

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am not sure that I recall this from the testimony or conversations I had with members of the staff of General Westmoreland, but it is my recollection that no defoliants have been used on any rice fields where there was any hope whatever that the rice could be harvested by the South Vietnamese. It was used only on areas where there was no possibility of anyone except the Vietcong benefitting from the harvesting of the rice.

I yield to the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] who has spent some time in South Vietnam.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Much of this information with respect to defoliation has been classified, but I would say to my friend from Pennsylvania that the primary interest in this particular defoliation is for clearing the jungles, in order that our people know what they are attacking when they attack such targets as the Ho Chi Minh Trail to prevent ammunition, troops and food from coming down said trail to help the Vietcong in their attacks against us.

Based on testimony received, the control of the use of these defoliants is very tight. I believe the Senator would be satisfied if he obtained the classified testimony, that there has been relatively little of it used for destroying any crops.

The testimony supplied me at this moment by a member of the staff is interesting, but I observe there have been too many deletions to make it useful.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am happy to have the Senator from Missouri confirm what I have said. I said that a small proportion of defoliation had been on crops, and only in instances where we knew that the harvesting of crops would rebound to the benefit of the Vietcong by supplying them with essential food.

It is very true that our position in the war and the mistakes we have made have been magnified all over the world. The news photographers of television networks have been permitted to accompany our people. The tragic pictures of little children who have been wounded, of mothers weeping over their dead, and of those who are binding up their wounds have been transmitted all over the world.

For every one of those instances there have been a dozen instances in which the Vietcong have deliberately done what we have done accidentally, but we have not had the means to present that to the world. That is one of the disadvantages of living in an open society.

Frankly, I think that in some cases the disseminators of news should have been more judicious in the showing of some of these films and in the statements that accompanied the films that indicated that our soldiers were careless and were deliberately killing the civilian population.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I agree completely with the distinguished Senator from Georgia. One of the tricks the Vietcong has been using is to wait until crops were ready for harvesting, then to go into the fields and cut the men, women, and children to pieces as they were working to bring in the grain.

One of the chief reasons why it has been necessary for the United States to

export grain to South Vietnam are the clever ways in which the Vietcong have combined to destroy both the people and the grain when the people have attempted to harvest it. I associate myself with the statement of the Senator from Georgia concerning how little of this story has been told in various films and other media when they have been shown to the American people.

Mr. CLARK. Is it not true that in many instances the Vietcong prefer to extort a tax from the people as a condition to letting them eat or market their grain, as opposed to destroying it?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield, to permit me to reply?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In many places the Vietcong do impose a tax. The tax apparently has been custom. It was one of Ho Chi Minh's customs, when he started his building of communism in Vietnam long ago. It was part of the effect to destroy all the people above a certain economic level by imposing a confiscatory tax in North Vietnam and South Vietnam. In many places, if anybody argued against the tax, he would, in typical Vietcong fashion, be destroyed.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I recall that in many areas the farmers were compelled to abandon their crops to avoid being forced to harvest it, and were thus unable to take it with them. The Vietcong collected the tax and left the civilian population there without any means of support, even though they had harvested the crop. That has had a terrific effect on the production of rice in South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. To return briefly to the question of chemical warfare, the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Missouri are aware, I know—the Senators have said so—that war is a nasty business. It is not always possible to fight a war according to the Marquis of Queensberry rules. The use of gas by our troops in South Vietnam enabled the Russians to mount a propaganda offensive at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva last week. They spent the better part of a day, together with one or two of their Communist allies, castigating the United States for violating the Geneva Convention in connection with the use of gas and chemical weapons.

It may well be that the use of gas is reasonably humane—at least as humane as shooting the enemy with artillery or dropping bombs on them. It may also be necessary. But I do point out the adverse propaganda effect.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator from Pennsylvania well knows that the Russians are masters of propaganda. They can seize a little, isolated incident, take it out of context, and make it appear to be a terrible crime against humanity. That was what I had in mind when I was discussing the news releases and matters of that kind.

The fact is that there is not a country on earth that is not using this type of gas against its own people. The type of gas we have used against the Vietcong is what is referred to as "tear gas." This type of gas is used by the police forces

of every country to restore order when matters get out of hand.

When it was announced that we were using tear gas, naturally the Russians seized on that and said that the United States was using lethal gases in this war. I have inquired into this matter and have been told that we have used only tear gas. We possess lethal gases, and we have them in large quantities. They have destruction powers almost beyond description. But we have not sent one container of lethal gas out of this country, much less used it against the Vietcong in South Vietnam. The gas we have used is the same kind of gas that the police force in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, or here in the city of Washington has available to enable it to maintain order.

Mr. CLARK. What is the view of the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Missouri with respect to the effect on personnel of the chemical defoliants which we are using? Do they have an adverse or lethal effect on the personnel?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I doubt whether it has any serious effect on personnel. If we happen to be fortunate enough to expose a vehicle on a road or to pick up a few trucks coming down and can knock them out, the defoliant has an adverse effect on that immediate contingent of troops or truck drivers. But I doubt whether the defoliant itself has had any lethal effect on the Vietcong personnel. As a matter of fact, I think we have done a great many things in Vietnam that have been said to have a tremendous effect, but that have been magnified out of reasonable proportion.

Mr. CLARK. I invite the Senator's attention now to the question of our bombing and the contemplated bombing of North Vietnam. I am glad the Senator from Missouri is in the Chamber, because this is a subject in which he has interested himself deeply.

Referring to page 42 of the hearings, do the Senators accept the statement of Secretary McNamara?

The quantities of men and the quantities of materiel involved in the infiltration into South Vietnam are small.

I recall some statements in the newspapers that the rate of infiltration of men from the north was about 4,500 a month. On the other hand, the Secretary testified that throughout all of last year only about 20,000 men infiltrated from the north, with the exception of the regular army battalions. The Secretary said, as shown at page 42 of the hearings, that he thought the infiltration from the north was small.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It all depends on what figure one regards as being small.

Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator from Georgia agree that 4,500 a month would be about the correct figure?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I should think that that is a fair estimate of troops coming down from North Vietnam at the present time.

Mr. CLARK. The 4,500 has reference to personnel.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is correct.

run the Communist state already established in North Vietnam and who are now directing the insurgency designed to bring the southern part of the country under their domination.

The term "Vietcong" came into circulation around 1956 as a means of distinguishing some of the players in the current act of this ongoing political drama from the players in act II. "Vietcong" is a contraction of the phrase "Vietnam Cong-San," which means, simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It is a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative except, perhaps, in the sense of "If the shoe fits. . . ." It is a useful, precise and, as we shall see, accurate generic label for the individuals leading the present insurgent movement, at all levels, and for the organizational structure through which that insurgency is controlled and directed.

Not surprisingly, the reactions of many whose concern with Vietnam is of recent origin are analogous to those of theatergoers who walk into the middle of the third act of an extremely complex drama ignorant of what has gone before. To understand the Vietcong insurgency, its relationship to the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi (the D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation Front and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam (and "their" respective interrelationships), it is essential to appreciate the historical setting within which the Vietcong movement developed and the ends it was created to serve.

Throughout their almost four decades of unremitting struggle for political power, the Vietnamese Communists have demonstrated great skill in coping with new problems and great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwavering strategic objectives. Yet, though skillful in learning from past failures, they have often become the victims of previous successes. For the past quarter-century the Vietnamese Communists have been doctrinally addicted to the political device of a broad front organization, dominated and controlled from behind the scenes by disciplined Communist cadres, but espousing general sentiments to which persons of all political inclinations can subscribe (though the formulation of these sentiments has invariably involved a special lexicon of key terms to which Communists and non-Communists attach radically different meanings). They have always rigidly subordinated military activity to political ends, and employed it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy forces in the conventional sense, but as an abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will to fight and force their enemies to accept interim political settlements favorable to the continued pursuit of Communist political objectives.

Because of this Vietnamese Communist penchant for repeating political and military stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnamese history is particularly helpful in understanding the present insurgency. Although westerners may be largely ignorant of the scenario and detailed plot development of the previous acts of Vietnam's continuing political drama, the Vietnamese most decidedly are not. Virtually all politically minded Vietnamese have spent at least their adulthood, if not their whole lives, during the Communist struggle for power. Few indeed have not had their lives altered, conditioned or shaped thereby. Without appreciating what the Vietnamese have lived through and without recognizing some of the things they know intimately—often from all-too-first-hand experience—Westerners cannot hope to understand the attitude of Vietnamese now living south of the 17th parallel toward the insurgency, the Vietcong, the National Liberation Front and the Communist regime in Hanoi.

II

Under the direction of the man who now calls himself Ho Chi Minh, the Indochinese Community Party was organized in January, 1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese Communists concentrated on perfecting their organization, jockeying for position within the rising anti-French nationalist movement and attempting to undercut nationalist leaders or groups whom they could not subvert or bring under Communist control, using any means available, including betrayal to the French.

In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined a nationalist organization called the League for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Ho—or Vietminh) which was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Vietnamese Communists to further their own political objectives. By 1945 the Vietminh movement was under complete Communist control, despite the continued presence and subordinate participation therein of non-Communist nationalist elements whose names and talents the Communists were more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender, the Communists used the Vietminh as a device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh.

On November 11, 1945, in an effort to make the Vietminh government more palatable to non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chinese Nationalist forces then occupying Vietnam down to the 16th parallel, Ho formally "dissolved" the Indochinese Communist Party, though the impact of this gesture on the discerning was considerably attenuated when the same day witnessed the formation of a new "Association for Marxist Studies." Complete control over the Vietminh and the subsequent resistance struggle, however, remained unchanged in essentially the same hands as those which control North Vietnam and the insurgency below the 17th parallel today.²

By the late spring of 1946, the fact of Communist control over the Vietminh (despite the "nonexistence" of the party) was becoming increasingly apparent, as was the fact that Ho's political maneuvering and stalling negotiations with the returning French were not going to work. In preparation for the inevitable struggle, Ho endeavored to broaden the Communists' base of nationalist support. In May 1946 he announced the creation of a new "popular national front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Vietnam), known as the Lien-Viet, whose announced objective was the achievement of "independence and democracy." The Vietminh was merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve as a generic label for those who participated in the subsequent armed struggle against the French. The Communists also brought into the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties which by then were under complete Communist control: the "Democratic Party," designed to appeal to "bourgeois elements" (i.e. urban trade, business, and professional circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party," designed to enlist the sympathies of students and intellectuals.

The war with the French broke out on

²Despite the Vietnamese Communists' claim that their party did not "exist" under any name from 1945 until 1951, on Aug. 31, 1953, the Cominform journal noted that Vietnamese Communist Party membership increased from 20,000 in 1946 to 500,000 in 1950.

December 19, 1946, and its general course is sufficiently well known to require no rehearsal here. The northern part of Vietnam constituted the principal theater of military operations; the struggle in the south, though intense, was primarily a terrorist and harassing action designed to keep the French off balance and prevent them from concentrating either their attention or their forces on the war in the north. Though the Vietminh achieved these objectives, their efforts in South Vietnam were beset with a continuing series of problems. French control of the sea, air, and major overland routes left the Vietminh in the south dependent for supplies, reinforcements, cadres, and communications on a tortuous set of jungle tracks running through Laos (along the western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which came to be known, collectively, as the "Ho Chi Minh trail." Saigon politics were considerably more complex than those of Hanoi, and non-Communist Vietnamese political groups were both more numerous and more powerful in the south than they were in the north. Furthermore, the Communist leaders of the Vietminh had a series of command and control problems with their southern organization which took several years to resolve.

In 1945, the senior Vietminh representative in southern Vietnam was a Moscow-educated disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the Third International named Tran Van Glau, whose blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate terrorist tactics alienated key groups that the Vietminh were anxious to bring into their fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Glau was accordingly recalled to Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Vietminh commander in the south were assumed by Nguyen Binh. Although eminently successful in harassing the French and furthering the cause of the nationalist revolution, Binh—a former member of the Communists' most militant nationalist rivals, the VNQDD—was never fully trusted by the Communist high command in the north and came to be considered excessively independent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a charter member of the Indochinese Communist Party who is now first secretary of the Communist Party in North Vietnam and one of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi regime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later, Le Duan continued to play a major role in developing and directing the Vietminh organization in the south and in ensuring that it remained under firm Communist control. However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was apparently compelled to share his authority with Le Duc Tho, the present head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Organization Bureau and also a member of its Politburo.³

The 1949 Communist victory in China had a profound influence on the course of events in Vietnam, particularly after the Vietminh offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the French out of the frontier area and gave the Vietminh a common border with their new Communist neighbor. The military consequences of ensuring Chinese Communist support to the Vietminh cause are fairly well known. The political consequences, less well known in the West, were of at least equal significance. With an increasingly powerful fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the Communist leadership of the Vietminh be-

³During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and Le Duc Tho apparently had a violent quarrel over tactics which Ho Chi Minh himself had to settle. The details of this dispute are still obscure, but the resultant enmity between these two men has never been completely dissipated.

and hence could not consider itself bound by them.⁷

Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the Geneva settlement had cheated them of the full fruits of their victory, but on the whole the Communists had no reason to be dissatisfied with the results. The land-reform program was then in full cry and consolidation of Communist control over the north was the task immediately at hand. The south could wait, particularly since its chances of survival as an independent political entity seemed nil at the time.

The Lao Dong leadership went through the motions of overt compliance with the provisions of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, though in doing so they took a number of steps to preserve a subversive potential in the south and thus insure themselves against unfavorable political contingencies. In accordance with the agreement, some 50,000 Vietminh troops were regrouped in specified areas below the 17th parallel and taken north, along with 25,000-odd Vietminh adherents and supporters. The Communists were very careful, however, to leave behind a network of cadres, which were instructed to blend into the scenery, deny Communist affiliation and agitate in favor of the scheduled elections. They also left behind a large number of weapons caches (3,561 of which were discovered between September 1954 and June 1959) against the day when their southern apparatus might have to augment political action with armed forces. The composition of the units taken north was also carefully structured with an eye to possible future needs. The Communists made sure that many of the persons involved were young, employing both coercion and impressment to get the kind of people that they wanted. Before they departed, personnel designated for regroupment were strongly encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered to contract local marriages and family alliances in South Vietnam. These would stand them in good stead if they ever had to return.

In the aftermath of Geneva, the area south of the 17th parallel was in a state of political chaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo Dinh Diem, who became Premier on July 7, 1954, had only the shell of a government, no competent civil service, and a far from trustworthy army. In addition to all its other difficulties, the Diem government was also soon faced with an unexpected problem of major magnitude: refugees from the north. The myth that the Vietminh was a purely nationalist movement to which virtually all Vietnamese freely gave their political allegiance and that "Uncle Ho" was almost universally loved and esteemed by his compatriots was rudely shattered soon after Geneva by what became, proportionately, one of history's most spectacular politically motivated migrations.

⁷The American position was formally enunciated by President Eisenhower in a July 21, 1954, statement, which said in part: " * * * the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in art. 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern."

Article 14(d) of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement promised that civilians could move freely to whichever "regrouping zone" they preferred. The Communists accepted this provision with a notable lack of enthusiasm, hindered its implementation in a variety of ways and eventually, when its application became altogether too embarrassing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all Communist intimidation, obstruction and harassment, however, some 900,000 people fled from the north to the south uprooting themselves and their families in order to avoid living under Ho Chi Minh's Communist regime. (Given the relative population sizes, this was the political equivalent of 9 million Americans leaving the United States.) As many as 400,000 more wanted to leave, and were entitled to do so under article 14(d), but were not permitted by the Communist authorities to depart.

The 2-year period from 1954 to 1956 was one of political progress and achievement in South Vietnam that would have been considered impossible at the time of Geneva. The situation which prevailed in the summer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock of its prospects. The rather pro forma protests made by North Vietnam at the passing of the Geneva election deadline suggest that Hanoi's rulers were not so perturbed by the fact that the elections were not held as they were over the increasing disparity between political life north and south of the 17th parallel, a contrast considerably less than flattering to their regime. The north was just emerging from the throes of the land-reform campaign and was in a state of economic turmoil, while the south presented a picture of increasing political stability and incipient prosperity.

Hanoi accordingly recognized that more decisive action would be required if the south was to be brought under its control. Instructions were transmitted to the Communist network left behind in the south directing these cadres to begin agitation and political organization. The Lao Dong Party set up a department of its central committee called the Central Reunification Department, which was made responsible for all matters concerning individuals who had been regrouped to the north during the post-Geneva exchange of forces. The following year (1957) a PAVN major-general named Nguyen Van Vinh, who had served in various responsible posts in the south during the Franco-Vietminh war, was named chairman of this Reunification Department, an office he still holds.

The 1956-58 period was unusually complex, even for Vietnam. Diem, in effect, reached his political high-water mark sometime around mid-1957. After that, his methods of operation, traits of character and dependence on his family became set with ever increasing rigidity along lines which ultimately led to his downfall. Despite the undeniable progress of its early years, his government was never successful in giving the bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry positive reasons for identifying their personal fortunes with its political cause. The administrators Diem posted to the countryside were often corrupt and seldom native to the areas to which they were assigned, a fact which caused them to be considered as "foreigners" by the intensely clannish and provincial peasantry. Land policies, often admirable in phraseology, were notably weak in execution and frequently operated to the benefit of absentee landlords rather than those who actually tilled the soil.

Such factors as these, coupled with the still manifest consequences of a decade of war, generated genuine grievances among the peasantry which the Communists were quick to exploit and exacerbate. Communist cadres began their organizational efforts among the disgruntled and the ill-served. They harped on local issues and avoided

preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were formed, village committees established and small military units organized. A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society: schoolteachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly but steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Vietcong," constituted a serious threat to South Vietnam's political stability.

Despite the increasing trouble that Vietcong bands were causing and despite the Vietcong's initial success in organizational work, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the pace of Vietcong progress and was particularly chagrined at the movement's failure to win a really significant political following. Several Vietcong cadre members who were subsequently captured have reported that in late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an extensive inspection trip in the south, and that upon his return to Hanoi in early 1959 he presented a list of recommendations subsequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central Committee and referred to in Vietcong cadre training sessions as "Resolution 15." These recommendations laid out the whole future course of the southern insurgency, including the establishment of a National Liberation Front to be controlled by the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese branch of the Lao Dong Party and supported by a South Vietnamese "liberation army." The Front was to be charged with conducting a political struggle, backed by armed force, designed to neutralize the south and pave the way for "reunification," i.e., political domination by Hanoi. We can be certain that some such decisions were made about this time, for in May 1959 the Lao Dong Central Committee declared that "the time has come to struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash [the GVN]."

The consequences of these Hanoi decisions became increasingly apparent during the 18 months which followed the Central Committee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and intensity of Vietcong activity began to increase by quantum jumps. Communist military moves in Laos secured the corridor area along the North Vietnamese border and infiltrators from the north began moving down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail": a few hundred in 1959, around 3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000 in 1961.

During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of the various stresses within the South Vietnamese body politic occurred. Diem's military establishment had been designed to counter the threat of conventional invasion and proved ill suited to cope with insurrectionary warfare. The quality of government administrators grew worse rather than better as Diem became increasingly inclined, in making key appointments, to put loyalty to himself and his family ahead of ability. His agrarian policies, particularly the disastrous "agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh sources of rural discontent. The Vietcong were quick to take advantage of the government's errors and steadily heightened the intensity of their terrorist activity. To complicate matters further there were rising political pressures within the non-Communist camp and a growing feeling that Diem had to be ousted before his methods of government made a Communist victory inevitable.

During the 1958-60 period, Hanoi's hand in southern troubles was quite imperfectly

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now claims to be a coalition of over 40 "associated organizations" which, collectively, purport to represent virtually all shades and strata of South Vietnamese political and social life. This coalition includes three "political parties": the PRP, the "Democratic Party" and the "Radical Socialist Party." (The latter two bear almost exactly the same names as the two minor parties allowed to exist in North Vietnam and are obviously intended to play similar roles.) In their present name or form, virtually none of its affiliated organizations antedates the founding of the NLF itself, many almost certainly exist only on paper, and a careful analysis of the NLF's own propaganda makes it clear that a goodly number have identical officers, directorates, and staffs. Some of these organizations, however, have acquired substance after the fact, as it were, and now play important roles in the NLF's efforts to organize and control the rural populace.

It is fairly easy to devise an organizational structure capable of lending verisimilitude to a political fiction, doubly so if one is trying to deceive a foreign audience unversed in local political affairs. Fleshing this structure out with live, known individuals to occupy posts of public prominence is considerably more difficult. The Vietcong obviously hoped to attract to the NLF South Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, preferably individuals not immediately identifiable as Communists or Communist sympathizers, who could enhance the Front's prestige and political attractiveness and provide a more or less innocent facade behind which the NLF's Communist masters could operate in secure obscurity. To date the Vietcong have been notably unsuccessful in this regard, though the full measure of their failure is far better appreciated within South Vietnam itself than it is abroad. No Vietnamese of what could accurately be described as significant personal prestige or professional standing—not even one of known leftist persuasion—has ever been willing to associate himself publicly with the NLF or lend it the use of his name.

The NLF's first Central Committee was not announced until March 1962, well over a year after the Front's supposedly spontaneous creation. Though the committee purportedly had 52 members, the NLF was able to come up with only 31 names, most of which were virtually unknown even within South Vietnam. The 41-member second (and current) Central Committee, announced in January 1964, is equally lacking in distinction.

The Chairman of the NLF's Presidium and Central Committee is Nguyen Huu Tho, a former provincial lawyer with a long record of activity in Communist-sponsored causes but of little political repute or professional standing among his former colleagues at the South Vietnamese bar, who generally categorize him as having been an "avocat sans briefs." The NLF's present Secretary General (also the Secretary General of the "Democratic Party" and the Chairman of the NLF's Saigon Zone Committee) is Huynh Tan Phat, usually described in NLF propaganda as an "architect," though one would be hard pressed to point to any edifices he has designed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently served as a member of the Vietnam/Vietcong Executive Committee in Nambo and as the Communists' propaganda chief for their Saigon Special Zone. The NLF's First Secretary General (also the Secretary General of the "Radical Socialist Party") was Nguyen Van Hieu, now its principal traveling representative abroad. A former journalist and teacher (some say of biology, some of mathematics), Hieu has been a Communist propagandist since the late 1940's. The Chairman of the NLF's External Relations (i.e. foreign affairs and propaganda) Committee is Tran Buu Kiem, a Central Committee member

who served briefly as Secretary General after Hieu and before Phat. Described in official NLF biographies as an "intellectual and ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the past two decades as a leader in various Communist-front youth groups. Such figures as these are the best the Front has been able to come up with to staff its most prominent public offices. Their organizational and revolutionary talents may be impressive, but their personal stature and prestige among the South Vietnamese people are not.

v

Over the past 4 years the Vietcong have labored mightily to improve their image beyond South Vietnam's borders and to enlist a broad spectrum of international support for their cause; to develop their organizational structure within South Vietnam, thus strengthening their internal political position; and to expand their military effort, to facilitate achievement of their political goals and if possible to generate an aura of invincibility capable of breaking their adversaries' will to continue the struggle.

The image-building campaign abroad has been designed to publicize the NLF and inflate its prestige and reputation. Its goal has been to get the NLF generally accepted as an indigenous South Vietnamese political coalition (admittedly with some Communist members) which sprang up spontaneously to combat the harsh excesses of the U.S.-supported Diem regime, and which seeks only peace, democracy and reunification as provided for in the Geneva agreements. Though moral—and, to some extent perhaps, physical—support may be afforded by North Vietnam and other fraternal socialist states (so the argument runs), the NLF is basically an independent political entity with a policy and will of its own. This campaign has been waged through the propaganda disseminated by the Liberation News Agency, replayed and echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) media throughout the world; through a steady flow of messages from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state (particularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); by ever increasing attendance at foreign conferences and meetings (generally Communist or leftist sponsored) by a small handful of indefatigable NLF representatives; and by the establishment of permanent NLF "missions" in Havana, Peking, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Djakarta, and Algiers. All of this activity has profited from the fact that knowledge of the realities of political life in South Vietnam does not extend much beyond its frontiers; all of it has been guided by a keen awareness of the effectiveness of incessant repetition in converting myth to assumed reality.

Throughout South Vietnam, the Vietcong have developed and employed the NLF apparatus in their intensive effort to organize the population (especially the rural population), involve it in their insurgency campaign and bring it under their political domination. The detailed application of this effort varies from locality to locality, and is materially influenced by such local factors as the relative degree of Vietcong strength in the area. The objective, however, is always to secure total participation and total involvement on the part of the local population in order to establish total Vietcong control. They endeavor to persuade—and, if conditions permit, compel—every inhabitant of a given area to join and work actively in some NLF component organization. Farmers are encouraged or forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Association; women, the Liberation Women's Association; children, the Liberation Youth Association. Where Vietcong control is strong, no one escapes the net. Physically fit males not sent off to some other Vietcong military unit serve in the local militia squad or self-defense platoon; women, children, and old men help make bamboo stakes and traps or

dig up roads to harass government forces. They serve as informants and couriers, or go on purchasing expeditions to nearby government-controlled market towns. Everyone participates and ensures that his neighbor does so as well. All of this activity is coordinated and directed by local NLF committees which where circumstances permit, assume the prerogatives and functions of local government. These local committees in turn are directed by superior echelons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the central committee of the NLF itself.

The NLF's organizational structure is paralleled and controlled at each echelon by a complementary PRP structure. Under the general command of its central committee, the PRP is organized on a geographic basis through the various regions, provinces, and districts down to the village level. Each geographic echelon has a directing committee responsible for controlling all PRP—hence all Vietcong, including NLF—activities within its area. These committees vary in size and organizational complexity, even among equivalent geographic echelons, but each one has a single chairman and several subordinate members or subcommittees with specific functional responsibilities. The number and nomenclature of these functional subcommittees also varies from area to area, but they normally cover military affairs, economic and financial affairs, and what the Communists term "front affairs and civilian proselytizing," whose chairman is responsible for controlling all NLF activity in that area. If the PRP organization at that echelon is sufficiently well developed, he in turn will have subordinate members of his PRP subcommittee to direct each of the local associations affiliated with the NLF. Though captured documents indicate that the Vietcong try to keep the level of overt PRP participation below two-fifths of the total membership of any given NLF component, the organizational structure we have just described (reinforced by a network of covert PRP cells throughout the NLF) keeps all components of the NLF at every level under complete PRP control.

The Vietcong's terrorist and military apparatus was developed and is directed by this same organizational structure, which insures that armed activity at all levels is rigidly subordinated to political objectives and kept under tight party control. The Vietcong military establishment now has over 90,000 full-time troops (including over 12,000 North Vietnamese regulars) augmented and supported by something over 100,000 paramilitary personnel and part-time guerrillas. This whole force, however, was built up for political reasons, to serve political ends. The Vietcong political apparatus was at work laying the foundations for insurgency long before there was even so much as a Vietcong hamlet self-defense squad.

The director of the military affairs subcommittee (mentioned above) is frequently also the commander of the Vietcong force attached to that geographic echelon. Village directing committees have village platoons under their control; district committees, district companies; provincial committees, provincial battalions. Regional committees have forces of regimental and multi-regimental size at their disposal, and the whole Vietcong military establishment is subject to the direction of PRP's Central Committee. Throughout this military structure, the same basic principles of organization and command relationship are uniformly applied. There is no such thing as a Vietcong military unit of any size independent of the party's political apparatus or free from tight political control. Probably no more than a third of the Vietcong forces are party members, but by virtue of its organizational mechanism the PRP controls the "Liberation Army" in the same way that it controls the National Liberation Front.

An understanding of the Vietcong's organizational structure enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into South Vietnam since the Lao Dong Party's 1959 decision to pursue its objective of political conquest by waging insurgent war. Until mid to late 1963 these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from the pool of regrouped Vietminh forces and supporters taken north in 1954. They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications specialists who built the Vietcong's military force into what it is today. They also became the village, district, provincial, and regional committee chiefs and key committee members who built the Vietcong's political apparatus.

The earlier arrivals had had at least 5 days of indoctrination and training in North Vietnam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, before departing on their southern missions; some of the later arrivals have had nearly a decade of such preparation. Until the recent sharp rise in Vietcong battlefield casualties, approximately a third of all the personnel in Vietcong military units at and above the district company level were "returnees" trained in the north. At least half of the membership of most PRP district committees, and an even larger proportion at higher echelons, also appear to be "returnees." Without this infiltration from the north, in short, the present Vietcong organization could never have been developed.

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The Vietcong insurgency is clearly a masterpiece of revolutionary organization, but its total effectiveness and real political strength are extremely difficult to assess. The bulk of the Vietcong's organizational efforts have been expended in rural areas and it is there that they are strongest. (The government controls all of the cities, major towns, and provincial capitals and all but a handful of the district seats.) There are indications, however, that sharply rising Vietcong taxation rates, increasingly frequent, resort to impressment to secure troops, and the Vietcong's manifest inability to deliver on political promises of earlier years are all beginning to erode their base of rural support. During the past year nearly 800,000 refugees fled from the hinterland to the vicinity of government-controlled towns. Some of these were fleeing from natural disasters, some from the simple hazards of war (though the direction in which persons of this category opted to flee is significant), but many were obviously endeavoring to get out from under the Vietcong. Furthermore, in assessing Communist claims of control it should be noted that over half of the rural population voted in the May 1965 provincial elections, despite Vietcong orders to boycott them.

In the cities, the Vietcong have an obvious terrorist capability but are politically quite weak—a fact of which they are aware and which, according to captured documents, causes them considerable embarrassment. They have been unable to turn the urban political ferment of the past 3 years to any obvious immediate advantage. None of the participants in the genuine social revolution now taking place in the urban areas of South Vietnam has sought Vietcong support or entertained overtures of political alliance. Though they have undoubtedly penetrated such groups as the Buddhists and the students, the Vietcong have made no visible headway in subverting or bringing them under the NLF banner. Just how weak the Vietcong are in the cities was demonstrated

twice last fall (on Oct. 15 and Dec. 19) when two public calls by the Vietcong for a "general strike" went totally unheeded and produced no visible change whatsoever in the pattern of urban life.

Despite its leaders' obvious organizational talents and revolutionary skills, the Vietcong movement is beset with a number of fundamental weaknesses. It has no universally appealing theme in any way comparable to the Vietminh's espousal of anti-French nationalism. Persistent propaganda efforts to portray the Americans as successor imperialists to the French have simply never taken hold. The concept of reunification has relatively little appeal for peasants who regard someone from the next province as an alien. The idea of reunification does appeal to politically minded urban elements, particularly to refugees from the north, but within such circles there is a great reluctance to accept the Vietcong's identification of reunification with political domination by the present Hanoi regime. Having lived through the sequence of historical events we have outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are not easily deceived by the NLF's pretensions to independence and freedom from northern control, particularly since the military side of the Vietcong insurgency is now being waged with an ever larger number of North Vietnamese troops.

The current struggle in South Vietnam is a historically rooted, political phenomenon of infinite complexity, particularly since it involves an externally directed Communist drive for power interlarded with a genuine indigenous social revolution. In analyzing such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a function of one's angle of vision, and myth is not always easy to distinguish from reality. Despite the fact that there are many aspects of the current situation in Vietnam concerning which confident assertion is a mark of ignorance or disingenuous intent, there are certain aspects of the insurgency, and of the Vietcong structure through which it is being waged, which are not open to intellectually honest dispute.

There are unquestionably many non-Communists heroically serving in various components of the National Liberation Front out of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in the honest belief that they are thereby helping to build a better political structure for their native land. As an organization, however, the NLF is a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi.

The relationship between the Vietcong and the DRV is not that of politically like-minded allies. Instead, it is essentially the relationship between a field command and its parent headquarters. Such relationships are never free from elements of tension and discord. Within the Vietcong movement, and even within its controlling hierarchy, there are unquestionably varying judgments (at least privately held ones) about the wisdom of present tactics and the best course of future action. (There are obvious differences of opinion regarding the struggle in Vietnam even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) Nevertheless, the whole Vietcong organizational structure and chain of command has been carefully designed to minimize the risks of insubordination. Though for tactical reasons the overt propaganda, outlets and spokesmen of the NLF sometimes take political positions which differ at least in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of the Vietcong's developing or adopting a genuinely independent political line in opposition to orders received from North Vietnam through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are slight indeed.

Finally, although the Vietcong organization is unquestionably a major factor in the South Vietnamese political scene, the NLF

mechanism which it controls has no serious claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists, the "sole legitimate voice of the South Vietnamese people." Were it ever to be accepted as such, the record of what has happened in North Vietnam in the years since 1951 makes it abundantly clear what lies in store for the more than 16 million Vietnamese who live south of the 17th parallel, especially for those who have resolutely fought against the Vietcong insurgency from its inception.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield on the same terms to the distinguished senior Senator from Florida.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall of course vote for the pending bill. I supported the bill in committee. I support the bill now.

Mr. President, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman, spoke at the Governor's Day luncheon of the Florida Citrus Showcase sponsored by the Florida Citrus Mutual in Winter Haven, Fla., on Friday, February 18, 1966, just a week after his return from Vietnam. His speech related in the main to his observations in Vietnam, with particular reference to food and the agricultural situation there.

I feel that Secretary Freeman's speech throws much light on conditions in Vietnam which are directly related to the contents of the pending bill. I therefore ask unanimous consent to have the Secretary's speech printed in the RECORD in full at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ORVILLE L. FREEMAN'S SPEECH AT THE GOVERNOR'S DAY LUNCHEON OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS SHOWCASE, SPONSORED BY THE FLORIDA CITRUS MUTUAL IN WINTER HAVEN, FLA., FEBRUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished officers and leaders of Citrus Mutual, of the Citrus Showcase, the mayor of this lovely community, members of your State cabinet, your State treasurer, your commissioner of agriculture, members of the State legislature, leaders of the citrus industry, ladies, and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here. I am flattered that you would ask me back again. I was here with you about a year and a half ago and enjoyed it thoroughly and am certainly pleased to be here once again.

I want, today, to talk to you a little bit in broad terms about agriculture in the world in which we live. Agriculture is the key to world peace. Agriculture is the key to the victory in Vietnam.

First, however, I want to express my most sincere commendation to you, your organizations and to this industry, to the leadership, the foresight you have shown, to your excellent job of marketing. I remember quite vividly about a year ago, when your distinguished executive vice president, Bob Rutledge, who serves you so effectively, came to my office and reviewed and discussed with me some of your marketing plans. And I listened with special interest because I have been concerned. You had learned how, as our agriculture has generally, to produce mightily. Sometimes that really challenges us in this country.

It is a blessed thing for which we ought to be truly thankful, but we haven't always learned how to live with that abundance, how to market it, and how to effectively get it where it is needed at the terms and con-

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ditions and at the price where people will utilize it. And so to note the excellent progress in your new plant, the fine reception of the new concentrate, to note some of the good work you have done in marketing abroad, I am glad to have the chance as the Secretary of Agriculture to come here and say to you, well done.

A week ago today, I was in a little village in South Vietnam at a training camp called Vung Tau. I was sitting on a folding chair beside a canal listening to one of the most impressive men I have ever heard in my life. Dressed in a simple, black pajama, he outlined for me the course of training of the rural construction cadres, made up of peasant boys who volunteered to go back into their home provinces and villages to hold those villages, to pacify those villages, after the military has taken them away from the Vietcong.

He was a tremendously impressive fellow. Some had likened him to a saint. He said in a very soft voice that these young boys are looking for some meaning in their lives which had been wrecked by war. All their lives had been spent in a nation engaged in war. They have been pretty cynical, generally, as to their stake in its future. And he told a little legend, very simple, about the beautiful lady and the dragon and how an accommodation between the lady and the dragon was developed and sustained. The spiritual side of life was the beautiful lady, the materialistic and powerful side of life was the dragon, and the harmony of the two was what gave meaning to life.

He went on with some other legends, and then said in a soft voice, "to the Vietnamese, this is much more understandable than the material of communism. The boys who have gone out of here have learned to be for something. They go out to secure and to hold these villages and fight to hold them if necessary."

And then he developed some of the symbolism which was a powerful part of this training course. He gave me one of their graduation pins. It has a T-H symbol on it, somewhat like our own 4-H Club symbol. He drew a hammer and a sickle on the blackboard, and then put the T-H over it. The hammer and the sickle were obliterated and he said these boys are obliterating that hammer and sickle everywhere around Vietnam.

We then looked at the rifle range. These men, he told me, fire more ammunition than the regular troops that are trained for actual battle. Then we saw the classrooms where they get general exposure to health, vocational, and agricultural training.

At the conclusion of their rural construction training, the night before they graduate, they sit out all night long and make up their minds whether they want to take a pledge which is part of the graduation ceremony next day, and take on the responsibility for caring for the ideals which he outlined; self-discipline, service, honesty, mercy to the old, the sick and the needy. This was couched in the traditional Vietnamese terms rather than ours but the meaning was exactly the same.

He said that during the new year celebration, the big ceremony of Vietnam, down the road in a single military camp they had 50 percent AWOL; in a military police training school they had 25 percent AWOL. But there wasn't a single man in the rural construction cadre who left. I was tremendously interested in this training center, because they have a workable system and it's based on hard experience that can win peasant support and ultimately win the war in Vietnam.

The military struggle is a bitter, difficult, complicated one. You don't know who the enemy is a good share of the time. We have the power and the resource and the fighting capacity to win the fighting war. But that doesn't do much good if a week

later the Vietcong infiltrate the area and take the village all over again. And that's what is happening. What's got to be done is this: We've got to win the hearts and minds of those poor people who have been promised and promised and promised and abused and decimated all these years.

Last year, 1,500 local government officials were brutally murdered, some of them tortured and captured, simply because they were doing a good job. The Vietcong is on an organized, purposeful program of terror and destruction. This would be the equivalent in the United States of 50,000 mayors and county commissioners. Now if 50,000 local officials in this country were murdered in one year—it's anybody's guess as to what it would mean. Now these boys who go out of this camp are to work with the military in areas being pacified or already pacified. They are to go into an area in teams of 50 men. They are highly trained; highly armed. They know how to use those weapons. They are highly motivated to help the peasants, but they are ready to fight. But they don't go into the countryside to fight, they go there to build.

And as Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, Minister of Rural Construction, a very impressive young Vietnamese general, said to me, "we don't go to hit and run, we go to hit and stay." And they go to the villages—their home villages in many cases—and they seek to get close to where those people live; to let them know that their government believes in them, wants to help them, to give them a stake in life.

I said to the general, "Well, now, I am the head of a cadre and I'm going into a village that has just been reclaimed. What's the first thing I do?" He said to me, "You keep your mouth shut." I thought that was a pretty good answer. He said when those folks want some help, you help them to help themselves. You don't give them anything; because if you give them something, it's not really theirs. If the Vietcong destroy it, it is not their loss. But if you help them build something and the Vietcong destroys it, then it is their loss.

About 20,000 have been trained already, and their training will be stepped up. The Vietnamese Government has selected a number of villages to be pacified with the help of these cadres. This is a hardheaded, hard-hitting, systematic job of pacification. And it is, as I say, a thoroughly planned and purposeful one. It carries within it, I think, the formula of victory.

Now this is the meaning of the spirit of Honolulu. I have just been back a few days and I have been rather shocked to find a good bit of cynicism about this in some quarters. I have difficulty understanding that because in Honolulu the President dramatized for the attention of the entire world the best in principles, the best in standards, that this Nation has; that we built ourselves to greatness with service, humanitarianism, concern for the people.

This is a second front of a two-front war. We have to win the tough, hard, difficult military part of this war. But of equal importance has to be the second part, what they call a social revolution in Vietnam. The word revolution has a much more positive cast to it, and it is broadly used, to give an identity, to give a meaning, to give a purpose to the lives of those people so that when the Vietcong come in, the people will notify the authorities so they can be rooted out. If they hide the Vietcong, if they protect them, if they don't report them, then it is an almost impossible task. So there is a two-front, sharp, clear objective—an objective in which I think we can feel pride, that we as a nation go out not only to stop the onrush of communism, but also go on to start and carry forward the onrush of human and social betterment.

I submit to you here today that that won't

be done if agriculture is not in the forefront in that effort. I said when I returned that in this war, fertilizer is just as important as bullets, and so it is. The essentials for effective agricultural production are ready, and we can make striking progress in agriculture in Vietnam.

What I found, really, was far beyond my expectations in light of the hardships under which those people live. If you ever wanted to see a justification for some of our dollars to be spent on helping other people, take a look at agriculture in Vietnam. It has only been 10 years and yet those little farmers, most of them tenants, or landowners with very small holdings, are using very modern practices of improved seed, fertilizer, chemicals, and pesticides, disease control in animals, and all the rest, whenever they can get it. They don't want it free. They want to buy it. But so far we haven't done as good a job as we should, in making it available. But where it has been available, they make every effort to get it.

I talked to one peasant who walked 15 miles with a basket on his head to buy 50 pounds of fertilizer and get a little package of seed and walked 15 miles back to his little hamlet. He knew about fertilizer. He knew about improved seed. All he wanted was a chance to use them, because, when he does, his yield of rice goes up 50 percent. And when yields go up 50 percent, he can buy his kids some clothes, and they have a little money in the village to build a little school. They then build a little better home. Then they have a stake in something. Then when the Vietcong come in after it, they are prepared to fight, and inform, and resist. What we need to do is to integrate agriculture effectively in the forefront of the second front of this two-front war.

Last Sunday, I was on the coast about in the midlands in Vietnam in an area called Phan Rang. I stood on a little plot of land on the coast that was plain sand. It had been sand dunes. It had been government land. It had been levelled off. Chinese technicians from Taiwan were there. They worked with the Vietnamese farmers on new techniques in growing vegetables. An onion, an adaptation of the Granex onion out of Texas that had been adapted by one of our plant technicians—took them 4 years to do it—was being planted on that hectare of land the peasant had gotten as a part of the land reform program. He netted on that 2½ acres 200,000 plastres—that's \$2,000 in American money. Growing rice in the same area, they were netting about \$20 an acre.

That peasant had a little irrigation system. He and a dozen others had gone together to buy a little gasoline engine pump for a shallow well. They had put in a little irrigation works—some shallow ditches. We saw the water flowing out. Onions, garlic and other kinds of vegetables were growing profusely. I had a picture taken with him with a basket of onions and vegetables besides, of all things, a bright red motorbike. He had made a little money, the first thing he wanted was a motorbike. Comparatively, you'd buy a Cadillac. And maybe he will one day, too. But a motorbike is a desirable status symbol; it means transportation.

And in this same area, I went to the village where he lived. They had a little self-help program to build a warehouse. The material was made available to them by the Vietnamese Government with our help. The people built the warehouse themselves. They were renting space in it to dry garlic. The rent was being paid. The village had made a little money and they were putting it in a school and a health clinic.

This was the only place I went in Vietnam where the province chief could travel at night out in the countryside. Most of the time they would go to see the people during the day. This fellow said to me, "I don't bother these people who are working

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in the fields by going to see them in the daytime. I go out and see them in the night, when they are available."

He was able to do that because his area was pacified. If the Vietcong move into that area he would be notified. He was a tough soldier but he was very good with these people, and it is not a normal mandarin attitude, you know, to say, "I adapt myself to the people." Politicians do that in the United States. They do not normally do that in Asia. But this philosophy was going forward. He could go out at night, because if anybody infiltrated that area, he got the word. And when he got the word, he got the troops out there and the Vietcong didn't last very long. This was an example of what can be done. It isn't easy.

These peasants have been promised to death. They are pretty skeptical; pretty cynical. They have been terrorized, brutalized, murdered, taxed by both sides, run off their land, run back on their land, and they have been in this war for 20 years. But I feel, really, that the sense of hopelessness and complacency that seems to permeate some parts of this country is not permanent. There is a base, for real hope; that we can win this war; that we can help these people. This nation can be a real bastion for freedom if we remember that this is a two-front war, that force alone is ineffective, that to go along with it you have to have service, accomplishment, and build a stake in society.

A lot of people have asked me, "What about these young generals? Do they mean it and will they do it?" It's hard to tell. You can only make a judgment.

I spent 3 hours in an airplane with General Ky. He is 35 years old. He is the Prime Minister. He was the commanding general of their air corps; very colorful, very smart, no particular background in government as such. I met all the corps commanders and all the top generals. The ruling group is about a dozen. I found them, without exception, bright and alert. They said the right words, and they said them with feeling.

For example, General Ky said a number of times: "It is a military war and a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. We are trying to bring about a true social revolution. We are instituting a program for a better society."

He then went on to say, "I think that the present government by and large has the confidence of the people. I think it has a greater measure of support than any of the previous governments. But that's not enough. We must have a government which has been freely elected by the people. Despite the many tasks we have on our hands today, I feel we can take on one more. And one, which next to winning the war I speak about, is most important and that is building democracy in Vietnam."

Prime Minister Ky said extemporaneously when the Vice President left Saigon: "I am sure Mr. HUMPHREY, prior to his visit here, was not convinced of the ability of the young generals, sometimes called the young Turks, to rule our nation. I'm sure that now he must recognize that we are more civilian than the civilians, and we love freedom more than freemen and desire democracy more than you do in the United States."

The Prime Minister grabbed a microphone in Honolulu at the conclusion of the press conference and said, "I'm not a war lord. I'm tired of fighting. I've been shot at all my life. I risk assassination every day. I want to win this war and help my people." He said, "I don't have a car. I don't have any property," and went on to say that his stake was one of service.

Only time will tell how sincere and effective these young generals are.

I was impressed with them, with their ability and their dedication but also with the fact that they are a smart, tough bunch. They had to be to survive. Some of them have been wounded six times. They were fighting in the jungles almost before they could walk. To survive that and the political wars, the coups and the rest, they have to have something on the ball. And they know as sure as day follows night that they can't win that war, repel that invasion, and make Vietnam a free nation unless they can earn the support and loyalty of their people. And so for that reason if for no other reason, they are going about their business. They don't do it always like we do. They are not as efficient and effective as your Commissioner of Agriculture here, for example, and your State Treasurer. Not as experienced in government, but they are tough minded, alert, and determined.

I went to Vietnam and took with me at the President's instructions 10 of the best agricultural specialists in this country in the fields of crops, chemicals, livestock, irrigation, and fishing—and we came back feeling positive; not overwhelmingly optimistic, building glowing word pictures, but feeling that there is a real purpose and that this is not a hopeless morass, that this war can be won and that it is vitally important that it should be won. We also felt real pride in our own profession of agriculture, because it is the key. Agriculture is the key in Vietnam, as it is the key around the world in the great race taking place between food and people.

On February 10, the President sent to the Congress a great message, a food-for-freedom message, calling on this Nation to mobilize its agricultural resources and to wheel them into action to help those nations who would help themselves so that this race can be won and the world will be able to feed itself. This is the greatest challenge we face down the road.

All of us who work in this great area, then, work not only to serve our Nation and our communities. We stand right at the heart-beat of the future well-being of mankind. A world that isn't fed, a world plagued and dogged by famine and desperation and malnutrition, is never going to be a peaceful world. So as you skillfully carry forward your work in this great industry, we join in seeking to use the power that comes with this great capacity to produce and as a great free Nation to use it effectively, so other people can have as great a stake in freedom as we have and there is no stake where there is no food.

The challenge down the road is a great one but is one that I think we can meet. I came back from Vietnam challenged but reassured. We'll win this one as we have won them before.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania permit us to have the yeas and nays on final passage?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second, and the yeas and nays are ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, there has been some discussion in the last couple of minutes about the possible bombing or mining of Haiphong Harbor. I should like to call to the attention of the Senators the statement made by Secretary McNamara on page 177 of the record where he testified that since the tonnage required for the support of enemy troops in South Vietnam is relatively small, the function of mining the harbor of Haiphong—and I imagine it would be the same result from bombing the harbor of Haiphong—would not materially affect the course of the war itself.

I wonder if the committee is in accord with the view of the Secretary, that it would not presently be useful from our overall point of view to attack Haiphong either by bombing or mining.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That view was stated in an indirect fashion by General Wheeler, as I recall, in his testimony before the committee. I must say, with all due respect to General Wheeler—and I do have very genuine respect for him—that in my opinion it flies in the face of commonsense to say that the closing of the harbor at Haiphong has a lower priority than the bombing of the petroleum dumps, the petroleum for which has come in through Haiphong Harbor.

It seems to me it would be self-evident even to a lay mind that it would be more effective to close the stopper of a bottle than to pour out the contents and set the bottle back down to be refilled. That is all that would be accomplished by clearing the petroleum dumps, because the next day a tanker could come into Haiphong and replenish these dumps.

There are a number of ways to close this harbor other than bombing. I am not committed altogether to closing the harbor by bombing. It so happens that there is a narrow waterway leading into the harbor. Two dredges work there constantly. Those dredges could be sunk by naval gunfire to close the harbor for a short period. It could be mined, or it could, if desired, be bombed; or a naval blockade could be established with a half dozen destroyers.

But I think it is self-evident that the closing of the harbor itself would be more injurious to the war effort of the North Vietnamese than bombing supplies, even as important as a petroleum dump, which can be immediately replenished by another tanker coming into that harbor. It simply does not make sense to me to say that closing the harbor has a much lower priority than these petroleum dumps.

Mr. CLARK. So to that extent, the Senator disagrees with Secretary McNamara?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Oh, yes, indeed, I disagree flatly with him on that point, and also disagree with General Wheeler.

I wish to add that at one time all the Chiefs of Staff thought that closing the harbor at Haiphong should have a very high priority, and it is only of late that there has been any disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. Gladly.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Georgia brought up the point I intended to bring up, there is disagreement in testimony before the committee. So I hope the American people will be informed, and information not classified. There is disagreement among the military as to the importance of closing the harbor at Haiphong.

Why should they not close that harbor? Only two railroads come down from China. One which we have not been hitting since the resumption is the railroad from the industrial section of

Manchuria into Vietnam. The other railroad comes from west to east. From the standpoint of commonsense and economy, why would they use that? But we have been hitting that latter railroad. There are a few roads which in the main I understand are not in too good shape.

But nobody could know what is coming through the Haiphong Harbor. Testimony before the committee admits, a very large majority of the oil moving into North Vietnam comes through the harbor at Haiphong. Obviously, those trucks that go down the Ho Chi Minh Trail must have that oil to be used. Statements have been made that it is thought relatively little ammunition comes through the harbor; but who knows what is in the boxes on the docks of that harbor? There is no reason for anybody to extrapolate what the many ships going into that harbor have on them. Anybody who looks at the map knows the Haiphong Harbor is the easiest, least expensive, and most effective way of getting in the tremendous amounts of supplies coming into North Vietnam to kill our troops in South Vietnam. If anybody does not think most of it is coming through the harbor, where else it is coming from?

The answer we hear is, "They don't need very much." But I was down in the Mekong Delta in recent weeks, and saw hundreds of magnificent weapons—made mostly in China, but also quite a few from Soviet Russia—on exhibit in the center of the town square in Can Tho. That exhibit showed to my satisfaction where those weapons were coming from. If they do not come over the railroad we are not attacking, and if they do not come from the harbor, where are they coming from? As we know, the Communists do not have any logistic support in the way of air power.

Mr. CLARK. I say to my friend, the Senator from Georgia, I have only one or two questions more. The hour is getting late; we are almost ready to vote. I should like, if I can, to finish it up.

On page 178, the Secretary of Defense testified that the industries in North Vietnam contribute very little to the supplies used in the south for the prosecution of the war.

He also said that wiping out the entire industry of North Vietnam would have no measurable effect upon their capability to furnish the supplies they are presently supplying to the Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Does the Senator agree with that?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do not agree with it in toto. I think it is substantially correct. But I have information and we have had some evidence that there is an iron foundry in the vicinity of Hanoi, which manufactures literally millions of hand grenades that are being used in this war.

With that exception, I think that the Secretary's statement is approximately correct.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his patience. I have one final question.

It appears in the hearings that if we were to destroy the petroleum depots in North Vietnam, and they got no fuel for their trucks in the south, they—that is, the enemy—could move the quantities of supplies now being moved by animal and by manpower. At page 299 of the hearings, Admiral McDonald asserted that the Vietcong in South Vietnam need few petroleum items, because they walk everywhere.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Well, that is true when one measures their equipment against the vehicles that are operated in modern warfare.

But petroleum is still a very essential element of war. Most of the materiel that is carried from Haiphong down into South Vietnam over the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh trail is carried by trucks. We have had the good luck once or twice lately to find a truck convoy exposed on the roads and attack it from the air, and have destroyed a great many of the trucks.

Those people, however, are resourceful. We had evidence before the committee that they were using elephants to carry supplies, and that they were using large numbers of people, bearers, who can carry three or four times their own weight.

Mr. CLARK. And bicycles.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that they would put on a bicycle 300 or 400 pounds of equipment, and push it along.

They are very resourceful people. They have been engaged in a war of this nature now for more than 20 years.

Mr. CLARK. Since the Japanese moved in.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They have had a great deal of experience in it, and are probably the most efficient guerrilla fighters on earth today, and would compare favorably with any in recorded history.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the Senator from Georgia, and I yield the floor.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his request, and yield to me for a moment?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT. I mention to the distinguished Senator from Georgia that the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] asked a question which has not been answered, and I would appreciate the help of the Senator in supplying an answer.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator for the compliment implied.

Mr. SCOTT. I am sure the Senator has information which would be helpful and useful.

The reference made by the junior Senator from Pennsylvania was to page 178, the testimony of Secretary McNamara, wherein he stated:

The industry in the north is so small that it plays a very little role in the economy of the north, and I think any of the analysts who have studied the problem would say it could be completely eliminated and not re-

duce in any substantial way the contribution of the North to South Vietnam.

Paraphrasing the Senator from Missouri, he said that if they are getting their materiel through Haiphong, it does not amount to anything, and if North Vietnam is not contributing anything of substance to South Vietnam, meaning to the South Vietnamese, the anti—

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Vietcong.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, the Vietcong, in other words—then said the Senator from Missouri, where are the Vietcong—if I can paraphrase him further—where are the Vietcong getting their supplies from?

What would the Senator from Georgia say to that?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would say that they are getting it from a great many sources. As I stated a few moments ago, undoubtedly thousands of hand grenades are being made in North Vietnam. An iron foundry, I believe, is located on the outskirts of Hanoi, or it could be on the outskirts of Haiphong, but they do have one iron foundry which does make some equipment; but, the great bulk of their equipment, all of their sophisticated equipment, such as 50 caliber machine guns, 55 millimeter recoilless rifles, their burp guns, and rifles—some of which have telescopic sights which can be favorably compared to any weapons we turn out, the great bulk of them come either from China or from Russia. Most of those which come from Russia are actually made at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. SCOTT. Therefore, they have to come down from China, not from Russia. Earlier testimony indicates that the bulk of petroleum comes in through Haiphong, yet I am told to ignore that.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It practically all comes in through Haiphong. Most of the weapons come in through Haiphong. That is the reason why I say that we should close the port at Haiphong. It is a natural step for us to take.

Mr. SCOTT. I completely agree with the Senator from Georgia that it should be closed in one of the several ways the Senator has mentioned, but we are asked to believe something which, to me, is a semantic impossibility. We are asked to believe that North Vietnam contributes nothing to South Vietnam, that anyway it does not matter if petroleum does come in, although it does come into Haiphong from Russia, that the economy of North Vietnam really contributes nothing to South Vietnam and therefore we should not worry about it. Admiral McDonald clarifies the situation further by saying that it does not matter about motorized transportation because everyone in Vietnam walks, anyway. He goes on to explain that last statement by saying that they walk from the 19th parallel but use motorized transportation from the north. If they use motorized transportation from the north, let me observe that I know very little about motors but I do know that they require fuel, lubricants, gasoline, yet we are told that while this comes entirely from Russia yet the

contribution from North Vietnam really amounts to nothing to South Vietnam. Now, let me say to the Senator from Georgia, the more testimony I read, the more confused I get. Can the Senator help me find my way through this morass of semantics?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I had assumed that the statement referred to by the Secretary referred mainly to principal weapons which might be manufactured in North Vietnam. I do not believe that the Secretary would take a position the weapons did not come through, because North Vietnam is the only place they could come from. I believe that he is referring to sources of production more than he is referring to sources of supply.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator will recall in one of the hearings that captured North Vietnamese weapons were displayed as coming from China or Russia.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Certainly, none of them was manufactured in North Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. But they had to come in through North Vietnam.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if the contribution of North Vietnam to South Vietnam is not worth anything, in the words of the Secretary—if the Secretary is right—"it could be completely eliminated, referring to the industry of the north, "and not reduce in any substantial way the contribution of the North to South Vietnam."

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. He is bypassing the fact that the North Vietnamese people are receiving oil and Chinese and Russian weapons; is that not a fact?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I stated, I thought the Secretary was referring to sources of production and not sources of supply.

Of course, North Vietnam has a very limited industry. They do manufacture some weapons, but the principal weapons being utilized against us are made in China or sent from Russia. They are the two principal sources of supply. They are supplying them with vast quantities of sophisticated, deadly, and lethal weapons.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the appropriation for military construction requested in this supplemental bill amounts to \$1,238,400,000, distributed among the services as follows: Department of the Army, \$509,700,000; Department of the Navy, \$254,600,000; Department of the Air Force, \$274,100,000; and Department of Defense, emergency fund, \$200 million.

I would like to point out that this is only a further increment to military construction funds for southeast Asia. To date we have already appropriated for southeast Asia, approximately \$417,700,000, distributed as follows: Army, \$162,200,000; Navy, \$117,600,000; Air Force, \$137,900,000.

By the way of explanation, I would like to point out that funds spent, funds available, and the funds presently in this bill will make a total appropriation for military construction, southeast Asia, amounting to \$1,656,100,000.

In view of the urgency of this construction money for southeast Asia, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, did not review the many projects in this bill in our usually thorough manner, meaning that we did not go into a detailed review of each individual project and the holding of extensive hearings. A great deal of the information concerning these projects is classified; however, the Department of Defense and the military services did furnish the subcommittee with classified information as to the location of projects and the intended scope of construction.

This bill contains language which will insure that the Congress will be fully informed as to how the Department of Defense and the military services expend these appropriations. I am sure everyone in this body knows my views concerning the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in matters of defense policy. There is in this supplemental bill, section 102, subsection B, language which reads as follows:

(b) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate, a report with respect to the estimated value by purpose, by country, of support furnished from such appropriations.

I wish to point out to my colleagues of the Senate that part of this construction money will be expended on permanent facilities both in the United States and overseas; for example, money will be spent for construction on bases for Guam, Okinawa, Wake Island, and in the United States which I will discuss later in this presentation.

A major construction effort is required to provide the proper logistic base from which to project our military operations in South Vietnam. The major portion of the military construction funds in this bill amounting to \$736,600,000 is for construction in South Vietnam; approximately \$325 million is for facilities outside of South Vietnam to support our logistics and communication bases; and \$63,421,000 is for construction in the United States, which is solely to support our southeast Asia operations. As further examples, we plan to spend approximately \$36 million in the Republic of the Philippines mainly for supply and operational facilities including hospitals and utilities. Thirteen million, six hundred and ninety thousand dollars is earmarked for Guam for hospitals and medical facilities, operational facilities and troop housing.

I would like to close, Mr. President, by saying that the effectiveness of our highly trained forces with their modern equipment will be greatly enhanced when the items contained in this military construction program begin to be used.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc-

GOVERN in the chair). Pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement entered into yesterday, the Senate will now proceed to vote on H.R. 13546.

The question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time the question is, Shall it pass? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], would each vote "yea."

Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is absent on official business.

The Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] is necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 87, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 59 Leg.]

YEAS—87

Aiken	Fulbright	Mundt
Allott	Harris	Murphy
Anderson	Hart	Muskie
Bartlett	Hartke	Nelson
Bass	Hayden	Neuberger
Bennett	Hickenlooper	Pearson
Bible	Holland	Pell
Boggs	Hruska	Prouty
Brewster	Inouye	Proxmire
Burdick	Jackson	Randolph
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Ribicoff
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, Idaho	Robertson
Cannon	Kennedy, Mass.	Russell, Ga.
Carlson	Kennedy, N.Y.	Saltonstall
Case	Lausche	Scott
Church	Long, Mo.	Simpson
Clark	Long, La.	Smathers
Cooper	Magnuson	Smith
Cotton	Mansfield	Stennis
Curtis	McCarthy	Symington
Dirksen	McClellan	Talmadge
Dodd	McGee	Thurmond
Dominick	McGovern	Tower
Douglas	McIntyre	Tydings
Eastland	Metcalf	Williams, N.J.
Ellender	Mondale	Williams, Del.
Ervin	Monroney	Yarborough
Fannin	Morton	Young, N. Dak.
Fong	Moss	Young, Ohio

NAYS—2

Gruening

Morse

NOT VOTING—11

Bayh
Gore
Hill
Javits

Kuchel
McNamara
Miller
Montoya

Pastore
Russell, S. C.
Sparkman

So the bill (H.R. 13546) was passed. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] again has used his unmatched military expertise and his strong and articulate advocacy to obtain the Senate's overwhelming approval of the defense supplemental appropriation.

Again, that outstanding statesman has won for our fighting men, whose vital needs he knows so well, the decisive support they deserve so much. All America is grateful for his deep and abiding devotion. For all America recognizes that he, more than anyone, has assured the reality of his avowed objective: To see that our soldiers are better supplied than any other fighting men on earth. No man has worked harder to achieve that goal.

The success of this vital appropriation was due also to the efforts of the Senate's highly able patriarch, the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] who backed this measure with the wise advocacy which has characterized his many decades of outstanding service in this body. To the distinguished senior Senators from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] and from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], a debt of gratitude is owed for their strong and articulate support.

Additionally, we are indebted as always to the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his cooperative support. The eloquent plea for swift and decisive Senate action by the ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee helped immensely to assure this great success.

We appreciate too the help given by the distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and by the junior Senators from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN] and Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], whose analytical discussions were typically provocative and enlightening. To the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] goes high commendation for again applying his cooperative efforts to assure the prompt and orderly action of the Senate on this important measure.

Finally, I personally am grateful to the Senate as a whole both for its swift and efficient action and for giving its unequivocal backing to those brave fighting men who deserve it so much.

DEATH OF MILTON KELLY, OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have just noticed on the AP ticker a news item to the effect that an old and good friend, Milton Kelly, Associated Press reporter since 1930, died today in George Washington Hospital after a long illness.

I have known Milton Kelly for many years. He was a man of sound integrity. He was a fair man. He did his job well.

I have watched him in his illness over the past several years. I have noticed him come back time after time after time, always with a cheery smile. He always did a good job. He was always considerate of others.

It is with deep sadness that I note the passing of Milt Kelly. Mrs. Mansfield and I extend our deepest sympathy to his family. Milt was a good friend and a good man.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I hope the Senator will permit me to associate myself with all he has said with respect to Milton Kelly.

It has been my pleasure and privilege to deal with hundreds of members of the press during my public career, which has stretched over a number of years, but I have never known a man I trusted more completely in discussing matters that would help him with the story, but were not for publication, than I did Milton Kelly. He was indeed a gentleman to the manner born, a man of integrity and courage. We mourn his passing, and extend our sympathy to his family.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too, wish to associate myself with the remarks just made. It was with sadness that I learned about the passing of Milt Kelly. I knew him as a fine, searching newspaperman, a fine reporter, a man of great integrity and character.

I am saddened to hear the news of his death. I am sure all of us extend to his family our feelings of deep sadness and affection.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I was saddened to learn of the passing of G. Milton Kelly. Milt Kelly, as he was affectionately known, was a highly respected and capable journalist whose pleasant and affable way won many friends for him in his tenure as an Associated Press reporter assigned to the U.S. Senate.

His coverage of some of the most controversial and heated investigations which took place in the Senate during his service here was noted for its objectivity and fairness to all sides. Milt will be sorely missed by the Members of the Senate, his many friends, and by his colleagues in the journalism profession.

AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MESSAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN BILLS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the adjournment of the Senate following today's session, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States and the House of Representatives; that committees be authorized to file reports; and that the Vice President or President pro tempore be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL FRIDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it ad-

journal until 12 o'clock noon on Friday next.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TIRE SAFETY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when S. 2669, the tire safety bill, is reported from the Committee on Commerce it be made the pending business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. The bill just read is to be the pending business on Friday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Montana expect disposition of that bill on Friday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know. Mr. MAGNUSON. The bill as being reported by the committee has been worked over, and practically all of the committee is unanimous in the reporting of the bill. Several sections were modified and amended. I do not expect too much opposition to the bill as reported. The bill merely affects uniform tire safety as against another bill on which we are holding hearings which deals with automobile safety.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator anticipate a rollcall vote on Friday?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I would like to have a rollcall vote on the bill when we are all through with it. That depends on how far we get with the bill on Friday.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator insist on a rollcall vote?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not insist on a rollcall vote.

Mr. MORSE. I think if the Senator wants it we should have it. It may be necessary to rearrange our programs so that those of us who do not wish to miss rollcall votes may be present.

I do not understand why we quit on Tuesday and reconvene on Friday.

Mr. MAGNUSON. This bill has not been reported. We are working on the report. I believe it will be filed late today. It is doubtful. It may be tomorrow morning. I would be glad to accommodate any Senators if there is sufficient interest in a rollcall vote and the leadership says we will vote on it at a time certain on Monday.

Mr. MORSE. I am not speaking for myself, although I am included in what I say, but I am advised that several Members of the Senate plan to be away on Friday for various party affairs—I mean political party affairs—and perhaps we could have a vote on Monday and not have a vote on Friday, in view of the fact that there is this long postponement from Tuesday until Friday when we are ready to stay here during the week and do business. I am ready to stay Friday, but I wish to know if it is necessary to cancel my engagement on Friday to be here to cast my vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not say that. We will see what we can do. I am certain this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all Senators.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The Senator from Washington would be the last to suggest otherwise.

USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 1046, Senate 801.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill, S. 801, to improve the balance-of-payments position of the United States by permitting the use of reserved foreign currencies in lieu of dollars for current expenditures.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill was considered, ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed, as follows:

S. 801

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any foreign currencies held by the United States which have been or may be reserved or set aside for specified programs or activities of any agency of the Government may be used by Federal agencies for any authorized purpose, except (1) that reimbursement shall be made to the Treasury from applicable appropriations of the agency concerned, and (2) that any foreign currencies so used shall be replaced when needed for the purpose for which originally reserved or set aside.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from the report (No. 1078), explaining the purposes of the bill.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of the bill is to permit Federal agencies to use any authorized foreign currencies held by the United States which have been or may be reserved or set aside for specified programs or activities of any agency of the Government. The bill would require that reimbursement must be made to the Treasury from applicable appropriations of the agency seeking the funds and foreign currencies so used must be replaced when needed for the purpose for which originally reserved or set aside.

GENERAL STATEMENT

S. 801 was introduced by Senators Boggs and DOMINICK on January 28, 1965, and was referred to the Banking and Currency Committee. Comments from the following agencies were requested: Treasury, State, Agriculture, and General Accounting. All of these agencies have submitted favorable reports. No objections to the bill have been brought to the attention of the committee.

An identical bill, S. 2115, 88th Congress, was considered by the committee and reported to the Senate on March 3, 1964 (S. Rept. 932). S. 2115 passed the Senate on March 6, 1964. The bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee, but no action was taken before adjournment.

S. 801 would provide on a permanent basis authority which Congress has provided on an annual basis for the fiscal years 1964, 1965, and 1966 by the inclusion of an appropriate provision in the Public Works Appropriation Act for those fiscal years.

The following excerpt from the statement made by Senator Boggs when he introduced the earlier bill explains clearly the way S. 801 is intended to operate:

"If we had a million lire in an Italian bank and the money was earmarked for an educational exchange program, for instance, the lire would simply lie there until a program was begun requiring use of the lire.

"Under the change I propose, the disbursing officer attached to our Italian Embassy could draw out that money to pay authorized U.S. obligations. Whether he drew out 100,000 lire or 500,000 lire, or the whole amount, the educational exchange program in question would still be credited with a million lire on U.S. Treasury books. When the program needed the money, it would be provided either from lire on hand or lire purchased with dollars.

"The Embassy, on the other hand, would have had its account lessened by the amount of lire spent. The net effect of this book-keeping and banking interchange would be to use the available foreign funds and keep U.S. dollars in U.S. hands."

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I wish to thank the majority leader for bringing up S. 801 at this time. It will be of substantial importance in solving the balance-of-payments problem. It occurs to me that it is a step that should have been taken much earlier. I hope that it will be possible for the House to press forward early enough so that action on the bill in that body can be taken in this session.

Again, I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana for having brought the bill up at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. It was a pleasure to do so.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

By unanimous consent, the following routine business was transacted:

REPORT ENTITLED "RESPONSES TO INQUIRIES ABOUT THE NORTHEAST POWER FAILURE"—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE (S. REPT. NO. 1079)

Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce, submitted an interim report of that committee entitled "Responses to Inquiries About the Northeast Power Failure November 9 and 10, 1965," which was ordered to be printed.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session, The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. MAGNUSON, from the Committee on Commerce:

Rear Adm. Willard J. Smith, U.S. Coast Guard, to be Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, with the rank of admiral;

Capt. William B. Ellis, Capt. Douglas B. Henderson, Capt. Russell R. Woesche, Jr., and Capt. Mark A. Whalen, for promotion to the grade of rear admirals.

BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED

Bills and a joint resolution were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. BENNETT:

S. 3117. A bill to provide for the free entry of one mass spectrometer for the use of Utah State University; to the Committee on Finance.

By Mr. EASTLAND:

S. 3118. A bill to permit the city of Senatobia, Miss., to count certain expenditures as a local grant-in-aid to the east Senatobia urban renewal project; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

S. 3119. A bill to amend chapter 15 of title 38, United States Code, so as to prevent the loss of veteran pension benefits as the result of increases in social security benefits authorized by the Social Security Amendments of 1965; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 3120. A bill for the relief of Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Pigford; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BIBLE:

S. 3121. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958, as amended, to increase salaries of officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force and the Fire Department, and for other purposes;

S. 3122. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Teachers' Salary Act of 1955, as amended;

S. 3123. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958, as amended, to increase salaries of officers and members of the Metropolitan Police force, and for other purposes; and

S. 3124. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Salary Act of 1958, as amended, to increase salaries of officers and members of the Fire Department of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. DIRKSEN (for himself, Mr.

CURTIS, Mr. MUNDT, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware, Mr. CORTON, Mr. CARLSON, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. TOWER, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. DOMINICK:

S.J. Res. 148. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to permit voluntary participation in prayer in public schools; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. DIRKSEN when he introduced the above joint resolution, which appear under a separate heading.)

RESOLUTION

STUDY AND INVESTIGATION BY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF ANY MATTER PERTAINING TO THE DISPLAY AND USE OF THE U.S. FLAG

Mr. TOWER submitted a resolution (S. Res. 237) to authorize the Committee on the Judiciary to make a study and investigation of any matter pertaining to the display and use of the flag of the United States, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the above resolution printed in full when submitted by Mr. TOWER, which appears under a separate heading.)

INVESTIGATION OF MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE DISPLAY AND USE OF THE FLAG

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, present law governs the display of our flag, which stands as a symbol of our great Nation, of our heritage of liberty and justice for

that the school milk program was devised to combat.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the terms of the unanimous-consent agreement, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] is recognized for not to exceed 1 hour, for debate on the bill H.R. 13546.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield, without losing his right to the floor, for an insertion in the RECORD and to suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to do that, but I do not personally require the calling of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No, but I think that should be done.

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CRISIS IN ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a speech by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], at the 21st Annual Conference on Higher Education in Chicago, Ill., on March 14, 1966.

The title of the speech is "Higher Education and the Crisis in Asia," and I think it is well worth the time of all Senators to read and study most carefully.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE CRISIS IN ASIA
(Statement by Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT, chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, before the 21st National Conference on Higher Education, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Ill., Mar. 14, 1966)

A society has the right to ask two great services of its educational institutions: the cultivation of those qualities of the mind which will help the society to avoid misfortune and the cultivation of those intellectual qualities which will advance the public happiness. What the community expects of higher education at any given time is determined by the extent to which it feels itself endangered or secure. There is a kind of Gresham's law of public policy: fear drives out hope, security precedes welfare, and it is only to the extent that a country is successful in the prevention of bad things that its institutions of learning are set free to concentrate on those pursuits which bring happiness and beauty and fulfillment into the lives of the people.

For a whole generation our country was greatly preoccupied with external dangers and, accordingly, neglectful of those aspects of the public happiness which require organized public programs and sizable public expenditures. The reason for this, of course, was the exacting demands of two World Wars and an intractable cold war, which required the massive diversion of resources from community life to national security. We felt ourselves compelled to turn away from our hopes in order to concentrate on our fears and the public happiness became a luxury to be postponed to some distant day when the dangers besetting us would have disappeared.

In 1961, a trend and an event coincided which seemed to promise a new era in our national affairs. The trend was one toward relative stability in international relations,

based on a fragile, tacit agreement between the great powers to live together in peaceful, or competitive, coexistence. The event was the coming to office in the United States of a creative new administration, eager to strengthen the developing detente with the Russians and eager as well to use a respite from international crisis to devise imaginative new programs for the betterment of American life. During the 3 years of his administration, President Kennedy put forward imaginative and well-conceived plans for the improvement of health and education, for the conquest of poverty, pollution and blight, and for the spiritual enrichment of American life.

President Johnson embraced and expanded upon these innovations. Elected in 1964 by a great popular majority and supported by a great congressional majority, President Johnson was able to utilize his own extraordinary political talents to make the 1st session of the 89th Congress the most productive in a generation. Vigorously executed and adequately funded, the legislation adopted in 1965 can open the way to an era of abundance and opportunity for all of our citizens. It seemed, a year ago, that at long last our fears could give way to our hopes, that we had indeed crossed a new frontier and were in sight of the Great Society.

Then came Vietnam. The war had been going on for many years but before 1965 it had been a small and distant war and, as our leaders repeatedly assured us, a war which would be won or lost by the Vietnamese themselves. Then about a year ago it became clear that the Saigon government was about to lose the war and we radically changed our policy. Intervening with a large army of our own, we changed our role from adviser to principal belligerent and expanded what was essentially a civil war into a contest between the United States and Asian communism.

As a result of this radical change in American policy in southeast Asia, we must now, after so brief an interlude, turn back once again from our hopes to our fears, from the advancement of the public happiness to the avoidance of international disaster. The President has been compelled to divert his principal energies from implementing the Great Society to the supervision of bombing missions over North Vietnam; the Congress has been diverted from debating future needs in education and urban renewal to debating the American involvement in a land war in Asia and how we can control it; the American people have been diverted from community and family life to preoccupation once again with foreign dangers, casualty lists, and the fear of a wider war.

What does all this mean for higher education? I most emphatically do not think that the university must act like a recruit called to the colors. I do not think that the humanities must now give way to military science, that civil engineering must give way to military engineering, or that history and philosophy must give way to computerized "war games."

Unless it conceives itself as nothing more than the servant of the party in power, the university has a higher function to perform. The university, it is true, cannot separate itself from the society of which it is a part. Like the rest of us, it must now divert some part of its energies from the enrichment of the life of the individual to the preservation of the life of the Nation. But the community of scholars must do more than accept misfortune and consider how it can be overcome. It must ask how we came to misfortune and whether we need have. It must ask what has been done wisely and what has been done foolishly and what the answers to these questions imply for the future. It must ask how it came about that

we have had for so long to devote so great a part of our resources to war and its prevention and it must ask whether we are condemned by forces beyond our control to continue to do so. It can, like the Secretary of State, ask what is wrong with the "other side," but it must not fail to ask as well what is wrong with our side, remembering always that the highest devotion we can give is not to our country as it is but to a concept of what we would like it to be.

Whatever the circumstances of the moment, whatever the demands of government and industry on the universities—and whatever the rewards for meeting these demands—the highest purpose of higher education is the enrichment of the life of the individual and the advancement of the eternal effort to bring reason and justice and humanity into the relations of men and nations. It is the further task of higher education to analyze existing public policies with a view to determining whether they advance or retard the realization of basic human objectives and whether and how they should be changed.

Applying these principles to the war in Vietnam, it would seem to me that the major service the university can perform for the community is to seek answers to some elemental question about means and ends.

The politician is usually preoccupied with technique rather than purpose and with immediate pressures rather than long-term needs. His concern is largely focused on the tactical questions of the war: What are the probable effects of bombing or of not bombing North Vietnam? What degree of escalation is likely to bring the Chinese into the war? What concessions, if any, are likely to induce the enemy to negotiate?

The scholar, on the other hand, must provide the historical and philosophical foundations on which wise political decisions can be based. His proper concern is with questions of means and ends, of motive and purpose: To what extent is the war in Vietnam a civil war, to what extent a war of international aggression, to what extent a conflict of ideologies? Does the American military intervention in Vietnam strengthen our alliances throughout the world, as the administration believes, or does it weaken them, as General de Gaulle's recent statement would seem to indicate? And perhaps the most important questions of all: does this war advance the freedom of southeast Asia or make a mockery of it by subjecting the region to great power domination? Does it increase the security of the United States by proving our resolve or reduce it by draining our material and moral resources?

The universities have a critical responsibility to meet in the crisis of our country's relations with Asia. I believe that students and professors all over the country have acknowledged that responsibility and are responding to it. I think that the student protest movement, despite certain excesses, has had a healthy effect in stimulating informed discussion and awakening the national conscience. But the more significant contribution of the university is made in the library and the classroom, by teachers who teach and students who study, by the raising and answering of elemental questions about means and ends.

Our prospects for a decent and lasting settlement in eastern Asia depend in great part on our ability to apply the kinds of insight and understanding that only broadly based liberal education can provide. We must bring to our efforts for peace in Vietnam and to our long-term relations with China some of the perspectives of history and

¹ Press conference of Feb. 21, 1966, in which he expressed fear that America would drag her European allies into non-European conflicts.

philosophy and psychology. We must apply the experience of the past with intelligence and discrimination, separating those experiences which seem to have general application from those which are unique or accidental. We must recognize that history can be misleading as well as instructive, and we must avoid the pitfall of simple and literal analogy—such as the eternally repeated example of Munich, which is so often cited as an object lesson for cases which it resembles only slightly or superficially. We must utilize our knowledge of man and his past in the only way it can be utilized, not as a source of detailed prescriptions for specific maladies but as a source of general insight into the kinds of efforts that are likely to succeed and the kinds that are likely to fail, the kinds of policies that are likely to advance peace and human welfare and the kinds that are likely not to.

We must be prepared to examine each situation and each problem on its merits and we must be prepared, as only educated men can be, to discard old myths in the light of new realities. More important than any single policy decision that we might make is the strengthening of our capacity to reconsider established policies in the light of changing facts and circumstances.

It is not so much change itself that the universities can usefully encourage as the capacity for change. Even in the case of those of our present policies which are perfectly sound, it is not at all certain that we would be prepared to alter these policies quickly in response to a wholly new situation or an unforeseen opportunity. One of the basic problems of our policy is thus intellectual rather than political. It is the problem of freeing our minds from the dead weight of habit and prejudice and stereotype and of bringing to bear on foreign policy the rich and diverse resources of liberally educated men.

A related problem—and one for which the solution, if there is one, can only come from higher education—is the retention of the capacity for honest individual judgment in a large organization in which the surest route to advancement is conformity with a barren and oppressive orthodoxy. There are many intelligent, courageous, and independent-minded individuals in our Foreign Service, but I have had occasion to notice that there are also sycophants and conformists, individuals in whose minds the distinction between official policy and personal opinion has disappeared. The universities—and especially those schools and departments whose graduates tend to enter public service—have a special obligation to train potential public servants in rigorously independent thinking and to acquaint them as well with the need for reconciling loyalty to an organization with personal integrity. It is an extremely important service for the universities to perform because the most valuable public servant, like the true patriot, is one who gives a higher loyalty to his country's ideals than to its current policy and who therefore is willing to criticize as well as to comply.

In recent weeks the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has engaged in an experiment in public education. With results thus far that seem to me highly satisfactory, the committee has made itself available as a forum for the meeting of politicians and professors and, more broadly, as a forum through which recognized, experts and scholars can help increase congressional and public understanding of the problems associated with our involvement in Vietnam and our relations with Communist China.

I believe that the public hearings on Vietnam, by bringing before the American people a variety of opinions and disagreements pertaining to the war, have done far more to strengthen our country's position than to weaken it. The hearings have been criti-

alized on the ground that they conveyed an image of the United States as divided over the war. Since the country obviously is divided, what was conveyed was a fact rather than an image. The question arises whether those who believe the hearings should not have been held would have preferred to maintain the image of unity even though it were a false image, maintained at the cost of suppressing the normal procedures of democracy and at the cost of denying both our people and our Government the advantages of a full, free, enlightened, and responsible discussion of a national issue of the greatest importance.

No one challenges the value and importance of national consensus, but consensus can be understood in two ways. If it is interpreted to mean unquestioning support of existing policies, its effects can only be pernicious and undemocratic, serving to suppress differences rather than to reconcile them. If, on the other hand, consensus is understood to mean a general agreement on goals and values but not necessarily on the best means of realizing them, then and only then does it become a lasting basis of national strength. It is consensus in this sense which has made America strong in the past. Indeed, much of our national success in combining change with continuity can be attributed to the vigorous competition of men and ideas within a context of shared values and generally accepted institutions. It is only through this kind of vigorous competition of ideas that a consensus of values can sometimes be translated into a true consensus of policy.

The hearings on Vietnam were undertaken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the hope of helping to shape a true consensus, even at the cost of destroying the image of a false one. They were undertaken in the belief that both the American people and their Government would profit from an airing of views by forceful advocates from both within and outside the Government. They were undertaken in the belief that the best way to assure the prevalence of truth over falsehood is by exposing all tendencies of opinion to free competition in the marketplace of ideas. They were undertaken in something of the spirit of Thomas Jefferson's words: "I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion."²

Many times in the past the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has served as the forum for a national debate and in some instances its proceedings have had the effect of translating a consensus of values into a consensus of policy as well. One notable instance was the debate on the nuclear test ban treaty in the summer of 1963. For 3 weeks the Foreign Relations Committee, with members of the Committee on Armed Services and Atomic Energy also attending, met in open session to hear vigorous arguments for and against the treaty by witnesses from the Government, from the universities, and from other areas of private life. My only feeling at the time was that the non-Government scientists and professors of politics, as disinterested individuals, were more influential than the Government witnesses, who of course were committed to the administration's policy. Each day's discussion was transmitted to the American people through the press. The result was that the Foreign Relations Committee was able to serve simultaneously as both an organ of Senate deliberation and a form of public education. In the course of those 3 weeks and the Senate floor debate that followed, support for the

treaty steadily grew and the treaty was finally ratified by a vote of 81 to 19. Through the medium of open discussion and debate an existing consensus for peace as an objective was translated into a policy consensus for the test ban treaty as a means of advancing it.

The committee is now once again drawing on the resources of both Government and the community of scholars, this time in the hope of increasing public knowledge of China and of helping to lay the foundations for a true consensus about our relations with China. It is our expectation that these discussions will generate controversy, possibly a great deal of controversy, and no doubt the committee will be criticized for fostering it. It is perfectly true that we are fostering controversy and, for my own part, I do so without apology, because there is nothing wrong with the honest and responsible airing of differences and, more important, because controversy is the condition of intelligent decisionmaking and the crucible in which a consensus as to objectives may be translated into a consensus of policy as well.

It is of great importance that we try to learn something more about the strange and fascinating Chinese nation, about its past and its present, about the aims of its leaders and the aspirations of its people. Before we can make wise political—and perhaps military—decisions pertaining to China, there are many questions to be asked and, hopefully, answered: What kind of people are the Chinese? To what extent are they motivated by national feeling? To what extent by ideology? Why are the Chinese Communist leaders so hostile to the United States and why do they advocate violent revolution against most of the world's governments? To what extent is their view of the world distorted by isolation and the memory of ancient grievances? And to what extent, and with what effect on their government, do the Chinese people share with us and with all other peoples what Aldous Huxley has called the "simple human preference for life and peace"?

We need to ask these questions because China and America may be heading toward war with each other and it is essential that we do all that can be done to prevent that calamity, starting with a concerted effort to understand the Chinese people and their leaders.

Higher education has a vital role to play in this inquiry into our relations with China and Asia. The testimony of a necessarily few experts before congressional committees is obviously a limited channel for the resources of our community of scholars, although it is an exceedingly valuable one for politicians like myself who do not have nearly the time we wish we had to study those matters of history and national character and aspiration which are so pertinent to the decisions we must make. But beyond their direct communications with politicians and policymakers the universities have the higher responsibility of the classroom.

The ultimate source of wisdom in public policy is, I feel certain, education at every level. To a certain degree a U.S. Senator can point the way toward intelligent and creative policies as he sees them; to a much greater degree the President of the United States can do so; but the ultimate answer to the challenge of excellence lies with public school teachers and university professors, with writers and scholars and all those who in one way or another help to shape the minds, or fail to shape the minds, of young Americans. "A teacher affects eternity," wrote Henry Adams; "he can never tell where his influence stops."³

The highest duty of higher education toward the community is to keep faith with its own essential purposes, which are the disinterested pursuit of knowledge and the culti-

² Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Charles Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820.

³ "The Education of Henry Adams," ch. 17.

vation of the free and discriminating mind. None of us—professor, politician, or private citizen—truly serves the interest of the community by uncritical support of the policies of the moment. All of us have the responsibility to act upon a higher patriotism, which is to love our country not as it is but as we would have it be. And, in the words of Albert Camus, "If at times we seemed to prefer justice to our country, this is because we simply wanted to love our country in justice, as we wanted to love her in truth and in hope."⁴

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PROXMIER in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION, 1966

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement of yesterday, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 13546) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, despite the agreement entered into yesterday, which entitles me to the floor for 1 hour when the Senate comes in today, that I may yield for 3 minutes to the Senator from Texas [Mr. TOWER], and that the time not be charged to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SCHOOLS FACE CUTBACK IN SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a recent proposal by the administration to cut back school milk rations by \$82 million has received considerable attention in the newspapers.

An article published in the Dallas Morning News treats this subject and points out the difficulties the school lunch program will face if this proposal is implemented.

I ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Dallas (Tex.) News, Mar. 13, 1966]

SCHOOLS FACE POSSIBLE CUTBACK—PLAN WOULD HURT LUNCH PROGRAM

(By Dorothy Lillard)

AUSTIN, Tex.—Many Texas school officials may be crying over spilled milk and empty platters if the Federal Government decides to withdraw from their lunchrooms next year.

⁴ Albert Camus, "Letters to a German Friend," in *Resistance, Rebellion, and Death* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1960), p. 10.

The basis for concern is President Johnson's proposal to cut back school milk rations by \$82 million and emphasize the needy youngster in the school lunch program.

The Dallas independent school district, which long has spurned the so-called Government platters and milk doles, would have reason to be smug if the revised Federal plan places other districts in a bind. Some observers say, however, that many Dallas civic leaders recently have exerted more and more pressure for participation in the Federal aid program.

If the Children Nutrition Act of 1966, the President's plan, passes, Dallas school officials could feel even greater pressure to seek aid for low-income youngsters.

Meanwhile Charles Hicks, school lunch coordinator for the Texas education agency, foresees serious curtailment of Texas programs in the near future.

Instead of a nickel reimbursement per lunch, Uncle Sam might have to offer an average 3 cents to the participating school districts.

Milk reductions could force schools to charge students 7 cents instead of 3 to 4 cents per half pint.

Last year, Texas schools served 128 million hot lunches in about 1,300 school districts. In addition to the milk served with the lunches, 94.5 million extra half pints were served.

Currently Dallas, Highland Park, Richardson and Garland schools are joined by San Antonio, Houston, and Fort Worth schools in rejecting the national lunch program. Unlike Dallas, the other three big schools do participate in the milk programs. Fort Worth and San Antonio schools also receive surplus Government food.

The President's program, said to face serious opposition in Congress, calls for milk subsidies to go to 3 million youngsters from the neediest families rather than all the 18 million children who received it last year.

School lunch programs aided by low-cost surplus food in Federal stock (a decreasing supply) are expected to continue unchanged. Free breakfasts are to be served in poverty area schools, which are also scheduled to receive money to equip kitchens and cafeterias.

Some have termed the "unchanged" description of the lunch program deceptive. While the President has asked for \$50 million more in special assistance, his proposals cut the actual cash and commodities by \$19 million. The special grants are intended for use in needy districts mainly.

"The cash provided in the lunch appropriation and proposed Child Nutrition Act will not be enough to meet these demands," explained Hicks.

"The proposals do not provide for growth and expansion of the local program."

"And I am very apprehensive of the situation which would develop if Houston, San Antonio, Fort Worth, and Dallas should decide to participate in the lunch programs," he added.

These areas represent more than 650 schools and administrators would be hard pressed to redistribute decreased funds to an increased number of schools. Districts already dependent upon the Federal lunch program will face a fund reduction without the addition of the four most populous cities in the State.

Hicks noted that Texas always refused to administer on a variable cost basis—5 cents on a lunch in district A areas and 2 cents on the same lunch in district B areas.

"We will cut uniformly when necessary," Hicks said. "We now are experimenting with the special assistance programs for the most needy schools as one solution."

Annual funds for the special assistance, which help pay up to 15 cents on a lunch, will amount to \$72,900 this year in Texas. If the State receives proportionately the same amount with the proposed \$50 million in-

crease, Hicks can count on about 12 times as much or \$875,900.

With this amount, administrators could avoid elimination of the program in the better off school districts, and just reduce the reimbursement fee. The special assistance funds would handle the bulk of the extra emphasis on the needy.

The milk slashes will affect more schools than the main lunch program. Under the act, the cheap half pints are intended strictly for the needy.

The milk program, which was started in 1954 because of heavy dairy surpluses, had \$103 million allocated to it last year. President Johnson has called for only \$21 million in his budget. Federal officials contend that most schools should be able to pay the extra cost and not the children. Districts usually receive 1 cent for handling, which the Government says is usually more than needed. Children pay 3 to 4 cents for half pints costing 6 to 8 cents.

Hicks said some districts take 1½ cents extra for handling, but often use the extra to pay for free half pints given to needy children.

"Cuts in the milk program will eliminate it for most school districts in Texas or limit it to schools within a district with a large number of low-income children," said Hicks.

Actually the milk program could end up operating only in south Texas and those schools attended predominantly by Negroes in low-income areas.

Ironically some Congressmen point out that if the program is limited to low-income areas, poor children in wealthy school districts would have to do without milk, unless provided from some other source.

Also, poorer Negro students, transferred into formerly all-white districts by Federal civil rights campaigns, might lose out on free lunch and milk programs or be embarrassed by accepting Government handouts where other students do not.

One educator cited an example in south Texas where students who paid their own way ate chicken while the free lunch students ate inexpensive meat loaf the same day.

Hicks said the State is experimenting with providing breakfast free to children in some Austin schools and elsewhere.

"It is my understanding that most schools serving free breakfasts use milk as the mainstay," he said. "If the milk supply is curtailed seriously, it will have an adverse effect."

Hicks said the President's proposal to extend the feeding service to nonschool activities (camps, nurseries) might be longer coming to Texas.

"I am happy to see that funds are being made available for equipping lunchrooms and also to assist the State in administering the programs," he commented.

The State pays only costs of administering the national lunch and milk programs. Some States appropriate additional funds to help the local districts pay for the actual lunches.

One of the most vocal congressional critics of the bill offered by the administration is Representative J. J. PICKLE, of Austin, a former member of the Texas Employment Commission.

PICKLE testified before the Ways and Means Committee last year and urged changes that would protect the rights of State governments in this field. He plans to give his views anew to the committee and to the House when the bill reaches the floor.

The Federal lunch program, begun in 1946 under the National School Lunch Act, reimburses public and nonprofit schools about 5 cents a lunch. The children are charged from 25 to 35 cents for the lunch. The remainder of the cost is absorbed by the district, with the addition of surplus Government foods from the Department of Agriculture. Hicks estimated that these supplies contribute 10 cents to the average meal cost.

March 22, 1966

Many children receive a free daily meal. Local school authorities determine the needy children and shoulder the extra expense.

Hicks said 6 to 7 percent of the daily hot lunches are provided free in Texas. In addition, more free lunches are financed through title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Districts qualify for money on the basis of the number of low-income families in their area.

Noting a current shortage of agricultural supplies, Hicks said he recently was notified that butter may not be available for school consumption. The U.S. Department of Agriculture said it had been unable since February to purchase supplies on the open market in enough quantity to provide for the schools.

"At this point, we don't know what to do about the schools," wrote the Agriculture officials.

EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a penetrating editorial was published in the Austin American on March 14, 1966, which concerns our exports to Communist countries.

I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed in the Record, so that I may share this perceptive observation with my colleagues.

I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for yielding to me at this time.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Austin (Tex.) American, Mar. 14, 1966]

A STRATEGIC QUESTION

State Secretary Dean Rusk in February submitted to Congress the Department's 1964 report on operations under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 also known as the Battle Act, the U.S. law barring shipment of strategic goods to Communist countries.

The report shows that exports to Communist countries in 1964 more than doubled over the 1963 level, rising from \$167 million to almost \$340 million. (U.S. trade with Communist China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam is, with minor exceptions, prohibited.)

This expansion resulted primarily from increased shipments of wheat but included also other agricultural products. The report showed that total free world exports to Communist countries rose sharply from \$5.6 billion in 1963 to \$6.7 billion in 1964.

General U.S. imports from Communist nations, according to the report, rose from \$85 million to \$102.5 million in 1964, while total free world imports from these countries rose slightly from \$6.2 billion to \$6.8 billion.

The report said the rise of more than a billion dollars in Communist purchases from the free world in 1964 was the largest increase in any year since World War II. The report said the balance of foreign trade between the free world and the Soviet Union shifted favorably in the direction of the free world. It added that the largest single gains were in exports and imports from Communist China. Chinese exports for the first time exceeded \$1 billion.

It would be interesting to learn precisely what goods are exported to Communist nations.

The law says that no goods of a strategic nature can be exported to Communist countries. But practically all goods have some strategic value.

SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPROPRIATION, 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 13546) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I continue with my speech, which was interrupted last night by the recess of the Senate around 7 o'clock.

At that time, I had made two principal points. First, that I found myself compelled to vote for the pending defense appropriation bill, on the ground that I could not conscientiously vote to deny money needed for the safety of American troops overseas. Second, that, in my opinion, we should never have been in Vietnam in the first place, committing large numbers of American troops to a land war on the ground mass of Asia.

I should now like to make my third point: that, as of today, our military, economic, and social posture in South Vietnam is far from favorable. We have eliminated the danger of losing the war, but we have not—at least, on the surface—started to win it.

I quote from page 266 of the hearings before the Armed Services Committee, in response to a question from the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], as to whether we had improved our position in South Vietnam during the past year, had slipped back, or are today about the same as we were a year ago, and General Johnson, Chief of Staff of the Army, replied:

I would say that we are about the same as we were a year ago with regard to control.

His answer contains a couple of deletions, but at a later point he stated—and I paraphrase him—that by reason of our improved firepower we show some improvement on total balance, but not on provable results.

The status in South Vietnam at the moment involves the vexing question of how much terrain we and our allies control. In this regard, it has been extremely difficult to get any categorical answer out of either the Secretary of Defense or the AID Administrator, to whom this question was addressed at the time of the hearings on the supplemental foreign aid bill. There has been great complaint as to whether an effective map could be produced. Nothing really effective in the way of such a map was produced before the Committee on Foreign Relations.

However, on page 145 of the hearings of the Armed Services Committee, a map was produced before the committee which, of course, is not copied in the testimony.

Secretary McNamara made this point with respect to who controlled the terrain: The important points to note, he said, are that the population is concentration in Saigon and the areas south of Saigon, the rice bowl, the delta area, and along the coast in these areas. He made the further point that the area fully controlled by the Vietcong was, to some extent, sparsely populated.

Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that the Mekong Delta, where a substantial part of the wealth of the country is located, has not been pacified. It is equally clear that the area adjacent to a number of American bases has not been pacified.

We find that in many of the areas where, as a result of our search and destroy tactics, we occupy the land as a result of a successful assault, we are compelled shortly thereafter to vacate the terrain we have taken, and in many instances the Vietcong have moved back in short order.

Thus, I would raise the question, with some confidence, that there is more than a majority of the land mass in South Vietnam and, possibly, even a majority of the densely populated land mass which is not really secure for either ourselves or our South Vietnamese allies.

An additional important question is, Who controls the population?

This is a rather deceptive matter because of the huge number of refugees who have left the land and moved into the more densely populated areas, particularly Saigon, and have no visible means of support and, generally speaking, are on the South Vietnamese equivalent of relief.

Nevertheless, I read from page 146 of the hearings where the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] ask the question of Secretary McNamara:

How much of the population does the Vietcong control?

Secretary McNamara answered:

Well, the figures we have received from South Vietnam say 23 percent of the population.

Then he continued:

However, this morning, earlier, I gave an estimate of Prime Minister Ky to the effect that his government controls only 25 percent of the population. Now, these figures are not necessarily contradictory because of the difference in the definition of "control." Prime Minister Ky, when he gave the figure 25 percent as being controlled by the Government, was thinking of the population that could participate freely and without coercion.

Then he continued:

I think if you applied the definition of control that our field representatives do, both the political and military representatives in South Vietnam, they would say that the Government controls today 53 percent of the population of the country, the Vietcong control about 23 percent. That makes a total of around 76 percent, and the remaining 24 percent is in the disputed areas.

Then he added this significant statement:

I think that Ky's estimate is a much more realistic appraisal of Government control than is the 53 percent.

The importance of the discussion of the terrain and population is clear when we recall that we have recently approved a substantial appropriation for economic aid to South Vietnam, \$175 million, which will be used largely, although not entirely, to bolster the South Vietnamese economy, which is showing signs of sagging, and the other \$100 million is to be

be here for many months. I appeal to the distinguished chairman to give this matter full consideration.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I think what the distinguished majority leader meant was that there is provision for an appeal to the ICC in this case, but the Senator from New Hampshire suggests that it would be highly improbable that the appeal coming from Missouri, situated as it is, would be favorably received. But you can appeal to the ICC.

Mr. SYMINGTON. There is not a more fair and just man in this body than the Senator from New Hampshire. I appreciate his suggestion.

I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I am in accord with the statements made by the Senators from Missouri, because I have the same problem.

I wish to mention another problem that deals along the same line. Kansas is a State that has a time zone change. When you run into time zone difficulties, you can have some real problems. We have a division between central time and mountain time, and I do hope that the Interstate Commerce Commission, if we cannot obtain the amendment suggested, which might be helpful even in our own State, will give some consideration to the problem.

Mr. MAGNUSON. They will still have the right to move the time zones. As a matter of fact, I am not sure that some of the time zones should not be moved, to make them correspond more nearly to the traffic and the growth of population.

When the time zones were first set out, they were more or less arbitrarily selected. There was not too much testimony or consideration of the problem.

Mr. CARLSON. It can create a real problem, as the distinguished Senator from Washington knows. I am fairly in accord with the positions taken by the Senators from Missouri. I sincerely hope their problem can be taken care of.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I do not see any other Senators on the floor from the Far West. Yes, there is one over there. But we would like the bill to stay as it is. It would save us considerable trouble.

I think in some cases there is 3 or 4 hours difference in the time. That means that many times people, at the wrong time of the evening, try to get in touch with one about some very important matter, and they forget about the change in time, and cannot understand why they have difficulty.

But uniformity is even more vitally necessary for people who travel. The situation as it exists is a most confusing thing, and I am hopeful that the State of Missouri will see the light and come into the fold with the rest of us.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. BASS. Mr. President, I am not exactly sure what the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire is. We have a problem in Tennessee; most of the State is on eastern time, but a portion is on central time. As I understand the Senator's amendment, it would mean we could have four different times in Tennessee.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Oh, no.

Mr. BASS. Will the Senator explain what his amendment would do?

Mr. COTTON. The suggested amendment is this: I fear that all the Senators do not have copies of the bill, but on page 6, the bill provides that all States shall be on daylight saving time, except that any State may by law exempt itself from the provisions of this subsection providing for the advancement of time, but only if such law provides that the entire State, including all political subdivisions thereof, shall observe the standard time.

Now, my suggested amendment would be to strike out the word "entire" and insert in lieu thereof "or a single contiguous part thereof," which would mean that any State could select any part of the State—it would not have to be just half, it could be a third or any part of the State—and retain standard time for that part, but all the rest of the State would have to be on the other time; you could not have four or five or six different times.

Mr. BASS. And that would have to be done by the State legislature?

Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes.

Mr. COTTON. That is right.

Mr. BASS. In other words, where we have two time zones now, if the eastern part of the State is on eastern standard time, the rest of the State, even though part of it might be on central time, would have to go to daylight saving time?

Mr. COTTON. It would have to advance the clock 1 hour from whatever time it was on, except for one section of the State, one contiguous part thereof that the State legislature could act upon.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to my colleague from Missouri.

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Washington and the Senator from New Hampshire that the amendment suggested, we think, would be very fair to Missouri. Our situation is very unusual, with industries on both sides of the State and the time zone line nearly down the center. If that could be split to not over half, it would certainly be a move toward uniformity.

Mr. MAGNUSON. I hope the Record will be clear that when the Senator from New Hampshire uses the word "contiguous," he means that literally, because one of the important reasons for this bill is that small areas can have different times. But if you have one area which is contiguous, which would be a large area in the Senator's State, it is not as bad as having a number of time zones arranged in spotted or patchwork fashion.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the House amendments, with an amendment which I now send to the desk.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 6, line 22, strike out the word "entire" and after the word "State" insert the language "or a single contiguous part thereof."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of

the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Corron] to concur in the House amendments with amendments.

The motion was agreed to.

SHIPPING JAM IN VIETNAM

Mr. BASS. Mr. President, one of the great problems in Vietnam is in the shipping and unloading end of our supply chain. It seems that we do a fairly good job in moving the supplies as far as the harbor areas of South Vietnam but at that point, due to a lack of unloading equipment and facilities, the ships pile up in great numbers and wait for long periods of time in order to be unloaded. I have reports that some ships have waited an excess of 100 days in the Vietnam harbors in order to be unloaded. Approximately \$1 million a day is being lost because of this jam. Recently 100 ships were waiting in South Vietnamese ports to be unloaded and another 100 were standing by in either the Philippines or Okinawa to proceed to Vietnam as soon as room could be created for them to anchor and unload.

Such a shipping jam creates considerable hardship in a number of areas. For instance the crews of these ships oftentimes are not able to take shore leave, some spending as much as 65 days in the harbor before being able to go ashore. In an area where daytime temperatures sometimes approach 120° onboard the ships, this creates a tremendous morale problem. The United Seaman Service is very concerned about this morale of our seamen in Vietnam. This agency has centers throughout the Pacific. Prior to recent times, however, they had none in South Vietnam. One has been established in Saigon since Christmas of last year and the service is attempting to establish more. They have been assured by the Army that one is in the works in the Cam Ranh Bay harbor construction project. They are attempting to get final Army approval to establish one at Da Nang and one at Qui Nhon.

In addition, it creates a problem from the standpoint of having enough available vessels to ship not only to South Vietnam but to other parts of the world. For instance, at the present time, when the Nation is engaged in the most serious freight car shortage in its history, huge numbers of freight cars are piled up in west coast ports, unable to be unloaded because there are no available ships on which to place their cargo. This, I hope, will be partially rectified by the announcement last week by the Maritime Administration that some 86 ships are being taken from the Government's reserve fleets and assigned to steamship companies for operation on behalf of the Military Sea Transport Service. I understand that an additional 25 reserve fleet ships are now undergoing reactivation, or are scheduled for breakout in the next few months.

In addition to that, two Maritime Administration employees are being assigned to South Vietnam to coordinate the handling of these ships. It is hoped that they will supplement the efforts of general agents, subagents, and shipmasters in the Vietnam area to assure

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The people of Missouri are unable to reconcile the two time zones and have expressed their desire to continue to have a choice in this matter.

I therefore hope that the Senate will vote against the House amendments to S. 1404 and insist on the bill as passed by the Senate last summer.

It is with regret that I see a bill that was passed by the Senate on a basis that was satisfactory to my State, amended in the House. I am sorry that more of my colleagues are not present, because I believe if they were here my distinguished colleague from Missouri and I might convince them that the Senate bill was a better bill.

Mr. President, with that in mind. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his request?

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his request?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I should like to say to both distinguished Senators from Missouri that our committee was thoroughly cognizant of the situation, not particularly with reference to Missouri, but with reference to the possibility of this situation arising. We discussed asking for a committee of conference instead of moving to concur.

The reason that we are moving to concur in the amendments of the House is that the House approved their bill by a vote of 292 to 93. Various amendments were offered to the House bill. Those amendments were voted down. One of those amendments was the very amendment in which the Senators from Missouri are interested. That amendment concerned the partition of States, rather than having statewide control. Because of the rather overwhelming vote of the House, we decided to move to concur.

In fairness to the distinguished Senators from Missouri, when we presented the bill to the Senate, it was originally the bill of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE] and myself. It was a bill that I had worked on for several years. We very carefully took one step at a time and tried to make uniform the date of opening and closing of daylight saving time and not interfere in any State, although we felt that probably it would be inevitable that this would happen.

A bus, a train, or an automobile passed through 7 time changes while traveling 35 miles a couple of years ago. We had the situation in which community X and community Y would be on and off daylight saving time and the next community would be on daylight saving and the next community would be off.

I had hoped that this could have been taken care of by permitting States to vote to split their State in half, so that there would not be such a hodgepodge situation.

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Mr. President, I think we could agree if that could be done. That would be what we would need.

Mr. COTTON. We were not trying to force this situation on any State. We

considered the overwhelming vote in the House and the fact that an amendment embodying the desires of the two Senators from Missouri was voted down. That was the reason that we voted to move to concur.

Mr. SYMINGTON. What was the vote when the Senate passed the measure?

Mr. COTTON. There was no rollcall vote.

Mr. SYMINGTON. In other words, it was unanimous in the Senate, but some one-third of those voting in the House voted against the amendment.

I have great confidence in the conferees on this legislation because I know what a superb committee it is. The distinguished Senator for Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is chairman of the committee, and the distinguished ranking minority member is the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON].

I know my friend from New Hampshire is very sympathetic to the concept of local option.

With all due respect to the situation in which there were seven time changes in 35 miles, one would have to go several hundred miles in the State of Missouri to encounter a change.

We hope that the Senator in charge of the bill will take this measure to conference rather than give up at this time.

This is a very important matter to the people of Missouri. The thinking of the people in Missouri is sharply delineated. One could almost draw a straight line down our State to show the division on this subject.

I ask that the bill be taken back to conference to establish what the people of Missouri desire.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I want to be perfectly frank with the Senator. Were I on a committee of conference, I should try to come back with a compromise that would permit States to determine whether they wanted local option and not permit States to have more than two time zones.

I think that would be a reasonable ground of compromise. I have the feeling that my distinguished chairman and the others on our committee might well feel the same way.

I have not discussed the subject with them. We simply voted as we did because of the overwhelming vote in the House. I would be the last one to try to have the Senate push down the throat of any State something that was an inconvenience or a hardship. I am not arguing contentiously on this matter.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, if the distinguished chairman feels the same way about it, and would take it to conference, I am sure that the people of Missouri and my colleague and I would be entirely willing to accede to that and have two time zones in the State.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish that the distinguished Senator and his colleague, the two able Senators from Missouri, would not ask to send the bill back to conference. It is my belief that

it would not change what the Senate is attempting to do now.

I would point out that there is an option in the House-passed bill which I think would fit in with what the Senators from Missouri are so valiantly and so doggedly trying to accomplish, and that is a right to petition to the ICC, which could take into consideration an effective case of this kind, as I understand the bill, and perhaps give the Senators an outlet and make it possible for them to achieve the objective they desire.

Mr. COTTON. Will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.

Mr. COTTON. That is a perfectly natural inference for the distinguished majority leader to draw, but I am afraid, in fairness to the Senators from Missouri, that recourse to the ICC would not take care of their situation, because Missouri is right in the middle of a time zone. May I make this suggestion: We do not need to go to conference. Would the Senators from Missouri be satisfied—I think we have an amendment to this effect; we have been working on it—if instead of agreeing to the House bill as passed, we agree to it with one amendment, and that is that States could only be split into two parts?

Mr. SYMINGTON. We would take that.

Mr. LONG of Missouri. Yes, Mr. President, we would accept that.

Mr. MAGNUSON. We could send it back to the House, but, of course, the whole purpose for having this bill is to get some uniformity through the country, and we were hoping that, if the Senate passed the bill with the House amendment, by 1967 the Legislature of Missouri will say, "Well, let's not be different from everybody else; we will come along."

The House deliberately pushed it up for a year, until the legislature in the Senators' State meets, as I understand. But I can also understand how controversial and deep seeded this time business becomes in a State legislature, particularly where you have people who are from nothing but the rural areas, as against the people in the cities. I know the problem.

I have no objection to doing what the Senator from New Hampshire suggests. I am hopeful, though, that we will retain the part of the bill that says in 1967 or later that the States will come along, so that we can get this uniformity. I do not know whether the House will accept that. I do not think they have too deep feelings about any one State, but that they would want to make it uniform.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the committee is being very fair. I think what the able ranking Member, the Senator from New Hampshire says is very logical. It is not, in our case, just a matter of the country against the city. We have two large cities which feel differently.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes.

Mr. SYMINGTON. We are early in the session now. We have had very little trouble with the bill thus far. We will

logistic support for all general agency ships. These men will also coordinate the efforts of the military and the agents to provide expeditious cargo discharge and turnaround of all general agency ships. Unfortunately, however, I believe this is insufficient to solve the problem. We need great additional numbers of barges, tugs, and floating cranes to supplement those there in the unloading of the ships.

Airpower has become increasingly important in recent years and is particularly important in recent years and is particularly important in South Vietnam. However, two out of every three soldiers fighting in Vietnam were moved there by ship and 98 percent of the supplies to support our troops in Vietnam have been transported by ship. When this is realized then it becomes obvious that our merchant fleet is still a subject of tremendous importance not only to our economy but to the defense of our country.

Some improvements in the loading time have been made recently in Saigon. I am informed that military supplies are removed at Saigon in 4 to 5 days and that nonmilitary supplies, such as provisions under our AID program, are unloaded in 12 to 14 days. However, as late as last week, there were 25 bags of mail undelivered to seamen. Thinking back to the time when I was in the military service during World War II, I can conceive of nothing more damaging to morale than nondelivery of mail to our people overseas.

Mr. President, to further compound this shipping problem and to rub salt in the quick, we have the allied problem of ships of the free world servicing North Vietnam and the Vietcong. The Department of Defense admitted publicly that 119 free world ships entered ports servicing the Vietcong during 1965. These ships carried a total of \$12.2 million worth of goods, including some military supplies. Mr. President, it is indeed ironic that, at a time when Great Britain, for instance, is soliciting our support in her boycott of Rhodesia, ships flying the British flag are carrying supplies to aid and abet our enemies.

Mr. President, let me say that from reading a recent Washington Post article, we have found a quotation from Foreign Secretary Stewart of Great Britain. He says:

The principle of preserving free trade is important to us as a trading nation.

The article states:

But there are no signs that the Government is planning any action to outlaw the business transacted with the Hanoi regime.

The Foreign Secretary further states:

We have not got the legislative power to order these ships not to trade (with North Vietnam) except when it comes to strategic goods, nor can we stop them from flying our flag. No case has yet been made out for us to introduce new legislation.

Mr. President, it was not until the middle of February when our Government finally decided that we should boycott these ships. Since that time, ships carrying cargoes to North Vietnam have been prohibited from carrying the U.S.-sponsored cargoes. But even this boy-

cott only runs to the individual ships. It does not run to the parent company owning the ship.

Mr. President, our armed services have been called the best equipped troops in the world. However, it is impossible for them to maintain this position unless they get the supplies and equipment they need to fulfill their mission. I, therefore, hope a thorough investigation can be made to survey the transportation requirements for Vietnam by land, sea, and air to insure that every necessary and possible step is being taken to get our men in and out of Vietnam on time and with whatever arms and supplies necessary.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. BASS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I believe that the Senator from Tennessee has made a timely speech as well as a splendid suggestion. The Senator is speaking about a matter which is complicated from a military standpoint, as well as from the point of view of the rest of the traffic there. I hope that he will follow up on his own thoughts and suggestions, which will be rendering a fine service to the country.

Mr. BASS. I appreciate the statement made by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, because of his important position on the Armed Services Committee and his keen awareness of the needs of our troops in Vietnam.

SALE OF PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATES IN FNMA

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, last week the Senate passed a bill to amend the Small Business Act.

During debate, the proponents of the bill in speaking on behalf of the administration insisted that the extra interest charges by selling these small business mortgages would be less than one-quarter of 1 percent. We who opposed this bill insisted that the interest charge would be at least one-half of 1 percent, higher thereby representing an extra charge to the taxpayers.

It is interesting to note, that the following day after the enactment of the bill, the Federal National Mortgage Association sold \$410 million worth of participation certificates. The interest rates they paid was 0.6 percent higher than the interest rates for corresponding Government issues.

At this point, I ask unanimous consent that the announcement of that sale, appearing in the Wall Street Journal of March 17, be printed in the RECORD, followed by a list of quotations of Treasury bonds, along with the interest rates on that same date.

There being no objection, the announcement and quotations were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PARTICIPATION CERTIFICATES OF \$410 MILLION IN THE GOVERNMENT MORTGAGE LIQUIDATION TRUST, FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION TRUSTEE

(New Issue, dated April 4, 1966, due April 1 as shown below)

The participation certificates are serial certificates issued in registered form only, in denominations of \$5,000, \$10,000, \$25,000,

\$100,000, \$500,000, and \$1 million. The amounts, maturities, interest rates, and offering prices of the participation certificates are shown below. The principal, together with the last installment of interest, is payable at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York upon presentation at such bank and surrender of the certificates. The interest is payable by check, semiannually, on October 1 and April 1 in each year. The participation certificates are not redeemable prior to maturity. This advertisement is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy any of these securities. The offering is made only by the prospectus, which may be obtained from such of the underwriters as are registered dealers in securities in this State.

NEW YORK, N.Y., March 17, 1966.

Amount	Due Apr. 1	Interest rate	Price ¹
\$20,000,000	1967	5.40	100
20,000,000	1968	5.45	100
20,000,000	1969	5.50	100
20,000,000	1970	5.50	100
20,000,000	1971	5.50	100
20,000,000	1972	5.50	100
20,000,000	1973	5.50	100
20,000,000	1974	5.50	100
20,000,000	1975	5.50	100
20,000,000	1976	5.45	100
42,000,000	1977	5.45	100
42,000,000	1978	5.40	100
42,000,000	1979	5.35	100
42,000,000	1980	5.30	100
42,000,000	1981	5.25	100

¹ Plus accrued interest from Apr. 4, 1966.

GOVERNMENT, AGENCY, AND MISCELLANEOUS SECURITIES

Over-the-counter quotations: Source on request.

Decimals in bid-and-asked prices represent 32ds (101.1 means 101 1/32). (a) Plus 1/8, (b) yield to call date, (c) approximate yield at maturity.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1966.

Treasury bonds

	Bid	Asked	Previous bid	Yield
3 1/4s, 1966, May	99.26	99.28	99.26	4.38
3s, 1966, August	99.6	99.8	99.5	4.83
3 1/4s, 1966, November	99.1	99.3	99.0	4.78
2 1/2s, 1962-67, June	97.21	97.23	97.21	4.40
3 3/8s, 1967, November	98.1	98.3	98.1	4.83
3 1/2s, 1968, May	98.28	97.30	97.28	4.90
3 1/4s, 1968, August	97.6	97.8	97.6	4.97
3 1/2s, 1968, November	97.9	97.11	97.9	4.95
2 1/2s, 1963, December	94.15	94.17	94.14	4.64
4s, 1969, February	97.19	97.21	97.19	4.78
2 1/2s, 1964-69, June	93.20	93.22	93.18	4.62
4s, 1969, October	96.29	96.31	96.29	4.94
2 1/2s, 1964-69, December	92.20	92.26	92.20	4.65
2 1/2s, 1965-70, March	92.13	92.17	92.13	4.67
4s, 1970, February	96.20	96.24	96.21	4.92
4s, 1970, August	96.10	96.14	96.11	4.91
2 1/2s, 1966-71, March	91.0	91.4	91.0	4.51
4s, 1971, August	95.14	95.18	95.15	4.94
3 1/2s, 1971, November	94.13	94.17	94.15	5.00
4s, 1972, February	94.28	95.0	94.30	4.99
2 1/2s, 1967-72, June	88.16	88.20	88.22	4.61
4s, 1972, August	94.12	94.16	94.15	5.01
2 1/2s, 1967-72, September	88.0	88.14	88.16	4.68
2 1/2s, 1967-72, December	88.0	88.4	88.6	4.57
4s, 1973, August	93.18	93.22	93.18	5.03
4 1/4s, 1973, November	93.31	94.3	94.0	5.07
4 1/4s, 1974, February	93.28	94.0	93.28	5.05
4 1/4s, 1974, May	94.24	94.28	94.24	5.02
3 1/2s, 1974, November	92.6	92.14	92.6	4.96
4s, 1980, February	92.20	92.28	92.12	4.70
3 1/2s, 1980, November	87.22	87.30	87.20	4.64
3 1/4s, 1978-83, June	83.4	83.12	83.0	4.66
3 1/4s, 1985, May	82.26	83.2	82.22	4.59
4 1/4s, 1976-85, May	93.6	93.14	93.4	4.78
3 1/2s, 1980, February	83.4	83.12	83.0	4.66
4 1/4s, 1987-92, August	92.30	93.6	92.28	4.70
4s, 1988-93, February	90.2	90.10	89.30	4.63
4 1/2s, 1989-94, May	90.28	91.4	90.26	4.70
3s, 1995, February	79.12	79.20	79.10	4.23
3 1/2s, 1998, November	82.2	82.10	81.28	4.54

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, this points out very clearly what some of us argued at that time—

that in order to camouflage the true deficit, this administration is selling its assets and by so doing, is paying an extra one-half percent in interest rates. This means that over the life of the \$4.7 billion in securities, the administration plans to sell altogether it will cost the American taxpayers \$600 million. To cover up the true deficit, this administration is selling its assets and using the proceeds thereof to defray the normal operating costs of the Great Society programs.

It is comparable to selling part of the furniture to pay for the cost of groceries.

STATEMENT BY UTAH COUNCIL OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, Salt Lake City was one of the first cities in the country where hearings were held on the draft standards, criteria, rules, and regulations suggested by the Department of Commerce to implement the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. More than 100 witnesses appeared at the hearings held on March 1 and 2—most of them in opposition. It was the general consensus that the guidelines were far too stringent—in fact, that if put into operation as drawn, they would practically abolish the outdoor advertising industry.

The largest area of dissatisfaction was in the regulations proposed for industrial or commercial areas, rather than those suggested for advertising on the open highways. The definition of industrial and commercial areas was questioned, and there was great discussion of the so-called setback restrictions which defined how far back from the street a sign must be, what its height could be, and how near the intersection it could be placed.

One of the best statements submitted was that of the Utah Council of Outdoor Advertising. I ask that this statement be carried in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY UTAH COUNCIL OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING

Reduced to its fundamental thrust, Public Law 89-285, known as the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, provides that States that fail to control outdoor advertising (U.S.C., title 23, sec. 131) and junkyards (U.S.C., title 23, sec. 136) are subject to a penalty of 10 percent each of the participation of the Federal Government in its partnership with the States on their roads program.

The act provides that the Secretary of Commerce shall reach an agreement with the several States in three principal categories, so far as the outdoor advertising industry is concerned:

1. They shall determine and define an unzoned commercial or industrial area.
2. They shall establish standards for the control of the advertising permitted in the commercial and industrial zones and areas, and
3. They shall provide for signs within the right-of-way for areas at appropriate distances from interchanges on the Interstate Systems on which signs giving specific information with respect to food, gasoline, and lodging, including specific brand names, may be erected.

The act and its legislative history show an intent to protest our areas of natural beauty

and scenic interest in the rural areas but to leave the urban areas to present customary use. Otherwise, this legislation would destroy outdoor advertising and not control its orderly development as the act requires. The clear command of section 131(d), title 23, United States Code, is that standards to be established after consultation with the States with respect to size, lighting, and spacing shall be consistent with customary use. The statements by Senator Moss, and Senator RANDOLPH on February 4, and Senator MUSKIE on February 16, which establish this intent beyond argument, are annexed in the appendix.

The act also provides that before the Secretary promulgates standards, criteria, rules and regulations in carrying out his agreement with the States with respect to a definition of unzoned areas and regulation of size, lighting, and spacing in the controlled areas, that public hearings in each State shall be held for the purpose of gathering all relevant information on which to base such standards. Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor wrote a letter on September 14, 1965, to the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works from which we quote:

"The policy of the Bureau in reviewing State determinations of unzoned commercial or industrial areas would be developed only after full consultation with the States as well as with interested private business, and every effort would be made to achieve equitable treatment.

"The criteria to be followed in setting the standards for billboards in both zoned and unzoned areas, designated as commercial or industrial, would be designed to assist the advertising industry to achieve an orderly development of this important and legitimate business enterprise."

Notwithstanding the clear legislative intent that the doctrine of customary use shall be followed in urban areas, the Bureau of Public Roads, a division of the Department of Commerce, proffered in the Federal Register of January 28, 1966, six categories of draft standards, criteria, rules, and regulations which are not only inconsistent with the doctrine of customary use but are radically violative of it and would completely destroy outdoor advertising industry.

The evidence adduced at the public hearings March 1 and 2 abundantly disclosed this proposition. We shall hereafter refer to this in somewhat more detail.

A particularly disturbing aspect of this legislation lies in the following unusual concept; the Federal Government here does not legislate directly upon the people affected, thereby escaping some of the direct whiplash of public opinion and indignation, but rather tells the State, in this case the State of Utah, that unless you do as we say, we shall withhold funds from you—a loss which our State can ill afford. This is the use of raw economic power unmasked and is subject to ruthless abuse. The beginnings of abuse have been evidenced already, because there is absolutely nothing in the act that authorized the Secretary to proffer draft standards, criteria, rules, and regulations in advance, as he did; and published rules restricting the public hearings to comments and criticisms relevant to the issues as established by him, as he did; and nothing in the act permitted the Bureau of Public Roads to further restrict the scope of these hearings to comment and criticism on the proffered criteria, as it did.

Section 303(a) of title 23, United States Code, requires that before promulgation of these standards necessary to carry out the purposes of this act, the Secretary shall hold public hearings in each State for the purpose of gathering all relevant information on which to base such standards, criteria, rules, and regulations. The clear language of the act and the exclusionary conduct of the Department of Commerce are to be compared, noted, and condemned.

OMISSIONS AND FAILURES OF THE SECRETARY'S PROFFERED STANDARDS, CRITERIA, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

The evidence produced at the hearings raises some problems obviously not fully appreciated before by the Department's planners, some of which are:

1. Standards for size, spacing, and lighting accommodating the principle of customary use is utterly impossible of linear delineation unless a different set of criteria is established for areas that vary within themselves, as many have been shown so to do.

2. Any definition of an unzoned area that restricts itself to buildings rather than use of land area will produce anomalous and ridiculous results.

3. The planner for the Secretary obviously failed to take into consideration such legitimate needs of the highway traveler as (a) on the primary system small towns such as Smithfield, Richfield, Logan, Vernal, and Grantsville are set in rural areas which run to the very boundary lines of the town. Yet the approaches for 2, 4, 6, and as much as 10 miles prior thereto have historically been used for advertising. Travelers depend on these signs for a multitude of reasons. Many businesses within these towns are completely dependent on this type of advertising. No provision has been made for this need. (b) Some of these areas are now zoned agricultural with sign structures permitted, yet under this act and rules and regulations no such signs would be permitted. (c) Many Utah communities located more than one-half mile off the interstate were shown to have desperate need to advertise reasonably on the highway in order to avoid a financial hardship and ruin, yet the planners have made no provision for any such advertising.

The inherent vice in the Secretary's planners' approach to this problem in all categories has been their failure to realize that a single set of standards are not capable of universal application because of the variety of needs found from area to area.

Historically in America business and trade have followed the building of cross-country highways and the transcontinental railroads. Through our cities and towns these "main highways" have carried the freight of the Nation and along them have grown up the highway service businesses for the convenience and requirements of the traveler and of the people who reside there. In Utah all but the five or six largest cities are what might be called "one-street towns" insofar as the business district is concerned, with a concentration of stores and office buildings in the central business area and other highway related businesses extending each way to the outskirts of town. The main highway has become the business street and residential areas have been built away from main street in the quieter parts away from the noise and confusion of trucks, buses, and interstate commerce. It is only in the larger cities that trucks are diverted onto truck routes and bypasses from the main street. This is the primary system—not the interstate.

On these one-street towns it will be seen that the street runs through a central built-up business district, but with business also extending from the center for several miles along the highway in each direction out of town into the country where you will find service stations, drive-ins, bowling alleys, bottled gas plants, dairies, cattle barns and sheds, potato storage bins, loading docks, fruit stands, and so on. The traveler is often several miles out of town before he enters the truly rural scene. The Secretary's standards do not provide for any advance advertising in these approaches, if rural, and not subject to his definition of an unzoned commercial or industrial area.

Customary use in these areas has been in accordance with local zoning provisions which have permitted advertising signs in agricultural zones. Such signs require no

to \$120 million, to permit acceleration of soils mapping and application of conservation measures on the land.

Watershed planning and development is another area where the backlog of work needing to be done approaches staggering proportions. A modest increase in funds—to \$10 million for watershed planning, and to \$80 million for watershed protection—would help give this program the added impetus it needs.

I know that this committee is well aware of the benefits of the small watershed program, particularly the multiple-purpose projects that have contributed so much to the concept of local self-help in developing the Nation's water resources for the benefit of the community.

I can tell you that in Kansas we have made impressive progress in many watershed areas under this program. Yet, of 236 watersheds that need attention—and there are others that would benefit by further protection and development—only 21 watershed projects have been authorized for operations assistance. There simply has not been sufficient money made available to do the needed job. Watershed protection and development requires more substantial Federal support of local cooperative efforts, as a matter of growing national concern.

In Kansas, and in nine other Western States, the Great Plains conservation program has given new life and hope to a vast region of great potential. I am happy to say that in Kansas at the beginning of the current fiscal year more than 1,725 farms and ranches with a total of 1,660,000 acres were being operated under Great Plains conservation program contracts. But throughout the Great Plains States, approximately 5,000 applications for assistance under the program have not yet been serviced. I believe this program has proved its worth beyond any question of a doubt, and that it should be accelerated, as, indeed, the economic life of the Nation in general is being accelerated in this period of dynamic national growth.

An increase in Federal support of the Great Plains conservation program to \$20 million would help reduce the backlog of pending applications, and thereby bring the Nation that much closer to solving its soil and water conservation problems.

I believe these suggested increases in the budget of the Soil Conservation Service are fully justified to assure the protection, development, and proper use of the Nation's soil and water resources, in order to meet the long-term needs of the American people.

A COMBAT VETERAN SPEAKS OUT ON VIETNAM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, an excellent article by Jim Morris, who had served for 5 years and 8 months in the Army, was a captain in the Green Berets in Vietnam, and was wounded three times in action against the Vietcong, appears in the current issue of the Saturday Evening Post.

No one can question his credentials. His article points out some of the numerous follies which we have been and are continuing to commit in our undeclared war in southeast Asia.

He also makes the very pertinent observation in the first paragraph of his article, which I quote:

Our men are most efficient in killing, but we can kill every North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldier in South Vietnam, and still lose the war.

I have been saying that for over 2 years now.

The facts he sets out just add up to further evidence of the complete unjusti-

fication and unwisdom of our being there militarily. Unfortunately, the Nation has now been committed by Executive act to this undeclared war and thereby condemned an increasing number of our fine young men to slaughter.

I ask unanimous consent that the article: "We Must Colonize Vietnam," be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

WE MUST COLONIZE VIETNAM (By Jim Morris)

(NOTE.—The author, 28, served 5 years in the Army, with two tours—8 months—as a captain in the Green Berets in Vietnam, where he was wounded three times in action against the Vietcong. He left the Army last June and now lives in Oklahoma City.)

Day after day I hear our military's reports about how many Vietcong have been killed, and it dismays me that so few Americans realize killing alone does no real good. Day after day I hear of the legislators and diplomats squabbling over Vietnam policy, and I wonder if they are talking about the same country where I served with the special forces—the Green Berets. Our men are most efficient in killing, but we can kill every North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldier in South Vietnam, and still lose the war. Our military and Government leaders meanwhile ignore a basic fact. Escalation is not the answer. South Vietnam is a country whose Government is totally dependent on us. But its leaders are running the place corruptly and stupidly. We must force them to reform or else forfeit the hope for a real victory.

The two most stable democracies in Asia—Japan and the Philippines—were created within forms molded by the American military. But the billions of dollars we pour into Vietnam go to a regime whose principal characteristics are inefficiency and corruption. None of this will change of its own accord; nor will more planes and tanks and men, more Presidential conferences or Vice Presidential tours, change the situation.

We are going to have to impose rule on this country. We must use the only real weapon we have: money.

Let me stress that I speak without anger toward the U.S. Army, in which I served with pride for more than 5 years, or special forces, which is as much my religion as my former outfit. But Green Berets live and fight with the people, and so they acquire experiences unavailable even to the highest American officials, who make their tours under the guidance of the Vietnamese mandarins. The Vietnamese Government, since its inception, has been the private preserve of these mandarins, who comprise one of the most detestable oligarchies in the world. The late President Ngo Dinh Diem was one of the mandarins, and control has remained within the Vietnamese Establishment, which contends with Vietcong for the support of the people. Some choice. On one side is Saigon and on the other the Vietcong, who would organize the country into a system of interlocking informants so tight it would make "1984" look like an anarchy.

Since returning home, I have often heard Americans talk offhandedly of the "corruption" and "misunderstanding" in places like Vietnam, but I do not think they understand what it really means in this war. In the spring of 1964 the Rotary Club of Hawaii donated a load of presents to the people of Vietnam. For some reason it was decided to give it all to the Montagnards of Phu Thien district, Phu Bon Province, in the Central Highlands where our strike force was operating. In short order the donation turned into an extravaganza. Officials of the Hawaii Rotary were flown in to make the

presentation. Gen. Paul D. Harkins himself flew down by helicopter to make a speech. A large crowd of Montagnards was gathered at the speakers' stand.

Back in Ceo Reo, the province capital, meanwhile, the local Agency for International Development representative was frantic. He had examined the cargo. In a society where soap is just beginning to catch on, there is a limited demand for 3,000 Barbie dolls.

In order to save the United States from embarrassment, the AID man denuded his warehouse, collecting all the farm implements he could find, along with wheat and blankets.

The gift giving was a huge success, and the VIP's departed in an orgy of mutual congratulations. The day after, as we later learned from our friends in the village, the district chief, a lieutenant in the Vietnamese army, seized all the farm implements and other useful merchandise (the dolls were spared) and had them loaded on a truck, donated to him by the U.S. Army, and shipped to Pleiku, where they were sold.

This chief and another not far away had a more regular system of acquiring income. This technique was to move villages. Each time a village family is resettled it is entitled to 1,000 plasters (officially about \$14) to establish its new home. But the villagers received only 200 plasters, and the chiefs kept the rest. Several times we tried to acquire evidence to prove this corruption—but who is going to testify against a man whose duties include those of judge, jury and executioner?

We figured that those two swine were each worth a battalion to the Vietcong.

Although upper class Vietnamese officials give lip service to winning the people, they are usually incapable of understanding the respect for human dignity which this requires. About 2 months after the Rotary Club incident, two of the Vietnamese guards on the Ca Lui bridge decided to get a little carbine practice. For their target they chose an old lady in a village about 200 yards away. They started kicking up dust at her heels with their bullets. She ran across the field toward her home and began climbing the notched log that Montagnards use for ladders on their stilted houses.

She was halfway up the ladder when one of the bullets killed her. I don't think the guards really meant to kill her; their marksmanship isn't that good. One of our strike force company commanders was a nephew of the old lady, and he reported the incident to us. My detachment commander and the province adviser, an American major, went to the province chief and told him the story. The chief responded with an elegant shrug, a legacy from the French, and said that he doubted that it was true, but if it was, there was nothing he could do about it, and why bother? It was just another savage.

This is the way the mandarins normally treat the Montagnards, who are 95 percent of the population of the Central Highlands. The Montagnard tribes have had wars among themselves for many years, but they share a hatred of the ethnic Vietnamese. The Montagnards fight the VC now because it pays pretty well, and because they like Americans, but all they need to do is stop fighting the VC, and the Highlands—the middle half of Vietnam—is lost. Should all the VC be killed today, the Montagnards would launch their own war for some form of autonomy. The Hoa Hao and Cao Dai are religious sects whose hierarchies want to carve their own feudal fiefdoms out of the country. The Khmer Serel, a group of ethnic Cambodians, wait the chance to reannex to Cambodia six of the southern provinces along the Mekong. All these groups have well-trained military units, currently serving under the Vietnamese and fighting the VC. The idea that the Vietnamese mandarins can, without re-

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form, mold these people into a nation is a mirage.

Of course there are competent people in Vietnam now, but few have any chance to rise to power, and we must force the mandarins to give them the chance. There was a second lieutenant named Luan in the Vietnamese special forces. The first time we went on patrol together he had a flunkie carry his pack and he walked gaily along leaning on a staff. He wore tailored camouflage fatigues and dark glasses. He was elegant. Eight miles down the trail the flunkie was still carrying his pack, but Luan was carrying the pack of a private who couldn't make it. He had guts and he was smart. If we suggested something in the afternoon, Luan had already done it in the morning. If it was advised in the morning, he had accomplished it in the afternoon before. He would have been an outstanding soldier in any army in the world.

I made the mistake of mentioning to his higher headquarters that he was a good man. Two days later he was whisked away, into some limbo that the Vietnamese army maintains for pro-American lieutenants, and replaced by a man who read maps upside down and parades around with a rusty sword. He is a lieutenant, and his father is wealthy. In Vietnam, talent is dangerous, for it threatens the establishment.

We brought in a prisoner once, a pretty nice old man, the chief of a Vietcong-controlled village. As a conversational opener, the commanding officer asked him if he knew Diem was dead.

He said no, but he was very sorry.

The commanding officer thought he had misunderstood and asked the question again and the answer came back the same.

The village chief thought Diem was a friend of the commanding officer and he was sorry his friend had died. He himself had never heard of Diem, or Vietnam either, although he knew who the Vietminh were and in his extreme youth had been to Pleiku and seen a Frenchman. People like this aren't worried about the Premier, whether he be called Ky or Diem or Khanh. To them, the district chief is the government. We have counted on the Saigon Government to win the districts, and they have failed. Yet Americans acquire the friendship of these people because they tender their own friendship honestly.

Recently, our attention has been drawn to the large-scale attack forces we have assembled to sweep valleys and hillsides, and the suggestion is that we are mounting an offensive that can finally "win." In fact, the infiltration of North Vietnamese units has distracted American forces into a gaudy, but essentially diversionary, war. An insurgency is a very special kind of war: A significant portion of the population must find the government despicable; there must be a countryside to hide in; and there must be help from the outside.

At no time within memory have the conditions for guerrilla war been met so fully as in the Republic of Vietnam. Thus the new, escalated American attacks bring a danger that we will delude ourselves with shows of strength—a very real danger, for most American commanders, as well as most generals giving advice back in the States, were schooled in World War II and Korea. The ramifications of guerrilla warfare do not come easily to soldiers trained to think in terms of real estate. We may conquer real estate, kill Vietcong by the thousands, and still lose the support of the people and thus lose the war.

Yet the situation is not hopeless, in my opinion. We have a dependency named South Vietnam. So far it is a disaster. Now we must get tough with the Saigon government.

Our entire AID and military advisory effort has been run from the top down, mean-

ing that we have entrusted the funds to the mandarins. This has been a drastic mistake we must rectify.

One of the Vietcong's principal techniques is the creation of a shadow government. For every government official they have an equivalent VC official. The French called this system parallel hierarchies. The Americans have created a parallel hierarchy too, with the AID and military-advisory effort. But our parallel hierarchy cannot force changes in the Vietnamese Government.

I am not suggesting that we use our parallel hierarchy to get rid of inept administrators by assassination and terror, as the VC do. But I do recommend that Province AID representatives should have final veto on any money or goods which are distributed within the Province. They should be encouraged to use this leverage to insist on honesty, fair treatment, and the replacement of corrupt officials. Whenever possible, the replacement should be a respected local leader. Our military advisers should have all pay and supplies in their possession until they are issued to the troops. It has always been that way in the Special Forces, and in our detachment the VC-kill ratio between our troops and all other troops in the Province, man for man, was 33 to 1 in our favor. The people supported us because they respected us, as they despised the mandarins.

In this way, in a sense, we will be running the country altogether—and such a program may take a generation to succeed. But the country cannot run itself, and it is our responsibility. It is axiomatic in revolutionary warfare that an insurgency can be resolved in one of two ways. Either the legitimate aspirations of the people are satisfied, or a regime so cruel and oppressive is established that the mere utterance of an antigovernment remark results in prison or death. Unless we force Saigon to provide the former, the North Vietnamese will establish the latter.

We are successful at the killing, and well-meaning about the diplomacy. But we must accept this country on its own terms. An Australian colonel, chosen for Vietnam duty because of his knowledge of the language, of the people and of guerrilla warfare, once summed it up well: "The Vietnamese have a proverb which they don't quote to Americans. 'He who gives and asks nothing in return is despised.'"

THE 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF BYELORUSSIA

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, this week marks the 48th anniversary of the liberation of Byelorussia from domination by the Soviet Union. Sadly, here independence was shortlived lasting less than 3 years. This is a very short time to be free when you have fought and struggled for freedom for so long. Having been exposed to, and having experienced freedom, the Byelorussian people, I am convinced, will not lose faith and will continue in their struggle to regain their independence.

The history of this small but brave nation offers clear and convincing evidence that the right to self-determination is an aspiration that all oppressed peoples share. Further, the oppressed people of the world long for the day when freedom once again will flourish in their countries and will cast asunder those totalitarian chains that will exploit a nation's economic resources and oppress the spirit and body of the people.

It is important for us as free Americans to remember, Mr. President, that all the peoples of the world are not free.

Many are struggling to achieve liberation from the yoke of oppression and persecution; others are striving valiantly to maintain their freedom.

Mr. President, we should particularly remember that no one came to the aid of Byelorussia in its struggle for independence and today there are many small countries that will fall to the same fate without the support of the free world. That is why our Nation is in Vietnam today.

The history of the United States shows that the securing of freedom does not come easy or cheap, but as all Americans know, the blessings of a free society are well worth the price. The prayers and thoughts of the American people, Mr. President, are with the oppressed people of the world and we sincerely hope that all people will soon enjoy freedom and independence.

A COMMONSENSE APPROACH TO SOLVING CRIME

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, as we all know, the crime problem in our country has reached a point where many people worry about leaving their homes at night for fear of being harmed.

We all need to look at this problem and its effects on ourselves, our families, our friends, and our property.

Some of the best "down to earth" advice on the subject came Monday, March 21, 1966, from Deputy Chief Lawrence A. Hartnett, who is chief of detectives for the Metropolitan Police Department.

Chief Hartnett spoke to the American Newspaper Women's Club in Washington. Because the advice he offered appears to hit at the center of the problem, I ask unanimous consent to have his address printed in the RECORD for others to read in its entirety.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

An increase in crime is being experienced throughout the United States and the District of Columbia has not been spared in the general increase.

The impairment of the security of person and property is a matter of major concern.

There are no quick or easy answers. A tremendous effort must be exerted to identify and eliminate the causes of criminal activity.

There has been in recent years much talk, but little constructive action to deal with the increase in crime.

Fortunately, since the President of the United States has voiced his concern, more interest and action has been generated to seek a solution than ever before.

For too long, too little serious attention, and too low a priority have been given to our methods and agencies of law enforcement.

The policeman, the frontline soldier in the war against crime, has been waging a lonely battle. His burdens have been increasing each day.

Police work and policing is no longer merely the presence of a uniform policeman on the beat. It is a complex, involved professional position, requiring utilization of the latest scientific detection, understanding, and a willingness to work under rules and decisions which would have confounded policemen of yesteryear.

What is police work?

Primarily, the police are responsible for preservation of the peace, protection of life

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I have said what I have today to show the difficulties that we must overcome to get these people to the conference table and the difficulties that we will face when we have got them there. I believe that those difficulties are still further increased by the resumed bombing in North Vietnam. It began a year ago yesterday, on February 7. We were told that it would discourage the Vietcong, check the movement of troops and supplies from north to south, and help to persuade Hanoi to end the war. In those three purposes it failed completely. Indeed, it strengthened the Vietcong, it increased Hanoi's commitment, and it stiffened their resistance, just as Hitler's bombing stiffened our resistance in 1940-41.

I see no reason in logic or experience to believe that the resumed bombing will be more successful now. U.S. generals have testified that the bombing of the trails in Laos has no military value, and anyone who understands bombing and jungle trails will see how likely it is that that is true. No doubt President Johnson sees no reason why bridges, railways, and power stations in North Vietnam should be immune. But I say that if he cares for Asian opinion, if he wants peace and an early conference, as I am sure he does, as a matter of hard political realism he would do much better to call off the bombing.

What else is needed to improve the hope of peace? The Prime Minister spoke about the status of the NLF. I believe that we must do more to clarify what that status is to be. On some days Mr. Rusk says that it is a matter of marginal importance and that, of course, agreement could easily be found once there was a willingness to come to a conference. On other days he says that he deals with governments only and that the NLF is not a government in any way. I sometimes wonder whether, in the realities of political power, the NLF is not quite as much a government in rural South Vietnam as is the militarist junta of Air Vice Marshal Ky, who boasts that Hitler is the man he most admires.

In any case, the NLF has been, is and will remain a major party in the war, and it must be an equal and accepted party in the conference and in the peace. Without it, we can be very certain that there will be no conference and no settlement.

I believe that we must clarify the West's commitment to the Geneva agreement of 1954. Washington repeats that it accepts the essentials of that agreement, but what does that mean? Does it mean what it meant in 1955? Of course, details can be varied, but the essentials of the Geneva documents, as I have described them, are crystal clear, and this time only honest interpretations will suffice.

Would the West take a terrible risk, if it agreed to carry out free elections which brought Ho Chi Minh to power? Honorable members have mentioned Tashkent, but what is the supreme fact about Tashkent? It is that the Soviet Government, instead of trying to create trouble between two neighbors, instead of trying to inflame a war from which they might hope that their Communist Parties in India and Pakistan would profit, took the initiative in securing a great agreement, to which Mr. Kosygin made a contribution second to none.

I call that the supreme fact about Tashkent, and surely it is the supreme proof that the domino theory is nonsense. Of course, much has happened to drive Ho Chi Minh into Chinese arms, but all who know him and his people say that he would follow an independent line and he would be an Asian Tito. In any case, so far as Vietnam is concerned, the domino theory, repeated today by President Johnson is simply nonsense.

I have shown that the war in Vietnam did not start in some deep-laid plan in Moscow or Peking. I answer the honorable member who raised the point, that its ending, with

neutralization of north and south and mutual armament reductions, would bring no threat to Vietnam's neighbors. It is the war itself which is the danger to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and China. It is sheer illusion to believe that Communist ideas can be destroyed by guns and bombs. As the Prime Minister said today, war creates the misery and chaos in which communism breeds.

Let us end the war and then let us work with Russia and perhaps with China to free the Asian peoples from their ancient enemies of serfdom, usury, ignorance, hunger and disease.

The Wrong Place for Budget Cut**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. ALBERT H. QUIE

OF MINNESOTA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Speaker, I have made a number of protests recently regarding the administration's proposal to cut the school milk and lunch program to the bone, affecting literally every school district in the Nation.

The following editorial is an excellent example of the kind of thinking that is going on at the local level—the local level that is so often overlooked in Great Society programs—and I hope it draws attention to the fact that people will not tolerate the replacement of sound established programs with new and experimental ones which also give more control to Federal administrators.

The editorial follows:

[From the Albert Lea (Minn.) Evening Tribune, Mar. 17, 1966]

THE WRONG PLACE FOR BUDGET CUT

The proposed Federal budget cut in school lunch funds ought to be raising more concern among local taxpayers.

A check with school district 241 officials reveals that during the 1964-65 school year the district received \$22,609 in Federal aid for the special milk program. In addition, another \$20,151 was allocated for the general school lunch funds. That's more than \$42,700 of our money that was returned here.

Now the Johnson administration has ticketed a cutback in funds from \$202 million this year to \$183,590,000, or almost \$19 million. Although it is impossible to know precisely how much this would affect the local situation we believe Superintendent Lorne S. Ward when he says, "It would hurt."

Why cut back what has been a successful program for many years?

The administration says a redirection of funds to needy families is needed and that conditions to other programs are in order.

The local school district is experimenting with titles I and II of the Federal Education Act. We cannot yet properly evaluate the results but we do know that the redtape involved in applying for these programs is unbelievable.

We believe that anyone who says these programs are entirely free of obligation is wrong. School officials have already been told that they are to try and distinguish between the poor and the rich student.

On the other hand it can be said almost without exception that school lunch programs have had very few strings attached over the years.

About 410,000 school lunches are served daily in Minnesota schools. Participation increased by 6.1 percent last year. Some

schools supply milk free to the students, others charge a penny, another group charges 2 cents, and 107 other schools charge over 2 cents. The Albert Lea District assesses 2 cents per half pint.

Application of a needs test or poverty test would mean that almost all students would have to pay the full cost of the milk which in Albert Lea is about 5 cents.

Presently, only a very small number of students obtain free lunches because of low family income. About 4 percent of students get meals free but most of these receive them in return for assisting with kitchen or lunch line work.

The present program has proved itself. It is money well spent. Let's keep it that way.

Vietnam: Beware Our Own Rhetoric**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, the road to peace, in any conflict between nations, is at best a difficult and tortuous route.

As Ray Price points out in the following column from the March 19, 1966, edition of the New York Herald Tribune, we must be exceedingly careful in our use of language and in any negotiations in which we participate.

Mr. Price's column follows:

VIETNAM: BEWARE OUR OWN RHETORIC

(By Raymond K. Price, Jr.)

It is time for the United States to consider seriously the dangers of being caught as a prisoner of its own rhetoric on two crucial issues in the Vietnamese confrontation: negotiations and free elections.

Both are useful only as means to an end, not as ends in themselves. Yet the rhetoric has tended to treat them as goals to be pursued in and of themselves.

Certainly, in the abstract, it is far more civilized to negotiate than to fight, to settle differences over a conference table rather than by the cruel means of war. But in practice, negotiations can take on some of the qualities of quicksand. And this is particularly true if one side (which would be ours) has been conditioned to feel that, having begun to negotiate, an agreement has to be reached at whatever price has to be paid.

It should be axiomatic that if a war is worth fighting, the peace is worth winning. There are, of course, those who argue that the Vietnamese war is not worth fighting, and who would readily accept any course—even precipitate withdrawal, and the certain take-over of the south by the north—that would extricate us from it. But these are few.

There are many more, however, who feel uneasily that though we have to fight because we are engaged, we should never have gotten engaged in the first place; who leap at each new suggestion, however tenuous, of a peace feeler; who insist (as Senator Fulbright said to Secretary Rusk) that if we have failed to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table, we, not they, must be doing something wrong. These are the ones from whom the strongest, if not the loudest, pressure for negotiations qua negotiations comes. And these are the ones who, if Hanoi relented and did sit down to negotiate, would probably press for concession after concession by our own side to reach an agreement—any agreement.

So far, we have been saved from possible folly by the stupidity and stubbornness of the enemy, who has not concealed his own demand for total victory. When Hanoi proclaimed as a condition of any talks that the National Liberation Front (a creature of the North Vietnamese Communist apparatus) be recognized as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam, it was bad public relations but an accurate reflection of Hanoi's war aims.

Suppose, however, Hanoi should decide that it could win more at the conference table than on the battlefield, or even that under cover of negotiations it could gain a military advantage. This is by no means inconceivable. The American build up, the effects of which are only now beginning to be felt, has radically altered the military balance. The Vietcong are hurting; they have not even been able to defend their own strongholds; increasingly, the peasants, no doubt sensing where their own security lies, are cooperating with the Government forces.

If Hanoi should suddenly decide to enter negotiations, the United States would then be faced with a test of will of another sort: whether to stick to its guns, figuratively and perhaps literally, with the prospect of peace dangling in front of its eyes—if only we would reach far enough. And the rhetoric of negotiations has created a climate in which it would be difficult not to overreach; difficult, that is, not to yield the very things we have been fighting for merely because we have been persuaded that there is something sacred about the fact of negotiating.

Free elections pose a comparable problem. The mechanics of election present a staggering enough challenge in a nation torn by guerrilla war, in which the Vietcong have for years practiced wholesale slaughter of selected civilians as a device of political terror, and in which there are no clear fronts behind which the people of one side and the other can be reasonably secure in their persons.

In Vietnam, the problem is complicated by the almost total lack of political sophistication among much of the farflung populace. To suppose that Western parliamentary democracy can be imposed, intact, on a war-torn country alien to its traditions and without its experience, is to suppose the highly unlikely.

Yet elections, like negotiations, has become a propaganda shibboleth, and the danger is that we will lose sight of the vast gulf between our own experience and Vietnamese experience.

Essentially, elections are a means of providing a responsive and responsible government, under which personal liberties can be secure. They can only be meaningful within a framework of legal order which, among other things, provides security against terrorism and the threat of reprisals. One goal of the war is to establish such a framework. Meanwhile, when talking of elections, we should be careful to bear in mind the essential distinction between the electoral process and what it is meant to achieve. Elections held under conditions which might invite their subversion by a skillful and cruelly disciplined Communist apparatus would be of no service to the cause of democracy, or to the Vietnamese people.

Like so many things in this world, the value of both negotiations and elections depends crucially on the conditions under which they are held. The danger is that we will become so firmly committed to holding them, that in order to do so, we will sacrifice the conditions necessary to their success. And if we sacrificed the conditions, we might find ourselves sacrificing South Vietnam.

Cure for the "Credibility Gap"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, our colleague, the Honorable DON RUMSFELD, of Illinois, has played a key role in attempting to obtain for all Members of Congress the proper flow of information from the executive branch. Mr. RUMSFELD's persistence is very properly and effectively described in an editorial in the *Topeka, Kans., Capital-Journal* on March 13 which I am pleased to place in the RECORD:

CURE FOR THE "CREDIBILITY GAP"

For a long time the word "gap" was one associated with geography. There was, for example, the famed Cumberland Gap situated near the point where Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky meet. This structural fault provided a natural passage through the Cumberland mountains. Daniel Boone's road to Kentucky ran through it and encouraged settlers to move west.

Most of our mountain areas have locally-known "Horseshief Gaps" or other names reminiscent of earlier days. We know of one instance where a route through the mountains was called "Bootlegger's Gap" for good reason.

But the modern use of the word "gap" is mostly in a different sense. John F. Kennedy, when campaigning for the presidency, had a lot to say about the "missile gap," which turned out to be something less than a major gap, if it was a gap at all. And now we are concerned with still another gap. This one has become known as the "credibility gap."

The term is derived from the complaint of Washington newsmen, and Members of Congress, that the Johnson administration is not (1) putting out enough information about what it is doing, and (2) coloring the news or its activities to the point where its reports are less than reliable.

There is sometimes a fine line between what a government can safely permit to be known and what it cannot. But the tendency in Washington these days seems to be to manage the news.

This can be damaging to the Nation and its citizens. Editor J. Russell Wiggins of the *Washington Post* wrote in his book, "Freedom or Secrecy":

"If a government repeatedly resorts to lies in crises where lies seem to serve its best interests, it will one day be unable to employ the truth effectively when truth would serve its interests best. A government that too readily rationalizes its right to lie in a crisis will never lack for lies and crises."

Associated Press newsmen Saul Pett, in a recent article on the "Credibility Gap," said there have been lies by the Government in recent years and cited the following:

"In 1930, the government of Dwight D. Eisenhower lied about the U-2 plane shot down over Russia.

"In 1961, through its Ambassador in the United Nations, the government of John F. Kennedy lied about the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"In each case, the deception was posed in a moment of profound national pain. But in neither did the President nor his adminis-

tration continue to suffer from a lingering doubt about its word.

"The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson has had no single moment as traumatic as the U-2 incident or the Bay of Pigs. It has not been obliged to make public confessions of attempted deception.

"And yet there lingers over Washington today a cloud of doubt—large and gray in the minds of some, small and white in the minds of others."

One doesn't have to look far to find other instances where the present administration has more or less had to be "smoked out" on international developments. There was the peace feeler from Hanoi in 1964 which was concealed until after the death of Adlai Stevenson. There was the case of the prime minister of Singapore who claimed the CIA had offered him a \$3.3 million bribe in 1960. The State Department denied it but was forced to admit it when the Singapore minister produced a letter from Secretary Dean Rusk apologizing for the incident.

The optimistic assessments of Secretary McNamara in the early years of the Vietnam war, which turned out to be wrong, didn't help the credibility of the Johnson administration.

And newsmen will not soon forget that Arthur Sylvester, from the McNamara Pentagon, proclaimed the Government's right to lie in emergencies.

President Johnson seems to go to extreme effort to bottle up some of his intended actions which could have no actual bearing on the peace and safety of the country. For instance, he appointed Abe Fortas to succeed Arthur Goldberg on the Supreme Court the day after he said he had not begun to consider Goldberg's successor.

What is the answer to all this jockeying to control the free flow of information?

It lies, we believe, in a measure now pending in Congress called the freedom of information bill. A leading advocate of the bill, which so far has only Senate approval, is Representative DONALD RUMSFELD of Illinois. At 33, young RUMSFELD is a member of the House Government Operations Committee and of the Subcommittee on Government Information and Foreign Operations which has held hearings on the bill safeguarding the public's right to know.

Representative RUMSFELD notes that when the House hearings were completed in early 1965, every witness who testified supported the legislation, except for every single witness sent to testify by the President on behalf of the executive branch of the Government.

RUMSFELD realizes that governmental secrecy is nothing new, that it is as old as government.

But, he said in a recent speech:

"The Johnson administration has been particularly skillful and imaginative in its use of secrecy and news manipulation as a protective device. Within the last few years, increased Government secrecy has resulted in a marked loss of confidence by the people in their Government.

"Talk of a 'credibility gap' and 'truth in government' is heard increasingly."

Nobody wants to release information that would be in the class of aid and comfort to the enemy but neither does the public want to be spoon fed political medicine. It would be to the interest of the public if Congress would approve the "freedom of information" bill, which would require the Government to make all public records available to any citizen.

sion, and revolution. His plans have been in constant operation from the time his military forces administered the decisive defeat to the French at Dienbienphu in May 1954.

The purpose of the Geneva accord was to provide a means for Vietnam to stabilize itself and reunify through free elections. The elections were never held. The plan has not worked. If a return is made to the terms of the Geneva accord it is obvious that the agreements need strengthening, particularly in the area of enforcement of the terms, and it has been suggested that the United Nations is best fitted for that difficult job.

Vietnam Study

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, on March 2, 1966, I addressed the House on the subject of our situation in Vietnam and urged that, following up on the suggestions made by Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY, an international study be launched, mobilizing the best possible experts, first, to explore the experience of various countries in which Communists have shared power with non-Communists, including cases such as Czechoslovakia, where the result was a Communist takeover, and other cases such as France, Italy, Finland, and Indonesia, where the result was the opposite; and second, to recommend possible arrangements for a system of shared power in South Vietnam, including provision for elections, which would provide safeguards, checks and balances, international supervision, and other guarantees, so as to make the system as fool-proof as possible against Communist takeover.

Among the comments on this speech which I have received is one from Prof. Willis L. M. Reese of Columbia University, director of the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law. While Professor Reese differs with my conclusion that the study I recommended be carried on under private auspices, I believe his letter is a provocative one and accordingly I commend it to my colleagues and readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD generally.

Professor Reese's letter follows:

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
New York, N.Y., March 16, 1966.

HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM,
Longworth House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JACK: Thank you for sending me a copy of your speech on the Vietnam situation. It strikes me as being the best speech on the subject that I have read, and I congratulate you with all my heart.

The one point about which I am dubious is your suggestion that the question of what terms might be offered the Vietcong should be studied by an independent group and be financed by foundation funds. My present inclination would be to say that this study should be done by people selected by the administration and should be financed with Government funds.

I suppose that the administration must

already have given considerable thought to what sort of terms to offer the Vietcong, including the question of whether, and if so on what terms, they might be permitted to participate in the government of South Vietnam. Certainly, a willingness to negotiate would seem to suggest a willingness to give something to the other side, and the administration would certainly be delinquent if it has not given thought to what it might give.

A difficulty that I can see with having the job done privately is that so much time might elapse before foundation funds could be procured and before the job could be completed. It would be hard to get top-notch people to work full time or nearly full time on a job of this sort unless it were pretty obvious that the administration was behind the project and was in a hurry for the report.

Also, the administration would presumably be more inclined to accept the recommendations of a group selected by it than those of a group which had undertaken the study on its own initiative or perhaps on the initiative of a foundation. A report prepared by an independent group might furthermore be of some embarrassment to the administration. It would presumably be made public and this might make it difficult for the administration to reject its conclusions if it happened to disagree with them. On the other hand, there would be at least one advantage in having the existence of such a group made public. The Vietcong would hear of it, and this might make them more anxious to negotiate. If such publicity was felt desirable, the administration could appoint persons outside its ranks to make the study and make their names available to the press. To be sure, the Vietcong would be unlikely to believe that any group of men appointed by the administration could be unbiased. But, I suspect they would feel the same way about any group composed largely of U.S. citizens. What would count in the long run would be the merit of the proposals made by the group. Able persons appointed by the administration should be able to make as good proposals as anyone else.

These are all matters of detail and do not bear in any way upon the excellence of your general thesis.

Faithfully yours,

WILLIS L. M. REESE.

Saving Lives

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AL ULLMAN

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, March 14, 1966

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I was interested in a recent editorial appearing in the Sunday Oregonian which comments on the fact that American farmers will be expected to grow more wheat because of the serious shortage of food in some parts of the world, especially India.

The paper states:

The United States has been pouring millions of bushels into that famine-threatened country under Public Law 480, the food-for-peace programs. * * * President Johnson's food-for-freedom program follows closely the present arrangement, with greater emphasis on efforts of recipients to increase their own food production.

The Oregonian believes the knowledge that "they are producing" wheat to

alleviate hunger among the millions who would starve without it" will be a great satisfaction to American farmers.

Since the editorial deals with a subject of vital concern to us all at this time, I offer it for the RECORD, where my colleagues may peruse its contents:

[From the Portland (Oreg.) Sunday Oregonian, Mar. 13, 1966]

LOOSENED REINS

It now appears almost certain that the total wheat allotment for next year will be increased by 10 percent—from 49.92 to 55 million acres.

A late Department of Agriculture report estimates that by July 1 the surplus stocks of wheat in this country will have shrunk to slightly below the 600 million bushels regarded as a necessary reserve against crop failure, new demands and other emergencies, including war. This is a supply 150 million bushels less than was foreseen only last October.

Last July 1, the carryover was placed at 818 million bushels. The 1965 crop was a bumper 1,327 million bushels. Ordinarily, this would have been more than enough to cover both domestic and export demands. But the Agriculture Department now estimates that 1,537 million bushels will have gone into domestic and foreign outlets by July 1, a demand more than 200 million bushels in excess of the crop.

Reason for the increased demand is the serious shortage of food in some parts of the world, especially India. The United States has been pouring millions of bushels into that famine-threatened country under Public Law 480, the food-for-peace program. Payment has been in Indian currency, for which the United States has little use outside of India, and thus our grain shipments may be regarded largely as gifts.

Hunger will continue to create a great demand for American wheat in India and elsewhere. President Johnson's food-for-freedom program follows closely the present arrangement, with greater emphasis on efforts of recipients to increase their own food production. No substantial reduction in shipments from the United States can be expected.

Therefore, the Federal Government's objective now must be to increase production, rather than to reduce it, as it has tried to do in the past in the face of huge surpluses. Even this year, winter wheat growers are being paid to divert part of their allotments to other uses. Some 2.5 million acres of the 35 million allotted to winter wheat growers may have been diverted by the end of the sign-up period April 1. The average farmer receives about \$13.50 an acre on diverted allotments.

Offer of diversion payments was withdrawn this year, however, on spring wheat when it became apparent that a larger crop was needed to meet foreign demands. It is expected that no payments will be offered for underplanting 1967 winter wheat and that the allotments will be boosted to a total of about 55 million acres.

It is good news to American wheat growers, of which the Pacific Northwest has many, that they most likely will be permitted to grow more wheat. The price should be good in view of the heavy demand.

There should be satisfaction for the growers, too, in the knowledge that they are producing wheat to alleviate hunger among the millions who would starve without it. Growing wheat for Government storage has not pleased farmers any more than city people.

All Americans, even though they must continue to pay heavily in taxes for the wheat sent out in foreign aid, should be happy that the reins are being loosened at least a little on this country's amazingly productive agriculture and that the food the money buys is being put to good use.

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handed to us by the Senate. As the late Sam Rayburn once remarked, "Legislation is the art of the practical." We were practical and accepted the possible.

The situation in Vietnam has put us in a similar position this year. If the administration proposal falls short of reaching the state of true equality for Government workers which we seek—as I believe they do—it is because our country has many other problems to solve and other worthy goals to strive for. Earlier I mentioned some of these—schools, clean air, clean water, roads and dams, space exploration, foreign aid. Our most immediate—and most grave—problem lies in our commitment in Vietnam.

To protect this country's interests, as we must do in Vietnam, to secure our children's futures as we hope to do through our poverty and crime and other programs, we are going to have to commit a large proportion of our available resources. And while we are a vigorous nation and these resources are indeed vast, our civil servants are being asked to wait for some of the benefits to which they are entitled.

Let me state at this time that I shall vigorously oppose any attempt to make Federal employees the only group to be denied needed pay increases while other groups in our society are not so restricted. The net result of such a policy would not just be a delay for the implementation of the comparability principle, it would be more in the nature of a complete rout.

I am not about to let the comparability gap grow any wider.

The major administration proposals—the suggested pay raise, the 55-30 retirement plan, liberalized disability and survivor benefits, a modest increase in the Government's contribution to the health benefits program—will most likely pass the Congress this year. I am hopeful that my bill to widen life insurance benefits will also pass, despite the opposition of the administration. I am afraid that other proposals must await future developments.

Whatever the successes—or the compromises—reached by this Congress in the areas of pay, retirement, health, and insurance benefits, we are committed to a rational and equitable system of compensation for the Federal worker. I will continue to work toward the full realization of that goal.

Bold New Approach

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's new transport plan is a bold new approach to a besetting American problem. Long Island's *Newsday* states editorially.

It hails the proposed highway safety program that includes Federal safety standards for new cars and trucks.

The paper declares:

This is a gigantic program, of which the best feature is the coordination of all types of transportation—on rubber, on rails, in the water, and in the air.

This timely review of a pressing problem will merit the attention of my colleagues, and I therefore include this article in the *Record*.

A NEW TRANSPORT PLAN

President Johnson, moving boldly to buttress his program for the Great Society, has asked Congress to establish a Cabinet-level Department of Transportation. As a corollary, he has recommended a 6-year \$725 million highway safety program that includes the creation of Federal safety standards for new cars and trucks, and has endorsed a pending bill that authorizes minimum standards for tires.

This is a gigantic program, of which the best feature is the coordination of all types of transportation—on rubber, on rails, in the water, and in the air. It represents an effort to improve all these modes of transport while, at the same time, making them safer. The probable overall costs have only been sketched in. These will have to be weighed out as they are put down on paper. But it is hard to fault the purpose behind the President's proposals.

The program starts gently as it affects the auto manufacturers. The Government would set standards for safe performance of vehicles—not involving a totally "crash-proof" car, which might have to be built like a tank, but rather a car from which all obvious interior and exterior hazards had been removed. If in 2 years the manufacturers had failed to comply with the regulations, their vehicles would be barred from interstate commerce.

The President's far-ranging program covers many items, including (1) the creation with Federal help of a 2,000-mile-per-hour supersonic air transport; (2) a new highway safety and research center; (3) encouragement to the merchant marine; (4) studies and recommendations to eliminate jet aircraft noises; and (5) a wrap-up, in the new department, of nearly 100,000 employees and an annual expenditure of nearly \$6 billion. The new Department would include the Federal Aviation Agency, the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Public Roads, the Maritime Administration, and the Office of the Undersecretary of Transportation. Safety activities of other existing transportation agencies would also be bound in.

All these proposals are worthy, if the execution equals the concept and if bureaucracy does not take over, as so often is the case with Government agencies. The supersonic transport is required to retain American aerial supremacy on world trade routes, though of course the utmost effort is required to keep the cost within bounds.

Safety in every field of transportation is essential. We lose, in highway accidents, more than 50,000 American lives yearly. Millions of others are injured. If the new Cabinet agency can reduce this wastage in lives and an equal wastage in efficiency, it will be well worthwhile. Now we all wait the details of this bold new approach to a besetting American problem.

The 1954 Geneva Accord

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, the *Chicago Sun Times* recently printed an excellent analysis of the 1954 Geneva accord, which is the subject of considerable discussion these days among those who participate in the debate on Vietnam.

I have taken the privilege of including this in the *Record* today because I believe the *Chicago Sun Times* has done a truly remarkable job in summarizing the full significance of the 1954 Geneva accord.

The *Sun Times* article follows:

THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORD

Some of our readers have asked about the General accord of 1954, mentioned frequently in the efforts to find peace in Vietnam—what it is and how it came about.

The Geneva conference, which ran from April 26 to July 21, 1954, was called to settle the question of reunifying Korea and restoring peace to Indochina. The Korean question was not settled. The agreements reached on Indochina have become known as the Geneva accord. The accord is a complicated document of 47 articles plus a long annex to the agreement.

Broadly speaking, the Geneva accord of 1954 put an end to the fighting between France and the Vietnam forces under Ho Chi Minh in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. The accord deals primarily with Vietnam. Separate peace documents were drawn up for Laos and Cambodia.

Nine nations participated in the Geneva conference. They were the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Red China, the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Representatives of France and North Vietnam signed the accord. All of the rest of the participating nations, except the United States, took "note" of the Geneva accord and pledged to respect the sovereignty and independence of both Vietnams, Laos, and Cambodia.

The United States issued its own declaration. It stated that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the Geneva accord, cautioning that it would "view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." The United States also pledged itself to seek to achieve the unity of both North and South Vietnam through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure fairness.

The major pronouncements of the Geneva accord are few but weighty. Vietnam was partitioned at the 17th parallel, pending elections which were to be held in 1956 for the purpose of reunifying the nation.

The introduction of armaments which would increase the military potential of either side was specifically prohibited. The accord also banned the introduction of any additional military forces by either side or the establishment of military bases. All hostilities were to be ended and an International Control Commission, made up of representatives from India, Canada, and Poland, was established to supervise and enforce the agreements.

It is a matter of historical dissent as to who broke the rules of the Geneva accord first and to what extent. However, it is part of the record that barely 3 months after the accord had been accepted the then Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam asked President Eisenhower for assistance in the form of military advisers and supplies to meet the direct threat to his nation from Communist guerrillas. The assistance Diem sought was granted by the United States on October 24, 1954. President Eisenhower insisted that some reforms also be carried out and sent his personal representative to South Vietnam to supervise a broad program of agrarian and economic reforms.

It is also part of the record that Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam's leader, had been an active Communist since the early 1920's. He had made public his plans to take over all of Indochina by guerrilla infiltration, subver-

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it requires stepped-up efforts by recipient nations to improve their own production capabilities, as a condition of receiving the aid. So it is not merely a handout but an effort to encourage food-short nations to overcome their shortages.

This bill deserves the support of every citizen in the form of letters to Congressmen. For, in the words of a witness who testified recently for the bill:

"A livable world cannot long exist in which two-thirds of human beings never get enough to eat, and the remaining third are overfed."

School Milk and School Lunch Programs

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. TENO RONCALIO

OF WYOMING

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, March 9, 1966

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, as Congress pursues a cautious and deliberate course through a stream of complex and serious national and international issues, it is imperative that those matters of a less crucial nature not be overlooked.

One of the seemingly less crucial problems that could be an unfortunate victim of our well-intentioned preoccupation with questions of paramount importance is the appropriation for the school milk and school lunch programs.

The Nation realizes that a certain degree of fiscal restraint will be necessary to insure our Government's capacity to meet our serious challenges, particularly our commitment in Vietnam.

The question is not whether increased economy measures are needed, but rather, where these economy measures can be safely directed.

I submit that the school milk and school lunch programs, proven and valuable Government services that they are, should not be summarily sacrificed.

We should instead direct our paring knives to appropriations for less proven and less valuable services that can better absorb cuts without serious impairment of such widespread impact.

If the Vietnam conflict is to require sacrifice on the part of certain Government programs, there are alternatives open to us. We may choose to begin by temporarily restoring the excise taxes on luxury items untouched by the recent tax adjustment measure.

Another alternative would be a move to effect reasonable reductions in certain antipoverty programs. Commonsense dictates that when economy measures are required, they should begin with those programs that have not as yet won broad acceptance nor demonstrated positive effectiveness.

In order to place into perspective the terrible impact of the proposed reductions, I would like to introduce some facts on the situation in my State.

In Wyoming, with a population of approximately 340,000, some 32,000 children in 273 participating schools were served lunches during fiscal 1965. During that year, 5.2 million lunches were served. Only 3 percent of the lunches were served free to needy children. For

the remaining children, the cost of the lunch was 27 cents a meal, with the Government absorbing 10 to 11 cents a lunch. Wyoming received \$222,000 in Federal assistance for the lunch program.

Under terms of the proposed cut, the Government would now pay 1 cent less per lunch, which would mean Wyoming would receive \$40,000 to \$50,000 less, based on 1966 participation. This would result in Government assistance of \$170,000 to \$180,000—instead of the \$222,000 last year.

During fiscal 1965, milk was served in 314 schools with 3.6 million half pints of milk served to Wyoming schoolchildren. This was over and above the 5 million included in the lunch program.

In the proposed budget, funds for this program are cut from \$103 million to \$21 million, and milk is to be served only in schools with no lunch program. This reduction of four-fifths means that Wyoming could expect her share to be \$25,800—instead of the \$129,000 received in fiscal 1965.

These children have paid 3 to 4 cents a half pint with the Government providing the other 3 cents. The immediate consequence would be a doubling of the cost of milk to the student.

This summary indicates to what a great extent this reduction would work a hardship on Wyoming students. I know it cannot be any less severe in our sister States, and with the total effect calculated, this proposed reduction can only be viewed as a serious threat to one of the most beneficial of Government programs.

The cost of these programs is actually modest when we view them as an investment in the health of our Nation's youth. The merits of establishing good dietary habits for our youth is obvious. Health is an essential factor in learning.

To restrict the chief impact to needy students is to place them in a separate and distinct category—an outlook so contrary to our American equality concept of a public school.

The school milk and lunch programs have done more than any other Federal program to improve the diet and health of American students. Now we are asked to assume the impossible task of limiting it to the needy, when we know that any ruling established will still hurt deserving children. This program must continue to be open to all students.

Because the merit is so apparent, perhaps it is best to emphasize the harmful consequence of a reduction. The increased cost would certainly cause some students to withdraw from the programs entirely, often to a totally unsatisfactory situation.

The dairy industry, already troubled by farmers leaving because of low income, would be further damaged, since these programs create and develop markets for dairy products.

The milk program supplements the dairy price support program because markets are provided for Government-purchased milk. Otherwise, the Commodity Credit Corporation would have to buy and store dairy surpluses—at a direct cost of about \$100 million—or almost the cost of the milk program in 1965.

Surely the scant savings ultimately realized by this ill-advised budget cut do not justify such a move. To continue the present program, as the public most surely will demand, will merely shift the burden to State governments already beset by increasing pressures upon their resources.

There is only one practical course open to us—total restoration of the necessary appropriations, for to handicap these programs in the false name of economy would be a grave disservice to the Nation.

Vietnam: Political Dilemma

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, political freedom and the individual security which democracy can provide are relatively new concepts in Asia. We must not forget, however, that these things are what the war is all about in Vietnam. It comes down quite simply to whether the South Vietnamese shall have a government imposed by force from the north or the right to choose their own government.

The following editorial from the March 20, 1966, edition of the New York Herald Tribune illustrates this dilemma:

Vietnam: Political Dilemma

When Buddhist monks in saffron robes start fulminating, and crowds pour into Vietnamese city streets, the United States is always reminded of its most painful dilemma in South Vietnam. One horn is the stark fact that this unhappy country has no government—only an administration. The other is that there can be no government in any real sense until there is enough peace and order to permit the people to establish one. Yet government is the essence of the war in Vietnam; the reason why North Vietnam and the United States are sending in troops.

In cold logic, this need not present any crisis of conscience in the United States. The American purpose is to permit the South Vietnamese to choose their own government; the purpose of North Vietnam is to impose one upon them—the same kind of Government which Ho Chi Minh created in the north at the cost of perhaps 100,000 lives and nearly a million refugees. The American aim is not ignoble.

But an administration formed by military men to fight a war is not likely to be the kind that wins devotion from either the peasantry or the intelligentsia. Nor, in a nation as new as South Vietnam, has there been time to erect the largely self-functioning bureaucracy that enables older states to carry on even during wars and revolutions. Wars, especially like that now being waged in South Vietnam, seldom lend themselves to the redress of grievances. The Communists appeal to those suffering economic hardships by shooting landlords. Then, of course, they shoot the peasants if the latter do not join the local collective. But that hardly comes under the head of reform.

The objective of any administration in a country situated as South Vietnam now is must be to give the people as efficient services as can be rendered under the circumstances and to assure them that they will

eventually be permitted to set up a government. It must enlist as broad support as possible. But at the same time it cannot bring into the leadership groups which, whether from good or evil intent, will sabotage the war effort.

This is an ideal which no South Vietnamese administration has yet achieved. There has been conflict of ambition, there has been unnecessary harshness, there has been corruption. The best that can be said of the men who have managed affairs in South Vietnam is that they have been no worse than those who have floated to the top in most of the new nations, and better than a good many. Also that their efforts are, in the long run, infinitely more promising for the freedom and economic well-being of the South Vietnamese people than the strait-jacket imposed upon the North.

The role of the United States in all of this is infinitely delicate. It is blamed for all the shortcomings of the Saigon leadership and yet it cannot exert full control over that leadership without stultifying its own position. It is accused of both action and inaction—and can have no assurance, in any case, that its own selection of leaders would be any better than those already in charge. Nor is there any certainty that movements stirring in the land—political Buddhism, for example—are more than crude power plays or less than attempted subversion.

With the unpleasant burden of so much responsibility and such limited authority in civil affairs, the United States must struggle. There are no easy answers for the political dilemma, any more than for the war itself—although the outcome of the war may well hang upon the resolution of the dilemma. But what the American people must not do is to be so sensitive to the constant and often contradictory criticism leveled at the administration in Saigon that they overlook the wood for the trees, that they join the critics in equating a temporary authoritarianism there with the permanent slavery that Vietnam are trying by force and fraud to put in its place.

Civilian Command and Robert McNamara

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JEFFERY COHELAN

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

MR. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, the defense of our Nation is an awesome and sobering job. Everyone of us who serves in the Congress is daily made aware of the complexities of this task. The man who today, at one of the most dangerous periods in history, bears the brunt of this enormous burden, is Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

As a former member of the Armed Services Committee, as well as in my current committee assignment, I have had occasion to observe the Secretary at close range and to be aware of the dedication and ability he brings to his task.

Because the problems he tackles are not easy of solution, because the decisions he makes affect so many facets of our public and private lives today, there is an understandable tendency to be critical of the conduct of the Secretary of Defense. But all of us owe a debt to Bob McNamara for the magnificent job he has done. While we may disagree with

individual decisions he has made, none of us should doubt his high motivation and sincere dedication to the welfare of our country.

Mr. Joseph Kraft's column in yesterday's Washington Post, which follows, is a reminder of the many criticisms leveled at the Secretary as he endeavors to reconcile conflicting interests in the Department of Defense for the common good of all Americans:

McNAMARA'S ENEMIES: VESTED INTERESTS DISPLAY HAND

(By Joseph Kraft)

Under cover of the Vietnamese war there is being waged a dirty political fight against Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

The attackers are the same old professional military men who have at all times challenged McNamara's rational approach to defense management. They are allied with the same old vested interests in the defense industries. And they speak through the same old military tribunes of the Congress.

Only now they are using the confusion and emotion of the war to reopen arguments lost long ago on the merits. A broad sampling of this ugly technique comes newly to hand with the publication of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee hearing on the supplemental defense appropriation bill for this fiscal year.

For a starter, consider that old chestnut, the role of the heavy bomber. Secretary McNamara and his civilian aids found, and convincingly demonstrated, that in a nuclear war, missiles would be immeasurably superior to manned bombers. They also found that in nonnuclear war, medium bombers were the most useful. Accordingly, they have been phasing out production of the heavy bombers.

But Air Force bomber pilots die hard. And they are now having their spokesman intimate that if only heavy bombing in North Vietnam were permitted, the other side would be on its knees. Here, for example, is Senator STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri, a former Secretary of the Air Force.

"They have taken the Air Force, put it in the ring, said make a good fight, then criticized it. You turn loose the naval air and Air Force air of this country against North Vietnamese military targets and you are going to have a changing situation in South Vietnam."

Another outworn issue centers on the famous F-4 or F-111, a combined fighter-bomber which Secretary McNamara had designed for combined use by both the Navy and Air Force. Inevitably, the common design compromised out certain special features that the Navy wanted, and others desired by the Air Force. Still the plane has proved very effective.

But here is a sweet question on the matter put to two Navy officials by Chairman L. MENDEL RIVERS, the Democratic Representative from Charleston, S.C., with its big naval base: "When you get by yourself at home at night * * * do you wish you had some other plane rather than working on the 111, to work aboard the carriers? If you had your way, wouldn't you rather have something else?"

And here is Representative WILLIAM H. BATES, Republican, of Massachusetts, and former naval officer, on the same subject:

"We have to remember that these planes here might fight the latest that somebody else might have, and we cannot fight a compromise airplane against a noncompromised airplane. If the situation should change overnight in Vietnam, so that we would have other planes against us, this is what we have to be ready for. * * *"

Another issue long since settled considers the Navy attack plane. Instead of the heavy

and expensive A-6 Secretary McNamara had designed a lighter and cheaper attack aircraft, the A-7. A part of the savings in money and weight came in radar equipment, and as a result, the A-7 is less able to fly in bad weather than the A-6. Still, there has been no important letup of naval air attacks because of weather in Vietnam.

But the A-6 was built by the Grumman Aircraft Co. of Long Island, while the new A-7 contract went to another company. And here is a typical question from Representative ORRIS PIKE, from a Long Island district with not a few constituents who work for Grumman:

"Does it make any sense to you to continue to buy aircraft in large numbers which are incapable of performing their mission at night, or in bad weather?"

On the surface, to be sure, these look like reasonable questions and comments. But the real purpose is to put into question the whole system of analysis and choice that has for the first time made it possible for the civilian leadership to get a grip on the defense program. And if anyone has any doubts on that matter, here is a revealing assertion by Representative BATES:

"The question that bothers me in all of these hearings is the kind of planning."

In the face of these attacks, it is easy to see why Secretary McNamara sometimes seems highbanded with the congressional committees. The fact is that the only way he could have amicable relations with the committees would be to let them and their allies in the defense industries and the military services run the defense programs. To me anyhow, it is a supreme source of satisfaction that he continues to meet his responsibilities.

Chicago's Scholarly Cop

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

MR. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, much has recently been written about the great things that are happening in Chicago. It is a source of pride to all of us from Chicago that finally, after many years of abuse and denegation, Chicago is now being recognized as the most exciting metropolis in America.

The complete transformation of the Chicago Police Department is one of the reasons, among many, for this revival of respect for Chicago.

Chicago today has undoubtedly the finest police force in the country. Two men are responsible for this development. One is Chicago Police Superintendent Orlando W. Wilson, and the other is Mayor Richard J. Daley, who had the good judgment to hire Mr. Wilson.

The current issue of the highly respected magazine, the Reporter, carries an excellent article about Superintendent Wilson.

I call this article to the attention of my colleagues by placing it today in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The article follows:

CHICAGO'S SCHOLARLY COP

(By Hal Bruno)

CHICAGO.—While much of the rest of the country is experiencing an increase in the

known to all nations. It is precisely because there can be no question of our peaceful intent, that Ho Chi Minh felt called upon to defend his intransigent policies to the Communist world.

Unlike his stale polemic, the American position is plain, simple and morally sound. In essence it is:

That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962;

That a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a ceasefire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations;

That the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference;

That the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam;

That the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes;

That the questions of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples.

But until an honorable settlement is reached in honorable negotiations, the United States will respect its commitments and the human rights of self-determination in South Vietnam. If aggression there is permitted to succeed, the consequence will be felt not only in Vietnam but in all the world. We fight an enemy that has planned its aggression. And history has taught us—especially the history of the Nazi years—the horrible lesson that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace. We will continue to resist aggression, therefore, but we will continue to seek peace.

At this moment, the fighting goes on and no one should be misled as to what is happening in South Vietnam. This is no more a civil war between citizens of the South than the Communist takeover of China was a simple agrarian reform movement. The Communist Government of North Vietnam, aided by Peiping has led, supplied, equipped, and sustained the fighting in the South. Hanoi has sent its regular army forces into battle and at least nine of its combat regiments have been identified. The presence of others is also evident. These North Vietnamese army units have been identified by many sources including neutral ones.

Hanoi has sent large mortars with a range of up to 6 miles. These sophisticated weapons are obviously not locally manufactured guerrilla arms nor have they been captured in the south. They are of foreign communist manufacture.

We want an end to terror and to violence in Vietnam, but this end can only come when communist aggression ceases and when our adversaries are as ready as we are for an honorable settlement.

Life itself is the first human right. If it is to have value, all men must learn—in the words of the United Nations Charter—"to practice tolerance and live together as good neighbors." That is our wish for the people of America, for the people of North and South Vietnam, for the people of the world.

McNamara Reassures United States

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. G. ELLIOTT HAGAN

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. HAGAN of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the Atlanta Constitution has commented

editorially on Defense Secretary McNamara's assurance that the Armed Forces are not overextended or suffering shortages but are fully capable of meeting their commitments anywhere.

The newspaper believes the defense achievement to date "is a great tribute to the Nation's adaptability and determination."

In the belief that many will want to read this editorial, I am taking the liberty of making it available for publication in the RECORD:

MCNAMARA REASSURES UNITED STATES

Secretary of Defense McNamara assures the country the Armed Forces are not overextended or suffering shortages but are "fully capable" of meeting their commitments anywhere. This news is welcomed in view of the fact there have been charges that the demands of the Vietnam war were depleting the Nation's trained manpower to a dangerous degree.

The Secretary also disclosed that 20,000 additional men were on their way to join the war against the Vietcong, bringing our total forces in South Vietnam to 235,000. "Far from overextending ourselves," the Secretary declared, "we have actually extended our military position."

The country will hope that the Secretary is right but it remains uncertain how many troops finally will have to be sent to Vietnam to win a military victory, if it comes to that. There are speculations that as many as 400,000 will be needed by the end of this year—more than the number in action during the Korean war. At this stage, we may expect troop strength to continue to climb.

In a press conference Wednesday, the Secretary was candid enough to say that some concepts and methods forged by him and his experts have failed to meet the test of the Vietnam war. "We have to develop new methods to meet problems for which we had old answers," he said. "Old answers are not applying." Those who have followed the course of the war will agree and hope that the new answers have been found.

Concerning the buildup, the Secretary also had a significant statement. "Never before," he declared, "has this Nation or any other nation been able to place so large a force in combat in so short a time and some 10,000 miles from its shores without calling up Reserves, extending active duty tours on a widespread basis and invoking the kinds of strict economic controls normally associated with military emergencies."

The country still may have to resort to the measures in the above statement but the achievement to date is a great tribute to the Nation's adaptability and determination.

We Cannot Afford Apathy About the Hunger Problem

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL H. TODD, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, there has been over the past months a good deal of very constructive discussion about the worldwide population explosion and the problems associated with it. Senator GRUENING has held a number of very interesting and informative hearings in the Senate. The House Agriculture Committee has considered the matter in connection with the proposed food-for-

freedom legislation. Newspapers and other communications media have devoted space and time to discussing the problem.

I would like to take this opportunity to salute those who have had the courage to lead and join in a rational dialog concerning a subject which was once taboo and upon which continued silence would have been disastrous. The people as a whole are becoming aware that the options are very simple: Either we undertake to reduce the birth rate or we face mass famine and political unrest.

The Battle Creek, Enquirer-News, which serves the city of Battle Creek, which I have the privilege of representing in Congress, has been one of the national leaders in bringing this problem to public attention. Space in the paper has been devoted to a discussion of the problem, and the paper has commented editorially on the matter, always with pertinence and good taste.

A particularly informative editorial on the matter appeared recently in the paper, and I take this occasion to bring it to the attention of the Members:

WE CANNOT AFFORD APATHY ABOUT THE HUNGER PROBLEM

An Associated Press feature on the world hunger problem, published in the Enquirer & News Sunday, implied that people with full stomachs do not become very concerned about those who go hungry.

"Since the scope of the problem has been poorly comprehended by the general public in rich countries," the writer said, "there has been a high degree of apathy toward the plight of hungry millions."

If that is so, the time has come to abolish that apathy and become concerned. The day is not far away when the food problem will reach the proportions of a disaster unless more is done to feed the underfed and to increase farm production.

Coupled with this problem is the matter of population control, and to that issue also more attention must be directed. Commenting on the problem earlier this year, four Nobel Prize winners warned of a "new dark age" of hunger, poverty, cannibalism, and possible nuclear warfare if world population growth were not checked.

The urgency of the problem is borne out by a few figures:

There are 180,000 new mouths to be fed every day—65 million a year.

If present trends continue, world population will rise from the present 3.4 billion to from 6 to 7.5 billion by the year 2000.

The growth, moreover, will occur mainly in the underdeveloped nations where the masses even now can be described as in a state of conditioned starvation.

The United States, of course, has done a great deal through its Food for Peace program to avert famine in many nations. An official of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization has been quoted as saying that had it not been for American food surpluses, "the disaster would be upon us right now."

This country must do still more, however, if disaster in the form of death and unrest fostered by nagging want is to be averted.

Governmental efforts in that direction are embodied in the administration's Food for Freedom bill, which would authorize a 5-year program for furnishing food abroad to replace the present program when it expires on December 31.

The purposes of the bill are to expand international trade, to develop and expand U.S. markets, combat hunger and malnutrition, and encourage economic development in the developing countries with emphasis on aid to countries determined to improve their own agricultural production. Wisely,

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more people are needed in the industries providing these goods and services—the entire area will pick up.

I should emphasize here that our program is not designed to help one area grow at the expense of other areas. We do not want to redistribute the wealth of the Nation and to relocate economic activity from the more prosperous regions to the depressed regions. There is enough growth to go around, as our rising gross national product indicates. There is an expanding, not a fixed, national pie of potential for economic growth. Our intention is to increase the contribution of each region of the country to that national pie.

Mr. Koerber, I'm sure, got help of some kind from the community when he was first beginning his business. And one of the most salient points of his story is the town raising \$40,000 to enable him to keep his doors open when calamity struck. This is the kind of local initiative and support our programs demand, and what its success relies on.

In this respect EDA is very similar to other Great Society programs. A tenet of the Great Society is that enforced solutions will never work. People in local communities must want programs designed for their benefit. Programs cannot attain their goals unless a willingness to support the solution to a particular problem permeates the community.

In the case of EDA, possible recipients of loans and grants must be willing to put up part of the money for the project. And they must also fulfill other requirements, especially that of developing an overall economic development plan—which increases the chances of the project's contributing to the economic growth of the area.

EDA programs—and those of the entire Federal Government—not only rely on local initiative. They seek to expand opportunities for local initiative, both individual and collective. For instance, the Bureau of Public Roads builds roads. In so doing, it enables an individual businessman who wants to ship his goods to a particular city to do so. An EDA loan enables a community that wants to attract industry to fulfill its desire.

I know this relieves a widespread impression that the Government is out to control all it can. But a careful examination of individual Federal programs will verify what I have said. These programs seek to be the helping hand that so many communities cry out for.

Well, Mr. Koerber, if I could report to the Congress the presence of a growing industry such as yours and the presence of community support such as exists here in De Puniak Springs in every ear in the Nation which concerns us, I would be a very happy man indeed. As we work with our programs, we will keep both you and this community in our minds as we work in Washington toward our goals of curing the economic wounds of the Nation and increasing our national wealth.

The First Human Right—An Address by the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 22, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, on January 31, 1966, at a banquet in his honor, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg was the recipient of the America's Democratic Legacy Award from the Anti-Defama-

tion League for his continuing championship of freedom, justice, and equality.

In accepting the award Ambassador Goldberg made the following address which I commend to the attention of our colleagues:

THE FIRST HUMAN RIGHT

(NOTE.—Ambassador Goldberg calls it "life itself"—and if it is to have value, all men must learn "to practice tolerance and live together as good neighbors.")

(By Arthur J. Goldberg)

President Kennedy once said, "Here on earth God's work must be truly our own."

In practical terms, a dynamic world society that has found ways to smash the atom and to conquer space must now use its genius and its resources to find new ways in human relations so that all men will live together in peace and harmony. There is no other way to succeed in achieving a world community of nations safe from the scourge of war.

In America we have long recognized the inescapable fact that there is no dividing line between equality and liberty. Indeed, it was George Washington who wrote to America's first Jewish congregation that a truly free nation gives "to bigotry no sanction; to persecution, no assistance."

Our Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 gave a new voice and force to those words. Every citizen in our Nation is now legally committed to their implementation. Every citizen has the obligation to do so not only because we have new laws, but because they are good and morally sound laws.

Despite our new laws, however, can we say that there is no sanction of bigotry in America? Can we say that equal opportunity is now an accomplished fact? Can we say it does not exist in the factory, in the office, in our labor unions, in the executive suite of our corporations, in some of our higher educational institutions? Can we say if beginnings are made to eliminate racial discrimination, this extends to the elimination of religious discrimination? Can we say we have stripped bigotry from our minds and hearts?

We are now only at the beginning of the end. Writing civil rights measures against discrimination into law gives us no moral rights to pause in any phase of what must be a never-ending fight. There is no such thing as a little bit of prejudice.

The aims that guide us domestically guide us internationally. Whether at home or abroad we must move ahead in the good company of those willing to stand up and to speak up against injustice.

Seventeen years ago, the United Nations made notable progress when it adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The declaration was a milestone in every sense, but we must look to new horizons now. We can no longer talk about how much we loathe discrimination. The test of our loathing must be the speed and effectiveness with which each and every nation turns up the lights in its own house to end the darkness in which discrimination breeds and dwells.

The lights did not shine brightly enough when the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination—adopted at the last session of the General Assembly—omitted a specific reference to anti-Semitism as one of the particular evils to be condemned.

With its evil history over the centuries and the monstrous crime of 6 million Jews murdered by the Nazis little more than a generation ago, anti-Semitism demands condemnation by name. The U.S. delegation at the U.N. will continue the fight to do so by raising the issue again in the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations.

We will do so because our attitude is consistent no matter what the violation of a man's right—anti-Semitism, apartheid in South Africa or the denial of rights to black Africans in Rhodesia.

More than 100 years ago Lincoln observed this Nation could not endure half free and half slave. Surely it is an appropriate question to ask whether any nation today can endure one-fifth free and four-fifths slave.

The twin evils posed by Rhodesia and South Africa point up the challenges that face us not only in the United Nations, but as a sovereign people deeply committed to the freedom and the equality of the individual.

We know from our own national experience that the response to injustice can be both emotional and extreme. Finding the peaceful and speedy solution is not easy. This is the problem that now confronts us and other Western nations in our relationships with the new African and the Asian states. It is quite understandable that they are suspicious of promises and impatient of results.

It is not easy to wipe out the evils of the past centuries overnight. Yet the call is universal both here and abroad—freedom and equality—here and now. We must honor this call and put an end to any form of racism, or indeed any instance of discrimination, be it based on race, sex, language or religion.

The great Court, on which I had the honor to sit, said a little more than 2 years ago that the concept of eliminating discrimination with all deliberate speed never contemplated indefinite delay. Indeed, it cannot. The mortal blow to discrimination will not be struck, however, when its most vicious elements will be ended but only when all people everywhere will be concerned when just one man somewhere has the least of his rights trampled upon. The elimination of all forms of discrimination and racism must be the companion goal of man's eternal search for peace.

In Vietnam, the problem now occupying so much of the attention and determination of Americans, what we seek is nothing less than one of the most basic human rights of our day: that each person should have the right and the opportunity to choose his own destiny free from fear and free from force.

Thomas Paine said at the time of the American Revolution that "those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it." Since that time, we in America have supported the principle of self-determination for ourselves and for all others. It is a central theme of our domestic policy; it is a cornerstone of our foreign policy. It is also a basic principle of the UN Charter to which we and all member states of the UN are committed. It would be wholly inconsistent if we should turn our back on that principle now.

We also believe that the power of our Nation must always be used for peace no less than for fighting.

We were told by individuals and nations of many ideologies that a pause in our bombing raids on North Vietnam for a reasonable period of time would be essential before Hanoi would respond. The President ordered a halt and it went into effect just before Christmas, but there was no indication that Hanoi was any the more interested in peace.

Our conviction remains that the Vietnamese people—once the aggression from the North ends—are entitled to work out their destinies so that each man—North and South—will enjoy the fruits of peace.

It would be a mistake to assume—despite the negative response from Hanoi—that our peace initiative has not been worthwhile. We have made our views and peaceful intent