February 23, 1966

Auditorium last night to present an adult evening of music.

The players form the permanent orchestra of the Interlochen Arts Academy, a recent prep school expansion of the famed summertime National Music Camp in northern Michigan.

For this first appearance on a seven-concert tour of the East coast and Ontario, Thor Johnson, the director of the school, conducted three-fourths of the program. The founder of the summer camp, Joseph Maddy, took the baton for Berlioz's "Roman Carnival Overture."

The program, which also included Mozart's "Linz" Symphony, Kodaly's infrequently heard concerto for orchestra, and Shostakovich's First Symphony, showed a wise selection calculated to challenge all the players with at least one major responsibility for the 2 hours.

It is practically a norm for the conservatory orchestra to fall short in one or more sections. With high school groups, you note the enthusiasm, then quickly assemble the "but's" and "however's."

Yet few excuses are necesary for this orchestra, in which even the string section is a disciplined, many-splendored thing.

The five continuous movements of the Kodaly Concerto, composed in the midst of World War II, proved to be the apex of the concert. The solo violas and cellos, responding smoothly to an equally eloquent windassembly, transformed the Largo into a sumptuous, impassioned affair intensified with unbelievable nobility in the later tutti reaffirmation in Bachian motivic work.

The command shown in this movement, as in the first with its incisive brass punctuations, and in the two allegros, stuningly managed even in improvisational solos, could hardly be matched by good adult performers.

The certainty evident through all levels of the string section most obviously characterized the reading of the "Linz." The reading of the adagio indicated an unusual maturity in maintaining a slow tempo without sacrificing the metrical pulse.

The musicians languished tastefully over

The musicians languished tastefully over the protracted dissonances and solo episodes. Yet they never sank into that ominous quicksand of increasingly sluggish paces that drags performers into the mire of a new farewell symphony.

There was a wonderful pliancy in exchanges between sections and individuals in the Berlioz. Maddy drew forth a controlled rather than a weepingly sentimental cantilena.

Coming from the pen of a 19-year-old, the Shostakovich Symphony impressed its Russian hearers immediately and impressed the audience last night. All the elements-skilled pizzicato, light wind tonguing, luxuriant tutti mixtures—were there for a total suavity and grace that were outstanding.

From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Feb. 22, 1966

Youth Concert ThriLling Event
(By Wendell Margrave)

The Interlochen Arts Academy Orchestra, Thor Johnson, Joseph E. Maddy, conductors. Department of State Auditorium. Program: Symphony No. 36 in C, K.425, "Linz," Mozart; Concerto for Orchestra, Kodaly; the Roman Carnival Overture, opus 9, Berlioz; Symphony No. 1, opus 10, Shostakovich.

Those fortunate enough to attend the concert last night at the Department of State Auditorium of the Interlochen Arts Academy Orchestra had the inspiring experience of hearing a fine orchestra concert, comparable in programing to that of any symphony orchestra in the world, played by 102 young people of high school age.

The school they represent, an outgrowth of the National Music Camp at Interlochen, is a

is the cohomogno-more present as a

college preparatory school for students gifted in the arts. The orchestra rehearses 2 hours a day, 6 days a week, for a 32-week season and is at present on a tour which takes them today to the University of Maryland, tomorrow to Carnegie Hall, then to three performances in Canada.

The orchestra members are mostly from the Middle West, but all sections of the country are represented, and there are members from Taiwan, Finland, and Japan. Three are from the Washington area: Violinist Nancy Cole from Silver Spring. Clarinettist Jonathan Lautman from Takoma Park, and Eugene Sittenfeld, percussionist, from Bethesda.

It was a thrilling performance. It is a student orchestra, to be sure, with not quite the routined confidence and mature sound of a professional group, but wonderfully competent, wonderfully accurate, wonderfully unified. The Kodaly-Concerto for Orchestra and the Shostakovich First Symphony gave opportunity for much excellent solo work by individuals, notably Violinist Victoria Matosich; Cellist Jane Schroeder; a remarkable young bass player named David Curric; Miriam Jakes, a blond oboist with the embouchure a bit to the right but with a sweet sound and a musician's way of phrasing; and the spectacular and dedicated timpanist, Tsutomu Yamashita from Kyoto.

The best single section in the orchestra is the brasses, for they have the incisive attack and golden tone that is America's own peculiar contribution to brass playing. This rests as much on the example of the great jazz players as it does on the symphony tradition; and it gives a particularly vital thrust to the sound of the orchestra.

The conducting was in the experienced hands of Thor Johnson, who for years conducted the Cincinnati orchestra. Dr. Joseph E. Maddy, founder of the music camp and of the academy, who is everywhere a symbol of this kind of enterprise, conducted the Roman Carnival. At the close of the program, the concertmaster led the orchestra in the excerpt from Hanson's Romantic Symphony that is the Interlochen theme.

The Something for Nothing Theory Always Fails

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. A. S. HERLONG, JR.

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, February 9, 1966

Mr. HERLONG. Mr. Speaker, a short time ago my distinguished friend and our former colleague, Millard F. Caldwell, now a member of the Florida Supreme Court, made an address before the Civitan Club of Jacksonville, Fla., which in my judgment was so outstanding that it deserves being printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the enlightenment of the Members.

Justice Caldwell is recognized as one of Florida's most distinguished justices. He has been a member of the State Supreme Court since 1962. His illustrious career includes a term as Governor of Florida as well as his service in the U.S. Congress. His speech presented here is typical of the clarity, profundity, and brilliance that are characteristic of his public utterances.

The title of the speech is, "The Something for Nothing Theory Always Fails."

The speech follows:

THE SOMETHING FOR NOTHING THEORY ALWAYS
FAILS

RETROSPECT

As we watch the American people trade in their old and tried Constitutional Republic for the welfare state some of us find it interesting to look back through the ages and note the effect of similar exchanges by other nations.

If the examples of the past mean anything, we must agree history demonstrates the fact that the "something for nothing" theory has never worked; and the fact that everytime the calculating confidence men have promised utopia on earth in exchange for political support, the people have been taken to the cleaners.

But people, generally, like sheep, decline to learn from history. P. T. Barnum grew rich on his circus tricks because, as he said, a fool is born each minute.

Some 1,100 years before the birth of Christ, Samuel, later to be known as the Prophet, told the Israelites, as they clamoured for a paternal ruler, that the King would take their sons to be his horsemen, to run before his chariots, to plow his ground and reap his harvests; would take their daughters to be cooks and bakers, would give their fields and vineyards and olive orchards to his officers and make the people his slaves. And then he told them, when all that had happened, they would cry out against that ruler, whom they had chosen for themselves, "but the Lord will not answer you in that day." The Israelites, as is the way with people, did not heed Samuel's word of caution. They preferred to follow the will of the wisp quest for fool's gold.

And a thousand years later, when the Roman Republic was at the height of its glory, there was another movement to swap independence for the promise of beneficence under a dictatorship. The leading politicians, already intolerant of restraint and contemptuous of the Constitution which was designed to curb their ambitions, were offering their panaceas of "something for nothing" and the people were buying.

It was just then that Marcus Tullius Cicero, a student of law under old Scaevola, was about to suffer his first great disillusionment with unprincipled government. Although Rome dominated the world, its citizens had grown slick and fat, careless of their rights, and had fallen prey to the cunning politicians who craved more and yet ever more power and riches.

CHICANERY

Cicero's first client was a substantial man of business—a man of integrity who trusted his government. But he was a rich man and, because powerful politicians coveted his wealth, he was a victim of bureaucratic chicanery. Cicero, his lawyer, also a man of integrity and one who trusted his government, submitted documentary proof of his client's innocence, confident justice would prevail. But he lost his case. He asked his old friend, Scaevola, why he had failed. Scaevola was disgusted—he slammed the table and shouted, "Imbecile. Of what use are records * * * if the government is determined to rob and destroy a man * * * who possesses what they want? Have I truly wasted all these years on such an idiot?"

All this has a familiar ring—I dare say some lawyers and clients in this room have gone through experiences similar to those which plagued Cleero and his client.

But Cicero, undaunted, appealed his cause to the august Senate in these words: "We are taxed in our bread and our wine, in our incomes and our investments, on our land and on our property, not only for base creaalways been dominated by commercial bankers?

ers?
The administration is seeking no such power and would prefer not to have the question asked. Yet, the question of the Fed's cherished independence from the executive branch is once again critical as a result of the inflation scare spawned by the Vietnam war.

The interest rate boost decreed by the Fed 3 months ago in defiance of Mr. Johnson has failed completely as an anti-inflationary device, just as critics predicted. Instead, it started a chain reaction in interest rate boosts. And though orthodox bankers deny it, this increase in the cost of money has been as inflationary as an increase in the cost of steel.

Working on the theory that if the first dose of medicine doesn't work try a second, the Fed is geared for another discount rate boost within 60 days. Whether this will really stop inflation is debatable. It will, however, escalate the runaway cost of money.

Indeed, bankers are privately demanding another boost in the discount rate—the rate charged by the Fed for money loaned to the banks—to justify their own increases in money rates to astronomical levels.

This raises the question of the indistinct, delicate relations between the White House and the Fed. Mr. Johnson came off second best to Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin last December when the Fed raised the discount rate without consulting the President.

Some high administration officials now believe Mr. Johnson made a political mistake in publicly disagreeing with Martin and should not oppose the forthcoming second discount rate boost—or still a third increase later this year.

This caution shows up in Mr. Johnson's failure to fill a vacancy on the Reserve Board created January 31, when the term of C. Canby Balderston, a Martin ally, ended. Although the President could take control of the Board by filling that vacancy, he has let Balderston remain as a lame duck.

The basic reason for this is Mr. Johnson's inability to find a Board member who will support his position but not anger Martin to the point of resigning. Thus, the White House has turned down a suggestion for the job forwarded by a prominent Democratic Senator on grounds that he is an "easy money" man.

While accepting Martin's private recommendation that the new Board member not be an economist, the President also has ruled out a commercial banker. What he wants is a moderately liberal businessman (though Assistant Secretary of Commerce Andrew Brimmer, who would be the Board's first Negro member, is under consideration).

Yet, the identity of Balderston's replacement begs the question that Senator Mc-Cartin plans to raise in the Finance Committee: Why should the President not have the power to regulate national monetary policy as he has the power to send 200,000 men to Vietnam; why should Presidential authority stop short of controlling interest rates?

Whatever Secretary Fowler's answer to these questions, it will transcend the simplest debate over tight versus easy money. The fundamental issue is whether the President can control a Vietnam inflation without ending 6 years of economic growth. If he permits the Fed to raise the discount rate again this spring without a serious effort to block it, he will say implicitly that the job can't be done.

TRANSPORTATION AND ITS IMPACT UPON THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

(Mr. WHITENER asked and was given permission to address the House

for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, during my service in the Congress I have been greatly interested in transportation and its impact upon the economy and national security of the United States.

As the Representative of a highly industrialized district I have been particularly concerned over the problems existing in connection with rail and highway freight transportation. The severe shortage of boxcars in the country is causing undue hardship on the shippers and manufacturers in my congressional district.

It is a problem which must be solved by the railroad industry and the Government if our economy is to continue to advance and if we are to be certain that we will have an adequate supply of boxcars of all types in the event of a great national emergency.

Mr. Speaker, it is an ironic fact that the Nation had more boxcars in 1925 than it has today. In that year 2,414,083 boxcars were in service in the Nation. At the close of 1965 only 1,547,307 boxcars were in service.

A 1925 boxcar had an average capacity of 44.8 tons. A boxcar in 1965 had an average capacity of approximately 57 tons. The greater carrying capacity of the boxcar today, however, does not offset the total loss in tonnage resulting from the continued shrinking of our boxcar fleet.

During 1965 the Nation's railroads placed in operation 87,826 new cars, which was a greater number than had been placed in service in either of the 2 previous years. Unfortunately, however, 78,661 cars were retired from service. These figures give a graphic illustration of what is taking place in the Nation in regard to our freight car supply.

Some of the Nation's railroads have made a sincere effort to respond to the demand made upon them by industry for freight cars. Severe car shortages, however, have been experienced during the past several years. In an attempt to temporarily solve the car shortage in certain areas of the country the Interstate Commerce Commission has issued car service orders which have required railroads to make a part of their boxcar fleet available to other roads more severely affected by the car shortage.

In other words, the ICC has been shifting cars from one hard-pressed road to another road in a more serious situation by reason of the car shortage. The car service orders, however, are no answer to the problem. It is imperative that legislation be passed by the Congress to assure that the railroads will maintain at all times an adequate supply of freight cars. The economy demands it, and it is absolutely necessary in the interest of national security.

The railroads which have kept abreast of their needs for cars are not to be blamed for the car shortage. Heavily taxed and confronted with many problems involving labor, regulation, and tremendous passenger deficits, some of the roads have not kept up with the boxcar demand. In the interest of national security and the demands of our

everyday economy I feel that some thought should be given to helping the railroads which have tried to keep up to date, overcome the boxcar shortage through long-term loans, tax credits, or other financial assistance in proper cases.

Within the past several days I have had numerous contacts from manufacturers in my congressional district with reference to the recent ICC service order requiring the Southern Railway System to deliver 350 boxcars per week to St. Louis, Mo., in order that the cars may be distributed on western railroads suffering a severe boxcar shortage. They are the innocent victims of the present crisis.

Under the dynamic leadership of D. W. Brosnan, the Southern has revolutionized the railroad industry in the Nation. The Southern has made tremendous strides in providing better and cheaper service for its shippers. Thousands of new boxcars incorporating the very latest technological advances have been placed in service on the Southern under Mr. Brosnan's leadership.

The Southern has not raided its neighboring railroads for boxcars. Yet the requirement that the Southern be made to deliver 350 of its cars per week to western railroads will compound an already serious car shortage existing on the railroad. The result is that shippers and manufacturers in my congressional district will experience undue delays in the movement of their shipments.

Mr. Speaker, this is an intolerable situation. I feel that the constituents of my colleagues have experienced similar situations in connection with the railroads in their areas. I am hopeful that the appropriate committees of the Congress will look into this matter and report legislation that will bring relief to the railroads, the manufacturers, and above all, to the average American whose security and economic well-being is vitally affected.

U.S. ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA CONSISTENT WITH INTERNA-TIONAL LAW

(Mr. CORMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, in recent weeks there have been a number of charges leveled against the legality of American actions in Vietnam.

Yesterday, the house of delegates of the American Bar Association, by unanimous vote, answered these charges by affirming the legality of the U.S. participation in Vietnam under international law, the United Nations Charter, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

I thoroughly agree with the bar's resolution, which states:

Whereas in recent hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, it has been stated that international lawyers are agreed that the U.S. position in Vietnam is illegal and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations; and Whereas articles 51 and 52 of the charter

Whereas articles 51 and 52 of the charter sanction steps for self-defense and collective and regional security arrangements such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to which the United States is a party; and Whereas in the course of these hearings it has been suggested that an expression on this subject by the American Bar Association would be appropriate: Now, therefore, he it

Resolved by the American Bar Association, That the position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law, and is in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of this association be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to transmit a copy of this resolution immediately to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate.

PROPOSED INQUIRY INTO THE OF-FICIAL CONDUCT OF JUDGES

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the Record at this point and to include a resolution.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, last week a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee heard testimony on the problem created by corruption, laxity, incompetence, or senility on the Federal bench. There was emphasis on the importance of public respect for our system of laws, and the grave danger that is presented when a cloud of corruption or incompetence hangs over the Federal judiciary.

Mr. Bernard G. Segal, of Philadelphia, chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure, and Compensation, put it this way:

It is axiomatic that of all our historic American traditions, none is more basic than the citizens' respect for the law. This respect requires confidence in the institutions of the law, and in the men who administer them. The citizen's esteem for his courts and the judges who preside in them is of the very essence of our kind of society.

Mr. Segal, Judge John Biggs, Jr., the chairman of the judicial conference committee on court administration, and Mr. Joseph Borkin, Washington attorney and author of the book, "The Corrupt Judge," were in agreement that impeachment is the only remedy available today for action against judicial misconduct.

Both Mr. Borkin and the chairman of the subcommittee emphasized the serious problem that has arisen in Oklahoma where the Judicial Council of the 10th Judicial Circuit made an attempt to bar Judge Stephen S. Chandler from handling cases because it was stated he was "either unwilling or unable" to perform his judicial functions adequately.

Mr. Borkin, a man with an impressive background in the study of the problems of corruption and misconduct in the judiciary, pointed out that Judge Chandler, in return, has made serious charges of attempted bribery and other misconduct against two other judges—Alfred P. Murrah, chief judge, 10th Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, and Luther Bohanon, district judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of Oklahoma.

Mr. Borkin stressed that this dispute in Oklahoma has been an upsetting factor in the Federal courts in Oklahoma since 1962, and he declared that these charges should not be permitted to stand. He emphasized that there can be no

compromise short of a full investigation to clear the judges or to force their removal.

I agree with Mr. Borkin that great damage has been done because the courts, the executive branch, and the Congress have taken no effective steps to clear up this scandalous situation. I have waited patiently for months, and I have hoped that the Justice Department, the courts, or the Congress would initiate or suggest a proper legal investigation to clear the air and put an end to this outrageous situation in the judiciary in the 10th circuit.

There has been no effective action taken, or even started. Therefore, I am today instituting the only action available to try to get to the bottom of this.

I have introduced a House resolution authorizing and directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the conduct of the three Federal judges in Oklahoma involved in this controversy. Upon its finding of fact, the House Judiciary Committee would be empowered to institute impeachment proceedings or make any other recommendations it deems proper.

The committee would also be empowered to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents—including financial statements, contracts, and bank accounts—as it deems necessary.

The resolution in no way establishes the guilt of the principals involved. It is necessary to the launching of an investigation for the purpose of determining the facts essential to an intelligent conclusion and eliminating the cloud now hanging over the Federal judiciary.

The resolution follows:

H. RES. 739

Resolved. That the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized and directed, as a whole or by subcommittee, to inquire into and investigate the official conduct of Alfred P. Murrah, chief judge, 10th Circuit, U.S. Court of Appeals, Stephen S. Chandler, chief judge, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, and Luther Bohanon, district judge, U.S. District Court for the Eastern, Northern, and Western Districts of Oklahoma, to determine whether in the opinion of said committee the said judges or any of them have been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which in the contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition of the constitutional powers of the House. Said committee shall report its findings to the House, together with such resolutions as it deems proper.

Sec. 2. For the purpose of this resolution the committee is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress, at such times and places in the District of Columbia and elsewhere, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents—including financial statements, contracts, and bank accounts—to administer the customary oaths to witnesses, and to take such testimony as it deems necessary.

DOWNFALL OF U.S. MERCHANT MARINE STRENGTH

(Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama asked and was given permission to address the

House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the downfall of U.S. merchant marine strength may be closer at hand even than many of us in Congress have been indicating. News of an increase in cargo insurance rates on the seas could mean that U.S. ships would be virtually eliminated from the common carrier shipping market.

The major shipping insurance firms in London have now advised that insurance rates on cargoes shipped in vessels more than 20 years old should be increased by about 100 percent. The word is going out that only newer ships should be used.

As pointed out by many Congressmen recently, our Government has allowed our merchant shipping fleet to go downhill steadily over the past several years until now a large percentage of U.S. ships afloat are more than 20 years old.

The new rates could go into effect as early as March 1, a week from today. Insurance firms do not legally have to follow the London lead, but they can be expected to do so.

The penalty rate would mean an 8-percent increase in a shipper's total bill on one cargo, according to one example mentioned by American shippers yesterday as they prepared to make an effort to ward off the increase.

This would be enough to divert a great volume of shipments from American ships to the generally newer fleets of other nations such as Japan, Russia, Norway, and Germany.

And still our cries for a greater American merchant marine go unheeded.

According to my understanding, this country would have to build new ships at a rate of 135 every year if we were to avoid a major disaster to our merchant shipping capability. Even without the increased insurance rates on older ships, U.S. shipping is a sick industry.

The problem is highlighted by the fact that President Johnson's budget calls for the construction of only 13 new ships in the coming fiscal year. We are treated to the spectacle of the Secretary of Defense saying that our merchant fleet is adequate, when obviously it is not.

If the merchant fleet were an ordinary domestic business, there would be small cause for concern. But our national security is at stake. The merchant marine is a vital arm of national defense. And this is not a new or superficial idea.

It has been acknowledged by the Congress beginning in 1936. It is understood today in most other nations. It is known here in Congress today. But it has been tragically overlooked by the administration.

We face today an absolutely vital need for attaining a U.S. merchant marine philosophy. As proposals for consideration, I want to call attention to the 12 steps I put forth as suggestions in my remarks of February 16, and to other ideas which have been advanced in recent months by those both in this Congress and elsewhere who understand the importance of regaining strength in our merchant marine.

NO SECTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY OF T

gration has drained off the advantaged and more venturesome. Agriculture, once the mainstay of its commerce, now that cotton is a minor crop, follows patterns of land use, logging, cattle, and pasture, which leaves too much land idle and too many country folk grossly underemployed. Merchandising plods along as it did at the turn of the century; local schools administer statewide programs of slight relevance to community needs. Craftsmen and artisans are in short supply. A new home is a rare event. Property values are stagnant. Tax revenues are unequal to forward planning.

Despite these staggering handicaps, the situation, to the close observer, is not as bleak as it sounds. The industries there could rather soon almost double their payrolls; in one case, by aggressive marketing and extra plant capacity; in the other case, by a larger labor pool sufficiently trained. Each is capable of expanding into lines kindred to its present output. The immediate locality has natural resources now left to occasional exploitation by nonresident owners. Fine products, commanding ready markets, could be manufactured from these raw materials and sold, not by the ton but by the ounce, were the skills developed capable of turning out such wares. Farming could escape the doldrums by a new pattern of agriculture geared into the processing and packaging of foods for the gournet trade.

The locality is rich in history, rich in its antebellum plantation homes, rich in a people honorable, hospitable, cultivated, and kind. Some wealth is there, too—wealth with little faith in the future of the community.

Manifestly a complete about-face could take place. As spirit is already aborning determined to leave past moorings and venture anew on the high seas of fresh endeavor. The community as it might become is coming vividly to view. But many of the skills are lacking for any such dream to mature into reality. The skills could be supplied through manpower training as adminis-tered by the U.S. Department of Labor. The U.S. Department of Agriculture is charged with the duty, indeed high privilege, of developing a pattern of agriculture befitting the present era. And so it goes with other departments of Government, State and Federal, each with some service that somewhere fits into the mosaic of this community's regeneration. But "some service" is not enough. There must be a total program, a consortium of agencies working with the community to impart deficit skills, to work out a new, viable pattern of agriculture, spark urban renewal, and bring to the local schools training in practical arts (for the love of heaven, not book ends and taborets). Much else, of course, is needed to complete the mosaic the community must supply for itself, particularly the enterprise to create new products out of raw materials right at hand.

Yes, the old market towns of the cotton kingdom can thrive anew once they face the last of the '20th century. As byproduct of such a transformation, the social problems of our big cities will assume more manageable dimensions. By a single nail driven at the right spot one salient in Big Town's war on poverty can be won. And it is the easiest nail to drive—the resuscitation of the sagging market towns of the old Cotton Belt. That nail, oddly missing now, is teamwork on the part of State and Federal agencies to bring them help suited to their opportunities. Such help would be trifling in cost compared with the values sure to

Should the Church Sponsor Federal Welfare Programs?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Speaker, very few persons are fully aware of the extent the Federal Government is involving the churches of America in its housing programs.

This involvement raises serious questions of the traditional state-church relations and may insert our churches in Federal programs as agents of the Government.

Mr. Ross Hermann, the talented and energetic young editorial writer for the Indianapolis News, has explored the role of churches in Federal welfare programs in a detailed manner.

Some of the conclusions reached and questions raised by this new concept have been included in a perceptive column written by Mr. Hermann for his newspaper on February 1, 1966.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent, I include this article in its entirety for the Members of Congress to examine. The article follows:

SHOULD THE CHURCH SPONSOR FEDERAL WELFARE PROGRAMS?

(By Ross Hermann)

Federal housing programs are bringing about some far-reaching changes in church-state relations.

Complete separation of church and state, supposedly favored by current doctrine in Washington, is in fact giving way to public embrace in which Government and churches cooperate on mutually approved social projects.

The subject came up locally at the Conference on Housing and Urban Development, sponsored last fall by Mayor John Barton and Representative Andrew Jacobs, when a speaker told conferees that churches and other nonprofit organizations can qualify for Government-insured financing to build housing projects.

housing projects.

Churches, in this approach, are further envisioned as agents of Government policy under the proposed rent-supplement program, administration-backed legislation currently stopped in Congress by a revolt of House Members. The issue is now being pressed by Federal welfare-staters around the Nation.

Sidney Spector, a Federal Housing and Home Finance Administration official, explained the idea to local conferees as follows: "Let us say a church group here in Indianapolis wished to undertake a housing project, as one of its services to the community. It could form a nonprofit mortgagor corporation. It could go to a private lending institution for financing. The loan would be insured by the FHA with the maximum rate of interest I mentioned (5½ percent) and for the term involved (40 years). And then it can go ahead, assuming all plans work out, and build the housing."

Rents, he said, could be set by Federal law in accordance with the nonprofit cost of operation and the cost of construction. Because the housing would be open to people

of varying incomes in an attempt to promote social integration, he noted, some could afford the rent and some couldn't.

Those who could pay the rent, he said, would do so. Poverty-level families, however, would pay a maximum of 25 percent of their income. The difference between that payment and the regular rent would be made up to the church or other sponsoring organization by direct subsidies from the Federal Government.

Some churches are, at present, administrative arms of Government social policy under a program of long-term insured financing to build rental housing for the aged. Church and other nonprofit groups can qualify for Government-insured loans at 5½ percent interest for 40 years, Spector said.

A prime example of church-state housing is San Francisco's Martin Luther Tower, built by St. Mark's Lutheran Church with Government backing. The 13-story apartment will house people over 62 who can afford rents between \$100 and \$220 a month. When complete, the tower with its adjoining social and recreational hall will be a self-contained community shepherded by Lutheran churchmen.

theran churchmen.
Institutions like the Martin Luther Tower are, to date, relatively rare and unobtrusive. As Federal officials travel around the country selling the idea to local congregations, however, a new national debate on churchstate relations may be in the making.

Other churches, for example, could charge that the Government has, within the confines of the Martin Luther enclave, established a religion, contrary to constitutional prohibitions.

To back up the point, they could argue the Federal Government has given the favored churches in such programs a captive audience for their viewpoint and has established their dominion over the daily lives of a group of people, to the effective exclusion and disadvantage of other religions.

U.S. Combat Forces Spread Thin

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD

of wisconsin

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, in yester-day's edition of the New York Times, the noted and widely respected military affairs correspondent for the Times, Hanson W. Baldwin, wrote an article that should cause concern to every Member of the House.

In his article, Mr. Baldwin cited chapter and verse about alleged shortages in experienced manpower, equipment, clothing, and ammunition, stating that "the Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere."

Mr. Speaker, there are some extremely serious charges made in this article which, if true, will shake the confidence of the American people in those leaders in this administration who have been charged with the responsibility of insuring an adequate and prepared Mili-

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say you agree with them, the President takes the position that there is not much difference between the Gavin-Kennan thesis and the Rusk-McNamara policy.

There is in fact a radical difference, the difference between a limited and an unlimited war. The President may not want to tight an unlimited war. I have no doubt myself that he does not want to do so. But the promises he made in Honolulu which the Vice President is now broadcasting so lavishly in Saigon and Bangkok, are-if they are to be taken seriously—an unlimited com-mitment of American soldiers and American money. It is this unlimited commitment which those of us who belong to the Gavin-Kennan school oppose. For we see that as the numbers of our troops and the range of our bombing are escalated, and as the theater of the war becomes widened, it is highly probable, indeed it is well nigh inevitable that the United States will find itself confronting China in a land war on the mainland of Asia.

Last week's hearings made visible that this is where the course we are taking leads. Congress and the people would be frivolous if they did not examine with the utmost seriousness how real, how valid, how significant is the hypothesis that the kind of war the Johnson administration is conducting is leading to a confrontation with China.

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who since 1961 has

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who since 1961 has played a leading part in our military intervention in South Vietnam, has recognized that the prospect of a land war with China is today our greatest worry. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, General Taylor is asked about the danger of "a military confrontation with Communist China." He replies that "one can never rule out the possibility. But I would list the probability quite iow in terms of percentage."

This has an ominous resemblance to the colloquy in 1950 between President Truman and General MacArthur. (cf. Lawson, the United States in the Korean War," p. 79.)

"In your opinion," President Truman asked General MacArthur, "is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?"

MacArthur shook his head. "I'd say there's very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river our Air Force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas."

At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking there were already more than a hundred thousand Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, the American, and other U.N. forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.

On the question of the need to contain the military expansion of Red China, there is virtually universal agreement in this country. The containment of Red China today, like the containment of Stalinist Russia after the World War. is necessary to the peace of the world and is a vital interest of the United States. What is debatable is the diplomatic policy we are pursuing in order to contain thed China. If we compare what Mr. Rusk and Mr. William Bundy are doing with the diplomatic policy by which some 15 years ago Stalin was contained, the differences are very striking.

The cardinal difference is that our Chinese containment policy is a unilateral American

policy whereas our Stalinist containment policy was shared with and participated in by all the Western allies. It is often said officially that in the Far East today we are repeating what was done so successfully in Europe. If this were what we are doing, there would be an alliance to contain China in which Japan, Russia, India, Pakistan, the United States, Great Britain, and France were alined in a Far Eastern Marshall plan and NATO. Instead, owing to the miscalculations and blundering of the Vietnamese war, we have alienated and indeed neutralized all the great powers of the Asian mainland.

The difference between the two containment policies in Europe and in the Far East is the difference between realism and verbalism, between professionalism and amateurism. Our present policy is as if we had set out to contain Stalinist Russia by ignoring the British, the French, the Italians, and the Germans, and had decided to make our stand against communism by the defense of the us say—Bucharest.

The Old Market Town: Operation Comeback

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JAMES A. MACKAY

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. MACKAY. Mr. Speaker, clearly, the function of the U.S. Department of Commerce's Area Redevelopment Administration was to revitalize our rural areas which, for years, have been losing their talented young men and women to the city.

I commend to the attention of my colleagues, an article that was written before the Area Redevelopment Administration was replaced by the Economic Development Administration, an agency with broader powers and authority.

The article, which appeared in the Atlanta Economic Review, November 1965, was written by my constituent, Dr. Philip Weltner, a prominent leader, active in community affairs, and who has had the roles of lawyer, educator, and management consultant.

Dr. Weltner is the father of our esteemed colleague, Congressman Charles Longstreet Weltner.

THE OLD MARKET TOWN: OPERATION COMEBACK

(By Philip Weltner)

"Sweet Auburn, loveliest village of the plain." Methinks Goldsmith penned that line. Since then, how many Auburns have vanished? The old Cotton South had many such and some still linger upgestalaly on

such, and some still linger uncertainly on. Strange that an age, bemused as is ours by economics and psychology, neither notes the loss in tangible values incident to the stagnation of our rural market towns nor ponders why so few reverse their decline. For certain, the centers of wealth are totally indifferent to the dollar drain on them caused by the impoverishment of the hinterland. The steady migration from the latter into the cities is by no means all gain. The unskilled and ignorant sector of that migration has done much to create city slums and swelled welfare rolls and has added substantially to costs of tax-supported medical care. Furthermore, a great share of tax contribu-

tions to government from wealthier centers is diverted in subsidies to deficit communities in aid of local schools and other public services. And then there is the farmer

services. And then there is the farmer. "How long, O Lord." For years his plight has been of National and State concern. Untold millions have been expended in his behalf. Those millions have served ruralia as prop and stay. But the rural market towns of the old Cotton Belt, along with the surrounding countryside, have generally continued to regress. Millions more have gone to support rural and semirural schools, from both State and Federal funds. And yet the majority of high school diplomates and nearly all college graduates hotfoot to "Big Town" as fast as they can. Educational subsidies actually accelerate the flight from home of the brains and brawn the old rural market towns must retain to restore their languishing fortunes.

languishing fortunes.

In 1961 the Federal Government started on a new track. Congress created within the U.S. Department of Commerce the Area Redevelopment Administration for the purpose of pumping new life into our decaying countryside. The hope was to move industry in and expand such industry as was there, stepping up local payrolls and infusing fresh blood into the local economy. Results to date have fallen short of anticipation. Fact is, brave new programs seldom fulfill the optimism of their sponsors. On the credit side, one can say that a three-quarter loaf is better than none. Nevertheless, an inquiry into why the loaf promised was not delivered could be highly instructive.

Quite symptomatic of our age is the fallacy shared in places high and low that "nothing is wrong that money won't cure." So if a billion won't do it, try 10. The money cure overlooks entirely the community as a social organism with a biology and psychology of its own. The rural market towns in the old Cotton Kingdom, barring rare exceptions, have steadily waned, not for lack of more money, but because their people for the last four decades failed to recognize and adjust to change. Instead of looking ahead. their people longed for the good old days to return. Well, they haven't and never will. Federal largess, distributed in whatsoever guise, is impotent to change the economies of such communities. Change, if ever it is to take effect, is first of all an inner process of discovery that a better future can be achieved through personal effort and how this effort can be directed so that once again the community may burgeon forth with opportunity.

But, even though this change of spirit and attitude takes place, too many of these communities by now are bereft of essential skills. in particular entrepreneurship, to create by themselves a new day. Nevertheless, all the essential helps are there in abundance, but alas in disjoined fractions. "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." "Water, water everywhere, but not a drop to drink." On the local scene we meet with a complex human organism, the com-munity; and yonder on the State and Federal levels we encounter departments, agencies, bureaus, branches, and sections, administering different programs or different phases of the same programs, many of high importance to the renascence of our shrinking market towns-but, so far as the latter are concerned, no common strategy at State and Federal levels, no plan, no tactics, no coordination, no comprehension of existence of a task that they must share if ever the task is to get done.

The vital need for coordination may more readily be seen by a case in point. The scene is a rural market town, a county seat in the Cotton Belt of yesteryear. Population has steadily declined. Per capita income is among the lowest in its State. The town offers little by way of recreation and less of opportunity to the rising generation. Emi-

tary Establishment. For this reason, it is incumbent upon the administration to publicly answer the very serious charges contained in the Baldwin article

So that all of my colleagues will have an opportunity to read the very penetrating article written by Hanson Baldwin, I include it herewith in the Appendix of the Record:

U.S. COMBAT FORCES SPREAD THIN—READY
UNITS AT HOME LARGELY COMMITTED TO
VIETNAM WAR—SHORTAGE APPEARS IN ITEMS
OF CLOTHING AND AMMUNITION

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

The Nation's armed services have almost exhausted their trained and ready military units, with all available forces spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere.

This is the conclusion of a study of U.S.

This is the conclusion of a study of U.S. Regular and Reserves Forces by this correspondent.

Virtually all the combat-ready units in the United States have been committed to Vietnam and, except for a few Army and Marine battalions and a few squadrons of the Tactical Air Command, no more units will be fully trained and equipped for a number of months.

In addition to the shortages in trained military manpower and in field-grade officers, there are major existing shortages in uniforms and clothing, and actual or potential shortages of various types of ammunition and equipment that are causing the services increasing concern.

The commitment of more than 200,000 men to Vietnam, supported by strong air and naval forces, and the maintenance of two divisions in Korea, more than five in Europe and of smaller units elsewhere, including the Dominican Republic, have reduced the forces in the United States to a training establishment.

The experience level of the Atlantic Fleet and of all other commands has been reduced to provide the needs of Vietnam.

According to the services, the "squeeze" appears to be becoming worse instead of better. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, is understood to have stated a requirement for some 200,000 more men in Vietnam during the 1966 calendar year, and a proportionate increase in air support.

High-level decisions about whether and how to meet these needs are expected shortly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended the limited mobilization of Reserve Forces ever since last spring, but President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered instead increased draft calls and voluntary enlistments to build up the Regular Forces.

In recent weeks, the services have been conducting studies at various command levels to determine how best to meet General Westmoreland's 1966 requirements. The alternatives considered were continuation of the present slow buildup of the Regular Forces by increased draft calls and voluntary enlistments; transfer of troops from Europe, Panama, Alaska, and anywhere else available; or a selected callup of the Nationary Guard and Reserves.

The studies, as far as could be learned, have not yet been completed. But preliminary indications were that the first course—continued dependence upon draft calls and enlistments—could fill only a fraction of General Westmoreland's requirements within the time he desired them and that the result would be what one officer called a very slow and disorderly buildup of the Regular Forces with a greater and greater lowering of the experience level and more and more bottle-

Transfer of troops from Europe and elsewhere would supply a greater proportion of General Westmoreland's stated requirements, but not all of them. Even the mobilization

of the Guard and Reserve might not supply all his stated needs, it was said, since various material shortages—as well as shortages in certain types of trained manpower—might develop by the end of the year.

A recently retired officer, whose last active duty assignment was concerned with the Army's mobilization base and Strategic Reserve, said that "whatever the course of action (in Vietnam)—continued, escalated, or modified downward—we are in a situation of perilous insufficiency," without much capability of "a graduated response to any scrious challenge."

The actual and potential trained manpower and material shortages are affecting
all the regular services—particularly the
Army and the Marines—and the Army National Guard and Reserves. One National
Guard general said, "there is not a Guard
division in the United States today that
could fight its way out of a paper bag."
There are many reasons for the difficult
situation in which the services now find
themselves, officers say. Many of the officers
in the services have long felt that many
of Secretary McNamara's cost-effectiveness
formulas were too rigidly applied and did not
allow a sufficient cushion of supplies and
equipment for emergencies.

Some of the centralized control procedures instituted in the Defense Department have proved to be too inflexible or too slow in response to the needs of the services.

For some years, even before Vietnam became acute, the services were tending to live off inventories, particularly in spare parts and ammunition, and full replacements were not provided.

EQUIPMENT WITHDRAWN

Equipment, particularly radios and automotive equipment, was withdrawn from National Guard and Reserve units to supply Regular Army units and this has not yet been replaced.

As the Vietnamese war became larger and larger the services were required until last year to fit the extraordinary expenses of the war into their regular budgets. The war was unfunded until last spring, and no special appropriation in any way commensurate with the war's expenditures was asked for until last month.

Service requests for reopening production lines of aircraft and other items were rejected or postponed until the emergency became acute. The letting of contracts was thus delayed and replacement of expended material was further delayed as available inventories became dangerously depleted. Officers point out that the administration's defense request for the fiscal year 1967, starting July 1, contains many items that were requested and rejected a year ago.

Other major reasons for today's squeeze are several. Expenditure rates—particularly for certain types of ammunition and ordnance and clothing—have been considerably higher in Vietnam than expected.

The administration's decision to depend upon the Regular services, without calling up the Guard and the Reserves, increased tremendously the strain upon the Regular Army and the Marines.

RESERVES IN PLAN

The Army's concept of mobilization had always been predicated upon the assumption that in case of any war as large as Vietnam the Reserves would be mobilized, and the supporting combat and supply units essential to supply and sustain Regular Army combat units would be furnished by the Reserves.

The concept also envisaged the replacement in the United States of Regular Army units transferred to the theater of war by mobilized Reserve units, thus maintaining the strategic reserve available for use in any emergency.

The Marines also depended upon a fourth (Marine Reserve) division, well trained and equipped, to supplement their three regular

divisions, which are already almost fully committed to Vietnam, the western Pacific, the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean, said to training duties.

The Army's problems have been further complicated by the fact that ever since the Korean war, the main thrust of the Army's strategle planning had been based upon the assumption of a mechanized war in the European theater. A major war in an undeveloped country, like Vietnam, with inadequate ports, piers, airfields, roads, and warehouses, required considerably more specialized units, such as engineer construction battalions, terminal service companies, port construction companies, and, for the Navy, Seabee battalions, than were included in the peacetime force totals of the regular services.

CADRES TRANSFERRED

Without mobilization of the Reserves some of these specialized units had to be created from scratch, and the trained cadres for them had to be transferred from other units.

Thus, the policy now in effect, of gradually building up the strength of the regular forces by increased draft calls and voluntary enlistments, has resulted in very considerable reduction in overall experience levels and in constant squeezes, or as one officer put it, in "robbing Peter to pay Paul."

The trained manpower situation in the services today is as follows:

REGULAR ARMY

The last of the Army's trained major units—the 25th Division in Hawaii—has just sent two of its brigades to Vietnam; the third is expected there shortly. No other major units in this country are immediately ready for service, although part of the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Wash., is expected to be trained shortly. About a third of the 101st Airborne Division (Fort Campbell, Ky.) and a third of the 82d Airborne Division (Fort Bragg, N.C.) are in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, respectively.

The two other brigades of both divisions, which have been used to provide replacements for Vietnam and cadres for new units, will be filled up to strength soon, but except for a few battalions they cannot complete unit training for some weeks.

They could, however, be sent overseas—as was the 1st Cavalry Division (airmobile)—without completion of unit training. The 5th Infantry Division (mechanized) (Fort Carson, Colo.), like other Army units, has been attempting to ease the heavy burden on the Army's crowded replacement training centers by training its own recruits; it cannot be ready for some months.

TRAINING DIVISIONS

The two armored divisions at Fort Hood, Tex.—the 1st and 2d—are acting, in efect, as training divisions, they have almost completed the training of one cycle of recruits who will be used to fill out new units or as Vietnam replacements and will start on a new cycle shortly. The 3d Armored Corps staff at Fort Hood was transferred bodily to Vietnam last year, and now a new corps staff, re-formed and trained, has also been transferred there. The Army's new division, the 9th Infantry, at Fort Riley, Kans., and one of the three new brigades authorized last year, the 196th at Fort Devens, Mass., have just been activated and will not be ready for many months. Smaller combat and support units are being filled up with new manpower and trained as rapidly as possible.

and trained as rapidly as possible.

In Europe, the combat strength of the 7th Army has been approximately maintained in numbers, but the experience level has dropped as specialists and individuals have been transferred to Vietnam. Supply and support units are at their lowest strength since before the Berlin crisis of 1961.

The dimensions of the Army's problem are illustrated by the fact that the Army took in almost 100,000 drafted men in November, December, and January, and 46,533 volunteers.

The training load for training centers, schools, etc., has climbed from 135,000 men in the month of January 1965 to 240,000 men in January 1966.

Scarcities in trained noncoms and in certain officer grades are becoming acute.

Officer candidate school graduates will elimb from 2,319 in the fiscal year 1965 to 4,091 in fiscal 1966, and to about 11,000 in the next fiscal year, starting July 1.

In addition, Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates will provide almost 11,000 officers annually. However, these are all inexperienced second fieutenants; there is no immediate prospect of eliminating the shortages in major and lieutenant colonel ranks unless the Army is authorized to call up individual reservists.

The Army's manpower problem will become more acute late this spring and summer, as the 1-year tour of duty of troops sent to Victnam last year expires and thousands of troops must be replaced by trained men from this country.

MARINES

The marines have been authorized another regular division, in addition to the three now in existence. The 3d Marine Division, and most of the 1st Division are now in Vietnam, and the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune, N.C. is responsible for maintaining one battalion atloat with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and another in the Caribbean. The need for replacements for the marines in Vietnam and for training cadres for the increased training load will delay the activation of the new regular marine division until late spring or early summer, and it cannot be ready for many months thereafter.

NAVY

The Atlantic Fleet is about up to strength in numbers of men, but the experience level has been greatly reduced by the transfer of 5,000 trained men and specialists to the Pacific. Ships in the Mediterranean and Caribbean are kept as close as possible to full complement; the remainder of the ships in the Atlantic are, to a large extent, in a continuous training cycle. One antisubmarine warfare carrier, minecraft, and other ships have been in reduced commission or reduced complement.

Right destroyers are periodically rotated to the Pacific from the Atlantic Fleet and some service ships have been transferred there. The Navy has relieved some of its worst personnel problems by extending enlistments for 4 months, but this authorization ends June 30.

AIR FORCE

The Tactical Air Command and Military Air Command are particularly affected. For a time, the Air Force rotated squadrons for temporary duty to Vietnam, but this system has been replaced by assigning pilots to 1 year's tour of duty in South Vietnam or, if thying over North Vietnam, to 100 missions.

Squadrons that have been rotated to southeast Asia from the Tactical Air Command in this country have now returned to the United States, or other home stations, leaving their equipment behind at the bases from which

they operated.

The F-105 fighter-bomber, being used by the Air Force against North Vietnam, is not in production; losses are being replaced by transferring F-105's from Europe, and these in turn are being replaced by McDonnell F-4's. But there is delay in the process and some of the returning squadrons find themselves temporarily without planes.

selves temporarily without planes.

Some of the few Tactical Air Command squadrons remaining in the United States have been charged with a refresher training mission, in addition to attempts to maintain compat readiness.

Filots of B-47 medium bombers, phased out of the Strategic Air Command, are being trained in the F-105 as replacements for Victnam. The Military Air Command, which has long been strained with the airlift to

Veitnam, has been utilizing to an increasing degree planes and pilots of the Air National Guard on weekend flights or on missions of a few days duration.

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

The Air National Guard, the Naval Air Reserve, and some units of the Naval Reserve are in relatively good condition, though few of them have really modern equipment. But the condition of readiness of the Army National Guard and of many units of the Army Reserve is lower than it has been in the past decade, according to many officers. Repeated withdrawal of equipment; the attempted merger by Secretary of Defense McNamara last year of the Reserves into the National Guard, a move opposed by Congress and still in abeyance; the inactivation of six Reserve divisions and the projected elimination of other Guard and Reserve units; the confusion resulting from the constant changes and reorganizations in the Reserve structure, and the saturation of the Army's replacement training centers with Regular Army inductees have all contributed to the low state of readiness.

Today, there are about 90,000 recruits of the National Guard and the Reserve waiting for 6-month training by the Army; some estimates are that this total will increase to 120,000 by the end of June.

When Mr. McNamara deactivated the 6 Reserve combat divisions last year, he announced the creation of a Select Reserve Force of about 150,000 men, composed of 3 National Guard divisions, each composed of units drawn from 3 different States, 6 independent brigades and hundreds of smaller combat and support units from the Guard and from the Reserves drawn from all 50 States.

This new high-priority force was to be built up to 100 percent strength and trained and equipped by this coming summer. The Pentagon hoped that about 15 percent or more of the 55,000 reservists in the 6 disestablished tactical divisions of the Reserve would voluntarily join the Guard.

But informed officials said last week that less than 350 reservists had actually joined the Guard and that out of the 55,000 some 3,600 had been assigned to Reserve units in the select force.

Nevertheless, by virtue of its priority the Select Reserve Force is almost up to strength numerically, though several thousand of its men have not yet completed 6 months' training. The force is supposed to have completed all basic training and unit training through battalion level by the end of June, but opinions differ about whether or not it will be able to do so. Some Guard officers say it will maintain its training schedule; others say that shortage of equipment and delay in training 6-month inductees will make it impossible.

New York State has only 1,600 National Guardsmen, plus reservists, assigned to the Select Reserve Force. Maj. Gen. A. C. O'Hara, chief of staff to Governor Rockefeller, said recently that "there is no Select Reserve Force unit in New York State at the moment prepared for intensive training."

Twenty other National Guard divisions, and other Guard and Reserve units, not included in the Select Reserve Force, are the "low men on the totem pole" in the military structure, and are many months away from readiness for deployment.

ARMS, CLOTHING, AND EQUIPMENT

There are worldwide scarcities or shortages of many items. In Vietnam all the services have experienced temporary shortage or scarcities of many items, some of them due to the local shipping tie-up and logistical difficulties. These have not materially interferred, however, with combat operations.

Clothing: Shortages of winter and summer uniforms, overcoats, raincoats, fatigues, jungle boots, underwear, socks and other items are widely reported. The Army has

reduced considerably the normal amount of clothing initially issued to recruits, and the Marines expect to issue only "half a bag" soon unless the shortages are relieved.

Some National Guard recruits have been temporarily drilling in civilian clothes until furnished with a suit of fatigues taken from the clothing allowance of other guardsmen. In some cases substitute items have been issued for standard ones.

The Defense Supply Agency, a centralized agency under the Secretary of Defense, which is responsible for procuring common-use end items for the services, said, through a spokesman, that there was a worldwide shortage of uniforms and clothing but that the United States had enough on hand and on order to meet its needs that all troops were "well clothed" and there had been no interference with training.

The Agency said it had initiated accelerated uniform and clothing orders last June, and that uniform and clothing contracts had increased from \$55 million in the last quarter of the 1965 fiscal year to \$200 million in the first quarter of the current fiscal year.

Officers pointed out, however, that increased clothing orders were not placed until after the start of the Vietnamese buildup and that inventories on hand were inadequate to supply needs until the contracts had been fulfilled.

Ammunition: Many different items of ground, air, and naval ordnance are in short, supply. Reports that rifle ammunition shortages had interfered with the training of recruits are denied by the Army, but a spokesman said that at a few camps there had been temporary shortages, due apparently to maldistribution, which did not delay training more than 2 or 3 days.

Some units of the Air National Guard have reported shortages of certain types of bombs and other aircraft ordnance needed for training

In Vietnam there has been no ammunition rationing as such, but many different items, including 5.56-millimeter ammunition for the M-16 riffe, 2.75-inch rockets, illuminating shells and 750-pound bombs have been issued on an "as available" basis, which means these items are not always available without limitation.

In part, these and other scarcities in Vietnam are due to Vietnam's inadequate port capacity and local supply problems. Worldwide, there has been a major reduction in ammunition stockpiles, not yet compensated for by new production.

Spare parts: Spare parts of every type for aircraft, helicopters, communication and electronic equipment, engineering equipment and motor transport are in short supply everywhere; it is not uncommon for a Navy destroyer to wait for months for spares for missiles, or generators.

The Military Air Command, which had stocked spare parts adequate to sustain a peacetime tempo of operations, is finding it difficult to keep its planes flying on the accelerated basis of the past year.

Arms and weapons: Except for some of the newest items the Army denies that it has any major weapons shortages. However, some of its weapons are old and the National Guard has severe shortages. In New York State, according to an assessment by General O'Hara, Guard units, even in the Select Reserve Force, are "still utilizing the M-1 ride and have never been issued any quantity of M-14 or M-16 rifles."

"We do have," he said, "a few M-60 machineguns." Old quarter-ton trucks "are still being used with parts becoming almost impossible to procure; major weapons systems are old." Communications equipment is the most critical item in short supply, "and I foresee no immediate relief to this problem."

Many other items that are in short supply include generators of all types, batteries, tires for jeeps, trucks and aircraft, engineer and

material handling equipment such as fork lifts, and, in Vietnam, barbed wire, sandbags and other field fortification material.

Aircraft: There is no actual shortage of aircraft and so far the United States has been able to replace its combat losses in Vietnam and its operational losses all over the world. But the margin of production over expenditure is small, aircraft production rates are still small and are limited chiefly, for combat aircraft, to the McDonnell F-4, the Douglas A-4, and the Northrop F-5. Increased losses and an increased air effort in Vietnam could greatly intensify the problem of aircraft replacement.

The scarcities or actual or potential shortages in trained manpower and equipment have caused considerable concern to the armed services, not only because of the increasing requirements of Vietnam and continued commitments elsewhere in the world, but because of the restrictive effect of these factors upon U.S. capability to meet other emergencies that might arise.

Blackmail in Home Rule Movement

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, according to the press, a group calling itself the Free D.C. Movement was launched yesterday. It is apparently an offshoot of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. One Marion Barry, Jr., director of the Washington office of SNCC in speaking for the new organization announced plans for a consumer boycott against all Washington merchants who refuse to support District home rule. The support demanded from Washington merchants will be to sign petitions, wire the President and Members of Congress, display a "Free D.C." sticker in the window of his business establishment and contribute financially to the treasury of the "Free D.C. Movement." Those who refuse to meet these demands will be blacklisted and boycotted. It is further reported that one cleric who has pledged support to the new movement said he was "sorry that this kind of militancy is necessary" but all other methods have failed.

Mr. Speaker, I do not speak from the premise of one who is fundamentally opposed to home rule. However, I am shocked that the advocates of home rule are now going to resort to the unconscionable methods of blackmail recited above. This goes far beyond the legitimate pressures that should be applied to gain political ends. Steps such as those requiring people to sign petitions, to make financial contributions, and display window stickers are offensive to my sense of fair play. They violate freedom of conscience and the right to freely petition without duress. Indeed they are totally repugnant to the precepts of a free and open society. This kind of blackmail campaign is not going to win any friends for home rule among Members of Congress. It will be completely counterproductive and alienate support now existent.

Mr. Speaker, it occurs to me that before we take up home rule legislation again perhaps we had better investigate the need for another type of legislation. Perhaps we should investigate the need to outlaw conspiracies to frighten, intimidate, and threaten under the guise of an economic boycott. This pernicious philosophy that the ends justify the means can be completely destructive of the fabric of a democratic society. Mr. Speaker, I do not like totalitarian and dictatorial methods even when practiced in defense of a good cause. And I repeat that I speak as one who is not opposed to home rule. The people who intend to resort to these tactics are a disgrace to the legitimate cause of home rule for the District of Columbia. They will fail as the forces which seek to employ tyrannical methods always fail when within the context of a democratic society they seek to substitute the weaponry of blackmail for the rule of reason.

Whither Foreign Aid?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. RICHARD T. HANNA

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, we will soon be engaged in this House in our annual debate over the budget funding for foreign assistance. The background against which these deliberations will take place will provide ample material for distorting our views and confusing our purpose. Included in that background will be the specter of the Vietnam war. The differing opinions on that conflict including both the international politics of the situation and the military conduct of hostilities will no doubt provide abundant confusion. The impact of the financial commitment which is a load factor on our balance of payments will unquestionably produce distortion.

The grave food shortage, the specter of famine is also adumbrated in the background tapestry. Humane as well as practical consideration will dictate that priority must be given to the food problem. As urgent as this need is, it does not take us to the central core of the problem. It is like giving aspirin for a headache which gives temporary relief, but does not treat the organic source which contributes to the recurring headache. Our views of the needs of underdeveloped countries will no doubt suffer distortion if we see our role as merely that of sustaining life without additional effort to make it tolerable and improv-We would hope that immediate necessity would not be confused with long-term need.

Part of the background against which decision will be forged is the factor of time and our attitudes regarding time. We have been a long time at the business of foreign aid and enthusiasm has been seriously eroded. Our efforts over the past 20 years have not been without serious fault and some embarrassing and negative result. These continue to pro-

vide a growing irritation. Time also works in futuro. There is no end in sight. It is to most Americans wearisome to project into the future and find no place safely predictable as that point at which our outgoing efforts will terminate. This factor will distort our view and confuse our purpose.

What we need, Mr. Speaker, is an up-to-date articulation of what the problem is. We need to thoroughly understand why this problem commands a sizable portion of our resources over an interninable and rocky future. Aside from the good Samaritan aspects of the exercise, wherein does the national interest of the United States lie in helping the underdeveloped nations?

I do not claim to know or understand all the answers to these questions, but here are some that come to mind. Peace and security are indivisible. There can be no security where there exists such a tremendous gap between less than onethird of the earths people who are the haves and the over two-thirds of those who are the have-nots. Free enterprise and its profit system can only survive in a climate of expanding markets. An increasing reliance will of necessity be built upon international market or export trade. Unless the present underdeveloped countries of nonconsumers begin to move toward an awakening consumer market, the developed countries will begin to take in each others laundry.

The great expansion for the next 50 years or more lies in bringing the trailing two-thirds of the earth's people into the stream of modern technical development and modern consumptive demand.

We need further, Mr. Speaker, a clearcut demonstration that we have learned from our past mistakes and that we are adjusting to the pragmatic requirements to make our assistance effective in serving our national purpose. The American public knows and rightly resents the fact that some of our aid effort in money and material have been diverted to private ends and other interests than our own. We should make it clear that we now have adopted a system of audit to trace the aid and report on its effective-We should point out that financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been fostered by us as being the preferred banking controlled way to approve projects and supervise funding. We need to make clear that we are shifting emphasis to technical assistance. That our priority is toward industrial agriculture and to small industrial pursuits. A much more reasonable program than one which seeks to build large steel capability or other tremendously costly capital ventures.

We need, Mr. Speaker, to indicate our understanding and assistance for the foreign exchange problems of the underdeveloped nations. We should be firm in our insistence that a more liberal liquidity program for international monetary policy should reflect appropriate concern for and participation by the less developed nations.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we should have clearly in mind the ultimate cost of doing nothing or the loss of time and loss of advantage flowing from a course which

does less than we are reasonably capable

of doing. For myself, I am a pragmatic altruist. I firmly believe that the healthy future of my country lies in a prudent, continuing investment in nation building abroad. In doing so, carefully and critically, I see our country serving its security interests and its economic interests in the long pull. To insist on enjoying all of the benefits of today without wise concern and provision for the future is not in our country's best tradition or spirit.

Because it discusses some of these same aspects of aid, Mr. Speaker, I have requested permission to insert in the Record, following my own remarks, an article from last week's Economist. I do not agree with all of the points made in this presentation. To the degree that it implies that some priority should not be given to food and education in our present aid efforts, I would take issue. To the main argument that aid cannot and should not be solely oriented to these present priorities, I am in hearty agreement.

The article follows:

IS AID OUT?--WHAT MUST BE DONE TO STOP THE NEXT WORLD CRISIS

Have the rich parts of the world lost the will to haul the poor parts up toward equality? The annual total of the West's aid to the developing countries has stayed the same since 1961, though the rich are getting richer and money is losing its purchasing power. Only France provides anything near the Western Nation's supposed aid target of 1 percent of gross national product. President Johnson's foreign aid message to Congress this month put the accent on specific kinds of practical help—food production, education, health and, warily, birth control. All these are sensible, but they do not make a coherent whole. Clearly the old philosophy behind aid is going out of the window.

The old philosophy was that every excolony had a duty to industrialize, and that the ex-imperialists had a duty to help. Now Malthus has caught up with Marx. The fear of real famine once more grips the rural slums of India and even parts of Africa. India is short of nearly a quarter of the grain it needs this year to maintain even the average peasant's starvation diet. With population growing as fast as food supplies in most developing areas, and faster in much of Asia, famine is liable to haunt the world for years to come. Only the capitalist West, and chiefly North America, has surplus food to shap abroad—a political point that will be hammered at time and again.

More and more voices can be heard saying now that the poor must stop dreaming of industrial plenty and get down to plowing their modest furrow on the old home farm. There is a good deal of sense in Samuel Smiles. But one must be clear about what lies behind it. To tell poor countries that they must concentrate on agriculture, not industry, is more than a shift in technical priorities. It murks a sharp fall in the already precaricus political position of the developing areas. They are, in a way, the casualties of the recent improvement in relations between Russia and the West.

In the 1950's Western attitudes to aid were generated partly by do-gooders, who were not a decisive minority, and by run-of-the-mill machiavellians, scared by the cold war, who were. Now that the West feels relatively secure, fewer and fewer allowances are made for the inevitable confusions and upheavals of the poor. Westerners are tired of Indian giganticism in planning; of Pakistanti obsessions with Kashmir that have wrecked a good start in development; of the Latin American pendulum swinging between

reaction and revolution; of the lack of viable states in Africa. Hence the stern new emphasis on "practical" aid, which is a measure of the irritation of the rich rather than of any change in the needs of the poor.

No one expected the poor to become instantly rich and self-reliant at the mere touch of the Western Midas. Some people, indeed, still argue that it is not at all clear that the poor are really going from bad to worse. Mr. George Woods, the President of the World Bank, the only really successful firm in the aid business, did not think so when he wrote in Foreign Affairs last month that "despite some discouraging failures among them, the underdeveloped countries as a group are growing in their ability to carry out investment. Their development institutions are becoming more firmly established, education, and skills are spreading, administrative and managerial abilities are improving, and program and project planning is becoming more effective."

This is the hopeful case. But even if the poor countries must haul themselves up by their bootstraps by increasing food output and exports, it is hard to see how they can do it without substantially bigger injections of aid than they are getting now.

Take India, a third of the non-Communist developing world in point of numbers. Its main problem is not shortage of land, as one might think from talk of overpopulation. It is appallingly low yields from the land—half those of China, and a quarter those of Japan. But high agricultural yields almost always happen only in industrial societies where farmers work with modern techniques. Where these conditions do not exist, a country is not likely to get much return from lavishing its scarcest resources—capital and skilled leadership—on an obstinate medieval peasantry.

The same applies to the poor countries' attempt to expand their exports. To have meaningful access to rich export markets, poor countries must make things that buyers want in growing quantities, and that means manufactured goods. The emergency of famine must not be allowed to obscure these long-term needs. Larger food and trade programs are going to involve expanding, not contracting, aid programs. Mr. Woods claims that the poor countries could, in each of the next 5 years, usefully absorb \$3 or \$4 billion more than they get now.

The aim should not be to scale down the estimates of what the developing world needs, but to find a new way of stimulating the will of the rich to do enough. It is true. as Mr. Andrew Shonfield pointed out as long ago as 1960 in his book "The Attack on World Poverty," that aid scheme: have generally been organized in a way that takes no account of the sensitivities of the rich, and this has boomeranged. Something must be done to avoid further damage. For instance, aid is going to be provided on the necessary scale only if it is more closely supervised. It goes against human nature to imagine that huge sums can change hands "without strings." This is why schemes organized on a regional basis—such as the newly created Asian Development Bank- are a sensible way of tackling the problem. They increase the potential bargaining power of the borrowers, and also give them a collective interest in seeing that none of their number kills the golden goose by sharp practices. The other thing that certainly has to be done is to find a way of linking international monetary reform with the business of helping the poor. This would loosen the stranglehold that balance-of-payments problems now impose on the aid policies of America and Britain.

But, unless a specifically political impulse is provided, mechanisms like these, however useful they are, will pretty certainly be set up with a sluggishness bordering on indifference. The one political event anywhere on the horizon that could put some zip into aid

policies is British entry into the Common Market. It is to Mr. Heath's credit that he, more than any other British politician, is insisting on this point. For British's early entry into Europe could shake the European nations, including Britian itself, out of their growing conservatism and halt their retreat into parochialism. The worst disaster would be if the Britian that finally did get into Europe years hence were more introvert than it is today because it had lost its nerve through being out in the cold too long.

An extrovert common market, with Britain in, would be by far the world's biggest trader and could be a major provider of aid, especially if the European Development Fund were extended beyond French-speaking Africa. And it would almost certainly have an added impact on the Americans, who are highly sensitive to signs of Europe "playing its part" or, as now, "slacking" in the world. Europe's preoccupation with internal quarreling rather than with external action, and America's feeling that it is having to carry the can alone, has had a great deal to do with Congress's recent impatience on aid. A sign of more positive European purpose towards the poor would galvanize the Americans too.

Without a change of this order, the fascination with famine and emergency relief funds can easily become a cover for a retreat from really determined aid policies. It gives people the thrill of charity without making them get down to the root of the matter, which is the need to start closing the cnormous and widening gap between the world's industrialized white north and the subsistence-level colored south. It is tempting to settle for programs that are designed merely to avert mass starvation, to "stop them going under altogether." It is easy to argue that the colored poor, weak and divided as they are, have no real influence on the balance of power. But it will not do, because prolonged poverty means constant crises in the developing areas, and constant crises will bedevil the efforts of the great powers to organize world peace. Vietnam, in its way, is a case in point. The awful threat of famine will be salutary if it awakens the West to the immensity of the problem. It will do harm if it makes it lose sight of the long-term aim of building modern industrial societies in such countries as are capable of them.

Right-To-Work Fight Misses the Point

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES $Tuesday, February\ 22,\ 1966$

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Speaker, of all the legislative issues which have confronted Congress, few have stirred as much controversy as the proposal to repeal section 14(b)—that provision of the Taft-Hartley Act which leaves with the several States authority to outlaw union shop agreements.

Under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I am including the text of an article which appeared in the February 26, 1966, issue of the Saturday Evening Post. The article sets forth a position that I have consistently taken throughout the debates on this subject: The Right-To-Work Fight Misses the Point

(By Congressman Robert P. Criffin)

Few political struggles have raged so long and so bitterly as the battle over the rightto-work provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. was attacked on a widespread basis. Frenchtown and Monroe Townships, for instance, were working on plans for sewers. It became obvious that prospects for Federal aid for their construction were dim indeed unless they cooperated with the city of Monroe in an areawide sewer plan which would

prevent expensive duplication of facilities. As to the industrial complex itself, it's still too early for unrestrained joy. We well recall the enthusiasm that greeted an announcement of the Dow Chemical Co.'s taking of an option on property at the port of Monroe. Everyone—city and port officials alike—were sure Dow was all set to build a big plant. These plans now apparently have fallen through.

City and township officials are convinced the planned industrial complex is a certainty. They speak in terms of 1,500 jobs within 5 years. Such a development would be a boon to this region. We surely hope their optimism is borne out by later developments.

Regardless of the outcome of this industrial complex, however, firm steps have been taken to establish city-township relations on a cooperative and friendly basis. This is a major advance. Great credit should go to Mayor Cohn, Frenchtown Township Supervisor Curtis Yoas, and members of their respective boards for opening the way to what should be a tremendous future for Greater Monroe.

Newton Daily News Comments on Cold War GI Bill of Rights

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. BERT BANDSTRA

OF IOWA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. BANDSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of my fellow Members an editorial on the new cold war GI bill of rights from the Newton Daily News of Newton, Iowa, published on February 17, 1965.

The editorial makes the very valid point that cost of this new program eventually will be repaid to the Government in the form of higher income taxes paid by these benefiting from the cold war GI bill.

This is confirmed by the history of earlier programs enacted to provide benefits to veterans of World War II and the Korean war.

Veterans who participated in these earlier programs, which included educational benefits, are now making \$1,000 to \$1,500 more each year than veterans who did not take part.

This, in turn, has resulted in added income tax payments to the Government totaling about \$20 billion over the last 20 years. The cost paid out for educational benefits under the earlier programs, it should be noted, was about \$14.5 billion.

Of course, legislation such as the cold war GI bill of rights cannot be measured in terms of dollars and cents alone. The program, by providing educational assistance to veterans, will raise the general standard of education and thus benefit the entire Nation. Nonetheless, it is important to note, as the Newton Daily News has done, that this new legislation is fiscally sound.

The Newton Daily News editorial follows:

EARLIER GI'S WILL HELP PAY BILL

The new cold war GI bill passed unanimously by both Houses of Congress involves the outlay of a healthy chunk of money—some \$2.8 billion over the next 6 years before it tapers off.

This is about twice as much as the administration asked for in its original request. But it is one of those things that cannot be categorized as inflationary or noninflationary, that eludes analysis in columns of profit and loss.

The fact is that a sumstantial share of the billions the program will cost will come from the incomes of citizens in the prime of their working lives who themselves received benefits—college educations, vocational training, home loans, etc.—under previous GI bills.

There were 8.4 million who participated in the first bill after World War II. Another 2.5 million were beneficiaries of the Korean GI bill.

How much more they have earned, how much more they have contributed to the Nation than they otherwise might have, is impossible to say. The monetary returns on these investments might perhaps be estimated; in any other terms it is incalculable.

While the heavy hand the veterans lobbles exercise over Congress is open to question in some matters, the new GI bill is one fruit of their labors everyone can applaud. Theoretically, it could be of immediate benefit to some 3.5 million veterans who were discharged from the services after January 31, 1955, when the Korean bill expired.

Today and Tomorrow

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 22, 1966

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, once again Walter Lippmann has written a column which crystallizes the problems which face this country. In assessing the recent statement by Senator Robert Kennedy, he notes that, if the administration really is prepared to negotiate, then it must be prepared for the formation of a provisional, coalition government which would organize a general election. The report of the ad hoc congressional conference on Vietnam which eight of us sponsored recognized this in discussing the terms of settlement.

Mr. Lippmann also points out the contradiction between Dean Rusk's statement that our stance in Vietnam will increase our allies' confidence in our commitments and the article by military expert Hansen Baldwin in the New York Times on February 21 which shows that the war in Vietnam has almost exhausted our supply of trained and ready combat units.

I hope that all of my colleagues will take the time to read Walter Lippmann's column which appeared in today's Washington Post: [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 22, 1966]

ROBERT KENNEDY'S POINT (By Walter Lippmann)

The key question in the Senate hearings has been whether the administration, which says that it wants a negotiated settlement has in fact committed itself to a policy which requires the unconditional surrender of the enemy. This is the question which is at the root of the profound concern of the Senators. It is also, most certainly, the question which is worrying the country. The question was not answered definitively in the hearings. General Taylor and Secretary Rusk kept insisting that the administration was fighting a limited war, that its objectives and its targets were limited, and that it is earnestly seeking to engage Hanoi in discussions and negotiations.

It has remained for Senator Robert Kennedy to raise the decisive question about a negotiated settlement, which is whether the administration is prepared to negotiate with its adversaries in the field. We have learned promptly from the immediate reactions of Messrs. Bundy, Ball and Humphere that the administration is not prepared to negotiate with its adversaries in the field. It does want to negotiate with Hanol but not with the Vietcong unless the Vietcong is acknowledged to be nothing more than the instrument of the Hanol government. This position is in fact a demand for the unconditional surrender of the Vietcong, which constitutes at least three-quarters of the military forces arrayed against us in the field, and it is a demand for the unconditional recognition of General Ky's government as the only political power in South Vietnam.

No one is entitled to claim that he is in favor of a negotiated settlement of the war unless he is prepared to negotiate with all his important adversaries who are engaged in the fighting. Senator Kennedy has gone to the heart of the matter in fixing public attention on the simple truth that if the administration wants to negotiate, it will have to negotiate with the enemy who is in fact arrayed against us.

This does not mean, it seems to me, that the United States itself should negotiate with the Vietcong for the purpose of forming a coalition government in South Vietnam. A negotiated settlement of the war in South Vietnam will have to be negotiated by the South Vietnamese, and our policy should be to refrain from vetoing it. We shall have to cease putting our whole intuence and support behind General Ky, who refuses to negotiate. The makings of a South Vietnamese negotiated settlement have long been present just under the surface in South Vietnam.

The outcome would probably be some kind of coalition government formed for the purpose of organizing a general election. Such a government would of course be vulnerable to the machinations of the hard-line Communists in Hanoi and Pelping. Difficult and unattractive as this may be, it would be a great deal better than an unlimited war to achieve unconditional surrender. Moreover, there would still be open to us what in my own view is the only live option we have ever had in southeast Asia. It is to help provide the material means by which a united Vietnam—probably under the rule of Ho Chi Minh, who is the one national leader of that country—could be neutral and militarily independent as regards (Chipa

tarily independent as regards China.

The partisans of our present course will do well to study carefully Mr. Hanson Baldwin's article in Monday's New York Times. It deals with the present condition of our combat forces. Mr. Baldwin is not only the leading military correspondent in contempo-