese expansion, practices her "containment" in the king's row, by strengthening at Tashkent the peace between India and Pakistan. We play the game in the pawn's row, by mixing into a Vietnamese war in "the Balkans of Asia."

There, in the name of defending Asia against China, we fight against North Vietnam. We insist that Ho Chi Minh is our enemy, the very man who won independence for all of Indochina by driving out the French. Charging him with aggression, we bolster Saigon's collapsing resistance with a huge American fighting force, brought from the opposite side of the globe. Into a region

which has just freed itself from Western rule, we import new legions of white troops to fight the natives.

And still we are confounded by the failure of other countries to rally behind us. Even the white nations in closest proximity—Australia and New Zealand—send us only token help, while South Korea, dependent on us for sustenance, remains the only other Asian country to contribute a substantial number of fighting men.

As for our European allies, they have been so mystified by our deepening involvement in Vietnam that we are now explaining it to them in terms of the importance of keeping our word. "It is the integrity of the American commitment which is at stake," Dean Rusk has solemnly warned. Traveling to Europe to plead for better understanding among our NATO allies, the Secretary of State repeatedly compared Saigon to Berlin—an equation which had never occurred to the Germans. If the United States failed to keep its pledges in southeast Asia, the Secretary demanded, how could we be trusted to keep our pledges in Europe? Surely this will go down as one of the strangest diplomatic misions in our history.

So we find ourselves practically alone waging a war on the mainland of Asia. The illusion that we are thereby thwarting China, or even the belief that we are holding a line in Asia against communism, are notions not likely to survive a careful reading of "Vietnam and the United States."

But the reader will not be left devastated and forlorn; rather, he will be left rewarded with a better insight into the nature of our past mistakes in Asia, and with a set of logical guidelines toward a more realistic American policy in the future.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 21, 1966]

CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION

The most hopeful significance of the hearings conducted by Senator FULBRIGHT may well be that more Members of Congress are beginning to take a belated but proper interest in foreign policy. If so, it's high time. "Debate over the basic premises underlying our posture in Asia has all but disappeared," Senator CHURCH said recently. He might well have agreed with a British observer that Washington is a "one-man, one-policy town."

There has been foreign policy debate of a peripheral sort, especially in connection with the voting of money for arms and aid. And some administration decisions have been discussed after the event. But there has been little of the searching examination which illuminates fundamentals, informs the public, prevents mistakes and brings reason to the support of action. Instead, there has been an almost abject acceptance of administration initiatives, covered by the false argument that foreign policy is exclusively the President's concern. Criticism and dissent have been left to a few, mostly outside the Government. And those few often have been regarded with coolness and even suspicion.

Without this failure of interest—and courage—how could the United States have become increasingly involved in Vietnam despite confusion as to its interest and its purpose? And has there been much more clear-sightedness about involvements in other parts of the world?

Whether the concern was with Soviet Russia, or Formosa, or Guatemala, or the Middle East, or the Dominican Republic, the majority in Congress accepted the administration's explanation, the managed news and the secrecy imposed in the name of security. Why?

McCarthyism, of course, contributed to the shaping of this timidity by threatening honest questioners with ostracism. Yet McCar-

thyism was made possible by the timorousness which for a time it intensified. The "mysteries" of scientific weaponry also contributed to the abandonment of discussion. Often they had to be taken on faith—and the word of the administration. And the absence of information made it easier for special interest groups such as "the China lobby" to spread their propaganda.

Granted, it is not easy for Members of so large and cumbersome a body as Congress to be efficient in searching for the essential facts. Senators and Representatives, further, are concerned with many other matters, large and small—including political campaigns. It is easier—and more expedient—to support the administration. It helps to have the door of the White House open, rather than closed. In any case, isn't it probable that the President is right—at least most of the time?

Such an attitude, however, is no real favor to the President. At best, it deprives him of the constructive criticism which enables him to test his own conclusions and the advice of his associates. At worst, it may encourage a dangerous self-assurance and the manipulation rather than the enlightening of Congress and the Nation.

Coequal with the executive, Congress should be the agency for national participation in shaping policies. This does not preclude Presidential leadership, nor does it forbid a reasonable degree of Presidential discretion. It does recognize, however, that democratic government involves more than the support of decisions after they have been made. There has been too little of this participation on Capitol Hill. The Fulbright hearings may be the sign of a happy change, of a revulsion from government in a "one-man, one-policy town."

EXHIBIT 4

[From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1966]

EXPERTS ON CHINA URGED UNITED STATES TO SEEK A PEIPING ACCORD—DECLARE IT IS NECESSARY FOR WASHINGTON TO DROP ITS OPPOSITION TO U.N. SEAT

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, March 20.—A large group of scholars on Asian affairs declared today that "it is up to the United States to try to move the Chinese to a greater acceptance of the principles of coexistence in the emerging world community."

This would be "a long and difficult process," the scholars contended. To begin it, they urged Washington to drop its opposition to admitting Communist China to the United Nations and to open negotiations for the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Peiping.

They also recommended American efforts to begin negotiations on such matters as arms control. They called for an end to the total trade embargo now imposed on Communist China, and advocated cultural, educational, and social exchanges between the two countries.

PLAN FOR TAIWAN

The Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan, they suggested, should be supported but regarded only as the Government of Taiwan, not as a potential ruler of mainland China.

These changes in the "out of date" American policy toward China, the scholars said, "will not solve the major political and military challenges to the United States in Asia, but they can improve the ability of the United States to deal with these problems and reduce the likelihood that a crisis could turn into a major military confrontation."

In an interview today on the Columbia Broadcasting System television program "Face the Nation," Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that repeated U.S. efforts to attempt to narrow the differences with China

March 21, 1966

were met by invariable intransigence. On the question of admitting Peiping to the United Nations, the main obstacle is the insistence by the Communists that this must involve the ouster of the representatives of Nationalist China, he said.

The document was signed by 198 academic experts on China, including such leading figures in the field as John K. Fairbank of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard and Alexander Eckstein of the University of Michigan. Both recently testified in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearings on China.

All the signers, ranging from private citizens and high school teachers to university professors, were members of the Association for Asian Studies, among whose membership of about 2,700 the document was circulated.

The principal authors of the paper and the prime movers in its publication were Harold Taylor, the former president of Sarah Lawrence College, and Mrs. Betty Goetz Lall of Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations.

Mrs. Lall, who formerly was a State Department arms control expert and the staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Disarmament, said about 300 scholars had responded to a request for endorsement of the statement on China.

Of these, 198 signed it, 60 approved generally, but not in every particular, 18 approved it but did not sign, 19 opposed all or part of the recommended policy changes, and 5 gave no opinion.

Mrs. Lall said the document had been written by a small group of China scholars, who consulted with such experts as Morton H. Halperin of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, John H. Lewis, an associate professor of government at Cornell, both signers, and A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University's East Asian Institute.

Professor Barnett said today he was "extremely sympathetic" to the document's recommendations. He did not sign it because when it reached him, he was "in the process of formulating a statement of my own precise views."

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 8, he urged the seating of Communist China in the United Nations and an American policy toward China of "containment but not isolation."

The recommendations will be submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mrs. Lall said the Council for a Livable World, a Washington-based political action organization, had agreed to undertake further circulation of the document and to seek official and public consideration of the views expressed in it.

Five "factors on which United States policy on China should now be based" were put forward by the China scholars. They were as follows:

Communist China is a "reality of international politics" of growing importance and therefore "there is increasing danger in the isolation of the United States from China and of China's relative isolation from other nations and international institutions."

Hostility to the United States has become "a cornerstone" of Chinese foreign policy.

Despite this hostility, which will not soon be changed, Washington can still hope to convince Peiping that "while prepared to respond when challenged, the United States is at the same time interested in exploring areas of mutual interest and normalizing relations wherever possible."

The future of the National Chinese can only be as a Government for Taiwan, not of mainland China.

The major problem for the United States in Asia is to help Asian countries to develop economic and social stability; this problem

arises "from factors independent of communism" although the existence of "an expansionist Communist force in Asia" intensifies it.

HOSTILE OPINIONS CITED

In a long "position paper" accompanying the statement, it was suggested that a hostile opinion in the United States was one factor "inhibiting" Washington's view of China.

"Therefore," the position paper said, "it is important through discussion and sober exchanges of views to persuade the Government that there is widespread support for a change in its policy toward China and that the United States by changing its policy within parameters dictated by its own best interests can contribute ultimately to an improvement in relations between the two countries."

On the question of Chinese admission to the United Nations, which is of immediate concern in Washington, the scholars suggested not merely acquiescence in other countries' insistence but that the United States should "cease to use its influence" to keep Peiping out.

The position paper said this would improve Washington's relations with other United Nations members since "the United States pays a heavy price in good relations with some countries by its pressure on them to vote against China."

The position paper also suggested that the problem of Peiping's opposition to having "two Chinas" in the United Nations might be solved through an agreement that the future of the Taiwan regime would be negotiated by Peiping and Taipei and guaranteed by an international arrangement.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1966]

TEXT OF STATEMENT AND EXCERPTS FROM POSITION PAPER BY EXPERTS ON CHINA POLICY

WASHINGTON, March 20.—Following is the text of a statement on China policy supported by 198 Asian scholars and excerpts from the position paper on which it was based:

STATEMENT

We, the undersigned, submit the following statement for the consideration of the executive branch, the Congress, and members of the public.

That the formal China policy of the United States has long since been out of date is widely recognized and tacitly accepted even by officials of the American Government. Changes in this policy will not solve the major political and military challenges to the United States in Asia, but they can improve the ability of the United States to deal with these problems and reduce the likelihood that a crisis could turn into a major military confrontation.

We believe that the following represent accurately factors on which U.S. policy on China should now be based.

1. The People's Republic of China with its capital at Peiping is a reality of international politics, whose importance to the course of international affairs will grow. There is increasing danger in the isolation of the United States from China and of China's relative isolation from other nations and international institutions.

2. The People's Republic of China is now committed to a policy of hostility to the United States and has made opposition to U.S. policies a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

3. In the immediate future the United States is unlikely to persuade Peiping that it is not its most implacable enemy. But the United States can hope to convince Peiping that, while prepared to respond when challenged, the United States is at the same time interested in exploring areas of mutual interest and normalizing relations wherever possible.

4. The Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan will be a member of the international community for the indefinite future, but only as the Government of Taiwan, and not as a potential government for mainland China.

5. The major problems for the United States in Asia have to do with establishing stable and mutually satisfactory relations between the United States and Asian national governments, while helping to develop social and economic viability within Asian countries through technical and economic aid programs. Although the problems are intensified by the existence of an expansionist Communist force in Asia, they arise from factors independent of communism itself and must be dealt with in the context of the total situation.

ADOPTION IS URGED

In the light of these principal factors and others, we urge that the U.S. Government adopt the following policies:

1. The United States should cease to use its influence to prevent the admittance of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. In the interests of international peace and the national interests of the United States, the government at Peiping should be accepted into these institutions, without conditions posed by us or by Peiping.

2. The U.S. Government should announce that it is prepared, while maintaining relation with Taiwan, to enter into negotiations regarding the establishment of full and formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

3. The United States should propose to the People's Republic of China an opening of a new phase of bilateral negotiations at which the following items would be discussed:

(a) Exchange of diplomatic representation;

(b) Renunciation of force as an instrument of policy;

(c) Arms control including problems of the control over nuclear weapons.

4. The United States should announce that it is prepared to accept accredited newspapermen, scholars, and others from the People's Republic of China and call upon the People's Republic to reciprocate. American willingness to accept Chinese visitors should not, at least in the short run, depend on reciprocation.

5. The United States should end its total embargo with Communist China and permit the importation and exportation of non-strategic materials.

We believe that the measures suggested here would only initiate what must be a long and difficult process leading, we hope, to the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China and a reduction of hostilities between the two countries. We believe, despite the antagonism shown by the Chinese Government, that it is up to the United States to try to move the Chinese to a greater acceptance of the principles of coexistence in the emerging world community.

THE ASIAN SCHOLARS

Arizona

University of Arizona, Tucson: Earl H. Pritchard, chairman, Committee on Oriental Studies; Arizona State University, Tempe; Guilford A. Dudley, associated professor of history.

California

California State College at Los Angeles: D. F. Gleaming, professor of international relations; Sam Stanley, associate professor of anthropology; California State Polytechnic College, San Luis Obispo: Francis V. Catalina; Claremont Graduate School and University Center, Claremont; Cyrus H. Peake, professor of East Asian history; Los Angeles Valley College, Los Angeles; Maria Naidis, associate professor of history; Mills Col-

March 21, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

Nebraska

Robert H. Stoddard, Lincoln.

New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire, Durham: Allen Linden, department of history; W. Findley Guffey 3d, Exeter.

New Jersey

Drew University, Madison: Changboh Chee; Charles W. Estus, instructor in sociology; Robert Friedrichs, professor of sociology; Newark State College, Union: Howard Disbury, professor of history. Princeton University: William W. Lockwood, professor of politics and international affairs, Rutgers University, New Brunswick: Katharine S. Diehl, assistant professor of library science; Charlotte Furth, Princeton; Jesse G. Lutz, East Brunswick; Lawrence H. Mandel, Parsippany.

New York

Brooklyn College: Brijen K. Gupta, department of history; Charlton M. Lewis, department of history; Colgate University, Hamilton: Theodore Herman, chairman, department of geography; Kenneth W. Morgan, professor of religion.

Columbia University: Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Allen, department of anthropology; William R. Bryant, graduate student; L. Carrington Goodrich, professor emeritus of Chinese; Frank Kehl, graduate student, East Asian Institute; Joan P. Mencher, research associate, department of anthropology; Wayne Wilcox, department of government; Cornell University, Ithaca: Knight Biggerstaff, professor of history; Alice Cook, professor of industrial and labor relations; Claire Holt, research associate, Asian studies; Lauriston Sharp, professor of anthropology; John W. Lewis, associate professor of government; Dutchess Community College, Poughkeepsie; Carolyn C. Landau, associate professor of political science; Hamilton College, Clinton: Edwin B. Lee, associate professor of history; Long Island University.

Brooklyn: Khalil A. Nasir, associate professor of history and political science; New York University: James T. Crown, associate professor of political science; State University College, Oswego: Johnson G. Cooper, professor of non-Western history; State University College, Potsdam: Luther H. Gulick, Jr., chairman, department of geography; State University College, Geneseo: Donald Innis, chairman, department of geography; State University of New York, Albany: Dewitt C. Ellinwood, associate professor of history; State University of New York, Stony Brook: Charles Hoffman, professor of economics; Union College, Schenectady: Malcolm Willison, assistant professor of sociology; Union Theological Seminary: Herbert C. Jackson, professor; Edward P. Gottlieb, national chairman, War Resisters League; Thomas L. Havill, Syracuse; Chang Hsin-hai, Great Neck; Eileen Koppelman, Bronx; Prafulla Mukerji, Brooklyn; Richard and Elsie Orb, Keuka Park; Romesh Shah.

North Carolina

Meredith College, Raleigh: Lillian Parker Wallace; University of North Carolina, Raleigh; W. L. Highfill, department of philosophy and religion; Wake Forest College, Winston-Salem: Robert G. Gregory, associate professor of history.

Ohio

Denison University, Granville: Louis F. Brakeman, chairman, department of government; Maylong H. Hepp, professor of philosophy; James L. Martin, coordinator of non-Western studies; Miami University, Oxford: John H. Badgley, department of government; Ohio State University, Dayton; Byron S. Weng, instructor in government; Ohio University, Athens: John F. Cody, professor of history; Western College for Women, Oxford: T. A. Bisson, chairman, department of intercultural studies; Robert Brank Fulton, associate professor of intercultural studies.

lege, Oakland; Edward Le Fevour; Pomona College, Claremont; Charles Leslie, San Bernardino Valley College, San Bernardino; William J. Moore, chairman of the political science department, Stanford University, Stanford; Harumi Befu, department of anthropology, Mark Mancall, assistant professor of Asian studies; Harold H. Fisher, professor of history and chairman emeritus, Hoover Institute and Library; G. William Skinner, professor of anthropology; J. T. Wixted, Department of Asian languages.

University of California, Berkeley: Gerald D. Berreman, associate professor of anthropology; James Cahill, department of art; Chauncey D. Leake, University of California, San Francisco Medical Center; Joseph R. Levenson, professor of history; J. M. Potter, assistant professor of anthropology; University of California, Santa Cruz: Bruce D. Larkin, assistant professor of international relations; University of California, Los Angeles: Michael Moerman, assistant professor of anthropology; Nikki Keddie, assistant professor of history; University of Southern California, Los Angeles: George O. Totten, associate professor of political science; A. Elgin Heinz, high school teacher, San Francisco; J. P. Richards, Berkeley; Mrs. Beryl F. Zimberoff, Los Angeles; William P. Norberg, Ackerman, Johnston, Johnston & Matthews, San Francisco.

Connecticut

Yale University, New Haven: Harry J. Renda, Department of History; Kenneth Scott Latourette, professor of missions and Oriental history, emeritus; Arthur F. Wright, Charles Seymour, professor of history; Mary C. Wright, professor of history; John de Francis, Madison.

Washington, D.C.

American University, School of International Service: Millidge P. Walker, associate professor of Southeast Asian studies; Howard University: Irene Tinker, assistant professor of department of government; Barbara Riegan Alperovitz, Arms Control Division, the Bendix Corp.; John Melby; Andrew E. Rice.

Florida

Mortimer Graves, Key West.

Hawaii

Institute for Student Interchange, East-West Center, Honolulu: Robert Aitken, evaluation of alumni liaison officer; University of Hawaii, Honolulu: Willard D. Keim, department of political science; Oliver M. Lee, assistant professor of political science; Elizabeth Wittermans, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West; John Singleton, associate director, Information Development Fellowship and Seminars, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West; George H. Gadbois, Jr., associate director, Exchange of Persons Programs, Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West.

Illinois

Bradley University, Peoria: George E. Stoner, Jr., instructor in geography; Knox College, Galesburg: M. Hane; Northern Illinois University, De Kalb: James R. Shirley, department of history; Northwestern University, Evanston: James E. Sheridan, department of history; Southern Illinois University, Carbondale: H. B. Jacobini, professor of government; University of Chicago: Clifford Geertz, department of anthropology; Benson Earl Ginsburg, associate dean of the college; McKim Marriott, professor of anthropology; Manning Nash, professor of anthropology; Melford E. Spiro, department of anthropology; Frederick M. Asher, Chicago; Douglas Wayne Johnson, Rockford; Norman J. Palmer, De Kalb.

Indiana

Earlham College, Richmond: Jackson Bailey, associate professor of history; Indiana School of Religion, Bloomington: Harold

E. HHI, associate professor of Old Testament language and literature; Indiana University, Bloomington: Leon M. Zolbrod, assistant professor of East Asian languages and literatures; Saint Mary-of-the-Woods College, Bloomington: Sister Mary Gregory, S.P., director of Asian studies.

Iowa

Drake University, Des Moines: C. Walter Clark, Jr., political science department; Barbara Teters, Ames.

Kentucky

University of Kentucky, Lexington; Walter Langlois, associate professor of modern foreign languages.

Louisiana

Tulane University, New Orleans: Henry Orenstein, associate professor of anthropology.

Massachusetts

Boston University, Boston: Amiya Chakravarty, professor of comparative Oriental religions and literature; Harvard University, Cambridge: Robert N. Bellah, associate professor of sociology and regional studies; Jerome A. Cohen, professor of law; Albert Craig, department of history; Rupert Emerson, professor of government; John Fairbank, director, East Asian Research Center; Morton H. Halperin, Center for International Affairs; Donald W. Klein, East Asian Research Center; Ezra F. Vogel, East Asian Research Center; Edward Wagner, associate professor of Korean studies; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge: William N. Locke, director of libraries; Tufts University, Medford: Freeland Abbot, chairman, department of history; Allan B. Cole, professor of East Asian Affairs, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Wellesley College, Wellesley: Paul A. Cohen, department of history.

Michigan

Alma College, Alma: Edwin C. Blackburn, associate professor of history; Oakland University, Rochester: Sheldon Appelton, associate professor of political science; David C. Potter, associate professor of political science; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: J. H. Broomfield, associate professor of history; Jason L. Finkle, consultant, Ford Foundation, associate professor population planning; Alexander Eckstein, professor of economics; Victor Kobayashi, associate professor of education; Stephen S. Large, student of China and Japan; Rhoads Murphey, department of geography; Wayne State University, Detroit: Shanti S. Tangri, associate professor of economics; Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo: Chester L. Hunt; Charles O. Houston, associate professor, Institute of International and Area Studies; Alton L. Becker, Ann Arbor; Mr. and Mrs. Seymour Kavesky, Madison Heights; Ronald N. Montaperto, Ann Arbor; C. P. Paul Siu, Harper Woods.

Minnesota

Carleton College, Northfield: Tetsuo Najita, associate professor of history; Bardwell L. Smith, associate professor of religion; Robert E. Will, department of economics; University of Minnesota, Indianapolis: Joseph E. Schwartz, department of geography; Romeyn Taylor, department of history.

Missouri

University of Missouri, Columbia: James W. Hamilton, department of sociology and anthropology; University of Missouri at St. Louis: Lyman Tower Sargent, assistant professor of political science; Washington University, St. Louis: N. J. Demerath, professor of sociology; social sciences consultant, Ford Foundation, New Delhi; Donald A. Gibbs, assistant professor of Chinese; Webster College, St. Louis; Sister M. Bernard Barbato, S. L., department of history.

Montana

Montana State University, Bozeman: Richard B. Landis, assistant professor of Asian history.

March 21, 1966

Oregon

Lewis and Clark College, Portland: Hideo Hashimoto, professor of religion; University of Oregon, Eugene: Kathleen G. Aberle, research association in anthropology.

Pennsylvania

Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh: M. Bronfenbrenner, Graduate School of International Affairs; Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster; Thomas Hopkins, associate professor of religion; Gettysburg College: John Roger Stemen, department of history; Haverford College: Holland Hunter, chairman of department of economics; Ohio Methodist Theological School: Ernest E. Best, associate professor of theology; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia: Derk Bodde, professor of Chinese; F. Hilary Conroy, professor of history; Leigh Lisler, professor of linguistics; Jonathan Mirsky, oriental studies; Donald E. Smith, associate professor of political science; Wilson College, Chambersburg: Roswell G. Townsend, professor of economics; Helen Lee Jones, Frederick Gaige, Philadelphia; A. Gutkind Bulling, Philadelphia.

Tennessee

Memphis State University: Ram Mohan Roy, department of political science.

Utah

Brigham Young University, Provo: Paul Hyer, coordinator of Asian studies; University of Utah, Salt Lake City: Helmut G. Callis, chairman of Asian studies, professor of history and political science.

Vermont

University of Vermont, Burlington: Horrace Briggs 2d, instructor, department of political science.

Virginia

Sweet Briar College: Richard C. Rowland, department of English; University of Virginia, Charlottesville: Richard J. Coughlin, professor of sociology; Maurice Melsner, associate professor of East Asian history.

Washington

Eastern Washington State College, Cheney: Charles H. Hedtky, division of history and social science; Gonzaga University, Spokane: Jack D. Salmon, assistant professor of political science; University of Washington, Seattle: Paul R. Brass, assistant professor of political science; Charles F. Keyes, assistant professor of anthropology; Marwyn S. Samuels, modern Chinese studies.

Wisconsin

University of Wisconsin, Madison: Eugene Boardman, professor of History; Ripley Moor, assistant professor of Indian studies.

Canada

University of Toronto: Donald E. Willmott, associate professor of sociology.

Ceylon

University of Ceylon: Gananath Obeyesekere, lecturer in sociology.

France

T. D. Long, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, directorate for scientific affairs, Paris.

India

Margaret L. Cormack, director of U.S. Educational Foundation in India.

Japan

Tokyo University: Toshio Ueda, professor emeritus.

Taiwan

Mark Selden, Taipei.

POSITION PAPER
Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to set forth reasons supporting certain recommended changes in United States policy toward China. It is hoped that the paper will con-

tribute to a growing consensus within the United States that our China policy should be modified, that our Government should indicate willingness to undertake changes, and that these proposed changes should be debated and discussed increasingly by citizens throughout the country.

There are occasions when policymakers in government are reluctant to embark on a given policy change because they think such a change would not be supported by the public. With respect to U.S. policy toward China it appears that this factor is one of those inhibiting United States governmental action. Therefore, it is important, through discussion and sober exchange of views, to persuade the Government that there is widespread support for a change in its policy toward China and that the United States, by changing its policy within parameters dictated by its own best interests, can contribute ultimately to an improvement in relations between the two countries.

General considerations

The United States has always been opposed to Communist expansionist and aggressive policies. In the past the Government has also refused to deal with Communist governments. We have believed communism to be an antidemocratic force, inimical to the growth of freedom and self-government, and bent on the destruction of those governments whose economic systems were based on a measure of free enterprise and capitalism. At times we assumed that Communist governments wanted to destroy any society or government that was not Communist.

Because of the above considerations the United States waited for 14 years before it established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933, and then the fact of recognition in no way implied approval of its Government policies, but rather acceptance of the Soviet Union as a government in control of a large population and important territory.

After World War II, while the United States never severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, our Government, nevertheless, felt that the Soviet Union had to be contained in what we believed were aggressive and expansionist policies. Today the Soviet Union has given indications of changes in its foreign policies and many of its internal characteristics, so much so that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached mutually satisfactory relationships on a variety of subjects.

U.S. relations with China, in contrast to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and Communist States in eastern Europe, have grown from bad to worse. Whereas shortly after the Communists came to power in China in 1949, the United States stated that it did not intend to take further sides in the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists and appeared to be actively considering recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, today there is increasing hostility between the two countries.

Beginning with the Korean war in 1950 it is not difficult for a U.S. citizen to construct excellent arguments as to why the deterioration of relations with China has been the fault primarily of China, but conversely it does not take a lot of imagination to construct a Chinese viewpoint to the effect that the cause of bad relations has been mainly the responsibility of the United States.

RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 1

The United States should cease to use its influence to prevent the admittance of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and other international bodies. In the interests of international peace and the national security of the United States, the Government at Peiping should be accepted into these institutions, without conditions posed by us or by Peiping.

1

The United Nations ought to be a universal organization. Its main purpose is to maintain international peace and security and its effectiveness to do this will be limited, if not drastically curtailed, as long as important nations are not members. China, the largest country in the world population-wise and one of the great powers in Asia, should be permitted to become a United Nations member and encouraged to assume all the obligations and responsibilities that membership entails.

Some argue that China does not qualify for membership because Article 4 of the United Nations Charter states that:

"Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations."

Leaving aside the legal argument, the question remains as to whether China is able and willing to abide by the obligations of the United Nations Charter as stated in Article 2. These obligations include willingness to settle disputes by peaceful means, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to give every assistance to the United Nations in any action it takes in accordance with the present charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

2

Peace and security in Asia will be more difficult to secure and maintain with China outside rather than inside the United Nations; thus, the security interests of the United States are better served if China becomes a United Nations member.

If the restoration of peace and security in Asia is made difficult or impossible in some cases because China is denied admission to the United Nations to present its case, to negotiate there to end the dispute, or to hear the complaints of others, then the security of the United States, with its widespread commitments in Asia, is also threatened.

Whether the Chinese, once admitted to the United Nations, would do all in their power to wreck it would seem to depend on how such behavior hurt or helped its foreign policy interests. If the Chinese want to win friends among the nonaligned countries of the world they would not act to alienate these countries by improper behavior in the United Nations. If the Chinese want to trade and have normal relations with countries in western Europe and elsewhere they may not want to antagonize them by attempting to obstruct progress in various areas of international cooperation.

3

U.S. interests in the United Nations would be better served if the United States removes its objections to membership for China than if China is admitted over the negative vote of the United States.

4

The United States would have a better chance of securing a balanced settlement over the future of Taiwan if it accepted China in the United Nations.

Many countries, especially several in Latin America and Africa, refused to vote a set for China because the wording of the proposed U.N. resolution simultaneously would have evicted the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan. Had that resolution been worded differently there are some observers who feel that a majority vote in favor of Chinese admission would have occurred.

RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 2

The U.S. Government should announce that it is prepared, without prejudice to

March 21, 1966

the maintenance of its relations with Taiwan, to enter into negotiations regarding the establishment of full and formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. By indicating that it is prepared to recognize and have diplomatic relations with the present Government of China, the United States would be taking a first step toward normalizing its relations with China. China may reject the United States offer, but this is not an argument why it should not be made.

1

The main reason why the United States should try to have formal relations with China, through recognition of its government, is that world peace will be jeopardized more by the continued hostility and lack of contact between these two countries than by increased contact. While the recognition in no way assures a steady improvement of peaceful relations, it would signify that the two countries were attempting to reduce tensions between them.

2

Recognition of China by the United States, if reciprocated by China, would mean that contacts at various levels might be made. While some U.S. citizens could be permitted to travel to China and Chinese citizens permitted to travel to the United States, this would be very limited if there were no diplomatic relations between the two governments. Contacts at various levels—scholars, Government officials, journalists, scientists, artists, businessmen, and so forth—would permit renewal of exchange of information about life, conditions, and thought in the two countries.

3

Recognition offers a means of conducting business and settling disputes. It provides a channel by which the countries can reach formal agreements about such matters as trade, exchange of persons, and political problems. Some might argue that the United States and China have reached agreements and resolved differences before without resort to recognition; the case most often cited is the negotiation to end the Korean war. Furthermore, some officials argue that the current occasional meetings between a U.S. and Chinese representatives at Warsaw provide a channel through which disputes can be settled.

RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 3

The United States should propose to the People's Republic of China an opening of a new phase of bilateral negotiations at which the following items would be discussed:

- (a) Exchange of diplomatic representation;
- (b) Renunciation of force as an instrument of policy;
- (c) Arms control including problems of the control over nuclear weapons.

Discussions on the exchange of diplomatic representatives might include such matters as how each Government was prepared to treat citizens of the other traveling within its boundaries. Some issues left over from 1949, such as economic arrangements, might be usefully treated. Similar talks with generally beneficial results took place between officials of the United States and Soviet Governments prior to U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933.

A discussion of the renunciation of force as an instrument of policy is of concern to the United States in view of the implications of the Chinese policy to take Taiwan by force and to support so-called wars of liberation in the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To the United States, the Chinese position suggests that the Chinese will be fomenting revolution, subversion, and violence in as many parts of the world as it can. The Chinese, for their part,

try to justify such wars on the ground that the people in these countries are being oppressed, usually with the help of the imperialist United States.

In the United States view the Chinese Government's sanction of force labels it as an enemy of peace and it is the principal reason today for the large U.S. military presence and involvement in Asia. Before the United States could consider any significant withdrawals of its military power from Asia, it would want an understanding that Chinese policy would not encompass military aid to Communist subversion groups in other areas.

It is unlikely, however, that there is much the United States can do at this juncture to persuade China to drop its policy of supporting, in principle at least, wars of liberation. But what would be desirable is an agreement to the effect that China would not supply arms to revolutionary groups and the United States would not use military force to thwart every attempt to install a Communist government into office.

Bilateral discussions over arms control issues including the control over nuclear weapons should not be regarded in any way as a substitute for international discussions. Such bilateral discussions are thought to be advisable because they could provide an opportunity for the United States and China to exchange their views on the subject without having them subjected immediately to public reaction.

As stated earlier, the main benefit to be expected from exchanges of persons in different fields is that the degree of ignorance about the society in the two countries would be reduced. Increased contact does not always result in improved relations or understanding, but it usually succeeds in reducing misconceptions.

RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 4

The United States should announce that it is prepared to accept accredited newspapermen, scholars, and other from the People's Republic of China and call upon the People's Republic to reciprocate. American willingness to accept Chinese visitors should not, at least in the short run, depend on reciprocation.

It has been stated earlier that the full implementation of this recommended change in U.S. policy for all practical purposes depends upon the success in negotiations over recognition and an exchange of Ambassadors. Some exchanges, nevertheless, could occur while such negotiations were being undertaken or even before they were convened. The United States refused to undertake an exchange of newsmen at a time when the Chinese were receptive to such a step in the mid-1950's. When the United States decided a few years later that this might be a good step, the Chinese retracted their offer.

As a result, no Chinese from China come to the United States and practically no Americans visit China. There is evidence that limited exchanges could now take place prior to diplomatic recognition if this could be done quietly and without extensive publicity.

RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 5

The United States should end its total trade embargo with Communist China and permit the importation and exportation of nonstrategic materials.

In the past few years 10 West European countries have sent trade missions to China (Austria, Belgium, Denmark; Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.) Japan and Canada have also sent missions. The results have not been substantial and it is not likely that a great deal of trade can be developed immediately between the United States and China; a start, however, could be made. This would be another channel for opening up contacts.

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with regard to the pending business, we discussed this matter at some length in the authorization stages only a few days ago. I supported the authorization because of the necessities of supporting the Army in the field in Vietnam.

The point that was of concern at that time was a question of our policy in Vietnam and also in China, about which we are now holding hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee.

These hearings, in my opinion, have opened the subject up for healthy debate. There are some differences of view among the committee members as well as among the witnesses.

I am hopeful that as a result of these deliberations by the committee members, the public, the Senate, and by the administration, a more effective policy, taking account of the very obvious changes that have taken place in Asia, as well as in other parts of the world, will be developed.

In Europe, for example, the attitude on the part of our closest allies under NATO has certainly undergone some change recently as announced by the consortium which negotiated to supply a steel plant to mainland China.

In a way, this entire procedure reminds me very much of the policy we followed after World War I in regard to Soviet Russia.

I think it is high time we reevaluated our policies, considered them objectively, and, if changes are warranted, that they be made.

I believe some changes are warranted; although there are differences of opinion in the committee, and I am sure in the administration, such is quite natural, healthy, and proper in our system of government. I am hopeful that we will move toward modernizing our policy as a result of this reevaluation.

I think all of us would agree that, regardless of our views, we should work for restoration of the peace.

The difference is how we achieve that common objective. It is said that there are people who advocate preventive war. No one appeared and testified before our committee to that effect. These rumors about extreme views are always current. There may be something to them, but I do not believe responsible, influential members of either the executive or the legislative branches would support such an extreme position. They may get impatient with our present policies. But that is natural.

By voting in favor of this appropriation, I consider it a vote to support our Armed Forces in the field. I do not consider it an endorsement of our past or current policy in South Vietnam. I thoroughly disapprove of the course of

March 21, 1966

events which has led us into the situation in South Vietnam. It is very difficult to say how we should extricate ourselves. I believe we made a great and serious mistake in becoming involved in a colonial war on the side of a colonial power in 1950. I do not want to review all this; it has been covered before. But I do believe we made a mistake in renewing that involvement in 1954.

I remind Senators that the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the ranking Democrat said at that time that they considered it involvement in a minor way. But now, having become greatly involved, we have become involved in a way I do not agree with. But the difference is not a matter of principle; it is largely a matter of degree. In any case, I want to make it plain that I am not objecting to our present situation so long as it does not become an expanded one.

I should like to see some efforts made to find ways to end the war. If the war is expanded in a major way, engaging hundreds of thousands of troops, there is always a danger, whether we like it or not or plan it or not and whether the President wishes it or not, that due to miscalculations, accidents, or to other unforeseen incidents, the war may become a major war, which would probably be a nuclear war.

We can never forget what happened in 1914. I do not really believe that any of the major countries wished to have the kind of world war that followed. But the plans got beyond their control, and they came very close to disaster. Certainly that war maimed the most advanced civilization of the Western Europe of that day, and the countries of Europe have never recovered. Yet it was really an accident, or in part an accidental war. What happened was ridiculous. There were no really serious grievances. The differences that were said to have caused that war were all trifling; particularly the issue concerning the assassination of the heir to the throne of the practically extinct Austro-Hungarian Empire by an irresponsible private citizen.

Nevertheless, I shall support this appropriation to pursue the war, much as I regret having to do so. The war is terribly expensive. It will certainly infringe upon our domestic programs, about which we were so enthusiastic only a year ago. As I recall, I supported all of the administration's programs in the domestic field.

Within a year, however, we are feeling the pressure. Talk of inflation is beginning. Undoubtedly, some measures will be taken to restrain its occurrence and, indeed, those measures may threaten a recession. Whether the domino effect exists in foreign policy, it certainly exists in domestic policy, when applied to our economy. I deeply regret it.

My only interest in holding hearings and having a discussion is to try to make an improvement so that we may better understand our policies. It is my hope that they may bring this very tragic war to some kind of conclusion through negotiations and, at the very least, to limit its extent and thus the amount of dam-

age it will do and is doing not only in South Vietnam but to our economy at home.

Finally, I have been anticipating for several years, because of the cold war, a time when we could concentrate on our domestic affairs. I made two or three speeches last year and the year before in which I said that the time had come for us to become more preoccupied and to give more attention to our domestic affairs. We have allowed our cities, our schools, our streams, and our air to deteriorate through neglect—both of attention and of money. It is a great tragedy that just as we thought we were making this breakthrough in the quality of our living at home, the war in southeast Asia arose to interfere. If the war is not stopped, I predict that we shall further deteriorate domestically; and our example to the world as a great and successful democratic nation will be drawn into question, which after all, is the strongest appeal we can have to other peoples, to other lands. In conclusion, our concept of society and the validity of our approach to the solutions of the many problems of society rest on the resolution of the conflict in southeast Asia.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator knows that I am generally in accord with the views he has just quite eloquently expressed. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is in the Chamber, and he, too, is one who thinks we cannot unilaterally pull out of Vietnam. I am sure that all three of us are most anxious to see this war brought to an end under terms which will be, as it is said, honorable to the United States.

I sometimes wonder if we do not identify "honorable" with "saving face." Perhaps we do; perhaps we do not.

Also, the Senator from Oregon is of the view that we had best get out of this war, a war which I think all three of us agree we should never have gotten into, through the good graces of the United Nations. I have been somewhat skeptical as to whether that agency as presently situated is in any position to be of much use in bringing the war to an end.

My question to the Senator is: How would he propose that we bring the war to an end and reach some sort of a solution which we could persuade the people of the United States was in their interest, and save face in South Vietnam?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Pennsylvania does me great honor even to insinuate that I have a solution of this problem at the tip of my tongue. There is no simple solution. The problems are complex and involved. But what strikes one who evaluates our policy is not any specific program. That went particularly bad but rather a general attitude that one assumes to be present. It developed in our hearings. It seems to me that implicit in this attitude is the necessity of requiring a complete surrender of the opponents. That attitude says, "We do not want any compromise. You must surrender, quit doing what you are doing, and come to the

conference table ready to surrender and apologize. Then we shall work out the details of ending hostilities."

The Senator said "saving face" or "saving honor." In dealings between nations, face is always being saved. There is constantly an interaction of friction between great nations; they are always saving face. That is a part of diplomacy.

That is what diplomacy is for. It is to allow people to compromise their differences in an honorable way. There is nothing wrong with saving face, which is actually compromise or accommodation, if you like. In certain circles, these words all take on a kind of ominous meaning. To me, they do not. The point is to get a settlement in which the faces of both sides are saved. It is an endeavor to see if a ceasefire can be brought about, and then to see if negotiations can be had with an open mind, with the idea of allowing the area to determine its own future, in the kind of society it desires to have.

We say we believe in self-determination. That is supposed to be one of the principles of our foreign policy. If it is—and I believe it ought to be—we should seek some adjustment by which this action could be brought about. I suggest, though I do not pretend it is the only answer, that we should give consideration to a form of neutralization of Vietnam, and then to look forward to the neutralization of Thailand and the perimeter of what was formerly Indochina. This possibility should be examined and analyzed. There may be difficulties. But there are grave difficulties in any suggestion that I have come across.

Once people start to fight, their tempers are flared; they develop an attitude that is uncompromising. So it is a war to the death; it is unconditional surrender, which is what we had in the last war. It created more problems than it solved. And I am merely trying to approach the matter in this way.

In doing so, I realize that it is difficult to cite an historical example of a powerful country like the United States not proceeding to complete victory. I am also quite certain that in nearly every case such action has created more problems than it has solved. It is not a satisfactory way, and much less so with nuclear weapons in the offing.

I do not know whether the words "face saving" are bad words. Perhaps we could think of a better term.

In a total victory, one side abjectly surrenders and the other side dictates the terms. Then the side that surrendered likes awake at night to find a way by which they may breach that agreement. And they will find a way. It has happened every time.

It will happen this time unless we choose to stay there to enforce neutrality. I do not know how long we would be able to maintain this kind of operation either physically, financially, or morally. I do not know whether the people would tolerate it.

I would not like to be driven out for any of those reasons. I would prefer to find a voluntary solution where we might

March 21, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

enter into an agreement with the other side. I believe such an agreement might have a chance of survival, at least for a generation or two. That is all that we can expect in this kind of world. I would not like to see any agreement break down in 4 or 5 years.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator will recall that we did not fight the Korean war to a total victory. Quite the contrary, we had total victory within our grasp at one point, but we did not seize it. The Chinese then came in with their "volunteers," and, in the end, we stabilized the lines of the contending parties about where they should have been in the first instance.

That would be more difficult to do in Vietnam for a variety of reasons that I shall not go into.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is a much more complicated situation.

Mr. CLARK. I should like to have the observation of the Senator on this matter. I do not believe that the Communist Chinese at this point will encourage Hanoi to talk and to settle the matter, for, after all, they are fighting to the last American and to the last North Vietnamese. They are not losing any of their own people. I think they are quite happy with the situation. Judging from the belligerent conduct of the Chinese leadership, I see very little prospect that they would be willing to discuss the kind of settlement in Vietnam which the Americans would consider.

Nobody knows the extent to which Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam are under Chinese domination. There can be two schools of thought on that. My own view is that at the moment it is not very likely that Hanoi would be willing to talk, because they are not yet convinced that they and their allies, the Vietcong, are not going to win and drive us out.

They have the view, I fear, that we may get tired, and I think some of us who have been opposing the present policy in Vietnam may lend some, but not much, credence to that view.

The one thing that disturbs me is that the Secretary of State and others in high authority—although the President has not been as clear on this as have the others—have said that we will not talk to the people who are shooting American boys.

I think the soundest way of eventually arriving at a satisfactory solution would be to make every earnest effort to get the Vietcong leaders to negotiate. I have great difficulty in believing that we do not know who those leaders are. I have equal difficulty in believing that it is not possible to get Hanoi to sit down and see if this thing cannot be worked out. Actually, I hope that a negotiation between either ourselves and the Vietcong—or, if we can only get a government in South Vietnam which would be willing to talk with their own fellow countrymen—would offer the best hope for an immediate solution, and, in fact, at the moment practically the only hope to prevent this war from not only continuing for a good long while, but also accelerating.

What are the views of the Senator from Arkansas on that?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is quite correct that we should be examining all of these approaches. It is not quite accurate to say that the administration or even the Secretary of State would not talk to the Vietcong.

They have said that they would tolerate them at a conference at which Hanoi would be the principal party. They would be given a place at the table, however. These differences, on a purely rational basis, do not have great appeal.

I think the excuse for taking such a position is that it would undermine the stability of the South Vietnamese Government. The South Vietnamese Government has been quite a disappointment; not only to the present administration, but also to the former one. Surely we should be able to influence that government. We are supporting it very strongly, and they are threatened with some difficulty now arising out of this new change.

I agree with the Senator that the Vietcong leaders are well known. Mr. Fall in a private session with the committee gave us résumés and biographical sketches of the leading figures in the Vietcong. I do not think it true that these people are not known.

For instance, one of the leaders is a well known and formerly, highly regarded nationalist lawyer from Saigon. He fell into disfavor with the tyrannical rule of the late Diem. At one time he was a non-Communist. I am not sure that he is a formal member of the Communist Party. In any case these people are known and can be found if we wish to find them.

Mr. CLARK. They have diplomatic groups abroad.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct. There was some discussion in the committee this morning about Hanoi and China. There is a difference of opinion among the experts.

And I can only judge on the basis of the testimony from the experts who study this matter. Dr. Zagoria, of Columbia, stated only this morning that he felt there was more ill feeling toward Hanoi on the part of the Vietcong than is generally understood.

Dr. Zagoria mentioned particularly the fact that Hanoi had betrayed them after the 1954 agreement and that Hanoi had sold them out. He feels that they could be disposed to negotiate on their own. He is not positive of this. These are estimates based upon past connections and past differences.

Mr. CLARK. That is also the view of Bernard Fall, I believe, judging from a private conversation I had with him last week.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under certain circumstances. I do not believe that these men actually know. This is their best judgment about the situation.

We do know that priority of punishment has gone to the Vietcong. They are being killed and bombed and attacked by the full force of our power. Surely, they do not enjoy that. Next are the North Vietnamese. And, of course through all of this China, as the Senator said a moment ago, is having a free ride.

I do not know whether it is proper to say that they are happy. I do not know how even the Chinese could be happy about this situation. I do feel that they think it serves their long-term purposes, because we are obviously spending our material resources and our moral resources. We are beginning to be very abrasive with some of our best allies in complaining about their policies, such as their policy of trading with China. I believe they feel it suits their policy. I think that we are the only losers.

I judge that China is not inclined to seek any negotiations, or even to approve any negotiations. Judging from the testimony we have heard I do not believe that, on balance, this necessarily controls either the Vietcong or Hanoi. If it is made to appear to their interests, if we could ever make them believe that we mean what we say, and if we say the right thing, it might be different. I realize that is a lot of "ifs." That is why one cannot be dogmatic about it.

There is certainly a great problem of convincing them that we mean whatever reasonable proposal we make—not so much because of our past connections, but because of the way they have suffered since World War II in the betrayal that has been mentioned. In 1954 they also think they were betrayed; and I think they were in 1946. After actions which would lead a reasonable person to believe the French were going to peacefully give up their colonial power, the French reneged on their agreement, and resumed the war to establish their control.

That creates suspicion, and what is generally called a credibility gap that applies to us even though we are not responsible for having created it—certainly not wholly if at all. We have been a party, with the French, in helping them to reestablish their control. Anyway, that is ancient history, although I think it is significant in explaining the attitudes and the difficulties that we now face.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the floor.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the pending supplemental defense appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1966, which ends on June 30, includes a total of \$13,135,719,000. This is the amount requested by the President, and is also the amount provided by the House of Representatives.

It is broken down as defense appropriation bills are usually broken down, but generally speaking, the bill provides needed funds for continued support of operations in southeast Asia for the remainder of the current fiscal year.

There is also in the bill, in addition to the normal military categories, something in excess of \$400 million for economic assistance to foreign countries, the major part of which goes to South Vietnam, and results from an authorization measure approved by the Congress which came out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not too long ago.

With this supplemental appropriation, the combined total for the Department of Defense which Congress will have appropriated for fiscal 1966 amounts to

March 21, 1966

\$60,868,733,000, excluding military assistance to foreign countries.

That is a sizable amount of our gross national product to devote to the military. I regret that it needs to be so large; and yet I see no alternative except to vote for the bill. Nevertheless, I wish to be quite specific about my reservations in backing the military to this extent, and about a number of the policies of the State Department and the Department of Defense.

I am concerned about the war hawks in the press and one or two of them in Congress. Senators will recall that the phrase "war hawks" was originally applied to several young Congressmen, notably Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, when they practically forced the Congress and the country into the War of 1812—a war which I think most historians now view as having been quite unnecessary. It resulted in the burning of Washington and of the Capitol, and that is about all that it did effectuate, although there was some diminution in the arrogance of the British in attacking our merchant shipping after the war was over.

But I do not believe the war hawks then turned out to be very good prophets. I do not believe they are turning out to be very good prophets now. I hope very much, and in fact I believe that the President of the United States will not accept the advice of the war hawks of the press, supported as they are by some, but certainly not all of the military, and by a few but not many of Members of Congress.

Mr. President, I am prepared to support the President of the United States in his onerous task as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. I hope that he will continue to heed the advice of those who advocate caution, of those who are opposed to a unilateral escalating of the war on our part.

I hope that he will discard the advice of those few warhawks who have no fear of the possibility of becoming involved in a war with Communist China which might easily turn into a nuclear war and pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it.

But in order to indicate my reservations with respect to our present policy and my hope that the President will give careful consideration to these reservations, I should like to state my position as explicitly as I can.

First, I see no alternative but to vote for the bill. The lives of our men are in jeopardy in South Vietnam. As long as a peace there seems a good ways off, I could not with good conscience do anything except to give them, by my vote, the money which the Commander in Chief, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense think is needed to maintain them and to minimize their casualties.

Second, we should never have been in South Vietnam in the first place. It was a grave error, which brought over 200,000 of our Army into that small and unfortunate country. How we got there is well enough known, and I shall not dwell on it at any length. The French empire in Indochina was broken up by the

Japanese during World War II; but after V-J Day and total victory on the part of ourselves and our Allies, the French went back, only to be thrown out by an indigenous revolution headed by Ho Chi Minh, the father symbol of Vietnam, south as well as north.

That revolution was a cruel one, it resulted in many casualties and vast bad feeling and, in the end, while France was not actually driven out of the country by military means, her position after Dien-bienphu became untenable. She was wise enough to enter into negotiations which resulted in her withdrawal from North Vietnam and in turning South Vietnam over to a puppet, who turned out to be quite incapable of governing the country.

At that point, we intervened and in effect put our own man, Ngo Dinh Diem into the leadership of South Vietnam.

For a while, all seemed to go well; but in short order he turned out to be a ruthless totalitarian with no real interest in the democratization of his country or in carrying through the social and economic reforms which were essential to bring in a species of freedom and well-being, much less democracy, to South Vietnam.

In due course, he was assassinated by his own original supporters.

A series of ineffective governments succeeded each other, one general or one civilian head after another being unable to maintain themselves in power in Saigon and having no effective control over the countryside.

These governments also pretty well alienated the peasants in South Vietnam. It was not too long before, the commitment made to have free elections in South Vietnam having been violated by Diem, a civil war broke out, which has continued to this date.

The result has been the progressive deterioration of the economy and of the South Vietnamese society.

The unfortunate people of South Vietnam have really lived under wartime conditions since the Japanese first moved in in 1941.

The American commitment made originally to Diem, who was actually installed as the head of South Vietnam under the prodding of some very important Americans, not all of them in public life, was to give assistance to the Diem government in terms of advice, economic assistance, and some training of troops to enable the South Vietnamese people themselves to put down the civil war which had broken out—in large part, I suggest—as a result of the cruelty and the ineffectiveness of the Diem government.

Our assistance, both economic and technical, including technical military assistance, continued to grow. But as late as September of 1963 President John F. Kennedy stated—and I paraphrase what he said—that this was a war for the South Vietnamese to win or lose. It was not our war. We could help with money. We could help with technical advice, military assistance, training of their troops; but it was their war, not our war.

At that time we had no more than 10,000 Americans in uniform in South Viet-

nam. Unfortunately, the Saigon government was unable to put down the guerrilla war which, to a very substantial extent, was supported, and to some extent, unquestionably, was controlled, by Hanoi, where Ho Chi Minh was head of state.

By the time the end of 1964 rolled around, it was quite apparent that the South Vietnamese Army was about to collapse; that the Vietcong, supported by Hanoi, were about to overrun the country; and that we had to make a basic policy decision—intervene with massive American troops or see the country taken over by the North Vietnamese, who were, to all intents and purposes, Communists, as were most, but not all, their South Vietnamese allies. And so President Johnson moved in massively.

Our troop strength on the ground, consisting of Marines and Army units, increased from the approximately 10,000 which were there at the time of President Kennedy's speech to what is now around 220,000 members of the Armed Forces, Marines, and Army, in South Vietnam.

In addition, there are perhaps a total of upward of 80,000 additional Air Force and Navy military personnel engaged in assisting land forces in their battle against the Vietcong, and those regular army troops of North Vietnam known as PAVN, which have been identified as fighting in South Vietnam against us and against the forces of the Saigon Government.

The results of this escalated war have been, first, that we did prevent the Vietcong and Hanoi from taking over. The South Vietnamese forces have rallied. In many parts of the country they are fighting gallantly. We turned the tide. Now, we have arrived at a point that is something of a stalemate in Vietnam.

My view is that without an unacceptable rate of American casualties, a rate far higher than the expanded rate we are now sustaining, we cannot win that war in the sense that we can clear out the countryside of the Vietcong and the troops of Hanoi, and pacify it, and create a free and hopefully democratic government in South Vietnam.

I do not believe that such a result is feasible, except, as I say, at a cost of American casualties at a rate which I, for one, would not be willing to accept.

On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear, particularly since the first of this year, that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong are not going to be able to win the war either, and that we cannot and will not be driven out, despite the criticism which has come from a number of Members of the Senate about our policy in Vietnam, and the desirability of arriving at some kind of sensible compromise and solution under which the shooting could be stopped and peace brought to that tortured land and its economy revived with our help.

In order to achieve all of these results I believe we are going to have to find some way of getting into negotiations with the opposite side and bring them to the conference table.

In my judgment, neither our national honor nor our national security are in-

volved in Vietnam, despite the strong statements to the contrary by members of the administration.

With respect to our national honor we made no commitment to anybody other than that we would help with money, with military equipment, and with military advice.

Most of the individuals to whom we originally made that commitment are dead, and the governments they represented have been overthrown. We have expended \$2 billion of our fortune and the lives of a good many American boys in order to keep that quite informal commitment, never really formalized in any treaty.

Now, it is said that the SEATO Treaty binds us to do what we are doing in Vietnam. With that I strongly disagree. The SEATO Treaty, reduced to simple terms which nonlawyers can understand, merely obligates us to confer with the other parties to that treaty to see what kind of action, conformable to the constitutional processes of each of the signers might be desirable under whatever circumstances we might find ourselves, if the Geneva agreements were upset, as indeed they have been upset, in my opinion, by both sides, and not only by the Vietcong and Hanoi.

So while a case can be made, and the American Bar Association did make such a case, to the effect that our intervention in South Vietnam with a massive military force is perfectly legal—and with this the able Senator from Oregon disagrees and has made a powerful legal argument to the contrary—nevertheless, while possibly legal it is quite clearly not a treaty which required us to do what we are doing.

I take the strong position that our national honor would not be involved by reason of the SEATO Treaty or by reason of the informal commitments we made to long-dead leaders of the South Vietnamese Government, if we were to terminate the war and withdraw.

Similarly, I place no reliance at all on the argument that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution requires us to do what we are doing.

In my opinion, it did no such thing. Actually, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution did not add one iota to the already existing powers of the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.

He could have done just what he did without the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. He acquires no new stature; his powers are not expanded by reason of that resolution. Moreover, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was applicable to a situation entirely different from the one which confronts us now.

At that point there had been an armed attack on naval vessels of the United States which the President quite properly resisted. He struck out against not only the North Vietnamese Navy, but by bombing certain installations in North Vietnam in retaliation for what was done.

At that point there was no thought, on the basis of what was done, that we would have committed 300,000 Armed Forces and personnel to South Vietnam.

I say again that neither the SEATO Treaty nor the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, nor the informal exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson with various and constantly changing leaders of the Saigon government affect our national honor.

Equally clearly I would think national security is not involved by the situation in South Vietnam. South Vietnam is a tiny country in terms of the huge land expanse of Asia. Only about 7 percent of the population of Asia is in that country.

Its economy is primitive. Its natural resources are largely a rice bowl. At one point, Vietnam exported rice overseas. The devastation caused by the present war has resulted in Vietnam's becoming a rice deficit country instead of a rice surplus country. Its economy is paralyzed. It is being held up only by a massive injection of American economic aid. To give one small example, prices in Saigon have risen 10 percent since January 1 of this year. There is substantial doubt whether the South Vietnamese economy can be made to survive, even with more massive help from us.

If we were to win a total victory from the Communists in South Vietnam, we would be confronted with a massive bill to rehabilitate the country. Indeed, we have already committed ourselves to the Southeast Asia Bank and have put our hard cash on the line to develop that part of Asia. Moreover, we are in a position where we shall certainly be called upon to make massive additional contributions to the economic and social well being of the country in the foreseeable future.

Yet if we were to lose all of South Vietnam, in my judgment, the domino theory would not take hold. China could nonetheless be contained. Our vital interests, our security, are not involved.

A few days ago, I had occasion to point out on the floor of the Senate that the four pillars of Asia, which in the long run must be called upon to contain Chinese expansion, are Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and Japan. We shall have to hold the fort for a while until their own economies and possibly their military strength are augmented to a strength capable of enabling them to contain Chinese expansion southward. Yet I am of the view, particularly so as a result of having listened, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, to the testimony of a number of Chinese experts with respect both to the intentions and the capabilities of the Chinese Communist government, that that government has very little power to take offensive military operations beyond its own immediate borders.

I am also convinced that the Chinese Communist government is primarily preoccupied with its own serious domestic problems and has no real stomach for military adventures overseas.

To me, it is reasonably clear that Chinese efforts to expand that country's influence, and with it the peculiar Chinese brand of communism, are pretty well confined to encouraging wars of national liberation in other countries,

wars to be fought without any Chinese economic involvement and with no Chinese military involvement, but merely to give Chinese advice and technique as to how to conduct a war of national liberation.

I should say, furthermore, that the economic, social, and political conditions in the countries where China would like to foment a series of national liberations are entirely different from the conditions in China at the time the Communists defeated Chiang Kai-shek and took over Mainland China.

So the advice that China is giving to other underdeveloped countries is fundamentally wrong and has proved to be wrong. In country after country the Chinese effort to create Communist parties, such as are proposed to take over the governments of countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, has turned out to be a disaster.

So I suggest that we need not be too much concerned, in terms of our national security, by the danger that China would be able to move south and take over, effectively, countries which have hated China for well over a thousand years.

The three countries in southeast Asia which have been most successful in resisting a Communist takeover have been countries where not a single American soldier was involved, where not a single American soldier was ever asked for or given. Those are the countries of Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

U Thant, the able Secretary General of the United Nations, said not long ago that if any Burmese Government had requested the intervention of American troops to prevent a military takeover by Communists, either now there would be raging in Burma the kind of vicious civil war that is now taking place in South Vietnam or, in the alternative, the Communists would have taken over the Government of Burma, and communism would then have appeared further, beyond the boundaries of India.

I do not imagine that any Member of the Senate thought that an anti-Communist revolution in Indochina could be successful without the intervention of \$1 of American money or one American soldier; yet that happened. Indonesia now has a strong anti-Communist military government, and the United States did not do anything to help them.

Similarly, while we gave substantial economic assistance and some military hardware to the Philippines, the Filipinos were able to put down the Communist revolution of the Hukbalahaps without the intervention of a single American soldier.

So I suggest that the precedents are strongly against our national security being involved by continuing a massive military intervention in South Vietnam.

Thus, I conclude that we should never have been in South Vietnam. Our principal objective now should be to get out of there as promptly as we can, with some reasonable compromise which will give that war-torn country some chance to lick its wounds, pick itself up from the floor, and attempt to become a viable, and, hopefully—possibly—democratic state.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. HART. Mr. President, early today, the able majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] obtained from the Senate an agreement to set aside the earlier agreement to vote at 5:15 o'clock today.

I wonder whether the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, in view of the opportunity now provided for him to bring to the attention of the Senate before it votes tomorrow, his own views, would be in a position to agree that we should vote at not later than 2:15 o'clock p.m. tomorrow on the pending matter.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I have no question of that suggestion if I am given the opportunity to complete my remarks, which I shall be unable to do tonight, and ask some further questions of the Senator in charge of the bill, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], which might take as much as half an hour.

I would suggest that perhaps we could agree to come in at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning and I would undertake to resume the floor as soon as the morning hour is over in order to complete what I have to say and possibly the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Massachusetts would be willing to come into the Chamber. In that event, I would have no objection to the proposed unanimous-consent agreement, but I do not wish to be rushed. I have perhaps 2 hours of material and it will take me 2 hours to present matter which I have not yet had an opportunity to present to the Senate.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, there is only one dilemma which confronts us. A very dear friend of all of us died in the last few days, and many of us desire to pay our respects tomorrow at his funeral. I refer, of course, to our able chief reporter and good friend, Mr. Gregor Macpherson.

For this reason I believe that we should seek to develop an agreement which would avoid the early convening of the Senate. Yet, certainly, we must insure that the opportunity which the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks is accorded him.

Mr. CLARK. I wonder whether we could not solve this, as one of the able members of the Policy Committee staff has suggested, by recessing tonight, instead of adjourning, in which case we would have no morning hour and, sub-

ject to the pending request of the Senator from Michigan, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate convenes tomorrow at noon I may have the privilege of the floor not to exceed 1 hour, for the purpose of completing my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. HART. If the Senator would further yield to me, in view of that understanding, I renew the request: Is it agreed that we shall vote at not later than 2:15 o'clock tomorrow on the pending matter? This request, of course, I make on behalf of the able majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the provisions stated by the Senator from Pennsylvania, is there objection?

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, assuming that the request includes the request that I be allowed the privilege of the floor when the Senate comes in tomorrow, I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the proviso stated by the Senator from Pennsylvania, is there objection that the Senate vote no later than 2:15 o'clock tomorrow?

Mr. HART. It having been agreed, Mr. President, I understand, that we shall recess tonight?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. Is there objection to the proposal made by the Senator from Michigan? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent agreement was subsequently reduced to writing, as follows:

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Ordered, That on Tuesday, March 22, 1966, immediately after the prayer the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] shall be recognized for not more than 1 hour for further debate of the bill (H.R. 13546) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes, and that the Senate proceed to vote on the final passage of the bill not later than 2:15 p.m. on that date.

MARCH 21, 1966.

RECESS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in recess, subject to the unanimous-consent agreement earlier entered into, until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to and (at 6 o'clock and 49 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday, March 22, 1966, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate March 21, 1966:

COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

Robert LaFollette Bennett, of Alaska, to be Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

THE JUDICIARY

William N. Goodwin, of Washington, to be U.S. district judge for the eastern and western districts of Washington to fill a new position created by Public Law 87-36, approved May 19, 1961.

U.S. MARSHAL

Harry M. Miller, of Kentucky, to be U.S. marshal for the western district of Kentucky for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Henry H. Fowler, of Virginia, to be U.S. Governor of the Asian Development Bank.

William S. Gaud, of Connecticut, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Asian Development Bank.

Bernard Zagorin, of Virginia, to be U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate March 21, 1966:

U.S. ARMY

The following-named officer to be placed on the retired list in the grade indicated under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3962:

To be lieutenant general

Lt. Gen. Charles Granville Dodge, O18072, Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).

The following-named officer to be placed on the retired list in the grade indicated, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3962:

To be lieutenant general

Lt. Gen. Alva Revista Fitch, O18113, Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army).

The following-named officer, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

To be lieutenant general

Maj. Gen. Austin Wortham Betts, O19373, U.S. Army.

FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION

R. D. Pennewell, of Missouri, to be member of the Federal Farm Credit Board, Farm Credit Administration, for term expiring March 31, 1972.

A. Lars Nelson, of Washington, to be member of the Federal Farm Credit Board, Farm Credit Administration, for term expiring March 31, 1972.

March 21, 1966

The mild-mannered, almost shy, young man is the third oldest of a family of eight. A younger brother now is with the Army.

From Okinawa, Powers then began TDY assignments in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. TDY hitchhikes are brief 6-month periods of assignments. Staff Sergeant Powers served for the most part as an adviser to Laotian, Thai, and Vietnamese troops.

In South Vietnam, he based his operations with the primitive Montagnards, a people he said made fine warriors.

"We learned as much from them as they did from us," Staff Sergeant Powers related. "We attempted to instruct them into the more technical aspects of waging guerrilla warfare, while they taught us a great deal about how to survive in the lush jungles of that country."

Next stop on his itinerary Powers said is what is hoped to be a lengthy educational period in Washington at the Special Warfare Center.

"I'm going to see if I can get my orders changed so I can enter a 47-week language course. No, I don't think I will be going back to Vietnam. I probably will get what I'm after, but if I have to go back I will."

Besides a short visit with his mother, Sergeant Powers also dropped in on his aunt, Mrs. Florence Noyes of 97 West Street, and his sister, Mrs. Ella Marks of 108 Geary Avenue.

Now You Can Complain About TV Commercials—Some Advice From One of the Top Women in Advertising in the United States, Bea Adams of St. Louis

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 17, 1966

Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, Miss Beatrice Adams of St. Louis, a vice president of Gardner Advertising Co., is one of the top women in advertising in the United States, and we in St. Louis are proud of her as a person and as a businesswoman. I am personally proud to count her as a friend.

Recently, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch carried an excellent article by Peggy Johnson about Bea Adams and the work of the Committee for Improvement of Advertising, on which she is one of two women members.

I think the advice given by Miss Adams, as relayed by Peggy Johnson in the Post-Dispatch, is good advice for any parent, and for any television viewer, to follow. If the commercials are offensive—or worse—as they sometimes are, the complaints should go to the advertising industry as one way to clean up practices within the industry.

As a consumer spokesman in the Congress, I do not join those who attack advertising for all ills; I think advertising—good advertising—serves a highly useful purpose. Our economy would never have grown to today's fabulous heights without it.

But advertising should be held responsible for its actions—under law, wherever necessary, and under effective standards of good practice and high ethics within the industry.

Many of the commercials on television are good fun. Some are horrible, just horrible. I intend to follow Bea Adams' advice hereafter when a commercial offends me, and I hope other citizens will do the same thing and contact the Committee for Improvement of Advertising of the Association of National Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising Agencies. The address of the committee, as given in this article, is 155 East 44th Street, New York City, attention Mr. William Heimlich, secretary.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I submit for inclusion in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Peggy Johnson's Post-Dispatch article of March 11, 1966, about Miss Beatrice Adams, as follows:

**Now You Can Complain About TV
COMMERCIALS**

(By Peggy Johnson)

Do certain television commercials make you long to throw your coffee cup through the screen? Does the drip-drip-drip of stomach acid spoil your morning bacon and eggs?

Then complain to William Heimlich, secretary of the ANA-AAA Committee for Improvement of Advertising. His group comprises representatives of the Association of National Advertisers and the American Association of Advertising Agencies, 155 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y.

This advice comes from Miss Beatrice Adams, a vice president of Gardner Advertising Co., 915 Olive Street, St. Louis, and one of the two women on the committee. She says that if the offending advertisement is printed, it should accompany the complaint with name and date of publication. If it is a radio or television commercial, the station call letters or network and the time and date of the broadcast should be given.

She believes that advertising that offends the standards of good taste and decency, that deliberately misleads or that appears to smear rival businesses is bad for the entire advertising profession. Therefore the committee was set up as a clearinghouse for complaints.

Members of the committee are experienced ad men and women. As soon as the majority have looked into a complaint, the secretary notifies the advertiser and its agency. Complainants are never identified to members of the committee, to the advertiser, or to the agency. The committee found that nearly 25 percent of the complaints represented justifiable criticism. Findings are relayed usually through friendly personal meetings with offenders. In the latest reported year, seven out of eight (advertisers criticized) quickly fell back into line.

"It must be noted that the committee's is not a fact-and-figure job. Misleading or illegal advertising is handled by Government regulations or the Better Business Bureau," Miss Adams pointed out.

The most flagrant offenses are suggestiveness, excessive nudity, repulsiveness, illness too graphically displayed (audiences sometimes object that drug and hygienic ads appear on television during their dinner hour). Improper reference to patriotic or religious themes is sometimes an offender, as is implied endorsement of bad habits. A television commercial builds dramatic impact by showing a tantrum, but it may make parents wince because they fear that their children may copy the behavior.

She pointed out that, as a whole, producers of commercials try to be in good taste and not offend anyone.

"A good deal of thought and psychology go into producing a television commercial," Miss Adams said. "Most commercials are aimed at the middle-class housewife, and 85

percent of all goods are bought by women. There are still more in the middle than on the top or bottom.

"The emotional reaction to your product is what makes all the difference. Women react strongly to the stunning white knight on the white charger. Psychologically he takes them back to their fairy tale days. They also like to think of the muscular Mr. Clean helping them in the kitchen. But they can react just as strongly against a commercial which offends their good taste."

Miss Adams was asked about one of my favorite commercials for a packaged soup mix. It starts out with a catchy little tune; "How do they do it at the price?" Then a little man pops up and says (confidentially) out of the side of his mouth, "They steal the rice."

Miss Adams explained that only a very imaginative advertiser would buy this sort of commercial.

"Some commercials are conversation pieces," she continued. "They are so well done that people talk about them. The Museum of Modern Art in New York periodically selects commercial classics and shows them in the museum like old movies."

She modestly refrained from telling us of her own commercials that became classics, but a friend remarked that one Adams commercial featuring a baby and a lullaby for an evaporated milk company ran for more than 8 years.

"I'll bet that kid is in college by now," Miss Adams said.

She is working on television commercials for the Australian market. "It must be hard to do when you're so far away," I ventured.

"Ouch my pouch," she roared.

Mr. Sparling's Views on Vietnam

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF**

HON. GEORGE P. MILLER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 17, 1966

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, Mr. William A. Sparling, Jr., is currently working in Vietnam as assistant personnel manager for Morrison-Knudsen on their very important construction projects there.

Recently, Mr. Sparling, in a letter to his father, set forth his impressions on the American position in Vietnam. The young man, who is the author of this statement, has had a great deal of experience in living and working abroad and I believe is quite learned in matters of this kind.

In view of this, I am pleased to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that portion of Mr. Sparling's letter which gives his candid views on our Vietnam policy.

EXCERPTS FROM LETTER FROM W. A. SPARLING, JR., TO HIS PARENTS, MARCH 6, 1966, FROM SAIGON

Don't doubt our being in Vietnam—one set of circumstances, defense against aggression, got us in here—and other circumstances have come to bear on the situation since—these, our doubters and detractors seem to prefer to regard as the whole issue, and conveniently overlook what got us here in the first place—but while they may quibble and lie by omission, you can be assured no one here is suffering from such confusion or delusion. There is an enemy; he does come from the Communists; he is a terrorist and oppressor; and our fighting him is

A1598

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

March 21, 1966

the last chance for the whole population of South Vietnam. This the South Vietnamese understand well. It can be confusing at home, because the real enemy never gets hit; and because of the American-South Vietnamese effort to salvage the enemy's pawn, not destroy it; but let me just assure you of this—the more I see, the more I'm convinced that not only are we right—but even a little more than that—and the prouder I am of Americans.

Resignation of David Dubinsky as President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN J. ROONEY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 21, 1966

Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr. Speaker. David Dubinsky, one of the true titans of the American labor movement, has stepped down and he will be hard to replace. For 34 years he has been president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and under his direction the union workers and the industry have prospered.

In 1932 when he assumed command of the union it was bankrupt and the sweat shop was a way of life in the industry. Today the ILGWU has almost a half million members and finds itself financially in the position of lending money to the Rockefeller interests for civic projects in Puerto Rico.

In his years as president, the little giant of the ILGWU fought and defeated a strong Communist element that sought to bleed the union and which had brought it to the verge of extinction. He fought for and won a host of social reforms in the industry including better working conditions, reduced hours, retirement and medical benefits and low rent housing. The union built, under David Dubinsky's leadership, an orphanage in China, a trade school in France, and lent large amounts of money to the fledgling Israeli Nation, while at the same time fostering training and apprenticeship programs for American workers. Last year, Mr. Speaker, I had occasion while in Mondello, Sicily, to visit an orphanage and school known as Instituto Franklin D. Roosevelt, a project heavily supported by the ILGWU. I wish that every Member here could see the fine work that is being made possible to a large degree by the ILGWU support of this orphanage and school.

In New York the garment industry is a major industry and around the world, the New York garment center is regarded as the pacemaker. But it could not be so without the stability that Mr. Dubinsky and his union have provided to the industry.

Today's new labor leaders, Mr. Speaker, are not of the Dubinsky heritage, and in fact how could they be? They did not have to fight in the streets for what are now considered the normal rights of the workingman nor did any

of them spend time in a Czarist jail in Poland for leading a strike against their father's bakery. This is not meant to denigrate today's labor leaders, it is just that, as it always must, the old order changeth.

I have been privileged over the years, Mr. Speaker, to make many friends within the ILGWU. I am sure they join me in a genuine sadness at the sight of David Dubinsky stepping down and I am also sure that they join me in wishing David Dubinsky an affectionate mazel tov.

New Policy Lifts Restrictions on Government Personnel Information

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN E. MOSS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 17, 1966

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, the Civil Service Commission last week made a major contribution toward the removal of Government secrecy when it issued a policy statement which, for the first time, sets forth Government-wide guidelines for access by the public and the Congress to the names and salaries of Federal employees. This is an area which long has been criticized as an information vacuum in many departments and agencies. A glaring example occurred only a few months ago when the Post Office Department refused to release the names and salaries of summer employees, even to Members of the Congress.

The Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, of which I am chairman, made its first investigation of the availability of names of Federal employees in 1956. The Civil Service Commission recognized at that time that basic information about employees was clearly within the public domain and it responded by establishing a set of internal information guidelines that provided for the release of the names and salaries of its own employees. Unfortunately, these guidelines were ignored by other departments and agencies and they continued to lay down their own rules and regulations which, in many instances, permitted in my opinion an unlawful information blackout about their employees.

Throughout the years as the subcommittee chipped away—agency by agency—at employee information restrictions, the Civil Service Commission gave its full cooperation in helping to set the stage for a Government-wide policy which would make it mandatory for departments and agencies, with few exceptions, to release information about their employees to the public and to Congress.

The Commission's policy statement of March 17, 1966, which is patterned after its own internal guidelines, achieves this long sought objective.

Mr. Speaker, I include herewith the Civil Service Commission policy statement and guidelines:

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., March 17, 1966.

Subject: Issuance of General Policy on Responding to Requests for Names of Employees and Identifying Information. Heads of Departments and Independent Establishments.

From time to time a Federal agency may be asked for the names alone, or for the names and certain identifying information, of some or all of its employees. The Civil Service Commission holds that the names, position titles, grades, salaries, and duty stations of Federal employees are public information. As an example of the public nature of this information, the Official Register of the United States for many years contained the names of all Government employees, with title, salary, State of origin, and duty station.

The Commission believes, therefore, that standard Government policy generally should be to release names, position titles, grades, salaries, and duty stations in response to requests.

For assistance in carrying out that broad policy when lists are requested, the Commission has issued the following guides, based on its own experience and after consultation with interested groups:

The agency should comply promptly with every request for the names, position titles, grades, salaries, and duty stations of Federal employees unless (a) there is a definite showing that the release would be contrary to the public interest; (b) it is evident that the list is sought for purposes of commercial or other solicitation; (c) there is reason to believe that the names would be used for purposes which may be in violation of the Hatch Act; or (d) the costs or labor involved in the preparation of the list would require an unwarranted expenditure of agency funds or interruption of the work of the agency. If unwarranted time or cost would be involved, the person requesting the list should be told that and what costs must be paid or work arrangements made by him before the list will be furnished.

The guides may be applied to specific requests along the following lines:

From Congressmen or congressional committees: The information should be furnished promptly; if furnishing lists precisely as requested would entail undue cost, this should be reported to the requesting party along with suggestions of any possible alternatives that would be helpful but more economical.

From the press and other information media on behalf of the public: The information should be furnished promptly if it is available without unreasonable public expense or interruption of regular work; otherwise, estimate the necessary time and costs, inform the requesting party what is involved, and determine if the needs can be met with information that can be furnished at reasonable cost or expenditure of time. When information media desire lists for solicitation purposes, they are treated like other commercial firms.

From commercial firms and individual solicitors: Such requests should ordinarily be refused; exceptions should be made only when it is clear that the public interest will be served (for example, requests from compilers of widely used directories) and there will be negligible public expense or interruption of work. In no event will names be furnished for solicitation purposes.

From charitable organizations: Few if any requests should be received from charitable organizations since the arrangements for charitable fundraising in the Federal service are prescribed by the Federal Fundraising Manual. Mail solicitation of employees at place of employment is not authorized, and this should be emphasized to any group requesting a list of names. If a charitable organization desires a list for other than solici-

tation purposes, it should be treated like other nonprofit organizations.

From nonprofit organizations such as professional societies, schools, unions, veterans organizations, State societies, etc.: In general, it should be the policy to cooperate fully with these organizations when it is evident that little cost to the agency or interruption of work would result. Otherwise, estimate the necessary time and costs, inform the requesting party what is involved, and determine if the needs can be met with information that can be furnished at reasonable cost or expenditure of time.

By direction of the Commission:

NICHOLAS J. OGANOVIC,
Executive Director.

Milwaukee County Property Owners' Association Makes Its Case Against the Property Tax

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the Milwaukee County Property Owners' Association, in a recent issue of its publication, the Property Owner, listed 25 reasons why the property tax should not be the sole source of revenue for local government. In the thought that many of my colleagues may be interested in this thought-provoking analysis of the drawbacks of a property tax, I include it herewith:

A STRONG CASE AGAINST THE PROPERTY TAX

To all of those, who have not given this much thought heretofore:

1. The property tax is no longer a public tax, since it does not cover all persons equitably.
2. It is only a selective tax because \$750 million of tax assessed property is tax exempt. The amount is 29 percent of total assessments in Milwaukee.
3. Property tax does not carry any credit refund like the sales tax for heads of families, who were forced to build or buy living accommodations.
4. It carries no exemptions for large families like the income tax, but only a complete exemption for certain institutions and corporations that could very well afford to pay it.
5. It is unfair, because it may be possible to put a price on property, but not a true value. A dollar has the same value for all.
6. It is not a direct tax to all people. To many it is only an indirect tax.
7. An indirect tax does not carry the same bite as the direct tax.
8. The property tax is not based on ability to pay.
9. The Constitution does not say anywhere that a property tax be used as support for the bulk of our Government costs.
10. A property tax should cover only the costs of city services to property owners, and not also benefits, that all property owners do not get.
11. A change to a nonproperty tax does not shift the tax load from one pocket to another, but from the pockets of the few to the pockets of the many or all.
12. A man with a high loan pays a high property tax on the portion of the property he does not own.

13. Persons depending upon the public tax for a living should not insist that their earnings come only from a property tax.

14. The cost of administration and collection of the property tax is most cumbersome and expensive and subject to political maneuvering.

15. A man's home is subject to government seizure, if the tax for it is not forthcoming.

16. Only one-third of the heads of families in Milwaukee are property owners, but foot 80 percent of the local government costs.

17. The property tax is decreasing in importance in many States.

18. Property assessments are not flexible enough to adjust themselves to fluctuating values.

19. Standards of property assessments vary with the various units of government.

20. Income-producing property is taxed two ways: (1) through property values, (2) through income produced, which is illegal.

21. A sales tax is said to take the milk and shoes from babies. The property tax pulls the pants off the old man.

22. Properties are depreciated in value through high property tax, and special assessments.

23. High property taxes only prevent proper maintenance and modernization, causing slums.

24. No income tax deduction is allowed for property tax on homes in the State income tax law. So we pay in the State a property tax on our homes and also an income tax. That is double taxation.

25. Too many doctors of economy are trying to juggle conditions around to bring forth a larger tax return, but they will continue to fail, because all economy is based on proper balance in competitive factors.

Message From a Teenager

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JOE SKUBITZ

OF KANSAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 16, 1966

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, such has been written and demonstrated as to the irresponsibility of the modern teenager.

Fortunately, the great majority of high school and college students in America are dedicated, hard working, clear-thinking individuals and theirs is a voice which must be heard and heeded. The following letter received from a teenager constituent demonstrates this clearly and I would like to share it with my colleagues:

Congressman JOE SKUBITZ,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SIR: There has been, as you well known, an extreme amount of controversy over the Vietnam war.

It is my firm belief that it is the duty of the United States to curtail communism in southeast Asia. Communism is an extreme and real threat to all of us. We, as a people who love and honor freedom must not allow these masses of people to be conquered and imprisoned by a totalitarian state. Of course, there will be those who will suffer and die, but we should be proud that we as Americans have a cause worth fighting, suffering and dying for. War is never pleasant, but on the other hand which is worse—living in a world without freedom or fighting for the rights of all men?

I, as a citizen, do not even suggest what steps need to be taken militarily or diplomatically, but steps must be taken. I urge you to do whatever is necessary to assure victory.

Respectfully yours,

WILLIAM T. NORTH,

Vice Chairman,

Chase County Teenage Republican.

STRONG CITY, KANS.

The Dividends Accruing From a Strong Stand Against Communism in Southeast Asia

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 21, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, Roscoe Drummond, in the following column from the March 16, 1966, edition of the New York Herald Tribune, lists some of the important changes in policy on the part of Asian countries during the past year.

Although no one claims that our policy of resistance to Communist aggression in Vietnam is solely responsible for them, it is quite clear that our actions have certainly contributed to those changes.

Mr. Drummond's column follows:

U.S. CAUSE ON OTHER FRONTS ADVANCED BY VIET SHOWING—LAOS, CAMBODIA CITED
(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—One thing the American people do not want about Vietnam is false optimism. We know the road ahead will be anxious and painful.

But since it became clear that the United States is prepared to stay the course in Vietnam, there have been heartening dividends.

What has happened during the past year following the strong stand—and successful battles—by the United States and South Vietnam?

The evidence is showing up in many nations in Asia and the far Pacific. When you add them up, they begin to show how significantly events have begun to move during the very period the once imminent Vietcong victory has been moving farther away from their reach.

The record tells its own story:

Laos: Twelve months ago the Laotian Communists were a mounting peril to the government. Today they are badly splintered.

Cambodia: Twelve months ago it seemed that Prince Sihanouk was trying to win merit points with the Communists as a hedge against the future. Today he is warning his own people that, if North Vietnam prevails, they can expect no mercy from their own Communist Party.

Philippines: Twelve months ago the Philippines were wracked with riots in protest against even the small support the government was giving to Saigon. Now the government is preparing to send troops.

Korea: Twelve months ago Korea had contributed only token forces to the defense of South Vietnam. Now it is at the point of bringing the total of its combat troops there to 44,000—more, in proportion to its population of 28,500,000, than the United States itself.

Peking-Moscow: Twelve months ago the American and foreign critics of U.S. policy

in Vietnam were in unanimous chorus declaring that one consequence of the U.S. decision to defend South Vietnam was bound to happen: It would end the Sino-Soviet feud and drive Moscow and Peking back into each other's arms. It did just the opposite.

Japan: Twelve months ago Japan was moving toward a new *modus vivendi* with Red China and was the center of harsh criticism of U.S. policy. Today the Japanese Government is helping to focus world pressure on Hanoi to accept peace talks.

Indonesia: Twelve months ago the unpredictable Sukarno held total sway; he was surrounded by pro-Communist associates and buttressed by the third largest Communist party in the world. Indonesian policy was pro-Red China and anti-Western.

Today Indonesian policy is anti-Red China and less anti-Western. The Indonesian Communist party is no more. Sukarno has either lost most of his power to the anti-Communist leaders of the army—or all of it.

And on top of these events, not a single dissident South Vietnamese political leader who left Saigon for involuntary exile in protest against past regimes has given his support to the Vietcong.

I am not suggesting that the overturn in Indonesia or that all of the other events stem directly from the strong U.S. stand in Vietnam. That is honestly arguable. What I believe is not arguable is that the evident will of the United States to stay the course in Vietnam made these heartening dividends more attainable.

National Wildlife Federation Resolution

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 15, 1966

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to permission granted I insert into the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a resolution of the National Wildlife Federation in opposition to unwise legislation which would infringe upon the rights of law-abiding citizens to buy and use, for lawful and legitimate sporting purposes, firearms of different kinds.

This outstanding national organization of outdoorsmen, sportsmen, and conservationists has taken the wise and proper position that it is much better to use rigorously the provisions of the many criminal laws for punishment of crimes by criminals armed with guns than it is to deny honest and law-abiding citizens the right to purchase firearms for lawful and legitimate sporting purposes.

The resolution, adopted at the 30th annual meeting of the National Wildlife Federation on March 12, 1966, is as follows:

The National Wildlife Federation reiterates its conviction that the constitutional right to possess, bear, and use firearms for lawful purposes must not be infringed and that the registration of guns beyond that already required would serve no beneficial purpose. This organization, however, supports greater controls which would impose mandatory prison sentences upon those who commit crimes when armed with guns and prevent the interstate sale and mail-order shipment of handguns to felons, juveniles, and

other unfit persons in circumvention of State laws. The sale of destructive devices, excluding sporting arms, should be prohibited.

How To Up Taxes and Not Say So

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 21, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, there is growing concern both inside and outside of Congress that the President is playing politics with taxes.

This concern is expressed in the article, "How To Up Taxes and Not Say So," by Charles Nicodemus, Washington bureau correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. The article, which appeared in the March 16, 1966, editions of the Daily News, follows:

HOW TO UP TAXES AND NOT SAY SO

(By Charles Nicodemus)

WASHINGTON.—Lyndon Johnson is treating the people to another of his major public relations gambits, this one designed to have the Nation itself persuade a reluctant President that he should raise taxes still further.

Mr. Johnson is, of course, well aware that taxes are going to have to be raised, and sooner rather than later. Every economic indicator shows the economy is becoming superheated.

The Vietnam war is becoming more costly every month and will need more taxes to fuel it.

Virtually every politician on Capitol Hill, on either side of the aisle, acknowledges this. In fact, in debate on the recently passed stop-gap tax measure, many of them came right out and said it.

Economists of every philosophical stripe are now crying for it. Columnists are raising desperate alarms, warning that the President had best act before inflation runs away with us all.

Yet the President tarries. Why?

Any good politician—and the President is a very good politician—knows that raising taxes in an election year can be deadly, particularly when saddled with another problem—Vietnam—that is bound to cost substantially at the polls.

So the problem that faced the President at the turn of the year was how do you ease into a needed tax increase, while causing as little political damage as possible?

Obviously, the best way is to (1) wait until everyone appreciates that the increase is necessary, and (2) until everyone who is anyone is urging the action.

Then, you (3) spread the impact of the boost as broadly and as thinly as possible.

The first two are what Mr. Johnson is now doing. The chances are strong that the third is what he will do shortly.

In fact, many astute Congressmen believe he has already begun. They're convinced that the newly enacted potpourri of excise tax adjustments and tax collection speed-ups is just the first part of a preplanned package which the President decided he'd best ease through first.

What's next?

Liberals have called for revocation of the 7 percent investment credit as the best way to pick up some cash while slowing down the boom. Conservatives have called for a 5-percent increase in personal income taxes.

It would be typically Johnsonian to split the difference—raising income taxes 2½ per-

cent; cutting the investment credit by half; jiggering a few other items. All on a temporary basis.

And when he finally acts, he'll stress, emphasize, and accentuate that he's doing so reluctantly, and only because nearly everyone—and particularly Republicans—insists that the harsh move must be made.

The administration's handling of the whole affair—the ambiguous, cautious statements by Cabinet officers; the leaked speculation on what approaches are likely, when and if the time comes—are typical of previous Johnson public relations gambits.

But there is a difference this time.

Tax cuts can't be instituted overnight, and their impact is several months in coming. Nor can they be begun quietly in advance, like troop movements and budget policies.

There is always the danger, therefore, that the President's public relations gambit on taxes can be carried on too long—and that by the time he finally decides to move, the actions he takes may no longer be sufficient remedy for the problems they were designed to solve.

Hoosier Journalist Explodes a Number of Irish Myths

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BERNARD F. GRABOWSKI

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 2, 1966

Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, every American regardless of his national ancestral heritage celebrates St. Patrick's Day each year. The reason is obvious. St. Patrick is the symbol of Ireland and Ireland's history is studded with glorious examples of devotion to freedom.

During this year's celebration there came to my attention an excellent article by the distinguished Hoosier journalist, Mr. John Ackelmire. In this piece he explodes a number of the unfortunate myths regarding the Irish and puts their noble heritage in a better perspective. This article, which appeared in the Indianapolis Observer, merits the attention of the entire House:

JOHN ACKELMIRE: THE IRISH

Ireland is the real or imagined homeland of all who will march or toast in honor of St. Patrick next Thursday. Being Irish for the day is like being a Notre Dame television alumnus. It isn't a matter of national origins or diplomas; it's the spirit that counts.

Ireland is one of the smallest of the world's nation-islands, being just about the size of Indiana. It is smaller than Iceland, and considerably smaller than Cuba. It also is a solitary island, a big toe of Europe stuck out in the cold Atlantic.

The first thing that strikes any visitor to Ireland, even before the plane lands, is its unspoiled beauty. It is even greener and lovelier than it is supposed to be, and much greener and lovelier than any country has a right to be.

The beauty of the land is matched by the quality of the people. Ireland is one of the great bastions of the individualist. Every Irishman is different, and there isn't a jig-dancing chowderhead or a bog-trotting harp plunker anywhere in sight.

The Irish of Ireland, are lively, courteous people and among the handsomest and most literate in the world. They are a people

March 21, 1966

Were you in Boston, one would say, "Top of the morning to you." And your response would be, "And the rest of the day to you."

It was in the year 387 that St. Patrick came from Heaven on the mission for which he was preordained which was, of course, the conversion of the Irish people to the faith of Christianity.

At that time St. Patrick used the sprig of the shamrock as his symbol.

Today we have had shamrocks flown here to Washington from Ireland. They came as a courtesy of the Irish Embassy and to the Irish Embassy all of us are indeed grateful.

Last year Congressman JAMES BURKE read a little poem which I would like to read to you now:

A little sprig of shamrock
Is a symbol we hold dear
A little sprig of shamrock
When we wear it every year;
A little sprig of shamrock
So many things convey
As it travels out across the world
To be worn on St. Patrick's Day.

Mr. Speaker, all of us today are wearing carnations and for these carnations we are extremely grateful because they were donated by the National Board of the Ancient Order of Hibernians.

May I wish to all of you a happy St. Patrick's Day.

Australia Recognizes Importance of Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. JACK BROOKS

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 21, 1966

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, the Government of Australia recently announced its intention to triple its forces in South Vietnam. An editorial appearing March 12, 1966, in the Houston Post, a well-known Texas newspaper, commented on this action taken at the request of the South Vietnamese. The editorial suggests that Australia, with its proximity to the conflict in Vietnam, has a vital interest in its outcome. As this editorial points out, the struggle in Vietnam is not totally an American enterprise and those who are closest to the problem realize the danger of Communist expansionary aims in southeast Asia.

I feel this concise editorial, which follows, will be of interest to my fellow colleagues:

AUSTRALIA BOOSTS VIETNAM FORCE

It is clear that Australia understands the importance of the war in South Vietnam, even if some Members of the U.S. Senate do not.

The government of the great island continent has agreed to triple its forces in South Vietnam to 4,500 men. The increase is in response to a request by the Saigon government.

Some 1,500 Australian combat troops have been serving in South Vietnam since June. They will be replaced in May by a task

force of 4,500 men. These will include two infantry battalions, a special air services squadron, and support units. Helicopters will also be sent to Vietnam to fly support missions for the task force units.

A glance at the map reveals quite clearly Australia's vital interest in the war in South Vietnam. Should Vietnam fall, the way to Malaysia, Indonesia and, finally, Australia, lies open to Communist grasp.

Australia's contribution is small, but significant.

It is a clear demonstration that those closest to the problem recognize the danger of Communist expansionist aims in south-east Asia.

It should not be forgotten that the struggle in Vietnam is not totally an American enterprise.

Good Idea

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 21, 1966

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, the Hartford Times praised the recent get-together of the Governors with the President to discuss domestic and foreign issues.

The item of most immediate impact was the Governors' unanimous endorsement of the President's handling of the Communist containment in Vietnam—

The paper points out. It adds that as a move for unity in our stressful times the session was important and meaningful.

Others may want to read the article to which I refer, and I therefore suggest that we include it in the RECORD.

[From the Hartford Times, Mar. 14, 1966]

L.B.J. AND THE GOVERNORS

Reputedly the President, politically astute and thoroughly informed, always knows what is going on back home in the various States.

But if President Johnson has not lost touch with the Governors and officials of the States, many of them feel that they have lost contact with him since he began to concentrate so intently on the problems of international affairs.

The weekend session at the White House, attended by 38 Governors, including Governor Dempsey, served therefore as a sort of get-together meeting, an all-purpose chance to discuss domestic concerns, to pass the word either up or down, to peddle a little influential observation and to reestablish internal diplomatic relations.

The item of most immediate impact was the Governors' unanimous endorsement of the President's handling of the Communist containment in Vietnam. This must have been heartening to the administration, for besides its evidence of bipartisan support the resolution expressed the political judgment of the various State houses which are in direct local contact with sectional public sentiment.

It is natural that a chief executive who likes to make his own judgments should bring in the Governors now and then to check their opinions against what the Congressmen and the pollsters are telling him. And one expects that each Governor will go away braced by a considerable acquisition of the presidential sentiments and opinions.

There was some speculation that calling in the Governors indicates serious develop-

ments abroad that require conference. Nothing along those lines came up. Still, as a move for unity in our stressful times, the session was not unrelated to the pressures that exist.

The Problems of America's Merchant Marine Are Important to All Americans, Not Just the Shipping Industry

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, March 3, 1966

Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, it was my great pleasure last month to attend a meeting of the Propeller Club of New Orleans and, in my capacity as ranking member of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, discuss some of the problems of the merchant marine. These problems are of vital concern to all of us, as events in Vietnam have demonstrated particularly.

Under unanimous consent, I submit for inclusion in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD my remarks in New Orleans on a subject which is now before the Congress and will be of increasing interest and importance to the Members.

The address referred to is as follows:

ADDRESS BY CONGRESSWOMAN LEONOR K. SULLIVAN BEFORE THE PROPELLER CLUB OF THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION AT A LUNCHEON ON FEBRUARY 16, 1966, AT ROOSEVELT HOTEL

I am delighted to be here this afternoon, both as a member of a propeller club myself, and as ranking member of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, a committee which has a great deal to do, I realize, with how happy you people are—or how unhappy, perhaps—about maritime conditions and issues.

As you know, I am a Democrat, but to give a bipartisan flavor to the occasion, I must thank a Republican for my being able to come here today. The Republican I refer to is Abraham Lincoln, in whose name the Republicans in Congress always insist on a congressional recess at this time of year in order to try to raise some money for the forthcoming campaign. Later on, we Democrats give them a few days off from congressional chores while we celebrate and do some money raising of our own in the names of Thomas Jefferson and the hero of New Orleans, Andy Jackson.

But thanks to the extended Lincoln's birthday recess, I was finally able this year to arrange my schedule so as to accept at long last the flattering and repeated invitations I have received from the Propeller Club over the years to come and meet with you. HALE BOGGS, our majority whip and one of the outstanding leaders of this Congress, has been urging me for a long time to come to New Orleans, and so has my closest neighbor in the Rayburn House Office Building, EDDIE HEBERT, who has a huge photographic mural of your city forming an entire wall of one of the rooms in his office, and who never loses an opportunity to boost this city. Across the hall from the photographic mural of New Orleans he has a huge painting of American soldiers fighting in the jungle, with murderous fire streaming from machineguns and rifles—and I got the message—come to New Orleans or else.