

nder the proposal I offer today, \$50 million would be appropriated for title V. This increase is necessary both to finance the expected projects forthcoming from the expansion of the act to include racial imbalance plans, and also to finance more adequately the existing authority to assist de jure desegregation programs. The Office of Education estimates that this amount is the absolute realistic minimum required if a satisfactory Federal effort is to be made.

Mr. President, I want to stress that my proposal contains no coercive features whatsoever. It does not require any school board to take any action. It is simply designed to help those school boards who have determined that a program to correct racial imbalance is necessary and who can make good use of the Federal funds which my proposal would provide.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill lie on the desk for 10 days for the purpose of permitting additional Senators to join as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill will lie on the desk, as requested by the Senator from Massachusetts.

The bill (S. 2928) to amend title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to authorize the Commissioner of Education to provide technical assistance and grants to school boards in support of programs designed to overcome any racial imbalance in the public schools, introduced by Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

#### THE NEED FOR A THOROUGH INQUIRY INTO OUR FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES BY VIRTUE OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, today the brooding specter of the war in Vietnam looms large over Washington.

Government officials, members of the communications media, and the American public in general, all realize that the single most important issue currently facing this Nation is the conduct of our policy in a small, beleaguered country thousands of miles from our own shores. In fact, whether they uphold, or would have us renounce our commitment to the people of South Vietnam, Senators, columnists, businessmen, students and all men of good will affirm that the pursuit of peace in southeast Asia is of overriding importance to the United States and every one of our partners in the free world.

But, concerned as we are over events in South Vietnam itself, we cannot lose sight of the problems related to the economic strength which undergirds America's ability to meet her responsibilities there—as well as in other friendly nations and at home. We cannot and must not allow the political and military questions about the Vietnamese struggle to obscure the implications for our economy of the increased spending required to sustain that struggle.

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Yet, though a thorough knowledge of present and future economic trends is vital to intelligent policymaking, there has been a surprisingly small amount of public concern and no widespread debate thus far in this area. A few economists and some business leaders have come forward with varying economic analyses and widely differing proposals, but their efforts have received scant attention.

Mr. President, the Constitution of the United States places the final responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations in the hands of the President. So, while debate in Congress over the conflict in Vietnam may prove healthy, may help clarify the issues at stake, and may even develop workable alternatives—still, in the final analysis—we cannot displace that ultimate responsibility of the Chief Executive—that final decision which is always his.

However, the same Constitution vests in Congress the primary responsibility for the American economy. It is we who must enact the laws levying taxes, imposing duties, appropriating moneys, and regulating commerce. And, if we are to legislate in a manner that will permit us to meet our international obligations while maintaining a growing, expanding domestic economy, Congress must assemble all the facts and information necessary to the task.

We must probe beneath surface appearances and examine in detail ranking questions that have yet to be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.

Mr. President, I, for one, am convinced that the United States is following the only just and honorable course of policy open to us in Vietnam.

But, I also believe that we would be derelict in our duty if we did not ascertain whether we can truly afford "guns and butter" without endangering our economic health; whether a sudden increase in military expenditures combined with growing domestic programs will generate unbearable inflationary pressures; whether future tax increases may be required to keep growth steady and stable; and, whether our balance-of-payments deficits can be further reduced. These are just some of the matters we need to look into in order to discharge our responsibilities.

Mr. President, such an investigation is not just desirable and timely, it is urgent and necessary.

For that reason, I am today submitting a resolution on behalf of the distinguished senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE], the able junior Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], and myself, which would authorize the Senate Committee on Finance to make a full and complete study of all matters relating to the fiscal and monetary position of the Government, and their effect on the state of the economy. The resolution would require the committee to report its findings and make such recommendations as it deems advisable to the Senate not later than 90 days after the day on which the resolution is agreed to.

I sincerely trust that this resolution will be speedily adopted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The resolution (S. Res. 221) was referred to the Committee on Finance, as follows:

S. RES. 221

*Resolved*, That the Committee on Finance, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized under sections 134(a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdiction specified by rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to all matters relating to the fiscal and monetary position of the Government of the United States in view of our increasing commitments in Vietnam, including, but not limited to the adequacy of the revenues of the Government, the need for increasing the statutory limit on the public debt, methods for further improving the United States balance-of-payments position, the problem of interest rates and other matters related to the Nation's economic welfare.

SEC. 2. The committee shall report its findings upon the study and investigation authorized by this resolution, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable, to the Senate not later than the 90th day after the day on which this resolution is agreed to.

#### EXTENSION OF TIME FOR ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS TO S. 2888

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, a week ago I asked unanimous consent that S. 2888 remain at the desk for the convenience of those Senators who desire to cosponsor it.

I now ask unanimous consent that S. 2888 remain at the desk for an additional week for the convenience of those Senators who are not present today, until February 23. This bill would give priority to school lunch programs.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the next printing of S. 2882, a bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act so as to extend to June 30, 1966, the period for initial enrollment in the program of supplementary medical insurance benefits for the aged provided under part B of such title, the names of Senator JAVITS, of New York, Senator ALLOTT, of Colorado, Senator FONG, of Hawaii, and Senator SCOTT, of Pennsylvania be added as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, at its next printing, I ask unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor of the bill (S. 2911) to amend section 301 of the Tariff Act of 1930, introduced by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TALMADGE].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name may be added as a cosponsor to S. 2797 at its next printing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION

Under authority of the orders of the Senate, as indicated below, the following names have been added as additional cosponsors for the following bills and joint resolution:

Authority of February 1, 1966:

S. 2855. A bill to amend chapter 207, title 18, United States Code, to prescribe procedure for the return of persons who have fled, in violation of the conditions of bail given in any State or judicial district of the United States, to another State or judicial district, and for other purposes: Mr. BAYH, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FONG, Mr. HART, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. JAVITS, and Mr. SMATHERS.

S.J. Res. 133. Joint resolution designating February of each year as American History Month: Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BOGGS, Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. CASE, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. ERVIN, Mr. FANNIN, Mr. FONG, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARRIS, Mr. HART, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. HRUSKA, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. KENNEDY of New York, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. LAUSCHE, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MCCARTHY, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. MORTON, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PELL, Mr. PROUTY, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota.

Authority of February 3, 1966:

S. 2871. A bill to amend Public Law 660, 86th Congress, to establish a National Traffic Safety Agency to provide national leadership to reduce traffic accident losses by means of intensive research and vigorous application of findings, and for other purposes: Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. BAYH, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. MCGEE, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MONRONEY, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. MOSS, and Mr. PELL.

S. 2874. A bill to provide for the strengthening of American educational resources for international studies and research: Mr. CLARK, Mr. GRUENING, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mrs. NEUBERGER, Mr. PELL, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey, and Mr. YABOROUGH.

Authority of February 4, 1966:

S. 2877. A bill to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965 in order to provide for a National Community Senior Service Corps: Mr. CLARK, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. HART, Mr. HARTKE, Mrs. NEUBERGER, and Mr. RIBICOFF.

#### NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, I wish to announce forthcoming hearings on electoral college reform. The hearings are scheduled to begin at 10 a.m. on February 28, March 1, 2, 3, and 4, and March 7 through 10. They will be conducted in the auditorium, G-308 of the New Senate Office Building.

Any persons or organizations interested in presenting their views to the subcommittee should contact the subcommittee staff in room 419, Senate Office Building, phone extension 3018.

#### NOTICE OF HEARING ON S. 2704. A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGULATION OF BANK COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I should like to announce that the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking and Currency will hold a hearing on S. 2703, a bill to provide for the regulation of bank collective investment funds.

The hearing will begin on Tuesday, March 8, 1966, at 10 a.m., in room 5302, New Senate Office Building.

Any persons who wish to appear and testify in connection with this bill are requested to notify Matthew Hale, chief of staff, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, room 5300, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., telephone 225-3921.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, communicated to the Senate the intelligence of the death of Hon. ALBERT THOMAS, late a Representative from the State of Texas, and transmitted the resolutions of the House thereon.

The message announced that the House had disagreed to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 3314) to require premarital examinations in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. WHITENER, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. HORTON, and Mr. ROUDEBUSH were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 647) to amend the act of March 3, 1901, to permit the appointment of new trustees in deeds of trust in the District of Columbia by agreement of the parties; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MULTER, Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. SMITH of Virginia, Mr. SPRINGER, and Mr. NELSEN were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message further announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 10304) to provide for the mandatory reporting by physicians and institutions in the District of Columbia of certain physical abuse of children; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. MULTER, Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. SMITH of Virginia, Mr. SPRINGER, and Mr. NELSEN were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

The message also announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 9985) to provide for the mandatory reporting by physicians and hospitals or similar institutions in the District of Columbia of

injuries caused by firearms or other dangerous weapons; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. ABERNETHY, Mr. MULTER, and Mr. HARSHA were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

#### ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message further announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution:

S. 9. An act to provide readjustment assistance to veterans who serve in the Armed Forces during the induction period;

S. 1407. An act for the relief of Frank E. Lipp; and

H.J. Res. 403. Joint resolution authorizing an appropriation to enable the United States to extend an invitation to the World Health Organization to hold the 22d World Health Assembly in Boston, Mass., in 1969.

#### FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, I have been a friend and supporter of the food-for-peace program ever since those days of serious agricultural surpluses back in 1954, when we enacted the original Public Law 480 legislation.

Last week the President submitted to Congress a comprehensive and expanded food for peace program. The President called it food for freedom. Personally, I regret the change in name as the name food for peace was established in our own Nation and the world. The program, as we have known it through these 11 years of operation, has been useful to us and to our foreign friends. It has reduced our surpluses. It has opened new outlets for our fields and our farmers. It has brought increased jobs and income to our city people. It has fed millions of hungry people overseas. It has stabilized food prices where otherwise there would have been severe inflation. It has stimulated economic development and laid the basis for expanded private trade. It has won friends for us. It has strengthened free world relationships and has advanced the peaceful aims for which we stand.

The program has done all that we originally hoped for it, and more. The fact that we propose now to change that program is in the spirit of progress rather than dissatisfaction.

Food for peace has been not only a useful tool in feeding people and expanding trade, but also has been a highly instructive teacher. The lessons we have learned are the basis for the changes now proposed.

We have come to have second thoughts, for example, about use of the word "surplus" in a world where millions are hungry or underfed. The same can be said for the "disposal."

The farmers of Kansas are producing wheat on about 9 million acres of their farmland, and a substantial amount of this wheat has been moving to foreign

years of broadcasting, made the decision all by himself to resign as president of CBS News.

This is a rare occurrence at broadcasting networks. Usually, if a man is fired, the event is referred to as a "resignation." The toughest term ever permitted is that a departed employee's services were "terminated by mutual consent."

But Fred W. Friendly, a volatile, emotional man, quit after a disagreement with his new boss, John A. Schneider. Schneider was promoted last Wednesday from president of the CBS television network to group vice president, broadcasting.

In the elaborate organization of CBS, Inc., Schneider had been Friendly's equal. On Wednesday, Schneider moved up, second only to Dr. Frank Stanton (president of CBS, Inc.) and to Board Chairman William Paley.

The Wednesday date is important, for on Thursday came a debate between Friendly and Schneider. Friendly wanted live TV coverage of George F. Kennan's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Schneider decided to go with the regular schedule but added that live coverage might come this week.

The official announcement, made yesterday by Dr. Stanton, said: "Friendly feels he is unable to continue in his post as a result of a decision made by \* \* \* Schneider not to schedule live coverage of the testimony \* \* \*."

Stanton added: "Fred Friendly has been an outstanding leader of broadcast journalism. His contributions to the public, to his profession and to CBS have been great indeed. My associates, his colleagues and I will miss him."

Fred's emotions were shown plainly in his letter of resignation. He called it "a matter of conscience." After the decision not to broadcast Kennan's testimony, Friendly watched the four TV monitors that are in his office. While NBC telecast the hearing, Friendly said, CBS was showing "a fifth rerun of 'I Love Lucy' and an eighth rerun of 'The Real McCoys.'"

"I wanted to order up an announcement that said: 'Due to circumstances beyond our control the broadcast originally intended for this time will not be seen,'" Friendly wrote.

His letter of resignation also said: "I am resigning because the decision not to carry the hearings makes a mockery of the Paley-Stanton CND (Columbia News Division) crusade of many years that demands broadcast access to congressional debate."

Friendly, TV's most honored producer of news documentary programs, moved to the presidency of CBS News, March 2, 1964. His success continued after he introduced the national TV "test" programs and as the Walter Cronkite news program gained ground and sometimes won higher ratings than the NBC team of Chet Huntley and David Brinkley.

One good source in New York said yesterday: "Of course, CBS hates to lose Fred. But he stood on principle and made his fight at the wrong time. The network has no choice in such a fight but to uphold its top executive."

Speculation began immediately about Friendly's successor. The names that cropped up immediately were those of Gordon Manning and Bill Leonard. Manning was executive editor of Newsweek for 8 years before Friendly selected him to become CBS News vice president and director of television news in December 1964.

At the same time, veteran broadcaster Leonard was promoted to vice president and director of news programming. The promotion came after Leonard had pioneered new techniques for covering elections.

Privately, Friendly has complained, rather mildly, that the presidency of CBS News brought him smaller earnings than he had made as a documentary producer. There's

almost no doubt that he'll return to making documentaries and there's even less doubt that a network will hire him.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield at that point?

Mr. GRUENING. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I commend the Senator from Alaska for his statement. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I wish to express appreciation for the coverage which television provided for the committee hearings. I believe that the action of the Columbia Broadcasting System and the success of the hearings in reaching the American people raises an interesting question. Many thoughtful Americans express apprehension as to the imbalance of power between the executive and legislative branches of Government. The President has frequently resorted—and properly so—to every means of communication.

The state of the Union message is not a message to Congress any more, but, over the heads of Congress, to the American people. I do not speak critically of this situation, because we have a people's government.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARTKE in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GORE. I ask unanimous consent that 3 additional minutes be allowed to the Senator from Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GORE. If the legislative branch is without the facility to communicate with the American people, how is this imbalance to be corrected, I ask the Senator?

Mr. GRUENING. I believe that the remarks of the senior Senator from Tennessee are extremely pertinent. I know of no more important function in a democracy, in a government of free people, than that the people shall have full access to all the actions of their government. Very frequently that has not been forthcoming.

I believe that broadcasting by the national networks by TV, the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, was one of the most important public services for the benefit of our democratic system that has been rendered in our time.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, the hearings deal with the most important issue before the Nation and the world today. I doubt that a more important committee hearing has been held in the last 20 years. Fortunately, the message is reaching the American people. Millions of people have been able to see and hear the issue questioned. It has not been a side show. I believe the Senator will agree that it has been a thorough examination of the commitments, the issues, and possible consequences.

If the American people are not entitled to the fullest information on such an issue as this, the issue of war and peace, then for what purpose should the Government permit the use of the other waves?

Let us never forget that every single television station operates at the license

of the Government. The wavelengths belong to all the people of the country. In my view, Congress should give very careful consideration to an allocation of a certain amount of time of certain wavelengths, for presentation, for discussion, for examination of public issues, not alone by the Congress, but surely partly by the Congress.

Mr. GRUENING. I could not agree more with the wise and penetrating statement of the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. It is very much the business of the American people. The southeast Asian involvement is one of the most critical issues before us, as we are being led more and more deeply into a war in which Congress has had no real voice.

Mr. GORE. And the Government has been very profligate in allowing the wavelengths to be monopolized by commercial organizations. The very idea of a vast television network using the wavelengths that belong to the whole people to advertise soap, when we should be having a critical examination of the issue of war and peace, makes it apparent that there should be a reexamination of the whole question of licensing television.

Mr. GRUENING. I hope Congress will not only examine this case, but the whole subject, which affects the right to know of the American people.

#### OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, with my responsibilities of being chairman of a committee as well as the assistant majority leader, I was not able to be present at the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee, but I want to say that these advocates of retreat, defeat, surrender, and national dishonor have not been doing the country any good when they went before a television network suggesting that this Nation was not committed to fighting aggression in this area. The Senate voted for the resolution last year, and Senators voted that this country would help that country resist aggression, and specifically authorized the President to take whatever steps he felt necessary to resist further aggression. We are committed. We have more than 200,000 men there. We have at stake our national honor. We are committed to resisting Communist aggression. That is what this is all about. It has been going on for some time.

The Senator from Alaska voted against the resolution, and he was privileged to do it, but once the Congress adopted that resolution, it had taken a firm position. Once Congress authorized the President to do that which he felt necessary, the President was authorized to do it. It was authorized in the resolution and discussed specifically during the debate on the floor of the Senate. He was authorized to send troops wherever necessary to resist aggression in the area.

It is not helping our country when Senators go before the Nation and express their fears on this issue that the Red Chinese might come in, and the fact that we are losing some American boys. We are inflicting at least 10 to 1 damage

on the North Vietnam invaders compared to the losses suffered by our forces.

If this great nation is to be humiliated, is to be defeated and run out and be downgraded to a second-class power by that little nation, then I wish Red China would come in. It would be a great humiliation for this Nation to be defeated by a small nation of 16 million people. If we must be defeated, it would be better to lose to a large nation of 700 million people.

This Nation was founded because we had courageous men. We became a great nation because the people had courage. They did not give up because they had to fight Indians. If the men who came on the *Mayflower* were frightened to helplessness the first time they had to fight Indians, they would have gone back to England on the *Mayflower*. But they fought the Indians and won, meanwhile losing some fine Americans, until this Nation became great. We are upholding our commitments in the proud tradition of our fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, and may other courageous Americans who fell on the field of battle.

I only wish that back during the Civil War there had been a humorous element in the Congress that would have appeared daily before a nationwide television network and have said, "We fought and lost a Yankee today. We lost a boy today let us quit." If they had spread that propaganda, it might have spread fear. Maybe the war would have gone the other way. Then we would have won the principles of States' rights. We would prove that we were the strong people. Having achieved victory we could have offered to rejoin the Union with considerable pride that our theory of States' rights had been sustained.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask unanimous consent that we may have 5 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. If the hearings continue to be televised, the American people may learn of the mistaken concept stated by our distinguished majority whip, that we have a solemn commitment. They will learn there was no such solemn commitment; that we were never so committed; that our commitment was a tentative one, dealing only with economic aid and further conditioned on reforms by the South Vietnam Government which were never made. There was never any commitment to send our troops into combat. We must inform the public of these facts, and they must be brought home to the American people.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I do not regard this Nation as being an international criminal, as the Senator from Oregon has said, and I do not regard this Nation as being an international aggressor, as the Senator from Alaska has said. I regard the Communists as the aggressors. We helped organize the peaceful nation of South Vietnam. We are members of the SEATO agreement.

We let those people know that we would help them resist aggression. We said we would put ships and advisers in there at that time to help those people defend themselves against subversion and aggression.

Then, the Communists came and they attacked our ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. That was an act of war. We shot back. Not only did we shoot back, but we bombed the bases from which those torpedo boats came to attack our ships.

So that there will not be any misunderstandings, at the time I was in charge of debating the equalization tax here on the Senate floor, the President asked Senators on the Republican side of the aisle and Senators on the Democratic side of the aisle to come to the White House and talk with him. While Senators were debating on the floor, the entire matter was discussed. The President asked for that resolution for authority broad enough to authorize putting troops in there and we understood that, if need be, the resolution said that he was authorized to take any steps necessary to resist aggression in that area.

It was explained on the floor of the Senate by the chairman of the committee. The resolution was broad enough to put Army men on the land mass of Asia.

Then, North Vietnam regular army units proceeded to march on South Vietnam, we put our troops there to resist aggression. They are the aggressors. We went in after that date. We are fighting there pursuant to that resolution. Our national honor is committed to it.

I do not believe it serves the purposes of this country to have two Senators who voted against the purpose of this Nation making a speech every week and sometimes every day against our determined national purpose to uphold our national honor and to keep our word and our commitment.

I do not believe it is helpful to go on national television and suggest that we are the international criminal when we are, in truth, the international good guys. We did not start this fight. They did. We are ready to talk peace at any time. They are not.

Our children will call us blessed and courageous if we stand fast and defeat Communist aggression.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for 1 additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. They will call us courageous because we have the courage to stand up and resist aggression in the tradition of our fathers, our grandfathers, and great grandfathers. I am proud of my forebears who helped to give us this great Nation.

I have just come from Louisiana. I had an occasion to visit with these fine young men who are preparing to fight in Vietnam. There is not a coward in the crowd. They are courageous young men. They have high morale and high spirit.

Those whom we have sent are whipping the Communists. They are going to beat the aggressors unless the best fighting men in the world—the American soldiers—are pulled out of there. They might be defeated, but they are not going to get whipped in Vietnam. If they are beaten, it will be in Washington.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I wish to say in connection with the criticism of the Senator of those who have expressed publicly their dissent from an undeclared war and an unconstitutional—

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I will finish my sentence, if I may.

Abraham Lincoln, who was not too greatly admired in the State of the Senator from Louisiana, opposed the entry of the United States in the Mexican War, spoke against it in the Congress and elsewhere and today no one vilifies the memory of Abraham Lincoln or castigates him for that courageous and proper attitude.

Those of us who oppose and continue to oppose our entry in an undeclared war and the sending of our boys to slaughter where there was no act of aggression against us, and where those people whom we are supporting are not willing to fight effectively for themselves, have no regrets or apologies to offer.

We will find that more and more American people will come to our point of view that we have no business down there. We were not attacked, and we have no right or obligation to involve ourselves all over the world as policemen and sending our boys to their slaughter, whenever someone scents a Communist threat. An examination of the record will show that there was aggression on both sides and that we too were guilty of aggression and violation of commitments far more solemn and binding than those that are alleged to justify our military adventures in southeast Asia.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I am glad that the hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations have not been characterized by intemperate and flamboyant language and arm waving.

I invite the distinguished junior Senator from Louisiana to attend the hearings and present the views he has here presented. I would like to suggest to him that the issue before the committee is not defeat, retreat, and surrender, to use his words.

This issue is rather whether this war is to be held within bounds which we can reasonably anticipate to be manageable, whether the goal be limited and the commitments be limited, or whether this be an open end commitment for total victory militarily against whatever forces may appear in opposition in southeast Asia.

The issue is rather whether this war is a global war. Such an issue deserves the deliberate consideration which the committee is giving it.



It is far too important to be considered with catch phrases and loosely selected slogans.

I hope the committee hearings for the next 2 days will be observed by countless millions of Americans. It is for their country, and it is their sons who will die if this degenerates into a war between the United States and China, and from that who can tell what holocaust may develop.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President—

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.

Mr. GORE. I yield, but I have only a minute left.

Mr. McGOVERN. It has been suggested here that those who share the Senator's concern about a major war in Asia are somehow lacking in patriotism and willingness to defend our country's interest.

I have not been in the Senate very long. The Senator from Tennessee has. Does the Senator from Tennessee recall the warning of General MacArthur some years ago that anyone who—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator recall General MacArthur's warning some years ago that anyone who committed the United States to a major war on the Asian mainland "ought to have his head examined"?

Mr. GORE. I recall that and that General MacArthur gave this country the warning that if we went to the Yalu in Korea, China would not come into the war. Unfortunately he was in error. They did come in and we lost many thousands of men in a few days.

Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator remember during the discussion of whether we should send forces into southeast Asia in 1954 that General Ridgway, who was then the Army Chief of Staff, vigorously opposed it and said that he regarded it as a harebrained idea?

Mr. GORE. And we also heard from General Gavin last week.

Mr. McGOVERN. It seems to me that no one would be foolish enough to suggest that General MacArthur and General Ridgway and General Gavin are lacking in patriotism or in knowledge of the problems we are up against if we get into a major war in Asia. It is easy for gentlemen to talk about our children calling us blessed if we get involved in war with China. But if that happens, there may not be any children left to call us blessed.

Mr. GORE. Chauvinism is not the issue here. The issue is the wisest course for this country involving war and peace.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I rather resent the suggestion that this Nation is waging illegal war. One hundred and twenty-five times in our history the President has sent American

troops into action, either to defend our position or to help our friends without a declaration of war or any prior authorization whatever.

Most of our declarations of war—in fact, I suspect that perhaps all but about one—actually occurred after the fighting had begun, sometimes after it had been going on for a long time. Our boys at Pearl Harbor did not wait for Congress to declare war before shooting back at the Japanese who were attacking. General MacArthur did not wait for Congress to declare war before he took action in the Philippines to attack the Japanese forces with our Air Force.

The President has the authority—and I have said this both under a Republican President and under Democratic Presidents—to send American servicemen into action to defend the position that this Nation decides to take, and he has the power to make such a decision.

I might add that when we fought the war in Korea, there was no declaration of war. But hardly anyone challenged the legality of what we were doing in Korea. There was no serious challenge of that action. We thought we were acting in pursuance of a United Nations treaty commitment.

In this instance, an act of aggression was committed against us. We were attacked, and we fought back. We attacked those who attacked us. Then Congress considered the matter and voted for a resolution that gave the President the specific power to take whatever action he thought would be necessary to resist in that area. Look at article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It specifically authorizes the right of individual and collective self-defense.

Then what happened? The Communists proceeded to march organized units from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. When they did that, we proceeded to send units of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps into South Vietnam to hold the land that the Communists were trying to take by outright aggression, and our forces are doing a magnificent job.

When I speak of my love for my great country, I am not embarrassed because now and then I become a little enthusiastic. I swell with pride when I see Old Glory flying from the Capitol. I swell with pride when I see Old Glory flying around the Washington Monument. I swell with pride when I see it flying from the Senate Office Building. I am proud of this country. I pray that no other flag will ever fly over it.

While sometimes I may be dismayed to see that flag flying at half mast, as it is today in honor of a patriotic, courageous American, who did his best to serve his country, as God gave him the light to serve it during his time here, my prayer is that there may never be a white flag of surrender up there.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. McGOVERN. I do not believe that anyone is questioning the glory of the American flag. The question is, What is in our national interest?

Does not the Senator from Louisiana believe that Members of the Senate have the right to raise questions about our policy in southeast Asia, when we consider that the backers of that policy have been consistently wrong about what they have told us?

The Secretary of Defense, not many months ago, gave it as his assessment that the American military combat role in Vietnam would be largely over by the end of 1965 and that our boys would be on their way home. We have come to the end of 1965 and have entered 1966. Instead of bringing the American forces home, we hear from those same sources that we shall have a force of 400,000, 500,000, or 600,000 in Vietnam before the end of 1966. That is only one of the more notable predictions that have been wrong. Each time we have had a disappointment in our effort in southeast Asia, our policymakers have merely asked us to redouble the prescription.

In view of that record, does not the Senator from Louisiana believe that Senators have some right to raise questions about our policy there and about the course we are on, without being reminded that the glory of the flag is involved?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Senators have the right to ask questions, but when the Nation is committed and our men are fighting in the field, we have a responsibility not to do things that will divide and confuse the people and prolong the war. The information I am getting—and it is coming from very high sources in the Government—is that one of the greatest difficulties in bringing the war to an end is that every time a Senator suggests that we retreat and accept defeat or surrender, that word goes right back to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, and the powers at Peiping, who say, "If we will just keep after those Americans, even though they are killing 10 of our men to every 1 of theirs that is being killed that great nation will lose courage and quit."

So every time a Senator makes another speech in fear that Red China might come in, he helps the Communist cause.

If the United States had been so timid and afraid of Red China during the Korean war, South Korea would be a Communist country today. Instead of trying to liberate only a part of Korea, we tried to liberate the whole country, but we did it in the interest of freedom. I am not ashamed that our troops went there. They achieved our national purpose, even though the Red Chinese did come in. Some of us felt that we should have fought the Red Chinese with more determination than we did.

But our Nation is committed in Vietnam. My own judgment is that we will see this action through. We will come out of it with honor worthy of all Americans who have gone before us.

To those forces of doubt and defeat who advocate, "Oh, my goodness; get out; Red China might come in," I say that if Red China thought that this Nation was so much afraid of Red China, Red China would be in the war. But Red China knows that we are a great, big,

strong country, a first class fighting power. They know they can do us much injury, but they also know that we can do a lot more damage to them. It works both ways.

Mr. McGOVERN. Did I correctly understand the implication of the Senator's earlier statement to be a recommendation to extend our action to a war with China?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I did not say that at all, and the RECORD will not show that I did. I merely said that if Red China thought that if by sending some of her troops in the United States would turn tail and run, as some Senators have advocated, Red China would be in the war tomorrow. But I am of the impression that Red China believes that if she came into the war, she would have a first-class modern fighting power to contend with, and she will be right.

I maintain that speeches on the floor of the Senate and on television, advocating that our boys not fight for their country, and that the people back off from the effort to help their country, handcuff our fighting men and to hold our country down when the going gets tough, do nothing but encourage the Communists to continue the war.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I take issue with the Senator's statement that our boys are fighting for their country. We are fighting in another country where we have taken sides in a civil war. The fact is that the new "white-haired boy" whom we have built up, Mr. Ky, made a statement in answer to a press request, "Who are your heroes?" His reply was, "I have only one, Adolph Hitler. We need four or five more Hitlers in Vietnam." That is the man whom we are now supporting. He is the man we are entrusting with domestic reforms. Actually his is the kind of corrupt government we have been supporting, of which there have been nine different specimens since Diem was "bumped off." That is the kind of so-called freedom we are fighting for, not the real freedom of the people.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I have never seen it fail, at any time when this Nation chooses to support a government that is resisting communism, that the Communists always put forth the argument that the head of that anti-Communist government is a "bad guy"; that he is corrupt and vicious; and pick out a statement the man may have made—perhaps an ill-advised misunderstood statement—to show that perhaps he is not the kind of fellow that we should support, and that he is not our kind of guy.

After all, Mr. President, this man is not chopping off the heads of innocent people. That is what cannot be said for the opposition, however.

Mr. President, for the life of me I cannot understand, when people stand and fight for our friends and keep fighting side by side with us, in resisting communism, why some persons will find so much fault with our friends and cannot even find one fault with the murderous assassins who want to kill us, as soon as they have disposed of our friends.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I believe that one statement made in the course of the very interesting discussion which we have just heard should perhaps be corrected to some degree in this Lincoln's birthday period.

I believe I am the only Member of Congress whose father was a Confederate soldier. Many Members of Congress had two grandfathers who were Confederate soldiers. In my case I knew for years all three of the men whom I have mentioned, my father and my two grandfathers. I never heard any of those three men speak with anything save respect, and sometimes they spoke almost with veneration, of Abraham Lincoln. They felt, as do most of the people in the part of the country from which I come, that perhaps the greatest national tragedy in connection with that war which split our country asunder was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.

I want the RECORD to show that most of us in the southland venerate the memory of Abraham Lincoln and believe that if he had lived we would not have had the troubles that came after the conclusion of that war.

#### DISCLOSURE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS IN ON-THE-SPOT REPORTING IN VIETNAM

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I recently received a letter from a retired chief warrant officer of the Army which I believe reflects the deep feeling and concern that parents throughout the Nation have for their sons who are currently on the battlefield in Vietnam. The concern centers around the fact that the movement of our forces is "telegraphed" to the enemy through on-the-spot reporting of the news media.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article written by Raymond L. Hughes, chief warrant officer, U.S. Army retired, of Plant City, Fla., which appeared as a letter to the editor in the Tampa Tribune of Sunday, February 6, 1966.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### MUST SHIELD TROOP MOVES IN VIETNAM

PLANT CITY.—We note with alarm and considerable apprehension the almost total lack of security afforded our troops in South Vietnam by every news medium; and the fact that newspapers, radio, and television seem to be vying with each other to disclose information which, by all standards of secrecy and commonsense, should not be disclosed.

Freedom of the press is one thing but when one can pick up the morning paper, listen to the radio, or look at television and see and hear disclosed the most minute details of troop movements and deployments right down to platoon and squad locations and even to pinpoint where private Joe Blow has his pup tent—and what road to take to find it, the whole aspect of freedom of the press begins to be asinine and literally explosive. If I were Private Blow—or his security officer—I would blow my top, clear to the Pentagon.

A recent news release from security agencies in Washington counseled all news media to use self-censorship and discretion in disclosing troop movements in Vietnam but if

this had any effect at all it has not become evident.

Commanders in the area of this vicious and nasty conflict to which so many of our men have been committed, and to which many more thousands will be committed, complain that they are extremely hampered by the lack of intelligence concerning location and movement of the Vietcong.

You may be sure that the Vietcong, Hanoi, and Red China (if any of their people can read English at all), have no trouble at all in tracing the movement and minutest operation of our troops and that of our allies. To them we must indeed be stupid to bare for all to read (who have the price of a newspaper) information which should reach only the Pentagon and then only in a top secret communication.

If this were only a game of marbles and the teams were not playing for keeps, instead of a deadly war where your boy, or mine, could be killed next week, I would say tell where the boy's tent is pitched, or where his foxhole is—and how to reach it from Saigon; but with my 18-year-old boy likely to arrive there at any time, I would prefer to let him tell me where his squad is billeted or bivouacked rather than to read it in the paper or see it on TV.

As a combat infantryman and communications officer in a war where we knew who the enemy was (and how to recognize him) I shudder for our boys every time I pick up a paper and read about an enemy who surrounds him and creeps out of holes in the night and who is unrecognizable; and yet who is furnished the minutest detail about where to locate our GIs—even in the dark.

The papers have a right to detest censorship but they also have a duty to make censorship unnecessary instead of aiding and abetting our enemies. This will be a long, bitter, and bloody war. Let us not show all of our cards to the enemy.

RAYMOND L. HUGHES.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, so that Senators may realize the travail which parents are now experiencing because of news reporting of many of our troop movements too soon and in too much detail I wish to read the covering letter Mr. Hughes addressed to me dated February 9, 1966, and reads as follows:

PLANT CITY, FLA.  
February 9, 1966.

HON. SPESSARD L. HOLLAND,  
Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Note attached clipping from last Sunday's Tampa Tribune.

Is there nothing that can be done about the flagrant disclosure of our every troop movement in Vietnam?

This week every move of an attempted entrapment of three battalions of Vietcong in a valley they had held for 10 years was announced in advance, by every news media. To no one's surprise they were gone when our troops enveloped the area.

For God's sake (and our boys' sake) read this in the Senate. And put the attached clipping in the Senate Record.

My 18-year-old son is to be in Vietnam June 1.

It is nothing short of murder what the news media is doing to our troops.

Sincerely,

RAYMOND L. HUGHES,  
Chief Warrant Officer,  
U.S. Army, Retired.

Mr. President, not being a member of the Armed Services Committee or the Foreign Relations Committee, I am not in possession of all the facts relative to our situation and the restrictions imposed on the news media in Vietnam, and it is not my intent, here on the floor of

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the Senate to suggest any unreasonable limitation on the freedom of the press as provided in our constitution. However, if, as seems to be the case, on-the-spot reporting—by newsmen accompanying our troops—enables the enemy to establish a pattern of our operations or actions in advance, then I believe the news media should certainly impose their own censorship of information, which I am sure will be their desire if they are advised that such reporting has comforted and aided and abetted the enemy. If such voluntary reporting is not effective, then steps should be taken by the military to censor news from the battlefield.

#### LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION SYSTEMS

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, for the past 2 weeks many Senators have been asking me about the legislative developments regarding the community antenna television systems. Many of the senatorial offices have been deluged with literally thousands of letters from people who have been informed that their television service via the cable systems will be curtailed because of the pending proposals by the FCC.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Commerce Committee, I have dealt with this problem at great length and, therefore, should set forth, as clearly and precisely as I can, some of the history of the present situation as it involves CATV systems.

First, the Subcommittee on Communications, anticipating the problems that the growth of CATV systems were facing, conducted long and extensive hearings in 1958 and 1959. These hearings were held in Washington, D.C., the States of Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. Numerous witnesses representing Government agencies affected, representatives of various organizations including television stations, CATV owners, association officials as well as the general public, submitted their views.

It was apparent that the FCC was reluctant and slow to take any constructive action in this field. In July 1959, in open hearing, I told the Chairman of the FCC:

You have CATV people coming in and setting up their systems contrary to all standards and no one seems to be policing it. There is no supervision on the part of anyone. We have to have rules and regulations. We have to have standards.

I urged him to move—to take action.

As a token effort, the Commission, finally, at the urging of our committee, sent a man out into the field to investigate the situation.

Again, in 1960, I stated that the FCC was rather lukewarm with regard to whether they should assume responsibility. It was obvious from the testimony developed by the committee that some action was necessary. If Congress did not act, a hodgepodge growth of CATV would take place with possible serious consequences to an orderly development of TV, particularly with reference to lo-

cal live TV service. As a consequence, the committee drafted original legislation setting forth appropriate guidelines that, in my judgment, would have permitted an orderly growth of both CATV and broadcasting under the umbrella of the FCC. The bill was reported favorably by the committee to the Senate and after many discussions and refinement of language, the representatives of the National Association of Community Antenna Systems agreed to accept the legislation. However, certain CATV interests at the last minute decided to vigorously oppose the bill and after 2 days of full debate on the floor of the Senate, the bill was recommitted by one vote. There is no question in my mind, and this will be agreed to by most of the CATV operators today, that if the legislation that the committee reported in the 86th Congress had been enacted, many of the questions that are now being raised, as well as the proliferation of the State and municipal regulations in the CATV field, may have been eliminated and CATV allowed to grow in an orderly fashion.

In 1961, the FCC's concern with the matter of CATV and its impact on the development of local as well as nationwide television service began to increase so that in May 1961 it asserted jurisdiction over a common carrier microwave serving a CATV system in Wyoming. The CATV representatives opposed this action of the FCC and appealed the decision to the Federal courts.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to continue for 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, in a landmark decision—*Carter Mountain Transmission Corp.* (32 FCC 459)—the Commission assertion of jurisdiction was sustained by the court—321 F. 2d 359 (C.A.D.C.) cert. den. 375 U.S. 951. The language of the court is quite interesting and very specific with reference to the FCC's responsibility.

Following the *Carter Mountain* decision, the Commission instituted further intensive studies and began accumulating additional data on the overall CATV situation. In April 1965 the Commission adopted rules governing the grant of microwave authorizations being used to relay television signals to CATV systems—first report and order, docket Nos. 14895 and 15233. In general, these rules require that any microwave-served CATV system, upon request, carry the signals of local stations and refrain from duplicating their programs from 15 days before and after the local broadcast.

On the same date in April 1965, the Commission also instituted a further CATV rulemaking proceeding, divided into two parts, which is presently in progress—notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rulemaking, docket No. 15971. Part I of this proceeding proposed to finalize the Commission's initial conclusion that it had and should also exercise jurisdiction over the CATV systems not

served by microwaves and, pursuant thereto, to extend to them the same requirements now governing the microwave-served systems. In part II of the proceeding, the Commission initiated an inquiry looking toward possible rulemaking on broader questions posed by the trend of CATV development. These included the effects on independent UHF stations in major markets of CATV entry into those markets; possible limitations on the long-distance extension of stations' signals by CATV and on CATV program origination, together with several other matters related to CATV impact on our broadcast system. Part II also included a notice of proposed rulemaking under which rules or other measures, interim or final, might be taken to deal effectively with some of the more pressing problem areas.

Interested parties have, of course, been provided an opportunity to submit counterproposals, comments, and replies on the matters raised by the Commission's proposals and inquiry. All such filings have not been completed.

Final action was taken by the Commission on Tuesday, February 15, 1966—which was yesterday—in which they announced plans for the regulation of all CATV systems. A copy of the Commission's report has been made available to me, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in full at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### FCC ANNOUNCES PLAN FOR REGULATION OF ALL CATV SYSTEMS

Following meetings held February 10, 11, and 14, the Commission has reached agreement on a broad plan for the regulation of community antenna television systems, including a legislative program. To insure the effective integration of CATV with a fully developed television service, the new regulations will apply equally to all CATV systems, including those which require microwave licenses, and those which receive their signal off the air. Excluded from these rules will be those CATV systems which serve less than 50 customers, or which serve only as an apartment house master antenna. The CATV rules concurrently in effect for microwave-fed systems will be revised to reflect the new rules adopted for all systems.

Coupled with the new CATV rules, to be incorporated in a Report and Order shortly to be issued, the Commission will send recommended legislation to Congress to codify and supplement its regulatory program in this important area.

The Commission's new CATV program includes eight major points:

1. Carriage of local stations: A CATV system will be required to carry without material degradation the signals of all local television stations within whose Grade B contours the CATV system is located. The carriage requirements thus made applicable to all CATV systems will be substantially the same as those applied to microwave-served systems by the Commission's first report and order in dockets Nos. 14895 and 15233, adopted in April, 1965.

2. Same day nonduplication: A CATV system will be required to avoid duplication of the programs of local television stations during the same day that such programs are broadcast by the local stations. This nonduplication protection, as under the existing rules, will apply to "prime-time" net-

work programs only if such programs are presented by the local station entirely within what is locally considered to be "prime-time." It will also give the CATV subscribers access to network programs on the same day that they are presented on the network. Nonduplication protection will not be afforded to programs which are carried in black and white by the local station and are available in color from a more distant station on the CATV system.

The new nonduplication rules thus embody two substantial changes from those adopted in the first report and order. First, the time period during which nonduplication protection must be afforded has been reduced from 15 days before and after local broadcast to the single day of local broadcast. Second, a new exemption from the nonduplication requirement has been added as to color programs not carried in color by local stations.

3. Private agreements and ad hoc procedures: The Commission will continue to give full effect to private agreements between CATV operators and local television stations which provide for a different type or degree of protection for the local station than do the Commission's rules. Moreover, the Commission will give ad hoc consideration to petitions from local television stations seeking a greater degree of protection than provided by the rules, or from CATV operators seeking a waiver of the rules.

4. Distant city signals—New CATV systems in the top 100 television markets: Parties who obtain State or local franchises to operate CATV systems in the 100 highest ranked television markets (according to American Research Bureau (ARB) net weekly circulation figures), which propose to extend the signals of television broadcast stations beyond their grade B contours, will be required to obtain FCC approval before CATV service to subscribers may be commenced. This aspect of the Commission's decision is effective immediately, and will be applicable to all CATV operation commenced after February 15, 1966.

An evidentiary hearing will be held as to all such requests for FCC approval, subject, of course, to the general waiver provisions of the Commission's rules. These hearings will be concerned primarily with (a) the potential effects of the proposed CATV operation on the full development of off-the-air television outlets (particularly UHF) for that market, and (b) the relationship, if any, of proposed CATV operations and the development of pay television in that market. The hearing requirement will apply to all CATV operations proposed to communities lying within the predicted grade A service contour of all existing television stations in that market.

Service presently being rendered to CATV subscribers will be unaffected. However, the Commission will entertain petitions objecting to the geographical extension to new areas of CATV systems already in operation in the top 100 television markets.

5. Distant city signals—New CATV systems in smaller television markets: The Commission's prior approval after an evidentiary hearing will not be required by rule for proposed CATV systems or operations in markets below 100 in the ARB rankings. However, the Commission will entertain, on an ad hoc basis, petitions from interested parties concerning the carriage of distant signals by CATV systems located in such smaller markets.

6. Information to be filed by CATV owners: Pursuant to its authority under Section 403 of the Communications Act, the Commission will, within an appropriate time be prescribed, require all CATV operations to submit the following data with respect to each of their CATV systems: (a) The names, addresses, and business interests of all officers, directors, and persons having substantial

ownership interests in each system; (b) the number of subscribers to each system; (c) the television stations carried on each system; and (d) the extent of any existing or proposed program origination by each CATV system.

7. Assertion of jurisdiction: To the extent necessary to carry out the regulatory program set forth above, the Commission asserts its present jurisdiction over all CATV systems, whether or not served by microwave relay.

8. Legislation to be recommended to Congress: The Commission will recommend, with specific proposals where appropriate, that Congress consider and enact legislation designed to express basic national policy in the CATV field. Such legislation would include those matters over which the Commission has exercised its jurisdiction, as well as those matters which are still under consideration.

Included in these recommendations will be the following:

(a) Clarification and confirmation of FCC jurisdiction over CATV systems generally, along with such specific provisions as are deemed appropriate.

(b) Prohibition of the origination of program or other material by a CATV system with such limitations or exceptions, if any, as are deemed appropriate.

(c) Consideration of whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances CATV systems should be required to obtain the consent of the originating broadcast station for the retransmission of the signal by the CATV system.

(d) Consideration of whether CATV systems should or should not be deemed public utilities. In this connection, Congress will be asked to consider the appropriate relationship of Federal to State-local jurisdiction in the CATV field, with particular reference to initial franchising, rate regulation, and extension of service.

The Commission, of course, stands ready to discuss all of the above matters with the appropriate congressional committees at any time.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT T. BARTLEY

I cannot agree that the Communications Act confers jurisdiction over CATV; however, I endorse legislation which would prohibit a CATV system from originating program matter.

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER KENNETH A. COX

I concur fully in those portions of the Commission's action in which it (1) asserts jurisdiction over all CATV operations, (2) requires carriage of local stations on CATV systems, (3) provides for expedited ad hoc procedures for the consideration of special relief requested either by broadcasters or CATV operators, (4) requires disclosure of information as to ownership of CATV systems and certain other matters, and (5) calls on Congress to give prompt consideration to the problem of integrating CATV operations into our overall television system, with particular attention to the questions of program origination by CATV systems, possible extension of the principle of rebroadcast consent, and overlapping jurisdiction with the States.

As to the balance of the action taken, I agree with what is done but believe it falls far short of protecting the public interest in an expanding television service. I agree that local stations should not have their programs duplicated, but believe that the protection afforded them is totally inadequate. As to network programs, they should be accorded exclusivity—that is, should not be duplicated—as to all programs which they propose to present in a comparable time

period within 15 days.<sup>1</sup> This Commission found in the first report that, for cogent reasons, delayed nonduplication served the public interest. (See pars. 101-127, 38 FCC at 721-731.) But the majority now cuts back on such delayed nonduplication to a single day. This 1-day protection is patently inadequate as to network programming (see first report, par. 125, 38 FCC at 730, where it is pointed out that only 10.2 percent of local stations' delayed broadcasts are delayed less than 1 day, with roughly 79 percent being delayed between 1 and 15 days). As to nonnetwork programs, the majority previously pointed out that such material was not distributed on a simultaneous nationwide basis and that, therefore, a 15-day protection was "clearly a minimal measure of protection against the duplication of syndicated or feature film programs, considering the extended periods—up to and exceeding 5 years—for which stations now bargain and obtain exclusivity in relation to such programs."

As to feature film, syndicated series, and other filmed or taped programming for which they have acquired local exhibition rights, they should be assured the right of first run—which is only one of the rights normally bargained for, but certainly the most important one. I realize that this is more protection than was proposed in this proceeding, but since I feel this would be necessary to assure the station of the most important of the program rights it has acquired as against prior exhibition by an entity which has acquired no rights at all, I certainly cannot agree with the majority's refusal to recognize any rights as to such programming. Some nonsimultaneous nonduplication is necessary to afford local stations sufficient flexibility to provide the best possible service to those viewers who do not subscribe to the cable service.

Similarly, I agree that some measures are needed to curb the indiscriminate extension of television signals by CATV systems. Section 303(h) of the Communications Act gives us clear authority to establish zones or areas of service for broadcast stations. In television, I think we have undertaken to do this by establishing a carefully designed channel allocation and by fixing maximum limits on heights and powers. While there are many situations in which deficiencies of service can and should be corrected by supplemental means such as CATV, satellites and transmitters, I do not believe that any of these auxiliary services should be permitted to disrupt the basic television system that Congress, the Commission and the broadcasters have worked so hard to establish.

The majority contents itself with saying that it will carefully examine proposals to provide CATV service in the top 100 television markets. I would greatly prefer an approach which would bar new systems—for a specified period—from extending a station's signal beyond its Grade B contour, except upon authorization by the Commission in certain carefully defined situations. I believe this is necessary to stem the current proliferation of CATV systems in areas already receiving substantial television service. Without such action, I am afraid that CATV—a supplemental and derivative service—will stunt the future growth of our free television system, and perhaps even impair the viability of some of the service which the public is now receiving.

It is all very well to study the problems posed by CATV's threatened invasion of the major markets. It is true that the most immediate hopes for expanded UHF service are centered there, and that the risk of CATV operators' building a pay television system

<sup>1</sup> I agree that as to network color programs the local station should not be protected unless it will present them in color.

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tunity for normal debate. But when we are living through the hours that Americans historically will be living through as this historic record is made I am not going to agree to have any limitation on debate whatsoever. Therefore, I announce now that if I am on the floor I shall object to any limitation of time on debate. I inform my leadership that I am opposed to any limitation of debate, and if I do not have assurance from the leadership that there will not be any limitation of time, I shall see that some Senator is present on the floor to make objection in my behalf.

**"VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CONGRESS AFTER HONOLULU"—A TELEVISION PROGRAM BY CBS TRULY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, last Sunday afternoon—February 13, 1966—the Columbia Broadcasting System, in continuation of its praiseworthy series of informing the American public about the issues involved in the undeclared war in Vietnam—a series ably directed by Eric Sevareid and Fred Friendly—presented an hour-long discussion of those issues.

I was honored to be invited to participate, along with my able and distinguished colleagues, Mr. Church, Mr. Javits, Mr. Symington, and Mr. Tower.

The discussion on the program—which was broadcast live—was spirited and, in the short time available, sought to bring forth all possible points of view.

The distinguished senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. Church] summed up the basic problem confronting this Nation when he said:

I am for getting a good policy that will deal more effectively with the phenomema of revolution. We are going to live in a generation of revolution throughout all of Latin America, Africa, Asia, for a long time to come.

I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of that television broadcast be printed in full at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the broadcast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE: CONGRESS AFTER HONOLULU**

(A broadcast over the CBS Television Network and the CBS Radio Network, Sunday, February 13, 1966)

Guests: Senators FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho; ERNEST GRUENING, Democrat, of Alaska; JACOB K. JAVITS, Republican, of New York; STUART SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri; JOHN G. TOWER, Republican, of Texas.

Moderator: Eric Sevareid.  
Producer: William J. Small.  
Director: Robert Camford.

ANNOUNCER. As part of its continuing coverage of the Vietnam conflict, CBS News presents "Vietnam Perspective: Congress After Honolulu."

Here to lead the discussion this afternoon is CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid.

Mr. SEVAREID. Good afternoon. Two weeks ago today five Members of the U.S. Congress sat at this table and debated the Vietnam war, its premises, its legality, its conduct, and its possible outcome.

The next day the President resumed the bombing of North Vietnam and took his plea for peace to the United Nations.

The fighting goes on as before. The talk about peace goes on, but no peace negotiations seem to be in prospect. And in the meantime the President has held a dramatic conference in Honolulu with the leaders of the Saigon Government.

How much of all this represents forward movement, either toward peace or prosecution of the war, and how much is just motion is rather hard to tell.

If anything anywhere has changed, it is the intensity of the domestic debate over Vietnam.

As broadcast viewers and listeners, as letterwriters, as demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, the American people are entering this argument more and more.

Let us try again today to put this complex and troubling combination war and peace effort into some focus.

Five more Senators of differing persuasions are with us this afternoon. Let me introduce them in alphabetical order.

FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, member of the Foreign Relations Committee which has been holding public hearings this week.

ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, of the Government Operations Committee, who has been opposed to this war from its beginning.

JACOB JAVITS, of New York, recently back from South Vietnam, for the Government Operations Committee.

STUART SYMINGTON, of Missouri, member of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees, and former Air Force Secretary.

JOHN TOWER, of Texas, member of the Armed Services Committee, also just returned from Vietnam.

Gentlemen, I think we might try first to deal for a little while with this Honolulu conference just over. I would like to know how you read its results and what you make of it. Senator Church.

Senator Church. Well, Eric, I think there are pros and cons. Only the future will tell.

On the debit side, the President has laid hands, so to speak, upon Air Marshal Ky and thus has invested him with the great prestige of the American presidency. This could prove a problem in the future if a need should develop for broadening the popular base of the Saigon regime.

On the credit side, I am glad of the emphasis that was given to the need for social and economic, political, reform in this situation in South Vietnam.

But I recall that—I think even in the first letter that President Eisenhower sent out that committed us to the initial assistance in 1954, there was mention of the need for reform, at that time relating to the Diem regime. And if I am not mistaken, Lyndon Johnson, when Vice President, went out there in 1961, again on a mission which gave emphasis to the need for reform and securing a broader popular base. And now Vice President HUMPHRIES is there for that same purpose. And obviously, this is a problem, a continuing problem, that we recognize, but a problem easier to define than to solve.

Finally, one caveat.

I think at Honolulu the statements of Air Marshal Ky and of our own Government indicate a definite split on the question of negotiation and on the question of the possible inclusion of the Vietcong.

If this split is as serious as it seems, that is a warning flag for the future.

Mr. SEVAREID. Any of the rest of you think it is serious?

Senator JAVITS. Well, a word on that Honolulu Conference.

It seemed to me that a number of things developed and a number of things did not develop.

For one, I think it showed to the liberals that the President means to follow the line, by espousing the social revolution in South Vietnam—the aspirations of the people for better health, better housing, better land tenure and all the things they fought for for so many years.

It is interesting to me that notwithstanding the fact that this should appeal to the liberals, and that the liberals should be for the limited struggle in Vietnam, because it is a struggle for freedom, the Honolulu conference showed up even more sharply the divisions within the President's own party and, interestingly enough, the real consensus on the Republican side, which is giving him all kinds of backing.

Just one other point which seems to me to be clear from Honolulu.

The central thing now stands out to be what are you going to do with the Vietcong if there is ever going to be a peace conference, and I do not think there is any question about the fact that they have to be a party, whether they are an independent party or a group or whatever you call them—they have to be a party. And the sooner that we state that unequivocally, I think, the more chance there will be to get to the negotiating table.

Finally, I think it is mature consensus on the part of the people, which was contributed to by the Senate hearings, that there is a way of limiting the South Vietnam conflict, and that is in the effort to consolidate and pacify the coastal areas and the Mekong Delta and area around Saigon where there are 70 to 80 percent of the people all within ready reach of air and naval power. And that I think is the ultimate thrust of the Gavin idea and the way in which a consensus can be developed on that.

Mr. SEVAREID. We may get back to the Gavin idea in just a moment.

I think Senator SYMINGTON wanted to talk about this conference.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. As Commander in Chief of this country, inasmuch as CINCPAC in Hawaii runs the Far East militarily, it seemed quite logical to me for the Commander in Chief, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to go out and talk with Admiral Sharp and General Waters and General Harris, and then at the same time to have General Westmoreland, who wears two hats, one toward Hawaii and the other to the Joint Chiefs here, to be in the discussion—and also to have Ambassador Lodge there to give his position with respect to it.

In addition to that, I think it was probably wise that he brought the head of the Government out there, Ky, because General Ky—because I was in Saigon last month and my impression was that if we were going to recognize the Vietcong separately, within a few hours that automatically meant the fall of the Government. Therefore, if General Ky felt that way, he was probably reassured by the attention that was given him.

Finally, I would like to join my colleague, Senator Church, in saying that I was very glad to note the emphasis that was paid in Hawaii to the economic and social developments that are at least as important as any other in this overall picture.

Mr. SEVAREID. Most of you so far seem to think there was not just a waste of effort. Senator Tower, do you have different ideas?

Senator Tower. No. I agree that this was not a wasted effort. I think it is altogether mete and proper that the President should go there and that he should meet with the Vietnamese heads of state. I think it is good that we should add a little prestige and stature to that Government, because apparently it is the most stable Government we have had there since the Diem regime.

I think, too, that it is good that we have placed emphasis on the civic action programs that we have already been engaged in over there.



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Actually the idea of assisting these people agriculturally, healthwise, assisting them with political and social reforms is not new. We have been doing this in Vietnam. Our servicemen, as well as fighting, have been on the constructive side, working with our USAM officials over there, in conducting these civic action programs, which I think are turning out to be a great success.

They are teaching these people the rudiments of sanitation, they are showing them how to get pure water supply, helping them combat disease, infection, showing them how to get the maximum utilization out of their land. And, more important, teaching them the art of self-government. The French failed to develop any native leadership over there. We are currently doing that now.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has been listening. Would you like to speak, sir?

Senator GRUENING. This Honolulu Conference was a big buildup for the Premier, Nguyen Ky, who is the ninth head of government since our first white-haired boy, Diem, was disposed of 2½ years ago. How useful he will be in bringing freedom to his people and having these reforms may be judged by his statement when he was interviewed by the London Mirror last July 4, when he said:

"People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one—Adolf Hitler. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam."

That is the man we have built up, he is the man whom we depend upon to bring about these reforms. I have no confidence these reforms will take place any more than they have taken place in the last 12 years when we said the same thing. Eisenhower tried to do the same thing. It is not going to happen—not with that man.

Mr. SEVAREID. That may be a question that would be pretty hard to answer, except over a course of time, I would think.

But let me ask you gentlemen this.

Do any of you find the same objection to that Conference that our ex-diplomat George Kennan had this week in testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee? He thought it wrong to have this public tieup with the Saigon government at the same time that we had taken this issue to the United Nations.

Does that bother anyone?

Senator CHURCH?

Senator TOWER. Well, I would disagree that the timing was bad. I think that the timing was very good, because I'm afraid that with our long peace offensive, with the long moratorium on bombing, that perhaps some people in Asia had gotten the impression that we had no real will or determination to prevail in southeast Asia, that we were trying to find some face-saving device to enable us to withdraw. And therefore I think that this Conference was very timely, to show our determination to stay in South Vietnam until we have achieved what the President said is our minimum objective, and that is the guarantee of the independence of South Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. Since you first turned that question to me, may I say a word or two about it.

I think that what was unfortunate was the statement that Air Marshal Ky himself made—I agree with Senator GRUENING.

I think there are grounds to wonder whether this man really represents the wave of the future in southeast Asia. And I think that when he said in Honolulu that he in effect was not much interested in negotiations, and that in any case there would be no negotiating with the Vietcong, that this did render our position more difficult for us at the United Nations. And I should think it renders the President's position more difficult. I thought that was one of the— one of the unfortunate consequences.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is a side to that also—and that is that the Premier Ky comes from the north country and there has been increasing irritation in the south, including Saigon, about the dominance of people in the north, which to some extent must have affected his control.

For example, I was told out there that there might be another coup—although Ambassador Lodge said—well, he was only supposed to last 6 weeks and he has now lasted over 6 months.

On the other hand, I think it is unfair to compare him to Hitler. We have had our own President and our own Foreign Relations Committee—recently there was some talk about Hitler—

Senator GRUENING. No one has compared him to Hitler. Ky said the one man he admired most was Hitler.

Senator SYMINGTON. Because if you take something out of context about the man—the truth is that he has come much further in his emphasis on the importance of land reform and on the importance of a new deal than anybody else who has been in charge of that Government so far. And I would rather take somebody who has been there a long time, like Cabot Lodge, or like the other people—I would rather take their word for the possibilities under him than I would people who would take a long-distance approach and have never discussed the matter with him, which I have done myself.

Senator JAVITS. Well, Senator, I do not think it is necessary for us to say we are all out for Ky. This statement that he made about Hitler is pretty rugged, very hard for anybody in the world to take.

I think the answer is that this is the Government for the time being, and we have got to work with him. And that should not inhibit our independent attitude toward the development of the country in economic and social terms.

I think for one that Honolulu was essential, because at the United Nations we said we want peace at almost any price. That is great. Now, if the other side won't negotiate for peace, Honolulu had to answer what do we do. Well, we are going to launch a new campaign on the social revolution front, with HUMPHREY as its coordinator. We need it sadly—a basic coordinator. And secondly, we are developing and putting forward a strategy which is viable for us until there are not just one, to wit, ourselves, but two to talk peace.

And so I think Honolulu was very needed and very constructive.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I don't want to go too far with the Honolulu Conference. Our time is running on, and there are some other things probably of more importance.

Now, one thing is this Foreign Relations Committee hearing this past week. They have dealt with the issues. But these hearings themselves have become something of an issue—whether they are injuring the morale of troops, or our negotiating position, or our fighting position.

How do you feel about this? How about you, Senator SYMINGTON? You have sat on them.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think these hearings are all right. The witnesses so far have been pretty critical of our current administrative program, just as you have illustrated, Eric, with respect to Mr. Kennan's thinking about the Commander in Chief going to Hawaii.

But, on the other hand, let's ventilate the subject, as Mr. DIRKSEN would say—and it is being done.

I would hope that people postpone their final opinions about it until they hear General Taylor on next Thursday and Secretary Rusk on Friday.

Mr. SEVAREID. Is there any man at this table who believes these hearings are harmful to the national interest?

Senator JAVITS. I think they are very good, Eric, and I will tell you why.

What you really ought to have is the President coming back to Congress for an updating of the resolution of August 1964, the dog-eared one he carries in his pocket and constantly refers to, which gives him power to use the Armed Forces of the United States, etc. That is completely outdated. And anything that leads to getting the President to do that—and I think these hearings are definitely a step in that direction—is good.

It is high time the whole country were crystallized behind what is the new policy, and the only way to do that is to get the backing of the Congress. And personally I think that is a very serious mistake the President is making, in not coming back to the Congress for a new resolution.

Mr. SEVAREID. In other words, you think the hearings are going to help him in the end, not damage his position.

Senator JAVITS. They will help the people's cause by crystallizing the Congress and the American people behind a policy which will be enough like his policy so that he ought to come and ask for that kind of support.

Mr. SEVAREID. I know you have a new resolution to crystallize it.

Senator GRUENING.

Senator GRUENING. I think these hearings are long overdue; they should have taken place years ago, when we engaged in what is called a commitment—although I am convinced there never was any such commitment—but if the administration thinks so, then that kind of commitment required a treaty from the Senate. And way back, when we made or alleged we were making that kind of a commitment, the President then or his successor should have gone to the Senate for the treaty-making power.

What right have we got to commit ourselves to defend the frontiers of another country and send our troops down there without the consent of the Senate formally sought and obtained? We have none.

Mr. SEVAREID. You are saying in effect the hearings have come about because of the manner we got into this war, that there would have to be such hearings at some point.

Senator GRUENING. Yes—that they are overdue.

Senator CHURCH. Eric, at that point let me say—I would like to emphasize the fact that the Foreign Relations Committee has a constitutional responsibility to advise and consent in the matter of foreign policy. And for years the committee has been tending to conduct its business more and more behind closed doors.

Now, when we came back to Congress this year, the gravity of the situation had become such in southeast Asia that we felt we had to come out from behind closed doors, and in the public, examine the premises that have led us into this situation, and take stock of the situation, and try to determine what is portended for the future. And this business is the business of the American people, and they should be included, and they have been through those hearings.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, now, gentlemen, the President said 2 days ago, as I recollect, that he had followed these hearings, or the testimony from them, and that he could not see that any concrete, clear alternative policies had been proposed at the hearings by people like General Gavin or Mr. George Kennan; the tone of their testimony appeared to be in opposition to what we are doing.

Did you discover, those of you who sat there, any concrete alternative that struck you as worth following?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, General Gavin's testimony was rather difficult to follow, because in the covering letter it said that he wanted—did not want to resume bombing in North Vietnam, and that he did want to withdraw to coastal enclaves. But then in direct testimony he denied that he felt that way about it. And also he denied that he was against the policies as advertised in an advertisement in the paper which said that he was against the President's policies.

So I think it is fair to say, and perhaps a little charitable to say, that his testimony was fuzzy as to just exactly what he stood for.

In the case of Mr. Kennan, I think that his position was more clear. He, in effect, as I gathered his testimony, wanted to strictly stick to a land war, if any war, in South Vietnam.

Mr. SEVAREID. To a land war.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, gentlemen, as I tried to follow those hearings, it seemed to me that both General Gavin and Mr. Kennan were talking about far more than just how the war should be conducted now—what the aims should be in Vietnam. They were looking at it in terms, as I gathered, of our whole world position. We have troops in Korea, in West Europe, and many places where things could happen. And that this was what one of them I think called possibly a baited trap. I suppose meaning that China might come in or that we would get overcommitted there in relation to our other commitments.

Do any of you have a feeling that Vietnam is sucking us into a position where we will be way off balance?

Senator GRUENING. Well, I think that there was no effort on the part of Mr. Kennan, whose testimony was most useful, to come up with a solution. He was relating it to the whole situation. He was not asked for a particular solution. And I think that some of us have ideas on the subject—but I think that would emerge from the findings of the committee.

I think at the end of the hearings they will probably come up with some recommendations. I hope so.

Senator JAVRS. Well, I would say, Eric, that I think the testimony of both Kennan and Gavin was extremely useful in crystallizing a position the administration has left very fuzzy.

For one, it is a fact that we do not want general mobilization for Vietnam, but we are willing to devote to it—and I think this is a national consensus—such resources as can be devoted without general mobilization. And that seems to be in the general order of magnitude of up to 400,000 troops, and all the other things we are doing there.

Now, what Gavin and Kennan said in effect—and you cannot hold them word for word—is there is a strategy of consolidating our hold on the coastal regions, the Mekong Delta, the Saigon area, engaging in a pacification program there, and in a sense making that our stand—just as when we withdrew from the Yalu into South Korea that became our stand.

Now, it seems to be a generally accepted proposition that even if the Communist Chinese come in—and you cannot tell when they will come in—that is in their control—even if they do come in, the long logistical lines which represent our stand on the coast around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta makes our position viable.

Therefore, what Gavin and Kennan, as I see it, were laying before the country in effect, was here is the way in which you can take a limited position, devoting to it the resources which you have available and reasonable without jeopardizing your situation in the rest of the world and without general mobilization and without a declaration of war, which I am against, and at the same time maintain a position in the confronta-

tion between ourselves and the Communist Chinese push in Asia.

As I see it, that is in effect what they recommended, and it seems to me that gave the lines of a perfectly viable position for the United States.

Mr. SEVAREID. It seems rather unusual for me that Senators would sit and try to thrash out alternative military strategies for this country, which is in a war.

Senator CHURCH. I don't think, Eric, that the purpose of this hearing is to come up with any miracle cures in Vietnam. I think it is generally recognized that what has been done there cannot be suddenly undone.

There are some omelets that are not digestible, but I don't know of any that can be unscrambled. And the President's options are narrowing.

Now, he is striving to find the rudiments for a satisfactory political settlement. He is striving to locate that diplomatic door which will lead to the negotiating table and he is striving to keep the war confined within manageable limits. And in all of these endeavors he certainly has my full-hearted support.

I think what the committee is looking to is to something both behind and beyond Vietnam. What kind of role are we assuming on the mainland of Asia and in the underdeveloped world that led us into Vietnam in the first place, and don't we have to take another careful look at these premises? Do we have the kind of policy that is well-designed to cope with the problem of guerrilla warfare, of wars of so-called national liberation in the ex-colonial part of the world? And is the best means the massive intervention of American troops imported from the opposite side of the world?

These are the things, I think, the long, searching questions, that we have got to grope with if we are going to fashion a policy in Asia that will work for the United States.

Mr. SEVAREID. While the Senate and others argue about overinvesting or not overinvesting resources, men, and money in that tip of Asia, the investment goes on, decisions by others.

Is this fruitful at all—Senator SYMINGTON?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, first, if I may, Eric, I would like to go back to the question of "fuzzy". I don't think the administration's position is fuzzy today. I think it is clear. I don't agree with all of it, but I think it is clear.

I explained why I thought that General Gavin's testimony was fuzzy.

Now let's take Ambassador Kennan's testimony.

Don't misunderstand me. I want to get into the big, broad problems that have just been discussed by my good colleague from Idaho.

But we have a problem. We are killing a great many American boys every week.

Ambassador Kennan—former Ambassador Kennan—said "I am opposed to strategic bombing."

I said "Well, will you define strategic bombing?"

He said, any bombing that hasn't got a direct relationship with troops.

Well, I said "For example, would you consider strategic bombing bombing a bus that was going down the Ho Chi Minh Trail full of ammunition and soldiers and guns?"

He said yes, it would be; therefore he would be opposed to it unless you were sure it was going to be used against our troops.

Now, there have been a great many figures used in executive sessions of the Armed Services Committee about the number of additional troops that would be required—from 600,000, I believe, John, to 500,000 and then 100,000 to 300,000.

And I asked him this question. "Would you agree to bomb military targets in North Vietnam," military targets, let me emphasize,

"if that would save 100,000 men, additional Americans, being needed and drafted out of their homes into South Vietnam."

And he said "Well, that is a serious question. I would have to study it."

Now, I think his testimony was fuzzy. I think—that, to me, is a fuzzy answer. And I would hope that at some time we would get a witness up there who would be clear as to just why it is we don't go after the military targets, and military only like power and petroleum, at the same time we know that they are coming down in such heavy quantities down the Ho Chi Minh trail and being used against the troops of the United States and the South Vietnamese in South Vietnam.

Senator CHURCH. Can I just say in that respect that I don't regard Ambassador Kennan as an authority when it comes to bombing, and certainly some of the questions you posed to him we would have no argument about. But I do regard him as an authority with respect to the overall strategy of dealing with the Communist world.

He was the architect of the successful containment policy in Europe, and his opinions are entitled to a lot of respect, and I think this was where on the diplomatic front, the strategic front, that he really made a very fine contribution, and what he said, in effect, was, let's not let the tail wag the dog, and invest so much resource in manpower, in treasure, in southeast Asia that we find ourselves at serious disadvantage elsewhere. And the President has just said that he is in agreement with that, that he does not—that he does not propose the kind of an accelerated war that might engage us in a massive confrontation in Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. But he brought it up, FRANK. I didn't bring it up. He said no more strategic bombing, so I asked him to define it.

Senator CHURCH. Well, he is a diplomat. He is not an airman and not a bomber, and I think it is in that phase of his testimony that he made a real contribution.

Mr. SEVAREID. Does Senator GRUENING wish to come in?

Senator GRUENING. I think that the questions that the former Secretary of the Air Force asked Mr. Kennan had to do with military details which were not in Mr. Kennan's field.

What he hoped to bring out was that this was a great error in view of our worldwide commitments, and I am hoping that this investigation before we get through with it will point out how completely false the premises are which justify our going in there.

I can demonstrate—there won't be time on this program—conclusively from the very documents which are used by the administration to prove why we are in Vietnam—this one (holding up the State Department's brochure entitled "Why Vietnam?")—that there was no commitment. President Eisenhower made no commitment to send in troops. He offered economic aid on a very tentative basis and we were not, as alleged, asked in there by a friendly government. We asked ourselves in. And Jack Kennedy never did anything more than send in advisers.

It is only under this administration that we sent troops into combat, and those are questions which I hope the Committee on Foreign Relations will bring out. I think the American public, which has been misled so long, is entitled to know these facts. And I hope in the subsequent hearings these facts will be thoroughly aired. It is about time the American people were let in on what has been going on without their knowledge.

Senator Tower. The fact remains that North Vietnam has intensified its effort in South Vietnam during the course of this administration, necessitating some reaction on our part. Had we not literally sent the

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airly to the rescue last summer, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese would have cut through the central highlands, cut their country in two. It would have probably overrun it by now.

Now, certainly it is true that Vietnam, South Vietnam, taken alone has no great geographic and strategic importance. But southeast Asia does. And this is where the front is. This is where Communist aggression is manifest. If we don't combat it here, aren't we going to encourage the precipitation of so-called wars of national liberation in other spots?

Senator JAVITS. Well, the whole idea is that you are encouraging the technique of wars of national liberation because you show an inability to deal with them, and you've got upsets right now in northern Thailand. You had it in northern India.

Senator TOWER. The point I was making.

Senator JAVITS. Exactly right, and you are going to face the situation in south and southeast Asia when you are facing it here, and you are getting prepared for.

I did want to say a word, Eric, about this bombardment thing, which I think is very—to my mind, has been a big obsession with lots of people.

The fact is that once you determine the size and character of your commitment in South Vietnam, and let's assume that the American people are getting to some consensus on that, then everything falls into place. If you are trying to do just so much and you have just so many people involved, then what bombardment you have to undertake, and I am not against the bombardment of the supply lines at all, relates to the size and character of your military decision as to exactly what you are going to commit.

But I do believe that what you are going to try to do, the purpose you are going to try to accomplish, and the means you are going to try to commit to it, this is a very important element of congressional as well as Presidential decision, and I feel very strongly that we should have our say in that, and I believe that it will come down to pretty much this philosophy of pacification of the areas which are within reach, 30 to 50 miles of the coast, Mekong Delta, the Saigon area, where there is 70 to 80 percent of the population, the necessary men to do that, and then everything that follows to protect that position en suite, including the extent of bombardment which is required for it, and we have to be prepared to face that as a total strategy, a total political decision with the military consequences which ensue.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I hate to interrupt at this point even for the 5 seconds necessary, but let us pause now for station identification.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, some very fundamental questions have been raised in the debate in the Senate and in the press recently and in some of the remarks of the President. In Honolulu he said something to the effect that subjugation by an armed minority in Asia is not different from the same phenomenon in Europe, that we have expended a lot of treasure and blood to reverse such things.

But from our position in the world, are these two things equal? Is Germany or France, for example, equal to this little country in southeast Asia? Senator Church?

SENATOR CHURCH. No, Eric. We have got to make better distinctions, I think, than that.

In the first place, we went back to Europe after the Second World War because we recognized that if all of Europe fell to the Russians and the Red Army in occupation of Eastern Europe was moving the Iron Curtain inexorably westward, that then the balance

of power would shift from our favor to theirs, and I think we must not confuse the situation in Europe with the problem that faces us in Asia.

In Europe, after all, we went back and were welcomed among people with whom we had a common civilization, common culture. The great majority of these people found communism as repugnant as we found it and willingly joined in a real system of collective defense against it, and that was the NATO line. But the NATO line just stopped the Iron Curtain from moving further west. It didn't exterminate communism behind the Iron Curtain.

And today in Europe we are not faced with the problem of guerrilla wars of national liberation simply because these countries with strong democratic traditions have cohesion and internal support.

But the situation is quite different in Asia, and I think our basic mistake has been to assume that policies which worked in Europe could be superimposed in Asia and would work there.

I think the facts betray that those policies designed for Europe are not suitable for Asia.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, you seem to be taking issue with really the most profound argument and premise behind the whole war as often expressed by Secretary Rusk. We are told again and again that if we do not stop this aggression in South Vietnam, we are going to have to meet it somewhere else in southeast Asia.

Senator GRUENING, is that necessarily true in your opinion?

Senator GRUENING. I want to dissent completely from the basic premise of our action down there, that we are repelling aggression.

The facts are that we are just as much, if not more, the aggressors. We came in to help the French with a military mission. We did not engage in combat because Congress would not stand for it. President Eisenhower could not get the support of other powers. But we were there with a military mission. We gave them a lot of supplies and a lot of training and we stayed on there, and then we continued to escalate.

We are in a foreign country. The Vietnamese are all Vietnamese, North and South. We are much more the aggressors than the others and their aggression, their infiltration, did not start until long after we had escalated our participation in violation of agreements which we approved unilaterally although we did not actually sign them.

I think this is the important issue and we will not have a suitable meeting at the peace table until we confess a certain amount of error on our part, and that is the basic issue.

Of course, we have got to negotiate with the people who are doing the fighting. This is a civil war.

President Kennedy said so. Just recently our colleague, Senator Young of Ohio, came back from there convinced that this is a civil war, that the overwhelming majority of the Vietcong are South Vietnamese fighting the tyrannical governments which we have supported down there. This is the basic issue, and we are not going to have a solution at the peace table unless we meet that question and confess a certain amount—

Mr. SEVAREID. Are you suggesting, Senator, that we go to a peace conference trying to settle this now rather big war and say that we should never have been in it in the first place? How can a great country do that?

Senator GRUENING. When individuals do it, confess errors, they are praised. Nations find it more difficult to do that, but we should do it.

De Gaulle did it in an analogous situation in Algeria. When he first came in he was never going to leave Algeria. Algeria was French. The French had been there for 130 years. But after a time he realized that it

was wiser for him to get out. He lost no prestige. He lost no face. He is stronger than ever.

We are losing face there every day. We would have far more face and we would save a great many American lives if we stopped right now and made a far greater effort to be made by admitting our errors and admitting that we are as much aggressors as the others.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to comment on what Senator Church said about Europe. I do not think today the way that the telescoping in time and space, that there is a big difference between Europe and Asia that so many people consider that are interested in this subject.

For example, today every country in effect is in the same county. I illustrate it in my State by presenting the fact that by time, militarily, by air, Red China is closer to St. Louis, Mo., than Kansas City is to St. Louis, Mo., by the fastest commercial jets, and therefore I completely agree with Dean Rusk when he says this is simply a question of whether we want to resist communism the world over.

We cannot pick, as I see it, the places that we want to resist.

As far as—incidentally, someone mentioned that I used to be the Air Force Secretary. It was a long time ago. I have been in the Senate 14 years. But I was mighty proud of it. My only point is that Socrates said "note se ata," know your terms. What is it we are talking about? And it begins to look to me as if some of the people who are so interested in what we are doing out there want to force us into a ground war only in Asia and not the utilization of our air power which I do not think we could ever win.

Now, finally, I have a little pin here which was given me at the political action team—my good friend from New York knows a great deal about—and which is the finest thing I saw in South Vietnam. The three T letters stands for victory, love, and sincerity, and I would hope that those who think that there is a predominance of Vietcong thinking in South Vietnam would go there. It is easy to talk long distance, and see and talk in the villages. There are 700,000 South Vietnamese fighting today on our side in South Vietnam and only 5 percent of them are conscripts, and in my opinion the very fact that thousands of these young men are being trained in this program prove that the South Vietnamese, if they were given a chance without terrorism and without a war that is dominated by the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, that they would elect a South Vietnamese government.

Senator JAVITS. There is one sure thing and that is when you—you have got to be convinced that the North Vietnamese are in this is an organized way, without question, throughout their units, et cetera, and I think that the question, with all respect to Senator Gruening, is begged by what he says and that the main question is the one you stated, the one Senator Church and Senator Symington have addressed themselves to, what is the importance of Asia to American and free world security?

And I think one thing we had better never forget, World War II, as far as we were concerned, was started from Asia by Japan. That is an Asian country and a mighty big one, and very important one, and World War II, through Japan, was the only time that we have ever been threatened in modern times in our own Nation, on our shores. California was in a state of alert at that time.

Now, what is threatened in Asia, as far as we are concerned, with its enormous preponderance of population, represents the overwhelming security problem of the free world for the very reason that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the most important alliance.

Why? Because that is the backing which the free world gives to the ideas for which we are fighting in South Vietnam. The support, the backing, the structure of the great industrial nations of the Atlantic basin is what makes the struggle for freedom in the world likely to succeed, but that struggle is now being fought at its central core which is Asia, the preponderant population mass in the whole world, the change of which over to Communist aggression would make the whole difference between security and freedom for the world and a condition of such jeopardy as to make our country almost immediately a garrison state.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, if there is a kind of relentless general tide of advancing communism or the threat of it in Asia, what do we make of such things as the complete turn-back of the Communists in Indonesia, which is the biggest country in that part of Asia? Must be assume that this is an irrevocable, remorseless, general advance?

Senator JAVITS. If I may answer that, Eric, it is an excellent question, but the very change in Indonesia is attributable to the fact that Indonesia for a long enough time was shielded from the tidelike power which flows from Communist China, and that is precisely, it is exactly that kind of a break-water that we are trying to erect in all of south and southeast Asia by strengthening in South Vietnam, in Thailand, in India, in Pakistan, and in Malaysia and in the Philippines and in Japan, what is the spirit which will hold on or hold back that onrushing tide.

Mind you, someday we will find a way to get along with the Communist Chinese. I am not for atomic war and I don't think it is inevitable at all, but at some point in the process you have to show steel. That is the only thing that will—that is an answer at this moment. That doesn't mean that it is a permanent answer, and I am not for it as a permanent answer.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH.

Senator CHURCH. Well, Eric, I think that this kind of discussion begs the point a great deal. Your original question had to do with the comparison of Europe with Asia.

Now, my good friends "STU" SYMINGTON says the world is much smaller. Of course it is. My good friend "JACK" JAVITS says that Asia is very important. Of course it is.

The problem that we face is whether the spread of communism which we would like to discourage in Asia represents the same kind of problem, and therefore can be dealt with with the same kind of policies that we used in Europe.

Now, in Europe communism was spread by the Russian sword. In Asia communism is being spread not by the same method but by revolution.

Now, unless we are prepared to say there is no distinction between revolution and the kind of westward movement of the Red Army in Europe, then we have got to recognize that this is a problem for which we must devise new policies.

I simply disagree completely with the proposition that by sending a tremendous western army into Vietnam that this somehow is going to bring an end to the problem of guerrilla wars. Why, we are there now with 200,000 troops. We have spent \$15 or \$20 billion. We will spend more before this war is—this year is over. Yet already we are being told that the war is spreading into Thailand right next to Vietnam.

That is not because we have pulled out. And your illustration was a very good one. The most effective work that is being done against the Communists is being done by the Indonesians themselves, not with our help but without it.

And talk about the tide moving inexorably southward from China, why, Burma dealt with a guerrilla war without any great western intervention, and that war was dealt

with by a country that has over 1,500 miles of common frontier with China.

Revolution must be dealt with differently and we need a policy that is better adapted to deal with it. And that is all that I am pleading for.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator TOWER.

Senator TOWER. I think it should be pointed out that there was an internal situation in Indonesia in which Sukarno played off the military against the Communist politicians. Ultimately, the Communists were a little bit precipitous in trying to hurry the process of takeover and the military reacted swiftly and have now gone about systematically exterminating Communists. And we have been treated to the spectacle of Subandrio having a soul-searching experience in an agonizing reappraisal. As far as—

Senator CHURCH. I am merely pointing out that they are doing this on their own and U Thant said that had we come in with a massive western force at the time Burma was dealing with her problem, we might very well have—

Senator TOWER. Well, Indonesia and Vietnam are not the same.

Senator CHURCH. Invested that government with the kind of front of puppetry that would have lost the support of its own people.

Senator TOWER. Indonesia and Vietnam are not the same.

Mr. SEVAREID. That is not a good—

Senator TOWER. The fact of the matter is that North Vietnam is actively engaged in armed aggression against South Vietnam. There are North Vietnamese troops concentrated in regimental strength in South Vietnam today.

Senator CHURCH. Nobody is arguing that.

Senator TOWER. Well, all right. When the aggressor nation moves in militarily against a non-Communist country, you cannot say, well, the way to solve this is not by the intrusion of troops. Let us go over there with specific action programs. Well, civic action programs are great, they are fine, if that is correct, but when the aggressor uses military power, then we must combat that military power. I remember a statement made by a great commentator who said, goodness without power is impotent and power itself is impotent without the willingness to use it, if necessary.

Senator CHURCH. Well, now, of course, JOHN, but you are pushing an open door here. No one is suggesting that we should use—that no power should be used against power. All that I am suggesting is—

Senator SYMINGTON. You compared—

Senator CHURCH. All that I am suggesting, "STU," if I may just finish—

Senator SYMINGTON. But let me just finish. Senator CHURCH. All I am suggesting is this.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am taking up for his side because you interrupted him. Now let me interrupt you.

I think that you felt that everything was the same in Asia and differently in Europe and used what had been done in Indonesia and Burma to show what could be done in North and South Vietnam.

What JOHN was doing, as I understood it, was to explain why he felt that Indonesia was totally different from anything in North and South Vietnam, and I think there is great merit.

Senator JAVITS. May we add one further fact, gentlemen. Every one of us who has been there knows that if we had not moved in as we did beginning in February of 1965, South Vietnam was finished—

Senator TOWER. Gone. Gone.

Senator JAVITS. Through, folded up and out of business.

Senator TOWER. Absolutely.

Senator JAVITS. That was not true in Burma.

Senator CHURCH. That is not true. I have

been there and that is not the argument at all. The argument is from the experience in Vietnam and looking around at other guerrilla wars, let us try and determine what will be best adapted to discouraging the spread of communism and recognize that revolutionary situations are different basically than the situations that faced—

Senator GRUENING. Indeed. Indeed.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator GRUENING has the floor.

Senator GRUENING. I would disagree with all my colleagues to the effect that Asia is so important that it justifies the kind of military and financial all-out action we have taken.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, you live very close to Asia.

Senator GRUENING. It has some importance, but if we kept out, I am convinced we would have had in Vietnam a reunited Vietnam which would have been independent of Peiping, an analogy to which is the situation in Yugoslavia where the United States invested \$2 billion in support of Communist Tito because he was independent of the Kremlin. That could be demonstrated if there were time. Ho Chi Minh had no use for the Chinese; the Vietnamese hate the Chinese. If we had just left the situation alone. But we were observed with our fears, with our mistaken beliefs that all communism was of the same kind.

Senator JAVITS. Well, the defect in that argument is that South Vietnamese people do not agree with Senator GRUENING. They did not want it—

Senator TOWER. That is right.

Senator JAVITS. And they fought against it.

Senator TOWER. That is right.

Senator JAVITS. And they are fighting against it to the tune of 700,000 right now, and that invalidates the thesis completely.

Senator TOWER. And too often the critics of administration policy say, well, we are not supporting a popularly based government in South Vietnam. How on earth can you determine what a popularly based government is?

Senator GRUENING. Well, why then did we have to take over a whole war?

Senator TOWER. Could you have a meaningful election in South Vietnam today?

Senator GRUENING. Why did we have to take over the whole war ourselves—

Senator TOWER. Of course you could not.

Senator GRUENING. If this was such a popular cause in South Vietnam?

Senator SYMINGTON. Because of the North Vietnam forces. The North sent in support.

Senator GRUENING. They only came in after we sent in American aid.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would go out there. I told you that. You would change a lot of your thoughts. I changed a lot of mine.

Mr. SEVAREID. I gather the thrust of a good bit of your talk a few minutes ago was to the effect that what we are really trying to do in a groping way is to get some kind of a balance of power in Asia comparable to the balance that was achieved and which has protected Europe these last 20 years.

Is this always going to have to require American armed presence? Should we have not taken a different policy with Japan, then? Should not Japan be armed if this is a problem? Japan at one end and India at the other?

Senator JAVITS. Well, isn't this really—we may ask a question of ourselves and of the people—a transitional phase in Asia?

Now, Europe is pretty well equipped to deal with its problems, whatever may be its unwillingness to venture outside of Europe. The fact is that the NATO alliance has held Europe together and now it is getting to be much more integrated, et cetera.

This is a nascent stage, a growing stage in Asia. India is getting a greater sense of

nationhood. The accord between Pakistan and India at Tashkent, indeed, the fact that Russia is emerging as a power itself, able to bring two parties together I think is a very significant aspect of world affairs. And I think that the United States is fitting into what is somewhat of a vacuum.

For a time and in this terribly tortured world where you are seeking to hold off an atomic war, a real big holocaust, it seems to me that that kind of interim action is essential on the part of the leader of the free world which is in the best position to do that, and one must admit it, has the will to do it, and indeed I am grateful that our country does have the will and still the pioneering spirit in which to see that far down the road so that it will itself assume a burden which must be assumed if no one else will.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to answer your point about India and Japan, if I may, to some extent.

India today is heavily armed by the Soviet Communists. They have the biggest air force by far in their part of the world.

So far as Japan is concerned, where recently I spent quite a lot of time, you have a treaty, and in that treaty the Japanese do not guarantee to protect us, but we guarantee to protect them. And they are very peaceful minded.

Of course, they don't like to see any fighting out there. Unfortunately they had a sad and tragic ending to World War II, but, on the other hand, if it wasn't for the guarantee that the United States has given them, that goes through 1970 or to 1970, I am sure that they would have a totally different approach to their own defenses.

I only mention this again because I think Europe, where incidentally we have heard talk of NATO—I don't think there is any greater enemy fundamentally to our future than France, which is perhaps the core of NATO, geographically, anyway. I think each and every one of these cases is different and what my apprehension is, listening to these witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee, is that they are too prone to continue a phase which perhaps could be best summed up in the words "spheres of influence."

I believe spheres of influence, the way the world is today, when you go around it in 90 minutes, is getting to be a rather obsolete term.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we haven't talked much about the prospects and possibilities of peace. There has been no hard signals from Hanoi so far as anyone knows in the direction of peace negotiations.

Is there any of you at this table who think there is any chance that Hanoi is going to talk peace before there is some military change in the battlefield that makes her realize she can't win this war and will take very great losses?

Senator TOWER. I think that the only way Hanoi can be brought to the conference table with a reasonable attitude is for us to make the war so costly that they do not choose to pursue it any further. I think to reduce their will to wage an aggressive war against South Vietnam we must reduce their capacity to do it. We have tried it. We have tried desperately to bring them to the conference table. We have sent our peace mission all over the world and they have rebuffed us. So apparently force is the only thing that they understand, because they have not yet I think been convinced of the determination of the United States to stay and defend non-Communist governments against Communist encroachment.

I think one thing that we in the United States had better resign ourselves to and understand; that is, because we are the most powerful nation in the free world, we are necessarily the free world's first line of defense, and it is incumbent on us from the

standpoint of maintaining our own security to maintain our defense perimeter as far from our own shores as possible, and as close to the enemy's as possible.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CHURCH, did you wish to come in?

Senator CHURCH. I just want to say I think we do ourselves an injustice by using terms that are really not accurate. We talk about the free world and the Communist world as though these were two great monolithic blocs. Neither are and most of the countries in the so-called free world aren't free and never have been free, and this is the reason in so much of Asia, in so much of Africa, where the people reth in poverty and suffer the yoke of ancient wrongs that revolutions are going to occur, and we have got to recognize that the Communists are going to try to take these revolutions over, and this is a different situation than faced us in Europe.

I was reading in the official statement of administration policy about the kind of military alliance system we have established in Europe, NATO, and then SEATO and CENTRO, around the rest of the Communist world, and the discussion of this alliance system is a great barrier to Communist penetration.

Well, Eric, if this is a barrier, then a sieve is a barrier to water and a plate glass window is a barrier to sunlight.

These alliances are not stopping the penetration of communism. We stand in Vietnam today practically alone and the only allies that we can honestly claim as military allies are South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, and all together they constitute less than 5 percent of the people of Asia.

Senator GRUENING. Who are on our payroll.

Senator CHURCH. Now, I must say we are deluding ourselves if we think this is the bulwark of a policy. It is evidenced that we lack a policy. I am for getting a good policy that will deal more effectively with the phenomena of revolution. We are going to live in a generation of revolution throughout all of Latin America, Africa, Asia, for a long time to come and we have yet to devise a policy that will deal effectively with the—

Senator JAVITS. Well, the basic ingredients—

Senator GRUENING. I could not disagree more with Senator TOWER. We tried bombing for 1 year and we have been totally ineffective. It has merely hardened resistance of the people, and one reason Hanoi is not interested is because our approaches, our alleged unconditional terms are very conditional. We have got to negotiate with the people who are doing the fighting. That is the first thing we have got to do. We are not doing it. If we were willing to negotiate with the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong, we would be realistic about it. Hanoi is not the villain in this thing. Hanoi came in late to infiltrate when the revolution, the civil war had already gone on for some time, and this is a reality that we have refused in our administration circles to face.

Senator TOWER. The Vietcong cannot wage war without Hanoi.

Mr. SEVAREID. We have about a minute and a half or so.

Senator GRUENING. They did.

Mr. SEVAREID. I wonder if any of you had time to form any opinions about Senator RIMICOFF's ideas published today, that we have a conference right away now in Geneva, invite the Vietcong representatives and offer a partial withdrawal of our troops if Hanoi will do the same. Is there merit in this?

Senator JAVITS. Well, I will tell you, the weakness of it is the very weakness of the things that Senator CHURCH and Senator GRUENING have been discussing. It is a unilateral effort to bring peace. We are going to sit down in Geneva and invite people to come

who then will not come which will set the effort back a lot further than it is now.

Senator TOWER. Further negotiation from weakness.

Senator JAVITS. I do not believe that escalation necessarily will do it. I think the maintenance of our position with integrity and viability on a unilateral basis, that is what we are doing in order to defend, pacify, reconstruct a viable area of South Vietnam is our best position. Let us remember that the South Vietnamese, Vietcong, could flow back to the villages just like they left them and the North Vietnamese could go home, and you would not need a peace conference at all, and that is very likely to be the result.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you sit down with the Vietcong alone, then automatically you lose all the Government of South Vietnam.

Senator GRUENING. That would be no loss.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do you want to turn over to the Vietcong South Vietnam which you would be doing if you sat down with the Vietcong.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I want to thank all of you for coming on this rainy Sunday afternoon. Our time has about run out. I wish we could talk for another hour, and perhaps in the future we will have occasion to have all of you back again. It looks like a long war to come.

I suppose there is some danger in public debate about the validity in the conduct of a war in which thousands of Americans are already risking their lives. There is some danger of encouraging the enemy to hang on, perhaps, when he hears all this, danger I would think to the political careers of those who speak out before this is all over, people on either side of this argument, but there are many precedents in our history for questioning an American war even after it is underway. And this Lincoln's Birthday weekend is a good time perhaps to remember that.

On January 12 of 1848 a young Congressman, Abraham Lincoln, stood up in the House and he denounced the Mexican War as unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by President Polk, and that speech was described by many people and many papers in this country as unpatriotic, a great disservice to the fighting man. He had a thousand of them from his own district in that war. And he never got reelected to Congress. Well, if there are dangers over this—he became President—this present national debate on this war, I think maybe we have to remember that life in the free society is not supposed to be safe. It is supposed to be free, in the belief that only in this free conflict of ideas do you ultimately find the way to the final safety.

This is Eric Sevard in Washington. Good afternoon.

ANNOUNCER. This has been "Vietnam Perspective—Congress After Honolulu," part of CBS' News continuing coverage of the Vietnam conflict.

#### TONY SCHWAMM

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Tony Schwamm, postmaster of Anchorage, who only a few weeks ago was 1 of 14 postmasters in the United States visiting Washington to be given citations by Postmaster General Lawrence F. O'Brien for the able way in which they had carried out the President's natural beauty program by improving the appearance of their respective post offices and their surrounding grounds, died suddenly of a heart attack. His passing is a great loss not merely to the city of Anchorage but to all Alaska, throughout which he was widely known and loved.

Only weeks ago, on January 18, after his award, I placed an item in the Con-



GRESSIONAL RECORD about him, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the extract was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**AN ALASKA POSTMASTER IS HONORED—CITATION OF MERIT IS CONFERRED ON "TONY" SCHWAMM OF ANCHORAGE**

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I am happy to record that of the 14 postmasters in the Nation who are being honored this week with a citation of merit by Postmaster General O'Brien, one is from Alaska. He is George S. "Tony" Schwamm, the competent postmaster of Alaska's largest city, Anchorage.

The citation of merit is awarded because of the able way in which Postmaster Schwamm has carried out the President's natural beauty program by improving the appearance of the various post offices in his jurisdiction and their surrounding grounds.

Postmaster Schwamm is an outstanding Alaskan, a former World War II pilot who thereafter served with great ability as the head of the territory's department of aeronautics. In that capacity he started a most effective airport construction program and built airfields which are still in use and have stood up under the wear and tear of service. He then became the manager of the International Airport at Anchorage, which, under his direction, became the air crossways of the Northern Hemisphere. It links the three great continents of that hemisphere. "Tony" Schwamm's dynamic leadership contributed substantially to this airport development. Today, the passengers from Europe and Asia have the opportunity to stop off at Anchorage and enjoy the outstanding scenic beauties of the last frontier.

It is a pleasure to salute "Tony" Schwamm for his outstanding performance in every position that he has occupied and to congratulate Postmaster General Larry O'Brien for making this award.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, what was so essentially true of Tony Schwamm was that he was a live, kindly, alert, dynamic individual, who performed every task that he undertook with great zest and competence.

In addition to his various personal undertakings, he was unofficially an Anchorage greeter, an assignment derived not merely from his innate outgoing nature but from the fact that for many years before his postmastership he was the manager of the International Airport at Anchorage, to which an ever-increasing number of visitors from abroad came. Tony had seen the beginnings of their influx. He took a personal interest in them. It was his delight to welcome the arrivals from the Scandinavian countries, from France, Japan, Germany and other countries, and to transmit to them the spirit of friendliness and warm hospitality which is characteristic of Alaskans, and which Tony embodied to a superlative degree.

A World War II aviator who was retired because of damage from lead poisoning received while in the service, it might truly be said of him that he was outstanding and dedicated both in war and in peace.

In his relatively short term of service as postmaster, he did a superlative job in distributing the vast volume of mail to a rapidly growing community.

He will be sorely missed, but the memory of his sterling character and his outstanding contributions will be remem-

bered and treasured as long as those who knew and loved him remain alive.

**MILWAUKEE MOTHER AND TEACHER TELLS HOWS CHILDREN NEED SCHOOL MILK**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I rise again to protest the administration's unrealistic and totally unacceptable cut-back in the special school milk program.

I have spoken out daily on this subject. Today I want to put into the RECORD the words of one who should know better than anyone else what this calamitous proposal means. This person, Mrs. Meyer Bloom of Milwaukee, is the mother of three children and a teacher of many more.

She says, in part:

I frequently have observed a marked change in attitude and responsiveness in a child after he or she has had the morning milk.

Are we going to permit the administration to eliminate this? I say we cannot afford it. Nothing is more vital than the health and education of our children, our most precious asset.

I ask unanimous consent to have Mrs. Bloom's letter printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: As a teacher and a mother of three growing (fast) children I have very little time to write notes to anyone—even the milkman—but I did want to write to support your actions regarding the special milk program for our school-children.

Your February 1966 report states probably the greatest truth regarding the situation—"You can't teach a hungry child." I have been teaching in one of Milwaukee's so-called core schools and frequently have observed a marked change in attitude and responsiveness in a child after he or she has had the morning milk. So very many of these children come to school without breakfast (among other things, including adequate sleep, etc.). I have always urged the parents I have come in contact with to send the 2 cents per half pint of milk for their child. Frequently this is the only milk children have each day.

Our school is now on a hot lunch program and the morning milk has been eliminated. It worries me to know that of the many children not purchasing the hot lunch, that is, those that bring sandwiches, a sizable proportion of them do not purchase milk. Is there some way we can work out this situation in the classroom or with the parents? Do you have any suggestions? I could provide you with statistics of our school's program alone if that would be of any help.

Most sincere best wishes in your efforts.

Mrs. MEYER BLOOM.

**TIMBER ALLOWABLE CUTS—II**

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on January 17 I discussed the subject of allowable cuts of timber in the national forests in Oregon and the effort some people were making to use a 5-year-old working paper to exploit the national forests.

The man who assisted in preparing this 5-year-old document was a Dr. William A. Duerr of Syracuse, N.Y. I sent my remarks to Dr. Duerr and received a letter from him dated January 26, 1966. I ask unanimous consent that this letter

be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SYRACUSE, N.Y.,  
January 26, 1966.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It was kind of you to write me on January 18 and to enclose a copy of your remarks on the floor of the Senate concerning the allowable cut of timber. And I appreciate the invitation you gave me to comment in confidence.

I am much relieved to have the record set straight, for over the years it had gotten pretty muddled. As you observed, I was being badly used. And yet I believed it best not to enter the squabble personally, lest I embarrass my associates. How fortunate for all of us that you came to our rescue.

As you know, the allowable-cut issue continues lively. My friends in the Bureau of Land Management tell me that Director Stoddard is determined to fight the recent insistent demands for an immediate upping of the cut in western Oregon. He proposes to make a basic study during 1966 of the whole policy and procedure for setting the cut, meanwhile sticking with the formula used in recent years. Such studies are essential to the public interest. The problem is technically difficult and cannot be resolved quickly. It would be a blow to Federal forestry if the Bureau were forced by local pressures to move prematurely.

Again, thanks to you, and kindest regards.  
Most sincerely,

WILLIAM A. DUERR.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it became quite obvious, after a careful reading of an October 27, 1965, letter sent to Dr. Duerr by a State senator from Oregon and Dr. Duerr's November 2, 1965, reply to the State senator, that those who were seeking to use Dr. Duerr in exploiting the allowable cut issue were not going to get any help in their efforts. Now Dr. Duerr himself observes that he was "being badly used."

In view of these developments I am pleased to insert in the RECORD Dr. Duerr's letter of January 26, 1966, addressed to me so that all interested individuals may have the benefit of his comments.

It is my desire to have this allowable timber cut issue placed out in the open where true conservationists—which include many in the timber industry—can see it in full focus.

As one who has labored as an educator, I should point out that another great principle is at stake here. It goes beyond the forest issue. It involves the right and the obligation of an educator to examine into a subject freely and fully and the right of a researcher to look at all possible alternatives and not be used because he dares to think. It includes the precious right to think new thoughts—the obligation to test new ideas—the responsibility to challenge the accepted policy. Above all, we must never abandon the right to bring the disciplines and knowledge of science, economics, and sociology to bear upon the problems that confront us—free from political harrassment.

For decisions on resource management to be sound, they must be based on facts. For decisions to be supportable, they must rest on logic. Any con-

I've had comes from junior officers and enlisted men. I have always made it a practice, therefore, to listen to anyone, no matter what his rank or rate.

A President I admire greatly was Teddy Roosevelt. He was a physical-fitness advocate. He was a man who understood the art of leadership. And he got things done. It may have been Teddy Roosevelt who coined that bit of philosophy I've long quoted: "If you need a helping hand, there it is—right on the end of your arm."

Young men sometimes ask me: "Is it still possible to achieve a full and satisfying career in the U.S. Navy?"

My answer goes something like this:

Contrary to the prophets of doom, there will always be a U.S. Navy—and opportunities abound for those who take advantage of them. In spite of substitute methods of transportation, we will for many years use the surface of the sea to carry the bulk of our trade and to defend our shores.

Fleets of the future may bear little resemblance to present-day ships. But I am convinced that there will be naval aviation in some form, aircraft carriers, submarines, and small, fast ships for escort duty. These are all battle-tested types and least vulnerable to nuclear bombs—if such weapons of mass destruction are used in the future.

To fulfill its mission, the Navy must have the finest, most dedicated officers and men it can attract. Being a part of the Navy is honorable, soul satisfying, and sufficiently remunerative to reward any active young man who loves his country and is willing to accept his responsibilities.

Last November 7, I remarked to my Marine Corps driver, "Today is a very special day for me because it was just 63 years ago that I entered the Naval Academy."

"Well, Admiral, do you think you'll make a career of it?" he quipped.

Yes, I think I shall. I'm still learning every day. I'm still trying to do my best (by Navy regulation a five-star admiral never retires). And I refuse to worry about things over which I have no control. If I had a chance to relive my life, I'd still follow Grandfather Nimitz' philosophy—even if it led to another court-martial for running the U.S.S. *Decatur* aground.

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—Reprinted through courtesy of Boy's Life magazine published by the Boy Scouts of America.) In speaking of the Boy Scouts, Admiral Nimitz stated:

"My boyhood occurred before Scouting came to the United States, but I have long been interested in its growth, development, and principles. If I were to sum up the qualities required of a good naval officer, I would be hard put to add anything to the qualities required of a good Scout.

Of the 2,500,000 men under my command at the height of the war in the Pacific, fewer than half were former Scouts. Yet this 40 percent won 60 percent out of all the medals awarded."

#### MAINE LEGISLATURE SUPPORTS U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleague from Maine [Mr. MUSKIE] and myself I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of the State of Maine in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

We, your memorialists, the House of Representatives and Senate of the State of Maine

in special session of the 102d legislative session assembled, most respectfully present and petition your honorable body as follows:

Whereas the United States of America stands committed to a policy of resisting the forces of Communist aggression which imperil the freedom and liberty of the people and nations of the free world; and

Whereas it is of vital importance that the forces of totalitarianism recognize that the United States of America, as a nation, will utilize every means at its disposal to honor such commitments; and

Whereas the present use of American military forces in Vietnam manifests the determination of the United States of America to implement this policy whenever and wherever the freedom of the nations of the free world are threatened; and

Whereas our military forces, in this great struggle, are proving a decisive factor in implementing American policy, not only in the defense of Vietnam against Communist aggression, but as a developing arsenal of strength which will provide the means of securing a final peace: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That we, your memorialists, urge that the Congress of the United States of America, in recognition of the sacrifices and heroism of our fighting men in Vietnam, extend the profound thanks of the Congress and the people of the United States to the military forces of this country in Vietnam for their valiant efforts; and be it further

*Resolved*, That a copy of this resolution, duly authenticated by the secretary of state, be transmitted by the secretary of state to the Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, and to the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress and to the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives from this State.

In senate chamber, read and adopted, sent down for concurrence, February 1, 1966.

EDWIN H. PERT,  
Secretary.

House of representatives, read and adopted, in concurrence, February 1, 1966.

JEROME G. PLANTE,  
Clerk.

#### CURTAILMENT OF REA LOAN PROGRAM WILL CAUSE FURTHER DEPRESSION OF RURAL AREAS

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, in his budget message last month the President proposed sharp curtailment in rural electrification loan funds. This cutback, if agreed to by Congress, will have a sharp effect in Montana.

Right now there is a large backlog of loan applications at the Rural Electrification Administration. This backlog, plus applications which will normally come in this year, amount to about three-quarters of a billion dollars.

Congress authorized the loan of about \$400 million to meet part of this demand.

However, the budget message proposed that about one-third of the amount Congress appropriated be impounded, its use withheld until next year. The administration proposes an REA loan program of about a quarter of a billion dollars next year, which is several hundred million dollars short of the need.

The 24 cooperatives in Montana will need about \$8 million during the next year and a half. If the budget cutbacks are accepted, several million dollars needed for expansion of rural electric service in Montana will have to be raised elsewhere, at a cost considerably above

the 2-percent rate on REA loans. This will mean higher rates for consumers on farms and in small towns.

I think that it is time for the Government to take a hard look at the ways it helps finance essential electric service.

The Government grants special powers and privileges to all suppliers of electricity, because electricity is essential and because it is most economically distributed on a monopoly basis.

A number of investor-owned utilities have received 2-percent REA loans on exactly the same terms granted the cooperatives. Any supplier who obtains one of those low-interest loans has to agree to serve the entire area, not just the lucrative, high-density areas.

Many power companies found they could make more money by serving selected, populous areas with conventional financing, than by serving an entire area with construction financed at only 2 percent. The investor-owned utilities take in about 15 times as much revenue per mile of line as the rural co-ops do. If the privately owned, consumer-managed rural cooperatives had that kind of density and revenue they could certainly finance their growth without any 2-percent loans.

Another point—there has been a big shift in financing of the major segment of the power industry—the investor-owned utilities—within recent years. A substantial proportion of the cost of their expansion has been shifted from the stockholders to the customers. About half of the IO U's—the investor-owned utilities—won't have to go to the marketplace for new money at all during the sixties.

In other words, these companies will pay zero percent interest on new construction capital.

The companies have already collected a lot of that capital, month after month, from the customers.

But the customers of the investor-owned utilities did not get any stock, or dividends. And they would not get their money back.

If the REA program is curtailed, either through increase in rates or inadequacy of service, needed employment opportunities cannot be developed in rural areas. It will be more difficult for us in Montana to keep our young people in these areas.

That is why I have told the President—and a number of other Senators, of both parties, have joined in the request—that the REA loan program must be restored.

Beyond its enormous value in the areas it serves it has a beneficial effect in cities served by investor-owned companies, because of the yardstick effect of competition. The program is especially useful in this regard in Montana, which is the only one of the States—except for Hawaii—without a single city-owned power system.

I believe the Congress will give the President better advice on REA matters than he received from his Budget Bureau.

## SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has submitted its seventh annual report to the President of the United States, the Vice President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Members will recall that this Commission was established by Congress in 1959, for the following basic purposes:

First. To bring together representatives of the Federal, State, and local governments, for consideration of common problems.

Second. To provide a forum for discussion of the administration of Federal grant programs.

Third. To give critical attention to the conditions and controls involved in the administration of Federal grant programs.

Fourth. To make available technical assistance to the executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government, in the review of proposed legislation, to determine its overall effect on the Federal system.

Fifth. To encourage discussion and study at an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation.

Sixth. To recommend, within the framework of the Constitution, the most desirable allocation of governmental functions, responsibilities, and revenues among the several levels of government.

Seventh. To recommend methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws and administrative practices, to achieve a more orderly and less competitive fiscal relationship between the levels of government and to reduce the burden of compliance for taxpayers.

The Advisory Commission is composed of representatives of the public and of each level of government. The senior Senator from North Carolina [Mr. ERVIN], the senior Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], and I have served on the Commission since its establishment. On the House side, Representative FOUNTAIN, of North Carolina, chairman of the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, and the original sponsor of the bill creating the Commission, and Representative DWYER, of New Jersey, are also charter members. The other House Member is Representative KEOGH, of New York.

In addition to the six Members from Congress, the Commission has three from the executive branch: the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Other members include four Governors, four mayors, three State legislative leaders, and three elected county officials. The public is represented by three members, one of whom is the Commission's Chairman.

A year has elapsed since the submission of the Commission's sixth annual report, and it is appropriate that the Senate be apprised of the Commission's activities during the past 12 months.

Mr. Frank Bane, of Virginia, Chairman of the Commission, continues to skillfully guide the Commission, while Mr. William G. Colman, its executive director, provides able leadership in overseeing the activities of the 23-member professional and clerical staff.

During 1965, general meetings of the Commission were held in January, May, and October; and this year, in January. The following major reports requiring implementation were adopted during the course of the sessions:

First. "Relocation: Unequal Treatment of People and Businesses Displaced by Governments." This study explores the need to achieve consistency and equity in the treatment of those persons and businesses forced to relocate because of Federal and federally aided public improvement programs.

The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations acted swiftly to implement the Commission's findings. On April 1, 1965, I introduced S. 1681. Companion measures to S. 1681 were introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressmen FOUNTAIN—H.R. 7821, and DWYER—H.R. 7970. H.R. 10212, introduced by Congressman SICKLES, includes provisions similar to S. 1681. Hearings were held by the subcommittee on June 30, July 1, 13, and 14, 1965. Final action by the Senate is expected in the near future.

Second. "Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes." If our States are to remain viable partners in our Federal system, their fiscal position must be strengthened. This report looks at this problem and develops a number of useful recommendations, including a proposed Federal tax credit for State income tax payments.

Third. "Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs." This report investigates:

Who lives in the central cities and corresponding suburban rings of each metropolitan area? What are the fiscal resources in our central cities and suburbs? How do governmental expenditures differ among these jurisdictions? What changes, if any, should be made in Federal, State, and local policies regarding such social and economic disparities, and what specific legislative and administrative actions should be taken to implement these changes?

Current work projects on the Commission's agenda include:

First. State taxation of interstate commerce. This report considers policy issues raised in H.R. 11798—WILLIS, Democrat, of Louisiana, pertaining to State taxation of interstate commerce.

Second. Intergovernmental responsibility for building codes and regulations. The variety of building regulations and how greater uniformity can be achieved were considered at the January meeting of the Commission.

Third. Effect of tax and expenditure practices on location of industry and economic development. State laws designed to attract industry pose serious intergovernmental problems. This question is now being scrutinized by the Commission.

Fourth. Intergovernmental relations in the poverty program. The war against poverty is running into serious obstacles and is being attacked in some quarters. The Commission is exploring ways in which more effective cooperation among levels of government can be achieved in the administration of this program.

Fifth. The Advisory Commission has contracted with the Department of City Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to reassess Commission recommendations relating to urban areas and to measure their effectiveness as devices for relieving pressing metropolitan problems.

Sixth. In October, the Commission sponsored and chaired a meeting to consider the need for a full-fledged conference to discuss the question of urban research. The staff of the subcommittee participated in the conference.

Of more general concern to those interested in intergovernmental relations is the tracing by the Commission of significant intergovernmental events in 1965. Brief descriptions of the Voting Rights Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, a grant program for the improvement of State and local law enforcement are included. Two major fiscal problems, State taxation of interstate commerce and the treatment of income derived from securities of State and local governments, are also discussed.

The brief survey of State legislative reapportionment in 1965 will be of special interest to all Senators.

The Commission's report also highlights a number of significant developments at the State level, including increased State interest in urban problems, improvements in intergovernmental fiscal relations, new and higher State and local taxes, and greater concern with revising State constitutions. A number of recent examples of greater areawide cooperation in urban areas were cited.

The Commission's report takes note of other significant intergovernmental relations developments that took place at the Federal level in 1965. The creation of the Department of Urban Affairs brings into better focus Federal activities as they affect our cities. The passage by the Senate of S. 561, the proposed Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1965, also marks a real milestone in intergovernmental relations. S. 561 will help to better coordinate Federal efforts as they influence State and local affairs.

The continuing debate on the so-called Heller proposal suggests that the topic of intergovernmental finances will occupy much of our attention in the months to come.

The report takes special note of joint hearings held by the House and Senate Subcommittees on Intergovernmental Relations last May on the 5-year record of the Advisory Commission.

In transmitting the subcommittee's findings to the Senate Committee on Government Operations, I pointed out:

The hearings revealed that the Commission, in its 5 years of operation, has achieved a high level of competence and productivity in its continuing study of problems which

**MILITARY EXPENDITURES FOR VIETNAM ARE NOT SERIOUS CAUSE OF PRICE INCREASES**

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, for the past several weeks there has been a growing stream of reference by financial columnists and economic writers to inflationary factors in our economy. This is understandable inasmuch as prices have moved up somewhat more rapidly in 1965 than in the preceding years. After increasing at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent between 1960 and 1964, the gross national product deflator, which is the best general measure of inflationary pressures in our economy, rose by 1.8 percent in 1965. Significantly, the President's Council of Economic Advisers which testified before the Joint Economic Committee last Tuesday, predicts no greater rate of price increase in 1966 than in 1965.

Nevertheless, with the submission of the 1966 budget there has been renewed concern about inflationary pressures. In particular, repeated references are made to the Vietnam war as a major factor in rising demand and inflationary pressures. Many analysts and commentators have drawn a parallel between the Korean war experience which did involve substantial price inflation and the emerging situation in Vietnam.

A closer analysis shows that the comparison may be spurious. In the course of the current hearings, it has been brought out that military expenditures are a lower percentage of the gross national product than they were in the 1950's. For the current fiscal year, total outlays for the military functions of the Department of Defense amount to \$56.5 billion, which is approximately 7.7 percent of the gross national product. For 1967, the percentage is 7.9 percent, which includes \$10.3 billion for the Vietnam conflict.

In the 4-year period 1956 through 1959, when our role in Vietnam was purely an advisory one and, therefore, far more limited than the present, the relationship between defense and total gross national product averaged 8.85 percent—higher than the projection for the year ahead. The following table shows the percentage relationship between Department of Defense military functions and total gross national product for each fiscal year from 1939 through 1967. Naturally, the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 are estimated.

I ask unanimous consent that the table may be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Defense spending as percentage of gross national product, fiscal years 1939-67	Percent of GNP
1939	1.2
1940	1.6
1941	5.4
1942	16.8
1943	35.1
1944	37.4
1945	36.7
1946	20.7
1947	6.2

Defense spending as percentage of gross national product, fiscal years 1939-67—Con.

	Percent of GNP
1948	4.4
1949	4.4
1950	4.5
1951	6.4
1952	11.5
1953	12.1
1954	11.1
1955	9.4
1956	8.8
1957	8.9
1958	8.9
1959	8.8
1960	8.3
1961	8.5
1962	8.7
1963	8.5
1964	8.2
1965	7.1
1966 <sup>1</sup>	7.7
1967 <sup>1</sup>	7.8

<sup>1</sup> Estimates.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this percentage relationship ranged from a low of 1.2 percent in 1939 to a maximum of 37.4 at the height of World War II, and a postwar high of 12.1 percent in 1953 reflecting the Korean war.

Turning now to the expenditures for the Vietnam conflict, the sum of \$10.5 billion is identifiable in the 1967 budget as required for this purpose. This comes to 1½ percent of gross national product. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, the \$4.3 billion in cost of our Vietnam military struggle comes to about seven-tenths of 1 percent of gross national product. Obviously, even with the expansion in 1967, the Vietnam conflict accounts for only a tiny fraction of total demands on the economy, and it is highly misleading to attribute any serious inflationary pressures to these outlays. It is true that expanding military expenditures have a multiplier effect and tend to trigger off other investments and expenditures, but obviously it is unreasonable to exaggerate the effect of current outlays for Vietnam or to draw close economic parallels with the Korean war period.

The base of military expenditures was and is much greater now than in the Korean war period. To illustrate: Total national defense outlays in 1949 were \$13.3 billion and, in 1950, \$14.1 billion. From that very limited base, they jumped to \$33.6 billion in 1951, \$45.9 billion in 1952, \$48.7 billion in 1953, and \$41.3 billion in 1954. Thus, in the fiscal year 1951, military expenditures were doubled and, a year later, tripled as compared with the pre-Korean war level.

By contrast, our military expenditures have been running at a \$50-billion level ever since 1961. The Vietnam additions come to about 20 percent of base, as contrasted with the aforementioned doubling and tripling in the Korean war period. As a result, there should be none of the inflationary thrust that was caused by rapid acceleration in the early 1950's.

For the same reason, it is absurd to contend as our leftwing critics often do, that this Nation is dependent on military outlays to keep its vast economy going. There would be no serious problem at all in diverting any portion of military ex-

penditures to the needs of an expanding civilian society. The President has indicated, both in his state of the Union message and his annual Economic Report, that Great Society programs have been held back in order to meet our military requirements and, at the same time, avoid undue pressures on our economic output.

Mr. President, it is clear from the testimony taken by the Joint Economic Committee that the dynamic factors in our current expansion are consumer expenditures and domestic investment. Gross national product is estimated at \$722 billion for 1966—\$46.5 billion over the 1965 figure. Rising consumer expenditures are expected to make up 60 percent of this increase. In the case of business investment, the annual rate of spending by business for plant and equipment in the first half of 1966 will exceed the full year 1965 level by \$6 billion, and this rise is expected to continue in the second half of the year. The total of fixed investment, exclusive of residential, is expected to reach 10½ percent of gross national product.

In truth, we are maintaining a very rapid rate of expansion on all fronts and it is natural that some price pressures will be generated. At the same time, it is most important that we see these pressures in proper perspective.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point an article entitled "The 2-Percent War" written by J. A. Livingston.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**THE 2-PERCENT WAR**  
(By J. A. Livingston)

Question. What makes a war economy or why is Vietnam different?

Answer. Quantity.  
World War II never left any doubt. National defense purchases took two-fifths of the economic pie. The homefront served the war maw. Bacon, sugar, meat, coffee were rationed. Copper, steel, aluminum, and rubber were distributed by priority.

An entire system of controls—who gets what, when—was centralized in the War Production Board in Washington. Even manpower was allocated. Behind guns, butter was an also-ran.

The Korean war gave a less decisive answer. The economy had grown 16 percent bigger. So the Nation's manpower and equipment could handle a quantitatively greater war effort with less strain. And Korea was far smaller than World War II.

A month after it began, President Truman said: "This is not the time for business as usual \* \* \* or for complete economic mobilization."

At the peak, national defense took a 15-percent wedge out of the pie.

And Vietnam is even smaller. Quantitatively, it is dwarfed by World War II. And it differs from Korea in both size and impact.

Korea caught Americans—you, me, and General Motors—with our military plants down. Promptly after the surrender of Japan, this Nation demobilized. National defense was scanted in the lunge toward peace: "Bring the boys back home."

After President Truman ordered General MacArthur to the defense of South Korea, industry had to retool and the Military Establishment, then a mere skeleton, had to be beefed up. Prices rose, shortages developed.

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is now being copied in a dozen States. And from the assembly came a scheme to harness the intellectual horsepower of California's "think factories." Last spring the State hired four aerospace firms to find solutions to problems of crime and transportation that California will face in the year 2000.

A visitor to Sacramento is struck by legislators like Jerry Waldie, the trim, dark-haired, 40-year-old Democratic majority leader in the assembly. An intense man who cares deeply about the problems of mental retardation, he directed a year-long probe of the State's mental institutions, then pushed through sweeping reforms. Or consider Senator Tom Rees, a lanky, informal man who is perhaps the only lawmaker in the Nation with the intestinal courage needed to pour a jigger of gin into a glass of scotch whisky and then swallow the mixture without grimacing. REES, recently elevated to the U.S. Congress in a special election, is concerned about urban sprawl. "One third of all our downtown areas are made up of ugly parking lots," he says, and he grins as he tells a visitor about an informal group he has organized "to give awards to the people who do the most to screw up our natural environment."

The name of this group is Los Angeles Gruesome (LAG); he hopes it will spread to the Bay Area around San Francisco (BAG) and eventually to Sacramento itself (SAG).

Men like Waldie and Rees can wrestle with complex problems primarily because they have provided themselves with adequate tools. A legislator's basic salary is just \$6,000, but the State provides fringe benefits (among them: an automobile, oil- and telephone-company credit cards) which, in effect, double that amount. Furthermore, each legislator has a private office and at least one assistant—not only in Sacramento but also in his home district.

Even more significant is the amount of professional help lawmakers receive. Each the Assembly's 23 committees, for example, has a staff director and a secretary; some committees have a dozen employees. In addition, there is a "floating" central staff of men and women who can be loaned out as the need arises. To answer general questions, assemblymen call on a six-man reference bureau. To draft bills and get legal opinions, they rely on a legislative council of 20 attorneys. And when they want to examine such matters as the Governor's budget requests, they turn to a separate staff of 16 fiscal analysts.

"We have had to develop these tools," says Assembly Speaker Jesse M. Unruh, "so we wouldn't be conned all the time either by the executive branch or by the special-interest groups." Unruh himself has played a major role in that development. Once, asked why California had such a progressive legislature, he replied, "Me." It was hardly an overstatement.

Basically Unruh is a pragmatist. Over and over again, in a somber, bullfrog voice, he reiterates his favorite theme: A legislature cannot be the expressive arm of government until it is independent. And it cannot be independent until it is adequately paid, housed, and staffed. He suggests further that "State government could profit greatly by emulating the 'result' orientation of private enterprise." And he envisions a coming era of "a new politics that is not restricted by conventional wisdom or ideological rigidity. If we cannot generate thinking in State government," he adds, "then we cannot survive."

California is not the sole repository of political virtue in the United States, nor is its virtue uniform. Like other State governments, California's is ever threatened by human fallibility and often thwarted as it gropes toward a future of awesome complexity. Yet in its demonstrated willingness to

grapple with gut issues, the State can serve as a qualified example to its 49 sisters.

There are signs that the States—frightened by the specter of further Federal encroachment and mounting fiscal crisis and shaken by the rigors of reapportionment—are gaining vitality. Some States, for example, are experimenting with regional solutions to the urban problems that often spill across arbitrary boundary lines. Indiana and Illinois signed a compact on air pollution last year, and New York has joined with Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan to reverse the tide of pollution in Lake Erie. The 1965 Governors' conference adopted an interstate compact on education and set up a commission to make recommendations to the States. "We are coming to realize," says former North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, "that education is too large and too important a subject to be left to the haphazard chance of unconnected State and local efforts. It is also too complex to be left to a single guiding national hand."

To solve their pressing fiscal problems, the States have lately been exerting tremendous efforts. Indiana, for example, faced a money crisis 2 years ago. The State desperately needed \$200 million. Its level of services was abysmal. Its citizens were screaming about inadequate schools, high property taxes, and the inability of the legislature to rise above petty partisanship. Then the legislature bravely enacted a compromise tax plan. Republicans accepted a 2-percent income tax; Democrats a 2-percent sales tax. It was stipulated that poor families who paid sales taxes on such essentials as food could apply for refunds on the State's income tax.

All of this was highly unorthodox. For a while license plates blossomed with the unofficial legend, "Land of Taxes," and several legislators who voted for the plan were defeated in the 1964 elections. But the plan has worked. Over the past 24 months the State of Indiana has not only veered away from bankruptcy; it has also improved its services substantially.

In 31 States last year legislators mustered sufficient courage to increase existing taxes. Additional increases are expected this spring. There is, however, a practical and political ceiling on the amount of money the States can collect by themselves. Realizing this, most Governors and legislators have been pinning their hopes on Federal acceptance of a modified Heller plan.

Before Dr. Walter Heller resigned as Chairman of the President's Council on Economic Advisers, he proposed a plan whereby the Federal Government would return a fixed portion of income-tax funds to the States. The States could use this money in almost any way they saw fit. As Heller envisioned it, the plan would not only reduce a worrisome Federal surplus; it would also prompt the States to become more active partners in the federal system.

Organized labor howled. So did the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. If the States are handed gift packages from Washington, their argument ran, the States would simply lower taxes and forget about improving services. In addition, they claimed, the Heller plan would deflate the current pressure on the States to modernize their own archaic tax structures. President Johnson seemed impressed with such reasoning. And he seemed piqued, too, by what he considered to be a premature disclosure of the plan in the New York Times. So nothing was done about it.

Last October, New York's Senator JACOB JAVRS introduced a modified version of the plan in Congress. JAVRS' proposal would establish a trust fund of about \$2.5 billion. Eighty percent of this money would be distributed on the basis of population; the remaining 20 percent would be divided among the States with the lowest per capita in-

comes. The money could be used only for health, education, and welfare projects.

JAVRS, however, is a Republican; his party is in the minority. It is unlikely that the plan will win congressional approval this year. "But sooner or later the Federal Government is bound to adopt it," insists one Washington economist. "Similar schemes have already been tried successfully in Australia and Canada." The economist pauses, then grins. "If you like this idea," he says, "you better start calling it the Johnson plan."

In an effort to disentangle themselves from a web of outmoded restrictions, at least 25 States have established constitutional-revision commissions. Almost all these commissions are recommending that many previously elective positions be made appointive; that governors be given longer terms and greater powers; that archaic borrowing and taxing provisions be thrown on the junkpile. "Not since the Southern States reentered the Union after the Civil War," says Alfred Willoughby, executive director of the National Municipal League, "has there been such a widespread examination of State constitutions. And this is only the beginning."

As a further outgrowth of these revisions, the legislative structure is also being strengthened. The number of States holding annual sessions, for example, has risen sharply in the last decade. In Pennsylvania, Maryland, Montana and other States, lawmakers' salaries are being increased. "You won't get better legislators merely by paying more money," says one lifelong student of State government, "but you won't get better legislators unless you do."

Gradually most legislatures are beginning to realize the importance of sound research. Some are taking advantage of a legislative-intern program cosponsored by the Ford Foundation; others are strengthening existing staffs. And many legislatures are even paying attention to those old bugaboos—conflict of interest and control of lobbying. New York, for example, strengthened its code of ethics last session. And in Nebraska, where lobbying activities were likened recently to "a semaphore operation on the railroad," lawmakers approved a measure providing that lobbyists can be fined and thrown into jail for 6 months if convicted of contempt of the legislature.

Such improvements, of course, are commendable. Yet many observers wonder whether they're not too few in number and too late in coming. The trend of the times seems to be running against the States. As the Nation becomes increasingly mobile, State boundaries will become even less significant. As Federal programs proliferate, State programs will shrivel. As they expect less and less from State government, Americans will show even less interest in it. Citizen loyalties will focus instead on Washington, D.C. And if the States are deprived of these loyalties, they will cease to function as meaningful units of government.

"The States today," says Pennsylvania Representative K. LeRoy Irvis, "are under the same sort of evolutionary pressure that animals are under. If they don't shape up, they'll get eaten up."

Can the States, somehow, shape up? Can they recapture the loyalty of their constituents, retain their role as active partners in the Federal system and stem the tide of sweeping centralization?

The only way in which the States can erect a barrier against the extension of national power, a distinguished American once wrote, is for the States to strengthen their governments. \* \* \* "As this cannot be done by any change in the Federal Constitution \* \* \* it must be done by the States themselves."

The author was Thomas Jefferson.



Reluctantly, President Truman resorted to allocations of some materials and to price and wage controls. But he never exacted a no-strike pledge from labor. He couldn't repress inflation.

The psychological acceptance of war was never all pervasive. Business continued partially as usual. The United States had plenty of butter while producing guns and sending men overseas.

Nevertheless, Korea changed the American stance. It underlined that the "ramparts we watch" are worldwide and demand instant and permanent readiness. Thus the Vietnam effort has been pretty much ingested by a national defense establishment in being. At the same time the economic pie—the capacity to meet war demands—has grown.

Today, military purchases amount to less than 10 percent of the gross national product and the Vietnam share of that is about one-fifth. Thus, in relation to the total economy—the aggregate production of goods and services—Vietnam absorbs about 2 percent.

Yet this 2 percent is an add-on. It reinforces prosperity, creates jobs, drains off manpower into the armed services and, in general, crowds an economy not too rich in leeway.

Will it generate inflation?

Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler thinks not. "Vast quantities of new industrial capacity will be coming on stream," he says enlarging the capability of the country to cope with expanding demand.

That is why President Johnson puts off asking Congress for a major tax boost which would cut down purchasing power. He'd prefer self-imposed restraint by labor and management on wages and prices to curb inflation.

Why permit a very small war—a 2-percent war—to reshape the Great Society? Should a sore tail wag a huge dog?

#### RENT SUPPLEMENTS

Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, since Congress adjourned last fall, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has studied carefully all aspects of the rent supplement program and has developed plans for its administration.

This program marks an entirely new step in providing decent housing for poor people—at rents they can afford to pay. It is designed to enlist the support and energies of private enterprise—and, I might add, the program has been given enthusiastic support by builders, realtors, lenders, private nonprofit organizations, and other private groups.

Public housing and other housing programs have accomplished much to improve housing conditions in the United States. But there are still far too many poor families and elderly persons with low incomes who are living in substandard housing. This is the group the rent supplement program will serve.

Recently the Department of Housing and Urban Development released income limits for a number of cities which will govern eligibility for rent supplements. The Department has leaned over backward to comply with the wishes expressed by the Congress at the last session.

The income ceilings are the same as public housing admission ceilings in those communities having public housing authorities. In New York City, the rent supplement ceilings are lower than

public housing admission limits for families having five or more persons. In localities where there is no public housing, rent supplement income limits will be established at the same level which would have existed if there were a public housing program, based on available rental information and the income limits for public housing in a nearby community having comparable cost levels.

Similarly, rules have been formulated to limit assets, so that persons or families with savings or other assets of more than \$2,000 will be not be eligible for rent supplements, except in the case of the elderly, where \$5,000 will be permitted.

Mortgage limits and maximum rent limits will assure that rent supplement housing will be of modest design without luxury features. The objective will be to provide sound and sanitary housing suitable to the needs of low-income people.

I understand that many organizations and other potential sponsors have expressed interest to FHA in the form of letters and other data.

These represent a total of 424 projects and 69,750 dwelling units. Private limited dividend sponsors account for 53 percent of the proposed dwelling units, which underlines my earlier statement that the rent supplement program is enlisting private enterprise to help solve the housing problems of the poor.

These projects are widely scattered in practically every state, and I am sure as the program gets underway, every state will have its share of projects.

President Johnson described the rent supplement program as "the most crucial new instrument in our effort to improve the American city."

The widespread interest which has been expressed since the program was enacted into law last August, even though no funds have yet been appropriated, underlines the accuracy and significance of the President's statement.

#### THE DEATH OF DR. J. ELLIOTT SCARBOROUGH, JR.

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta, Ga., late last month, there died one of the great men of the medical profession, a man whose death will leave a void of massive proportions in the bridge of knowledge which will eventually lead to the conquest of cancer. Ironically, cancer is what killed R. J. Elliott Scarborough, Jr., who, at 59, was acknowledged as one of the Nation's outstanding specialists in that disease.

Mrs. Simpson and I have had a long and enduring friendship with Elliott Scarborough. Like hundreds of others throughout the Nation, we were shocked that he could be taken at so young an age by the disease that he had given his creative energy to conquer.

As the Atlanta Constitution expressed it so eloquently in an editorial February 1:

He was the one who gave back life to so many who were dying, or who walked gently as a father with those he could not save and, out of his unbounded strength, gave them composure.

No man's passing, in the medical profession of this State and region, will be more deeply mourned.

Mr. President, the death of Dr. Scarborough deprives the Nation of a great mind, a great conscience, and a great humanitarian. He was truly a national figure whose passing is felt in and out of the medical profession. I ask, Mr. President, that various obituaries and editorials pertaining to Dr. Scarborough be printed in the RECORD with my remarks.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1, 1966]  
DR. J. E. SCARBOROUGH DIES; LED FIGHT AGAINST CANCER

Dr. J. Elliott Scarborough, Jr., 59, one of the Nation's outstanding cancer specialists, died Monday afternoon in Emory University Hospital. He succumbed to the disease he spent a medical lifetime fighting.

Since coming here in 1937 to direct the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic, Dr. Scarborough had been a leader in developing Emory's Medical Center and in expanding Emory University Clinic, of which he became director in 1957.

He held a Rockefeller Clinic Fellowship at Memorial Hospital in New York where he was invited here to head up the tumor clinic being established in the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic, one of the first for diagnosis and treatment of cancer in this area. Under Dr. Scarborough's guidance it became nationally known.

He believed an expanding teaching program should be an integral part of the treatment of private patients at the clinic, and that the clinic could grow in service by acting as a training center for physicians. Scores of associates who once worked under Dr. Scarborough's direction are now practicing in many other areas.

His continuing interest and influence in the clinical handling of patients referred by other doctors helped in expanding his concept and philosophy to other areas of medicine.

In addition to his original assignment as director of the Robert Winship Clinic, Dr. Scarborough held teaching positions in the Emory Medical School, beginning as instructor in surgery in 1937 and rising to professor of surgery in 1957. In the same year he became director of Emory University Clinic and director of professional services in Emory University Hospital.

Dr. Scarborough did much to enable the general public to understand cancer, for he had the gift to speak in terms understandable to laymen.

In 1949 he was appointed to the National Advisory Cancer Council, the Government's top policymaking scientific group in cancer research. In 1955 he was named to the national board of directors of the American Cancer Society and reelected in 1959. He also served as a member of the cancer committee of the American College of Surgeons.

In 1956 Dr. Scarborough was chosen president of the James Ewing Society, composed of doctors prominent in treatment and research of cancer and other neoplastic diseases. In the same year he received the American Cancer Society's Award for Distinguished Service in Cancer Control. He had served as chairman of the executive committee of the Georgia Division since 1952.

In 1960 he was appointed a member of the Cancer Research Training Committee of the National Cancer Institute and served until 1964.

Dr. Scarborough was a diplomate of the American College of Surgeons, and the American Board of Surgery. In addition, he was a member of the American Medical Associa-

tion, the Medical Association of Georgia, and the Fulton County Medical Society.

Born July 26, 1906, in Mount Willing, Ala., he received his A.B. degree at the University of Alabama in 1926 and his M.D. degree at Harvard Medical School in 1932. He served a surgical internship at Roosevelt Hospital in New York, then continued his training at Memorial Hospital before coming here.

He was an elder in the First Presbyterian Church. He served as a director of the Great Southern Real Estate Trust.

He was a member of the Piedmont Driving Club, Capital City Club, and Kappa Alpha fraternity. Emory students recently chose him as an honorary member of ODK leadership fraternity.

Dr. and Mrs. Scarborough, the former Isabelle Wisell, of Middlebury, Vt., were married in 1935. They lived at 100 Westminster Drive NE. Their two daughters are Mrs. Nancy Cottraux, of Atlanta, and Mrs. Joseph H. Long, of Dallas, Tex. Their son, Elliott III, is a college student and another son, Evans H., attends Darlington in Rome. He is also survived by his mother, Mrs. Mattie Hinson Scarborough, and six grandchildren.

The family request that in lieu of flowers donations be made to the Robert Winship Memorial Clinic Patient Care Fund of Emory University.

[From the Atlanta Constitution, Feb. 1, 1966]

ELLIOTT SCARBOROUGH, M.D.

It does not seem quite possible that Dr. Elliott Scarborough is gone.

He was the one who gave back life to so many who were dying, or who walked gently as a father with those he could not save and, out of his unbounded strength, gave them composure.

No man's passing, in the medical profession of this State and region, will be more deeply mourned.

For his field was cancer, and all who came to him asked him for miracles. He headed the Emory University Cancer Clinic and its distinguished reputation in American medicine brought to him the highest professional esteem. Yet to the patient who entered his door—and his door was ever open—he was a warm friend, steady counselor, calming voice, and knowing hand. No suffering human being was too humble, no frightened person ever too weak, to be outside his understanding, his concern, and his ready help.

To those who studied under him, the hippocratic oath took deeper meaning from his example—"I will impart this art by precept, by lecture, and by every mode of teaching." And so did the oath take unforgettable meaning for those patients he treated—"Whatever house I enter, there will I go for the benefit of the sick."

He entered innumerable houses, where he will not be forgotten.

For Elliott Scarborough was more than a brilliant doctor who advanced the art of medicine.

He was a good man.

[From the Atlanta Journal, Feb. 1, 1966]

DR. SCARBOROUGH

In the death by cancer of Dr. J. Elliott Scarborough, Jr., Atlanta lost one of her first citizens. The world lost a man long in the forefront of the battle against cancer.

Dr. Scarborough was a national leader in cancer research and education. He was a pioneer in the field of diagnosis and treatment, and for many years was with Emory University Hospital and Medical School.

His work brought cures and comfort to many, but it was his fate to die of that which he fought.

He contributed greatly to the search into the causes of cancer and its cures, and this

is a search which some day will be successful.

The day of discovery will come. It will be a day of thanksgiving for the human race. It will be a day of thanks to Dr. Scarborough and those like him, who labored so long in humanity's behalf, and whose patient labors finally bore fruit.

#### THE COLD WAR GI BILL

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, the passage of the cold war GI bill of rights is a major public service to the Nation. The benefits to our servicemen, to our universities, to the Nation as a whole will be felt for many years.

For this achievement the primary credit must go to the senior Senator from Texas. The Senator from Texas has carried the burden of this fight for 7 years. Throughout that time he has sought to educate the Congress, the executive branch and the public on the need for this bill and the benefits to be expected from it. His wide knowledge of education, his perseverance, above all his dedication to justice for those who have guarded freedom's gate around the world—these things have been indispensable to the passage of this bill.

It has been a pleasure and a privilege to have worked with him on it during my short time in the Senate; it is an honor to vote with him for its passage.

#### THE BOXCAR SHORTAGE

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the boxcar shortage, originally just a seasonal matter, has become a yearlong problem of serious proportions. In recent weeks there have been an increasing number of alarming reports about this shortage.

On January 27 I joined with 17 other Senators in urging the Interstate Commerce Commission to take strong steps and to utilize to the fullest its existing authority to alleviate this shortage.

I would like to call our letter, and Chairman Bush's reply, to the attention of the Senate. I respectfully ask unanimous consent that the text of these letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE

OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER,

Washington, D.C., January 27, 1966.

JOHN W. BUSH,

Chairman, Interstate Commerce Commission,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In recent weeks, there has been an increased number of alarming reports about the shortage of boxcars. In years past, this situation has been limited generally to the harvest season. However, it has now become apparent that this is a year-round problem. Reports indicate that demands for boxcars are being met only 50 percent of the time. Several of the major railroads have only 60 to 65 percent of their own boxcars operating on their lines.

There are two distinct problems in this situation which call for immediate attention. First of all, the railroads are not replacing boxcars in kind as they are taken out of service. Also, there is too much delay in the expeditious return of boxcars to their own lines. In this latter instance, orders from

the Federal Government have been of little value because they are immediately tested in the courts, thus involving time-consuming delay.

In addition to these two difficulties, another situation has arisen which will complicate matters even more. The Commodity Credit Corporation has now ordered the relocation of some 85 million bushels of wheat and corn. This movement of grains from the farms to the elevators and to seaports will place heavy burdens on the railroads in the Middle West and West. This country's efforts to expand overseas shipment of agriculture commodities will continue to aggravate the situation.

We know that car service is but a small part of the activities under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but we want to stress the importance of this work and ask that each member of the Commission give the problem every consideration. Therefore, we suggest that a greater effort be made to facilitate utilization of existing boxcars. More car-service personnel are needed to work at railroad terminals in an effort to keep the cars moving. Reports reaching us indicate that these personnel are decreasing in number and that their efforts are being diverted into other areas at a time when their services are needed at the terminals.

We ask that the Commission initiate contacts with the individual railroads discussing the need for purchasing additional boxcars and other equipment for the hauling of grain. We recognize that the railroads are making many improvements in their equipment, but there does not appear to be a sufficient stress on the need for replacing and increasing the number of the common, ordinary variety of boxcar.

The boxcar shortage, originally a seasonal matter, now a 12-month problem, can easily develop into a traffic situation of monumental proportions. Movement of products by surface transportation to points of export is continually expanding. If we are to avoid the congestion now indicated, we will have to act now. In addition to S. 1098 and S. 2816, now being actively considered by the Congress, we feel the Commission must take some initiative and utilize to the fullest existing authority. This is of grave concern to our constituents and to us as their representatives. We demand prompt action, now.

With best wishes, we are,

Sincerely,

MIKE MANSFIELD, WARREN G. MAGNUSON,  
MAURINE NEUBERGER, GALE W. MCGEE,  
QUENTIN BURDICK, MILTON R. YOUNG,  
LEN B. JORDAN, WALTER F. MONDALE,  
GEORGE MURPHY, LEE METCALF, HENRY  
M. JACKSON, GEORGE MCGOVERN,  
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, MILWARD L. SIMPSON,  
KARL E. MUNDT, WAYNE MORSE,  
FRANK CHURCH, EUGENE J. MCCARTHY.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION,

Washington, D.C., February 4, 1966

HON. LEE METCALF,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR METCALF: I want to give you an in-depth reply to your recent letter reflecting your deep concern over the boxcar shortage, rather than a perfunctory "we're doing the best we can" type of reply. I have therefore had our director, Mr. Pfahler, and his staff combine the information they have available with a considerable amount of additional information the Association of American Railroads very helpfully assembled for us. This report to you is submitted in the form of two enclosures.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. BUSH,  
Chairman.

Enclosures.

standards to be established by the Secretary."

No section of this act received more exhaustive attention by the Committee on Public Works. After 4 days of hearings on the bill and 3 days in executive session, the committee reported an amended bill which required that the unzoned areas would be determined "in accordance with provisions established by the legislatures of the several States, which shall be consistent with the purposes of this section."

The last proviso of the amendment was accepted in committee on my motion, and I believe then, as I believe now, that it would have given the Secretary of Commerce quite adequate authority to implement the act.

As the committee report stated:

The committee has given long and deliberate consideration to this subsection. \* \* \* The basic postulate of this provision is that outdoor advertising is an integral part of the business and marketing function and an established segment of the national economy; as a legitimate business, it should therefore be allowed to operate where other industrial and commercial activities are conducted.

The report continued with the observation:

The committee notes the qualifying clause quoted above "which shall be consistent with the purpose of this section." The purpose of this act is to preserve and develop the recreational and esthetic values of the interstate and primary highway systems \* \* \*. The committee is of the opinion that subsections (b) and (c) provide the Secretary with adequate authority to enforce compliance with the purpose of the act.

However, the argument was later advanced by officials of the administration, shortly before S. 2084 was brought to the Senate floor, that in the process of closing off many areas heretofore occupied by outdoor advertising, the act would tend to enhance the value of the remaining sites in industrial and commercial areas. Therefore, in order to prevent consequent clutter in these areas, the administration requested an amendment which would authorize limited controls in commercial and industrial areas, whether zoned or unzoned.

On September 15, 1965, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate [Mr. RANDOLPH] proposed the first of the administration amendments addressed to this issue. As a substitute for the committee language, the amendment read as follows:

(e) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, signs, displays, and devices conforming to criteria determined by the States subject to concurrence by the Secretary concerning the lighting, size, number of signs, and such other requirements as may be appropriate, may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State law, or which are not zoned under authority of State law but are used for industrial or commercial activities, which unzoned areas are determined by the several States subject to the approval of the Secretary.

After rather lengthy debate and considerable opposition, the senior Senator from West Virginia requested unanimous

consent temporarily to withdraw the amendment, which act was later made a permanent withdrawal.

On the following day, September 16, the Senate floor manager received a copy of a letter from Secretary of Commerce, John T. Connor, to Representative JOHN C. KLUCZYNSKI, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Public Roads, explaining the purpose of the proposed amendment. The Secretary stated, in part:

In order to prevent an unchecked proliferation which not only results in a public eyesore but undoubtedly impedes the effectiveness of billboard advertising, reasonable standards pertaining to size, spacing, and number of billboards would be developed. \* \* \*

It is the intention of the administration that the regulations, insofar as they are consistent with the purposes of this act, shall be helpful to the advertising industry and that, for instance, standards of size which may be adopted would be insofar as possible consistent with standard size billboards in customary use.

Viewed in the context of the events at that time, Mr. President it is quite evident that the Senate had no intention of giving authority to the Secretary of Commerce to outlaw outdoor advertising in industrial and commercial areas, whether zoned or unzoned. In his letter to Representative KLUCZYNSKI, Secretary Connor made it equally evident that he desired no such authority and that the proposed amendment would not be so interpreted by him. With this understanding in mind, the manager of the bill in the Senate, the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH] introduced on September 16 a modified version of the amendment which he had withdrawn on the preceding day. The substitute amendment, which was passed by the Senate with a vote of 44 to 40, read as follows:

(e) In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective display of outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the purposes of this section, signs, displays and devices whose size, lighting and spacing is to be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary, may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or commercial under authority of State law, or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary: *Provided*, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to signs as defined in section 101(c)(2).

Mr. President, there are three significant differences between the amendment finally adopted by the Senate and the earlier one which was withdrawn. And each of these changes is important in terms of the congressional intent of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 with respect to the recently announced "guidelines." First, the declaration of purpose in the amendment acknowledged the legitimacy of outdoor advertising as a business enterprise in industrial and commercial areas. Second, it deleted the catchall phrase, "and such other requirements as may be appropriate," and limited control criteria to "size, lighting, and spacing." And, third, it required both the control criteria and the desig-

nation of unzoned areas to be "determined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary."

I would add that this subsection was further amended by the House of Representatives, in which action the Senate concurred, to provide that the criteria of size, lighting, and spacing would be consistent with customary use. In presenting the House bill to the Senate for final action, the senior Senator from West Virginia stated:

Any regulations or criteria with respect to size, spacing, and lighting of outdoor advertising signs should, insofar as possible, be consistent with customary use in the industry. Therefore, I cannot perceive any valid objection to this particular language in the House-approved bill.

Thus, Mr. President, it is apparent from this brief summary of the genesis of subsection (d) of title I of Public Law 89-285, that both bodies of the Congress were quite deliberate in their aim to acknowledge the right of outdoor advertising to operate in commercial or industrial areas. That is not to imply that the industry should operate free of any controls. But, as the Secretary of Commerce indicated, and as the Congress affirmed, the purpose of controls would be primarily to prevent undue proliferation of signs in commercial and industrial areas and to provide for any orderly development of the industry. This is a purpose supported by a majority of the Senate, including the Senator from West Virginia and myself.

I shall not comment on the specifics of the proposed guidelines for outdoor advertising. The senior Senator from West Virginia made sufficient observations on this point in his comments on February 4. However, it does seem to me that the proposals of the Department of Commerce are at variance with the legislative intent that I have summarized. For these reasons, the Secretary may wish to consider the advisability of issuing a clarifying statement before instituting the hearings in the several States.

#### A DISPATCH FROM VIETNAM PUBLISHED IN THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER

Mr. INOUE. The Honolulu Advertiser is perhaps the only metropolitan newspaper in the 50,000 to 100,000 circulation class with 2 full-time staff reporters covering the battlefronts in Vietnam—Bob Jones, chief of the Advertiser's Vietnam bureau, and Bob Krause.

Both of these men are frontline combat correspondents in the best Ernie Pyle tradition. On February 9, the U.S. military headquarters in Saigon reported that Bob Jones was wounded by mortar fragments during an operation against Vietcong forces. The 30-year-old reporter suffered wounds in one leg, his back, and both hands. S. Sgt. Robert S. Andrade, 33, of Waimanalo, Hawaii, the patrol leader, was killed in the same action, as were several other members of the patrol. Despite his wounds, Bob Jones was able to get off a final story to his newspaper. I respectfully request that his account be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**I WAS BLEEDING, HE WAS DEAD**  
(By Bob Jones)

**CU CHI, VIETNAM.**—The story wasn't suppose to end that way.

It was going to be a story of 2d Brigade men who lived while others were dying, or being shipped off to the hospital with the wounded.

The patrol was almost over, and I was writing the story in my mind. It was going to be in the form of a letter to Sgt. Boyd Andrade, of the Honolulu Police Department, and Lt. Sonny Andrade, of the Kailua Fire Department, and to Mrs. Robert S. Andrade, of Waimanalo, and her five kids.

"Army S. Sgt. Robert S. Andrade," the story was going in my mind, "looks to me like the kind of GI who has a sixth sense amid the confusion of battle to keep himself and his men alive."

Andrade, a former Iolani school football player, was a squad leader with C Company of the 1st Battalion, Wolfhounds. Between C and A Companies, there had been more than 50 casualties in 3 days of trying to flush the Vietcong out of a jungle enclave they call Taro Village.

I teamed up with Andrade's squad to do a profile piece on him.

He had the reputation of being one of the best in the business over here.

A few days earlier, three of his men had been hit by a grenade, but he rallied his squad and took the sniper bunker. Another of his men froze on the ground in fear, and Andrade had dragged the man 100 yards using an ammo sling wrapped around the man's arm.

"Sure, I get scared," he told me out there in the jungle, "but mostly when we are pinned down by snipers and can't see who's shooting at us."

I had taken about 15 pictures of him that day (Thursday) and he had pulled out his wallet and showed me pictures of his wife, and two of his kids under a Christmas tree in his two-story Waimanalo home.

Well, that's the way the story should have gone. As I said, the patrol was almost over. It was 2 p.m.

We were sitting waiting for the order to make the final push.

Andrade had just given me a can of fruit cocktail from his C-rations, and I was making notes on how his squad had been better than 90 percent of the units I have been with.

Then there was a dull but overpowering explosion. For a few seconds I lost my sight and hearing. But there was the familiar smell of powder choking out the rest of the air.

I was on the ground, and bleeding from the hand, back, and leg.

I crawled over to a young Army movie photographer from Fort Shafter, Hawaii. He was dead. His camera lay in the settling dirt.

Andrade, who had been sitting there with his knee touching mine, was on his back, and although I know nothing about medicine, I had the feeling there was nothing I could do for him.

If you have never heard the moans and the "Oh Gods" that come from the lips of the men who are dying, consider yourself lucky. You would never erase it from your mind.

There was a youngster who had both his legs blown off. Another lay with his body ripped open and moaned, "Oh, my God, I'm dying, I'm dying."

There weren't enough medics or bandages to go around.

A lieutenant who was the mortar forward observer came up and said it apparently was a short round from our own 2d Brigade that hit us. (The 25th Division public information office at Schofield yesterday said that

the lieutenant was wrong and that Sergeant Andrade was killed "by hostile small-arms fire." The PIO said that the round of mortar fire may have been American made, but that it definitely was fired by the Vietcong.)

They covered up four bodies with rubber ponchos there in the jungle. Those still alive crawled, or were dragged to a clearing.

A medical evacuation helicopter and armoured personnel carriers came in to get us out.

The doctors in Saigon said I took seven pieces of shrapnel in the back and legs, and one fragment had fractured a finger.

I consider myself the luckiest guy on earth.

Just before I went into the operating room, they told me Sergeant Andrade had died on his way to the hospital.

**PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOOD-FOR-FREEDOM PROGRAM**

**Mr. McGOVERN.** Mr. President, I believe that President Johnson's recent call for a 5-year war on world hunger can become the most important single initiative of his administration.

The President has previously challenged us to eradicate poverty in our own society. Now he calls upon Americans to join with the people of other countries to eradicate the most serious enemy of mankind—human hunger.

An excellent summary of the President's challenge was carried by the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association radio broadcast on Friday, February 11. M. W. Thatcher, general manager of GTA, has long been in the forefront of efforts to make greater use abroad of our agricultural abundance and know-how. Mr. Thatcher believes that the administration has "come up with the one thing that can lead the world along the shortest road to peace—food to feed the hungry."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the GTA broadcast referred to be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the broadcast was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**GTA DAILY RADIO ROUNDUP**

As you know by now, President Johnson has asked Congress to approve an American 5-year world war on hunger. Congress may give the President all that he asks—or more—or less.

This is clear: The United States of America will offer its open hand bearing bread to help the young nations and the troubled nations of the world conquer hunger. Long years of effort by dedicated national leaders in this country are bearing fruit. This is what Senator McGOVERN has sought and Vice President HUMPHREY and Senator MONDALE, just to name some of the originators and strongest advocates of food for peace. On the farm front your own M. W. Thatcher, general manager of GTA, is one of the great leaders of the policy of abundance for peace from the good earth. Food for freedom, a program begun by Mr. Thatcher in the fall of 1942, was the first of its kind.

And today Mr. Thatcher said: "This is a great program, a truly magnificent contribution to peace and prosperity. I know our farmers will answer the challenge to produce more food. I know that the President and Mr. HUMPHREY and our other top officials in Washington are troubled by many immense problems in the world today, but here they have come up with the one thing that can

lead the world along the shortest road to peace—food to feed the hungry."

Now, just what does the President's war on hunger program include?

First, he called for more food production by U.S. farmers—not all-out production, but a regulated increase. Already programs for 1966 have been adjusted to get more wheat, soybeans, rice, and malting barley.

Second, it looks like the Nation will finally get a stabilized food reserve.

Third, food aid will not be limited to merely surplus products. Commodity Credit Corporation would be authorized to buy what is needed in the open market.

Fourth, the nations that receive food aid would also be helped to increase their own food production. They will be aided and urged to help themselves.

Fifth, voluntary relief agencies, churches, and charities will continue to receive farm products for their programs.

The President said that he wants this Nation to return to production as many reserve acres as may be needed in the critical race between food and people, "but not to produce unwanted surpluses and not to supplant the efforts of other nations to develop their own agricultural economies."

Well, that's a short and fast summary of a big program, but it is the essence of what President Johnson recommended to Congress.

At the same time that President Johnson made his announcement, USDA made its move to get more soybean production. Farmers will be able this year to plant all of their feed grain base to soybeans if they so desire, but must maintain their conserving base and minimum diversion of 20 percent. For example, the corn farmer who signs up and elects to substitute soybeans for corn will still get the loan plus payment (30 cents a bushel) on projected corn yield on one-half of his base, even though he grows beans instead of corn.

These changes are coming almost too fast to keep up with, so once again sharpen your pencils, figure the best program for your farm, and be sure you check out with your county ASCS office.

**UPI REPORT SHOWS U.S. AID FAILS TO REACH MOST PEASANTS**

**Mr. PROXMIRE.** Mr. President last Thursday I spoke at length on the floor of the Senate in support of a stepped-up program of school and farm aid and land reform for South Vietnam.

I contended that the facts show eloquently that we are talking a good fight in this regard but that we are doing pathetically little. I also contended that if we are to win our way to peaceful negotiations that will permit an independent decision by the people of South Vietnam that we must do more—far more.

Recently Michael Malloy, writing from Saigon for the United Press International, documented the point I made last Thursday in an excellent article that appeared in the Milwaukee Journal. I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**U.S. AID FAILS TO REACH MOST PEASANTS IN VIETNAM**

(By Michael T. Malloy)

SAIGON, VIETNAM.—The American aid program to South Vietnam is the biggest and most expensive in the world. But there is little evidence to show that this has done

much to win the peasantry away from the Vietcong.

There is much to be proud of in the American efforts. And politicians from both America and South Vietnam have insisted for years that the war for the hearts and minds of the people is just as important as the war to kill Vietcong.

This was reaffirmed again in the Declaration of Honolulu, just adopted by President Johnson and the military rulers of South Vietnam.

But compared to the mountain of resources applied to killing the Vietcong, only a molehill of men and money goes into the silent war for the hearts and minds of the peasants.

#### THREE MILLION PIGS GROWING

And the resources of doctors, schoolrooms, and fatter pigs are barely enough to keep the Vietnamese standard of living from going backward under the pressures of an expanding war.

Carl Van Haeften, of Santa Cruz, Calif., is proud of the fact that about 3 million Yorkshire pigs are growing fat on Vietnamese farms, thanks to the aid mission's agriculture division, which he heads.

But the fat, new pigs cannot get to market over the mined roads and blasted bridges, so South Vietnam is importing shiploads of pigs for the first time in many years.

There is a sad repetition of these paradoxes in other fields.

Carl Winer, of Albion, N.Y., is proud of the schools he builds and the teachers he trains as the head of the aid mission's education division. But sometimes the war destroys as Winer builds.

The worst example was the year of 1963, when the aid mission built 1,320 classrooms and trained 1,260 teachers. The education ministry checked the next year and found it had fewer schools and teachers than it did in 1963.

The United States and its allies have sent teams of skilled surgeons into provinces where most of the peasants have never seen a doctor before. But surgeons like Dr. George Love, of Ogden, Utah, reports that up to 90 percent of their patients are victims of land mines, hand grenades, mortars, and bombs.

Dr. Lowe's experience is a miniature of the problem which faces the whole aid program. Most of its efforts must go to repairing the ravages of war, rather than improving the life of the people.

To begin with, the 627 American aid officials are overwhelmed by the presence of 197,000 American fighting men. The soldiers of the shooting war outnumber them by 300 to 1. Their artillery, bombs, and napalm join with Vietcong terrorists to make life miserable and dangerous in much of the countryside.

The military machine gobbles up so much money and manpower that most of the aid program is simply an attempt to catch up with inflation and food shortages brought on by the war effort.

#### BULK FOR IMPORTS

Out of \$326.6 million spent on economic aid in the last fiscal year, for instance, only \$103.8 million actually went to development programs like health and agriculture. The bulk of the money was used to import grain and goods to make up for war caused inflation and food shortages.

Military expenditures and demand for labor have created boom conditions in the cities. Prices have shot up more than 50 percent but wages have not kept pace. Urban unemployment has been wiped out and the imported goods make the city folk more prosperous than ever before. America sends cheap rice to keep food prices stable.

But three-quarters of South Vietnam's

people are peasants, and only a fraction of these peasants actually get any benefit out of the American aid program. All they see of their Government is its mailed fist: Bombs, artillery, napalm, and "search and destroy" campaigns.

The contrast between the suffering farmers and the booming cities is partly intentional. Although officials do not like to talk about it publicly, American strategy is presently intended to force the peasants to take sides or suffer the consequences.

"They can come to the Government or they can go join the Vietcong, but they can't remain neutral and indifferent," a high ranking American spokesman explained.

The Province of Long An, for instance, has 585 hamlets. American aid goes only to the 76 hamlets which are considered pacified and the rest of the countryside is written off as enemy territory. Police confiscate rice, salt, sugar, and medicine bound for these villages.

This kind of economic warfare is intended to keep food and supplies away from the Vietcong. But it also means that life is going from bad to worse for at least half of the population of South Vietnam.

The benefits of American aid go first to the city people, who have always been pro-government, and second to the secure villages, which have never been pro-Vietcong. The peasants in the insecure areas are untouched by the battle for their hearts and minds.

#### LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ROUTINE

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I wish to reemphasize my strong support for the Teacher Corps and urge speedy passage of the appropriation bill to finance it.

The local school boards of this Nation are now finishing up plans for the 1966-67 school year. They will complete their budgets—that is, allocate money for supplies, equipment, personnel—by early spring. By late spring the school boards will be taking the 1966-67 plans to their local citizens.

Unless the school districts know—on a district-by-district, person-by-person basis—just what the National Teacher Corps is all about, its purpose, its plans, its potentialities, and in fact where on earth to write for more information—there's little chance that local school districts will be asking for the teachers they so desperately need for the 1966-67 school opening.

Prompt action on this appropriation, therefore, is urgent.

#### INDUSTRIAL AIR POLLUTION

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, an outstanding example of the increasing attention which is being given to the problem of industrial air pollution control and abatement appeared in the October 1965 issue of Factory magazine. In a very thoughtful and most comprehensive article entitled "Industrial Air Pollution," Factory has examined four facets of the air pollution problem:

First. What is being done about it in terms of Federal, State, and local legislation and in terms of private initiative?

Second. What constitutes an industrial air pollutant, where it comes from, and what its harmful effects are?

Third. The various methods, processes,

and equipment which different industries have used to clean the air.

Fourth. How industry may choose the right air pollution control system and what it will cost.

In this study Factory reaches some interesting conclusions which seem well worth pondering. It recommends research to improve control equipment with an eye to lowering costs, to disposing of collected solids, and to developing useful byproducts. Factory also suggests tougher penalties for persistent violators of pollution codes, increased financial assistance for small plants, and practical local codes for small communities as well as for big cities.

Mr. President, I would like to commend the staff of Factory magazine for its constructive approach to educating industry about the problems of and solutions to industrial air pollution. I ask unanimous consent that the editorial which accompanies this fine article be inserted in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### CAN INDUSTRY AFFORD NOT TO BE A PUBLIC NUISANCE?

Smoke. Smell. Slop. Dust. Noise. Eyesores. This is the face that 6 out of 10 manufacturing plants show to the public. And the public is slowly building up to a big burn about it. Rightly so, we think. In this age of engineering advance, irritating or unsightly plant effluent seems technically inexcusable. Only an economic argument deserves the public ear. But industry in general hasn't been talking very persuasively.

All too often industry evades the issue. Typically, it has replied to public criticism with such banal and arrogant comments as: "That's a million-dollar smell," or "when that smoke clears up, you'll have a depression," or "if you don't like it, we'll take our payroll elsewhere." Official denials to the contrary, a plant knows when it is becoming a public nuisance. But it also knows that the cost of curtailment is, more often than not, downright prohibitive. And, regardless of what the plant might like to do, it simply can't afford to reform if others don't.

The high cost of nuisance abatement, like any other cost, is ultimately paid by the consumer. This is one fact that industry must hammer home. But in the meantime, such costs are siphoned off from a company's current profits. To expect a plant in one community to add significantly to its cost while other similar plants elsewhere do not, would create economic anarchy. On the other hand, widespread or impulsive legislation would knock many marginal companies out of the market entirely. The rich and wise companies would persevere. The poor and struggling plants would fall. This is another fact the public must be made aware of.

The ultimate solution to nuisance abatement, we believe, lies in four related measures:

1. Education of the public as to the price it must pay—directly or indirectly—for elimination of these industrial nuisances.

2. A national planning program jointly supported by industry and by Federal and State Governments.

3. Federal legislation based upon this planning and characterized by progressive intensification of restrictions.

4. Vigorous development by industry of less costly and more effective equipment for preventing or containing these nuisances.

L. R. BITTIE,  
Editor in Chief.



## PAINTINGS IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, recently the Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., in cooperation with the White House, produced a color film entitled "Paintings in the White House." This program which has been shown on some television stations throughout the country describes our Nation's history through the art now exhibited in the Executive Mansion. It is a movie which has received highly favorable comments for its artistic merit and is devoid of commercialism.

A copy of the film is being loaned to the Senate and I have made arrangements for two screenings, one at 12 noon and one at 1 p.m. on Friday, February 18, 1966, in the auditorium of the new Senate Office Building.

In behalf of the Committee on Rules and Administration, an invitation is extended to all Senators and their staffs and other Senate employees whose schedule permits to attend one of the scheduled showings of this beautiful film.

## MAUI NO KA OI

Mr. INOUE, Mr. President, residents of the island of Maui have a saying, "Maui No Ka Oi," which means Maui is the best, the best of all the lovely islands in the Hawaiian chain.

The mayor of Maui County, which also includes the islands of Lanai and Molokai, and two unpopulated islands, is Mr. Eddie Tam, one of Hawaii's greatest ambassadors of goodwill, 16 years mayor of Maui County and 22 years in public office. This record is unmatched in the State of Hawaii.

The Malayan Times recently published a story about Mayor Eddie Tam, a man who has carried Hawaii's message of aloha and goodwill to many nations. May I respectfully request that the article be printed in the RECORD?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## DYNAMIC EDDIE TAM GOVERNS FIVE HAWAIIAN ISLES

With his neck outstretched to see over the steering wheel of his limousine, Maui County's Chinese-American Mayor Eddie Tam drove up to his personal covered parking stall at the County Building, Wailuku, Maui, county seat of five Hawaiian islands.

He didn't so much as glance at the mynah birds chirping on the lawn, or the green-clad crags of the lowering West Maui mountains, as he walked from his car to his carpeted, air-conditioned office. It was Friday, and mauna was on his mind.

Two Fridays a month Mayor Tam calls to order the eight members of the Maui County Board of Supervisors. Three members are of Japanese ancestry, one Korean, one Puerto Rican, one Filipino, one Hawaiian-German, and one Puerto Rican-Caucasian.

Three of the county's islands are populated: Maui, the Valley Isle, 36,487; Molokai, the Friendly Isle, 5,825, and Lanai, the Pineapple Island, 3,037. Maui County occupies 1,159 square miles.

For more than 22 consecutive years "Friendly Eddie" has been in public office, 16 of them as mayor.

"I have learned and followed somewhat of a unique philosophy," Mayor Tam said.

"What a man does for himself dies with him; what a man does for his community lives forever."

## FARMER

The five-foot, five-inch, 152-pound mayor was born in November 25, 1899, at Makawao, Maui, the son of Tam Hong and Jeng Kiu, who emigrated to Maui in the late 1800's from Sam Chau village in China. Mayor Tam's father worked as a blacksmith, carpenter, and farmer in Makawao. His 96-year-old mother now lives in Kula Sanatorium, Maui.

Mayor Tam is the eldest of three children. His brother, William K. Tam, is assistant manager of a Honolulu branch of the First National Bank of Hawaii, and he has a sister.

He married Lily Hise Morimoto in Wailuku on December 31, 1948, shortly after being elected to his first 2-year term as mayor. On November 4, 1964, he was reelected to his ninth consecutive term.

Mayor Tam received his early education at Makawao and Wailuku elementary schools. Upon graduation from St. Anthony Boys' School, Wailuku, in 1916, the former Maui tennis champion began his career with the Baldwin Bank in Kahului, Maui. For 10 years he served in various capacities, as clerk, collector, bookkeeper, and secretary.

## RESTAURANT

Leaving the bank in 1927, Mayor Tam was employed as office manager, bookkeeper, and secretary to a Maui State senator. In addition, he was agent for a Honolulu brokerage firm. From 1945 to 1948 he operated a restaurant on Maui.

In 1942 he entered the political arena for the first time, and was elected to the board of supervisors as a Republican. He was reelected as a Democrat in 1944, and continued to serve on that body until elected mayor.

The mayor played a major role in establishing and expanding tourism as a major industry on Maui.

Three luxury hotels and the championship Kaanapali Golf Course, scene of the 1964 Canada Cup and International Golf matches now attract tourists. The hotels are liberally spaced to comply with a rigid master plan designed to preserve the esthetic beauty of the area.

The mayor of Maui was among those instrumental in attracting the Canada Cup matches to Maui.

## HARMONY

"It is only fitting that golfers from all parts of the world come to compete in friendship on Maui, where several races work and play together in harmony," Mayor Tam said.

Mayor Tam's enthusiasms draw attention wherever he goes. Wayne Tanaka, sports editor of the Maui News, described Mayor Tam on the golf course, the day before the Canada Cup tournament:

"'Friendly Eddie' Tam, who got the biggest applause at the 'meet the teams dinner,' drew as many raves as Palmer and Nicklaus on the course. You couldn't miss him in his red and yellow outfit. His back-lash swing and backhanded putting were as talked about as the booming drives of the 'big boys.'"

During the summer of 1964 the mayor was invited to represent the State of Hawaii at the annual Kelowna Regatta in British Columbia.

"We in Maui County have much to be proud of," Mayor Tam said. "We have the largest dormant volcano, the largest sugar plantation, the most and best beaches, and the only roadways in the world where you can drive from sea level to 10,000-foot elevation by traversing a distance of 40 miles.

"And that's not all," Mayor Tam continued. "We have the largest stand of eucalyptus trees in the Nation, the first capital of the Sandwich Islands, and the clearest astrophysical 'window' in the world at Science City atop Haleakala.

## "RANCHES

"But it doesn't end there. We have one of the finest golf courses in the world, the largest banyan tree in the Nation, probably the tallest hardwood tree. Haleakala National Park, one of the largest ranches and the principal base for the deep-sea drilling Project Mohole which will enhance our science industry.

"I may be prejudiced, but I think we have the most efficient county government in the United States, the most beautiful tropical valley in the world at Iao, the most ideal climate and variety of climate in the world, and the friendliest and most hospitable people in the world.

"But what we are more proud of than anything else is the ability of all our different races to work and live together in harmony. Here in Maui County, 'aloha' is more than just a word; it's a way of life."

## RESEARCH DIRECTOR FOR U.S. FOREST SERVICE RETIRES

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, retirement has caught up with one of our Nation's most able and dedicated public servants. After 38 years of devoted public service, Dr. V. L. Harper has left his position as Deputy Chief of the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture.

Dr. Harper began his career with the Forest Service in 1927 in the piney woods of north Florida. His personal interest and work on gum naval stores and on the growing and producing of southern pines is reflected in the improved economy of the southern pine country.

Dr. Harper has held a number of positions in the South, in the Northeast, and here in Washington, each increasingly complex and demanding. He served, with great distinction, as director of the Northern Forest Experiment Station at Upper Darby, Pa., during 1945-51.

Since 1951, Dr. Harper has been Deputy Chief in Charge of Research for the Forest Service. During his years in this post, until his recent retirement, many of us brushed shoulders with this fine scientist and gentleman. Dr. Harper always demonstrated rare foresight and vision in the programs he planned and developed. His testimony before Senate committees was always outstanding in its depth and clarity; his knowledge of technical details of the Nation's forestry problems, and the Forest Service proposals to solve these problems, was always remarkable, in my opinion. His honesty, sincerity, and integrity were above reproach.

The impact which this learned and devoted man has had upon our Nation and its natural resources has been very great. Naturally, I am most intimately acquainted with accomplishments of the Forest Service research program in my own State of West Virginia. Dr. Harper early saw the need—and brought it to the attention of the Congress—to find ways to improve our Appalachian mountain timber and water resources. He played a key role in developing a laboratory and assembling a team of top-notch scientists at Princeton, W. Va., to study these problems. He visualized the need for utilization and marketing research for our valuable mountain hardwoods, and diligently sought the will of the Congress in constructing the necessary

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sacrifice to responsible citizenship. It declined with surprising swiftness, but was enormously influential almost because it was so readily secularized. Its "secularizability," in fact, is an important clue to the movement's long-term civic significance. Knowing this, we can share the poignant historical observation of George W. Pierson: "Just as with the philosophy of the Greeks, or the laws laid down by the Romans, the moral attitudes of New England culture persist though the people who gave them birth have long since passed away."

The disappearance of classic Puritanism did not end its influence however. The great awakening of the 18th century kept alive some dimensions of the Puritan impulse. The revolutionary generation renovated and enlivened the old sense of the country's mission in a way that was by no means utterly secular (see the several devices on our national seal on any dollar bill). And the great evangelical revivals beginning after 1790 made the entire 19th century a time of evangelical resurgence in which Puritan and enlightened notions of the national purpose were blended. Throughout this process, moreover, the idea of civic responsibility as a Christian virtue was a corollary of the American's confidence in his country's political and religious destiny and his refusal as a practical matter to separate church and state. On this subject, too, Francis Grund offered a valuable observation:

"It is with the solemnities of religion that the Declaration of Independence is yet annually read to the people from the pulpit or that Americans celebrate the anniversaries of the most important events in their history. \* \* \* The Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political liberty; and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of the affection which they cherish for the institutions of their country. In other countries, where religion has become the instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of the liberal party to diminish its influence; but in America its promotion is essential to the Constitution."

Americans are not now faultless paragons of dutiful citizenship and responsible governance. Sober analysts, indeed, are speaking of a moral crisis. Violence and irresponsibility in our public life have shocked the world and scarred a generation of Americans. Yet the tradition as a whole has also been a beacon—even a marvel—to the world; and there is in it profound occasion for gratitude. A portion of this gratitude, moreover, is due to the Puritan's total view of man's state under God's rules, to his explicit concern for law, duty, public spirit, and the commonweal, and to the fact that he framed his counsels in such a way that their efficacy continued long after the movement's flourishing time. In the grounds for and the fruits of that concern lies the chief political legacy of Puritanism.

#### NEW TREND IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the noted columnist, Richard Wilson, has written a stimulating piece, entitled, "Chance for a New Era in Farm Policies," which appeared in the Sunday Washington Star, February 13, 1966.

Mr. Wilson points out that the mounting world food crisis and the response of the Johnson administration to that crisis will call for greater production by America's farmers. He quotes a distinguished constituent of mine, Mr. Robert

C. Liebenow, president of the Corn Industries Research Foundation and former president of the Chicago Board of Trade, who is calling for an increase of acreage in 1967 to meet the growing demands for U.S. food abroad. I have frequently consulted with Mr. Liebenow on farm policy and have found him to be a forward-looking, practical-minded thinker in this field.

I ask unanimous consent to insert Mr. Wilson's column at this point in the RECORD;

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CHANCE FOR A NEW ERA IN FARM POLICIES (By Richard Wilson)

President Johnson calls on Congress for an act of intelligent generosity in the new food-for-freedom program to avert in relatively small degree the world's growing hunger.

But it is more than that. The program unlocks the door for the release of American food producers from the restrictions they have hated, but accepted, for 30 years. This can be the beginning of the end of regimented agriculture.

The proof will be in how this beginning is handled. If the farm politicians insist on clinging to their security blankets with both pudgy fists there will be a small relaxation of farm controls without a truly constructive advance. We will then have more of the same—billions for worldwide food distribution with America's farmers still under Washington's thumb, and the whole thing costing more than ever.

But if the minds in Washington are big enough they will see in the world hunger problem the golden opportunity to serve the highest American interests while restoring freedom of action and choice to a large sector of the population. The continuance of the heavy Federal subsidy to American farmers, which by now runs far past the \$50 billion mark, will be harder and harder to justify.

What the President has done in essence is this: He has proposed expanding worldwide food distribution by about \$500 million on condition that countries receiving this food aid work out really effective programs of self-help. Then, foreseeing bigger demands, controls have been relaxed, and will be relaxed further on wheat production. In addition, the President wishes to create a permanent food reserve for emergencies and to be used in stabilizing prices. Several million acres previously taken out of production are in the process of being brought back in production of wheat, soybeans, and rice.

What the future holds in the biggest food commodity of all, corn, is yet to be seen. Corn, and other feed grains, make possible the huge meat supply which America and now the whole world, wishes to consume.

Several critical things can be said about this. The expansion of acreage isn't very great yet. Most of the Nation's farm acreage will still be subject to control. Calling surpluses a reserve is to use only another name. Money will still pour out in farm subsidies. The cotton surplus remains a huge unsolved problem, and there is yet too much corn.

But when all this is said it still can be seen that agriculture is entering a new era which should be welcomed with open arms. Some kind of light is beginning to appear at the end of the tunnel for that great heartland of America so rich in the American tradition. Small towns which have languished in the industrial age can take heart. Rural life, already a rich reward for the resourceful, can be better for all.

Robert C. Liebenow, president of the Corn Industries Research Foundation, Inc., with the help of a team of economists, is calling for an increase of 20 million acres of crops in 1967. He forecasts that it is entirely possible exports within a few years will increase by 50 percent.

In the North Central area of the Nation alone that might increase farmers cash receipts by \$2 billion and send a stream of fresh economic lifeblood through the Midwest which could revivify the elm-lined streets of many a delightful small town.

In the largest sense, food for freedom as now projected is only beginning. The world is racing at increasing speed into a food crisis. Half the world's population already suffers chronically from lack of food. The U.N. estimates that by 1975 food supplies will have to be increased by 35 percent merely to sustain the present level of a world half in hunger.

The Aswan Dam in Egypt aptly illustrated the problem. In the 10 years which will be taken to create the dam's irrigation canals and bring in 2 million additional acres of cropland, Egypt's population will have so increased to absorb more than the production of those 2 million acres. Egypt is not running fast enough to keep up with itself.

The plain fact, as President Johnson points out, is that even the American cornucopia cannot be made to overflow enough to meet the food needs of the developing nations.

So the challenge is here and now. The transition to the new stage from the older era of unmanageable surpluses will have to be managed carefully.

But it will be a welcome change from the old days of killing little pigs, and the gentle rain of Government checks. Congress now has an opportunity to act promptly, and even more imaginatively, on the President's initiative.

#### WAR ON TWO FRONTS

Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, President Johnson's trip to Hawaii gave new emphasis to the administration policy to hold the line against Communist aggression while at the same time building up the economic and social conditions of Vietnam.

Speaking of this policy, the Portland Oregonian in a recent editorial said that:

The President's statement that the United States is pledged not only to defend the freedom of South Vietnam but "to build a decent society" there will be carried out in specific programs of economic aid and in support of Premier Ky's civic action program.

The editorial adds that:

What can be done under war conditions will be done. But, of course, the imperative is to suppress the Vietcong by military action. When aggression is defeated, the main work of rehabilitation can begin.

There is much deep thought to an issue which concerns us all at this time, and because of its lucid analysis I ask that the editorial be included as a part of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

President Johnson's trip to Honolulu to confer with United States and South Vietnamese diplomats and generals from the frontlines gives new emphasis to administration policy.

That policy is to defeat Communist aggression in South Vietnam, to uphold the caretaker military government in Saigon until conditions permit popular elections, to throw U.S. resources into rebuilding and strengthening the economy of South Vietnam.

To accomplish these objectives, the decisions unquestionably have been made to step up the airstrikes against military targets in North Vietnam and to increase American military power in South Vietnam to at least 400,000 troops—double those now supporting South Vietnamese troops in the mounting attacks on Vietcong strongholds and North Vietnamese regiments.

The limited and responsible employment of American power is calculated to achieve the objectives without encouraging Red China or the Soviet Union to enter the war—as one or both might do should the American methods be changed to accomplish aerial destruction of North Vietnam's industries, cities and Red River Delta farmlands. At the same time, the bombing of North Vietnam's military targets establishes the policy of denying a sanctuary to the Communist aggressor, a warning to Red China, particularly, not to send in its troops as it did in Korea.

The 37-day suspension of U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam, while the President sought aggressively but fruitlessly for an indication from Hanoi of willingness to negotiate a ceasefire and peace terms, was a setback to what public confidence there may be in South Vietnam in its military government. The President's conference with Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky will enhance their prestige by affirming American confidence in them and unaltered intention to defend South Vietnam.

The President's statement that the United States is pledged not only to defend the freedom of South Vietnam but "to build a decent society" there will be carried out in specific programs of economic aid and in support of Premier Ky's civic action program. What can be done under war conditions will be done. But, of course, the imperative is to suppress the Vietcong by military action. When aggression is defeated, the main work of rehabilitation can begin.

#### ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay down the unfinished business from the previous day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unfinished business will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that

further proceedings under the quorum call may be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, last August, when the President announced a series of actions that had been decided upon in an attempt to help the people of South Vietnam preserve their privilege of self-determination, the Congress was asked to approve a supplemental appropriation of \$1.7 billion.

This appropriation was unanimously approved in the Senate, by a vote of 89 to 0. This action followed the earlier approval of the appropriation of \$700 million, which had been earmarked for this same purpose.

During the hearings on the \$1.7 billion appropriation, forthright testimony clearly indicated that the amount then sought was in the nature of a downpayment for the additional military steps then ordered and that when the total bill could be calculated the necessary authorizations and appropriations would be requested.

The rest of the check requested for this fiscal year is \$12,345,719,000.

The sum of \$3,417,700,000 of the additional appropriations now requested has never been authorized for appropriation. In exercising their rulemaking powers, both Houses of the Congress have adopted requirements that only appropriations authorized by law are in order. The bill before the Senate would make later enactment of the entire 1966 defense supplemental appropriation in order.

Of the appropriations that this bill would authorize, \$3,417,700,000 would be used to buy aircraft, missiles, and tracked combat vehicles; \$151,650,000 would be used for research and development; and \$1,238,400,000 is intended to fund military construction.

I do not wish to make a disingenuous argument, but I think it important that the Senate and the Nation clearly recognize this bill for what it is: an authorization of defense appropriations. It could not properly be considered as determining foreign policy, as ratifying decisions made in the past, or as endorsing new commitments.

That ours is a Government of three equal and coordinate branches and that there are checks and balances in this system are concepts we all learn in elementary civics. Under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. By approving or disapproving a bill of this type, Congress can neither enlarge nor diminish the President's power to command these forces; it merely can influence how many members of the Armed Forces the President has to command, and determine the nature of the equipment with which they will be provided, and how they will be cared for and protected.

Of course, I would not suggest that Congress does not have a role in the formulation of foreign policy. Under the division of legislative labor that Congress has prescribed for itself, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are the instrumentalities specializing in for-

eign relations. Accordingly, I think it is important to emphasize that it would be inappropriate for this authorization to be used as a poll of congressional opinion on whether our foreign policy is sound. In my opinion, such action would tend to oust the jurisdiction of the committees charged with primary responsibility for such consideration. Instead, I prefer to think of this authorization as facilitating the arming and equipping of persons in the Armed Forces with the most effective weapons to assure their survival when they are carrying out the orders of their Commander in Chief.

For those persons who would like to rescind the support the Senate gave at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, I wish to point out that the resolution adopted then provides by its own terms that it may be terminated by concurrent resolution of the Congress. As we all know, a concurrent resolution requires action only by Congress and does not require Presidential participation or approval. There is, then, a readily available means for securing a test of congressional opinion, and that is to consider a resolution rescinding the Gulf of Tonkin one. I understand that a resolution to do just this has been submitted and is pending in the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia permit a question?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Am I not correct in saying that the Senator from Georgia, as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services at that time, offered an amendment to the concurrent resolution to provide that Congress would have an opportunity to exercise its responsibility.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. To my distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, who is the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, I may say that, as I recall, that suggestion was made at the conference we first held with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. I made the suggestion, and they agreed that it should be embraced and embodied in the resolution that was proposed, and that was done.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator from Georgia took that action as chairman of the committee, did he not?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I did, so as to preserve the prerogatives of Congress and to make the resolution comparable to the one that had been adopted in 1957, relating to the Middle East. That resolution granted broad powers to the President and contained a provision that these powers could be terminated at any time by a majority of Congress, without participation by the President.

Mr. President, an attempt to brush aside the misgivings and reservations that many Senators and members of the public hold about events in southeast Asia would be futile. This is not my purpose. I, too, am extremely unhappy and concerned about the gravity of the situation there and what our commitment portends. But, like many of my colleagues, I have had an opportunity to suggest alternative courses of action,

and I have been unable to suggest one likely to lead to an honorable termination of the conflict there other than the course now being followed by the President.

In the Senate last year, the junior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Morton] recalled, in his remarks on the floor of the Senate, that he had visited me when he was a member of the executive branch to inform me of President Eisenhower's decision to begin assisting the South Vietnamese people and my comment that I feared this course would be costly in blood and treasure, but that when the President had made his decision and had committed the flag, I had no alternative but to support the flag.

I mention this not to engage in self praise as a prophet but because it still summarizes my view.

For any Members of the Senate who may be initially disposed to oppose this authorization because they have reservations and misgivings about whether the policies being applied in southeast Asia are wise, I strongly urge them to stay their opposition and to find some other manner in which to register it, other than by doing it in a way that will work injury to our fellow Americans who are in southeast Asia. Incidentally, there are 300,000 there instead of the 200,000 we hear about when we include all those who are in Thailand and in the waters off the coast of Vietnam.

Members of the Armed Forces are in southeast Asia under orders. From all reports, they are giving a splendid account of themselves. I am proud of them. Although many have volunteered for this duty, others are there not by choice. They nonetheless are doing their best. An unreasonable delay in approving this bill or a close vote on it is hardly the way to demonstrate appreciation for their sacrifices in our behalf. If we try to view our position on this bill through their eyes, I hope the Senate will not let itself be misunderstood.

Mr. President, I say that without implying that I wish to deny to any Senator the right to express himself on this measure and what is involved herein.

In recent weeks there have been many references to the possibility of a credibility gap. If the Senate shilly-shallies with this supplemental, it will be much harder to convince those opposing us of our determination to see this commitment through and our adversaries are much more likely to be intransigent and contemptuous toward our efforts to find peace.

I must say that I think some observers and critics have not given the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense the credit they deserve for the earnestness, the soul searching, and the vigor with which they have considered alternative courses of action, and particularly for the efforts they have put forth in an attempt to find a solution leading to peace with honor.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, it is true that this authorization is to complete the total authorizations now con-

tained on the books for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, 4½ months from now, so that the appropriation which will follow will use this authorization, together with the remaining amount on the book, to obtain the supplies that are needed at once by our fighting men in southeast Asia.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct. That does not mean that it must all be spent in 1966. It is to be added to the appropriations for 1966 to make sure that there is no shortage of vital supplies for the 300,000 American boys who are in the so-called danger zone. Those supplies include everything from rations to bombs and shells.

Mr. HOLLAND. I think that that one fact speaks like an angel's trumpet tones for the early passage of this measure.

I believe that more good can be accomplished by this bill if we pass it quickly as something that is needed now for funds to be shortly appropriated and committed or spent during the remainder of the fiscal year.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No appropriation can be made without this authorization. It will be necessary for additional legislation to follow this legislation to appropriate the money.

We all know that even if the requirement is not spelled out in the Constitution, the position of the House makes it necessary for appropriations to originate there.

I understand that the committee in the House has already held hearings on the appropriation—all items of it—and is only awaiting the authorization to send the measure here.

Further, there was testimony in the hearings before the Committee on Armed Services that it is important that this appropriation be passed by the latter part of February. It will be exceedingly difficult to do that under the very best of conditions, because the authorization must be obtained before the appropriation can be considered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding. I hope that we shall all make it clear in discussing the bill that this is for an authorization to be followed immediately by an appropriation in a like amount and that this amount would be included with authorizations already on the book for the purpose of providing for what is actually needed to be spent or committed between now and the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. President, I desire to comment more particularly for a few moments on what the authorization in this bill is for.

In the aircraft field, it would fund more helicopters and more aircraft of the type used by our Armed Forces, whether or not we were participating in the defense of South Vietnam. The same can be said of the missiles and the tracked combat vehicles. Much of this procurement is intended to replace losses already incurred and those that may be incurred if hostilities continue.

In research and development, the effort is concentrated on those projects that

could benefit our efforts in South Vietnam. I will not enumerate them all. They include such things as better drugs to combat an unusual type of malaria, from which hundreds of our boys are suffering there at this hour, better protection for our helicopters, better medical facilities, improvements in electronic warfare equipment, weapons and ordnance of the type needed in nonnuclear warfare, and modification of aircraft to adapt them to the kinds of missions needed in southeast Asia.

The military construction that would be authorized stretches all the way from some bases in the United States through intermediate staging areas to South Vietnam. The kinds of things that will be built include new hospitals, storage facilities, runways, and port facilities to facilitate the unloading of supplies.

It was really disturbing to hear some of the difficulties encountered in unloading and landing essential supplies in South Vietnam because of the lack of harbor facilities. That condition is being remedied now as rapidly as it is possible to do.

The committee report gives more detailed information on the weapons to be procured, the research and development to be undertaken, and the construction that would be accomplished and I shall not repeat them here.

I should point out, however, that title IV of the bill could serve as a basis for provisions in the appropriations act that would permit the funding of our support for South Vietnam and the forces of free countries associated with us in her defense from appropriations available to the Department of Defense.

In ordinary circumstances, when a nation is not enduring hostilities on its own soil, the military assistance given to that country is authorized and appropriated and accounted for separately from the appropriations for our own Armed Forces. When combat is taking place, the maintenance of records of the supplies and equipment and assistance furnished becomes most difficult and relatively irrelevant. In Korea, support for the South Korean forces and for the forces of other nations who participated with us there was included in the appropriations made to the Department of Defense and provided from those funds.

The arrangement proposed for South Vietnam by this legislation is similar to that.

The intent is that the military support for South Vietnamese forces and for the forces of Allied countries there will be added to the requirements of the U.S. forces and that support will be provided in the field as determined by our commanders without separate computation and bookkeeping for the part furnished non-U.S. forces.

As is indicated in the committee report, the committee has modified the authority sought in this instance by tightening up on what could have been considered a new transfer authority and by requiring quarterly reports of estimates of the amount of support furnished each nation participating with us in South Vietnam.

This limited merger of support for our associates in South Vietnam with the requirements for our own Armed Forces would be authorized only during the rest of fiscal year 1966 and for fiscal year 1967. The limited duration of this authority will permit the Congress to reconsider whether it should be continued. But I am sure that I voice the sentiments of every Member of this body when I say that we all hope and pray that an honorable termination of hostilities can be accomplished and that there will be no need to continue the authority.

Mr. President, in closing, I wish to leave the thought that I think every Member of the Senate, without regard to his views on the policy involved in Vietnam, can conscientiously support this assistance. This means of providing arms in self-defense to U.S. citizens, without compromising any convictions he may have about what further action should be taken to restore peace in South Vietnam. I urge approval of the bill and I shall be glad to try to answer questions about it.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, as one who joined the chairman of our Armed Services Committee in presenting this bill to the Senate, I wholeheartedly endorse what the chairman has stated as to the purposes of the bill.

As we proceed with the consideration of this legislation, I think that it is imperative that we all remember what this legislation does and what it does not do. Senate bill 2791 provides authorizations for appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles for various Army, Navy, and Air Force research, development, test and evaluation programs, and for the construction of military installations. These authorizations total \$4,807,750,000—the amount requested by the Department of Defense.

These authorizations provide the required authority for the necessary appropriations to support military operations in southeast Asia. The recommended authorizations totaling \$4.8 billion are for the following purposes:

[In thousands]	
Procurement of aircraft, missiles, and tracked vehicles.....	\$3,417,700
Research, development, test, and evaluation programs.....	151,700
Military construction projects...	1,238,400

Shortly we will be considering the Department of Defense supplemental appropriation bill which will involve some \$12.3 billion. I ask unanimous consent to have included at this point in the RECORD a tabulation of the appropriations requested in the proposed supplemental appropriation bill and the required authorizations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The tabulation ordered to be printed in the RECORD is as follows:

Department of Defense supplemental, south-east Asia, fiscal 1966

[In millions of dollars]

Appropriation	Supplemental request	Authorization required
<b>Military personnel:</b>		
Military personnel, Army.....	\$833.5	
Military personnel, Navy.....	318.5	
Military personnel, Marine Corps.....	184.6	
Military personnel, Air Force.....	219.3	
Reserve personnel, Army.....	7.0	
Reserve personnel, Marine Corps.....	2.2	
Reserve personnel, Air Force.....	2.7	
National Guard personnel, Army.....	4.9	
National Guard personnel, Air Force.....	5.7	
<b>Total, military personnel.....</b>	<b>1,626.6</b>	
<b>Operation and maintenance:</b>		
Operation and maintenance, Army.....	1,077.2	
Operation and maintenance, Navy.....	506.0	
Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps.....	107.6	
Operation and maintenance, Air Force.....	544.9	
Operation and maintenance, defense agencies.....	41.8	
Operation and maintenance, Army National Guard.....	3.4	
Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard.....	5.1	
<b>Total, operation and maintenance.....</b>	<b>2,319.3</b>	
<b>Procurement:</b>		
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army.....	2,467.0	\$965.4
Aircraft.....	(604.7)	(604.7)
Aircraft spares and repair parts.....	(220.9)	(220.9)
Missiles.....	(35.5)	(35.5)
Missiles spares and repair parts.....	(28.5)	(28.5)
Tracked combat vehicles.....	(75.8)	(75.8)
Ammunition.....	(671.3)	
Other.....	(821.3)	
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy.....	764.5	764.5
Other procurement, Navy.....	607.5	
Procurement, Marine Corps.....	516.6	38.4
Tracked combat vehicles.....	(10.9)	(10.9)
Missiles.....	(27.5)	(27.5)
Aircraft procurement, Air Force.....	1,587.7	1,585.7
Missile procurement, Air Force.....	63.7	63.7
Other procurement, Air Force.....	1,017.4	
<b>Total, procurement.....</b>	<b>7,019.4</b>	<b>3,417.7</b>
<b>Research, development, test, and evaluation:</b>		
R. D. T. & E., Army.....	28.0	28.0
R. D. T. & E., Navy.....	52.6	52.6
R. D. T. & E., Air Force.....	71.1	71.1
<b>Total, R. D. T. &amp; E.....</b>	<b>151.7</b>	<b>151.7</b>
<b>Military construction:</b>		
Military construction, Army.....	509.7	509.7
Military construction, Navy.....	254.6	254.6
Military construction, Air Force.....	274.1	274.1
Military construction, defense agencies.....	200.0	200.0
<b>Total, military construction.....</b>	<b>1,238.4</b>	<b>1,238.4</b>
<b>Total, regular military programs.....</b>	<b>12,345.7</b>	<b>4,807.8</b>
Request to reimburse DOD for stocks advanced to military assistance program during fiscal years 1966 and 1966.....	375.0	
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>12,720.7</b>	<b>4,807.8</b>

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, this bill does not involve an endorsement of our present policies in southeast Asia. Neither is it a repudiation of those policies. This bill authorizes the appropriation of funds to back up over 200,000

American fighting men now engaged in military operations in southeast Asia.

The distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee discussed the intent of this legislation with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the hearings. I think this colloquy will help to keep this matter in the proper perspective during our consideration.

Senator RUSSELL stated:

The mere fact that a Member of the Senate might heartily disapprove of everything that is going on in Vietnam wouldn't necessarily preclude him from supporting this legislation if he felt it his duty as a U.S. Senator to provide for those who may serve in the armed services of this country.

Secretary McNamara replied. "It would not."

General Wheeler replied, "I agree with you, Mr. Chairman."

Mr. President, section 401 of the bill provides that funds for the support of the South Vietnamese armed forces and other free world forces fighting in South Vietnam shall be derived from the regular appropriations for the support of our own military forces. In recent years funds for this purpose have been carried in the military assistance program. However, during the Korean war funds appropriated for the support of U.S. Forces was used to support the Korean forces and other allied forces engaged in that conflict.

The reason for this change in funding, simply stated, is to make it easier for our military commanders in southeast Asia to fight the war. Under the present system of funding, South Vietnamese troops cannot be supplied with rifles purchased with funds appropriated for the Army procurement program, nor can U.S. forces use ammunition purchased with military assistance funds. I think we can all agree that this is not a reasonable restriction to place on our military commanders who have the responsibility of fighting this war. During the balance of fiscal year 1966 it is estimated that about \$200 million will be required for the support of the South Vietnamese and other free world forces, and for fiscal year 1967 the estimate is \$600 million.

I call attention to subsection (b) of section 401, which provides that the Secretary of Defense shall render to the appropriate committees of the Congress quarterly reports on the estimated value of support furnished to other forces from the appropriations made for the support of U.S. forces. That is to keep us informed, during this period, of these combined funds that are used specifically for the South Vietnamese. I want to make it absolutely clear that section 401 does not expand the authority available to the Secretary of Defense to transfer funds between appropriations. We tightened that up in the committee, and I believe, now, it is clear. And, Mr. President, it does not enlarge the powers of the Department of Defense to reprogram various appropriations that the Congress has made.

Mr. President, this legislation should be supported by every Member of the



Senate and I so urge. I shall join the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in opposing any amendments to the bill that are designed to constitute an endorsement or repudiation of our present policies in southeast Asia. As I have stated, that is not the purpose of this legislation.

The purpose is to provide the necessary funds for our forces and the South Vietnamese who are fighting in that country at the present time. It does not concern whether we are right or wrong in our policies in so fighting. We are supporting our boys, and that is the purpose of this authorization bill which will lead to appropriations. Mr. President, I support our chairman wholeheartedly. The committee was unanimous in making this report to the Senate at this time.

I thank the chairman of the committee.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator from Massachusetts.

Mr. President, I am now pleased to yield to the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], who, before his service in the Senate and on the Committee on Armed Services, had a distinguished career in the executive branch, including service as the first Secretary of the Air Force.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able senior Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee for many years, and the authority in this body on military matters, for yielding to me.

First, I commend the Senator for this fine analysis summarizing the bill before us this afternoon.

I also congratulate the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts, who, during his superb career, has always put his country above party, and who has so thoroughly endorsed the observations and conclusions of the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. President, I would nail down again the statements made by the chairman of our committee by asking two questions.

First, as I understand it, the Senator's conviction is that regardless of how one feels about this matter of Vietnam, whatever opinion one may have on that particular subject, this bill has nothing to do with agreement or disagreement with respect to our foreign policy. Rather, it is a question of whether we do or do not wish to support young Americans, men and some women, over there in the combat zones of South Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator from Missouri has correctly stated my position and that of the entire Committee on Armed Services. This bill cannot possibly be construed as either an endorsement of or as an attack upon national policy. It involves more the throwing of a rope to a man in the water. We may have cause to question how he got there, but he is there, he is a human being, he is our friend and a member of our family and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not throw it to him to enable him to assist himself out of the water, this would be a callous and heartless attitude for us to take.

Our committee is not a policy committee in the field of international relations, but we do have a direct responsibility to bring to the Senate legislation to provide for those who are in the Armed Forces of the United States wherever they may be stationed throughout the world as a result of policy.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator. My second and final question is based upon a recent trip I made in the past month to South Vietnam. After noticing the heavy build up which resulted from the decision to move our troops in force there during 1964 some logistical shortages were noted—as there always will be in peace, in industry, and in war; and I found at least one case in which shortages resulted in additional casualties, something which was frankly recognized and every effort was made by the Department of Defense to correct the situation.

Would not the able chairman agree, however, that if we do not supply the funds he is requesting in support of this bill, and which is supported so convincingly by the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], additional casualties over a period of time are bound to occur in the fighting zones because of shortages?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course, if a hopeless impasse were to result between the Commander in Chief who ordered these men into Vietnam, and Congress, if it refused to provide for them there, it would mean that all of them would perish eventually, either through sickness, or from the bullets of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. In a short while, they would be perfectly helpless. They would have no medical facilities, no food, ammunition, no shells, and no fuel for the airplanes and helicopters now in that area.

I cannot conceive of the Senate's tolerating such a condition for a moment, without regard to the views of any Senator on the wisdom of the policy which put our boys in South Vietnam.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able Senator from Georgia for yielding to me. And I assure him of my support, without reservations of his position with respect to the proposed legislation.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the distinguished Senator from Missouri for his comments.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am now happy to yield to the Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], who has been on the Committee on Armed Services for many years.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as should be evident by now to everyone, we are engaged in Vietnam in a limited conflict with the limited aim to help South Vietnam preserve its independence. The adversary can have peace as soon as he gives up his efforts to impose his will on the south by force and terror.

I support the administration's bill, S. 2791, unanimously reported by our Senate Armed Services Committee, which authorizes supplemental fiscal 1966 Defense appropriations of \$4.8 billion.

This was the sum requested by the administration to meet additional costs in helping the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom.

I should like to comment briefly on our military effort in the Vietnamese conflict.

First. The main military effort in the future, as in the past, must be in the south. There is much to be said for increasing that effort rapidly, to confront Hanoi quickly with a buildup in the south they cannot match, and to give our side the initiative in keeping the adversary moving and off balance. The principle involved is clear: Hanoi and Peiping are less likely to think it worthwhile to increase their efforts in relation to the war if our side steps up its efforts rapidly, than if we drag out the buildup, little bit by little bit.

I am well aware that it is extremely difficult, for logistical reasons, to increase the American contribution quickly. Existing ports and airfields have limited capacities. To train, properly equip, and deploy combat-ready forces takes time. But the evidence that we are actually preparing as promptly as possible to mount a substantially larger effort would itself, I believe, have an impressive effect on the adversary.

Second. We should persuade our allies in the Pacific area to increase their contributions to the defense of South Vietnam. The Republic of Korea has sent 20,000 troops. This could be doubled to 40,000. Australia has sent 1,500 combat forces, and, at a minimum, this could increase to 5,000. New Zealand has sent small forces that could be increased. These allied forces have performed in first-rate fashion and have been a substantial asset. We can hope that certain other countries—realizing that their vital interests are also involved in the successful defense of South Vietnam—will follow the example of New Zealand, Australia, and the Republic of Korea.

Third. I believe we are not making the most effective use of our airpower in the Vietnamese conflict.

As I see it—based on the advice and counsel we have received over a long period of time in the deliberations of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, as well as directly from the professionals on the ground out in Vietnam—we are unduly and unwisely tying our hands by limiting ourselves to only tactical targets in North Vietnam. I agree that we should avoid, for the foreseeable future, targeting the cities in North Vietnam, and we should take great pains to avoid hitting civilians. But there is every good political and military reason to make a careful selection of strategic targets—like oil refineries and ports—which are not only of major economic importance to the Hanoi regime but also have a direct and important bearing on its ability to move men and material into South Vietnam.

The careful choice of such strategic targets—which would be struck only from time to time at the President's personal direction—would contribute in a major way to raising the cost of infiltration from North to South Vietnam and to slowing and reducing the move-

ment of supplies and forces into the South. This new strategy would also deter the replenishment of North Vietnamese stocks of arms and supplies via shipping into the northern ports. If coupled with a certain reduction in bombing operations against less important tactical targets, this strategy could lessen the costs to us in risks to American pilots, and in the loss of planes over the north—which is already well over 200.

I hope the administration will review this matter again. It should be apparent that the strategy I am suggesting would constitute a restrained but significant contribution to the military pressure we must maintain on Hanoi if we expect to persuade the adversary to give up its efforts to impose its will on the South by force and terror.

In closing, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] for his intelligent and responsible handling of this supplemental authorization which is needed in support of the American effort to help block Communist subjugation of all of Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, may I also express my appreciation to the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his dedicated support.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President—

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me for 2 minutes in order that I may read a telegram which I sent to the majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and the reply he sent to me. I believe that this courtesy to the majority leader should be given to him at this time.

Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, yesterday I sent the following telegram to the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], which was delivered to the Senator's office:

Respectfully recommend that debate and vote on supplemental military procurement and construction authorization bill, fiscal year 1966, now the pending business of the Senate, be postponed until after February 22. I consider it important that Senate and Nation have benefit of testimony given at Foreign Relations Committee hearing by Taylor and Rusk, and I hope also by McNamara and Wheeler, before Senate votes on this war appropriation bill.

McNamara's testimony before Armed Services Committee is no substitute for his discussing overall issues of U.S. policy in Asia at public hearings before Foreign Relations Committee. Contrary to impression administration has tried to create with American people, neither McNamara nor Wheeler would be asked at Foreign Relations Committee hearings any question that would involve security matters. If any such question were asked, the administration knows that all its witnesses need do is to suggest that such questions be laid aside until they can be answered in executive session.

I can assure you that I am far from alone in the Senate in my recommendation to you that this military authorization bill be voted on after February 22.

With best wishes for a speedy recovery.

Regards,

WAYNE MORSE,  
U.S. Senator.

Today, I received the following telegram from the majority leader:

February 15, 1966.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.:

Reurtel. Senate has already laid down S. 2791 authorizing military procurement and I announced last Thursday that this bill would be pending at the return of Senate from Lincoln Day recess. In circumstances I feel that I am bound by this announcement of program which the Senate was given to understand would be the situation on reconvening. I personally have no objections to final vote coming after Washington's Birthday, but date of vote is something which Senate in its collective interests and judgments must and will decide. It is my understanding that several amendments will be offered to S. 2791. Discussion of these amendments and of the bill itself will undoubtedly take some time. I would hope that Senate can go ahead in view of announcement already made placing Members on notice as to the program on reconvening and to the end that S. 2791 will receive full discussion and every consideration. At same time Foreign Relations Committee might hear what witnesses it has scheduled and any others it decides upon.

With warm regards.

MIKE MANSFIELD,  
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I yield to the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS].

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for yielding.

I wish to underscore one of the points made by the Senator from Georgia with reference to the figures in this bill, which he expressed so plainly. This is really a continuation of an appropriation of last year, an item in the general appropriation bill for these identical purposes. In that appropriation we made the down-payment on the necessary military hardware. Now we must meet the second and third payments, in order to complete the order.

Supplementing what the Senator said on this point, in the procurement figure in this bill of \$3,004 million, which is for the procurement of military hardware articles I have already mentioned, this sum is merely a continuation of the appropriation made last year, in order to make the second, third, and however many more payments are required with reference to the entire purchases. The due date for the debt for which we appropriated last year is here. I urged then that we appropriate more funds. I knew that much more would be required. I thought we should take a bigger bite on the necessary fund in 1965.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield, with the indulgence of the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator from Mississippi interpret the approval of this request for supplemental appropriations as either approving or disapproving our policy in South Vietnam?

Mr. STENNIS. Frankly, I think it is neither approval nor disapproval of our policy. We are already committed. We have already gone in. We have already put the men on the ground. They must have support; \$1.2 billion of the funds in the bill is for military construction items. It is to take care of the men and

materiel that we already have there, that are on the way, or that are expected to be sent there.

This bill merely presents the question of supporting our men. We have already put them out front in the battleline.

As the Senator from Massachusetts has stated, this bill is neither affirmative nor negative with reference to policy matters.

Mr. AIKEN. It could not be interpreted as indicating approval of Congress for future involvement?

Mr. STENNIS. No. If we did not support the men, we would have to bring them home. We would have to tuck tail and run, so to speak.

Mr. AIKEN. I think it is important to have this statement so that the act of Congress on this proposal may not be so badly misinterpreted or misconstrued as was the resolution of August 1964.

Mr. STENNIS. That is the construction our committee put on it. It is also what Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler pointed out in the hearings. I would say, with the Senator from Massachusetts, that this neither affirms nor denies the policy contained in the resolution of last year, because the bill before us is an authorization bill for appropriation for military supplies and equipment, some of which has already been used.

Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator for making it clear that our action on this bill can have no effect on our southeast Asian policies.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from Vermont for his remarks; \$1,200 million in this is for military construction which is to be used in direct support of our military effort already in existence in southeast Asia. It pertains to equipment for the men, includes hospitalization, and supply depots, all to take care of what we have there.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I am grateful for the statesmanlike presentation of this bill by the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL]. He, and also, just now, the able junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], have made it perfectly clear that one can support the pending bill without having it interpreted, unless someone desires to make a misinterpretation, as an approval of the policies that have been followed or may hereafter be followed in southeast Asia.

I shall support the pending bill. I shall do so because, whether wisely or unwisely, as has been said here, our troops are committed to battle there. They are there on orders, not of their choosing, but on orders of the Commander in Chief.

American troops in an area of hostilities must be supplied the equipment and the materials necessary to enable them to accomplish the mission assigned them by their superiors with maximum effectiveness and with minimum danger to themselves.

The Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that additional funds are required for this purpose.

In my view it is incumbent upon the Congress to provide funds for their sup-

port. This I will do, but I wish to make it emphatically clear, however, that support of similar measures in the past and support of the pending measure now has not and does not reflect approval on my part of the policies and decisions that have led to our involvement in Vietnam in its current proportions. On the contrary, it is my view that commitment of U.S. combat forces to Vietnam was a serious mistake, and will prove to be, in my view, a historic mistake, that has increased rather than diminished the danger of a major war.

Support of our troops in battle is one thing; approval of national policies and decisions which put them there is quite another. Some may regard this as a narrow, legalistic distinction. I do not; and I am pleased the Armed Services Committee has unanimously determined that it should not be so interpreted. What has been done has been done.

I will not support an amendment to repeal the resolution of 1964. We can no more repeal what has been done than we can turn the sun back in its course. I will not support an amendment to oppose sending draftees to Vietnam. Draftees are already there. Such an amendment to prevent the sending of replacements would, in my view, be unfair to the men already serving there.

Let it be understood that I support and support strongly the pending measure. We cannot be niggardly in supplying the materiel that our forces need to accomplish their mission and to do so with minimum danger to themselves.

I voice my deep concern at this time, not with any idea that the calendar can be reversed, not for the purpose of expressing criticism, but in the hope that a review of the past and a searching public analysis and debate of the present may possibly be of some help in shaping the momentous decisions in the days and months ahead. The responsibility of a U.S. Senator and the dictates of conscience impel me to participate in this discussion and to express these views. Public discussion is essential in a free society.

Statements have been made here earlier today to the effect that this debate would be an aid to the enemy. I recall that when the previous authorization bill was before the Senate last August, the junior Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, and also a member of the Committee on Appropriations, invited debate. Unfortunately, in my view, the Senate did not respond to his invitation. I fault myself in that regard.

Debate is necessary for our democratic processes. A government conducted under such a system must be conducted, in the main, in public. Democracy may have its weaknesses. I believe it was the late, great Winston Churchill who said that democracy is the worst form of government except any other kind. That may not be an accurate quotation. This is a hazard that democracies always face.

An interesting observation was made to me in this regard last week when the delegation was here from the Mexican Congress on an interparliamentary ex-

change mission. One of them listened to the Committee on Foreign Relations. In the evening thereafter he made a significant remark to me. He said, "This could occur only in a great and free society."

Mr. President, I am pleased for the Communist world to know. I am pleased for those behind the Iron Curtain who may not be pleased with their lot to know that there is one place in the world where the most critical issues can be the subject of free debate. Yes; this is necessary in our democratic society.

It is in the interest of public understanding of the issues that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is now holding public hearings on the overall questions of policy involved in Vietnam. In my view, both these hearings and this debate are in the national interest.

I wish to advert to the question that approval of the pending bill is not tantamount to approval of the policies in southeast Asia. I do so to call attention to the fact that when Secretary Rusk was last before the Committee on Foreign Relations testifying in support of the foreign aid authorization request, he was asked, I believe by the chairman of the committee, if a vote for that bill could be or would be regarded as approval of the policies in southeast Asia. The Secretary demurred and said he would not like to answer that question "just now." I am not attempting to quote him exactly, but at any rate he deferred his answer.

So it is pertinent to make the point and to make it clear. From the Record it is now abundantly clear that a Senator can vote for this measure, and have it understood that he is voting for a specific bill and only that.

From the beginning I have had serious reservations about our policy in Vietnam. The publicly stated objective of our policy as being designed to secure to the people of South Vietnam the right to determine their own destiny without outside interference is, of course, fully desirable, if possible and feasible, but I have not and do not believe that the policies and programs followed offered or offer a reasonable opportunity for achieving this objective at bearable cost and without posing potentially disastrous consequences for ourselves and for the free world. It is easy to coin or repeat slogans like "victory" and "standing up to the Communists."

One can enjoy wrapping the flag about himself and enjoy a chauvinistic exercise, but it is much more difficult to devise and implement programs for application to the conditions existing in Vietnam which offer realistic hopes of converting such slogans into a workable policy that is fully consistent with our national interest.

I have repeatedly voiced my reservations about the course of events in Vietnam. When President Eisenhower undertook our initial commitment I counseled against it.

The junior Senator from Mississippi did likewise, and I joined him in debate in 1954, as the Record will show.

I strongly advised President Kennedy against broadening and deepening that

commitment. I have frequently urged President Johnson and his Cabinet members to avoid a wider war.

Until late 1964, I confined my statements to direct communication and to sessions of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the main. I say now that I should have been speaking out publicly more than I did. I feel a share of responsibility in that regard. I followed this course in deference to the constitutional responsibility of the President and to a feeling that strident public opposition and dissent to policies already publicly proclaimed might in some degree lessen whatever chance there was for effectiveness of such policies. Upon reflection, I have concluded that this was a mistake and I am sorry I did not speak out publicly more often and sooner than I did.

Legislative support of what must be done to meet national commitments neither implies approval of unwise policies nor negates my responsibility to voice apprehension about present policy.

An analysis of the present situation and a consideration of the future require a review of the past.

Our direct involvement in Vietnam may be said to have started with the fall of Dienbienphu in 1954. Of course we were involved before then, but our role theretofore was in support of the French to whom we gave massive economic and materiel support. As I recall, our support of the French in their efforts in Vietnam amounted to some \$2 billion.

After 7 years of war to which they committed hundreds of thousands of troops, and despite our logistic support, the French suffered a costly defeat. The French learned, or at least were compelled to admit, that massive military operations conducted thousands of miles from their shores in the jungles and rice paddies of southeast Asia are not the answer to a problem that was and still is to a large degree political, ideological, cultural, economic, religious, and racial in nature.

Much is said about the necessity of meeting our national commitments, upholding our national honor, and protecting vital national interests. Of course, we must do these things, Mr. President. But having said so, we must define and understand the commitments that national honor requires us to meet, from both a legal and moral standpoint. And in determining our vital national interests we must do so in context with our many worldwide responsibilities; we must avoid becoming mesmerized by slogans and by commitments that do not exist; and we must achieve a balanced posture that recognizes our limitations as well as our strength.

Mr. President, let us examine the nature of our legal commitment in Vietnam.

Following the Geneva accords of 1954, to which we did not subscribe but which we agreed to recognize and support, the Eisenhower administration made the crucial decision to pick up the pieces dropped by the defeated, withdrawing French and to shoulder the responsibility for promoting economic and political stability and preserving order in this iso-

lated area of the world which was teeming with turmoil.

That was our first big mistake. How foolish we were to undertake a burden which the French, who were far more knowledgeable of this area than we, had, after 7 years of war, with an army of 400,000 men, found an almost impossible undertaking.

And so, in October 1954, in a letter from President Eisenhower to the President of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam, the Government of the United States made what, along with the obligations we undertook under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, constitutes our formal commitment to Vietnam. President Eisenhower offered U.S. aid "to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion through military means."

In this letter, President Eisenhower made it clear that such aid would be conditional upon assurances by the Government of South Vietnam "as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied." He added, significantly: "the Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms."

In addition to the unilateral commitment contained in President Eisenhower's letter, the United States incurred certain obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol which was negotiated in September 1954, and which went into effect in February 1955. Article IV of the SEATO Treaty provides as follows:

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

It is to be noted that the parties to the treaty pledge action in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures to meet "aggression by means of armed attack" against any of the parties or certain other States in the treaty area—including South Vietnam. The Parties

agree—to do what?—to consult immediately to determine such measures as should be taken to meet any threat other than by armed attack.

Pursuant to the Presidential letter of 1954, the United States proceeded to extend aid to South Vietnam. This aid consisted of economic aid and military supplies and equipment together with funds to support the Vietnamese military establishment. U.S. military personnel were limited to small numbers whose mission was to assist in training the Vietnamese army and directing administration of the aid program.

This arrangement continued for several years. From time to time, optimistic statements were issued about the solid progress being made in development of the economy and development of the Vietnam army. For example, in May 1957, a joint statement issued from the White House on the occasion of a visit by President Diem noted that:

In less than 3 years a chaotic situation resulting from years of war had been changed into one of progress and stability. Concerned was expressed over the buildup of military forces in North Vietnam and it was agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace and stability.

That is as far as this joint statement went.

During this period which, by comparison, now appears to have been one of relative calm, however, it appeared necessary to continue to provide more and more in the way of aid to maintain the Diem regime. Statements about progress proved to be illusory. And by 1959 it was obvious that the situation was getting worse instead of better.

In April 1959, in an address at Gettysburg College, President Eisenhower reviewed the then current situation and concluded that South Vietnam was incapable of meeting unaided the threat of aggression and subversion. He reiterated the domino theory and justified the extension of military as well as economic assistance as in our own national interests. Aid was continued and increased.

But despite increased aid, the Government of South Vietnam became less stable, its economy weaker. Subversion became more widespread, with the Vietcong holding and openly controlling substantial segments of the country. Thus was the situation upon the change in administrations in January 1961.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. First, may I ask the Senator whether he would prefer not to be interrupted? If so, I shall wait until he has concluded his speech.

Mr. GORE. I have no preference; I am happy to accommodate the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. I have had the opportunity to read quickly most of the Senator's address. I believe he is making an extremely important statement today, one which reflects the sentiment of many other Members of the Senate. Among other things, he has pointed out

that because of his own feeling about the problems of the Commander in Chief and the administration, it was the better part of discretion not to speak out until near the end of 1964. I think that reflects the course of action that many Members of the Senate have been taking. The fact that other Senators have not yet spoken out on this issue is no reason to conclude that they do not have deep apprehensions and misgivings about the course that the United States is following.

Before the Senator leaves that part of his speech—

Mr. GORE. If I may interrupt, I should like to comment on that point briefly.

Although I hold myself culpable for reluctance to speak out, I do not wish to criticize other Senators in that regard. In extenuation, however, I should like to suggest—

Mr. McGOVERN. I do not want to imply any criticism either.

Mr. GORE. I suggest that it is the imminent threat of a third world war, as I interpret events, which has disturbed me; and, I dare say, it is the imminence of this threat which is causing more and more Senators to express their views publicly.

Unless the threat of such a catastrophe bestirs men to action, and unless men's souls are aroused by these events, what on earth could arouse them to action and impel them to take a position which for the moment may be unpopular with a great many people?

Mr. McGOVERN. I thoroughly agree with the Senator's observation. He has been speaking about the critical period after 1954, when the French effort in this same area ended in failure.

The Senator will recall that in the spring of 1954, when the French collapse appeared imminent, the late Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, felt that perhaps we ought to send American forces into that area to see if we could turn back Ho Chi Minh's forces and resolve the military decision on the side of the French against the Communist forces.

President Eisenhower believed that should not be done unless we could obtain the cooperation of the British, who were then headed by Prime Minister Churchill.

Frequently we hear people argue that we are in southeast Asia lest we repeat the errors that were made at Munich when the Western Powers failed to stand up to Hitler. The voice that sounded most clearly in 1938, at the time of the Munich crisis, in a call for firm action against Hitler was the voice of Winston Churchill. Yet, it was Prime Minister Churchill who counseled against American intervention in French Indochina in 1954.

Anthony Eden writes of this period that Winston Churchill firmly believed that the British would be doing the Americans a great injustice if they gave any encouragement whatever to the sending of American troops into that part of the world.

Does the Senator not think it significant that the one man who stands out in our mind as having been right at the time of the Munich crisis in 1938 did

not see any parallel between that situation and the sending of American troops into French Indochina in 1954?

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, Mr. Churchill was very knowledgeable of conditions in both Europe and southeast Asia. Those conditions are in contrast, in many respects—political conditions, governmental structures, social organization, terrain, divergence in economics, in industrialization, and political sophistication. Indeed, there has never been a nation of Vietnam. I shall not get into a description of Vietnam in reply to the Senator.

Mr. Churchill was showing his usual perspicacity when he drew a distinction rather than a parallel.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, it seems to me that one of the things that may have led us astray in southeast Asia is that we have drawn the wrong lessons and interpretations from previous historical situations. It is argued by some who most ardently defend our present position in southeast Asia that we are trying to contain the threat of Chinese communism in that part of the world in the same way that we were containing Russian Communist belligerents in Western Europe after World War II. I believe the two situations are vastly different.

Mr. GORE. Some have become so obsessed and pleased with the success of the Marshall plan in the containment of communism in Western Europe that they seek to apply that remedy worldwide, when European conditions do not prevail in southeast Asia.

Mr. McGOVERN. Is it not correct that, if we were to follow in southeast Asia the same course that we pursued in checking the spread of Soviet Russian power in Western Europe 20 years ago, it would involve the active support of the countries of Western Europe, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, plus the principal countries of Asia, India, Japan, Pakistan, and others? This would parallel the collective security arrangements to check the possible threat of Chinese Communist power in that area in the same manner in which we had an all-tight collective security arrangement thrown around the Soviet Union in 1945?

Is it not true that we have moved into southeast Asia largely on a unilateral basis, and that we are following a policy that has very little support, either in Asia or in Western Europe, and, in fact, has the active opposition or, at least, the grave doubt of other great countries in Asia and in Western Europe?

Mr. GORE. I agree with the Senator. As I said on the floor of the Senate a few days ago, a basic and grievous error in our policy is that, in a unilateral manner, we violate the collective security principle which we endorsed in the United Nations Charter.

Mr. President, I return now to a brief history of our commitments to South Vietnam.

The Kennedy administration embraced and expanded the policy of military and

economic aid inherited from the Eisenhower administration. Secretary Rusk announced increased military assistance on May 4, 1961. On the next day then Vice President Johnson went to Vietnam and on May 13 a joint statement issued in Saigon announced additional measures "to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid." Upon his return, Vice President Johnson appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and explained that no commitment had been made to send U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, upon the return of Vice President HUMPHREY, I shall suggest to the committee that he be invited to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We should know what commitments he has made—what public commitments have been made, what private commitments, if any, have been made, and the authority by which he made them.

I do not speak critically in this sense. I assume that whatever commitments he has made have been upon authorization of President Johnson. But in line with my deeply held feeling that the American people are entitled to know the facts regarding this all-important question of war or peace, Vice President HUMPHREY should appear promptly upon his return.

In October 1961, a visit by Gen. Maxwell Taylor resulted in a decision to bolster still further the military strength of Vietnam. In December 1961, in an exchange of letters with President Diem, President Kennedy pledged to "promptly increase our assistance to your defense efforts."

Please note, Mr. President, that this was an increase of our assistance to the defense efforts of the Vietnamese themselves.

Increased military and economic aid failed to halt the slippage. A "strategic hamlet" program for local pacification was very costly but ineffective. When I was in Vietnam, I visited some of these strategic villages. I came back and reported to my Government my assessment that this was a costly program that was doomed to failure. It failed miserably; but it cost heavily.

It became obvious that the Diem government did not enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese people and that only the U.S. presence and support kept it in office at all. Religious controversy and riots brought crisis nearer and nearer. The conditions contained in President Eisenhower's letter of 1954 had clearly not been met. Reforms had not been accomplished.

President Kennedy was moved to comment on this aspect of the situation on a television interview of September 2, 1963. He stated:

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Vietnam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won un-

less the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

It should be noted that in this and a subsequent TV interview filmed on September 9, 1963, President Kennedy endorsed the so-called domino theory and made clear his view that we could not afford to withdraw from Vietnam, but he also made it clear that stability and order by the Vietnamese themselves were a prerequisite to victory.

Now, Mr. President, I should like to address a few remarks to the "domino theory."

I recall that when the Communist apparatus was being fastened upon Cuba, many statements were made on the floor of the Senate, on television and radio, in the press, and on the public platforms, to the effect that if Cuba fell under communism, one after another, the countries of Latin America might have the Iron Curtain folded about them. I entertained such concern myself, though I never made such statements. I wondered if it might follow. Many of us felt uncertain about it.

But what do we find now? The misery, the suffering and the want, the suppression which communism has brought to Cuba is building resistance to communism in other Latin American countries. The domino theory did not work.

The subsequent overthrow and assassination of Diem did not produce either reform or stability.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. I should like to pursue a little further the Senator's analogy of the domino theory in Cuba, as he would draw an analogy to the domino theory in southeast Asia.

Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I was attempting to draw an analogy.

Mr. McGEE. The parallel; would that be better?

Mr. GORE. I am not sure that I even intended that. I had previously referred to the fact that former President Eisenhower had seemed to endorse the domino theory, and then I had referred to it again, and it came to my mind that there were instances in which the domino theory had not worked. Cuba came immediately to mind. I am not sure that it is an analogy, but I am willing to discuss it in that context.

Mr. McGEE. To begin with, the dominoes would become a little wet.

Starting with Cuba, we were able, with naval patrol and firmer economic policies on our own part, and the firming up of the backbones of some of our friends in the OAS, I think, to make it considerably more difficult for Mr. Castro to spread his doctrine. It was not a matter of merely abandoning the situation, leaving it alone, or letting the rest of the people do it themselves.

The reason I raise the point with the Senator from Tennessee is that there is a good bit of the same element present in Vietnam. If there is someone there



who is in the position to take the lead, we shall find the same firming up of the willingness and the disposition not to knuckle under, not to surrender, not to roll over and play dead, under the pressures that may be coming in from the north.

Further, I think Cuba would be a better illustration of the importance of not letting this sort of disease, this falling of the first domino, knock over the rest of the elements on the board.

Mr. GORE. First, let it be understood, I believe it would be regrettable for the first domino to fall. I do not believe that communism in South Vietnam would be a disaster for the United States, but it would be most undesirable. So I join the Senator in opposition to the Communist apparatus fixing its grip on South Vietnam. But there again, as the Senator has said of the domino in Cuba, it might get a little wet tumbling to Indonesia or to the Philippines.

It seems to me that we become a little mesmerized with these terms, and that they may not always be applicable. That is perhaps one reason why I was reluctant to say I was drawing an analogy.

Mr. McGEE. I appreciate the Senator's point. If I may return to southeast Asia, however, and the domino theory, perhaps we need to think up a new name for it. "Domino theory" has become a dirty word, or an expression open to criticism. But whatever we may call it, small countries being forced to accommodate their positions and policies to an overwhelming giant near their borders, because their neighbors collapse, is what is about to happen in southeast Asia. If we want to call it the domino theory, let us deal with it as the domino theory, and then we can discuss the domino theory as applying to southeast Asia.

Mr. GORE. It might be equally, though perhaps inaccurately, described by another term with which so many people have become fascinated, namely "sphere of influence."

Mr. McGEE. I do not happen to buy the sphere of influence theory either, but I believe that there is much concern over abandoning this area because of the disproportionate capabilities in sheer power between the small independent countries in southeast Asia on the one hand and China alone on the other. It is quite unlike Cuba, in the Caribbean, where an overwhelming force still remains, that of the United States. The issue there is a comparable force which would not permit Russia, through Cuba, or China, through Cuba, to move very far on whatever theory we may wish to consider it.

But, in southeast Asia, there is no force commensurate with the great land mass potential of China. For that reason, I believe that we have to weigh the prospect that faces Cambodia, Thailand, Burma—and Indonesia. Indonesia becomes an interesting case in point, because it was a case of the Chinese Communists really overreaching many of their own dimensions too fast and too soon. We should go slow in dismissing the concept that the fall of one nation only delays momentarily the fall of the next, the next, and then the next in this

part of the world. This has historically been the pattern of power politics in this area of southeast Asia.

Mr. GORE. I wonder whether the Senator from Wyoming would mind if I addressed some remarks to the Indonesian situation to which he made reference?

Mr. McGEE. No. I believe it would contribute to this dialog.

Mr. GORE. More or less parenthetically, I believe it is important to keep in mind that, as the Senator indicated, the upheaval in Indonesia may have been in consequence of the Communists overreaching themselves. That is, in my view, partly correct.

But, there was another factor. The United States continued aid to Indonesia under the most difficult and trying circumstances. One of the most difficult speeches I have been called upon to make was on the floor of the Senate in support of continuation of aid to Indonesia after Mr. Sukarno had publicly told the United States to take its aid and go to hell. But, I was advised, as other members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations were advised, that in the view of our Government, a confrontation between the local Communists in Indonesia—called, I believe, the PKI—and the military was inevitable, that although the military leaders were not particularly aligned with the United States, they were anti-Communist and, therefore, it was in our national interest to maintain liaison through aid and otherwise.

Congress, fortunately, supported the administration in that policy. When the confrontation came, it came in an awkward way. The Senator has aptly described it as an overreaching by the Communists.

The Communists intended to assassinate all the military leaders. They did succeed in assassinating several, but they missed some. Out of this upheaval has come the emergence of the military leaders, many of whom received their education in the United States. They are not aligned with the United States. They are, however, asserting an Indonesian independence and the kind of government suited to their own people and their purposes. But they are anti-Communist. What more can we ask? We ask no more. When I am asked, as I am frequently and critically, why I support and have supported foreign aid programs for Indonesia, I am pleased to cite this example, in which I believe our aid has been fully justified.

I hope the Senator will pardon me for this parenthetical reference to a matter to which he had alluded.

Mr. McGEE. Not at all. The fact is that I, too, stanchly supported all of our programs in Indonesia. We cannot afford to change our foreign policy because we are angry at some individual who is the head of a country. And our foreign policy must therefore be premised on that basis. He will not always be there. But the people will be. I believe there was some static raised on the floor of the Senate in respect to helping a country headed by someone like Sukarno, but I believe we see now that

there is substantial evidence of making one policy and continuing that policy, and recognizing that heads of state are mortals, and will eventually pass on, but the people as a whole will still be there. I believe that Indonesia becomes another case in point in terms of our support for the kind of stance which will make it possible for the independence of Indonesia, of Vietnam, of Cambodia, of Malaysia, to take firm root.

Much as I am unhappy with the fact that there is a heavy military complexion in some of these countries, we cannot but wish to give them the opportunity to win their independence and develop along paths of their own choosing. That is what is at stake now. That is the reason why I cannot understand the misgivings which are being expressed on the floor of the Senate from time to time concerning America's position in Vietnam. Any casual glance at the vast subcontinent of Asia, it seems to me, tells its own story in history and is a contemporary fact of our time. We do not need to argue that some of the critics elsewhere and in the Senate do not read the history books. They need only to read the newspapers to see what has happened in our time.

Here we have a great land mass dominated overwhelmingly by one major power. I believe that the Senator from Tennessee shares this position because my first baptism in that part of the world was with him, and I sat at his feet, he was my professor in 1959 when we first visited India, Thailand, and Vietnam when Diem was still alive—but many of us have been hoping for many years that India would be the great "makewait" for China. Nehru, as he made it clear the day we visited him, was not of that mind, but a "squeegie" effect was beginning.

We thought that Japan might have checked China, or that Japan might have been a balancing force for China. But we have not trusted Japan. What are we confronted with now in the wake of these great, vast, deeply moving changes in the wake of World War II in the small countries such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and those which stretch on out into the South Pacific? They really are at the mercy of an unbalanced, predominantly mainland Chinese continent. India is in no position, however, to move south, to try to maintain the balance, even though Nehru in his last years was beginning to talk in terms of India being like the United States in its earlier history, except as relates to aggression. Whether he should have reconstructed his thoughts in terms of some kind of balance of power in Asia, I do not follow the critics who say we have no business there, that we must get out of there, that we must have some kind of orderly withdrawal plan. What will happen to the little countries there? Does the Senator argue that they do not wish to be independent? Does the Senator argue that they would rather be under the wing of mainland China?

What is the case that can be made for pulling out of that part of the world, after we, as the victors in World War II—really the victors, Mr. President—

were the only ones left, by the circumstances of a devastating war, with sufficient policing power, to try to put the pieces back together again?

France and England pulled out. The Dutch pulled out. Even the old forces that had existed there and had contributed to the stabilization of some of the elements out there, were gone. Only we were in a position to do something.

We tried to carry on with a stabilization of that line. We gave India our backing when she was put to a show-down in the crisis with China. The Chinese pulled back.

What is the article on which one can base the argument that if we were to pull out everything will settle down, when in the face of all the evidence there has been a concerted move outward, to disturb the balance of Asia, if we may use that unfortunate expression?

Mr. GORE. The distinguished Senator has given a very able treatise on geopolitics in a vast portion of the world. He has referred to numerous situations in his eloquent statement.

He will recall the evening when he and I, in the company of our wives, were with Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi. I wonder if he recalls that during the course of that evening, the able and great Prime Minister on three occasions made the remark: "When China is strong, China is aggressive." Does the Senator recall that statement by the Prime Minister?

Mr. McGEE. Yes; I recall it.

Mr. GORE. The emergence of China as a world power is one of the significant events of all time. The threat of China to world peace, to world stability, is felt in all quarters of the world. Indeed, I know of no nation more aware of it or which, in my opinion, is more apprehensive about it, than the Soviet Union herself. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by China is another event of monumental proportions. The degree to which the Communist apparatus is able to regiment the people is a factor in this equation. The degree to which they are able to engender hate of America in this surging mass of one-fourth of the world's humanity is something to which all thoughtful men must give apprehensive concern.

It seems to me that we must consider our obligations, our commitments, our performance, our actions, wherever the situs may be, in the context of our total global obligations, our responsibility as a world leader, and first, foremost and last, in the context of our own national security.

These must be interpreted in the light of our capacity, as well as the dangers, in the light of first priority, and degrees of priority.

I consider communism in Cuba most detestable and undesirable. But it has not been disastrous to the United States. I detest communism in its every concept. It is oppressive. It is stultifying. I oppose it wherever it shows itself, southeast Asia included.

But we must not permit our anti-communism to so blind us that we follow a policy that may bring eventual disaster for our country. It is easy to

beat one's breast and say, "I am standing up to communism." This will bring applause. But how do we stand up to communism?

We found a successful procedure in collective security, NATO, the United Nations. Here we have in Vietnam an area of secondary importance. Please note, I did not say an area that is not important. All peoples are important. All countries are important, even Vietnam and Cuba. But certainly one could not, in my view, say that either Cuba or Vietnam's being out from behind the Iron Curtain, or behind it, effects a major shift in the balance of power.

During World War II, I was closely associated with one of the wisest men I have ever known, the late Bernard M. Baruch. I was author, as a young Member of Congress, of a bill to bring about wage and price controls early in that war. The late President Roosevelt was not ready to accept it. He was well aware that what I was advocating and what Mr. Baruch was advocating was paving the way for what was bound to come.

Anyway, near the end of the war, as the attacks upon Japan were reaching a crescendo, and victory, though months away, was already in sight, Mr. Baruch and I were having dinner together. He said to me, in a paternal sort of way, "Young man, after this war, which has been such a world of convulsion, there will be many upheavals in many parts of the world, in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But keep your eye on Western Europe, because here, with her industrialization, with her traditions, her political influence and structure, lies the balance of power between the Communists and the free world."

I have remembered that admonition, and I relate it only to illustrate that as between Western Europe and Vietnam, there is a vast difference in priority of commitment, in essentiality and vitality, a difference in American interests.

I agree with Mr. Kennan, who said that Vietnam was a matter of national interest to us, but not a matter of vital national interest.

That is one part of my answer.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, would the Senator prefer to complete his statement?

Mr. GORE. Let me complete it.

Mr. McGEE. Very well.

Mr. GORE. I would treat Vietnam as a matter of importance, but of secondary importance, not as a matter of first priority.

The difficulty with our policy is that we have become mesmerized with it. We are tending to put all our eggs in this frail basket, thus endangering our commitments on a broader scale to other areas where our national interest is more vitally concerned.

An answer to all the questions which the Senator has posed would require a full afternoon of discussion. I would like to go a bit further, however, and then I shall yield again.

I have been deeply convinced from the beginning—and the records of the executive sessions of the Committee on Foreign Relations, if the Senator will read

them, will so disclose—that the most important thing involved in southeast Asia was not Vietnam, north or south, or north and south, but rather it has been and is the equation between the three world powers, the United States, Russia, and China.

Shall we follow a course that is calculated to heal the breach which we have been developing between China and Russia, thus splitting the monolithic unity of the Communist world? That is a possible consequence of a war between the United States and China.

The able junior Senator from Mississippi has expressed the view that a war between the United States and China might involve nuclear weapons. I join him in that estimate because I doubt that public opinion in this country would permit her sons to be pitted man for man against the masses of China without giving to them every weapon in our arsenal. Once the nuclear weapon is used, the holocaust may have begun.

If the United States uses it first, for the second time the white man will have used nuclear weapons against the yellow race. This has portents for the future which none of us can foresee and the end of which no one could predict.

It is not certain that Russia would come to the aid of China in a war with a capitalist state. True, she has a firm treaty commitment to do so, but I do not know that we could rush to the conclusion that she would keep that treaty commitment. She might act otherwise should the United States become bogged down in an Asiatic war in this Asiatic morass.

The Soviets might rub their hands and look about themselves and start working their machinations in Latin America and in Africa. They might raise trouble in Berlin again, or move into Manchuria. What would we do then committed to a war with one-fourth of the human race, halfway around the world, under circumstances most disadvantageous to ourselves logistically, politically, and militarily?

Hitler learned, or should have learned, that it was unwise to have a war on both his fronts.

I believe Russia has been looking over her left shoulder. Her apprehension of China may well increase her desire for rapprochement with the West. Indeed, the more China has emerged as a world power the more inclination Russia has shown to improve her relations with the West. Berlin has not been flaming with action for many months, but once we are bogged down it may be inflamed quickly.

So I conclude a partial answer to the question which the Senator has raised by saying that in my view these factors must be weighed. Vietnam must be viewed in perspective and considered in perspective not as the end and the center of the earth. It is neither. It is an area in which we have demonstrated already in a costly way our deep concern for people who wish to resist communism.

I do not believe that in order to demonstrate our sincerity in this regard we are required to leap over the precipice into an abyss that threatens a third

world war and a possible nuclear holocaust.

I am sorry to have taken so long. I could have taken longer.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator need not apologize to the Senator from Wyoming for taking so long, because the Senator always approaches these questions on which we differ at such a high level that it contributes to the dialog and the better understanding of these questions.

I wish to attempt to respond in those areas where we have a basic difference on the remarks the Senator has just shared with us.

Mr. GORE. I welcome the exchange with the able Senator. I consider him to be one of the brightest lights that has come to the Senate for a long time. We are personal friends. I enjoy his contributions and welcome them.

Mr. McGEE. I thank my colleague from Tennessee for his very generous observations.

I should like to go back to two or three of the real essentials and discuss those hypotheses or fundamentals with him.

Mr. GORE. First, let me ask the Senator from Wyoming whether the type of discussion in which the Senate is engaged today is an aid to the enemy, or whether it serves the cause of democracy?

Mr. McGEE. I believe the honest answer is yes.

Mr. GORE. Which?

Mr. McGEE. Both. I believe that under our system of government and the kind of society we are trying to perpetuate, this is one of the calculated risks that we must take. We do not want to have a society of closed ideas, a society of one truth. That is one of the risks we must take. In that respect, it gives aid and comfort to the enemy.

Mr. GORE. We cannot abort our own democratic processes in order to keep certain information from our enemies.

Mr. McGEE. If we must give up a free society in order to be doing something else, what is the purpose of doing the something else?

Mr. GORE. Then we are agreed. Let us now turn to something else.

Mr. McGEE. I should like to proceed to something else. There are some essential issues which the Senator has raised, and it is those issues to which I should like to turn. They have to do with priorities.

The Senator reminds us that we should keep these things in perspective. I believe that if we put these things in historic perspective, the priorities become obvious.

It is as though someone had said in 1941, "Let us see what our priority is. Is it Hitler or is it Japan?" We would have had a debate then. We cannot do both, obviously. Many people were saying that.

Mr. President, we are living in a different world, in the wake of a war from which we emerged as one of two powers capable of shaping the form of new balances in the world in the wake of World War II.

Mr. GORE. Now there are three such powers.

Mr. McGEE. We are now discussing another fundamental hypothesis. We

can no longer replan the world in Western Europe alone. There is an emerging concern from Eastern Asia, that would compete with Western Europe as an essential basic area of national interest and of the concern of the remainder of the world. What would be the use of rebalancing Western Europe, which the Senator from Tennessee and I agree we have done, notably and largely because of our presence there at the end of the war, and then losing it all through Eastern Asia? The world is round, and World War II did more to shrink the globe than anything else in our time. With the great scientific breakthroughs, and the like, we can no longer talk about Western Europe, about Versailles, or about the Congress of Vienna, and then believe we are pulling back into some kind of tenuous balance of the powers of the world, because we discovered in 1941 that what goes on in Asia as genuinely can jeopardize the security of the people of America, and, indeed, of the world, as what goes on along the Rhine River in Western Europe.

So it is no longer possible to pick and choose. It is no longer possible to say, "This is our first priority, this is our second priority." Unless and until the whole globe is brought back into some semblance of balance, we have no reason to hope for a constructive opportunity to contribute to a different world, to help to contribute to a world that would be a little better than the world that preceded World War II.

So I take issue with the Senator from Tennessee in terms of priorities. We have to take the world as it comes. We did it successfully in Europe; we did it successfully in Iran in 1946; in Turkey and Greece in 1947; in Italy in 1949; and there has been a difference.

We met the test in Korea; we are meeting the test now in Vietnam. I submit to the Senator that these tests are all cut from the same cloth. It is a many-colored cloth, but it has been put together in strange new ways, because the repetitions of history are not precise and accurate. Because it happened one way in Western Europe and happened in another in the East does not mean there is no reason why we cannot learn from the one and apply to the other. Likewise it is fundamental that in terms of monopoly of power in one place, what inhibits the right of independence of smaller neighbors is as irrevocable in Asia as it is in Europe.

The lessons we should have learned from Mr. Hitler are just as strong as the lessons we can now put into practice before the time becomes later.

The Senator from Tennessee talks about the prospect of a great nuclear war, an atomic war on the mainland of Asia. I do not know whether that will happen. God help us if it does. But I submit that if we follow the Senator's policy with respect to Vietnam, the necessity of resorting to some extreme of that sort may become more horrendous and probably more likely in the long run.

We said exactly the same things about the Soviet Union. The people who opposed our going into Berlin, the people

who opposed our taking the great chance, who were afraid of what would happen if there were a blockade of Berlin, said that it would lead to a big war with Russia. Who knows? Only Moscow could answer that question. But somebody had to put the issue face up, because what happened in Berlin made a difference. As the great Winston Churchill once said, because of the American willingness to take a chance, even the chance of a big war related to Berlin, Russia is not on the Atlantic coast of Europe today.

I disagree with the Senator from Tennessee about Cuba. Cuba, with only Castro and whatever his little party has there, is no great make-weight on the balance of power in the world. But with Russia and her missiles in Cuba, the balance of power in the world was readjusted, and that was where we risked a showdown in 1962: We risked war with Russia. Who can say that we did not risk nuclear war with Russia? That depends on the decisions that were made in Moscow. But somewhere it was necessary to draw the line.

I submit that drawing the line falls upon our shoulders more than it does on the shoulders of anyone else, because we emerged from World War II with the capabilities of doing something about it.

Let me turn now to the priority of Vietnam, if I may—

Mr. GORE. Let me reply to the four points the Senator from Wyoming has made. Then we can come to the next one. If I do not reply now, I shall forget what the able Senator has said; I did not take down his remarks in shorthand.

Mr. McGEE. I have some basic differences with the Senator's very learned remarks. Following our interesting exchange, I had hoped I might go to his second priority.

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator contain himself for a moment until we deal with the first one?

Mr. McGEE. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor; he has done me the courtesy of yielding.

Mr. GORE. I am delighted to do so, but the colloquy might be more meaningful to those who may read it, and I shall be better able, I think, to engage in it, if I deal with the points as they are made.

The able Senator has said a good many things. For one, he said that we must draw the line somewhere. He said we must determine where that is. But then, it seemed to me, he met himself coming back when he said it is no longer possible for us to pick and choose where to stand.

Mr. McGEE. As between Europe and Asia.

Mr. GORE. The Senator did not say that.

Mr. McGEE. Let me interpolate that now. That was obvious from the context.

Mr. GORE. To quote the Senator further, he said, "we must take them where they come." There, indeed, is a fundamental difference in our points of view. I believe we must pick and choose. We must put things in perspective.

The Senator from Wyoming says that there are no degrees of priority; that "we must take them where they come."

Mr. McGEE. If the Senator from Tennessee will yield, the Senator from Wyoming did not say any such thing as that. He said as between Western Europe, which was the area about which the Senator was speaking, and the Soviet Union, and the Far East, where we are talking about Vietnam. The Senator from Wyoming said we cannot pick and choose; they are cut from the same cloth. I was not talking about the whole globe. I am talking about the centers of power, where the real clash of power emerges, where the confrontation needs to be met. That is far different from saying there are no priorities.

Mr. GORE. What did the Senator from Wyoming mean when he said, "It is no longer possible to pick and choose; we must take them where they come"?

Mr. McGEE. That we cannot settle our differences in Western Europe. We must recognize that the world is round, and that the great forces of potential power that both the Senator from Tennessee and I have been discussing are no longer concentrated along the Rhine or at the Congress of Vienna; they happen to have moved into Eastern Asia, as well. It is no longer Moscow and the United States. Peiping has come into the picture. Many of us had hoped that India would have checked Peiping. We had hoped that Japan might do so, too, but Japan appears not to be willing. We cannot separate the restoration of the remainder of Asia from the rest of Western Europe. It is no longer "either, or," as it was not even in 1941.

Mr. GORE. I am glad to have the Senator's explanation. That was not exactly what I understood him to say.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator has to know what I mean rather than what I say; I am not so articulate as he is.

Mr. GORE. I am always glad to know what the Senator from Wyoming means, because he means well. The difference between us emerges rather clearly. Not only Vietnam, but all areas in which we are interested, as well, must be viewed in their relationship to our own vital national interest. They must be viewed in relationship to our global responsibilities. If, indeed, we have lost the capacity to pick and choose; if, indeed, we are stripped of the power of discretion, of the option to put things in perspective, and if we consider every area as all-important to our national interest, then, indeed, we are the victim of events; we are no longer the masters of our fate.

If this be true, we have become prisoners of an anti-Communist dogma and the initiative rests in the hands of our enemy who can bring us to a battlefield not of our choosing, but of his choosing. Indeed, in this context, if we are in this sad plight, it might well be that some of our military men are correct in their analysis that Vietnam is a baited trap. I have not been so convinced. I had thought it had a degree of "happenstance" about it. But, if indeed the situation is as bad as the Senator describes it, I shall have to think about it again.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I did not allude to it as a baited trap.

Mr. GORE. The Senator draws an analogy between our enemies in World War II, Germany and Japan, and our adversaries in this Vietnam war. There is a vast difference.

The United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor. This attack was described by the late President Roosevelt as a day of infamy. To a man, to a woman, to a child, with one voice, with one accord, we arose. We had a cause for which practically all men were ready and willing to fight. That is not true in this situation.

The United States is involved, and it has become involved step by step. We have inched into this Asiatic morass through three administrations. Three Presidents have assured the American people that combat forces would not be sent to Vietnam. Upon many occasions it was said that the steps being taken were not to be followed by subsequent events which some of us foresaw.

The war did not begin with an attack upon the United States which would have given the American people a clear cause for which to fight and for which they would be willing to send their sons overseas. Even the enemy is not clearly identifiable. Although we speak of bringing Hanoi to the peace table and we identify North Vietnam as the adversary—and I believe that they are the directing genius of the guerrilla war—yet a majority of the forces that have been plotting terror and brutality, with which forces we are presently fighting in South Vietnam, are South Vietnamese.

I am not prepared to dismiss this as a civil war, as an indigenous revolution. I think those elements are present. Unquestionably there is religious strife. There is ancient racial animosity between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese. The Senator and I visited together Montagnard villages. We sipped some bitter liquid through straws from a deep wine keg in a native village.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, let the RECORD show that it was liquid rice.

Mr. GORE. Religious animosities exist there. France never permitted the country to become a nation. It pitted prince against prince, duke against duke, and divided in order to exploit. There is little doubt as to just who the enemy really is.

We heard it said on the floor of the Senate today that the real enemy is the Chinese. Is it the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, or the Vietcong? Perhaps it is all three.

In any event, the situation is fraught with confusion. It is military, but it is equally political, economic, social, religious, racial, and anticolonialism.

We have the legacy of 100 years of French exploitation with which we must cope. I do not believe that the analogy between Germany and Japan as the enemy in World War II and the confusion which exists in Vietnam is an accurate one. It is contrast rather than comparison.

The Senator draws another analogy with which I disagree. He draws an analogy between South Vietnam on the

one hand and Russian missiles in Cuba and the Communist conquest of Berlin on the other. I completely disagree with that.

In Berlin and in the 1962 Cuban crisis, priorities were clear. Yet the Senator says we cannot draw priorities, that we must take them as they come, that no longer can we pick and choose.

Mr. President, in Cuba the Russians were attempting atomic blackmail. They were attempting to seize and reverse the balance of power.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, if they had succeeded in Cuba, would they have upset the balance of power?

Mr. GORE. The Senator is correct. Had they succeeded in placing numerous missiles with atomic warheads in Cuba, they would have achieved a great victory. They would have altered the military situation in the world.

I am not prepared to say that that would have shifted the balance of power, but we would have been under the gun.

Mr. McGEE. Then the Senator agrees with me. That is what I just got through saying.

Mr. GORE. We would have been under the gun, the trigger cocked, with a pistol at our temple, so to speak. This would surely have seriously altered the situation. Indeed, although I am not prepared to assert this, it was stated to the Committee on Foreign Relations in executive session that if the Russians should succeed in Cuba, it would shift the balance of power.

Now, with respect to Berlin, Germany is the strongest industrial and military force in Western Europe. The seizure of Berlin by the Communists would have seriously altered the military situation and the balance of forces, political, economic, and military, in Europe. It would have extinguished the ambition of all Germans, East or West, for ultimate reunification of their country.

It would have placed the largest city in central Europe under Communist domination.

Mr. President, much as I regret to disagree with the able Senator, to consider Vietnam, on one hand, as having the same priority and importance to the United States as Russian atomic missiles in Cuba or Russian seizure of Berlin, is totally in error.

Now, to come to the fourth and last point—and then I shall yield again—the Senator treats Vietnam as one of the—

Mr. McGEE. Critical areas of the world.

Mr. GORE. Critical areas, where the Communists attempt to make a gain; is that correct?

Mr. McGEE. Correct.

Mr. GORE. But he says we must treat them all alike; they all have the same priority.

I think the point is important. I wish to resist this conclusion. I think a Ho Chi Minh government of South Vietnam would be most undesirable; but I do not think that possible eventuality should be considered as a matter of top priority concern to the vital interests of the United States. I simply do not think it holds that relative importance to us.

Now I yield.

Mr. McGEE. I thank my fellow Senator for yielding again.

I address myself, first of all, to the relative roles of Japan, the Pacific, and Western Europe in our stake in Asia and Europe simultaneously, rather than to the convenience of selecting priorities as between the two.

Of course, the attack of Japan on Pearl Harbor galvanized us all. Of course, we were united. Because we had not been willing to learn in Manchuria in 1931 the lesson I trust we learned then, we paid with a gigantic war in the Pacific.

That is the reason why we would like to avoid that kind of exigency, that kind of confrontation again. That is the whole point. The Senator could not have more eloquently made the point I wish to get across: that we cannot afford to wait another time, because of nuclear capabilities, for war tension to get as far along as it had when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, or when Germany attacked Poland.

I trust we have learned our lessons. For the language that is universal, both in Berlin and in Tokyo, both in London and in Washington, in Saigon, in Jakarta, in Canberra, is the lesson that we should have learned by now about when to stop an aggressor.

If we had only learned that lesson, or been willing to act upon it, in 1931 in Manchuria, in 1935 in the Rhineland, in 1936 in Ethiopia, who knows what the prospects might have been for a different kind of confrontation of the aggressors? It would have been in different dimensional form than we have known since in history. We cannot say with certainty, because we do not have that kind of omniscience, but we do know what the price was for doing it the way we did it; before, trying to appease a dictator, whetting his appetite by giving him somebody else's real estate. It does not work.

So I would answer the Senator, who says that there is no necessary priority connection between the Pacific and Western Europe, in response to my assertion that there is, that there is indeed; they are cut from the same cloth, they are swept by the same threat, and they are put out of balance by the same disproportionate forces that characterized the imbalance of Europe at the end of World War II.

What has happened in Asia is as much our doing or undoing as it is the next fellow's. We fought a war in Asia, simultaneously with the war it was said we could not fight in Western Europe. Many sober voices warned us against a two-front war. But in spite of the unfortunate experience of Mr. Hitler on that score, both with Russia and Western Europe, we did rather well. We discovered what we had to do, and with the great resources God has blessed us with, and the leadership we were able to command, we succeeded.

But I say to my friend from Tennessee that we are going to have to do it over the old way if we do not watch out, and that the time to stop aggression is at the beginning. I call to his mind a bit of warning and finger-wagging Lord Palmerston did 100 years ago in the

British Parliament. He was speaking of the Russians—they were not Communists then, but they had great power. He said that anyone can predict the policy of an expansionist state if he reads a history book. He said that what they seek to do is press outward along their periphery; and wherever they are not stopped, they will break through and take another piece of geography, but whenever they are stopped, they go elsewhere to seek softness.

The parallel Palmerston referred to 100 years ago obtains at the present time, whether one applies it to Moscow of Peiping. The willingness to risk the use of force, or in certain instances to actually command that force, makes the difference.

Those on the other side have gambled all along that we were inhibited about using force—that somehow the Americans, because we had a different standard, and because one human life makes a difference to us—would be very reluctant to resort to the use of force.

Hitler knew our minds better than did some of the American people themselves, and he gambled. He was not a great power, as we know them today. England, France, the United States and Russia were all more powerful than Hitler on paper. But Hitler was willing to risk his power, and he capitalized on the inhibitions of the "have" nations not to risk what they had. That is how he got by with literal murder for as long as he did, until it took the holocaust of a gigantic World War II to bring him down.

That is exactly the reason for the petition I would submit to the Senate today. I say that we have a lesson to learn, and that lesson, which was written in Europe, is equally applicable in Asia.

Look at the prize at stake in Asia. Look at the prize, I say to my friend from Tennessee. Southeast Asia: 300 million people, and more. Most of the rice of the world. Oil, tin, bauxite and rubber. These would be sparkling diamonds in the resources of great powers, and particularly of a power that is only now beginning to expand its quest for new industrial capabilities.

This is an area that historically has been a great power factor. It was one of the prizes on the scales of the old-fashioned balances of the 19th century. This is one of the strategic waterways of the earth. The trade from East to West primarily goes this way, across southeast Asia.

Likewise, the area itself flanks the mainland. Here India is outflanked to the East. It thrusts, almost as a dagger, directly toward the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. This is indeed a prize to covet.

If we tend to think otherwise, I believe it would serve us well to go back and read our history again. Japan did not attack Pearl Harbor, in order to get Hawaii. Japan started World War II in order to obtain a great empire in southeast Asia. The Japanese had read the history books. They were cognizant of the sources of great power. And I say that it behooves us, in our national self-

interest, to see that we do not permit, through our own folly or indifference, this area to fall into the hands of a great power that can use it in a hostile way. That would only raise the cost of redressing the balance.

Finally, let me say to my friend that there is another great issue at stake here that was in truth at stake in Berlin. If I may draw the parallel—

Mr. GORE. Let me respond to some of the Senator's points before he makes others.

Mr. McGEE. If I am speaking to several points, only because I am attempting to answer the many points the Senator from Tennessee raised.

Mr. GORE. Very well; I yield further.

Mr. McGEE. Each time I respond to half of the Senator's points, he injects another dozen, and I am having difficulty keeping up. So I would appreciate it if I could finish the context of his suggestions just made.

The question of the uncertainties of the people in southeast Asia, it seems to me, is a very large question. In Western Europe, at the time of the Berlin crisis, we were friends of the English, the French, and many others. They knew what we stood for. But they were not sure that the great power that we were left with at the end of the war would be used to try to protect a balance in Europe. They, too, read a history book.

At the end of the first great war, we went home, and Europe was taken over by the dictators. It was forfeited. The English, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, and the rest of them had to have the answer to that big question: Would the Americans, this time, stay as they had promised when they went to war? They did not know for sure. Would they accommodate with the Russians? Or could they afford to remain outside of this orbit, and remain free?

It took Berlin to answer that, incidentally, to resolve that question in the mind, well as they knew us. What it represented was more the breaking of the blockade. It represented the American will to risk a war in behalf of freedom and an opportunity for a better kind of peace, if that were to be our lot in our time. That is the great questionmark which hangs today over some of the small nations in southeast Asia. Of course they are different from us. They are different because their institutions are sometimes in opposition to our own. But the one thing that they have, that we have, the one thing they can talk about that we can talk about in the same language is the dignity of independence; namely their national identity. It is that identity which makes the difference.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I must interrupt the Senator there. Despite the statement of the able Senator from Wyoming, the Vietnamese people do not have, never have had, and never have known the dignity of individualism, the freedom, the sense of independence which the American people have. They have never even been a nation. They have never been independent. I do not know how the Senator arrives at that conclusion.



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Mr. McGEE. May I respond to that?  
Mr. GORE. Certainly.  
Mr. McGEE. One of the great prizes we won in Asia for the American role there during the war was the prize of winning the complete disintegration of the old colonial empires. They had been there too long.

Mr. GORE. But they had been there 100 years.

Mr. McGEE. After the colonial empires pulled out, those people were sparked by the new and often underestimated drive for national independence, for their own identity as areas, even though those areas sometimes resulted in awkward geographic configurations imposed by colonial powers, and even though it did not always represent a basic ethnic nationalism.

The point remains, typical of most of Asia, as well as Africa and Latin America: The explosion of the nearly independent countries in a drive to further their own independence again. This is true of southeast Asia. It is that spirit of historic craving for independence to which I am referring when I draw that analogy. All I am saying is that these countries need to know where we stand. Are they going to have to live beneath the shadow of the great giant to the north, not knowing from one day to the next what the future of their own independence may be? Are they going to have to accommodate themselves in some way, economically and politically—as we have seen through the National Liberation Front movement—to the regimes in the north? They do not know. It makes a difference to them, because they would like very much to survive some way. They need to know whether it will be a shield or a wall behind which, as was the case in Western Europe, they would have a reasonable opportunity to struggle, in some tortuous way, up the scale of economic, social and political growth.

God knows, they have a long way to go. That is another reason, it seems to me, why this question mark hangs over us, the same kind of question mark that poses the same fundamental question which was posed in a far more mature way, and in a far more elevated scale of living, in the politics of Western Europe, but it is, nonetheless, the kind of spirit that causes their hearts to beat a little faster. I am sure that they are as proud of their nationalism as we are of ours. That is why we are there. That is why we have to take over and be there. That is why we have to follow through this responsibility as well.

Let me say in conclusion to my friend the Senator from Tennessee, in response to the particular issue which has been raised—

Mr. GORE. I must interrupt the Senator. I do not believe that is the reason we are there at all. We are not in Vietnam because of the nationalism of the Vietnamese people.

Mr. McGEE. There the Senator goes again, lifting my words out of context.

Mr. GORE. The Senator just stated—

Mr. McGEE. I have been speaking for a great many minutes with the Senator. I have stressed the balance of

power in southeast Asia. I have stressed the lessons learned in fighting aggression. I have stressed the element of the nationalistic ambitions of the people. Therefore, if the Senator would be willing to keep what I have said in its total context when he refers to my explanation of independence and our presence in South Vietnam, it would be appreciated.

Mr. GORE. I shall be happy to deal with the total context of the able Senator's very eloquent interjection. It is true that there are lessons to learn from history. It is true that we can draw some wisdom from the events of the past; but I, as a limited historian, have not noticed history repeating itself very often. It is much less likely to do so in the nuclear age. Never before have we had the balance of power, the means of communication, and the power of almost total destruction in the hands of a few powers as it exists today.

Mr. McGEE. Did the Senator say "never before"?

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator kindly let me proceed, please?

Mr. McGEE. Of course.

Mr. GORE. The Senator very ably cites many incidents of the past and many tragic historic occurrences. Then he makes what I believe is a grievous error in drawing an analogy between every one of those occurrences and Vietnam.

They are simply not analogies. True, we have made errors. True, we have succeeded in containing communism in the Mediterranean basin to some extent, although we have not exterminated it. The largest political party in Italy is still the Communist Party.

Once again, I suggest, that is a situation which is not analogous. But, to hasten on to my address, and to make summary comment, the Senator has again referred to Berlin and to Russian nuclear missiles on Cuba.

As one Senator, I was fully prepared to accept the risk of a third world war—a nuclear war—when the Russians attempted to put their atomic missiles in Cuba. This was a risk which I thought we should take. It happened that I was a delegate to the United Nations at the time. There, I saw the secret communication between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. Never in all my life have I been so proud of an American President as I was during that dramatic episode. I shall not undertake to quote the communication except to say in essence that the President told Mr. Khrushchev that the missiles must be removed from Cuba and quickly, that if he did not take them off, we would.

This was a risk which we had to take because the stakes were high. The vital interests of America were at stake. I am not sure that the balance of power in the world was not also at stake.

At least, our freedom of action would clearly have been compromised had we allowed Russian missiles to remain in Cuba.

I was prepared, in my own mind, to support the risk of war over Berlin, because there, too, I thought the balance of power was at stake. But I am, not willing to go over the brink of the abyss

toward a third world war over Vietnam.

Let me repeat, it is important, but it does not, in my opinion, involve our vital interests. Communism there would be disagreeable and undesirable, but surely no more disastrous to the United States in Vietnam than it is in Cuba.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator does not really believe that, does he?

Mr. GORE. Indeed I do. I do not know why the Senator asked the question in that way.

Mr. McGEE. Will the Senator yield—

Mr. GORE. Not for the moment. Indeed, I believe it. I have been trying for the last hour to convince the Senator of the error of his way when he undertakes to draw an analogy, to establish a comparable priority, between Vietnam and Western Europe, between anything and everything in the world. He says, we can no longer pick and choose; we have to take them where they are.

Mr. McGEE. Between Western Europe and Asia. The Senator is running a little loose on this analogy. It is between Western Europe and Asia.

Mr. GORE. If I am running a little loose it is only because I am quoting the Senator.

Mr. McGEE. The Senator withdrew a statement earlier. I assume he wants to withdraw this.

Mr. GORE. No, I do not withdraw it. The Senator has made a second explanation, but he has arrived at the same conclusion he previously stated.

If I may, I would like to get back to the historical development of our escalation—

Mr. McGEE. Is the Senator terminating the colloquy? I asked him to yield a moment ago.

Mr. GORE. If the Senator wishes me to yield, I do so.

Mr. McGEE. I understood the Senator was responding to my comments that I have been making for an hour or so.

Mr. GORE. I am happy to yield further, as much as the Senator desires.

Mr. McGEE. May I say that my friend and I disagree over—

Mr. GORE. We have disagreed. Let us go to another point.

Mr. McGEE. My friend and I disagree. The central point is whether Vietnam by right is of such importance as for us to assume whatever risk may be involved in our presence there. These are risks we cannot foresee. We have to make educated guesses. I said this risk is of a high priority, in the national interest and that of the world, because I feel that what we do or fail to do in southeast Asia can well write the real future of eastern Asia in terms of the various potentials of power that are loose in that area. Therefore, our fundamental disagreement rests, if I understand the Senator correctly, upon the issue that Vietnam is only another small country, in which there may or may not be communism. If we leave the word "communism" out of the debate, we can see the issue a little more clearly. I think it is a matter of aggression. It is a matter of power that jeopardizes the balance in this critical area, where the power cal-

culations, by offsetting the balances, bring about stability.

It is awful to talk about "balance of power." I know that. But balance of power is still the only substitute which man, in all his foolishness, has been able to find for war. That is a sorry commentary on the human race.

Mr. GORE. And does the Senator say that Communist control of Vietnam would bring about a shift of that balance of power?

Mr. McGEE. I suggest that, in the same hour to which the Senator has alluded, I have been trying to make that point.

Mr. GORE. The Senator thinks that is so?

Mr. McGEE. I do. I believe the balance of power in Asia depends on our presence there.

Mr. GORE. The Senator mentioned the numerous minerals in that area. Can the Senator name one strategic product in South Vietnam?

Mr. McGEE. I think rice itself would be a considerable inducement—

Mr. GORE. That is the first time I have heard rice described as a strategic material. I thought it was a bit starchy.

Mr. McGEE. People have happened to become a basic indispensable resource in the modern sinews of power. Rice happens to be a part of what is necessary for those people to survive.

Mr. GORE. Will the Senator name me a strategic mineral exported from South Vietnam?

Mr. McGEE. I think that is irrelevant. The Senator, with his skillful debating, is getting by the point.

Mr. GORE. No; I am trying to get the Senator on the point.

Mr. McGEE. Vietnam lies astride a vast area—

Mr. GORE. The Senator is talking about strategic materials. That is a geographic point.

Mr. McGEE. It is astride a vast area of 300 million people, and rice is necessary to them. There are bauxite, tin, rubber, oil—

Mr. GORE. The point I am trying to make is that, with respect to Vietnam, there is nothing but confusion.

Mr. McGEE. Vietnam is a symbol. Mr. GORE. Now the Senator talks about a symbol.

Mr. McGEE. It is a symbol of the whole area, and that is at stake just as much as Manchuria, even with its remoteness, was deemed to be unrelated to the rise of Japan.

Mr. GORE. The Senator is drawing an analogy—

Mr. McGEE. Whenever the Senator finds an uncomfortable analogy, he downgrades the analogy. We can learn from the pages of the history books. Let us not do it this time. The only way not to do it is on the side of not ignoring aggression in the hope that no more will take place.

Mr. GORE. I do not find the analogy uncomfortable. I find it abstruse.

Mr. McGEE. The pattern worldwide, it seems to me, is whether we should seek to confront aggression, which had something to do with the beginning of World War II, and has something to

do with the aftermath following that same conflict; that we would be mistaken in trying to confine our analysis to a single incident; and that the tactics and strategy are the same. Even though the strategy may remain the same, the tactics may differ. The fact is that the tactics of Russia in Iran were not the same tactics she took in Greece, in Turkey, or in Berlin or Korea.

Mr. GORE. The Senator is now generalizing.

Mr. McGEE. I am trying to put it in perspective, as the Senator has suggested.

Mr. GORE. The Senator has said that Vietnam would affect the balance of power. He has talked about the rich strategic minerals and products and the people of Vietnam. I have asked him to name one of those strategic materials. He has named rice.

Mr. McGEE. I wish the Senator would not—

Mr. GORE. Does the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] feel the need of more rice?

Mr. McGEE. The Senator reduces the power concept to a ridiculous concept. He knows what the sinews of power are.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In Arkansas we are great producers of rice. A 10-percent increase in acreage has just been announced. Vietnam ought to be producing its own rice. Formerly it did.

Will the Senator yield to me for a question?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Unfortunately, I did not hear the analogies which the Senator from Wyoming mentioned. Who is the aggressor? Did the Senator indicate who he thought was the aggressor in South Vietnam?

Mr. GORE. I would rather yield to the Senator from Wyoming on that point.

Mr. LAUSCHE. What is the question?

Mr. McGEE. As I understand, the question is whether we had attempted to name the aggressor.

Mr. GORE. Whether the Senator from Wyoming had named the aggressor?

Mr. McGEE. I believe the record is rather replete with evidence that the aggressor that we are concerned about at this particular point is the aggression across the 17th parallel from the north, through the National Liberation Front, and through regular units which have come down.

Mr. GORE. Is that a sufficient answer for the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought that part of the discussion indicated that it was China which was the aggressor. I was not clear who the Senator thought was the aggressor.

Mr. McGEE. We were discussing China as being a major source of power.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Does the Senator from Arkansas claim that the United States is the aggressor?

Mr. GORE. I yielded to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not hear the beginning of the colloquy with the Sen-

ator from Wyoming. He was drawing an analogy of various other places.

Can the Senator remember when the United States ever before stepped into the shoes of a former colonial power, as we have done in South Vietnam, in which we support a colonial power in trying to retain its power, as we did in the case of France?

Is it not true that in nearly every case that I can think of our sympathies and support have been on the side of the colony seeking freedom from the colonial master?

Mr. GORE. The statement of the Senator is certainly true, and this is consistent with our national origin.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GORE. We came into being through a revolution, through insurgency. This country has sympathetically responded to moves of independence and I do not now recall any other instance—

Mr. President, may I ask for order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. GORE. I do not recall any other instance in history when the United States has gone to the aid of a country to retain its colonial empire.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is the only one that I know of.

Mr. GORE. And we went heavily. I believe the cost was about \$2 billion. The Vietnamese people did not wish France to continue her exploitation. They resisted. They fought victoriously at Dienbienphu. They fought viciously and won. We made the very great and grave mistake of undertaking this burden after the French, after fighting 7 years with an army of up to 400,000 men, with our almost unlimited aid, had failed.

I cite that as an answer to the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is what I thought. This situation is not comparable, it seems to me, to Berlin or hardly any other case that has been mentioned in the course of the colloquy in the recent exchange. There are many differences in this case from many of the other analogies referred to.

Most important is that Vietnam was seeking to recover her independence, which was taken from her by force in 1784 or 1785. Normally, in our traditional way, we would have favored that.

Instead of that, in this case, for reasons unrelated to Vietnam, we took the side of the French and did our best to retain their colonial control. This has led to many unfortunate results. I thought that should be clear for the Record.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. GORE. No; I do not now yield. I wish first to respond to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

I know of no valid analogy that can be drawn between the predicament in Vietnam and any other instance in which we have been engaged. It is quite unique.

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Mr. FULBRIGHT. I feel that way. There are no similar analogies anywhere in the world.

Mr. GORE. The question on which the distinguished Senator from Wyoming and I have been engaged in extended debate turns on this point.

The able Senator equates Vietnam with World War II, with Munich, with missiles in Cuba, with Berlin, and with just about every instance that he has thus far recalled in history. I do not believe they are on all fours.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe they are relevant.

Mr. GORE. There may be a certain relevancy, but in my view they are certainly not analogous.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with the Senator if I understood him to say that Vietnam, *per se*—and leaving for later discussion the influence of China—is not vital to the security of the United States.

Mr. GORE. Does the Senator agree with me that Vietnam does not constitute the balance of power between the major powers of the world?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do agree with the Senator. It is a weak and poor country, with no industrialization to speak of. It formerly had almost a large surplus of rice. It is now importing rice due to the destruction as a result of this war. For the foreseeable future it is a very poor country that will need a great deal of assistance for its problems.

Will the Senator not agree that apparently behind the concern about Vietnam is really a concern about China in the minds of those who exaggerate, in my view, or emphasize the significance of Vietnam?

Mr. GORE. I believe in all fairness and candor that I should say that this is behind my concern also, but from a different point of view.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is from mine, too.

This is a matter one must consider; and we in the Senate should try to understand what is the significance of China, what role she has played in the past, and what she may be playing in the present.

I do not believe that it is at all clear at the moment.

Mr. GORE. I agree.

I wish now to take the opportunity to express my appreciation to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations for having taken the initiative to promote a better examination of the issues herein involved.

I was in my home State over the weekend, and I heard many expressions of appreciation for the committee hearings. People considered them enlightening and educational. "For the first time," they said, "we begin to understand the issues involved."

Mr. President, this is a democracy. We can follow the course of wisdom only to the extent that our people are enlightened and informed. It is only from information and enlightenment that a wise decision can be reached.

I thank the chairman.

Expressions have been made here to the effect that we are aiding communism by holding these hearings, or by engaging in the kind of debate that has been held on the floor of the Senate today.

I reject that argument. I believe that our democratic processes must operate. We lose the most precious element we have if we forego that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. First, I wish to express my appreciation for what the Senator has said about the hearings. I understand that earlier today, before we had completed our hearings on the Asia Bank, there were some rather harsh words said about the hearings. I appreciate the Senator's comments. He has played a very important role in the hearings.

Speaking for myself, I agree that the hearings are most essential. I apologize to the Senate, and I regret that I did not initiate them and that the committee did not initiate them long ago. I can only say that I did not realize earlier how serious this commitment in southeast Asia was.

At the time of the 1964 resolution I really had no realization of what we were about to get into, or how it was about to escalate, or certainly I would have held hearings then. I regret that we did not do this earlier. However, it is better to have the hearings now than not at all.

If the Senator and his committee colleagues are agreeable, I hope we shall be able to continue to have some hearings for the education and enlightenment of the people of this country and of the Senate.

Mr. McGEHE. I am sure the Senator from Tennessee recalls my earlier comments on that point.

Mr. GORE. I am pleased to say that the senior Senator from Wyoming said that although the Communists are our enemies, and might draw some encouragement and some glee from the debate, nevertheless, on balance, in his view, the debate is an essential part of the working of our democratic process. The able Senator from Wyoming and I have had some difficulty agreeing on numerous points, but we agreed on that one.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to hear that.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, following a very knowledgeable, although I fear too lengthy colloquy with my colleagues, I shall return to the history of our involvement in Vietnam. I shall resume with the assassination of President Diem. I had said that the subsequent overthrow and assassination of Diem did not produce either reform or stability.

Since 1963, a succession of governments, some military and some civilian, have operated one step removed from utter chaos. The pace of deterioration became more rapid. As our aid was further increased and our military advisers became more numerous, the Vietcong increased its control over the

countryside both in terms of geography and people. But we continued to maintain the fiction that our role was that of providing assistance to the sovereign Government of South Vietnam in its struggle for freedom. On June 2, 1964, President Johnson, referring to the October 1954 letter from President Eisenhower, stated:

We will keep this commitment. In the case of Vietnam, our commitment today is just the same as the commitment made by President Eisenhower to President Diem in 1954—a commitment to help these people help themselves.

Events took a significant turn on August 2 and 4 of 1964, when North Vietnamese gunboats attacked U.S. Navy ships in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. President Johnson ordered immediate retaliatory action against gunboat bases in North Vietnam. His action was strongly supported by the overwhelmingly majority of Congress and the American people. This included the senior Senator from Tennessee. As I recall, the President described the retaliatory action as a limited response to the attack on our ships on the high seas. Shortly thereafter, as the President's request, the Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution supporting the determination of the President to take "all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The resolution has been interpreted by some as giving the President *carte blanche* authority to wage undeclared war.

I shall not enter into a discussion of this issue except to say that I did not so regard it. But raising legalistic questions will not solve our current problems. We must deal with the situation as it exists, whatever may be the theoretical legal arguments about how it was created. It has been suggested that Congress can rescind that action. But of what benefit would that be? What has been done cannot be repealed. We must start from where we are.

Since August of 1964 we have witnessed steady escalation of the scope of U.S. participation in the conflict. Our military forces on the scene have been drastically increased in numbers and are now committed to combat. Beginning a year ago, planes have carried the war to North Vietnam with bombing raids almost on an around-the-clock basis. We have engaged in saturation bombing of the jungles with our B-52 bombers. All of this has been done without visible measurable progress in bringing the situation under control.

The flow of supplies and recruits from the North has continued, but the strength and manpower of the Vietcong is still predominantly indigenous to South Vietnam.

If I correctly understand the situation, the brutalities, the atrocities, and the horrible bestiality that are practiced upon the people in the villages of Vietnam are committed by the South Vietnamese Vietcong adherents.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield for a statement on that point?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I reject vigorously and vehemently the statement that the South Vietnamese are the perpetrators of torture and bestiality. The truth is that the Communists and the North Vietnamese are the ones that are perpetrating it.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President—

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee permit me to comment on that statement?

Mr. GORE. In just a moment, I am willing to have the Senator from Ohio make his statement, but I do not believe that the facts support his statement. The overwhelming preponderance of the forces of the Vietcong and the Communist forces that have been in South Vietnam are indigenous to South Vietnam. It is true that many of them have been trained in North Vietnam; that they are supplied by the North Vietnamese; and that to a large extent they are directed by the Communist Party and officials in Hanoi. But the fact is that perhaps as much as 80 percent of the forces that we face there as enemies are South Vietnamese Communists or Vietcong forces that are augmented, supplied, directed, or abetted by the North Vietnamese. I believe that the testimony before our committee clearly supports this statement.

If the Senator from Ohio draws a distinction between the South Vietnamese, on the one hand, and Communists on the other, there might be a basis for his statement. But, as I understand, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong fight side by side and perpetrate horrible crimes together. But it has been my impression that the Vietcong constituted the vast majority of those forces and therefore perpetrated the greater majority of the wrongs.

Mr. LAUSCHE. With that modification, there is some good reason for the Senator from Tennessee to make his statement.

Mr. GORE. In other words, we perhaps misunderstood each other.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The implication contained in the original statement was that the Communists are free from guilt of torture and atrocities, and that all the blame lies with the anti-Communists.

Mr. GORE. I am sorry that the Senator from Ohio so interpreted my statement; I surely did not so mean it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The records are replete with statements that the Communists have practiced the most violent atrocities imaginable.

Mr. GORE. I agree.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The lives of the chiefs, the mayors, and the other friends of the West have a duration of about 4 months. Within 4 months, their heads are removed from their bodies and are placed on pikes for the observation of the innocent South Vietnamese citizens.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator. Many of the victims have been the innocent teachers of little children. If the inference first drawn by the Senator from Ohio could be read

from my statement, I wish it made explicit that I did not so intend.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I point out that very obviously there have been atrocities on both sides. This is the kind of war that produces atrocities.

I am fully aware of the consistent atrocities practiced by the Vietcong. As the Senator points out, there have been executions—murders—of village leaders, teachers, and others. There have been atrocities by both parties in the civil war. These people are not fighting under the kind of Marquis de Queensbury rules which we should like to see applied. One atrocity breeds another.

While the atrocity of planting bombs in buses and restaurants is horrible, I think there is not a vast distinction to be drawn between dropping bombs from the air, supposedly on strategic targets—which bombs kill many innocent people—and any other kind of bombing.

It is a matter of record that in the bombing of South Vietnam, with napalm and other high explosives, our bombs have killed many innocent peasants. It is a part of the whole atrocity of that war itself.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I know of no war in history that better illustrates the accuracy of the old statement that war is hell than this war in Vietnam. The atrocities committed by the Communists in this war are really unbelievable in their viciousness.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I do not believe that we can justifiably and in fairness to our country place the atrocities admittedly proved to be committed by the Communists on an equal basis with our action and say that our country is following a similar course. We are not doing that.

Mr. GORE. The Senator did not understand me to say that.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator did not say that. However, the fact is that we have been most charitable. We have been enduring the brutality of the Communists. It is not true that when the people of the United States are told that, with our entire ethnical background, our acts parallel the acts of the Communists.

Mr. GORE. I know of no one who has said that. And if anyone does say it, I shall join the Senator in denouncing him.

Mr. President, last summer, with further rapid deterioration in South Vietnam, President Johnson and his advisers undertook a full-scale review of our military commitments and our military operations. There was much public speculation about a major escalation of the war. It was widely reported that the military leaders had recommended that some 400,000 troops be committed to Vietnam.

When the President announced his decision after much public speculation about what that decision would be—in a July 28, 1965 statement, however, it appeared that he had resisted the massive escalation that has been urged upon

him. It was announced that 50,000 additional troops would be sent to Vietnam. In commenting on the President's statement, I said on the floor of the Senate:

I took some heart and found some encouragement in President Johnson's statement today for the following reasons:

First, the President has apparently resisted the far greater degree of escalation that has been urged upon him.

Second, the President stopped short of accepting, or treating this as an American war. He showed an awareness of the fact that our policy has been, and, I think should be, to assist the Vietnamese to win their own war. I believe the President showed a keen awareness of the danger of permitting the struggle to become an American war, a white man's war against Asia.

According to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services in a statement earlier today, our troop strength in that area is now in the neighborhood of 300,000—and our "highest military authorities" are talking of 600,000 men being sent there.

I was heartened by references in the July 28, 1965, pronouncement to the possibility that the good offices of the United Nations might be utilized in an effort to find a solution. I read from my July 28, 1965, remarks in the Senate:

Third, by his increased emphasis upon the United Nations through his letter delivered today by Ambassador Goldberg to Mr. U Thant, the President demonstrated, it seemed to me, an awareness of the danger of isolating the United States in a land war in Asia and the danger of unifying the Communist world into monolithic unity by the landing of a major American expeditionary force in Asia.

Should this happen it might well be that we would not be permitted the luxury of concentrating most of our forces in Vietnam.

I had earlier applauded the President's Johns Hopkins University speech in which he announced clearly our willingness to negotiate with interested nations without preconditions. More recently, the pause in the bombing of North Vietnam and the widely publicized peace offensive conducted by President Johnson have served to improve our posture in the eyes of world opinion. The President is to be commended for having made this effort, and again I commend him.

But the fact remains that this effort did not succeed in bringing the controversy to the bargaining table. Moreover, the further effort to utilize the United Nations which was begun when bombing of North Vietnam was resumed has thus far not been particularly fruitful.

And so, Mr. President, all our prior actions having failed to resolve the controversy, or even to have brought a solution nearer, another major escalation has been under consideration.

There are important differences, I think, between our situation now and what it was last summer. Another escalation must be considered in the light of the fact that our military effort has already been substantially escalated over what it was last summer. Each time our policy has been reviewed over the years, the result has been that our involvement has been deepened and the level of our military effort has been escalated. At

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each step we have become more heavily committed, the problem has become more complex, solutions have become more elusive, and the potential consequences of any course of action have become more serious.

Thus has our commitment evolved, step by step until what many now regard as our obligation in Vietnam bears no resemblance to the obligation we actually incurred under the Eisenhower letter of 1954 and the SEATO Treaty. The pattern of step-by-step escalation of our commitment, accompanied with repeated assurances that we seek no wider war, concerns me greatly and I am apprehensive that this pattern may be continued. And that is the purpose of this speech.

We have been told repeatedly that we are in Vietnam only to help the Vietnamese help themselves. This was not to become an American war. But we have gone by successive stages from the extension of economic aid, to military aid, to military "advisers" and technicians, to troops to protect vital American installations, and finally to full-scale offensive commitment of U.S. ground forces and the bombing of North Vietnam. It has become an American war.

If we had insisted upon the terms and conditions contained in President Eisenhower's 1954 letter, we would have long since had to terminate any assistance at all in Vietnam. But we did not insist.

From a review of the record it seems clear to me that we have no binding legal commitment that requires us to expend the effort we have undertaken in Vietnam. What commitment we have, we have managed to create for ourselves. It is as if, by saying over and over publicly that we are committed to restore order and tranquillity in South Vietnam, we have somehow convinced ourselves that we are legally bound to do so, whatever the cost.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have before me the SEATO Treaty. Article 4 of that treaty reads:

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this

Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

This is the protocol, which provides:

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

Mr. President, I interpret that as a commitment to help these people defend and hold their territorial sovereignty and integrity, and that that is a binding agreement that we made.

If, in our judgment, this agreement for the benefit of a third party means we are going to help them maintain the "inviolability and integrity of their territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any party in the treaty area" when threatened by any means, whether by armed attack or by means other than armed attack, it seems to me that we have a treaty which compels us to act to help these people maintain their own territorial integrity and sovereignty against Communist enslavement.

Mr. GORE. I appreciate the Senator's reference to the SEATO treaty. For his information, I have previously dealt with that and have given reasons why I think this treaty does not amount to a binding commitment to do what we are doing or what is contemplated in Vietnam. I should be glad to discuss it again, but I have already done so.

Does the Senator from South Dakota wish me to yield?

Mr. McGOVERN. Yes, I wish to make a brief observation. I know the Senator has been on his feet for a long time, but I was particularly grateful for the point he has made, that we must beware of the danger of making this an American war. I think the Senator is absolutely correct; this is a struggle which, in the last analysis, must be decided primarily by the people of Vietnam themselves.

Frequently, people draw the wrong parallels with other situations.

We are in South Vietnam with over 200,000 American forces and billions of dollars in American aid. The government there has not been able to put together an indigenous army capable of providing the kind of resistance and successful effort that we saw, for instance, in Greece at the end of World War II.

Mr. GORE. I thank the Senator very much. As I see it, the Communists have us committed to war in an area where we face the greatest possible disadvantages. Second, they have us committed there all alone. Third, if what some of my colleagues have said today be true, we must treat this commitment with the same degree of priority that we should treat an attempt to enslave Western Europe, or to put Russian nuclear missiles on Cuba.

I do not believe the situation is quite that bad, but I appreciate the relevancy of the Senator's remarks.

I recognize that, in addition to whatever formal legal commitment we have in Vietnam, there is also what is called our moral commitment to assist a people in quest of freedom. I do not subscribe

to the view that the Vietcong movement is simply a popular indigenous uprising against the remnants of despotic colonialism. Evidence of Vietcong terrorism, of direction and support from Hanoi is clear. The Vietcong, if they could do so, would in my opinion doubtless establish a repressive Communist regime.

But, Mr. President, there are many other communist regimes, including the one in Cuba. Our moral commitment to liberate Cuba should be at least equally strong. Even so, it does not necessarily follow that we should launch a major military effort to overthrow Castro.

These indefinite "moral commitments" have their limitations. They must be measured by our national interest.

In reality, our present commitment in Vietnam has evolved from the fact of our presence. Each time we have increased our presence we have enlarged our commitment. Each time we have escalated our presence and effort our dilemma has become magnified.

The distinguished former Ambassador, Mr. George F. Kennan, in his recent forceful testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, stated as follows:

The first point I would like to make is that if we were not already involved as we are today in Vietnam, I would know of no reason why we should wish to become so involved, and I can think of several reasons why we should wish not to.

In this statement I concur completely.

In the final analysis we should be guided by our own vital national interests. It is my view that our national interests are not served by a major military operation in southeast Asia.

First, even if we accept the inevitability of military solutions to cold war problems—which I do not necessarily do—it is difficult to imagine more disadvantageous conditions under which to wage war than those which prevail in South Vietnam.

Second, we stand virtually alone in the struggle. We have received only token support from a few of our allies. Other free world nations do not even agree with what we are doing in this unhappy area. They find it difficult to understand why we are there. It is not that our Government has failed to explain our position. It is simply that they do not believe that either their interests or ours are served by the conflict. On the contrary, they think the free world's position is endangered. In going it alone we violate the principle of collective security to which we committed ourselves when we subscribed to the United Nations Charter. We cannot, standing alone, remake the world, and it does not serve our national interests to try on the scale and under the conditions which prevail in Vietnam.

Third, we must, as I stated earlier, be guided by our position and our posture on a global basis, with recognition of the fact that our strength, though greater than that ever enjoyed by any nation, is not limitless. We have responsibilities around the world. We must meet our commitments in NATO. We still have two divisions in Korea. We have problems and responsibilities within our own hemisphere. Our military and eco-



conomic substance is committed in varying degrees to many nations.

Vietnam is not the only area of the world in turmoil or the only area facing the threat of Communist subversion. As we become increasingly committed in Vietnam, other pastures look correspondingly greener to our major adversaries. The Soviets, or not inconceivably the Chinese, may become sorely tempted to launch or promote other adventures in Latin America, in Berlin, in Africa, or elsewhere in Asia. If so, our heavy commitment in Vietnam lessens our capability to respond quickly and effectively, or at least the Communists may think so.

Fourth, the present conflict poses great danger of escalation into nuclear war, a tragedy that would surely be contrary to our vital interests as well as those of every nation. We cannot afford to overlook the equation among the three major world powers—the United States, Soviet Russia, and Communist China—either from the standpoint of the effect of this equation on preservation of peace, or how the equation would be altered by hostilities between either two of them.

One of the more encouraging developments of the last decade has been the break in the monolithic structure of international communism as reflected by the growing schism between Russia and Red China. Meanwhile, there has been an improvement in relations between the United States and Russia. As of today, however, should armed conflict erupt between the United States and Red China, we must assume the Russians would be on the side of China.

The present conflict poses inherent danger of intervention by the Chinese. Every time the war is escalated this danger increases. If we continue to escalate, such a conflict may well become inevitable. With or without initial Soviet intervention in a United States-China war, such a conflict would almost certainly degenerate into a nuclear war. We could hardly fight the hordes of Chinese on their home grounds without resort at least to tactical nuclear weapons. And when nuclear weapons are used, the very existence of civilization is in jeopardy.

Mr. President, these are some of the dangers and difficulties we face. From the standpoint of our national interest, the basic question is whether the stakes are sufficiently high to warrant the risks we assume or are about to assume. In my view, they are not.

From a strategic standpoint, considering the means of communication and transportation of today, South Vietnam does not appear to be of great importance. It has little industrial capability. It has no strategic resources that we require. Indeed, it might well be considered a liability of any major power of which it becomes a ward. It has surely been a liability to us, both in terms of cost and in terms of world opinion.

Some express the point of view that we might better fight now, in Vietnam, than later somewhere else. As I said earlier, if indeed we must fight, we surely could pick a better place, if not a better time.

Some say it would be easier to knock China out now than 10 years from now. I reject the preventive war philosophy. When the cold war began, strident voices urged that we make war on Russia while we had what amounted to a practical nuclear monopoly. I am glad that these voices were not heeded. Many of these same voices now urge preventive war on Red China, urging that we should welcome a confrontation before China becomes a major nuclear power. I hope that these voices will likewise be rejected. There is scant hope for mankind if we accept the view that nuclear war can solve our problems.

It seems to me conclusive that our vital national interests are not served by our involvement in Vietnam. But that does not change the fact that we are there. We must of course consider our future course of action in the light of the facts as they exist rather than as we would like them to be.

A review of how we got where we are, however, does have a bearing upon what we should do in the future. It is for this reason that I have undertaken this rather lengthy, but still not detailed, review of the history of our Vietnam involvement. The record of the last 12 years has demonstrated a pattern of escalation that has been singularly ineffective. If step by step escalation is a policy, it is a poor one. And each additional major step of escalation will compound our problems and pose increasingly disastrous possible consequences.

Mr. President, I wish I could offer a solution that would be in our national interest and at the same time assure attainment of all our objectives in Vietnam. The truth is that no satisfactory solution is now foreseeable, given the present circumstances. It is a question of selecting a course of action that is least unsatisfactory under all the circumstances. Further escalation, with its cost in life and with the risks inherent therein, is surely not prudent, as I see it.

The President has said repeatedly, and he said again last Friday, that he is against escalation, and I am confident that he is. But the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], chairman of the Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee, has spoken of a possible commitment of 600,000 troops in southeast Asia and the possible use of nuclear weapons if necessary. I have had the privilege of discussing his speech with the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS]. He says that he did not advocate, and I did not understand that he advocated, use of nuclear weapons, but, rather, he expressed the view, in which I have today earlier joined, that a war between the United States and China would make use of nuclear weapons highly likely for the reason, as I have stated—and as I understand the Senator from Mississippi to state—that the American people would not permit their sons to be matched man to man with the masses of Chinese in Asia without using whatever weapons might be at hand.

The able senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], a member of both the

Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, stated last week that this troop estimate of 600,000 did not originate with the junior Senator from Mississippi, that it came from "highest military authority." The Senator from Missouri referred to this estimate in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings when he addressed Ambassador Kennan, as follows:

Mr. Kennan, there has been mention of a figure of 600,000 people in South Vietnam by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. That figure did not originate with him. It came from the highest military authority in a hearing before the Armed Services Committee.

The American people have been told over the years that an Asian war should be fought by Asians, that we would confine our efforts to helping the South Vietnamese to help themselves, that we should not send American boys to do the job that Asians should do for themselves. Yet, step by step, escalation by escalation, our country has been brought into a predicament which the American people were assured would not occur.

I am profoundly apprehensive that we are fast approaching the point at which no options will be left; a point beyond which our actions will be dictated by events over which we have no control. If we do in fact send 600,000 troops to the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam—or 400,000—we should contemplate and prepare for a military confrontation with Red China. A distinguished military expert said on a television program on Sunday that he did not think the Chinese would come in because it was not in their interest to do so. Another distinguished military expert said they would not come into Korea, but they did.

We still, I hope and believe, have some flexibility in determining our course of action. I do not believe the American people would support—if asked—a decision to send 600,000 American boys to fight a land war in southeast Asia, with all the consequences that would entail. But if we inch up, to 300,000, then to 400,000, then to 500,000, then to 600,000, we will find ourselves with that many troops there, even though the administration had no intention of going that far when the first additional increment was ordered into the combat area. We ought to pause now and contemplate where the program of escalation has taken us and where such a program will lead if it is continued.

National prestige is important. It is more important to the weak than to the strong. This Nation has proved its dedication to the cause of freedom and its determination to resist aggression, in Greece and Turkey, in Korea, in Berlin, and in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. We do not have to prove it again by sending half a million men to Asia.

I advise that this war be kept within bounds which appear manageable, with limited goals and limited commitments, that goal being a tolerable political arrangement that would permit honorable disengagement of U.S. combat forces at the earliest feasible time. Once again,

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I advise against a wider war, against a commitment to total victory in a major war in Asia. Here, it seems to me, is the great issue now under debate.

I do not advocate precipitate withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The presence of more than 200,000 American fighting men there precludes such action. I do urge, as strongly as I know how, that we do not further escalate the scope and intensity of the conflict by substantially increasing our forces in the combat area. Admittedly, the current level of our military effort will probably not achieve total victory. Neither, in my opinion would the presence in Vietnam of twice as many U.S. soldiers.

We should accept the fact that total military victory in the normal sense is not achievable in Vietnam, short of action that would obliterate the country and solve nothing. This is not that kind of war. Eventually we shall have to settle for less than total victory, and the sooner this is recognized, the better.

Our military experts can best decide the most appropriate use of our forces in the area and the manner of their replacement. They are formidable, and they are giving a good account of themselves. We can, I believe, sustain them indefinitely if need be, and surely we can do so while further efforts are made to find a solution whereby we can extricate ourselves honorably from a most unfortunate involvement.

Meanwhile, we must continue and intensify our efforts to bring about negotiations, under the auspices of the United Nations or in any acceptable forum, in Geneva or in any other acceptable place. In this connection we should recognize that it is unlikely that we can attain a complete political victory in negotiations, just as it is impossible for us to achieve total military victory by force of arms.

If our adversaries do not already so understand they should stand forewarned that though there may be strong division of opinion over policy, they can never run us out of Vietnam or any other place for want of appropriations from Congress to pay for whatever munitions, equipment, and supplies may be required to sustain our forces.

If our adversaries can take some comfort from the debate, let them have it; but let them know that Congress will not be niggardly in providing whatever our forces need to complete their mission, and with the least possible danger to them.

But Mr. President, I urge the President and the advisers upon whom he relies to consider most carefully our own national interest in its broadest terms and to analyze most carefully the pitfalls of further escalation. We must not pass the point of no return.

Mr. President, it is my intention to vote for the supplemental Vietnam authorization now before the Senate. I do so because it provides funds for American men fighting in Vietnam. They have been committed to action at a time and in a place of which I do not approve. But they are there. And as long as they are there, we must, and we will, support them with everything they need.

I do not want my vote for this supplemental authorization to be construed,

however, as a vote for an indefinite and open-ended commitment of American forces to land war in southeast Asia.

The time has not yet come when that course of action would be essential to protection of the vital interests of the United States. For what other or lesser cause should America go to war?

Indeed, it is my view that further substantial escalation—creeping or galloping—of U.S. men and materiel in Vietnam would be damaging, if not disastrous, to far more important and more vital interests of the United States elsewhere.

By my vote for this bill, I want to make it clear that I will support, and do support, the men and materiel we now have in southeast Asia, but I want no one in doubt that my vote does not go beyond that. This is not a vote for further escalation. We have had enough of that.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GORE. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I highly commend the Senator from Tennessee for a very valuable, constructive speech. He and I do not agree on some vital points as reflected in his speech, but the speech was well prepared, well documented, and was historically accurate in the consecutive steps we have taken. His views were set forth in eloquent fashion. He sincerely and emphatically argues well for the points which he makes. The way he has presented this matter is highly commendable. As a Member of this body, I believe he has made a significant contribution to this debate. Debates like the one of the Senator from Tennessee, as it reflects on this subject, vital as it is, do not divide. They enlighten. They give meat for thought, the way the Senator has presented it. I hope the remainder of the debate will be along those lines.

As the Senator pointed out, the one vote we are asked to make is not on how it all started, but to start from where we are. The bill should receive a unanimous vote. It would be a boon for our boys over there and a warning for our adversaries.

Mr. GORE. The trite phrase "I am deeply grateful" is not sufficient under the circumstances. I am moved by the generosity of my friend, my neighbor, and my distinguished colleague the junior Senator from Mississippi.

I had no intention whatsoever of speaking as long as I have held the floor. When I started, I estimated to one of my colleagues that I would speak for an hour or an hour and a half, but, as the junior Senator from Mississippi knows, there have been numerous requests for me to yield. I felt the issue was of such import that the freest possible exchange of views would be in the public interest.

I close by again saying to my dear friend, "I thank you."

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I should like to join in the remarks made by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi in thanking our distinguished colleague from Tennessee for his very candid and frank statement. It has been free of the vitriol which sometimes enters into arguments. He has presented his argu-

ment in a rational way, although I am constrained to disagree with him on many points.

I should also like to commend the tolerance of the distinguished junior Senator from Mississippi in presenting dissenting points of view that have been raised on this vexing issue. It is wise that we should act as rational men in presenting our varying points of view on this issue.

## WHY WE ARE THERE

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, the fact that the entire Nation is sorely troubled over the present conflict in Vietnam is evidenced here today by the debate on the administration's request for authorization to spend a portion of the extra funds requested for our military efforts there. I support the position of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], that a vote here is neither an endorsement or a criticism of our policies in Vietnam but merely an affirmation of the fact that wherever American boys are sent by their Commander in Chief they should be supplied with the best possible weapons and with the best logistical support that their Nation can give them. However, this action of increasing expenditures to provide these necessary supplies has again focused national attention on Vietnam.

A debate in whatever context on a course of action which may well determine the future course of the entire world is not only fitting, it is indispensable. But it serves no interest, least of all our own, if that debate skirts the hard-core reasons for our presence in Vietnam. Yet in recent weeks, it has seemed to me that we have strayed further and further from the central issue at hand—the "gut issue"—why we are there. Too many dialogs of late seem to center around irrelevant questions, wishes, hopes, and superficial issues. As we turn more intensely now to this national dialog, it is imperative that we put first things first. Let us strip from the verbiage and the oratory of discussion the questions that do not go to the heart of the matter. Let me illustrate.

The question of resuming the bombing in North Vietnam was often discussed as though it were an end in itself, and it was easy to make a case against resumption if it were to be assumed that the top priority was the destruction of North Vietnam by the best available means. If, however, the question was cast in the context of our presence in South Vietnam, the bombing of the north had to be weighed against the needs of attaining our objectives in the south, namely, that of holding a line against the forces of aggression from Hanoi. It becomes a tactical measure then rather than a strategic one.

Bombardment that would interdict supplies of material and men from the north would be difficult to deny. Bombardment aimed only at the scorched earth policy for cities and settled areas would be open to question. It is in the former category that the President was compelled to order the resumption of the air attacks north of the 17th parallel.

Another of the relatively superficial areas of controversy in the public forum is the question of whether we agree to recognize the National Liberation Front and the Vietcong at a mythical conference table. A few days ago I detailed to this body how the record is replete with evidence that the National Liberation Front is nothing more nor less than the instrument of Hanoi. It was created in Hanoi, by Hanoi, for Hanoi as a sham and a front behind which to cloak their aggressive operations across the borders in the neighboring country of South Vietnam.

Still another illustration of a superficial issue is the argument raised this week by some Members of the Senate that we are not getting enough help from our allies to warrant our position in Vietnam. It seems to me that this is completely irrelevant. The real question is, Does our national interest require our presence there? If it does, what our allies do or don't do is beside the point. If our chances for a better future depend upon doing what we are doing in Vietnam, we must go it alone if necessary—regardless of the rest of the world. Anyone who chooses to join us in the endeavor—as New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea have with men and as have other nations in other ways—all the better.

Or even the question of what mainland China may or may not do is really of secondary importance until we resolve the question of primary concern. Do we have a rational alternative to Vietnam? If we have no alternative, and I believe that to be the case, we dare not back out of there because China threatens. In our role as leader of the free world, we dare not knuckle under to that kind of international blackmail. Similar threats were posed by the Soviets during the Berlin blockade and in Cuba.

Needless to say, we would hope that our policy would be sufficiently wise and restrained to meet the needs of achieving our objectives without deliberately provoking the extremes of other powers. But that's the kind of imponderable that only the other side can answer. We cannot live in fear of what that answer might be else all is lost before we start.

Let me hasten to add at this time, Mr. President, that I have no sympathy for those reckless and irresponsible voices in our midst now being raised in behalf of a so-called preventive war against China. You do not prevent a war by starting one. And, as history records, there are many more wars talked about than fought. But when a retired general dares to express the thought that he is afraid that Red China will not attack us, thus creating an excuse to strike back, he casts discredit on the image of a great nation such as our own. Such a senseless observation should confirm us in our determinations to make sure that such spokesmen remain retired.

No one wants war with mainland China if it can be avoided. No one wants war of any sort. But the shape of the world in which we hope to live will be measured in considerable degree by our willingness to risk conflict in behalf of

our larger causes. This is a hard lesson from the history of our time.

Another superficial question is that of the alleged peace feelers from Hanoi. Even as I speak now, there are rumors afoot that yet another so-called peace gesture has come from North Vietnam. The strange thing about these gestures is that there has been to date not a single expression directly or through second-hand sources, in any form whatsoever, from any official sources in North Vietnam and Peiping to the Government of the United States. Yet many critics of our policy in Asia ascribe to the Communists all the virtues of good intent and to our own Government all the vices of deceit and wormongering.

The President of the United States has pursued over 300 overtures and contacts all around the world in pursuit of the possibility for some less violent confrontation in Asia but to no avail. And once again, may I suggest that the question of these peace feelers is still not the central issue but only a surface manifestation of the desperate hopes of millions of people.

Mr. President, as we look back over these several cases in point which I have just cited as either secondary issues at best or superficial questions at worst, what the answers to them ought to be can only be determined in the context of the basis for our presence there. If the assumption of the critics is that we must withdraw from South Vietnam, this would suggest an answer to each of these questions quite different from the answer that would stem from the opposite assumption, that is, that our being there is indispensable to the stability of the world. Once this divergence is resolved, these surface issues take on an entirely different meaning. That's why it is so important that we discipline our public dialogs, our Senate hearings, our letters to the President, to go to the heart of the matter in Vietnam, namely, why we are there.

For the next few minutes, I would like to discuss why I think we are there and why we have no rational alternative but to remain indefinitely. To understand our presence in Vietnam, we must see it as an inseparable part of what we have been striving to do for 20 years in the wake of World War II. In this endeavor, we have sought to reestablish our favorable balance among the contesting power centers on the globe both in Europe and in the Far East. We have also sought to honor the tenuous, if unhappy, division of the spoils of war agreed upon as part of the transition to a more peaceful future.

Further as a result of the lessons preceding World War II, we have sought this time to arrest aggression wherever it was undertaken around the world and at the same time to arrive at a balance of the hopes of newly independent and restless peoples everywhere. Let us examine each of these objectives in America's postwar policy.

First, the new balance of the world. Balance of power is a dirty phrase. In the philosophy of some, it is immoral and wrong. For others, it is wishfully

relegated to another century. But the hard fact of our time is that it remains the only substitute for war that so-called civilized man has been willing to produce.

To be sure, it is a sorry commentary on an advanced society such as Western civilization which has begun to conquer outer space, to score new breakthroughs in other scientific wonders, and to solve many of the persistent mysteries of medicine to note that we are no further advanced in the science of international law and order than the balance of power. This does not make it less true, however. It is important that we begin where we are with what we have, and it should be obvious that we cannot stop where we wish we were or where we ought to be. This brings us back to the imperative requisites of establishing a favorable balance of power in the wake of the disastrous discommodulations of World War II.

That war was especially violent and dislocating on the balance of the world. Not only were three great powers destroyed—Germany, Italy, and Japan—but even two of the victorious powers were left so strapped that they could no longer sustain their historic roles in the delicate balancing process. In fact, only two nations were left in the wake of the war sufficiently strong to contend for the shape of the new balance of the world—obviously, the Soviet Union and the United States.

The requirements of victory at the end of the war were more novel to the United States than to the Soviets. In our own case, we pursued two lines of policy. First, placing a trust in international cooperation, disarmament, and even the sharing with our adversary of atomic secrets when we had a monopoly of them. This direction of policy was more in accord with the idealism of our national history.

The other line of policy was far more difficult, frightening, and—in the short run—even more important, to wit, that of being willing to risk war in order to stop the expanding efforts of the Russians. Without the second of these lines of policy, the first would have no chance. Thus, it became a question of putting first things first.

It was frightening to a nation that had just emerged from the cocoon of idealism; for until that moment in modern history, the United States had looked upon the wars of the world as secondary considerations. Up until then, whenever war broke out in Europe, the Americans had been able to study the two sides and choose the one most in the line with their own national interest. But now it was all changed. The United States, for the first time in history, was one of those two sides. There was no longer the luxury of choice.

Likewise in the past as the world waged its wars, the Americans always had a ring of friendly nations out in front in Europe and behind which they themselves could hesitate, dawdle, and delay until they could make up their minds if or when to join the battle. Now after World War II this was no longer possible. For the first time in our his-

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tory, we in America found ourselves strangely on the front line of the world. In fact, we ourselves were the ring behind whom others hoped to win time and the chance to determine their national destinies. In short, the force of history imposed upon us the heavy responsibilities for waging what in earlier centuries the British, or the French, or the Spanish, or the Portuguese had waged before—the contest for rebalancing a world as much in their favor as their power would command. It was new, costly, dangerous, but nonetheless indispensable.

For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the requirements of victory in the war were less novel and untried. The Soviets, in fact, pursued an historic policy that was Russian long before it was Communist. Lord Palmerston in London put it best more than 100 years ago when he described Russian policy as one constantly pressing outward along the periphery of their own boundaries probing for weakness and soft spots that would permit new conquests short of war. In this competition for the new balance of the world, the Soviets had a measurable advantage—they operated from a contiguous area outward in many directions, whereas the Americans had to operate in several areas far flung around the fringes of those peripheral interests.

The obvious first step by Moscow was to seize and hold the fringe of countries in Eastern Europe already occupied by Soviet armies when the war ended. Their next step was to try to overthrow neighboring governments torn by civil war and disension but not directly occupied by Russian troops. The first step was a fait accompli when the guns stopped firing. But the second step could still be stopped, and it was here that the United States first stepped in with an overt policy of containing Soviet expansion. The answer to the Reds was the commitment to Iran in 1946 and the Truman Doctrine sealing off Greece and Turkey in 1947.

The parallel which it is important we keep in mind in Vietnam may be seen best in Greece in 1946 and 1947. There we were asked to rally behind a corrupt government headed by a king and a questionable royal family with an administration filled with black marketeers and characters of other shady types against what was apparently a genuine people's revolution demanding democracy and freedom. The catch in Greece was that this Greek civil war was being seized upon by organized, trained Communist leaders just over the border in the Balkan countries to the north of Greece as an effort to grab control of the Greek Government. Those leaders were ordered and directed, as we know now, by Moscow. They were not unlike the National Liberation Front in Indochina.

So our decision under the Truman Doctrine was one of sustaining a government of the status quo to prevent a Communist takeover from the north on the one hand or staying out of Greece and surrendering the whole country to an aggressive force from the outside. Our answer is now a matter of the judgment of history. If we had not intervened in Greece, the good people of that country would never have had a chance under

Communist domination which was imminent to develop self-government or to achieve freedom of any sort. But even though we had to back some unsavory characters in the Government, we won for the people of Greece both the time and the chance to win a greater measure of freedom and to grow up to a higher standard of self-government than they had ever known before.

Greece is an excellent parallel to Vietnam. In Vietnam with all of the need that there is for land reform, social opportunity, and political freedom, none of these things will have any chance at all of taking root if the territory is seized by the forces of the aggressor from the north. Those hopes are then dashed. It is imperative that we establish a line and hold it against the invaders from the outside. In effect we must erect a wall behind which South Vietnam will have the chance to do all of the things for which you and I hope.

As a climax to the test between the victors soon after World War II, there was the showdown in Berlin in 1948. And it was there the Americans dramatically and publicly revealed their determination to risk all-out war if necessary to thwart the blockade of that beleaguered former capital of Germany.

In the restoration of Western Europe, this was the high point. And in the language of the great Churchill, this incident was the turning of the tide in the postwar testing of nerves and flexing of muscles between the two sides. It was the highwater mark of what we have since come to call the cold war. As Winston Churchill aptly assessed it:

If the United States had acted in 1948 like she did in 1918, Russia would be on the Atlantic coast of Europe today.

That the competing forces of great power in Western Europe have in fact been brought into balance is best attested to by the easing of the severity of the crises in that part of the world. It can be illustrated by drawing with a piece of chalk a white line on a globe of the world—a line that would begin in Finland to the far north and stretch down across Eastern Europe above Greece and Turkey. That line is so firmly drawn as a result of the competition of forces on either side that neither Moscow nor Washington dares to cross the line with impugny or recklessly. It is in truth a tenuous balancing between the two worlds. That line, though less firm, even extends part way across Asia, along Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and India, almost—but not quite—to the China Sea. Only in the Far East has the balance not been struck. And thereby hangs the story of the second objective of American policy in seeking to restore stability in the postwar world, specifically, the balance of Asia.

In the past it was possible to restore stability in the world after great wars by a simple meeting of the great powers at Vienna or Versailles. The long tentacles of control from London, Paris, and Berlin stretched clear around the world. But in the wake of World War II, the disintegration of colonial powers changes all of this very drastically. The balance of Asia remained, nonetheless, inseparable from

the balance of the world and with it the chance for a more stable peace. But the new disruptive forces let loose in Asia jeopardized the new balance of the Far East. The defeat of Japan, the retreat of the colonial powers, the emerging drive for independence—particularly in south Asia, and the growing strains between Moscow and Peiping combined to bring about a vast rearrangement of the traditional power structure of the Far East.

Even as the uncertainties of the new balance teetered between India and China, southeast Asia remained—as it always had in history—a significant make-weight in the balance of forces. With its 300 millions of people, its vast natural resources of tin, rubber, oil, and rice, its possession had been throughout history one of the sinews of power on the far side of the globe. Its strategic location, moreover, has always accentuated its role in the fortunes of the old great powers of another century. The area still lies athwart the main commercial arteries between east and west. It outflanks India to its west and thrusts toward the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand to the east and south. For the control of this area, Japan started World War II. Under the influence of Peiping, it would measurably disadvantage any other groups seeking to contain China.

Southeast Asia is composed of small entities—Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indochina—that are clustered in awe before the giant shadow cast from Peiping to their north. They are but pygmies by comparison with the new China. Neither singly nor together could they successfully defy the historic ambitions of the Chinese to dominate them.

At the end of the war, many of us had desperately hoped that India, in her newly won independence, would become the great counterweight to China. But Nehru thought otherwise too late. Japan might have become a counterforce, but we were not sure she could be trusted. So that once again the hard fact is that only the United States is capable of balancing the awesome potentials of the new China. We alone provide an alternative to the little nations of south Asia. Either they must accommodate to China under the threat of force or continue their independent ways behind a wall capable of restraining the expansion of Peiping. It is the second alternative that we alone can provide. That also is why we must remain in Vietnam.

A third thread of American policy since the war is woven around the tacit, if unhappy, arrangements for divided authority in disputed areas between the United States and her allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and later China on the other. By these terms, the defining of the limits of conflicting interest was speeded up and clarified. They hastened the day when the world in fact would be rebalanced and restabilized in the wake of the havoc wrought by World War II. Thus, the division of Germany; two Berlins; the two Chinas astride the Formosa Straits; two Koreas along the 38th parallel; and, with the withdrawal of the French from Indochina at the Geneva Conference in 1954, the two Viet-

nams along the 17th parallel. Unhappy as we were with this kind of divided territory, it at least was an accommodation to achieve the transition from military victory to postwar stability. Whatever else, American policy was committed to holding those lines of division and not permitting pressures from the east to erode them.

At the risk of total war, we lived up to that determination in Berlin in 1948. At the risk of the big war with China, we sustained that line along the Formosa Straits in 1949 and the 38th parallel in 1950. And today we are demanding that the line drawn along the 17th parallel be equally respected. The line separating the two Vietnams is thus cut from the same cloth as Berlin, and Germany, and Formosa, and Korea.

But the restoration of an equilibrium of forces around the world is only the beginning of the policy goals of the United States. It is not the end which we seek but rather the beginning.

A restabilized world is the starting point, not the stopping point of our policy. Above and beyond it is our ever-constant dedication to all peoples of their right to national independence and to freedom from the fear of force from outside their borders. This means that, out of the events that produced World War II, we should have learned that we cannot ransom our own freedom or security with somebody else's territory; that we cannot barter a neighbor's real estate for our own survival. We should have learned in Manchuria in 1931, along the Rhineland in 1935, in Ethiopia in 1936, and at Munich in 1938, moreover, that the appetite of an aggressor cannot be appeased with someone else's land. To knuckle under to the threat of force only whets the appetite of the tyrants of power. The price for appeasing the aggressors in the 1930's was World War II in the 1940's. Likewise, the cost of appeasing the Chinese now in the 1960's would most likely mean world war III within a decade. The time is now for determining our priorities in Vietnam.

In these remarks, Mr. President, I have tried to suggest that we have no rational alternatives but to stand firm and to remain in Vietnam indefinitely. To dare to predict when we may withdraw presumes altogether too much. But the President has already done the next best thing. He had made it clear that we will not forfeit southeast Asia to aggression; but he has made it clear that we covet no part of North Vietnam; that we have no designs on China.

Nonetheless, the times and the continuity of our postwar policy responsibilities demand that we remain there as long as the threat of aggression continues. After all, we still have 50,000 troops in Korea 15 years after the start of the conflict there. Our Navy still patrols the Straits of Formosa. We still have thousands of troops in Berlin and more thousands in Eastern Europe over 20 years after the end of World War II. The real point is that we cannot know with certainty when withdrawal may be a reality. But we can know with certainty the consequences if we withdraw too soon. Our choice must be to live up to the respon-

sibilities of the leadership which history has imposed upon us.

Having made that determination about our presence in Vietnam, all other questions there must be judged in relation to how we can best achieve those objectives. The resumption of bombing in the north, what kind of bombing, the terms of negotiation, with whom we negotiate, the prospects of a larger role with China, the role of our allies—all must be recast in the context of the necessities of our presence there. The point is that our public dialog must focus on the heart of the problem—why we are there.

To be sure, our task is made no easier by the fact that the war is being waged on TV screens. Nor is it to be unexpected that, with the blood of our young men being spilled on every TV channel in every living room in the land, political blood within committees of the Congress should be shed on those same screens. One can raise serious doubts as to whether either of these spectacles is wise or necessary or even whether we can afford them in times like these. The fact remains, however, that they are a part of the social order which we seek to preserve.

Unhappy and unsatisfying as the attributes of this kind of conflict in southeast Asia may be, it is probably the only kind of war that either we or the rest of the world can afford. And it is likely not the last of these bloody confrontations around the peripheries of power. In seeking to stabilize the expressions of uncertainty and criticism here at home, some critics have demanded a formal declaration of war. But even this would be too great a price to pay for unity and conformity. It would freeze the conditions in south Asia against alternative settlements and would positively close the door to any chance for a less violent balancing of power.

It behooves us to assume a more sophisticated stature as we live up to the demands of world leadership. In our new role in the world, we ought to think twice about indulging the luxury of warfare by committee, or by public letters to the President, or by congressional hindsight after the fact. The consequences of personal pique or constituent appeal warping or blocking our foreign policy we can ill afford. To indulge them, moreover, not only makes us look ridiculous in the eyes of those who depend upon us for freedom, but it also prejudices our own chances for achieving the goals toward which we have been working for the past 20 years.

Nor dare we let up in our constant probing for conceivable breakthroughs to a peaceable settlement, however remote it may seem in fact. Given our own national principles and the idealism of a free people, we dare not risk ever being hailed before the bar of history at some future date, there to be condemned for having missed a chance to end this conflict short of the battlefield.

Let us not delude ourselves, however, about the prospect of the leaders on the other side ever sitting down at a conference table on Vietnam. In some ways they cannot afford to do so. In some

ways it would seem to be political suicide for them. Thus, what may finally take place in Vietnam is a gradual subsidence of the conflict without agreement, without negotiations. In such a case, however, the result would be the establishment in fact of a fine line of balance between the contending forces—in short, two Vietnams.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the time has come to go to the root of the American position in Vietnam. If it does not serve the best interests of the world for us to be there, let those among the critics who believe this now say so instead of concealing their case behind the facade of superficial excuses and arguments. However, if our own security and that of the other independent nations of the world and the hopes of mankind in general rest upon the success of our efforts there, as I believe they do, let us resolve to do all within our capabilities to make it so.

affair!

#### GREECE AND VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, since many of the advocates of our present involvement in Vietnam have cited the experience of the Greek civil war as a precedent for today's conflict in southeast Asia, I think it would be well for all of us to consider whether the parallel has been properly drawn.

Dr. D. George Kousoulas, professor of government at Howard University, who served in the Greek Army during the guerrilla war, has written an excellent article for the Washington Post of February 13, 1966, on this subject. Professor Kousoulas makes a most significant point when he states that the Greek Army won its war against the guerrillas largely through its own efforts, with very little support from the outside.

Considering the enormous amount of aid and the huge American force now fighting in South Vietnam, one wonders if there is any longer any parallel between the victory of an indigenous Greek Army over guerrillas backed from the outside and the growing tendency to turn the Vietnamese struggle into an American war fought with American forces.

I ask unanimous consent that the piece by Professor Kousoulas be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### GREECE HAS LESSON TO OFFER VIETNAM

(By D. George Kousoulas)

Last Sunday, the Washington Post published a speech delivered earlier by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball. Ball suggested that in terms of tactics on the ground, Greece is a closer analogy to Vietnam than Korea. This was an encouraging observation. In Greece, the Communist-led guerrillas suffered a crushing military debacle, and there is no reason why we should not benefit as much from our successes as we are presumably expected to profit from our failures.

In terms of guerrilla tactics, there is little difference in what happened in Greece 20 years ago and what has been taking place in South Vietnam for 5 years.

In Greece on March 30, 1946, a group of what we may call Communist technicians of revolution launched a guerrilla operation, with the moral and material support of



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Greece's three northern neighbors, Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, with an attack on the small village of Litochoron on the eastern slopes of Mount Olympus.

It left in its wake corpses and charred ruins. In the months that followed, several exposed villages met a similar fate. The guerrilla tactics were simple but effective: concentration of forces against an exposed village; attack; destruction of the gendarmerie station; execution of government officials; forceful recruitment of young villagers; pillaging of foodstuffs and then retreat to mountain hideouts.

## THE HIT AND RUN

Throughout the summer of 1946, the Communist-led guerrilla bands continued hit-and-run strikes while the Greek Government and its British advisers viewed the attacks as a matter for the police forces. Only after October 1946, did the Greek Army replace the gendarmerie units, which were hopelessly inadequate for this type of warfare. In the meantime, the guerrilla bands had grown in number and gained control of several mountain villages.

For more than a year, the small Greek Army, unprepared for this challenge, employed tactics of static defense and search-and-destroy operations. Under the concept of static defense, nearby troops were not permitted to leave their assigned posts and rush to the rescue of a village under attack for fear that they might be ambushed or that another guerrilla force might attack their village. Many small towns and villages paid a heavy toll.

The search-and-destroy operations were no more fruitful. The guerrillas, as a rule, avoided engagement with the army, but were ready to return as soon as the army had departed. Needless to say, no villager in his right mind—regardless of his personal feelings or political views—was willing to cooperate with a visiting army and bring upon himself the iron fist of the returning guerrillas.

The tactics of search and destroy actually played into the hands of the guerrillas. The villagers suffered heavily because bombs and bullets made no distinction between guerrillas and civilians. In the end, the army inadvertently became the best recruiting agency for the guerrillas.

At the same time, the aimless sweeps through the countryside, yielding meager results after many days of sweat and toil, caused fatigue and frustration among the troops, while the civilian population began to doubt the competence and effectiveness of the military leadership. To many, it seemed as though someone was trying to catch fish in a pond with his bare hands.

With the enunciation of the Truman doctrine in March 1947, the hopes for a successful end of the fight against the Communist-led guerrillas brightened. But the inadequacies of the past could not be eradicated with one swift strike. The Greek Army had to be expanded, retrained, and its strategy and tactics reshaped. At no time was there any serious consideration of the use of American troops or of the bombing of the supply routes in Yugoslavia, Albania, or Bulgaria.

It was clearly understood that the fight could only be won on the ground by an army led and inspired by a truly national leadership. Throughout 1947, the process of co-operation among the political parties went forward.

The Communists were politically isolated and the lines clearly drawn.

In the military sector, most of the erroneous practices of the past were discarded. A new strategy of "seize and hold" gradually evolved. The army systematically began to expand its control over well-defined areas. This involved the selection of a target area, the concentration of regular and special anti-

guerrilla forces, continuous offensive operations, the extermination or capture of the guerrilla force in the area, mopping-up operations by auxiliary units, the establishment of local units for static self-defense, the extension of permanent government control over the cleared area and measures to prevent reinfiltration.

A good example of this strategy was Operation Dawn in Roumeli. It started on April 15, 1948. The army high command augmented the 1st Army Corps to the level of 27 infantry battalions, 16 National Guard battalions, 6 gendarmerie battalions, 2 LOK battalions, 48 pieces of artillery, and a regiment of armored cars.

The corps completely surrounded the area of Roumeli, establishing three or four successive and overlapping lines of interception, while the main infantry and LOK forces carried the thrust against a force of approximately 2,500 guerrillas.

The tactic of establishing several lines of interception deprived the guerrillas of their usual advantage of being able to slip through the army lines into their safe areas. The 1st Army Corps did not end the operation until almost the entire guerrilla force was for all practical purposes destroyed.

After 1 month of continuous pursuit, 2,000 guerrillas were either dead or taken prisoner. At the same time, the 1st Army Corps broke up the underground organization in the villages, removing both agents of intimidation and sources of information and supply. After that, intelligence started to flow in freely.

The remnants of the Roumeli guerrilla force, hunted constantly, with their sources of food and supply cut off, were gradually eliminated by the battalions of the National Guard, the gendarmerie and the militia which was formed in every village. The entire operation lasted approximately 3 months.

A similar operation in the Peloponnesus proved equally successful. Faced with this new strategy, the Communist leaders soon realized that by withdrawing in guerrilla fashion in front of the army they could eventually withdraw themselves to extinction. Zachariades, the leader of KKE, advocated the passing from the subconventional (guerrilla) to a conventional type of warfare, holding ground and even making an effort to capture and hold major provincial centers. Markos, the military leader, argued that the guerrilla forces were not strong enough to fight the Greek Army in a conventional war. He was right but he lost the argument.

Zachariades also had a point. A guerrilla operation may serve a practical purpose if it is used to prepare the ground for the time when intervention by regular military forces becomes feasible, or the morale of the loyal troops is undermined to the point that they become apathetic or even shift their allegiance, or the leadership of the target country is discredited, or a compromise is reached and Communists and sympathizers join in a coalition government as a first step toward ultimate control of the country.

When foreign intervention is not in the cards, nor collapse of the homefront imminent, the guerrilla operation cannot be consummated unless the guerrillas pass into conventional warfare and replace their hit-and-run tactics with a strategy of seize and hold. Zachariades, of course, overlooked the fact that this is the soft point of every guerrilla operation. The moment a guerrilla force transforms itself into a more or less regular army, it faces its opponent on equal terms. The well-known 10-to-1 ratio ceases to be operative. If the loyal troops are ready for this moment of transition, the guerrillas are doomed.

The Greek troops were ready. The curtain came down in August 1949, when the Greek Army attacked the last Communist strong-

hold of Gramos-Vitsi along the Albanian frontier. The Communist army was destroyed after a monthlong offensive. Contrary to popular belief, the guerrillas were not defeated because they ran out of ammunition.

To claim that our experience in Greece can give us all the guidelines we need to carry the war in Vietnam to a successful end would be somewhat unrealistic. The Greek Communists were supported by three foreign governments, which made them appear, in the eyes of most patriotic Greeks, as foreign agents.

Besides, they were never allowed to extend their control over three-fourths of the country—as the Vietcong are reported to have done. In Greece the national leadership included all the familiar, respected political personalities representing almost all political groups. And at no time during the fighting was there any talk about a negotiated settlement that could leave the country divided.

Still, there is a great deal to be learned from our experience in Greece. President Johnson's program for social reform and economic development in South Vietnam, however attractive, is largely irrelevant at this point. It will become extremely important if and when we switch to a seize and hold strategy.

The Vietnamese villagers who are under the control of the Vietcong can do very little—even if they accepted our message in toto—as long as we continue our strategy of search and destroy.

In a recent study in this newspaper, reported by Jack Folsie of the Los Angeles Times, South Vietnamese villagers and captured Vietcong expressed their bewilderment with, if not scorn for, this strategy.

General Gavin's somewhat undefined suggestion for holding coastal enclaves could make sense if these enclaves were to become actually our jumpoff points for a gradual, well-planned, determined expansion of control over clearly defined areas. Some of our military experts contend that we need greater forces to put such a strategy into effect. Maybe so.

The Greeks did it with no more than 250,000 to 300,000 troops. In Vietnam, together with the Vietnamese, we have more than 830,000, and South Vietnam is not much bigger than Greece.

## ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SENATOR STENNIS ON THURSDAY MORNING

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately after the morning hour tomorrow the distinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] be recognized for such time as he may require to express his views on the Vietnam situation and the measure now before the Senate.

It is estimated that his speech will require about 25 to 30 minutes, but he is not to be limited to that amount of time because I well realize how these matters become extended.

After the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] launched on his well prepared address today, I thought I would go to speak with some constituents and discuss other business. After 3½ hours I found that the Senator from Tennessee had worked his way through five pages.

I hope that when the Senator from Mississippi concludes his speech there will not be too much colloquy so that we may consider the money matters for these committees.

I believe the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] plans to oppose some of the resolution, as he has done in the past. I ask unanimous consent that the junior Senator from Mississippi be recognized tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. TOWER. I should like to ask whether we will come in at noon tomorrow, and whether there will be a routine morning hour, and then the Senator from Mississippi will proceed?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator is correct.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY AND PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, FISCAL 1966

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, as this debate commences, I believe it is well to keep in mind the fundamentals which are involved.

First, it should be kept in mind that we are not fighting to maintain our position as a colonial power in southeast Asia. We seek no aggrandizement of territory.

We do seek to help people who seek to be independent to maintain and preserve their own freedom and independence. If they choose, as most people do, not to live under Communist slavery, we propose to help them achieve that result.

In some instances we are bound to that resolve by treaty obligation. In other cases we think it good policy to help people to have or hope that they may enjoy freedom as we have known it in this country.

We are not seeking, as the French did, to build a colonial empire. This problem is not unique. All over the world there are former colonies of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and others, who have been acquiring freedom.

It is important that these people, who previously lived under colonial government, should not be subjected to Communist slavery for their lives, which would be far worse than the colonial government to which they have been accustomed in years gone by.

It was always the impression of this Senator that the British treated their colonials better than the French treated their colonials. Whether that is correct, there is no doubt in anyone's mind that it would be far better for a person to live under British or French colonialism than Communist tyranny which we have witnessed in some parts of this planet.

The aggression started. A nation fighting against the French obtained a victory. There were many of those people who fought the French wanting a

free independent country that seeks and works for the kind of freedom that we know here.

At the end of the war, there was a struggle between the Communist element and the anti-Communist element. I read from a paper prepared by the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

The present political struggle in South Vietnam had its origin soon after the Geneva accords of 1954. By 1955 the Communists had initiated a program of calculated assassinations of political leaders which reached astounding proportions; in the year 1957 alone, 452 village chiefs were assassinated. This political vacuum was soon filled by the Communists.

The North Vietnamese Communist government proceeded to organize the so-called National Liberation Front. Those who controlled it were North Vietnamese. It was controlled and directed by Hanoi. Many of the Vietcong who were captured did not even know the names of the leaders of their movement. Finally, some persons who had not been known particularly as combatants—lawyers and doctors—were selected and given some sort of name in the movement. But all the intelligence proves beyond any doubt, so far as we are concerned, that this was a case of North Vietnam trying to capture the independent nation of South Vietnam.

The United States has sought to help people who desired to have freedom and maintain that freedom. We signed a treaty for collective defense. It is known as the SEATO Treaty. Officially it is known as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol thereto, and is dated September 8, 1954. I read from article IV of the treaty.

#### ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

The United States signed the protocol, or amendment, to that treaty, which includes the area we now have in mind. This is what it provides:

#### PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

*Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of article IV and article III are to be applicable*

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty

the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

Under the Geneva accords, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia became fully independent states. Accordingly, this communique announced agreement by France and the United States to channel assistance directly to those countries in accordance with article 3, rather than to have it go through the French.

So this is a treaty that was signed by the United States. It was signed by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States.

For the United States, that treaty was signed by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State; H. Alexander Smith, a distinguished former Member of this body; and by MICHAEL J. MANSFIELD, our distinguished present majority leader.

Under that treaty, we agreed with our friends in the area that we would seek to help the people of the countries named to maintain their freedom and independence. The Geneva accords were signed, but the Communists never kept them for a moment. They broke them from the moment they started to negotiate and have continued to break them to this very day. The Communists have never kept them for a moment.

It has been suggested by some that perhaps in some respects the United States might be in violation of the Geneva accords, because something in them, to which we were not a signatory, but which we still recognize and which we propose to abide by, has not been kept by us. Our position has been that if two parties sign a contract, and one party does not keep his word for a moment, but breaks it from the day he signs it, then the other party to the contract is not bound. If it were possible to get the violators before the World Court or a body of that sort, or even before the United Nations, on the basis of the provisions of the Geneva accords, and they could be persuaded to keep their word, as we would keep ours, that would be fine; I am sure that we would be happy to settle with them. But that is not possible because those people perform as Communists have historically performed. They do not keep their word; they break it whenever it is to their advantage.

In other words, if a Communist looked at this white sheet of paper and said it was white, and that failed to advance the cause of communism and placed his nation at a disadvantage in any respect whatsoever for the spread of communism, he would have told a lie, by the definition of the Communists, and ac-

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cordingly he would be subject to prosecution for having told a state secret or for having told a falsehood, by the definition of the Communists.

It has been suggested—and I regret to say this—that a U.S. Senator, both on the floor of the Senate or on a nationwide television program, accused his Nation of being an international outlaw. That is harsh language to use with respect to any nation, particularly one's own.

I understand that when the junior Senator from Louisiana spoke of his love for his country today, a statement was made to the effect that that was flag waving of the worst sort. Perhaps it is old fashioned, but there is no law against holding high the flag of one's country. There is no law against waving the flag. There is a law against pulling the flag down and putting one's foot on it, dragging it in the muck, mud, and mire. That sort of contemptuous regard for the flag of one's country indicates contempt for one's nation. Every nation, every tribe, every element of organized humanity regards one crime as universal—that is, treason. The giving of aid and comfort to the enemy of one's people seems to be a more universal crime than murder.

I do not accuse any Senator of being guilty of such a thing, but I do say that, in a sense, when a Senator accuses his Nation, and accuses it falsely of being an international criminal, an international outlaw, of conducting an illegal, immoral war, he is showing disrespect for his Nation. In a sense, it is as though he were treating the flag of his Nation with contempt, which today, by modern vogue, seems to be the acceptable thing. But as I was raised as a boy, it was not acceptable at all.

In fact, it was not regarded as being improper or wrong to put a flag in front of one's home on George Washington's Birthday or on the Fourth of July. Perhaps I am still old fashioned enough to regard that sort of love of country and patriotism as being a very fine thing. It is so regarded by people who are not even citizens of this country.

The argument that we are an international criminal, as I understand, relates to the United Nations Charter which, in its early chapters, says that we are a peace-loving nation. We are now at war as the means of settling international problems. We have sought to abide by this Charter in good faith. It is too bad that the other fellow did not abide by it. However, when we read through it, we come to one article which clearly exonerates the United States from any of the so-called crimes with which a Senator, and perhaps more, have charged our Nation.

I refer to Article 51, of the United Nations Charter, which reads:

## ARTICLE 51

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported

to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Mr. President, this Nation has tried time and again to bring the Security Council up to its responsibility and to cause the Security Council to maintain international peace as we had hoped it would be maintained in the United Nations Charter.

We have been frustrated over a hundred times by Russian vetoes and have found that smaller nations have no stomach or heart for a confrontation with nations as big and strong as the Soviet Union or Communist China. If a nation borders on either of those nations, or if any of its neighbor nations border on either of those nations, it trembles at the thought of a confrontation with such a power.

We are the only country big enough to confront such a nation. While it is fine to talk about what the United Nations can do, when they adopt the resolution, somebody has to back the resolution up if it is to be meaningful.

There is no other nation strong enough, courageous enough, to take the lead and to do what is necessary, as does the United States.

We obtained aid from some friends and allies and, compared with the size of their nations, their sacrifices may be very substantial. However, when we look at the overall effort, it has been proved before, and it is being proved now, that the contribution they can make is relatively small.

Let us review how we got into this present situation. We made this commitment. These people were trying to save and preserve their independence. The Communists were determined that that should not be the case. So, by brutality, murder, and assassination, they proceeded to kill off every person they could who did not want to be a Communist and who did not want to live under the government of Hanoi.

This Nation provided economic help, advice, and military equipment for the peace-loving people of South Vietnam who wanted to be free. We also provided military intelligence.

I do not know as a certainty, but I believe that history will show, that our ships were in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of last year for the reason that we were providing military information.

Our ships were using their radar to help the South Vietnamese watch their own coastline. Our ships were attacked. When they were attacked by the Hanoi torpedo boats, that was an act of war.

In line with all previous precedents, we fought back. We not only fought back at the attacking vessels, but we proceeded then to attack the bases from which those vessels came.

The President of the United States asked Members of Congress—and I was in the Senate Chamber that night because I was the Senator in charge of a bill, and there were only approximately four Senators present here—to come to

the White House and discuss the matter with him. The President announced that we would strike back. He asked Congress for a resolution, and the resolution started by stating, in the first instance that we would resist aggression and that we approved of the President's striking back when we were attacked.

The resolution then went on to state, as we should well have anticipated, that this would not be the end of it. When the Communists from North Vietnam attacked us, we struck back. We knew that the Communists would not take it lying down. There would be a reaction.

The resolution stated that the President was authorized to take whatever steps he found necessary in order to resist aggression in that area.

There have been a number of suggestions. When the going got a little rough, different people had different ideas. The first thing that happened, of course, was that the North Vietnamese began to send their troops into South Vietnam in regular army units. We reacted by sending our troops into South Vietnam in regular Army units. As they stepped up their efforts, we stepped up ours.

We are making a very great effort in Vietnam today. We have more than 200,000 men there carrying out that resolution, which states that the President should take whatever steps he deems necessary to resist aggression.

If we are going to tell the President that he cannot increase the number of troops in Vietnam and that he cannot draft American boys to fight there, we should reconsider this resolution. The resolution said that the President should take whatever steps might be necessary to resist aggression in Vietnam.

If we want to win the struggle there, we shall have to unite as a Nation and make it clear to the whole wide world that we are going to make whatever sacrifices are necessary and pay whatever price may be necessary to defeat aggression in Vietnam.

I regret to say it, but I think it is true, that if we say that all we are going to do is to try to see this thing through with 200,000 men, then the Government of North Vietnam, which has an army of approximately 1,200,000 men, need only send 600,000 people down to annihilate and decimate our people in South Vietnam.

They will know that that is our troop limit, and they will have a written order on all that it will take to defeat this great country.

It has been said that the French lost to the Communists in Vietnam, not at Dienbienphu, but at Paris. I am told that that is a familiar quotation among Communists. They say that they defeated France at Paris. They say that the French lost the Battle of Indochina at Paris. The French lost that battle when the French Chamber of Deputies voted that they would no longer draft any Frenchmen to fight in Vietnam. Having so voted, it left only the courageous Frenchmen who fought so loyally for their country and for the glory of France—those who insisted on staying there and fighting and dying for their

country. No mother's son from that day on was expected to volunteer to fight for his country.

The Communist victory over the French occurred not at Dienbienphu, but at Paris. Those courageous Frenchmen at Dienbienphu were overwhelmed by superior forces. I did not see it, but I was told that there was a moat that the French had dug in front of their fortifications. The Frenchmen stayed behind that moat and fought and killed so many of the attacking Communists that the remaining Communists marched across the moat on the bodies of their dead comrades.

If no Frenchman were to come to their aid, and only those few courageous Frenchmen were to fight for their country, there was certainly very little chance of victory for the French.

So indeed it may be said that the battle for Indochina was not won at Dienbienphu, but at Paris, when the French Chamber of Deputies made the decision that no one else would go to the aid of the brave men who were already in Indochina.

So we are being told, and we will be told again, that no mother's son should be drafted to help the boys who are already in Vietnam.

That is not the way this Nation has performed in days gone by. In days gone by, when anyone attacked the United States, he knew that he had indeed attacked a hornets' nest. Everyone was expected to do his part.

It will be interesting to observe the vote on the amendment that I have heard will be offered. It is the so-called surrender at Washington resolution. If we adopt it, we shall lose the war, because we shall draft no one to fight over there to help the brave men who are now fighting in Vietnam. It would be foolish for anyone to go over there to confront this horde of Communists if he knew that he would be surrounded and cut off, with no help coming. I would say it would be wiser to surrender now.

The story is told concerning a Confederate general—I suspect perhaps it was General Hood—who was a courageous fighting man who was wounded many times, and was placed in charge of the defense of Atlanta.

His predecessor had found himself outnumbered and kept maneuvering for position, waiting for the right time to give battle; but General Hood threw his troops into battle at every opportunity, and suffered disastrous losses.

Finally, after he had succeeded in facing the part of Sherman's troops that went north until they decided it was time to turn and give battle to him, and imposed on him an ignominious defeat—which was about the last defeat he could sustain and still hope to carry out any operations—this sweet old one-legged general, strapped to his horse because he could not walk, finally was forced to say to his orderly, "I regret to say you must go forward and sound the retreat; and inasmuch as I have but one leg, I will start now."

If we agree to the proposed amendment, and thus tell our courageous young men over there that no more help

is coming, we might as well pull our troops out now and sue for some kind of settlement of the overall problem which exists in the cold war between this Nation, the Soviet Union, and Communist China—some arrangement under which they will perhaps permit us to live.

But if we look at the tremendous power this Nation has, it is beyond imagination. I remind Senators that the effort we are making over there does not exceed the military effort we made on the Anzio beachhead, which in World War II was regarded as a relatively small operation for the forces that we had available. In that war we had over 14 million men in the United States, trained, armed, each one ready to do his part.

Mr. President, it has been my privilege to observe the training of some of the fine young men who are preparing themselves to fight for their country, knowing that they are on their way to Vietnam. I must report that the enthusiasm, the morale, the courage, and the training of those young men is absolutely marvelous. They are as fine as any troops that ever wore the American uniform. I say with great confidence, if we approach this matter the same way we have approached other difficult problems in the past, we shall prevail, we shall win, and we shall continue to be a great military power that seeks nothing but peace, a country that keeps its word, a country that honors its commitments; and we will continue to be the hope of all free people for peace and freedom throughout the world.

In my judgment, that is the course to peace. If we look at this situation as a part of the overall picture, we decided quite a while back that if we let the Communists take first one nation and then another by aggression, by subversion, by brutality, by murder, by assassination, there would be no stopping point, and eventually we would be compelled to fight a desperate and very big war for our own survival. We decided it would be cheap, by comparison, to pay the cost of stopping aggression when it starts; and we have been engaged in that task.

There is no doubt that the Communist aggressors are going to probe and test our courage. They are going to test our will. If they can defeat us by intimidating or scaring us, that, of course, will be the method they will use. If they cannot succeed in that way, they will try something stronger.

But let us not make this mistake, Mr. President. Let us not make the mistake of thinking Red China wants an all-out war with the United States. They are not that foolish. Let us not make the mistake of thinking that the Soviet Union wants that, either. They are not that foolish. And we do not want such a war. We are not that foolish.

But we know very well that if we must eventually confront Red China, we would be better off doing it now than having them confront us 5 years from now.

We do not seek any confrontation with them. All we seek is peace. All we seek is an honorable settlement. And I predict that within 1 year of the time we muster our national courage, gather our

national unity, agree as we have in every confrontation, in every struggle in which this Nation has been involved, that we are going to see this thing through, we are going to make whatever sacrifice is necessary to achieve an honorable settlement of this fight, within 1 year it will be all over.

But until we do that, this struggle will drag on and on. And every time a Senator makes a speech suggesting that we should withdraw, quit tomorrow, or limit our effort to what we are doing at this moment, all he is doing is encouraging the Communists to continue the war.

They are paying a very heavy price, Mr. President. The Communist aggressors are losing about a thousand men a week. That is about 10 times the number we are losing; perhaps more than that. And while our troops are inflicting 10 times the casualties on them that they are inflicting on us, we are a nation that outnumbers their nation by more than 10 to 1; and the South Vietnamese are working on them, too, with their army, which is a good army of 450,000 courageous men, and they are taking their toll of the Vietcong aggressors.

Considering the size of that country, that would be just as though we here in the United States were suffering 10,000 casualties a week, 45,000 deaths a month. Think of the impact that would have on us. If we were suffering those kind of casualties, while the other fellow was not losing 1 man for every 10 that we were losing, obviously it would be a very demoralizing thing; especially if our adversary had the airpower to keep blasting away, knocking our bridges down, and destroying our communications.

So the biggest problem we have is to assure those who lack faith in America that this is the same America that has been equal to any challenge imposed upon it, and that we propose to be worthy of those who have gone before, those who captured this land from the savages and those who endured all the hardships that can be conjured by the mind of man; that we are still the greatest nation on the face of the earth, and that we are still the same kind of people that our fathers and grandfathers were.

When we convince them of that, Mr. President, we shall find that this struggle will become fairly simple, and we will win it a lot faster than people are inclined to think.

I wanted to make one more point about the nature of our enemy. It is not this Nation that is the international criminal; it is the enemy. It is he who has broken his word every step of the way. It is our enemy who has refused to negotiate. It has amazed me, as a Senator, to hear Senators make speeches downgrading their own courageous American fighting men, and say nothing whatever about the murderous assassinations, about these people coming into towns and taking innocent people, men, women, and children, and slaughtering them, and taking our soldiers, captured in battle, and killing them without permitting them any rights under the Gen-

Knop, David E.  
Knox, James H.  
Kollar, Joseph J.  
Kowalski, David M.  
Krone, Melvin P.  
Krusinger, Alan E.  
Laidig, Scott R.  
Lancaster, Alexander E., Jr.  
Lancaster, James E.  
Lane, Malcolm V.  
Laney, James L.  
Lau, Raymond R.  
Laux, Peter E.  
Lawrence, Stephen P.  
Leach, Steven R.  
Lee, Harry E., III  
Legge, Glenn F.  
Le May, Granville T.  
Libey, George S.  
Liesegang, Robert B.  
Lindeman, Allen A.  
Lindsey, Jimmy L.  
Littler, James L. M., III  
Livingston, John C.  
Loveridge, Gary F.  
Lucas, John R.

Lulfs, Gary K.  
Mabley, Christopher T.  
MacLeod, Gary W.  
Malone, Michael G., II  
Maloney, John C.  
Manion, Robert G.  
Martin, David P.  
Mattingly, Robert E.  
Max, William J.  
Maynard, Robert W.  
McCoy, Paul  
McDermott, John R.  
McDowell, Gary W.  
McEvoy, James R.  
McHugh, Jack D.  
McInturff, David L.  
McKay, Thomas J.  
McQuigg, Frederick C.  
Meehan, Thomas J.  
Meeker, Thomas H.  
Meints, Ronald R.  
Meinertz, David T.  
Meints, Ronald R.  
Meissner, Robert B.  
Meyer, Ronald W.  
Miksad, John R.

Mills, William F.  
Mitchell, Frank D., Jr.  
Moore, Jack M.  
Moore, John R.  
Morrison, Charles H., III  
Mosley, Donald H.  
Mueller, Richard A.  
Mulherin, Byron J., Jr.  
Murphy, James W.  
Nagazyna, John K.  
Nelson, John J., Jr.  
Neubauer, John W.  
Neubauer, Ronald S.  
Norman, Geoffrey W.  
O'Neill, Gene P.  
Pace, Simone J.  
Parker, Allen D.  
Parker, William A.  
Parr, Walter O., Jr.  
Parra, Lionel, Jr.  
Pellecchia, Donald E.  
Peterson, Frank K.  
Petroski, Richard M.  
Pfeitz, Albert R., III  
Platt, Richard W.

Pierce, Charles G., Sr.  
Pritchard, Charles L.  
Reber, Joseph M.  
Richman, Dean J.  
Richwine, David A.  
Riggs, Robert K.  
Rivers, Frederick M., Jr.  
Roach, Jerry N.  
Robertson, Jerry L.  
Rumbley, James A., Jr.  
Saldarini, Charles A.  
Sanchack, James J.  
Sandberg, William J.  
Schultz, Donald D.  
Schwartz, Peter A.  
Sharkey, John E.  
Shearer, Robert C.  
Shepherd, Robert C.  
Shirley, Michael S.  
Skultety, Edward S.  
Sligar, Howard B., Jr.  
Smith, Gordon W., Jr.  
Smith, John J.  
Steele, Gregory C.  
Stegich, Steve R., III  
Stillman, Edward W.  
Storey, Stanford I.

Stout, David M.  
Stoy, James M.  
Sullivan, Robert J.  
Summa, John A.  
Swain, Howard L.  
Swankowski, Ronald E.  
Szabo, Steven F.  
Taber, Edward A., III  
Taylor, Arthur J.  
Taylor, Charles L.  
Taylor, Donald G.  
Teasdale, Harold W.  
Terpstra, Jesse H., Jr.  
Thomas, Raymond A.  
Thompson, Ky L.  
Thomson, Terry L.  
Timm, Frederick M.  
Timmons, Herschel M., Jr.  
Trachta, Stanley J.  
Trader, William A.  
Upton, Herbert S.  
Urbanski, Victor R.  
Van Dervoort, Dennis R.

Vandiver, Del R.  
Van Gysel, Gary R.  
Vincent, William T.  
Vogel, Frederick J.  
Vogt, Richard J.  
Voigt, Richard H.  
Walsh, Matthew F., Jr.  
Ward, George F., Jr.  
Warfield, Jimmie A.  
Warren, Robert T.  
Waters, Francis A.  
Waters, Richard E.  
Weaver, Charles L.  
Wecht, Ronald H.  
Wellbrook, Roger V.  
Williams, Gary L.  
Wilsman, William K.  
Winters, John W., Jr.  
Woodhead, John A., III  
Woods, Clyde E.  
Wroten, John W., Jr.  
Yanger, Thomas R.  
Young, Earl W., II  
Zadel, Charles W.

(NOTE.—Asterisk (\*) indicates ad interim appointment issued.)



# House of Representatives

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1966

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Reverend John Kuzinskas, of the St. George Church, Chicago, Ill., offered the following prayer:

Our Heavenly Father, who created all men equal, give us the insight to honor the rights of individuals.

You have blessed our country with abundant riches, let us extend a friendly hand to the less fortunate. In our struggles for freedom, we have emerged as the mightiest of nations and as a leader in the quest for peace. Upon our President and our Congress you have placed a heavy burden of negotiating for peace so that every nation can enjoy the freedom of speech, worship, and action. Let our country be an example for harmony which can exist in a nation of many nationalities and for satisfaction which can be found in a two-party system. Our hopes of the day are to fight common fears so that some day in the near future we may pray and work with one accord toward a new and better world in which all nations can live together in love and peace.

Today, we commemorate the 48th anniversary of Lithuania's brief independence. For many years she, too, fought many battles to overcome the yoke of oppression. Her countryside is drenched with the blood of countless heroic men and women. What once was a glowing amber light along the Baltic seacoast, has now become a total blackout behind a curtain. Today, Lithuanians, as other oppressed countries, place their trust in You; do not forsake them. Teach us, their American descendants, to cherish freedom and to oppose any threat to our freedom.

And with the proposals for peace of Pope Paul, let us unite in our efforts and pray together as he says, "Again we ask you this day to pray for the great interests of the world, which are mainly the interests of peace, of internal peace of nations and peace among nations." Amen.

## THE JOURNAL

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

## RESIGNATION FROM COMMITTEE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following resignation from a committee:

FEBRUARY 16, 1966.

Hon. JOHN W. MCCORMACK,  
Speaker, House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: It is with considerable regret that I submit my resignation as a member of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, effective today.

It has been a privilege and an honor for me to work with the many fine members of this

committee during the 89th Congress. My association and participation in the deliberations of this group will always remain a pleasant and rewarding experience.

Sincerely yours,  
HENRY P. SMITH III  
Member of Congress.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resignation will be accepted.  
There was no objection.

## ELECTION TO COMMITTEE

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I offer a resolution, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 735

Resolved, That HENRY P. SMITH III, of New York, be, and he is hereby, elected a member of the standing Committee of the House of Representatives on Judiciary.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

## APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO ATTEND FUNERAL OF THE LATE HONORABLE ALBERT THOMAS

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints as members of the committee to attend the funeral of our late colleague, Albert Thomas, the following Members of the House: Mr. PATMAN, Mr. MABON, Mr. KIRWAN, Mr. POAGE, Mr. WHITTON, Mr. FISHER, Mr. HOLIFIELD, Mr. ROONEY of New York, Mr. FOGARTY, Mr. PRICE, Mr. TEAGUE of Texas, Mr. BURLESON, Mr. EVINS, Mr. PASSMAN, Mr. THOMPSON of Texas, Mr. STEED, Mr. BOW, Mr. ROGERS of Texas, Mr. DOWDY, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. HOSMER, Mr. JONAS, Mr. LAIRD, Mr. RHODES of Arizona, Mr. FLOOD, Mr. DENTON, Mr. MINSHALL, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. BECKWORTH, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. CASEY, Mr. GIALMO, Mr. MORRIS, Mr. SHIPLEY, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. PURCELL, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. POOL, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. CABELL, Mr. DE LA GARZA, and Mr. WHITE of Texas.

## RESTRAINT URGED IN VIETNAM POLICY ATTACKS

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I saw in the papers yesterday that eight more Members of this House have just come out with another bitter attack on the established policy of our Government in Vietnam, and have proposed their own individual plan for ending the fighting in that troubled area.

Far be it from me to suggest what any Member of this House—or of the other

body—ought to do or say. But I do think we ought to admit, whether we like it or not, that this country is in a shooting war in Vietnam. Our Nation has decided to resist Communist aggression in that area, and to implement that decision 200,000 men are fighting on the front line out there and some of them are dying.

In those circumstances I for one think it is about time we here in Congress exercised some restraint in constantly attacking and harrasing the established decision of our country. I think it is time we considered foregoing the luxury of trying to come up with 535 separate, individual policies for dealing with Vietnam. No matter how hard we try, we are not going to run this war from Congress, nor from any particular study group, nor even from any standing committee.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to suggest that now is the time for us in Congress to demonstrate a little good old-fashioned national unity in adversity. The decision has been made. It has been supported by the Congress and overwhelmingly supported by the American people.

So let us get on with the job of implementing that national decision. Let us show the Communists and the world that we are united here in America, and that we do support our Government's policy to resist Communist aggression in Vietnam, and that we are determined to back up, not undercut with our repeated doubts and fears and agonizing personal reappraisals, our fighting men on the combat fronts.

## THE LATE ALEXANDER F. "CASEY" JONES

(Mr. HANLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HANLEY. Mr. Speaker, last night, Syracuse, N.Y., lost one of its most distinguished citizens and the world of journalism lost one of its leading lights. Alexander F. "Casey" Jones was for many years the managing editor of the Washington Post and, since 1949, executive editor of the Syracuse Herald-Journal.

America has lost a great citizen. It seems such a short time ago that this dynamic man was at the helm of the Herald-Journal, always pushing for the betterment of the city he adopted and came to love. On many occasions I sought his counsel and advice, and if his exterior was gruff it was part show. Those who were fortunate to know him realized how kind and generous he really was.

The stories and legends of Casey Jones are far too numerous to cite today. Suffice it to say that his name was one of

the greatest in the world of journalism. In all the roles he played—civic leader, crusader, husband, father, and newspaperman—he dedicated himself to the best. Casey was a reporter's reporter and in his profession he was both respected and admired.

I extend my deepest condolences to his wife and family.

#### REGULATION OF CATV SYSTEMS

(Mr. ROGERS of Texas asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Texas. Mr. Speaker, on yesterday the Federal Communications Commission announced a plan for the regulation of all CATV systems. The manner in which this was done and the information contained in it was in direct contradiction of assurances that had been given me by the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, that when they had reached a conclusion as to what should be done, they would come back and discuss this with the proper committees of the Congress.

I conveyed this information to my colleagues in this House in good faith—this information which was given to me by the Chairman.

He told me that the rules would be worked out, refined by the staff, and that it would take approximately three weeks. They would then again discuss them with the committees of the House before any final action was taken.

That was not done.

I want to say to the Members of the House here, those of you who wrote letters to your constituents on this very vital issue, that the information that I gave you was given to you in absolute good faith, and I am deeply distressed if the time has come when a Member of the Congress of the United States cannot seek and acquire information in good faith from the agencies downtown and convey that to his colleagues without the assurance that it is going to be adhered to.

#### THE 1966 MAID OF COTTON

(Mr. MAHON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, Miss Nancy Bernard, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Bernard, who live in my hometown of Lubbock, Tex., is the 1966 Maid of Cotton. Nancy left Washington on Monday for Tampa, Fla., after a successful 5-day stay in the Nation's Capital, during which time she engaged in a whirlwind round of activities. In Tampa, Nancy will resume her tour of the United States and Europe as the cotton industry's "Fashion and Goodwill Ambassador." While in Washington the Maid of Cotton warmed the hearts of all of us who came in contact with her. She possesses poise, beauty, and intelligence comparable to the most gracious women of our country.

Mrs. Mahon and I had the privilege of joining with officials of the National Cot-

ton Council in meeting Nancy at the airport on the night she arrived. During her stay here, she visited with members of the House Agriculture Committee while they were holding hearings on cotton legislation. She also met with officials of the Department of Agriculture and made a short film for the Department which will be used in promoting the sale and utilization of cotton.

She met and earned many distinguished Members of the House and Senate during a luncheon which Mrs. Mahon and I gave for her in the Speaker's Dining Room here in the Capitol. The President found time to relax from his busy schedule to visit with Nancy and give her a brief tour of the White House. In addition, Nancy appeared in several fashion shows, modeling the all-cotton wardrobe which was created for her by some of America's leading designers, and which she will model throughout 35 American cities, as well as in Canada and Europe during the 7 months of her tour.

The Maid of Cotton is more than a beauty queen. She is a beautiful girl with a purpose. She is contributing to the stature of cotton and the cotton industry.

Her tour takes her to the largest cities in the United States, where most of our cotton products are bought, and she reaches millions of people by appearing in hundreds of fashion shows, on television, in newspapers and in motion pictures. Her purpose is to show people all over the world how cotton can serve them in beautiful and comfortable wearing apparel.

Cotton is one of the world's most vital crops. Cotton production is America's greatest agricultural industry. This year's Maid of Cotton comes from the largest cotton-producing Congressional District in the United States. The farmers of the 19th District produce more cotton than any State in the Union, with the exception of the State of Texas itself. We produce annually about 2 million bales of cotton—about one-half of the total production of Texas. The cotton economy affects the entire United States. Cotton is also a vital commodity in world trade, and a great benefit to this Nation's balance of payments.

It is an industry indelibly woven into American history. Early America virtually was built upon cotton, our principal export commodity. By 1837 more than 1 million bales of cotton a year were exported, bringing to the fledgling nation more than \$72 million in that year. This money was used to foster our industrial revolution. It was used as well to build the railroads, which, of course, allowed the migration West. One could go on and on recounting the influence that cotton has had upon American history.

Nancy Bernard is an important representative of this great and historic industry, and I want to wish her good traveling and high accomplishment as she continues her tour.

#### TRIBUTE TO THE PEOPLE OF LITHUANIA

(Mr. KREBS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 min-

ute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KREBS. Mr. Speaker, I join with my fellow Congressmen in paying tribute to the gallant and heroic people of Lithuania on this day which marks the 48th anniversary of the declaration of independence by Lithuania. This day is a day of sad remembrance, a day that surely recalls to the memory of all freedom-loving people the sad and melancholy contrast that captive Lithuania and her suffering under Communist domination presents with the free world and the free people elsewhere. The history of the brave Lithuanian people is a history marked with challenge to tyranny and oppression. When in 1918, at the close of World War I, this Baltic State freed itself from the shackles of czarist Russian domination, it was only a brief spell of hardly two decades before the ominous approach of Soviet communism imposed itself. This day marks not only the anniversary of Lithuania's independence but also marks the determination of a brave people in its continuing search for lasting independence.

On this day let us reaffirm our responsibility to the gallant people of Lithuania and convey our message of hope to them and to all those held in bondage. Let us assure them that their struggle is our struggle and the struggle of all freedom-loving people all over the world. It is an irony of fate, that while the Americans of Lithuanian descent and the other free people are observing the anniversary of independence of Lithuania, the Lithuanians themselves under the Soviets cannot observe this great day of their national life.

#### STRONGER STEPS NEEDED TO HALT ALLIES SHIPPING TO VIETCONG

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the Maritime Administration yesterday released the first in a series of blacklists of free world ships trading with the Vietcong. Vessels included in this blacklist will henceforth be denied carrying U.S. Government cargoes.

Since the Congress reconvened this January there has been much recent criticism voiced in the House and Senate over this problem.

Free world shipping to the Vietcong was much more a problem last February 18, 1965, when I first brought this matter to the attention of the Congress on page 2874 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of that date. At that time 32 ships from 9 Allied nations had called in North Vietnam since the beginning of 1965. The approximate number of free world ship calls to Communist Vietcong ports for the same period this year comes to 8—so this year's figure is 25 percent of the free world trade carried on with North Vietnam as of this time last year.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that some official action has been taken to curb these free world traders. However, in order to be effective, the Maritime Administration blacklist ought to deny U.S.

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Government cargoes to all ships from nations trading with the Vietcong.

On March 11, 1965, I introduced H.R. 6154, which would bar ships from such nations from coming into U.S. ports. I urge that this legislation be passed.

While this free world seafarer with the Communists has dropped nearly 75 percent over the same period last year, as long as Americans are dying in battle against the Reds one free world ship calling in North Vietnam is one too many.

#### REDUCTION IN THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH AND SPECIAL MILK PROGRAMS

(Mr. TAYLOR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, I was surprised that the 1967 budget recommended drastic reductions in the national school lunch and special milk programs. These are two of the Nation's most important programs affecting the health and welfare of our children and it is disturbing that they should be sought out as a place to save money.

I have received hundreds of letters from parents, schoolchildren, and school authorities protesting the action.

More than 900,000 children are included in these programs in North Carolina alone. The cost involved is not great in this multi-billion-dollar era of Federal spending.

It is not the money, however, that concerns me most. It is the health of our children that is at stake. It is the teeth and bodies and general good health of our boys and girls that the budget-cutters are putting on the chopping block.

How can we be consistent in supporting new and untried antipoverty campaigns on one hand and slashing the school milk appropriation and school lunch appropriation on the other hand? The lowest income families which often have the most children would be hardest hit. In many cases, we would be sacrificing the nutritional needs of schoolchildren.

Congress should reject this cutback and look elsewhere for ways to save money.

#### PROTECTION OF ANIMALS INTENDED FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH

(Mr. McCARTHY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. Speaker, the growing demand for dogs, cats, and other animals for vital medical research has led to a tremendous increase in the unscrupulous and scandalous transportation, sale, and handling of these animals.

A recent article in Life magazine illustrated the horror and callousness of the dealers who steal, buy, or auction animals for eventual medical research and experimentation.

I believe that it is imperative that Congress call a halt to this practice.

So I am today introducing legislation to regulate the transportation, sale, and handling of dogs, cats, and other animals intended for medical research and experimentation.

I want to stress, however, that my bill is in no way intended to curtail or outlaw scientific research. Rather, it is intended to prohibit the acquisition of animals for research and experimentation from anyone other than licensed dealers.

Scientific research is absolutely essential to continue the search for solutions of medical problems. The Federal Government is a major supporter of medical research. There is no reason why Government should not be a supporter also of humane and legal means of acquisition of animals for this research.

Mr. Speaker, this is a disgraceful situation that now exists in our country, and I believe that it must be curtailed as quickly as possible.

#### SUSPENSION OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO NATIONS WHO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND TRADE WITH NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. MARTIN of Alabama asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, today I have introduced a concurrent resolution which will notify the President and the American people that Congress is opposed to helping those who help our enemies. My resolution expresses the sense of Congress that we should suspend all economic and military aid to any nation maintaining diplomatic relations and trade with North Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I believe this is the sense of the American people. The mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, and wives of men who are now fighting and dying in Vietnam, simply cannot understand why we should use the money of the American people to subsidize countries who, in turn, help strengthen an enemy which is killing Americans.

We know, of course, that the conduct of foreign policy is the full responsibility of the Chief Executive, but it is our responsibility as representatives of the people, to let the President know when we feel the course he is following is wrong. In this instance where we permit unlimited shipping to North Vietnam, I believe the policy is wrong.

Recent figures indicate that more goods and materiel has been shipped into Haiphong Harbor and up the Mekong River to the North Vietnamese enemy by ships of nations supposed to be friendly to us and to whom we are giving billions of dollars in economic and military aid, than by the Communist nations who are openly on the side of North Vietnam. To permit such a situation to continue is not only ridiculous, but when it results in killing and wounding Americans, it is criminal.

I hope Congress will unanimously support my resolution so that the people we represent will know that we are on their side and on the side of the men who have

been sent to stop Communist aggression in Vietnam.

#### THE 48TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF LITHUANIA

(Mr. ERLÉNORN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ERLÉNORN. Mr. Speaker, the people of Lithuania have lived, all too long, under the heel of one foreign oppressor or another. In my State of Illinois, many of them gathered last Sunday in observance of the 48th anniversary of their independence—in observance of this day, February 16, 1918.

Although their freedom has been taken from them throughout most—indeed, almost all—of this century, they still have the desire for freedom. To these people of Lithuanian ancestry who live here in the land of the free, let us all extend an encouraging handclasp of greeting, a handclasp to fortify their vision of importing freedom to their homeland on the Baltic Sea.

#### GREAT PLAINS CONSERVATION PROGRAM GOING WELL IN KANSAS

(Mr. DOLE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOLE. Mr. Speaker, there is evidence in Kansas that after 10 years of operations the Great Plains conservation program is equal to the task for which it was conceived—to minimize the hazards of climate by converting unsuitable land from continuous cultivation to permanent vegetation.

To my mind the progress in Kansas alone justifies the budgetary increase which Congress voted last year for this activity.

The Great Plains conservation program is supplementary to other activities. It does not replace them. A fundamental principle in the program is the requirement that the landowners develop a complete plan of conservation operations.

Were it not for the Soil Conservation Service this might have been a limiting factor in the program's expansion. As it is, the landowner gets professional help from SCS technicians in the formulation of a plan which then becomes the basis for application of conservation practices under a contract with the Federal Government.

This Great Plains conservation program has proved to be an excellent tool for the Soil Conservation Service, providing technical assistance to cooperating farmers and ranchers through soil conservation districts in an area of special agricultural problems.

Measures of the program's worth are its effectiveness and its acceptance. Of the latter there can be no doubt in view of the increasing number of applications.

Between June 30, 1964, and June 30, 1965, there was an increase of 3,835 contracts in the 10 Great Plains States with some 4,300 unserved applications at the end of fiscal 1965.

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To prevent fourth-class mail delivery of products that could be harmful to children; to prevent free distribution of these products in homes or residential buildings, particularly where children could get at them.

To encourage the distribution of such products in stores where adults could get them if they wished; and to make it mandatory to label all drugs and any other product that could be harmful to children in any way.

Asked what her husband thinks of her new "interest," Mrs. Thompson replied, "Oh, he's been great support." Mr. Thompson is a Ph. D. candidate in geochemistry at MIT.

And of the campaign itself, she said she hopes to have an organizational meeting in January, at a yet unspecified date.

She said she will not name any organization that comes out of the meeting because "we will be stuck with the name.

"I think mothers as individuals can do an awful lot," she said.

#### TIMELY REMINDER

(Mr. MILLER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, where do we draw the line—and how do we hold it?

The answers to both questions were stated with clarity by President Johnson in his statement at the Honolulu conference.

The San Francisco Examiner and News Call Bulletin on February 11 said that the President's major statement in Hawaii "provides a fitting rebuff to opponents of his Vietnam policy who, regardless of their motivation, invariably fall to offer a logical and honorable alternative."

Comparing the strong comparison of the Vietnam situation to American foreign policy decisions of the 1940's and 1950's, the San Francisco paper made sense when it said:

The Hawaii speech was a reemphasis of the "so far and no farther" outlook which has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy in the post-World War II years. The policy has worked, and to depart from it would court disaster, shame, and inevitably world war III.

It seems to me that the comparison to which this editorial refers should be studied and restudied, and in order that my colleagues may do so I place this article in the RECORD at this point:

#### TIMELY REMINDER FROM JOHNSON

Speaking in Hawaii earlier this week, President Johnson emphatically restated the unassailable case for the American presence in Vietnam. It provides a fitting rebuff to opponents of his Vietnam policy who, regardless of their motivation, invariably fail to offer a logical and honorable alternative.

Perhaps the most striking point made by the President was his comparison of the Vietnam war to American foreign policy decisions of the forties and fifties when "we took our stand in Europe to protect the freedom of those threatened by aggression."

The firmness of such stands—for example, in Greece and during the Berlin airlift—has apparently convinced Soviet Russia that America means business when it says it will not stand idly by and watch communism prey on small relatively defenseless regions. This determination was, of course, also strikingly and grimly illustrated during the Ko-

rean war, at great cost in American life and treasure.

The taking of such a stand moreover evokes sad memories of the pre-World War II era when democracy allowed Adolf Hitler to prey in precisely the same fashion on his neighbors. It took a great world conflict to stop him, or don't the administration's Vietnam opponents recall this?

The Hawaii speech was a reemphasis of the "so far and no farther" outlook which has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy in the post-World War II years. The policy has worked, and to depart from it would court disaster, shame, and inevitably world war III.

#### OUR AMERICAN SOLDIERS ARE ENTITLED TO OUR FULL SUPPORT

(Mr. CABELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CABELL. Mr. Speaker, the United States now has some 200,000 young Americans in combat with communism, and as the President has said:

They are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination.

In this, the majority of American people fully concur. As the Dallas Times-Herald has pointed out:

The President could have followed no other course than to order resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Although Hanoi shows no signs of turning toward peace, "the President has assured this Nation and the world that the determined pursuit of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam will continue," the Herald said.

It added that the President spoke with a determination and conviction, "that must be ours also."

Because this is an issue on which we all are so vitally committed, I believe that my colleagues will want to read this editorial, and I offer it herewith for publication in the RECORD:

[From the Dallas (Tex.) Times Herald, Feb. 1, 1966]

#### BOMB MESSAGE CONVINCING

The President could have followed no other course than to order resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. Mr. Johnson's talk to the Nation Monday should have convinced even the most reluctant of that fact.

With his statement it should have become absolutely apparent, too, that the determined peace efforts by the United States were no mere surface show, displayed for political and diplomatic purposes only. The peace offensive was conducted by every possible means that the President and his advisers could employ.

Moreover, the determined efforts to get some small encouraging response from Hanoi—meanwhile holding back the bombers from the skies of North Vietnam as guarantee of sincerity—went far beyond, and lasted far longer, than even the most stubborn critic could logically expect.

But in spite of this pervasive and long-continued campaign, the President told his listeners: "Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world—but not in Hanoi and Peiping. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection. The answer of Hanoi to all (the peace efforts) is \* \* \* that they persist in aggression and they insist on

the surrender of South Vietnam to the Communists. It is plain there is no readiness for peace in that regime today."

The President's description of the situation was emphasized later by Secretary of State Dean Rusk who disclosed that the United States offered to extend the bombing pause if Hanoi would make a responsive peace gesture. Hanoi's response, he said, had been "negative, harsh, and unyielding."

Though this rock-hard attitude of the Hanoi regime shows no sign of cracking, the President has assured this Nation and the world that the determined pursuit of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam will continue. And he immediately supported his promise with action. This is certainly as it should be. The peace offensive must be prosecuted just as ardently as the military offensive.

But meanwhile, there is no peace, and Americans and allies and South Vietnamese are dying at the hands of the Vietcong. "They are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination. We will give both," President Johnson declared with the conviction that must be ours also.

#### PACIFIC ISLANDS HAVE NO COMMUNIST WOES

(Mr. ASPINALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks, and to include a speech.)

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to include for insertion in the body of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an article written for the Honolulu Star Bulletin by the Honorable Carlton Skinner, Governor of Guam from 1949 to 1953 and presently senior Commissioner for the United States on the South Pacific Commission.

Commissioner Skinner points out that the Communists have made no progress in planting or propagating their philosophy in the Pacific Islands where "Western nations have in the last 20 years established very substantial institutions of self-government in all Pacific territories." He contends that "it is these institutions which have kept the islands and their inhabitants friendly to the administering powers. The people of the islands recognize that with universal suffrage, the secret ballot, legislatures of their own choosing and independent judiciaries, they have more true self-government than half of the members of the United Nations. The result is that the people of the islands are following democratic educational systems, democratic political systems, and capitalist economic systems."

It is refreshing to know the efforts of the free world are recognized and admired by the Pacific islanders and that there appears to be no evidence that communistic concepts are being welcomed. I commend the reading of Mr. Skinner's article to my colleagues:

[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1965]

PACIFIC ISLANDS HAVE NO COMMUNIST WOES (By Carlton Skinner, Senior Commissioner for the United States on the South Pacific Commission)

Is there a major geographical area of the world which has not yet afforded the Communists a foothold? Certainly not Europe, or Africa, or North or South America. Yes,

there is one left—and only one. It is the Pacific Islands area which only a score of years ago was the bloody battleground for the war to save democracy from totalitarianism.

This soil in which communism has been unable to flourish embraces 20 percent of the earth's surface, 13 million square miles of land and water, and has a population of but 3 million spread out among 17 island territories.

The people of these territories were closer to the great war of 1941-45 than any others in the world. They live in Guadalcanal, Tarawa, New Georgia, Truk, Saipan, Guam, and a hundred other tropical islands well known to the American forces and their allies from the devastations of the sea, air, and ground battles for their liberation.

For these very reasons, the Pacific islands area is politically and militarily the most strategic area of the world today. It is the one section of the world where the democratic nations of the world, sometimes called the Western Alliance, can move freely, install, establish airlines, shipping lines and other businesses, create military installations, assign fleets and troops, and man observation posts with the complete cooperation of friendly inhabitants.

The cooperation comes from the very fact that the Western nations which originally established colonies in this part of the world have, particularly in recent years, been generally fair, honest and helpful in their dealings with the indigenous people. While the early European settlements in the islands were the scenes of many cruelties and injustices, the Polynesian and Melanesian peoples retaliated vigorously and frequently gave as good as they got. At the same time missionaries, Protestant and Catholic, came in large numbers and were successful to a high degree in spreading Christianity, Christian ethics and respect for the rights of others.

#### SELF-GOVERNMENT

In the crucial field which has led to the proliferation of new nations in Africa, that of the right of people to govern themselves, the Western nations have in the last 20 years established very substantial institutions of self-government in all Pacific territories.

It is these institutions of self-government which have kept the islands and their inhabitants friendly to the administering powers. The people of the islands recognize that with universal suffrage, the secret ballot, legislatures of their own choosing, and independent judiciaries, they have more true self-government than half of the members of the United Nations. The result is that the people of the islands are following democratic educational systems, democratic political systems, and democratic and capitalist economic systems.

The U.S. territory of Guam has an elected legislature with full legislative powers on all territorial matters and a judiciary which is part of the U.S. court system, from which appeals can be made to the U.S. Supreme Court. Samoa has a freely elected legislature and similar institutions. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, an American administration, inaugurated its Congress of Micronesia in July, this year.

The French territories of Tahiti and New Caledonia have elected legislatures, universal suffrage, and secret ballot and are officially part of Metropolitan France, with elected representatives in the Senate and House of Deputies in Paris. The New Zealand territory of the Cook Islands has just achieved autonomy with elected legislators and ministers for its local government.

The Australian territories of Papua and New Guinea have established a house of assembly in which elected local residents make up two-thirds of the members. The newly independent state of Western Samoa has an elected legislature, ministers, prime min-

ister, and head of state. The British territory of Fiji has an elected legislature with ministers chosen from its membership and this spring will hold consultations with the Government in London on further measures of self-government within the framework of the British Commonwealth.

#### OTHER HELP

These developments have proved to the inhabitants of the island territories that they can have the personal liberty and social and economic freedoms of Western democracy and also can decide their problems in their own way. In addition, the metropolitan governments are all aiding their Pacific territories with grants, construction projects, educational assistance and technical help. They are putting the equivalent of several hundred million dollars a year into the area to help it help itself.

The rapacious leaders of communism are bitter and furious at their failure in the Pacific islands. They have tried to infiltrate Tahiti, Fiji and Western Samoa, with notable lack of success. The active political life of these two territories and independent state have not developed a Communist or Communist-oriented political party. There is not an established Communist movement anywhere in the Pacific Island area.

There have been strikes in which attempts have been made, with little success, to introduce symbols of the class struggle. A few journalists have started weekly papers with leftwing sentiments, which tended to fold up quickly. Even the few political parties made up exclusively of indigenous inhabitants have concentrated on economic issues and plumped for autonomy or complete self-government instead of "independence" of the type the Communists advocate.

In New Guinea, two members of the United Nations Committee on Decolonization, Mr. Natwar Singh of India and D. Mohied-Din Nabavi of Iran toured the territory recently and approached members of the newly elected House of Assembly to get them to agitate for immediate independence. The members told them to get out of town in a hurry and then all the indigenous members of the House joined in introducing a resolution stating that they wanted no advice from outside on what their future political status would be; they were perfectly capable of deciding it themselves. The resolution was passed unanimously.

#### REDS PROSTRATED

Frustrated as they have been by these political reactions, the Communists have resorted to infiltration and subversion by naval patrols and cultural methods. For months, the Russian Navy's Hydrographic Service has stationed the 125 foot survey ship *Ampermetr* off the entrance to Apra Harbor, the large and powerful U.S. Naval base and commercial Port of Guam. The ship cruises back and forth along the breakwater but never crosses the 3-mile limit. The *Ampermetr* is a fishing trawler type with no fishing gear in sight. Neither are there elaborate antennas and other communications gear obviously on deck.

It is clear, however, that the *Ampermetr* knows everything that goes in and out of Guam and is listening to everything it can on the radios. Other Russian trawlers cruise the Pacific, but none have taken up such a blatant patrol station.

In the cultural field, the Russian Embassy in New Zealand is sending a monthly supply of Russian propaganda films to the newly independent State of Western Samoa. Half of them go to the main library in Apia for free showing to the public. The other half go as a personal gift to Malietoa, the Head of State, who is a moving buff, and gives big dinner parties followed by movies. A recent movie which he showed was a Czech production entitled, "Island of Freedom," which gives a syrupy version of life in Cuba today.

The Russian Communist interest in the Pacific island area has only recently developed. The first sign was an article in *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* in 1960 which said, "The Soviet Union demands that 1965 should become the year of the establishment of liberty and independence for all the peoples in colonial slavery."

"The struggle against colonialism in Oceania has a protracted and stubborn character. Apart from their political and economic interests, a large part in the policies of the colonizers is played by strategic ideas; the numerous islands spread out over huge expanses of the greatest ocean on the globe are marvelous natural sites for nuclear rocket bases. \* \* \* The territories have various masters, but the situation of their peoples is similar—they suffer from lack of political rights, illiteracy, poverty, and mass epidemics."

#### FUJI STRIKE

In Aziya I Afrika Segodnya in 1964, a writer said the British in Fiji were trying to cover the rusty nails of exploitation with the figleaf of talk about the civilizing role of the European. He found little comfort for communism except that the first strike in the history of the islands took place in Fiji a few years ago. He concluded that "the fight is not yet over. The islands of Fiji have suffered too long under the colonial yoke. The time of liberation is approaching."

The Russian expert on trusteeship territories, Malakhovskiy, has written a book on the alleged iniquities of colonial administration of Pacific islands people. He has searched the literature on each island in an effort to find some sign of revolt and has had to settle for accounts of religious movements, such as the 1964 cargo cult in New Guinea which wanted Lyndon Johnson as its leader, of local political campaigns, and of public meetings which supported measures of self-government.

He even complains that the 160 descendants of the *Bounty* mutineers on Pitcairn have certain governmental, educational, postal, and similar matters handled for them by the Governor of Fiji. This had its echo recently in the U.N. Committee on Decolonization which solemnly reported that the British did not keep an administrator on Pitcairn and therefore the committee couldn't complain about him. (The Pitcairners elect their own magistrates.)

The Communist Chinese have not shown their hand yet in the Pacific Islands but they are keenly aware of the great value of this area to Western democracies and will certainly step up their attention and attacks. They have propaganda broadcasts aimed at the region and are reported to have used them to invite applications for scholarships for study in Red China.

The value of the Pacific Islands area to the Western powers is partly military. Guam, as America's part of the Far East is and must be a major U.S. military base. The overseas navy of France is headquartered in New Caledonia and shows itself frequently in Pacific Island ports.

There are five jet airstrips in the Pacific Islands. There is now a Polaris submarine base in Guam. The Pacific Missile Range runs through the center of the area. When further military or naval action by Western powers is wished it will encounter no political obstacles in the area.

#### MAJOR VALUE

However, the major value to the Western democratic powers is political. Here, in the Pacific, it has been proven that economically underdeveloped regions can get technical assistance and support from democracies to develop into self-reliant economies and self-governing political units, with education and opportunity for their young men and women.



## Special milk program—Minnesota

	½ pints reimbursed (percent)	Number of outlets part- icipating	Program expendi- tures
1955	21.8	1,360	\$843,977
1956	44.0	2,156	1,543,465
1957	49.0	2,496	1,795,287
1958	51.7	2,541	1,870,208
1959	58.0	2,691	2,008,830
1960	64.7	2,720	2,322,374
1961	66.4	2,748	2,436,590
1962	76.0	2,807	2,527,683
1963	71.8	2,765	2,612,897
1964	76.5	2,779	2,768,304
1965	77.3	2,841	2,677,706

### PROPHETS OF GLOOM AND DOOM FEAR JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION PROSPERITY

(Mr. PATMAN was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gloom and doom boys are with us again.

Like a voice out of the past, Arthur F. Burns appeared in Washington this week to deliver what the Washington Post described as a "bitter, slashing attack" on the economic policies of the Johnson administration. With great fear and trembling, Mr. Burns, as he has for so many years, once again sees that ugly bugaboo inflation under every bed.

Mr. Burns has made a substantial career out of these perennial cries of gloom and doom. Apparently picturing himself as a modern-day Paul Revere, Mr. Burns rides off in all directions warning that the country is about to be engulfed by inflation.

Arthur F. Burns' theory seems to be, "Things are good today, but that only means that they will be bad tomorrow."

A look at Mr. Burns' background might help to put his dire predictions into proper perspective. He is, of course, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the last Republican Administration and one of the chief architects of the Eisenhower economic policies. He was guiding economic policy during a period in which the country dropped into two serious recessions and started on a third.

With this kind of background, it is not surprising that Mr. Burns is somewhat confused by the economic policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations which have brought the country five solid years of progress and prosperity. Undoubtedly, it is a little embarrassing to Mr. Burns that this wave of prosperity started soon after the voters were able to sweep out the Eisenhower team and policies in 1960.

Mr. Burns comes from the school of economics which believes that the worse thing that could happen to the economy is full employment. This Eisenhower adviser seems to regard putting people to work as a dangerous trend.

Here again, Mr. Burns' experiences with the Republican administration in the 1950's may indeed be embarrassing. Through much of this period the country had unemployment rates of 5, 6, and in one period almost 7 percent. During much of this period, we had rising un-

employment—something which the Burns school of economics apparently regards as a virtue.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that putting people to work is a sign of a strong nation and an indicator of wise economic policies being carried out by the Johnson administration. I am happy that unemployment has dropped to record lows in this administration. I hope it continues to drop and that people who want to work have jobs.

Both political parties should be proud of the Nation's record of prosperity. Our ability to maintain high production and high employment is one of our great strengths throughout the world. It is the answer to the Communist leaders who have consistently argued, just as Mr. Burns contends, that the United States could not have high employment, high production, and stable prices. The Johnson administration is disproving this theory of gloom and doom which is consistently voiced by the far left and the far right.

Arthur F. Burns sounds suspiciously like another gentleman of the gloom and doom school, Federal Reserve Board Chairman William McChesney Martin. Like Mr. Burns, Mr. Martin constantly issues dire warnings of impending economic disaster. Last June, Mr. Martin journeyed to New York to issue his famous speech which attempted to show a similarity between the economic policies of 1929 and the policies of the Johnson administration. No sooner had this doomsday speech been discredited than Mr. Martin was back with a new theory that inflation was about to overtake us. Of course, this became his excuse for raising interest rates on December 6 as high as 37½ percent.

It is not surprising that we find such great similarity in the public pronouncements of Mr. Martin and Mr. Burns. Both were coconspirators in leading the country down the road to recessions in the Eisenhower administration. Both have been coconspirators in the financial community's efforts to impose tight money, high interest, and high unemployment on the country.

In our deep concern over inflation, Mr. Burns seems to have completely ignored the role of the Federal Reserve Board and the banks in feeding the fires of cost increases. No mention is made of the fact that the Federal Reserve Board's order of December 6 raised the discount rate—the wholesale cost of money—by 12½ percent—considerably above all wage-price guidelines. No mention is made of the fact that as part of the same action the Federal Reserve gave the banks permission to raise the interest rates they pay on time deposits by 22.2 percent and 37½ percent. Again these percentages are much higher than any wage or any price demands that I have heard about. For some strange reason, price rises in this banker's area of the economy do not seem to worry economists like Arthur F. Burns; he just fails to mention them.

The Burns and the Martins have always made a good thing out of the scare word inflation. This word has covered a multitude of economic sins in which

the Federal Reserve Board and the bankers have participated.

Of course, Mr. Burns and Mr. Martin are clever. They know that no one is in favor of inflation. But they would like to have the American people believe that they have some sort of monopoly on concern about inflationary trends. This is simply not true. Democrats and Republicans alike have no desire to plunge the country into inflation.

President Johnson is fully cognizant of the dangers. His advisers are extremely competent men and they, like the President, are keeping a close watch on the economy. These advisers have appeared in recent days before the Joint Economic Committee and their testimony fully bears out the validity of the Nation's current economic policies and clearly establishes that the Johnson administration is keeping a very close eye on any trends which might be inflationary.

The administration, of course, has many effective tools which it can use to combat any inflation. For example, if inflation becomes a problem, the President can always raise taxes, particularly those on excess profits. Most economists agree that tax policy is a prime weapon and defense against all forms of inflation. Certainly, it is much superior and much more effective than the bludgeonlike methods employed by the Federal Reserve Board in raising interest rates. The President has the power to combat inflation and, if necessary, I am sure he will not hesitate to use it.

But President Johnson and his advisers, unlike the Burns-Martin school, do not believe that we should sit in fear and trembling at the sight of prosperity. They, unlike Martin and Burns, do not believe that this is the time for learned economists to bandy about scare words such as inflation.

Arthur F. Burns appeared in Washington under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, probably the chief gloom and doom organization in the Nation. As reported in the papers, Mr. Burns' speech unfortunately has the sound of political demagoguery rather than the ring of economic truth.

It is regrettable that such unsubstantiated attacks are leveled on the President at a time when he is attempting to rally the country behind our efforts in Vietnam. We are in a grave time, and it ill serves our national purposes to have spokesmen running around the country with unfounded predictions of gloom and doom.

In these times of national emergency, I hope the U.S. Chamber of Commerce will use its forums to promote the country and not to divide the people and to create doubt in the land.

### NEW DECISIONS

(Mr. MORRIS was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, Columnist Roscoe Drummond reports that the conflict in Vietnam is a "people's war," and that the decisions at Honolulu "go to the heart of winning."

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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In terms of the importance of this program to the schoolchildren of Minnesota, I wish to point out that the number of schools and other milk outlets participating has risen from 1,360 in 1955 to 2,841 in 1965. Milk consumption has risen from 21.8 million half pints in 1955 to 77.3 million in 1965. These figures in themselves attest to the need for and acceptance of this program.

In terms of its economic importance to the dairy industry, I would like to point out that in my Second Congressional District, where there are nearly 32,000 farms, a healthy dairy industry is particularly important. Better than 70 percent of cash farm income in Minnesota, for example, is derived from the sale of livestock and livestock products.

Dairying alone in 1959 contributed \$259,077,000 to the economy of Minnesota and \$52,123,000 to the economy of the Second Congressional District.

Mr. Speaker, the special milk program has been in operation since 1954. It has been highly successful. It represents a very small but important investment in our children.

I do not like to question the motives of this administration or the Bureau of the Budget, but I cannot believe that the proposed budget cut for this program from \$103 to \$21 million for the next fiscal year is sound or responsible.

We are dealing with a budget of nearly \$113 billions and it will probably run many billions more, judging from the experience of the past 5 years. In this budget, funds are allocated for the Great Society almost as though money were of no consequence.

If the administration is seeking to save money, there are many obvious areas where slashes can be made without curtailing programs which have proved their worth to the American people. If the administration is looking for economy, the Congress can and should react in kind, but we should be selective where we make our cuts. Certainly, we should not feed the appetite of the Great Society at the expense of our children.

I think the Congress should tell the American people that we are interested in the youth of this country; that we intend to make the special milk program permanent, and that we intend to provide sufficient funds so that the program can grow with its needs.

It is important we make our intentions known to the American people at this time, and that they be assured the special milk program will not be wiped off the books as indicated by the proposed budget for the 1966-67 fiscal year.

The special milk program for children, unless extended, is scheduled to expire June 30, 1967. My bill, therefore, is designed to assure the American people that the special milk program for children will receive sufficient appropriations now and in the future, and that the program will be continued beyond June 30, 1967.

There is further reason why it is important for Congress to act now. Mr. Duane J. Mattheis, Commissioner of Education in the State of Minnesota, has just written me to protest the planned

cutbacks in both the school lunch and special milk programs in our State. Mr. Mattheis pointed out, however, that these cutbacks are not only being planned for the next fiscal year, they are being carried out now on funds Congress has already made available for the special milk program.

While Congress has appropriated \$103 million for the special milk program for this year, the Bureau of the Budget has instructed that expenditures for the year be held to \$100 million. In order to comply, schools in Minnesota are finding their repayment claims reduced by an extra 5 percent.

Such cutbacks were obviously not intended by Congress, nor should they be condoned as a necessity because of the war in Vietnam when all the money supposedly saved is simply being spent for other more questionable domestic programs. There is plenty of fat that this administration could cut out of its Great Society spending without damaging an existing, worthwhile program for which Congress has already appropriated money.

I wish to include the correspondence of Mr. Mattheis at this point in my remarks, along with two telegrams and a letter from the U.S. Department of Agriculture outlining the cutbacks. I also insert in the RECORD statistical matter relating to the special milk program in the State of Minnesota:

STATE OF MINNESOTA,  
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,  
St. Paul, Minn., February 7, 1966.

HON. ANCHER NELSEN,  
U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. NELSEN: During the last number of weeks we have received two telegrams and a letter from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, copies of which are enclosed.

Because of the many benefits that are provided to our school children under these programs and because of their contribution to the education, welfare, and health of the participants, I feel the lowering of payments to the schools will have a great detrimental effect on the school lunch and special milk programs in our State.

There is also a discriminatory feature in the cutback of funds as outlined in the second telegram that I feel worthy of mention. I would be concerned about the administrative arrangements for programs in Minnesota public schools in which special emphasis and direction were placed upon providing milk for needy children and children in schools without a food service program that would be above and beyond the efforts now being made by local school boards in taking care of these needs.

In view of the significant appropriations of money for recently developed and new programs, it is difficult for me to understand why programs such as school lunch and special milk which have proven to be so worthwhile in the schools of our State and the Nation and for which the needs are definitely known be curtailed in their appropriations.

Because of the substantially worthwhile contributions of these two programs and the increased participation in them by school children, I urge you to do everything possible to reinstate the funds to their present level and increase them accordingly each year to provide for the improvement and expansion of these excellent programs.

Sincerely,

DUANE J. MATTHEIS,  
Commissioner of Education.

C. E. HOLT,  
School Lunch Section,  
Department of Education,  
St. Paul, Minn.

For your information the President's budget for 1967 requests total of \$183 million for school lunch with breakdown as follows: Cash payments, \$129,415,000; Section 11, special assistance, \$6,500,000; Section 6, \$45 million; Administration, \$2,085,000.

Request of \$21 million for special milk program to be redirected to provide milk for needy children and children in schools without a food service. We will give you further details as quickly as they are available.

DENNIS M. DOYLE,  
Food Distribution, USDA Chicago.

CHICAGO, ILL.

CARL HOLT,  
Director, School Lunch Section,  
State Department of Education,  
St. Paul, Minn.

In accordance with instructions from the Bureau of Budget to hold expenditures under the special milk program to \$1 billion inclusive of administrative costs for this fiscal year you are hereby advised that the current deduction of 5 percent will be increased to 10 percent beginning with claims for the month of February. Schools and child care institutions should be notified as promptly as possible. As provided in section 215.7(E) of the special milk regulations no deductions will be made in reimbursements to needy schools.

DENNIS M. DOYLE,  
Director, Midwest Area,  
U.S. Department of Agriculture.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,  
CONSUMER AND MARKETING SERVICE,  
Chicago, Ill., December 28, 1965.

Mr. C. E. HOLT,  
Director, School Lunch Section, State Department of Education, St. Paul, Minn.

DEAR MR. HOLT: This will supplement my wire of December 23 on the special milk program fund situation for the remainder of the fiscal year.

As you know, Congress appropriated \$103 million for the special milk program this year. Based on preliminary estimates of expenditures for the year, however, we would need at least \$102 million obligating authority in fiscal year 1966 if the present 5 percent reduction is continued through the full year. In order to hold expenditures to \$100 million as instructed by the Bureau of the Budget, it has become necessary to reduce obligations for the last half of the year by \$2 million.

Because the school year generally begins in September, about 40 percent of program obligations occur from February 1 to the end of the fiscal year. Thus, in order to reduce obligations by \$2 million during the remaining 40 percent of the year, an additional 5 percent reduction in claims is necessary beginning with claims for the month of February.

No restoration of funds which may be saved by the percentage reduction method will be made after the end of the fiscal year.

Although the wording of section 215.7(e) of the special milk program regulations, effective December 1, 1965, is not spelled out as thoroughly as it was in the former section 215.8(e) of the prior regulations, the intent is the same. No percentage reduction of reimbursement shall be applied to any part of claims submitted by needy schools approved for special assistance under the special milk program.

We hope the overall impact of this action will not adversely affect program operations.

Sincerely yours,

DENNIS M. DOYLE,  
Director, Midwest Area.

February 16, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3071

They were primarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malleable and, perhaps, decisive turn in the war—

His column of February 14 said.

Drummond reported that the Honolulu decisions centered on "how to help Saigon show the Vietnamese peasant that it is his own government, not the Communists", which can and will protect him, help him, and secure him better against the worst hardships of the fighting."

The problem—and the opportunity—is to get people who are now either willingly or unwillingly living in Vietcong-controlled areas to seek the shelter of the Government.

The end of the war, Drummond believes, "will come when the Vietnamese peasants make this choice."

This column spells out the challenge before us and our allies in Vietnam, and in the belief that others may find the column illuminating, I offer it to the RECORD for publication:

[From the New York Herald Tribune, Feb. 14, 1966]

**DECISIVE TURN IN VIET? WINNING A PEOPLE'S WAR—VITAL STEPS AT HONOLULU**  
(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—General Giap, the supreme commander of the Communist forces in North Vietnam, has labeled it a "people's war." He's right.

This is why the decisions taken at Honolulu by President Johnson and Premier Ky go to the heart of winning. They were primarily social, economic, and political decisions. They come at a malleable and, perhaps, decisive turn in the war.

For a long time the larger part of the 16 million South Vietnamese people, mostly peasant farmers, has tried hard to stay neutral in the seesaw conflict between the Vietcong and the government troops.

They did so not because they wanted to be ruled by the Communists; there is ample proof they don't. But for one main reason: neither side could give them security. Neutrality seemed the only way to survive.

The situation is now being radically altered. The mounting South Vietnamese and U.S. forces, the steady B-52 raids against VC strongholds keeping the Communists ever on the move with fewer places to hide, the new ability to take the battle to where the enemy is and not let him rest—these are the new factors which are changing the face of the conflict.

They are making it impossible for the peasant farmers to avoid much longer having to choose sides and either help the government to win or to cast their lot and lives with the Communists.

Before the escalation of fighting and the search-and-destroy strategy of the expanded Vietnamese and U.S. forces, it was understandable that the peasant should feel he could best avoid trouble by not choosing sides.

Now the moment of decision is at hand when the farmers and villagers will have to decide whether:

To stay on their farms or in their hamlets and take risks of noncombatants in war.

To move to areas under government control where the Vietcong is not drawing the fire of defending forces.

To put their fate and future into the hands of the Vietcong.

The Honolulu decisions centered on this very matter: How to help Saigon show the Vietnamese peasant that it is his own government, not the Communists', which can and will protect him, help him and secure

him better against the worst hardships of the fighting.

Saigon has given the peasant food when the Vietcong have taken it away from him. It has given him medicine, helped him repair the village schools and employed him to repair roads, whereas the Vietcong have forced the peasants to dig their trenches.

But after a decade of fighting, the Saigon government cannot alone meet this problem which will soon become more acute. More is needed and the United States proposes to provide it.

One of the wisest young generals in the Pentagon, Brig. Gen. Edwin F. Black, who has just returned from a special mission in Vietnam, puts the problem—and the opportunity—in these words:

"This new combination, of relentless pressure on the ground and ceaseless attack from the air, is making the Vietcong and their supporters steadily more miserable \* \* \* sooner or later these pressures will probably cause many more of the people, who are now either willingly or unwillingly living in Vietcong controlled areas, to seek the shelter of the government."

The end of what General Giap calls the "people's war" will come when the Vietnamese peasants make this choice. It is a choice which is coming nearer.

**WTOP EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIETNAM POLICY EXPOUNDS SOME MUCH NEEDED COMMONSENSE ON A COMPLEX ISSUE**

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, those of us who have followed the progress of the fighting in Vietnam, and of the developments of our policy in connection with that conflict, as we have been privileged to follow them in the Committee on Armed Services, are well aware that the facts and issues in the Vietnam conflict are highly complex. Because of this complexity it is not always possible to make a contribution to a thorough understanding of what is involved in Vietnam simply by resort to easy slogans or passing headlines or hastily conceived proposals.

For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, it is especially encouraging to run across now and then a comment on the matter of our Nation's policy in Vietnam that has been carefully thought out, that demonstrates a full awareness of the complexity of the issues involved, and that is marked with a high measure of sound commonsense.

Two such comments I am happy to say, have recently appeared on WTOP radio and television in editorials prepared and presented by Jack Jurey of WTOP. Because of their soundness and commonsense I commend these two editorials to my colleagues and to the American people.

The editorials follows:

VIETNAM—I

(This editorial was broadcast on February 14 and 15, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Television.)

This is a WTOP editorial.

The hardest work that men ever do is to think; to define their terms; to sit down and, putting aside preconceptions as much as pos-

sible, try to arrive at a rational definition of a problem and a rational approach to its solution.

In the case of Vietnam, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has now heard from two men with exceptional credentials: Gen. James Gavin and former Ambassador George Kennan. In prolonged testimony, they appeared to say much the same thing. Both men, and Professor Kennan in particular, criticize the policy decisions of the last dozen years which led to the present warfare, both are extremely apprehensive of the perils of continued escalation; both consider our Vietnam commitment to be a distortion of American foreign policy objectives; both warn that the United States cannot be all things to all men throughout the world.

But when it comes to the situation as it is, Professor Kennan and General Gavin agree that continued resistance is necessary. Kennan made this statement: "I think it should be our Government's aim to liquidate this involvement just as soon as this can be done without inordinate damage to our own prestige or to the stability of conditions in that area." The involvement, he said, "is today a fact \* \* \* a precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in present circumstances a disservice to our own interests."

President Johnson has responded to this by saying that he can see little difference between what Kennan and Gavin recommend and what the Government is doing. Neither can we. If all the people who are concerned about Vietnam will stick to the relevant issues—which is how the present problem can be dealt with—a good part of the fog ought to lift. It is vital to debate strategy not in retrospect but in terms of the immediate crisis. Provided this is done, it could very well turn out that there is not nearly so much disagreement about Vietnam as appears in the headlines.

This was a WTOP editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP.

VIETNAM—II

(This editorial was broadcast on February 15 and 16, 1966, over WTOP Radio and Television.)

This is a WTOP editorial, the second in a series on Vietnam.

At the root of much of the discord and dissent about Vietnam is the fear of continuing escalation the fear that if American military power is applied in ever-greater measure we will drift into conflict with Communist China and, perhaps, the Soviet Union.

This is not an unreasonable anxiety. But if we are trying to deal with the Vietnam problem rationally—which seems to be the principal need of the moment—escalation can be controlled and kept within rational limits.

Military power is not an end in itself, it is an instrument of policy; which means that the escalation of such power can be severely limited to the achievement of policy objectives.

These include, first and foremost, persuading the other side to come to the conference table to negotiate what would be—for us and them—an acceptable formula for ending the fighting.

We do not seek to harm Red China, although one of our purposes is to contain an extension of Chinese power in southeast Asia. We do not seek to destroy North Vietnam. And we probably are prepared to concede the existence of the National Liberation Front—the Vietcong—and deal with it as a political entity in one way or another.

These limited objectives imply a limit to escalation. They argue against the bombing of Hanoi. They argue against a vastly greater commitment of American troops. Our aim is to establish an unshakable American military presence in South Vietnam, but

not to undertake an unending build-up of men and material.

In other words, in terms of escalation, we must control the situation—not let the situation control us. Here again we suggest the President and his critics are closer to agreement than the headlines indicate. Because we can see nothing significant in the record to indicate that Mr. Johnson is not fully aware of the need for restraint and caution in South Vietnam.

This was a WTOP Editorial, Jack Jurey speaking for WTOP.

#### DECEPTION BY VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES

(Mr. KING of Utah asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I am alarmed at the lack of cooperation and the secretiveness, even the willful deception that is currently practiced by various Federal agencies.

It is conceded, I believe, that one of the most effective bulwarks of freedom in the United States has been our historic resistance to government in secret. Yet there is evidence, today, that secretiveness has become in some instances an instrument of departmental policy.

No one questions that our national security requires certain critical information to remain classified. There are official documents whose general circulation is not in the national interest. There are important decisions, we all agree, which must be made behind closed doors.

In order to preserve the freedom of our intellectual marketplace, however, the number of items designated to be withheld should be kept at an absolute minimum. The tendency is for departments of government to classify everything which might prove to be embarrassing to anyone within that department. Loyalty to the establishment rather than the dissemination of truth, becomes the important factor in determining whether governmental information should be released to the public, or kept under lock and key. Secrecy is to be deplored, and should be justified only in situations where national security is clearly at stake.

Now that the Government is spending billions of dollars in basic research—which amount represents over 60 percent of all basic research conducted in this country—it is mandatory that this information be made freely available to the public. People are entitled to this dearly paid for information, not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of right, subject only to the considerations of national security.

Errors in judging, incompetence, neglect, and maladministration should be exposed. The concealment of truth, or, worse yet, the dissemination of error, should be repudiated as an instrument of governmental policy.

Over the past 8 months I have had a most frustrating experience with the Food and Drug Administration. Personnel in that agency have followed a policy of official deafness and calculated obtuseness that defies credibility.

The full story began a long time ago, but a convenient beginning point for my narrative is October 25, 1963, when the FDA released a progress report on its "Campaign Against Nutritional Quackery" in connection with the Second National Congress on Medical Quackery held in Washington, D.C., under joint sponsorship of the FDA and the American Medical Association.

Among other things, this report warned against what the FDA still calls the soil depletion myth. One statement in the report seemed to me and to many of my well-informed friends to be difficult to defend:

The facts are that research has demonstrated that the nutritional values of our crops are not significantly affected by the soil or the kind of fertilizer used. Only the yield is affected. Lack of iodine in soil or water, of course, has been shown to cause goiter, but this is the only disease definitely associated with soil deficiency.

May I say, in passing, that any proven relationship between soil composition and the nutritional value of food becomes a matter of great significance. The food industry, considered collectively, is the largest single industry in the United States. Gross annual food sales are approximately \$65 billion. That industry has done an excellent job of making America the best-fed Nation in the world, but the question has been seriously asked, by experts, whether this industry may not have spent a disproportionate amount of time and effort in improving eye-appeal, convenience, storability, and packaging, at the expense of effort which might have been spent in improving the nutritional quality of food. We are not splitting hairs, or magnifying molehills. We are raising a question which might determine the direction in which the largest industry in this Nation will travel for generations to come. The FDA, by use of the above and other similar language, has indicated one clear course for the food industry to follow. The facts which I am about to discuss raise the serious question whether the FDA, in so doing, has acted with complete candor.

I willingly concede that there is a sharp divergence of opinion among the experts on the question whether depleted or contaminated soils may produce food deficient in nutritional value. In my discussion, I do not take sides in that controversy. I assert only that the paramount importance of the subject requires that all persons concerned act with complete candor. The public interest requires nothing less.

In an attempt to resolve this conflict, I sought a conference with the FDA personnel when I returned to Congress last year to discuss the aforesaid statement.

On May 5, 1965, Dr. Phillip L. Harris, Director of the Division of Nutrition of the Food and Drug Administration, along with Dr. Homer Hopkins of the division staff, joined the members of my staff, and me, in a conference. Dr. Harris and Dr. Hopkins, both of whom are distinguished men in the field of nutrition, listened respectfully and sympathetically to my objections to the categorical nature of the aforesaid FDA statement. With-

out making any commitment, they agreed to review the problem to see if the FDA might reconsider its official view of the matter.

I was later told, unofficially, that on or about June 11, 1965, Dr. Hopkins, at the request of Dr. Harris, had prepared an interoffice scientific memorandum, which held that the FDA position could not be defended. I was also told that an official report would be sent to me within a few days.

A few days became a few weeks; and on July 9, I wrote to Dr. Harris asking for information about the progress of their review of the interrelationship between soil quality and nutritive value of food.

Another month of silence elapsed.

Finally on August 12, I wrote and asked when I might expect a reply to my letter of July 9. When I still received no acknowledgment, I instructed one of my staff to call the Assistant Commissioner's office on the telephone.

The Assistant Commissioner said that a reply by Dr. Harris to my July 9 letter had been sent on July 28. I had never received that letter in my office, so I asked for another copy. When it arrived, I was disappointed to find it devoid of substance. In it, Dr. Harris said:

We in the Division of Nutrition are actively reviewing and evaluating literature, much of it very recent, on this subject. We hope to complete the review shortly and will be glad to let you hear further from us at that time.

I confess that I was taken aback by the fact that over 3 months had elapsed since my conference with Dr. Harris and Dr. Hopkins, and over 2 months since Dr. Hopkins had drafted an interoffice memo covering the subject in question.

When one of my staff questioned the delay by phone on August 18, the Assistant Commissioner assured him that a definite decision on the subject could be expected within about 10 days after then, that is, by August 28. When I had received no word from anyone by September 8, I wrote again, this time to the Assistant Commissioner. A copy of my letter follows:

SEPTEMBER 8, 1965.

MR. WINTON B. RANKIN,  
Assistant Commissioner for Planning,  
Food and Drug Administration,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. RANKIN: As I understand it, Dr. Homer Hopkins, staff assistant to Dr. Phillip Harris, Director of the Division of Nutrition of the Food and Drug Administration, prepared a report on or about June 1 relating to the subject of the influence of soil upon the nutritional quality of food.

As I further understand it, this report purported to conflict with a previous statement of the Food and Drug Administration to the effect that the quality of soil affected the quantity but not the quality of food grown thereon.

As a result of this apparent conflict, the Food and Drug Administration decided to review its statement of policy, in the light of the aforesaid report of Dr. Hopkins.

On August 18, you were kind enough to discuss this matter with my administrative assistant, Mr. Frank Mensel, at which time you indicated to him that a report would be forthcoming within 10 days.

It is possible that the report has already issued, without my being aware of it. This letter is to indicate to you my great interest

## NATIONAL SENIOR SERVICE CORPS

(Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, in 1900, life expectancy in the United States at time of birth was 47 years. Today it is a little over 70 years. In 1900 there were approximately 3 million Americans over 65 years of age. Today there are over 16 million in that age group, and by 1970 there will be about 20 million.

In earlier times, the pattern of life was that people worked until they died, but today retirement comes at 70, 65, 62, or 60, and there are several years remaining before death.

The transition from active life to retired status is satisfactorily met by some, but for many it is a traumatic experience that is most difficult to overcome. To be suddenly faced with enforced idleness, to have to break with past associations involving the isolation from friends of long standing without new friends to fill the vacuum, especially to be overtaken by a feeling of uselessness—these are conditions which we must do everything possible to avoid.

It is one thing for the pace of activity to be slowed down; it is quite another thing for activity to come to a sudden halt. Many elderly persons desire to be of service to their community, but there are too few means by which their services can be rendered.

By the Older Americans Act of 1965, a fine beginning was made toward the objective of a better life for our senior citizens, and I am particularly happy that the State of Maryland Commission on the Aging has been successful in obtaining one of the first grants under title III of the act for the purpose of helping to maintain the Metropolitan Senior Center in Baltimore City. I have recently received a letter from the Maryland Commission on the Aging which indicates how important the Older Americans Act is to the State of Maryland, and I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the RECORD at this point.

STATE OF MARYLAND,  
COMMISSION ON THE AGING,  
Baltimore, Md., January 26, 1966.

Hon. CARLTON R. SICKLES,  
House Office Building,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CARLTON: I am delighted to inform you that on January 20, the State Commission of the Aging acted favorably on the first project under the Older Americans Act in Maryland. Indeed, if not the first, among the first in the Nation.

Under this project a grant of \$10,000 for the first year will go to the Metropolitan Senior Center in Baltimore City. This center has become increasingly effective in the city and has previously depended largely on private financing plus some additional appropriation from the city itself. There was a possibility that without this grant, their activities for the coming year would have been much restricted or even abandoned at the very time when it was becoming most useful to the older citizens of the city.

This project represents the first "bite" into the \$67,000 Maryland may use during this fiscal year for grants on a matching basis of 75 percent Federal, 25 percent local money, under title III of the act.

I know you will share our own sense of accomplishment that we were able so speedily to assist such a meaningful operation on behalf of the enrichment of the lives of so many older citizens.

Sincerely,

MARGARET C. SCHWEINHAUT,  
Chairman.

Such centers as the senior center in Baltimore City are of great importance in providing informational, counseling, referral, and similar services. I believe we must go further, however, by the establishment of a National Senior Service Corps to enable senior citizens to work in their own communities up to 20 hours per week for compensation not to exceed \$125 per month. Such a Senior Service Corps should be administered on a cooperative Federal-State basis. The details regarding the proposed Senior Service Corps are contained in a bill I introduce today to amend the Older Americans Act of 1965. I wish to emphasize that the bill provides that members of the Senior Service Corps would be used in programs that would contribute to an undertaking or service in the public interest that would not otherwise be provided, and that such programs will not result in the displacement of employed workers or impair existing contracts for services.

I hope this bill will receive favorable consideration by the Congress, Mr. Speaker. It will help to bring the elderly back into the community in the twilight of their years, allow the community to profit from the time and talent and wisdom of our senior citizens, and enable all of us to see that the retired life is one that is well worth living.

## LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT

(Mr. SICKLES (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SICKLES. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call my colleague's attention to a statement on the subject of legislative reapportionment which was adopted by the national board of the League of Women Voters of the United States, and which has been approved by the League of Women Voters of Frederick County, Md. The statement was as follows:

STATEMENT OF POSITION ON APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES AS ANNOUNCED BY THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 12, 1966

The members of the League of Women Voters of the United States believe that both houses of State legislatures should be apportioned substantially on population. The league is convinced that this standard, established by recent apportionment decisions of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and that the U.S. Constitution should not be amended to allow for consideration of factors other than population in apportioning either or both houses of State legislatures.

Of overriding importance to the league in coming to this decision is the conviction that a population standard is the fairest and most equitable way of assuring that each man's vote is of equal value in a democratic and representative system of government. Other considerations influencing league decisions are that the U.S. Constitution should not be amended hastily or without due considera-

tion because of an unpopular Court decision, and that individual rights now protected by the Constitution should not be weakened or abridged.

Against the background of its longstanding interest in State government, the league also hopes that by maintaining a population standard State government may be strengthened by insuring that State legislatures are more representative of people wherever they live. Finally, the league feels certain that the term "substantially" used in Supreme Court decisions allows adequate leeway for districting to provide for any necessary local diversities.

## DECLINE IN UNEMPLOYMENT

(Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FALLON. Mr. Speaker, the decline in the Nation's unemployment rate has been hailed editorially by the Baltimore Sun—and other newspapers—as "an economic milestone."

Referring to the report from the Labor Department that the Nation's unemployment rate declined to just under 4 percent in January, the newspaper recalled that this was "a goal set by President Kennedy in 1962 and reaffirmed by President Johnson."

Stating that this does not mean that a condition of literal full employment has been reached, because many unskilled workers do not have jobs, "it does mean that the country is close to a condition of statistical full employment," the paper states.

I offer this editorial, on a subject of general interest to us all, for the RECORD with the request that it be reprinted there.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1966]

## FOUR PERCENT

The report from the Labor Department in Washington that the Nation's unemployment rate declined to just under 4 percent in January is an economic milestone. It was a goal set by President Kennedy in 1962 and reaffirmed by President Johnson. It obviously does not mean that a condition of literal full employment has been reached, because we know that many unskilled workers do not have jobs, but it does mean that the country is close to a condition of statistical full employment.

We can understand this when we note that, while there still is unemployment among the unskilled, there are labor shortages in many of the skilled categories. Labor Secretary Wirtz predicted that the unemployment figure will go down to 3.5 percent or lower this year. The figure for December was 4.1 percent. As we have said before, the declining unemployment total, together with the scarcity of qualified jobseekers in many fields, points up the importance of training programs to develop skills for the jobs available. Declining unemployment also points up the importance of restraints on wages and prices to check the inflationary effect of nearly full employment.

(Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. FALLON'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]



### THE BOEING 727 SHOULD BE GROUNDED

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the Boeing 727 jet should be ordered grounded pending a full investigation into its airworthiness and crashworthiness.

Last week on the floor of this House I spoke on the subject of aerial garbage and aviation safety. That speech mainly concerned near-collisions. Today I want to talk about real collisions.

There have been four crashes of Boeing 727 jet airliners in the past 6 months. A United Air Lines 727 crashed in Chicago on August 16, 1965, killing 35 persons. An American Air Lines 727 crashed in Cincinnati on November 8, 1965, killing 59 persons. Another United Air Lines 727 crashed 3 days later in Salt Lake City, killing 42 persons. And most recently, a Japanese 727 crashed into Tokyo Bay killing 133 persons. A total of 264 persons were killed in these 4 crashes.

These facts alone, in my opinion should have moved the Federal Government to order all 727's grounded pending a complete investigation. The additional fact that each of the four fatal crashes occurred under similar circumstances, as the planes were preparing to land, makes it even more imperative that the Government act immediately before additional lives have been lost.

Problems of construction have already been found in the Boeing 727. A study recently completed by the FAA disclosed a number of deficiencies in the materials presently being installed in the interiors of the planes. Further, the CAB has pointed out that the manner in which the fuel line is installed could have had something to do with the Salt Lake City crash.

Each of the four crashes are currently under investigation by the CAB. A CAB team has even been dispatched to Japan to act as technical adviser to the Japanese Government in its investigation of the Tokyo crash. But these investigations consume a great deal of time. Ordinarily, CAB investigations of major accidents take as much as a year, sometimes longer.

Meanwhile, more than 220 727's are in service with 17 airlines in 7 nations and whether 1 of them is getting ready to crash the next time it prepares to land because of some structural defect or other deficiency is something we may not know for many months.

Mr. Speaker, this is really an intolerable situation. The Government is on notice that something may be wrong with the way the 727's are put together. There have been 4 crashes in the past 6 months in which 264 persons met horrible and undeserved deaths. Each crash occurred under similar circumstances. Yet they continue to fly. There is no excuse for this. Surely, the great commercial air lines would be willing to endure the temporary inconvenience of utilizing the planes that were in service before the 727's for a few months while the CAB completed its investigations. I

fail to see why the Government has not yet acted.

An editorial at the New Republic, February 19, 1966, discusses this problem. I invite my colleagues' attention to this article. With unanimous consent I am inserting it at this point in the RECORD.

#### SAFETY IN THE AIR

The crash early this month in Tokyo Bay of yet another Boeing 727 jet—the fourth in 6 months—has still not moved the Civil Aeronautics Board to recommend grounding the planes. All four crashes occurred as the planes were preparing to land, but the CAB has seen no pattern in the accidents to suggest that the 727 is unsafe. The CAB has yet to complete any investigation of the domestic 727 crashes; it has yet to hold a hearing on any of them.

It takes a distressingly long time for the Board to investigate accidents—often as long as a year—and once it has made a finding more time may elapse before corrective action is taken. The limited recommendations the CAB has already made to improve the crashworthiness of the Boeing plane will take time to implement. Meanwhile nearly 200 727's are flying.

Last November 11, 43 persons died in the crash landing of a United Air Lines Boeing 727 in Salt Lake City (hearings on that crash open this week). According to a preliminary report by the CAB, the interior furnishings of the plane helped spread the fire that broke out on impact and gave off a heavy black smoke which "contributed to the fatalities." The Federal Aviation Agency has just completed a study, says the CAB, which "disclosed a number of deficiencies in the materials presently being installed in aircraft interiors. Materials are available," the report continued, "which would be far superior to those being used today." But no planes have been grounded as a result of that finding, and so far the FAA has not ordered the airlines or manufacturer to refit plane interiors. Until the FAA completes its flammability studies and hands down new standards, a repeat of the Salt Lake City disaster is possible at any time. (FAA spokesmen don't know yet whether new standards will apply just to planes coming off the assembly line or to planes now in service as well.) Officials mysteriously distinguish between "airworthiness" and "crashworthiness"; they see no reason to ground a plane simply because it doesn't crash well (43 persons died in Salt Lake because the plane was not crash-worthy).

The CAB has identified other problems with the Boeing 727. Its fuel line passes through the fuselage of the plane and runs close to generator wires which can spark a fire in a belly landing. In the Salt Lake crash the "ignition of spilled fuel could have been caused by sparks from runway contact or by a broken and shorted generator lead or both." It would help, the CAB noted, to move the wires away from the fuel line and strengthen insulating and tubing materials to withstand the shock of a crash landing. This Boeing plans to do—in 4 months.

#### THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE

(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the San Antonio Light, February 11, carried an editorial on the much-discussed Honolulu Conference. In this editorial the Light quotes from the statement of the South Vietnam leaders that to win the military war "we shall strive as we

fight to bring about a true social revolution."

In order to share this editorial with my colleagues, I include it in the RECORD:

#### DECISION AT HAWAII

In the "Declaration of Honolulu" the United States and South Vietnamese Governments have effectively dispelled any doubts that may have been entertained about allied resolve in pursuing the Vietnam war to victory.

Victory in Vietnam means, of course, success in both the political and military spheres and it was on this double aspect of the conflict that the declaration placed its greatest emphasis.

The mission of Vice President HUMPHREY to Saigon, moreover, is added evidence of this emphasis.

As the leaders of South Vietnam stated, the struggle is "a military war, a war for the hearts of the people. We cannot win one without the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. For this we shall strive as we fight to bring about a true social revolution."

President Johnson could not have demonstrated his awareness of this better than by his inclusion in the U.S. conference delegation of his Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and his Secretary of Agriculture.

In other words, the conference placed an appropriately equal emphasis on the future as it did on the present.

#### A "DECLARATION OF FREEDOM" ADOPTED BY 1,500 CUBAN EXILES

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. REES) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, on January 23, 1966, 1,500 Cubans, living in exile, adopted a "declaration of freedom" at a rally held in Key West, Fla.

This established another date to be placed in the history and in the hearts of all freedom-loving Cubans.

It is altogether fitting that this was done at the San Carlos Club from the same balcony where in 1898 the great Cuban patriot, Jose Marti, turned the course of history by proclaiming the ideological basis of a free Cuba from Spanish colonialism.

Mr. Speaker, this "declaration of freedom" is submitted for the attention of my colleagues and should be read by all freedom-loving people throughout the world:

#### DECLARATION OF FREEDOM

In the city of Key West, Monroe County, State of Florida, United States of America, we, the Cuban exiles in the United States, in the name of God Almighty, and speaking both for ourselves and the oppressed people in Cuba, the martyr island, do say:

That on January 1, 1959, the slavery yoke that came from Europe and was extinguished in Cuba at the end of the 19th century, was resumed.

That those responsible for this high treason to our fatherland and to our people are just a score of traitors who, usurping the government of the country have been acting as mercenary agents for the Sino-Soviet imperialism, and have surrendered to that imperialism our freedom and our dignity, also betraying the American hemisphere.

That as a consequence of this high treason, those who are usurping the power in Cuba (as they were never elected by the people).

soon became the center of Polish emigration.

The Polish insurgents invited General Kosciuszko to head the rebellion against Russia and offered him command of the Polish national armies. With the news of the insurrection and Russian determination to crush it, he hastened to Cracow, where he summoned his people to arm and proclaimed new decrees in favor of the peasants.

The Polish patriots led by Kosciuszko defeated the Russians at Raclawice and ably defended Warsaw but were at last overcome by the superior numbers of the enemy. On October 10, 1794, the gallant Polish force of 7,000 was almost annihilated by a Russian force over twice as large. General Kosciuszko's valor and heroism in this battle were unsurpassed. Three horses were killed under him as he rode again and again into the thickest of the battle. Finally, seriously wounded and insensible, the heroic general was taken prisoner. As the poet, Campbell, has written, "Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell."

Freed by the Russians 2 years later, the Polish patriot traveled to the United States for a brief period and then returned to Europe where until his death in 1817 he continued his unceasing efforts for the liberation of Poland.

Mr. Speaker, Americans and Poles alike revere the memory of General Kosciuszko for his service to the independence of our countries. His name is synonymous with one of the noblest causes of all—freedom. His heroism transcends dimensions of time and man-made national boundaries. He is the universal patriot, and to him we pay tribute and from him we gain inspiration and strength for our own hard fight for freedom.

  
**Hanoi's Decision**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**  
OF

**HON. MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS**

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mrs. GRIFFITHS. Mr. Speaker, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg stated the case succinctly when he said:

The United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is responsible.

Commenting on this, the Detroit News said:

Ambassador Goldberg laid the blame where it should lie. His temperate and reasoned justification for the indictment won't satisfy the scattered spectrum of vociferous critics, particularly at home, because hard facts will never satisfy them.

In his efforts for peace, the editorial points out President Johnson "halted the bombing unconditionally, sent 6 special envoys to 34 capitals, contacted more than 115 governments, even directly approached the aggressor, North Vietnam."

It adds:

The Reds were asked to show only an inkling of willingness for a negotiated settlement so that the guns could be silenced at least temporarily in Asia.

For anyone who wishes the facts, he may read this editorial and get them. Because I thought it a lucid examination of this matter which so vitally concerns us all, I offer it to the RECORD for publication.

**GOLDBERG TAKES U.S. CASE TO U.N., BUT HANOI SPURNS PEACE BID**

"The United States is not responsible for resuming the bombing. President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is responsible."

Thus succinctly U.S. Ambassador Arthur H. Goldberg, appearing before the U.N. Security Council, laid the blame where it should lie. His temperate and reasoned justification for the indictment won't satisfy the scattered spectrum of vociferous critics, particularly at home, because hard facts will never satisfy them.

In their dream world they bleat or whine about the United States being an "international outlaw with blood on its hands"—to quote Senator WAYNE MORSE of Oregon—and they protest it is wicked to pursue peace and at the same time, in the event that the pursuit fails, to use military power to protect those willing to resist aggression.

These oddly assorted critics were given their chance by President Johnson. He tried it their way. He halted the bombing unconditionally, sent 6 special envoys to 34 capitals, contacted more than 115 governments, even directly approached the aggressor, North Vietnam.

Here was communism's opportunity to prove Mr. Johnson's critics were on sound ground. The Reds were asked to show only an inkling of willingness for a negotiated settlement so that the guns could be silenced at least temporarily in Asia. But what was the outcome?

As Goldberg said: "No letup in war activities on the Communist side. No reduction in infiltration into South Vietnam. No reduction in terror. No reduction in the supply of men or arms during the bombing pause. No willingness to negotiate or even to talk quietly through diplomatic channels with a view to negotiations \* \* \*, absolutely nothing."

Goldberg explained how even before the bomb pause was 1 week old, this Nation directly informed Hanoi of the suspension and advised that if Hanoi reciprocated by making a serious contribution toward peace it would have a favorable effect on further extension of the pause.

For 30 days after that we waited, to no avail. So, back to the bomb racks we had to go.

It was not, however, the end of our pursuit for peace, as Goldberg explained. Recourse to the United Nations opened up "a new dimension" in that drive, with an offer to both North and South Vietnam to come before the world's only established peacemaking forum and plead their differing causes.

But that hope apparently has died, too, Hanoi rejecting as invalid any Security Council action to settle the war. More, it wouldn't even agree the United Nations should discuss the matter. And on this stand it was backed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union and that sour apple of the Western alliance, De Gaulle's France.

The short answer to all this is that North Vietnam, the Vietcong, and Red China, that giant skulking in the background, don't want to talk peace because they don't want peace. Trapped by their own fanaticism about power in the barrel of a gun being the final and only arbiter, they say that if the issue is to be discussed at all, it must be discussed by the 1954 Geneva accord powers and

what is discussed there can be on communism's terms alone.

It appears that if the United Nations is to be blackballed and the conference table denied us and our allies, we shall now have to answer aggression in the only language it permits.

**The U.S. Tax System and International Relationships**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. AL ULLMAN**

OF OREGON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Speaker, I think it is a matter of utmost importance that the United States diligently pursue the possibilities of resolving the many problems of international relationships in the area of taxation.

Significant progress has been made in recent years in the number of agreements effected with other nations and in our tax regulations treating income of U.S. foreign investments and the investments of foreign nationals in this country.

Former Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon deserves great credit for initiating many important steps, as does his successor, Henry Fowler, and Assistant Secretary Stanley S. Surrey. Mr. Surrey made a significant contribution to better understanding of this complicated problem in a recent symposium of the Tax Institute of America. Under unanimous consent I insert his remarks in the RECORD:

**THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS—CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 1965-66**

(Remarks by Hon. Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at the Tax Institute of America Symposium, the New York Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y., Thursday, December 2, 1965)

About a year ago in a paper presented at Montreal before the Tax Executives Institute, I discussed the U.S. Tax System and International Tax Relationships. Since then two income tax protocols, with Belgium and Germany, were signed and have been ratified by the Senate; three treaties with less developed countries, the Philippines, Thailand, and Israel, have been signed and are pending in the Senate; tentative agreements have been reached with the Netherlands and India; and negotiations are actively being pursued with a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Honduras, Trinidad, and Tobago, and Taiwan.

Since then important regulations and rulings affecting the international allocation of income have been issued and more are in preparation. A comprehensive bill revising our statutory income tax treatment of foreigners is moving through the Congress.

A consideration of these current developments is now appropriate. I shall divide this consideration into three parts—income tax treaties, both with developed and less developed countries, the administration of U.S. statutory or unilateral treatment of foreign income, and U.S. statutory or unilateral treatment of foreigners. Because of the length of this paper, I have prepared a summary which precedes the paper.

## SUMMARY

*Income tax treaties*

The United States is engaged in an extensive revision of its income tax treaties with developed countries, prompted by the recent changes in the corporated tax systems of the European countries and the adoption in 1963 by the OECD of a model income tax convention. The protocol with Germany ratified recently by the Senate and the tentative protocol with the Netherlands shortly to be signed illustrate much of the pattern that this revision is taking. This pattern provides a widened flexibility to international trade and investment activities between the United States and Europe. The scope of export activities in a treaty country can now be enlarged, for instance, by displays and warehouses for the storage or delivery of goods, without subjecting the exporter to a tax in that country.

Also, in cases where a firm maintains considerable commercial or industrial activity in a treaty country and therefore is taxable there on that activity at regular corporate rates, it can at the same time make investments in that country, or establish licensing relationships, that will remain subject to the lower rates of tax which treaties provide for investment and royalty income. Investors, moreover, will generally be free from tax on capital gains arising in a treaty country. In the important matter of withholding rates on dividends paid to parent companies in one treaty country by their subsidiaries in another treaty country, the United States is in favor of the low OECD model rate of 5 percent, and likewise favors the 15 percent rate on portfolio investment. It also favors the principles that the withholding rates should be nondiscriminatory—in that a country should be willing to offer the same rates to all its treaty partners—and reciprocal—in that a country should not claim higher treaty rates than the rates it desires us to adopt in the treaty.

These concepts cover ground that has been considerably explored in recent years. But the new corporate tax systems present problems less fully mapped. Some of these systems involve integration of the corporate tax with the individual shareholders' taxes on distributed dividends, through credits to these shareholders for the corporate tax. Their structure, by limiting these credits to domestic shareholders in domestic corporations, discriminates against both their domestic shareholders who invest abroad and the shareholders from abroad who invest in their domestic corporations. The OECD convention does not fully meet these problems, and therefore an analytic framework for their solution is needed. Such a framework should be rested, as far as possible, on two basic concepts: first, the concept of long-range neutrality in a country's tax system between those of its investors who invest at home and those who invest abroad; and second, the concept of nondiscrimination in a country's tax system between its investors at home and investors from abroad.

These treaties, under the pressure of negotiating problems and inevitable differences among countries and negotiators, will not always exhibit uniformity in phrasing and arrangement, apart from substantive differences. There is therefore clearly a need to clarify the disuniformity—to state through regulations or otherwise when and to what extent different phrases and different approaches in various treaties, or even the same treaty, really embody differences in end result and are so intended. The United States intends to improve its regulations in response to this need.

The United States is also engaged in an extensive program of negotiations to obtain a network of treaties with less developed countries. We believe that such treaties significantly improve the trade, investments, and cultural relationships between the

United States and these countries. Many of the European nations are also engaged in similar efforts. While these new less developed country treaties in many provisions follow those with developed countries, there are quite significant differences arising from the fact that the investment and trade flows from the United States to these countries is generally much larger than the reverse flows. As a consequence, and also in the light of the revenue problems of these countries, the reductions in withholding rates on investment income and royalties in these treaties do not always match those in the developed country treaties. There also is pressure to widen the definition of permanent establishment and thus contract the area of trading activities free from tax in these countries. In addition, since the restrictions on taxation by the source country that do emerge in these treaties bear in a revenue sense more heavily on the less developed countries, such countries seek some provisions on the part of the developed countries that can be regarded as an encouragement to investment in them.

The European nations have responded through provisions reducing the burden of their taxes on income flowing back from these investments, either through an exemption or adoption of tax-sparing credits. The United States, emphasizing instead the encouragement to the investment itself at the time that it is being considered by the U.S. taxpayer, is responding through extending to investment in less developed treaty countries the 7-percent credit now in our law for investment at home. This 7-percent treaty credit extends to investments of cash and tangible property. A complementary provision offers encouragement to the investment of technical assistance, through deferring tax in both countries where intangible assets, such as patents, processes or know-how, are exchanged by a U.S. investor for stock in a corporation in the less developed country.

We believe that extension of the investment credit is appropriate only where the other country is receptive to our investment and where its tax system, taken as a whole and in the light of any modifications made in the treaty, does not involve measures that can be regarded as significantly working at cross-purposes with this investment. This negotiating approach on our part has met with an affirmative response by the less developed countries.

The Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has performed a useful public service in holding full hearings on one of these new treaties, the Thailand Treaty. The published hearings contain a complete technical explanation of the treaty and a description of factors affecting negotiations with less developed countries.

Necessarily, as experience is gained, the present pattern that has so far evolved in our negotiations with less developed countries can be improved. The progress of these negotiations is encouraging, for it indicates that the United States and these countries can reach a treaty arrangement that each regards as fair and conducive to improved investment, trade, and cultural relationships. This attitude and the promise it holds for a growing network of tax treaties represent a major step in our political and economic relationships with these countries.

*Administration of U.S. statutory taxation of foreign income—Allocation of income and section 482*

The importance of developing a sound administration of the U.S. statutory taxation of foreign income is matched by the formidable nature of the task: The field is relatively new as tax matters go, and the needed experience, analysis of detail, and synthesis of concepts are still in a formative stage; the international business activities to which the rules relate are rapidly expanding in importance and number, and thus the variety of

transactions and business relationships involved steadily increases; the tax rules moreover are constantly being buffeted by the shifting exigencies of balance-of-payments problems. But all of this merely underscores the challenge of the task, and the Treasury is seeking to respond in a fitting manner.

The Treasury regards as the matter presently having major priority the establishment of a satisfactory framework for the administration of the rules governing transactions between the domestic and foreign units of our business companies.

In our tax parlance, this centers on the application of section 482 of our code, authorizing the Commissioner to allocate income, deductions, and credits between related units of an enterprise so as to prevent evasion or clearly reflect the income of the various units. The variety and number of transactions in the foreign area that lie within the reach of the section have overstrained the level of technical development that had been achieved in the earlier domestic application of the section. The situation thus calls for a many-faceted implementation of the section so that it may carry the new burden placed on it.

Several steps have already been taken. The first, in revenue procedure 64-54, achieved an orderly treatment of controversies that had arisen for years prior to 1963 by permitting taxpayers to offset—against any increase in U.S. taxes occasioned by an adjustment under this section allocating additional income to the U.S. unit of the enterprise—the foreign taxes paid on the income involved and thus to avoid double taxation. In addition, the revenue procedure stated that the Internal Revenue Service would not pursue for those years adjustments based on applications of section 482 not clearly required by its previous technical development. Through its achievement of an orderly treatment of the pre-1963 years and the consequent very marked reduction in number and dollar amount of deficiencies under the section for those years, this revenue procedure has permitted the needed technical development of the section to proceed in an atmosphere free of acrimonious disputes that would otherwise have existed.

The second step, in revenue procedure 65-17, provides rules governing the transfer of income between foreign subsidiary and U.S. parent intended to reflect an adjustment correcting an understatement of the parent's income, as where it charged too low a price for goods sold to the subsidiary or rendered services to it for an inadequate fee. The principal impact of these rules is to permit broad flexibility in fitting the section 482 adjustment into a proper position within the flow of funds from the foreign subsidiary and its dividend pattern. This removes impediments to the orderly repatriation of funds from the subsidiary and makes it possible for the taxpayer to accept the adjustment without increasing the transfer of income from subsidiary to parent more than it considers desirable.

These procedural steps set the stage for the development of appropriate guidelines for the substantive application of section 482. To this end the Treasury has already issued detailed proposed regulations covering transactions where assets or services of a U.S. parent are made available to its foreign subsidiary—where money is lent, where management or other services are rendered, where machinery and other tangible assets are made available. Essentially the approach is to offer taxpayers a safe conduct pass through section 482 through guidelines, based on the costs incurred by the parent and an allocation of those costs to the subsidiary in a manner that follows accepted accounting precedents outside the tax field. The second set of proposed regulations, now in preparation and far more difficult to develop, will

Vietnam Discussion

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. LESTER L. WOLFF

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, during this period of discussion on the whole range of problems associated with the Vietnam conflict some very excellent appraisals of the situation have been made. I respectfully include in the RECORD the following editorial from the Long Island Press about the views of former Ambassador George Kennan, and commend it to the attention of this distinguished body:

NEITHER DOVE NOR HAWK

George Kennan, our former Ambassador to Moscow and one-time chairman of State Department policy planning, did the Nation a great service last week in his testimony at a Senate airing of Vietnam policy. He made the point, too often lost in the passion of this debate, that we have to be neither doves, nighttalling it away from danger, nor hawks, swooping down on the enemy. We can be wise old owls—or better yet, reasonable, realistic human beings.

Surrender? Of course not, said Kennan. "Precipitate and disorderly withdrawal could represent in our present circumstances a disservice to our own interests and even to world peace greater than any that might have been involved in our failure to engage ourselves in the first place."

On the other hand, he doubted that even the most formidable military successes would bring about "the complete disappearance of the recalcitrants with which we are faced, the formal submission by the adversaries to our will and the complete realization of our present stated political aims."

If we have such difficulty in tiny Vietnam, just think of the formidable task in imposing our will on 700 million Chinese.

To "dig in and wait" for a political solution to emerge, as Mr. Kennan suggested, is essentially what we are doing in Asia. And it is essentially the policy we have followed successfully in Europe—since 1945, a policy largely shaped by Mr. Kennan himself. The differences are in degree, not in substance—whether it be Mr. Kennan's "diggin' in" or Gen. James M. Gavin's enclaves or Lyndon Johnson's more aggressive, yet quite limited, kind of war.

We can profit from the long experience of cold war confrontation in Europe and apply some of its lessons to the hotter war in Asia. The hawks and the doves were busy in Europe, too, with one side urging us to destroy the other to embrace the Soviets. But the Russian bear dies hard, as Hitler discovered even before atom bombs; and his embrace can be a fatal hug, as hundreds of thousands in East Europe well know.

We took—and still take—neither course. Instead, we built up our allies in West Europe and drew lines beyond which we made it clear Russia must not tread—in Greece, in Iran, in Turkey, in Berlin and in Cuba. We dug in and we waited and now each day, the prospect of war in Europe grows less and less likely.

A millennium? Utopia? Detente, even? Of course not. We will have profound differences with Russia and will for years to come. There can be, as Mr. Kennan said of Vietnam, "no happy way out of this conflict." What we have had since 1945 is a de facto co-existence, neither intolerable surrender nor

The effectiveness of this treaty led to the development of a similar agreement with Mexico, concluded in 1936.

Your Town May Just Need Stirring Up

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GRAHAM PURCELL

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. PURCELL. Mr. Speaker, every person who has the opportunity to visit Burkburnett, Tex., is impressed by the aggressiveness and activity in that community.

Burkburnett offers ample evidence of the old rule that "communities that pull together get things done."

Recently the Christian Science Monitor told the story of Burkburnett's projects which are being entered in the 1964-65 community improvement program sponsored by the General Federation of Women's Clubs and the Sears, Roebuck Foundation.

To those interested in learning what an outstanding community can do to make itself a better place to live, I commend the following article:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 26, 1966]

YOUR TOWN MAY JUST NEED STIRRING UP

BURKBURNETT, TEX.—When high school students must travel 15 miles to the nearest library to study for exams, your town's in a bad way.

Facing such a dilemma, citizens of Burkburnett decided a library was first among many town needs. The Council of Federated Study Clubs, of which Mrs. F. M. McMurry is president, saw those needs, entered the community improvement program (CIP) last February, and called a communitywide meeting at the town hall.

High school students as well as their elders were on hand for the meeting.

"We will make enough patrons to justify the library," said the students. They were articulate. They still are and they take active part in Burkburnett's community projects. The student council is among the 40 organizations represented on the Community Service Council.

The Community Service Council was organized by the steering committee appointed at the initial meeting. Having no pattern for the new council, Burkburnett cut its own. Mrs. Marjorie Kauer wrote the constitution and bylaws.

Like many another community, Burkburnett's big need was for citizens to pull together. That they had not done so until recently might perhaps be explained in part by the town's history.

When Burkburnett was incorporated in 1907, there was an oil well in every back yard, and water sold for more than oil. A decade later came World War I and an oil boom. Remember the movie "Boom Town"? Burkburnett was that town. Its population soared to 30,000 but slumped back to 5,000 when peace came and ended the boom.

POPULATION CLIMBING

Old shacks and store buildings remained as shabby reminders of the vanished prosperity. A few of them survived over the

years. But they have been fast disappearing as Burkburnett, spurred by its women citizens, presses on with the library and other projects.

The population is rising. In the past decade, Burkburnett has doubled its population and tripled its school enrollment. Farming, ranching, and business from Sheppard Air Force Base give stability to the economy.

It was spring in January the day I landed at the Wichita Falls Airport. On the 15-mile drive to Burkburnett, I heard about some of its accomplishments.

There was a cleanup week (November 8-15) with Joe Salter, chairman of the civic improvement committee and vice president of the Community Service Council, in charge. On November 11, schoolchildren were given a half holiday and furnished litter bags with which they cleared the streets. High school students worked by classes on assigned areas; the seniors won the student council award for the best job.

Members of the ministerial alliance manned tractors to mow vacant lots. Members of the men's clubs cleared downtown streets and alleys.

As we swung into town through an underpass, one of my hostesses apologized for beer cans and other roadside litter. Burkburnett itself is dry by local option, she said, but beer is available in nearby towns. Boy Scouts are trying to cope with the nuisance and do the clearing-up, but soon the police will step in.

At the home of Mayor James E. Frye, some of the clubwomen talked of their projects while Mrs. Frye, the steering-committee chairman, served hot-mulled cranberry and pineapple juice and sandwiches.

LIBRARY PUSHED

"The most important thing for us," said Mrs. Frye, "is to have a real cross section of our town in this, and we have. No one group or individual is doing it."

Membership in the Community Service Council extends to two rural home-demonstration clubs and the nearby Clara-Fairview organized rural community. Claude Adams, Clara-Fairview president, is chairman of the Burkburnett library committee and board.

"I've lived here all my life," said Mrs. Philip Carpenter, first and only woman on the Burkburnett City Council, "and we've never had a library—always had to go 15 miles to Wichita Falls."

The library committee did research on the choice of a site, funds available, and standards. They visited other libraries and consulted with the Texas State librarian in Austin.

"Many of our first ideas had to be revised," the women told me. "Our park would not be an ideal site. The library couldn't be successfully operated by volunteers. We knew that what we got we'd have to live with a long time. If we were going to have a library we'd have to think big."

At this point things happened. Mr. and Mrs. Walter Bohner gave a lot opposite Town Hall with a frame building, their former family home. They also gave \$1,000. Many other donations have since come in.

The old house will be removed to an adjoining lot. Meanwhile, architect's plans have been approved for an \$84,000 library building. The city will vote on a \$42,000 bond issue to be matched by State funds.

"A bunch of little people trying to do big things," some people said at first. But now that they see things shaping up they've changed their opinions. Everybody is behind the project.

"People's attitude is wonderful," said Mr. Adams.

sified by the Department of Agriculture as Government-financed programs, the \$1.669 billion rises to \$2.605 billion. This will leave \$3.599 billion as truly commercial competitive exports of agricultural products in the 1964-65 fiscal year instead of \$4.426 billion—see table 3, page 15, of the above cited Department of Agriculture publication.

This leaves a considerably less brilliant accomplishment. No doubt we could export well above \$6 billion in agricultural products if we first, sold more for foreign currencies under title I, Public Law 480; second, moved more exports under famine and emergency relief under title II of Public Law 480; third, increased foreign donations under section 416, Agriculture Act of 1949 and section 302, Public Law 480; and fourth, and offered more shipments under barter programs—CCC Charter Act; section 303, Public Law 480; and so forth.

But if we did so we would not advance by one iota the competitive capacity of this country in foreign markets. This is a matter of production costs, and giving away agricultural products does not reduce costs of production. It tends to raise them because of the higher tax burden created.

Mr. Speaker, the false impression created by the inclusion of subsidized farm products in our exports and shipments under Public Law 480, and so forth, is matched by another statistical practice that is equally pernicious in its effects. I refer to what has been called the f.o.b.-c.i.f. distortion. All the other leading trading nations report their imports on the c.i.f. basis. This merely means that they record the true cost of the goods imported by adding to the foreign price, the cost of shipping and insurance incident to bringing the goods to their ports of entry.

What is our practice? We leave off these charges and record the value of our imports at their foreign price, point of export. If anyone believes this to be a minor matter he should compare the price of an automobile at its f.o.b. Detroit level and what the cost would be if he took delivery several thousand miles away.

From calculations made on the basis of actual import and export statistics of this country in its trade with England and Japan, it seems safe to say that our imports from these countries are undervalued from 20 to 25 percent for the reason just set forth. This represents a serious distortion, and we should review all our import statistics with this distortion in mind.

Surely we cannot base our trade policies on unreliable statistics. Yet that is what we have been doing.

It has been estimated that in place of a \$5.2 billion surplus in our exports over imports for 1965 as reported recently by the Department of Commerce we actually ran a deficit of about \$2 billion, when the figures are corrected by the guides I have set forth above.

I am very anxious to see this statistical practice corrected as soon as possible and am introducing appropriate legislation to that end. I urge all who are concerned about a sound foreign trade policy to take an interest in this matter and to support the legislation.

## Migratory Bird Treaty

### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. JOHN D. DINGELL

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to permission granted I insert into the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a release from the 31st North American Wildlife & Natural Resources Conference to be held in the Hilton Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa., March 14-16, 1966, at which time an announcement will be made of the establishment of a Migratory Bird Treaty Stamp to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Migratory Bird Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada.

This was one of the great milestones of American conservation and wildlife history and it is highly appropriate that the announcement be made at that time. Also inserted into the RECORD is background information on the 50th anniversary of the Migratory Bird Treaty with Great Britain and Canada made available by the Wildlife Management Institute, one of the outstanding wildlife and conservation organizations in the United States.

The material follows:

#### MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY STAMP TO BE ISSUED AT WILDLIFE CONFERENCE

A new 5-cent postage stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Migratory Bird Treaty that provides uniform protection for migratory birds in the United States and Canada will be issued on March 16 at Pittsburgh, Pa. The stamp-issuance ceremony will be held in conjunction with the 31st North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference, which will be held at the Pittsburgh Hilton Hotel, March 14-16, under the sponsorship of the Wildlife Management Institute.

Described as a starkly modern artwork, the horizontal stamp features two birds in white outline, one flying north, the other south, at the Canadian border. Canada is red; the United States blue; the Great Lakes a lighter blue. At the top in a white panel appears in black capitals "Migratory Bird Treaty/1916 United States-Canada 1966." The words "U.S. Postage Five Cents" appear in black in a white panel at the bottom.

The Migratory Bird Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C., by Sir Cecil Arthur Spring and Secretary of State Robert Lansing on August 16, 1916. President Woodrow Wilson, after receiving the advice and consent of the Senate, proclaimed the treaty December 8, 1916.

The treaty observed that "many species of birds in the course of their annual migrations traverse certain parts of the United States and the Dominion of Canada; that many of these species are of great value as a source of food or in destroying insects which are injurious to forests and forage plants \* \* \* as well as to agricultural crops \* \* \* but are nevertheless in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection during the nesting season or while on their way to and from their breeding grounds."

Collectors desiring first day cancellations may send addressed envelopes, together with remittance to cover the cost of the stamps to be affixed, to the Postmaster, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15219. Send money order or certified check only. The envelope to the Postmaster should be endorsed "First Day covers 5-cent

Migratory Bird Treaty Stamp." Requests must be postmarked not later than March 16.

#### BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND CANADA

By 1910 it was apparent that the effects of year-round hunting of migratory birds with improved firearms for both sport and commerce, coupled with the vagaries of weather and the demands of an expanded rural population, were drastically decreasing the abundance which characterized the frontier era.

It was also evident to the leading conservationists of the time that this was a matter of national concern which would not be met by individual actions of the several States.

On August 16, 1916, the Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States and Canada was signed. The treaty was ratified later that year and proclaimed by President Wilson on December 8, 1916. It remains a unique action among nations in dealing with wildlife protection and preservation. It was an extraordinary treaty between sovereign nations when it was signed and remains so after 50 years.

This treaty afforded international protection for the first time to named migratory game and nongame birds common to both Canada and the United States and made each nation responsible for enacting its own laws to implement the treaty provisions.

Nine families of migratory game birds and 33 families of insectivorous and other nongame species are under its protection. Migratory waterfowl and the recreation these birds afford have particularly benefited from the treaty.

The direct and indirect effects of the treaty and the resulting national legislation to implement it have been much broader than those envisioned by the proponents of the treaty. This international agreement has affected legislation and regulations of most of the States.

More than 230 waterfowl refuges and over 45 general migratory bird refuges comprising over 2 million acres have been acquired or set aside by the U.S. Government in addition to nearly 100 waterfowl production areas comprising over 100,000 acres. A broad program of migratory bird research costing over \$1,800,000 annually has developed in the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife.

An International Bird Banding Center at Laurel, Md., is the focal point of a single system of bird banding on the continent. Here records are maintained on automatic data processing systems which support studies of migratory birds by both professionals and amateurs.

An International Migratory Bird Committee, consisting of an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and an Assistant Secretary of the Interior for the United States, and the Canadian Director of Agriculture and Canada's Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, was formed in 1961 to give further attention to the continental management of migratory birds.

Four flyway councils, consisting of State and Provincial officials, give continuing attention to the welfare of migratory waterfowl. Cooperation among these councils, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, and the Canadian Wildlife Service provide for the most comprehensive annual surveys and continued studies of migratory birds in the world.

The Canadian Government carries out research, establishes hunting regulations, and provides law enforcement in its implementation of the treaty. Canada also is embarking on a wetlands preservation program.



impossible victory, but the difficult and painful sharing of a crowded planet with disagreeable neighbors.

This is what we seem to be up to in Asia. Just last Friday Peiping screamed that the Soviets have joined the United States, India, and Japan in forming a "ring of encirclement" around Red China—not de facto co-existence but de facto containment.

We do not, however, share Mr. Kennan's misgivings over the Honolulu Conference. There are many ways—none without risk—to wage limited war. Honolulu was basically an extension of how Lyndon Johnson chooses to do it. Instead of just digging in, we are trying to pressure the enemy to the peace table. And, at the same time we are trying, sad to say, belatedly to improve the political and social climate so that we can put to work the gains of the battlefield. It is a difficult and dubious path. But this is a difficult and dubious world that seldom offers perfect, absolute answers.

### School Milk Program

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I wish to serve notice that I am very much opposed to the administration plans to slash funds for the school milk program. During the last fiscal year this program benefited more than 90,000 schools and child care institutions. The amount appropriated for the special milk program during the current fiscal year was \$103 million. According to the Milk Industry Foundation, the school milk program and the national school lunch program accounted for the usage of nearly 3 billion pounds of milk.

If the milk had not been used it would probably have been acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation where at present support prices it would have cost the taxpayers exactly the same amount of money as was required to finance this program which is so highly beneficial to the nourishment and health of American schoolchildren.

Mr. Speaker, it makes very little sense to fund new expenditures and untried programs which cost many millions of dollars more and then penalize a tried and true program like the special milk program or the school lunch program.

I am amazed that an administration which professes to be so interested in fighting the war against poverty and in doing something about school dropouts is so shortsighted in its approach to these problems. Furthermore, as a Representative from an area where dairying constitutes an important part of the farmers' cash income, I am distressed that the Government's false economy will result in a curtailment of the consumption of milk. There are so many other areas in which savings could be accomplished without sacrificing the health and welfare of the schoolchildren of America.

### Connecticut's Highway Commissioner Ives

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

### HON. WILLIAM L. ST. ONGE

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. ST. ONGE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to insert into the RECORD the text of an article published in the Hartford Courant, in the issue of February 7, 1966, about Connecticut's highway commissioner, Howard S. Ives.

Commissioner Ives, who resides at North Stonington, Conn., in my district, has devoted a lifetime of service to the State highway department dating back to 1917. He started as a rodman and was appointed commissioner in 1959 by the then Gov. Abraham A. Ribicoff. Commissioner Ives has been nationally honored for his work on highway beautification and is regarded as one of our most safety-minded road engineers and experts.

The article about Commissioner Ives not only tells us about the man and his accomplishments over the years, but also his views and outlook on life, his character and his fine qualities. I am delighted to count him among my friends. The article reads as follows:

HOWARD S. IVES: MAN IN MIDDLE OF THE ROADS

(By James J. Devaney)

State Highway Commissioner Howard S. Ives is the man in the middle.

Everyone agrees the State needs roads, but no one wants the road to go through his house.

Ives has been nationally honored for his work on highway beautification—and his name arouses ire among lovers of Bushnell and East Rock Parks.

He is noted as one of the most safety-minded engineers ever to head the department—and is criticized for allegedly dangerous crossovers on I-91 in Hartford.

#### CONSCIOUS OF COMPLAINTS

Ives is acutely conscious of the complaints, but he points out, "I'm charged with running a department, carrying out the mandate of the legislature—to build facilities with the funds made available.

"We're not a bunch of firebreathers, but we have to keep our minds on the goal—to put these facilities where they will do the most good for the most people, and we can't deviate from that."

He feels many critics would remain silent "if people would only realize the extremes we go to to insure safe, economical and engineeringwise sound roads.

"What people don't realize," he continues, "is you can pick up a newspaper in Providence, or Talahassee, or just about anywhere else and find the same complaints. But these roads are the work of the best engineering minds in the country."

But Ives has a real concern for people affected by new highways. One of his aids said "I've seen him leave meetings and take off to some little town in a far corner of the State to investigate some complaint personally."

Ives comments "One of the most painful things in the department is the displacement of people. It tears us apart, but we do

what we have to do under the law, as fairly and humanely as possible."

Discussing the charge that highways destroy natural beauty spots Ives says "People think of ruthless destruction as they see the bulldozers, earthmovers, and trucks. But this ruthlessness—these earthmovers—are to the engineer a sign of progress.

#### CITES GOALS

"This ugliness is temporary. The goal is a highway. Two roads divided by a median. Something planned and executed very carefully.

"The landscape engineer is active in every phase of construction. We try to design a highway so it looks as if it belongs there.

"When we put a road through woodland or countryside, conservationists complain. But we've enabled thousands of people to enjoy that area who never had a chance to do so before.

"As a conservationist, I look at a tree, and know how long it took to grow it and that it is a beautiful thing. As a safety man, I hate trees—those near the pavement—because people can run off the road and kill themselves."

Much of the superhighway activity in the State since Ives took office July 1, 1959, has been concentrated in the Hartford area.

"We talk about the population explosion, and it's a real thing," Ives said. I-91 was designed several years ago with the 1970 population in mind. Now we're designing for 1990 and 2000."

Ives continues "The Hartford highway complex isn't complete. It won't really work until I-291 is complete." I-291 is the link between I-91 and I-84 which will give Hartford a belt highway system.

Discussing criticism of I-91 and its link to the city and over the bridges of the city Ives says "There isn't anything that has been done that can't be corrected—and will be corrected; only minor changes are needed.

"The fact that we've made some changes in signs and movement is not a sign of bad design. We know that one of the worst troubles is that people drive too darn fast.

"No one in the department will make excuses for anything we do. If we make mistakes, we say so, and correct them. We don't make the same mistake twice."

#### LOVES BRIDGES

He sums up: "All I'm trying to do is run the highway department. And when someone says 'Ives, go home,' I'll go home, but I want to leave a heritage of highways.

"Outside of my family and my country, this has been my life."

Born in New Haven, July 31, 1900, Ives grew up in Norwich, where he attended local schools and planned his future. And he knew what he wanted to do.

"I can't remember when I didn't want to build bridges. I read every book on bridges I could get my hands on, starting when I was about 10 years old.

"If there's anything I love to do it is to build bridges. A bridge is something alive and beautiful. If I could do what I want to do, I'd be building bridges, not sitting here."

Ives started his career with the highway department as a rodman with a survey crew in the summer of 1917. One of his cherished possessions now is a plaque which reads "From rodman to commissioner." "That's the story of my life," he says.

He worked for the department until 1922, and after various engineering positions and his qualifications as a professional engineer in 1925, he returned to the department in 1927, and started his rise through the ranks.

And he helped build bridges—the Middletown-Portland Bridge, the Housatonic River Bridge connecting the Merritt and Wilbur

Cross Parkways between Milford and Stratford; the Charter Oak Bridge; Gold Star Memorial Bridge over the Thames between New London and Groton, and the Raymond E. Baldwin Bridge over the Connecticut between Old Saybrook and Old Lyme.

## CITES FAVORITE

His favorite was the Arrigoni Bridge in Middletown. "It was the first big bridge on which I was project engineer, and the first high level bridge in Connecticut. Fortunately, everything came together right, or I'd be living in Mexico."

Ives was appointed deputy highway commissioner in July 1955, and concentrated on organizing the department for the completion of the Connecticut Turnpike, and the development of a division of research and development within the department.

He resigned in 1956 to become general manager of the Edward Balf Co. of Hartford, but returned to the department when he was appointed State highway commissioner by Gov. ABRAHAM A. RIBICOFF in 1959.

Between the time he took office July 1, 1959 and June 30, 1965, the Department spent more than \$600 million for about 223 miles of new highways.

In addition to his career as an engineer, Ives managed an active military career.

He enlisted as a private in the Connecticut Army National Guard in 1938, when he was 38 years old.

"I went for a year's active training, and it stretched to more than 5 years," he said. "I like it, but I didn't care too much for the spit and polish."

Ives served as an engineer officer both in the Pacific and in Europe during World War II. He was recalled to active duty during the Korean war, but to his chagrin, instead of being sent to Korea, he wound up commanding the anti-aircraft defenses of Baltimore, Md.

"It bothers me that I had to retire a few years ago, and I can't get into this one," he comments. Ives retired in 1957 as a brigadier general.

## SERIES OF BOATS

Ives and his wife, the former Caroline Wallen of Norwich, live at Long Pond, North Stonington, in a former summerhouse they converted to year-round as a family project after World War II.

He lists his hobbies as his eight grandchildren and boating. His boat the "Kitty Higgins VI," is a cruiser rigged for sport fishing.

Ives explains "Kitty Higgins" was a nickname he first gave his wife—it was the name of a comic strip character. Ives has had five boats—"Kitty Higgins II" was his jeep in Europe during World War II.

Ives is acutely aware that his position is a hot spot. "People ask me 'Why do you stick to it?' I don't know. Every 3 months or so I say 'I'd better go home.' But I don't, and I don't want to. I just hope I know enough to go home when finally I should."

## Lithuanian Independence

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

## HON. DONALD RUMSFELD

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak in behalf of the Lithuanian people, who 48 years ago, at Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, proclaimed their independence after over a century of Russian rule and went for-

ward as a free nation, achieving a high level of economic and social prosperity. Tragically, this taste of freedom was brief. It was only a little over two decades after the establishment of independence that Lithuania once more became the victim of her overpowering neighbor. The totalitarian might of the Soviet Union has since been used to exterminate any sense of Lithuanian nationhood. Despite oppression, the Lithuanian people continue to resist tyranny and attempt to preserve their heritage of freedom.

Today, our prayer and hope is that this proud nation of people dedicated to the cause of liberty throughout their history will once again join the family of free nations. We honor these people on this 48th anniversary of their independence and join with all Americans of Lithuanian descent in renewing our devotion to the cause of freedom and justice.

## We're on the Winning Track

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, success in fulfilling our commitments in Vietnam is now within reach.

The following column by Roscoe Drummond, which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of February 9, 1966, gives a realistic estimate of the war situation and I commend it to the attention of our colleagues:

CONG FORCES WARNINGS: A VIETNAM REPORT—  
WE'RE ON WINNING TRACK  
(By Roscoe Drummond)

WASHINGTON.—What is the most reliable and realistic estimate of how the war is going in Vietnam? Are we losing? Are we just holding on? Are we hopelessly stalemated? Are we making solid headway toward victory?

It is the purpose of this column to report the overall trend of the fighting in Vietnam—and to cite the evidence. It is based on information and judgment of people, some only just returned from Saigon, whom I consider trustworthy and objective.

Here are the essential elements:

1. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are being hurt—and hurt badly. The extent to which the enemy is hurting is only now becoming evident.

2. Hanoi's whole timetable and strategy of conquest is out of gear. Vietcong "victories" during the monsoons last year were to enable the Vietcong to take the offensive. Captured North Vietnamese prisoners say they were told they were being sent south just "to wrap it up." It isn't happening that way. Vietcong morale is deteriorating and Hanoi radio is bracing its troops for a "long, hard war."

3. There is absolutely no defeatism among the highest U.S. officials (military, political, and economic) who are on the scene in Vietnam. They are confident that the independence of South Vietnam can and will be secured.

4. No easy or early victory is expected. Hard fighting, perhaps harder than we have thus far experienced, may lie ahead. There

is no basis for airy, blue-sky optimism. But success is within reach.

Here are some pertinent facts.

Troop strength: During 1965, U.S. military manpower rose from 23,000 to 181,000 and will expand further. South Vietnamese armed forces increased from 560,000 to 679,000. Enemy military strength rose from 103,000 to 230,000.

Losses in battle: Enemy troops killed in battle in 1965 totaled 34,000, with 6,000 captured—a 100-percent increase in losses over 1964. U.S. losses were slightly more than 1,300 in 1965, South Vietnamese losses were 11,000.

Where Vietcong is hurting. In-depth interviews with several hundred Vietcong prisoners and defectors, carried out by experts independent of any government agency, reveal:

That Vietcong forces are thrown badly off balance because B-52 bombers constantly keep them on the run, preventing them from resting and regrouping. They complain: "There is no longer any place to hide."

That the Vietcong is increasingly losing the support of the villagers and peasants who have hid them in the past. They are losing it through terror and taxes. The villagers mostly blame the Vietcong for the air attacks which their presence brings.

The Vietcong are so short of manpower they are impressing 15-year-olds and young women into armed service.

The Vietcong prisoners complain of heavy losses in combat, and North Vietnamese prisoners admit they were misled by Hanoi, which had assured them that U.S. soldiers would be soft and couldn't fight against guerrillas.

The great majority of prisoners say that most have now come to believe the Vietcong can't win the war.

It is clear that there is a feeling among quite a few Americans in the United States that we can't win. I am convinced that the evidence is on the side that we can win, are winning, and will win.

The confidence and stamina of our men on the battlefield deserves to be matched by confidence and stamina on the homefront.

## Operation Trading Stamps: Community Service

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. RICHARD L. OTTINGER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to call our colleague's attention to the wonderful community service which has been performed by one of my constituents, Mr. Al Reid, of Yonkers, N.Y.

Mr. Reid is the publisher of the Illustrated News, a weekly newspaper in Yonkers and for more than 2 years he has collected over 400,000 trading stamps. He has redeemed these stamps and has distributed more than 2,000 toys, games, and other comforting items to hospitals, convalescent centers, children's homes, homes for the aged and other deserving institutions. Recently the Peoples Savings Bank of Yonkers contributed 10,000 trading stamps to Mr. Reid's project. These stamps, in turn, were translated into a dozen toys and games which were presented to the chil-

den's ward at St. John's Riverside Hospital.

It is with great pleasure that I join with Al Reid's friends and neighbors in honoring his outstanding service to the community.

### Metropolitan Dade County's Pioneering Traffic Court

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. DANTE B. FASCELL

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, since July 1, 1959, Dade County, Fla., has had a new and effective traffic court. This court has done an outstanding job in helping Greater Miami deal with the problems caused by a steadily increasing number of cars and trucks on our highways. It has had a marked effect on safety and, in the 6½ years of its operation, has proved to be one of the finest and most effective courts in the Nation.

I wish to call the attention of our colleagues to a most informative article concerning the court in this month's issue of American County Government, by the distinguished mayor of Metropolitan Dade County, Charles Hall.

The article follows:

#### FEWER ACCIDENTS AIM OF A PIONEERING TRAFFIC COURT

(By Mayor Charles Hall)

The metropolitan court of Dade County, Fla., has been recognized as the best in its field nationally. Winner of 10 national awards since it was established in 1957, the court received 5 from the American Bar Association for establishment of a model court and its continued progress.

Metro court jurisdiction includes all cases arising under county ordinances adopted by the metro commission. It may punish for contempt; impose fines not exceeding \$1,000; commit offenders to the county jail; and issue bench warrants. If the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding \$500 or imprisonment of more than 60 days, the accused can demand a jury trial.

The court, which tries all traffic offenses in Dade County, is based on the underlying concepts of traffic safety through driver education and uniform laws and treatment.

The objectives of metro court are to increase respect for traffic laws and to contribute to the total community effort required to reduce traffic accidents. The main tool in this all-out campaign is not the fear of having to pay a heavy fine but the education of the violator.

After being in metro court, many motorists say they hadn't realized the importance of traffic laws or the dignity in which the court conducts itself. Such statements are a pleasant contrast to those charging that many traffic courts are mere fine-collecting agencies with no concern for justice or correction.

Before metro court was established, the quality of justice ranged from excellent to terrible in the 27 municipal traffic courts. Small cities were unable to afford proper facilities or full-time judges. Twenty-seven different sets of regulations made knowledge of the driving laws almost impossible.

Result? A deterioration of the driving public's attitude toward the law and law enforcement that was seriously reflected in the county's soaring death, injury and accident rate.

Metro court had to overcome many hurdles—mainly legal suits—before arriving at its present position. In one 1958 decision, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that metro traffic ordinance 57-12 expressly nullified and superseded the ordinances of all Dade County municipalities and that traffic offenses arising under county ordinances should be tried only in the metro court.

After initial legal obstacles were overcome, the board of county commissioners approved a three-phase proposal of the American Bar Association to render traffic court services to Dade County, setting up the present court system.

The court went into effect on July 1, 1959, with seven court locations (another was added later). In addition to all 27 municipalities, the Dade County Sheriff's Department and the Florida Highway Patrol also file traffic cases in the metro court.

Except for violations of inspection regulations, equipment requirements, pedestrian and parking laws, all moving violations are scheduled for a court hearing on first offenses.

#### COURT APPEARANCE

Without extenuating circumstances, all persons must appear personally before the judge. This follows a national recommendation of the Conference of State Supreme Court Chief Justices. The arresting policemen are assigned specific court dates—twice a month. The courtroom for the case depends on where the citation was issued.

Personal appearance of violators affords the judges the opportunity to review the person's prior driving record, to observe any mental or physical deficiencies, and to give enough individual attention to educate and correct the individual violators rather than to punish them. In his opening remarks, the judge talks about local problems and current accident statistics.

Tourists and nonresidents may advance the trial date by arrangement with either the individual police officer at the time a ticket is issued or the clerk's office, where the offender posts a nominal bond equal to the fine for the offense. This privilege is extended to local residents when circumstances warrant it.

Dade County residents or property owners may be released without bail upon a written promise to appear in court, except for hazardous moving violations which require booking and bail. Noncounty residents may be released on cash bail except where the officer is required to book the person. The officer may also release sick persons from custody if a valid driver's license is surrendered or when he is willing to accept a written promise to appear.

All parking, standing, and nonmoving violations may be paid by mail upon signing a waiver of appearance and a guilty plea. This privilege is extended to certain moving offenses when no court appearance is required.

Strict accountability for the issuance of traffic complaints has been incorporated into the clerical and financial processing to eliminate ticket fixing. Police officers' voided, spoiled or lost complaints are processed in open court.

In 1964, 289,000 cases were handled. By November, the 1965 load had surpassed the 300,000 mark. The cases are handled by 175 employees.

A traffic school originally was maintained by the Miami Police Academy, but was assigned to the metro court, which updated and expanded it in 1961 in conjunction with

the Dade County Board of Public Instruction.

The school has paid dividends. Many motorists who made dangerous errors through ignorance, inexperience or faulty judgment are not fined but sent to the school.

In the drive for traffic safety, the court promotes vehicle and pedestrian safety in English and Spanish on radio, TV, newspapers, billboards, photo and literature displays, waste cans and postmarks on metro mail.

The court sponsors the ABA program, "Go to Traffic Court as a Visitor, Not as a Violator," and hosts groups such as the Boy Scouts and civic organizations.

Realizing that Dade County has a large number of Spanish speaking people, a Latin American safety education program was launched in 1960. Some 1,800 Latin Americans attended classes taught in Spanish and learned all phases of driving regulations and the Florida financial responsibility law.

Five years ago the metro court's student traffic safety council, recently cited as the most outstanding such countywide group in 13 Southeastern States, was organized. The council has representatives from 32 county high schools. The judges send student defendants to the council for driving education punishment.

Another court project is the distribution of a printed monthly report of its activities with complete accident analysis, including conviction rate by type of violation.

Metro judges are chosen in accordance with the so-called Missouri plan, approved by Dade County voters. Candidates for the 13 judgeships are screened by a committee consisting of attorneys, laymen, and the presiding senior judge of the circuit court. The county commission appoints one of three selected by the committee to serve until the next primary. At that time, the candidate runs unopposed for the approval of the electorate. If he wins a majority, he receives a full term. The top seven in the balloting serve for 6 years; the others, 4 years.

### Hope Is Seen

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

#### HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's quest for peace in Vietnam has at last received a glimmer of encouragement.

This comes from the fact that the Vietnam issue has been moved to the corridors of the United Nations. I was one of the Members of the House who communicated with President Johnson last month to request that he formally request the United Nations to seek an effective cease-fire and that we pledge our support and our resources to such an effort.

Certainly, the decision of the U.N. Security Council to place the Vietnam issue on its agenda marks a clear victory for this administration. It could prove the necessary step in moving the problem from the battlefield to the conference table.

Commenting on this, the Baltimore Sun said the fact that the issue now is

before the United Nations Security Council "means that another door is being held open while another possible route to a Geneva conference is being examined."

The editorial suggests that "words like hawks, doves, and aggression, for example, could well be dispensed with for the time being while calm, dispassionate efforts are made to discover the basis for a rational peace settlement."

Here is a calm, dispassionate appraisal of a subject of vital concern to us all, and place the editorial in the Record:

[From the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 4, 1966]

IN THE UNITED NATIONS

As Ambassador Goldberg keeps saying, what the United States is trying to do is to have the Vietnam war brought to the conference table. Our objective, our belief, our hope is to have it settled there rather than on the field of battle. The fact that the issue now is before the United Nations Security Council, after procedural preliminaries which tended to obscure the modest nature of the United States proposal, means that another door is being held open while another possible route to a Geneva Conference is being examined.

To this extent the involvement of the Security Council, limited as it is, may be helpful. Communist China and North Vietnam, which pour vituperation on the United States and scorn the United Nations, may talk more candidly with some of the small nonaligned states. Diplomatic conversations thus could be more useful than a public debate in the Security Council over a formal resolution, especially if a debate should end in a Soviet veto.

Public debate is useful, of course, at the proper time, when it promotes understanding by sifting the grains of facts from the chaff of speculation and emotion. Words like hawks, doves and aggression, for example, could well be dispensed with for the time being while calm, dispassionate efforts are made to discover the basis for a rational peace settlement. This applies to the Senate committee's inquiry as well as to the United Nations.

### Ad Hoc Congressional Conference on Vietnam

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL**

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I am inserting below the report of an ad hoc congressional conference on Vietnam, held in Washington on January 21 and 22. The conference was sponsored by eight Members of Congress, listed in the report.

The report represents the views of a group of experts particularly qualified to discuss American diplomacy. The conclusions were reached by that group, rather than by the congressional sponsors. The sponsors believe the report merits careful consideration by their colleagues, the executive branch, and the American people.

The report follows:

#### REPORT OF THE AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM, HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 21 AND 22, 1966

##### CONGRESSIONAL SPONSORS

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, Democrat, of New York, chairman.

CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Democrat, of Michigan.

DON EDWARDS, Democrat, of California.

LEONARD FARBSTEIN, Democrat, of New York.

DONALD M. FRASER, Democrat, of Minnesota.

ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Democrat, of Wisconsin.

HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin.

WILLIAM F. RYAN, Democrat, of New York.

##### Foreword

On January 21 and 22, 1966, a group of experts and scholars met in Washington at the invitation of eight Members of the House of Representatives to analyze the current situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic proposals to help end the war and facilitate a negotiated settlement.

The sponsoring Congressmen have felt unsatisfied with the recent role of Congress in foreign affairs. They believe their office requires a more fundamental examination of foreign policy than that allowed by even the most careful consideration of specific legislation. The sponsors are convinced that the level of congressional analysis can be raised through greater intimacy between the legislative branch and the intellectual and university community. It was with this in mind that they invited to Washington a group of experts particularly qualified to discuss with them Vietnam and its implications for American diplomacy.

Some of the participants have spent considerable time in Vietnam, and have obtained intimate association with conditions there. Others offered the important perspectives of experience in negotiation, study of economics, diplomacy or international law, or expert knowledge of relevant geographical areas.

Participants were requested not to dwell on episodes or errors of the past. Instead, they were asked to discuss present policies and possible alternatives to them; to analyze the problems involved in reaching and enforcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to project the outlines of a creative American policy toward Asia.

Certain conclusions and recommendations by the participants emerged in the discussions and these are stated explicitly at the beginning of the report. The subsequent summary of the discussions also includes some individual points which contributed to the analysis, although they were not unanimously endorsed.

The sponsors regard the proposals made by the conference as important contributions to their own thinking about Vietnam and the formulation of American foreign policy. They feel the report deserves the attention of their congressional colleagues, members of the executive branch, and the American people. Finally, they view the conference as having set an important precedent for future congressional initiatives in foreign affairs.

##### CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Arthur Larson, chairman, director, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University; former director of the U.S. Information Agency, and Special Assistant to President Eisenhower.

Mr. Richard Barnet, codirector, Institute for Policy Studies; former Deputy Director, Office of Political Research, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Prof. Robert Browne, professor of economics, Fairleigh-Dickinson University; former A.I.D. official in Vietnam.

Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, former counsellor to the Department of State.

Prof. Richard Falk, associate professor of international law, Princeton University; editor, American Journal of International Law.

Prof. Bernard Fall, professor of international relations, Howard University; author of "The Two Vietnams."

Mr. Arnold Fraleigh, lecturer in political science, George Washington University; former Foreign Service officer.

Dean Edmund Gullion, dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; former Counsellor of American Legation in Saigon; former Ambassador to the Congo.

Prof. George McT. Kahin, director, south-east Asia program, Cornell University.

Prof. John Lewis, professor of government, Cornell University.

Prof. John Lewis, professor of government, Cornell University.

Mr. Robert Nathan, economic consultant.

Mr. Marcus Raskin, codirector, Institute for Policy Studies; former member of the special staff of the National Security Council.

Prof. Louis Sohn, Bemis Professor of international law, Harvard Law School.

Mr. James Warburg, writer on foreign policy.

Betty Goetz Lall, Rapporteur, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

Paul T. Gorman, executive assistant.

Mr. Nathan attended that part of the conference dealing with economic aid but did not participate in the preparation of the report.

Dean Gullion is not in agreement with a majority of the findings and recommendations.

##### CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The conference reached the recommendations and conclusions set out below. A summary of the discussions from which they were developed follows:

##### Present strategies

There are diplomatic alternatives, not yet fully explored, to continued military escalation of the war in Vietnam.

Continued bombing of North Vietnam is not in the American interest either in shortening the war or in improving prospects for a negotiated settlement.

There should be no further escalation of American troop commitment. There are serious risks of inviting greater North Vietnamese and Chinese activity.

Unilateral withdrawal of all American troops prior to a cease fire or peace conference is not in our national interest.

##### New policy initiatives

The most productive course for the future is a deescalation of military activity and commitment.

The National Liberation Front must be recognized as a principal belligerent in the war, and as a necessary party to any peace conference and settlement.

To improve the likelihood of negotiations, the Saigon government should be broadened to include representatives less hostile to negotiations.

The United States must help promote greater contact between all South Vietnamese factions—representatives of the National Liberation Front, the Saigon government, and influential private citizens.

##### Negotiations and the convening of a conference

The differences between the several negotiating positions are not insurmountable. The United States might agree to Hanoi's four points, treating them as one interpretation of the 1954 agreement and thus an appropriate basis for negotiations. The controversial point 3 of the Hanoi program would then be a subject for subsequent discussion rather than prior approval.

The 1954 Geneva Conference should be reconvened with all parties to the hostilities represented.

A procedure for reconvening the Geneva Conference would be to have the three na-

tions on the International Control Commission (Canada, India, Poland) request a conference to receive new instructions on enforcement of the 1954 agreements.

The inability of the United Nations thus far to use its good offices to help end the Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of including China as a full member of that institution. Despite the difficulties of involving the United Nations in a settlement of the war, all parties should seek opportunities to utilize the United Nations in appropriate ways.

#### *Terms of a settlement*

A cease-fire must be secured. Given the dispersed nature of the conflict, such a cease-fire might be more easily reached at a conference, though the possibility of a prior cessation of hostilities should be explored carefully.

Agreements must be reached on a provisional government in South Vietnam and procedures for the holding of elections to form a constituent assembly. A provisional government might be established on the basis of geographical areas controlled, with contested areas to be administered temporarily by the International Control Commission. Alternatively, decisions regarding such a government could be reached by prior negotiations between all parties in the south.

All parties must firmly adhere to the results of free elections.

Amnesty must be granted for all parties in the conflict.

Guarantees of the cease-fire, the provisional government, free elections, troop withdrawals, amnesty, and neutralization must be enforced by an effective International Control Commission. The International Control Commission must therefore be significantly strengthened. United Nations participation in this process might reduce administrative difficulties and set precedent for future United Nations participation in the solution of other civil conflicts threatening world peace.

A settlement should assure the neutralization of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Arms control agreements must be reached applying to other nations of the area, prescribing their nonparticipation in military alliances, the freedom of their territory for foreign military bases, and their protection from outside arms, material, and armed personnel infiltration.

#### CONFERENCE SUMMARY

##### *I. The current situation in Vietnam*

In discussing the present situation in Vietnam, the Conference concentrated on two major issues: the status and relations of the several Vietnamese parties in conflict and the political effect of various military tactics and strategies.

##### *The Vietnamese Antagonists*

There is little information about the National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Vietcong. Their top leaders are not easily contacted; below the top leadership few of their personnel have been adequately identified by Americans. Many of the participants felt this lack of knowledge itself obstructed needed initiatives in the diplomatic sphere. Several participants acquainted with politics in South Vietnam reminded the Conference that the Vietcong had grown out of the resistance movement when all of Vietnam was struggling against the French. The National Liberation Front is clearly dominated by the Communists, although several experts pointed out that the Front does consist of various factions, some of them more nationalist than Communist. It was felt that attempts must be made to learn more about the structure of the Front, constituting as it does, such a significant force in the south.

There were varying viewpoints regarding the strength of the South Vietnamese Government, and the Conference was aware of the extreme mutability of circumstances in Saigon. Some participants believed there was no organic non-Communist political structure left in South Vietnam, and that the military government was simply an extension of the American presence. Others argued that there was considerable structure intact. The Conference agreed that the stability and prestige of the Government was largely a function of the degree of American support.

Many participants were deeply disturbed by the Ky government's insistence that talk of negotiations jeopardizes its life and threatens to dissolve its army's will to fight. All agreed that this position should not be allowed to prevail. In fact, it was felt that a broadening of the South Vietnamese Government would be a prerequisite for moves toward a negotiated settlement.

##### *Relations Between Saigon and the National Liberation Front*

Given the above evaluation, the participants were deeply convinced that steps must be taken to promote greater contact between the National Liberation Front, members of the Saigon Government, and influential South Vietnamese citizens. American policy, in its insistence that the war is a simple case of external aggression, may be undercutting this goal. While many noted the intransigence of Saigon on stimulating contacts, several of the participants pointed out that some South Vietnamese officials, Buddhists, independent political figures, and non-Communist intellectuals are undoubtedly acquainted with the National Liberation Front agents and officials. The United States, through local aid and intelligence officials, should actively seek to promote these relations. The participants thought that the United States must persuade the Ky government not to obstruct this process and inflict punishment on citizens engaged in promoting contact between presently hostile groups. If, as all parties to the conflict agree, a future South Vietnam must be autonomous and free from foreign interference, then attempts at reconciliation within the country must be made.

##### *Relations Between the National Liberation Front and Hanoi*

Many in the group believed there are differences between the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese Government regarding the conduct of the war. Some argued that those fighting in the south are likely to feel less inclined to compromise for a settlement. An example of this difference was the variation in interpretation given by the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam to the statement first issued by the Front on March 17, 1965. The North Vietnamese version, broadcast 3 days after the National Liberation Front account, was much toned down.

The difference in outlook between the Front and North Vietnam was cited as another reason why the United States should encourage the Government in South Vietnam to make contact with the National Liberation Front. We could be committing serious errors if we assumed that Hanoi had such complete authority over the National Liberation Front that it could speak for it on all issues of stopping the war and negotiating a settlement. We do not know definitely that the National Liberation Front would accept Hanoi's terms for a settlement. In fact, it was felt that one of the reasons why reunification of North and South Vietnam is no longer an issue of priority was the recognition by Hanoi that even with a Vietcong victory, reunification would involve a complicated process of bargaining between Hanoi and

whoever formed a South Vietnamese Government.

##### *The Political Effects of Military Tactics: Bombings in the North*

The Conference participants were in agreement that the bombings in the north were of little military value, while the diplomatic disadvantages were very serious. It was agreed that the bombings had helped bolster South Vietnamese morale; but it was believed this factor did not outweigh harmful diplomatic effects. Further escalation of the bombings, it was felt, could not be expected to improve the situation.

##### *The Political Effects of Military Tactics: Operations in the South*

The Conference expressed extreme anxiety over the prospect of increased American troop commitments in the south. Echoing the conclusion of the recent Mansfield report, the participants argued that an escalation of troop commitment would likely result in stalemates on yet higher levels of engagement. There was profound awareness of the risks of provoking greater North Vietnamese and possible Chinese ground participation. No member of the group believed the United States should withdraw all its forces from Vietnam prior to a settlement. But the group agreed that the most desirable future course would be a deescalation of military activity and involvement. Many held that American initiatives on staged withdrawals would be more in the U.S. interest than a continued enlargement of our involvement.

The Conference also noted that bombings in the south and ground clear-and-hold operations were creating a serious refugee problem. The number of refugees, estimated at 1 million in 1965, was growing beyond the capacity of pacification programs to absorb them. The problem was thought to be of increasing importance to the stability of the South Vietnamese Government.

Throughout the discussion there was concern expressed that the more the United States makes the war our war, the less chance we have of building attitudes congenial to a settlement. With respect to U.S. economic efforts, for example, it was argued that without the willingness of the South Vietnamese Government to commit itself to improving conditions in the countryside, large increases of U.S. economic aid and personnel are not likely to achieve intended political results.

##### *II. Negotiations and a peace conference*

The conference discussed in some detail the present bargaining positions of the parties in conflict. From here, it turned to an examination of the problems involved in initiating negotiations and convening a peace conference.

##### *Current Negotiating Positions*

On the surface it appears that both sides in the war are agreed on what should constitute the basis for negotiations and a peace conference. The United States and North Vietnam have said that the 1954 Geneva Agreement should form the foundation of a settlement; the United States has presented 14 points as representing its own position. The North Vietnamese position is represented by the four points announced on April 8, 1965. Of these, point three has been the principal obstacle to agreement. This point reads: "The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of the NLF (the South Vietnam National Liberation Front) without any foreign interference." The United States has indicated that all points, 4 or 14, could be dealt with in negotiation. Yet there is still considerable controversy regarding the true nature of Hanoi's point three. One view was that point three meant that Hanoi would settle for nothing less than



a settlement based entirely on the program of the front. Many, however, disputed this interpretation, arguing that the four points are but an elaboration of Hanoi's understanding of the 1954 agreement. Cited as documenting this contention were the preamble and postscript to the four points. The preamble states that it is the intention of the North Vietnamese Government "to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam and to correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following four points":

A significant number of participants felt that the negotiating positions of the parties were not so irreconcilable. It was then proposed that the United States should accept the four points of Hanoi, treating them as one interpretation of the Geneva accords, and thus an appropriate basis for negotiations. The controversial point three would then become a subject for discussion at a conference rather than prior to it. This American diplomatic initiative would give Hanoi less reason to oppose negotiations.

There was some belief that Hanoi was not disposed to negotiate now since it felt that the United States could be worn down psychologically.

If, however, the above view is not entirely the case, and if the positions of the several parties are not so opposed, what then is holding up the convening of negotiations and a conference? There appears to be the lack of conviction on each side that the other side does in fact accept the conditions proclaimed for a settlement. There may also be conviction that military success is still possible. And clearly there is ambiguity regarding the role of the National Liberation Front, in addition to other procedural difficulties regarding the convening of a conference.

Dealing with the National Liberation Front

A main stumbling block to negotiations has been the refusal of the United States to accept the presence of the National Liberation Front as one of the necessary parties to the negotiations and settlement. The U.S. position has been, in the words of the President: "The Vietcong would not have difficulty being represented and having their views represented if for a moment Hanoi decided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think that would be an insurmountable problem." This has appeared to be insufficient recognition to satisfy the Front and North Vietnam. And Hanoi has sometimes seemed to take the extreme view that the Front is the only group from South Vietnam that should be dealt with.

The group felt strongly that the United States should be clearer about its willingness to deal with the Front at the negotiating table. While the United States should consult fully with the South Vietnamese Government on its view, the Ky government should not be permitted to exercise a veto over U.S. policy in this respect. One approach to dealing with the Front might be an American decision to grant the Front belligerent status.

Reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference

The reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference is almost a certain prerequisite to negotiating an end to the war. There is, however, a procedural problem as to which government or body should request the reconvening of this conference.

While there are considerable uncertainties regarding future developments, the participants thought it important to discuss likely alternative procedures for convening a conference.

The cochairmen of the 1954 conference—the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—are unlikely to issue a conference call because the Soviet Union might not wish to expose itself to further denunciations by

China or complicate its good relations with North Vietnam. So this avenue was therefore considered unpromising.

Another possibility is that the United Nations might request the reconvening of the conference. The principal problem here is that neither North nor South Vietnam or China are members of the United Nations; and North Vietnam and China may continue to regard any United Nations action as likely to be partisan and therefore unacceptable.

A third possibility, now unlikely, is to act on a former (1964) Cambodian request to reconvene the conference to guarantee its neutrality and borders, which Cambodia charged were threatened by the Vietnam war. This conference might then be used by the parties to discuss a settlement of the war in South Vietnam.

There is a fourth possibility, as yet untried, which might be most acceptable to all parties. The three countries of the International Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) could request that the Geneva Conference be reconvened in order that they receive further instructions on the implementation of the 1954 agreement. At this conference, the terms of a settlement to the present war could be considered.

In requesting such a conference, the International Control Commission members might propose that representation be determined along the lines of the 1961-62 Laos Conference, which allowed each of the warring factions to participate in discussion. One of the major functions of that conference was to provide a channel through which leaders of the three groups met and eventually agreed on the formation of a government. The Laos accord was then intended to be a guarantor of the settlement.

### III. Terms of a settlement Cease-Fire

A cease-fire will have to be a precondition for elections to form a government for South Vietnam. Yet given the dispersed nature of the conflict, there would have to be prior negotiations.

The U.S. position is that it will accept a cease-fire before a conference or will agree to a cease-fire as the subject of a conference. The group agreed that either sequence could be tried. But given the complexities of such matters, a cease-fire would probably have to be worked out at preconference or conference negotiations.

The United States is accepting some risk in being willing to have a cease-fire before a conference. It is one thing to call upon major military forces to stop fighting, and quite another to rely on the observance of a cease-fire by guerrilla forces. Yet, the United States side would gain politically as a result of a cease-fire. Participants noted that there are many recent examples where negotiations were convened while fighting continued. This was the case in Indonesia, Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, and, in 1954, Indochina. What is desirable is that the belligerents agree, at least tacitly, that they will engage in a maximum amount of deescalation so as to permit a conference to meet in the most relaxed possible atmosphere.

### Provisional Government

One of the most difficult questions for a reconvened peace conference to settle is the nature of any provisional government pending the holding of elections. Some believed that this question is so difficult for outside parties to decide that elections to form a constituent assembly for South Vietnam should take place as soon as they could be organized. Others thought that elections immediately following a cease-fire would present serious problems.

Two principal ways of forming a provisional government pending elections were discussed. At the national level, an all South Vietnamese Government would be composed

of representatives drawn from geographical areas. Although many details would have to be worked out in conference, the essential functions of government would be divided among the major South Vietnamese groups and the International Control Commission. At the local level the Saigon government would continue to exercise authority over areas controlled by it, and the same would be true for the National Liberation Front as well as such largely autonomous groups as the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and some of the Montagnard groups. As to those geographical areas which are contested, the International Control Commission would need to exercise temporary control. (It was noted that there is some precedent for this in the agreement which gave the United Nations temporary administrative control in West Iran.) In this connection, members of the group again stressed the importance of promoting closer contacts by the different groups in South Vietnam.

A second way of forming a provisional government is the more traditional one of having the parties decide on a cabinet where portfolios would be divided among them. Within this context the I.C.C. could be given special responsibilities. Some expressed anxiety that this form of provisional government has provided Communists with a means of staging a coup d'etat. It was pointed out by others that whether such a provisional government can function until elections are held depends in large measure on the political orientation of the population. In such countries as France and Italy, Communists were included in the cabinet of the immediate post-World War II governments with no subsequent Communist takeover. In the Laos Agreement of 1961-62, a coalition government that was formed at the time subsequently broke down when the Communist faction withdrew its support and refused to participate, leaving the centrist and right-wing groups to run that part of the country they controlled.

### Elections

There was unanimity that elections should be held for the purpose of creating a government of South Vietnam and that the United States and all other parties to a negotiated settlement should be absolutely firm in their willingness to accept the results of them. The United States, among its 14 points for a settlement, includes the "support of free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice." Most of the group felt that the U.S. Government would honor this commitment.

Finding acceptable means by which elections can be held will be a difficult task. The International Control Commission was commissioned at Geneva to supervise elections for the reunification of the two zones of Vietnam. The group assumed that the International Control Commission could also be given the duty of supervising elections for the formation of a constituent assembly among whose responsibilities would be the formation of a government.

### Amnesty

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided that the representative authorities of the northern and southern zones of Vietnam "must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families." This amnesty will need to be reinforced in a peace settlement. If necessary, the ICC must be given special authority to see that amnesty is being observed, and to consider reports of violations and recommend action in their event.

### Unification With North Vietnam

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 provided that elections would be held in July 1956 for

the purpose of reunifying the northern and southern zones of Vietnam. Among the members of the group who have had close contacts in Vietnam there was agreement that North Vietnam would not demand early reunification of the country. Since the United States is on record as supporting any free decision of the people of Vietnam on reunification, this issue no longer appears to be among those causing great controversy. A constituent assembly could be given responsibility for achieving reunification. On this point it was noted that in January 1957, 6 months after the failure to hold elections in Vietnam for reunification, the Soviet Union proposed that North and South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations as separate states. The United States rejected the proposal at the time.

#### Neutralization of North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

The Geneva Agreement of 1954, by providing that North and South Vietnam could not accept foreign military personnel and bases or participate in military alliances, set the stage for a military neutralization of the four areas comprising Indochina. It was recognized by the group that such neutralization does not preclude governments in these countries headed or controlled by Communists, but that insofar as military matters are concerned, Communist or non-Communist governments could not be allied with other countries. It was the conviction of the group that neutralization of North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos would not jeopardize the security interests of America or the non-Communist states of Asia.

#### Withdrawal of Troops

Informally and unofficially, many Communist spokesmen have stated that it would not be necessary for the United States to withdraw its troops in advance of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. There is, however, some uncertainty whether Hanoi and the Front are in accord on this point.

The U.S. position is that we "want no U.S. bases in southeast Asia," and that "we do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South Vietnam after peace is assured." Assuming flexibility on the part of both sides on this issue, the group did not think that the withdrawal of troops per se would constitute a major issue in the negotiations. The exact staging of the withdrawal of troops on the part of both the United States and North Vietnam, of course, would need to be the subject of rather detailed discussions.

#### Enforcement Provisions of a Settlement

The International Control Commission, under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, is made responsible for implementing the terms of the agreement. However, in the 1954 agreements it was expected that the French Army would provide the necessary logistic support and that financial support would be given by the French Government. When the French withdrew from South Vietnam in August 1956, the Commission was left without any means of support. The need for a reinforced ICC, therefore, was strongly felt by all members of the group. If the ICC is to perform the tasks assigned to it in 1954, plus any additional ones designated by a new peace conference, there must be agreement on a new financing formula. The Laos Agreement of 1961-62 bolstered the ICC in its operations in that country; this included a financing formula whereby the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom each agreed to pay 17.6 percent of the costs. The other parties agreed to pay lesser percentages.

Some of the group felt that the ICC by itself did not have the kind of administrative structure needed to perform its duties. It was therefore suggested that the United Nations could provide administrative support to strengthen the implementation of a settle-

ment. Whether the Chinese would agree to such administrative support was not known, but some participants thought that a United Nations decision to support strict observance of the Geneva Agreement would be evidence to the Chinese of the United Nations impartiality regarding a settlement.

#### IV. Related aspects of a Vietnamese settlement

##### China

At a number of points in the conference China was discussed. These discussions covered China's view of the Vietnamese conflict, and the relation of its domestic affairs to foreign policy. Thought to be particularly important were the problems of providing sufficient food for its expanding population, the succession question, and the adaptation of the army to political rather than professional military purposes. Chinese food needs cannot be met by extending control over small states in the area. Only in the loess region of North China can total food production be substantially raised, something in the order of 40 percent. As to the question of succession, the older leadership has attempted—with only only moderate success—to instill revolutionary and anti-American attitudes in those younger men likely to replace them. American policies, however, can affect the degree of success the older leadership has with this indoctrination process.

It was also noted that the Maoist leadership fears that the United States may attack the mainland soon and that China must be prepared to meet this attack by various forms of defense encompassing guerrilla-type operations. There are signs, however, that army leaders may be seriously resisting the role assigned them by the party in the defense of China.

On Chinese foreign policy, the specialists in the group noted the gross misinterpretation given by many to the September 1965 statement of the Chinese Defense Minister, Lin Biao. This statement, contrary to popular and some official beliefs, advocated scaling-down of overt Chinese action and those militant policies which increased the risk to China itself. The Chinese espoused the view that revolutions and wars of liberation could not be imported, and that conditions within a country had to be ripe in order for such revolutions to succeed. This did not mean that China would not send out agents and propaganda to foment revolution. Yet such tactics should be differentiated from the likelihood of repeated large-scale Chinese aggression and the sending of Chinese troops and arms to local Communist groups in the developing areas of the world. Notable too in the Lin statement was the absence of threats to the United States in Vietnam, even though China had issued many such threats in the earlier months of 1965.

Thus in Vietnam, China has exercised caution. Yet in assessing future Chinese intentions it was stressed that there undoubtedly was a threshold for China's active participation in the war. At some point in a continued U.S. escalation the Chinese would doubtless feel compelled to enter.

Many believed that since 1963 Chinese foreign policy had suffered a series of significant setbacks in the developing areas primarily because of the hostile reactions of indigenous populations and leaders.

#### Wars of Liberation

The group considered the above evaluation as having particular relevance to Communist policy on wars of liberation. Given Chinese inability or reluctance to commit military force to support wars of liberation, and what some felt was a growing uneasiness on the part of the Soviet Union unilaterally to promote these conflicts, the participants felt it important that the United States revise its conception of Communist aggression.

American response to Communist agitation for conflict in developing areas must not be to react unilaterally with military forces. U.S. aid to certain governments with anti-democratic features appears to have pressed the Soviet Union into increasing its agitation for disorder. Yet Soviet and Chinese exhortations to developing countries have met with little success. Those nations which are in their post-colonial stage are anxious for periods of sustained economic growth which increased revolution and violence would only disturb. There are still some nations, nevertheless, in which revolution is, or may soon be ripe. This must be anticipated by the United States. It was felt that our own particular revolutionary tradition was not appropriate to guiding these revolutions. But our interests are most likely to be served by a sympathetic rather than a hostile response when these events finally occur.

In discussion of possible responses to revolutions in the developing nations, the conference emphasized the need for discovering new roles for international organizations. Likewise, the participants thought the United States should seek to explore new avenues of cooperation with the Soviet Union within the United Nations.

In discussing the role of major powers in local conflicts of the future, many favored stress on developing procedure within international law rather than emphasis on securing agreement on general principles.

There was some discussion of whether Communist-inspired violence was likely to break out in Thailand. The topic was considered to be highly speculative, though several experts expressed the view that a major outbreak of hostility was unlikely. Local tension and increased terror, on the other hand, were thought to be a distinct possibility. Some thought was given, therefore, to the possibility of multilateral action to anticipate strife and prevent a crisis analogous to that in Vietnam.

The group also noted the need for arms control agreements in Thailand and possibly other areas. Such agreements might prohibit the import of arms or armed personnel, the establishment of foreign military bases, and the joining of military alliances. These steps could be incorporated into a general conference on Vietnam, or as an adjunct to a Vietnamese settlement. Our greatest interest, finally, should lie in insulating these conflicts from outside interference.

On the relationship of Vietnam to other countries in southeast Asia, including Thailand, it was pointed out that Vietnam was the only case in southeast Asia where the Communists effectively identified themselves with the country's nationalists. Elsewhere in southeast Asia, nationalism has not been forced into fusion with communism. Indeed, the failure of Communist insurrections in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines testifies to the positive contribution of Asian nationalism. In each of these cases, the inability of Communist insurgents to secure nationalist backing defeated their ultimate goals.

### "Not To Doubt," by Richard Chaput—A Saga of Spiritual Conquest

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

**HON. JAMES C. CLEVELAND**

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, on January 12, I paid tribute in the CON-

February 16, 1966

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—page A62—to Mr. Richard R. Chaput of Nashua, N.H., who was named 1 of 10 outstanding young men in America by the National Junior Chamber of Commerce.

On January 20, I paid further tribute to Mr. Chaput and inserted a wonderful editorial from his hometown paper the Nashua Telegraph—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page A 260.

Mr. Chaput achieved his distinctions in spite of the fact that he is nearly totally paralyzed as the result of childhood polio. His accomplishments include the authorship of his autobiography "Not to Doubt," which contains a foreword by Richard Cardinal Cushing.

Since my remarks appear in the RECORD, a number of my colleagues have inquired about the book and I am taking this opportunity to repeat the name of it and to recommend it as an honest, gripping, moving story of a man's conquest over pain, fear, depression, loss of faith, and frustration at what appeared to be a hopeless life.

I have sent a copy to the President in the belief he would find the story of a man whom trouble could not conquer inspiring in this time of our country's troubles. I wish it were possible for me to send a copy to each of my colleagues in the Congress, who also bear great burdens in these days of strife and uncertainty.

Again, I am pleased to recommend "Not to Doubt", an inspiring story of spiritual conquest by a brave man.

### Lithuania: A Captive Nation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, nations like individuals, wish to be free to order their affairs as they see fit. How tragic it thus is when a nation is deprived of its independence through no fault of its own. Certain great states were deprived of their freedom for a few years recently because they had shown complete disregard for the rights of other peoples. But when a nation is subjugated to the will of a foreign power simply because it was too small and weak to resist the brute force of its neighbors, then we are faced with a situation which is wrong and which assaults all the instincts for fairplay and decency which we profess.

Lithuania is one such case of a nation held captive by a stronger, rapacious neighbor. The Lithuanian people have an identifiable history dating back to the Dark Ages. They have a proud history as one of the great nations of Eastern Europe. They have a culture and language which has set them apart from their neighbors. They certainly have as much right to an independent national existence as any people. Yet, this is not today the case. Since 1940 Lithuania

has not been an independent country. While it is right that our Government has not recognized the destruction of the Lithuanian state and still has diplomatic relations with representatives of independent Lithuania, the unpleasant fact is that more than 2½ million people live under the yoke of Soviet Russian domination in their own homeland.

The last two and a half decades have been especially hard years for the people of Lithuania. Their country was a battleground in one of the most merciless of conflicts—the Eastern Front of the Second World War. After the Soviet armies returned in 1944 the infamous methods of Stalinist repression increased the suffering of the people. Opposition was quickly blotted out. Sovietization of all forms of living was imposed. The population declined. Russian immigrants appeared to fill the places left empty by the deaths and deportation of tens of thousands of the native populace.

But what is especially terrible about these events is that they began by the destruction of the independent Lithuanian nation. When the Soviets reimposed the rule of Russian czars, they ended 22 years of Lithuanian freedom. Lithuania had become independent on February 16, 1918. In the years which followed, a great deal of progress was made, especially in social matters, which indicated that Lithuania would be a peaceful, developing nation. It is particularly sad that this renaissance was so viciously ended and the freedom and progress of Lithuania transformed into the sterile slavery of a Communist satrapy. Mr. Speaker, I feel that it is thus especially appropriate that we take note of the 48th anniversary of the declaration of independence of Lithuania. Let me extend to the people of captive Lithuania my deepest wishes that the great hope for the future embodied in the anniversary of their independence may soon be fulfilled.

### People to People

EXTENSION OF REMARKS  
OF

**HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL**

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, in these troubled times when international understanding and good will are so important, it is heartening to note the individual acts of brotherhood performed by some dedicated citizens.

One fine example of such action is well demonstrated by the work of my good friend, Mr. Frank M. Perper, of Arlington, Va. This businessman, who is president of the Motel Management Corp. of America, Inc., has made many unselfish contributions of his time and energy, as well as his resources, to help further friendship between the people of Korea and the United States.

Therefore, I was particularly pleased to attend a recent reception held in his

honor by the Korean Ambassador and Madam Kim. The Government of the Republic of Korea honored Frank Perper on this occasion in appreciation for his arduous support of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. His efforts are in the highest tradition of our country's "people-to-people" program and we can all be proud of Frank's contributions to international understanding and good will.

Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I insert at this point in the RECORD a letter from the Korean Ambassador at large concerning the tour of the "Little Angels" and the letter of appreciation to Frank Perper:

THE KOREAN CULTURAL AND  
FREEDOM FOUNDATION, INC.,

Washington, D.C., January 21, 1965.

DEAR FRIENDS: The Little Angels' 1965 tour of the United States was a cultural triumph. Audiences responded to performances by these 26 young ladies and 1 boy from Korea with ovations. Critics used such words as "charming," "magnificent," "superb" to describe their skillful and entertaining Korean folk dances, accompanied by ancient oriental music.

In these critical days in Asia, of course, the Little Angels' performances do more than bring Americans a better understanding of the centuries-old Korean culture. They also honor those Americans who have fought and died to preserve the independence of the Republic of Korea and emphasize that Free Korea is one of America's staunchest allies in the defense of freedom in Asia.

The Little Angels would like to return to the United States this year as part of a world tour planned by the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation. All funds raised by the tour will assist the greater cause and objectives of the Foundation, which include the education of underprivileged children in Korea.

Whether or not the 1966 tour will be possible depends in large part upon the people like you who have an abiding interest in culture and in people-to-people exchanges as a means of increasing world understanding.

With warm personal regards,  
Sincerely,

YOU CHAN YANG,

Executive Vice President and Ambassador at Large of Korea.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION,  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA,

Seoul, Korea, November 1, 1965.

This letter of appreciation is presented to Mr. Frank M. Perper, the Motel Management Corp. of America, Inc., Arlington, Va., in recognition and gratitude of his unselfish contributions which helped to further the friendship between the peoples of Korea and the United States.

As an arduous supporter of the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation he has made tangible aid available in assisting the recent tour of the Little Angels, Korean children's musical and dancing group.

He also cooperated cordially in providing facilities and services for official and ceremonial occasions in Washington, D.C., area, and has shown warm humanity by assisting many Korean students in the United States to become self-supporting in continuing their education.

The generosity of Mr. Perper will long and affectionately be remembered by the Korean people, and is hereby recognized and commended.

HONG JONG CHUL,

Minister, Ministry of Public Information,  
Republic of Korea.

February 16, 1966

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

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they have only seen the beginning. The British have promised to invoke an even wider range of sanctions and are expected to announce the next round shortly.

There is no question in our minds about the determination of the British to see this program through. I might point out that at the Lagos Conference of January 11-12, the British appear to have convinced all other Commonwealth members who attended that there were sufficient reasons to believe that these sanctions can be successful. This led to a decision to wait until July before the Commonwealth will reexamine the effectiveness of this attempt to bring down the Smith regime. We are sure that the British will use that time to good advantage.

Before and after the illegal rebellion, the British position has been that they would not use force in the Southern Rhodesia rebellion, except to restore law and order. Shortly after the rebellion took place, the British gave an indication that they were willing to send troops into neighboring Zambia, although agreement could not be reached with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda on a mandate for such troops.

In the meantime, when the possibility that the Smith regime would cut off Zambia's power from the Kariba Dam became a specter on the horizon, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson publicly stated that the United Kingdom could not stand idly by and allow that to happen. Zambia's entire copper-based economy depends on Kariba power. Late last week, too, a British military mission arrived in Zambia for talks with the Zambian Government.

The United States and the United Kingdom are united in their determination that Zambia shall not be made to bear the brunt of the Southern Rhodesia crisis. As a result of their common colonial past, the economies of Southern Rhodesia and Zambia are rather intricately intertwined. All of Zambia's oil, for example, has been received from the refinery at Umtali. Thus, the announcement of the British oil embargo caught Zambia with less than 2 weeks' supply of petroleum products, although measures were already underway to meet Zambia's petroleum requirements by alternate overland methods. These, of course, take time to function fully.

## NEIGHBORS HELP ZAMBIA

The help given to Zambia by its African neighbors has been vital to the success of the supply operation. Kenya and Tanzania have cooperated magnificently in making available their port, railroad, and airport facilities for the British segment of the airlift. Tanzania has greatly facilitated the overland flow of petroleum by helping to organize truck convoys.

The Congo has met every request of the United States and Canadian Governments to make a success of the airlift we have mounted from Leopoldville. Two great American overseas airlines, Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines, deserve a hearty "well done" for their assistance with this airlift. Together, they are carrying a minimum of 180 tons of diesel fuel a day to Zambia.

By the first of March, the petroleum situation within Zambia should be sufficiently normal again for that aspect of the airlift to be discontinued, but we are prepared to continue the airlift for other vitally needed supplies. President Mobutu made a large gift of oil from his Government's own stocks to help tide Zambia over the most critical period of the oil shortage. The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique and Angola and the South African Government have shown a correct attitude. They have respected the British oil embargo and show every sign of continuing to practice their neutrality in what they see as a domestic British problem.

Let me close with a comment on the claim of the Smith regime that it is a bulwark against communism in Africa. We disagree. We believe the regime's policies and actions are designed to perpetuate minority rule. If those are left unchallenged and unchecked, they would create exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their influence in Southern Rhodesia and which would encourage the Communists to renew their efforts elsewhere in Africa.

We have had some experience in helping responsible African governments resist Communist encroachments—far more experience, I might add, than the Southern Rhodesian regime. We believe the policies of governments in other African countries—policies looking toward social advancement, responsible majority rule, and political stability—are far more effective weapons against communism than any of the methods the Smith regime might devise.

We know of no Communist threat to Southern Rhodesia at present, but we fear one may well develop if the colony continues on its present course. We do not consider our support of British efforts to return Southern Rhodesia to legal, constitutional government inconsistent with our policy of resisting the Communist threat to genuine independence in Africa. On the contrary, we look on our opposition to the rebel regime as additional evidence of our determination to resist that threat.

[From the South Bend (Ind.) Tribune, Jan. 29, 1966]

## "AFRICA LAUDS PEACE STEPS" MENNEN WILLIAMS TELLS OF TALKS WITH LEADERS

Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, who carried President Johnson's Vietnam "peace offensive" to Africa, said here Friday night that the African part of the peace effort was successful.

Williams, former six-term Governor of Michigan and now African affairs assistant in the State Department, spoke at a dinner meeting of the International Relations Council of St. Joseph County in the Morris Inn.

The "peace offensive" was well received by African leaders, said Williams, who traveled the length of Africa, visiting 14 heads of state in 7 days, to explain this Nation's Vietnamese policy.

Williams said African leaders were pleased to be consulted and praised the United States for efforts to open Vietnam peace negotiations.

## PROMISE ACTION

Many of those to whom he talked promised to approach the Communist world and urge negotiations, Williams said.

"Even if the North Vietnamese refuse to negotiate," Williams added, "I am positive that we have convinced the leaders of black Africa of the sincerity of our intentions."

During a question period following his speech, Williams also said communism has lost its early impact on Africa and has settled into a status more like imperialism.

"Ideologically, communism hasn't made any headway in Africa," Williams said. "The number of card-carrying Communists in Africa is very small."

He said the only really successful effort by Red China and Russia has been Brazzaville, the Congo.

The main topic of Williams' speech was the Southern Rhodesian crisis resulting from the effort of the Ian Smith regime to obtain independence from the British Government and extend a white supremacy rule.

## PRAISES EFFORT

Williams praised the efforts of Britain to bring down the Smith regime. He said the efforts of Britain to use controls on trade rather than armed conflict in the Southern Rhodesian matter are proving successful.

"American reaction to the illegal seizure of power by the Smith regime was immediate and positive," Williams said. He praised American businessmen for voluntary cooperation in helping to make the trade controls successful.

Williams scoffed at the claim by Smith that the minority-rule government in Southern Rhodesia would be a bulwark against communism.

On the contrary, Williams said, Smith policies to perpetuate minority rule and hold down the advancement of the Negro majority creates "exactly the kind of situation in which the Communists could greatly extend their influence in Southern Rhodesia" and encourages Communists efforts elsewhere in Africa.

## Communism and Crisis in Italy

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

## HON. EDNA F. KELLY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 16, 1966

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I wish to place in the RECORD and to commend to the attention of the membership of this body, an editorial entitled "Communism and Crisis in Italy," which appeared in the February 14, 1966, edition of the New York Times.

For many years I have spoken in this House about developments in Italy, expressing my growing concern about the influence of the Communist Party in the governmental affairs of this country.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and as a great admirer of the Italian people, their contributions to our culture, and their positive and important role in the NATO structure, I have viewed with dismay the progress which the Communist Party of Italy has made over the years in various local, administrative, and national elections. The current government crisis in Italy is in part attributable to those developments.

Mr. Speaker, it is my hope that the current situation in Italy—a situation which may provide the opportunity for the increase in power of the Communist Party of that country—will be resolved in such a manner so as to prevent any diminution of Italy's important role in the affairs of the free world.

The editorial follows:

## COMMUNISM AND CRISIS IN ITALY

The failure of Aldo Moro, leader of the Christian Democrats, to form a government on his first try in the present Italian political crisis is bad news for everyone but the Communists. The possibilities now are a long crisis, a caretaker government, or a general election. The four-party coalition is displaying lack of unity just at the moment that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has reorganized and unified its leadership.

The PCI, largest Communist Party in the West, is likely to continue on the relatively moderate line set for it years ago by the late Palmiro Togliatti. In its esoteric terminology, polycentrism—or autonomy from Moscow and Peiping—is the party's policy in international affairs. In internal affairs, it is democratic centralism, which calls for centralized strategy but diversity and even liberalism in tactics.