

once table. The other side refused to talk.

I spent some time in Vietnam this fall. I talked to a good many troops because I went up into the forests and the jungles where they were fighting. I can report to you that the morale of those troops out there, as far as I was able to ascertain it, is better than the morale of some of the people who are marching here and burning draft cards and holding sit-ins and teach-ins here. The only complaint I heard out there among these troops was, "What is wrong with some of these people back home? Yes, and what is wrong with some Congressmen who are holding forums for these people to air their views making the North Vietnamese believe that we do want to quit?" Some people say, "Well, if we do not get out of there Communist China is going to come in." I talked to a good many people in Hong Kong, Bangkok and Vietnam itself and almost universally they say that if we make it perfectly clear to Peiping that if they do come in that same afternoon their atom-bomb-making complex will disappear from the face of the earth, then they will not come in. The reason for that is these Chinese I talked to say—and some of them visit Red China occasionally—that the Chinese Communist leaders believe and are planning on a 50-year program to get enough atom bombs to annihilate the rest of the world. They will do anything to keep from having their atom bomb apparatus immobilized. They said, and I believe it is true, that if we make it perfectly clear to Peiping that the first time a Chinese soldier is found engaged in combat that that atom bomb complex will disappear—and we can make it disappear with one Polaris missile—then they will think a long time before coming in. If they do come in I think we ought to use every weapon we have to stop them in their tracks as Mr. Truman had the courage to use the ultimate weapon in the war against Japan and thereby save 1 million American casualties. I do not advocate the use of any terrible weapon lightly. I do not want to see any noncombatants, women and children, killed. However, as the Secretary of State said last week, what is the difference between a bomb dropped from an airplane which kills civilians and a bomb delivered on a bicycle or in a Renault which kills as high as 50 or 60 women and children in Saigon. I cannot make the distinction and I cannot get as upset as some of the people do who seem to have a double standard.

Their attitude is that it is not fair to do anything to North Vietnam but it is perfectly fair for North Vietnam to do anything they want to do to the civilians of South Vietnam.

I support the President in this and I hope the card burners and the marchers will also decide to close ranks and support the United States of America.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

(Mr. FOLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, on January 27, I was unavoidably absent during rollcall No. 3. Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

VIETNAM

(Mr. FOLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, as an individual Member of the House of Representatives I wrote to the President last week and expressed my full support in the event he found it necessary to resume the bombing of North Vietnam.

As I stated in that letter, it is the President, and he alone as Commander in Chief who has the responsibility and the right to make this momentous decision. It is clear that the decision has been made, after the most careful analysis of all the relevant facts at issue and with the deepest resolution on his part, not only to maintain the freedom and the integrity of South Vietnam but to seek every honorable means of restoring peace in southeast Asia.

I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the President's action will have the support of the overwhelming majority of the American people of both parties here in the Congress and throughout the country.

PROBLEMS OF APPALACHIA

(Mr. PERKINS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the Record and to include a newspaper article.)

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Speaker, the problems of Appalachia have been of concern to this Congress for some time and we have taken a number of legislative actions to assist that section as well as other depressed areas. Therefore, I believe you will share my pleasure in knowing about one of the very fine and hopeful things that is happening in my State as a result of some of this legislation.

I refer specifically to the work experience and training program which was started the winter of 1963-64 in 9 counties of Kentucky and is now operating in 19 counties. The Federal laws which made this program possible are the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965. The program is designed to help needy families become self-supporting and is administered by the Welfare Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in cooperation with the Kentucky Department of Economic Security. This program has built-in safeguards—including merit-system appointed personnel—to assure that its benefits reach those who need them most and that it is operated in ways that will help them most.

Today, I was notified by the Welfare Administration that a grant of \$13.4 million has just been approved to enable the nine counties, where the program started, to carry it on for another year. The 10 other counties, which started later, are still operating on their original grants.

I want to take just a few minutes of your time to tell you why the approval of this grant today was especially good news to me, why I believe it will be equally good news to you, and why I know that to several thousand families in Kentucky, it is not merely good news but almost literally lifesaving news.

The people I am talking about live where I live in the most remote hill sections of eastern Kentucky. Their plight has been my chief concern since I have been a Member of Congress, but every legislative proposal designed to provide programs of educational, employment, economic development assistance for the most part have been sidetracked and bypassed until the very recent sessions of the Congress. The plight of people living in these regions has been the focus of nationwide attention thanks to the excellent reportorial services of the New York Times and the Louisville Courier Journal who went into these sections and exposed the many, many families who were living on the razor-edge of starvation.

As I have said, I have been anxiously concerned about the plight of these families who could look forward to little more than more hunger, more deprivation, and more hopeless years of unemployment. Regular grant-in-aid programs fashioned for the Nation as a whole seem to bypass and do little for this area. As a consequence, I have worked actively for national attention to the specific problems of the area through specific programs to cope with educational and economic needs of this isolated region of our Nation. A regions I might add, which is vast in many natural resources not yet developed.

Many of the mothers and fathers in those families could not read or write and their children were growing up the same way. You can not send ragged, half-sick, half-starved children off to school and even if you do, they are in no shape to learn. Other factors contribute to providing barriers to education not the least of which is the deplorable lack of roads.

For over 6,000 of the most desperate of those families, the winter of 1966 is very different from the winter of 1963 because of the work experience and training program. Unfortunately, that change has often been described by a phrase that distorts its real meaning—"happy pappies." Yet in a literal sense, the description is true. These men are happy.

They are happy because their children—some 23,000 of them—go off to school every morning with a breakfast under their belts and with shoes on their feet and warm coats on their backs. Most of these families still live far below the poverty line of \$3,000 a year but now they at least have the bare essentials.

They are happy because they know that if anyone in the family is sick, he will get attention—and many of them can remember when loved ones suffered, perhaps even died, for lack of such attention.

But most of all, these fathers are happy because they can look to a

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dump of unsightly debris, graveled the drive, gathered and burned trash in one spot, and built a wide unloading area. Formerly trucks and cars did not have enough room to turn after unloading trash at the dump.

Most of the jobs would have gone undone or would have had to wait had it not been for the program.

But in the long run, only time will tell how successful the new program will be in teaching participants to actually become steady wage earners. The 24 who currently have progressed to traneships is not a large percentage of the 171 on the program.

And always there is the possibility that a private employer will be tempted to take advantage of the program to obtain free labor for some menial task under the pretext of teaching the worker specific work skills.

In the end much of the program's future value to the public will depend on the alertness of officials in finding worthwhile jobs for the men, and citizens in calling attention to jobs that need doing.

VIETNAM

(Mr. ROGERS of Florida asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, the President's announcement to resume the bombing of North Vietnam is symbolic of this Nation's determination to keep its commitment in southeast Asia. President Johnson has kept all doors to negotiations open in an effort to bring about a peaceful settlement to the problems of South Vietnam. Yet the Communist aggressors have both rejected and maligned his repeated pleas for peace. In the face of their unwillingness to discuss on any level the complex problems which the world is faced with, President Johnson has made the right decision.

During the lull in U.S. bombing the Communists have been given the chance to repair damage and replenish supplies which had been destroyed by previous American raids. The current U.S. efforts should spare no military target of strategic importance. I urge the President to render ineffective the vital North Vietnamese supply port of Haiphong.

The port of Haiphong should not become a sanctuary as the Yalu River did in North Korea. The port of Haiphong is currently the main port of supply for the aggressive forces of North Vietnam and so long as it continues to be the conduit of aggression, it should receive priority consideration and be rendered inoperable.

VIETNAM

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I approve of this decision of the President to resume the bombing, but I think it ought to be given an assessment of actually what it is. Despite all the leaks from the White House during the past few days about all the "To be or not to be" soliloquizing going on down there, I do not think it is anything that we should go into emotional orbit about. The prolonged "Be kind to Hanoi week" which stretched out to 5 weeks and 2 days sim-

ply did not accomplish its objective. It was a failure and it was time to stop it and take another tack. And, now that we are going to do so I think we should also take realistic stock of the success or failure of the bombing as it was carried on up to the Christmas holidays. It was supposed to, first, slow down the infiltration of North Vietnamese military units into the South and, second, raise the price of the war in the North to the point where they would determine to cease their aggressions. That bombing failed utterly to accomplish either of those two purposes. So the score so far is two failures in a row and again I say it is nothing to go into a state of euphoria about as so much of this Presidential adulation seems to indicate.

Instead we had better do some hard thinking about what kind of bombing we ought to be doing from here on out to accomplish the objectives we have set instead of failing to accomplish them. If we are thinking about doing something which will discourage them from doing the things the President, Secretary McNamara, and Secretary Rusk say we are trying to discourage them from doing, we should realistically admit that the use of TNT bombs on targets we have thus far selected has failed of its purpose. A repetition of that kind of action should not prove any more successful in the future than it has been in the past. I am not thinking in terms of blowing up Hanoi and Haiphong or using atom bombs, but I am thinking in terms of using some intelligent analysis to determine what kind of targets are meaningful to those people and using some creative imagination to determine what kind of ammunition should be used against those targets to succeed in achieving our purpose. Both the targets and the ammunition may turn out to be quite unconventional. I shall say more about them in the near future. The point I want to make now is that if civilians in Washington are going to insist on running this war without paying any attention to the advice of the military, then they should start to make sense about the way we fight it and stop mismanaging it before they turn it into a fiasco. They should stop fighting the last war, which this one is not. They should stop thinking about the war as a conventional war which it is not and start thinking about it as the unconventional war it is. If they do so intelligently and imaginatively, that will bring us victory and we will not have to fight forever to get it.

THE SPACE PROGRAM—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 371)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Science and Astronautics and ordered to be printed with illustrations:

To the Congress of the United States:

The record of American accomplishments in aeronautics and space during

1965 shows it to have been the most successful year in our history.

More spacecraft were orbited than in any previous year. Five manned Gemini flights were successfully launched.

Our astronauts spent more hours in space than were flown by all of our manned spacecraft until 1965. Ten astronauts logged a total of 1,297 hours, 42 minutes in space.

The five manned flights successfully achieved included a walk in space, and the first rendezvous between two manned spacecrafts.

A scientific spacecraft completed a 325-million-mile, 228-day trip to Mars. Mariner 4 thereby gave mankind its first closeup view of another planet.

The Ranger series, begun in 1961, reached its zenith with two trips to the moon that yielded 13,000 closeup pictures of that planet. The entire Ranger series produced 17,000 photographs of the moon's surface which are being studied now by experts throughout the world.

Equally important were the contributions of our space program to life here on earth. Launching of Early Bird, the first commercial communication satellite brought us measurably closer to the goal of instantaneous communication between all points on the globe. Research and development in our space program continued to speed progress in medicine, in weather prediction, in electronics—and, indeed, in virtually every aspect of American science and technology.

As our space program continues, the impact of its developments on everyday life becomes daily more evident. It continues to stimulate our education, improve our material well-being, and broaden the horizons of knowledge. It is also a powerful force for peace.

The space program of the United States today is the largest effort ever undertaken by any nation to advance the frontiers of human knowledge. What we are discovering and building today will help solve many of the great problems which an increasingly complex and heavily populated world will face tomorrow.

The year 1965—the year of Gemini, Ranger, and Mariner—is a brilliant preface to the coming years of Apollo, stations in space, and voyages to the planets. I have great pride and pleasure in transmitting this remarkable record to the Congress that, through its enthusiastic support, has made possible.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 31, 1966.

FIFTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 372)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read, and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Science and Astronautics and ordered to be printed, with illustrations:

To the Congress of the United States:

I said in my state of the Union message this year that, "We must change to master change."

Failing that, this Nation will surely become a casualty to the relentless tide of history. For in assessing our prospects, we must remember that mankind faces not one but many possible futures. Which future our children's children enjoy—or endure—depends in large measure on our ability to adjust to the needs of the times.

But change comes not of itself. Neither the requirement for change nor the desire for change will see us through. In a complex world—growing more complex every year—only knowledge can keep us apace.

We must achieve a better understanding of our environment and our place in that environment.

We must continue to unlock the secrets of the earth below us, the sea around us, and the heavens above us.

And we must intensify our search into the very meaning of life itself.

It is not too much to say that every aspect of our lives will be affected by the success of this effort. The military and economic strength of our Nation, and the health, the happiness, and the welfare of our citizens all are profoundly influenced by the limits—and potentialities—of our scientific program.

In the furtherance of this program, no organization, agency or institution has had a more profound or lasting influence than the National Science Foundation. The establishment of this Foundation by the Congress, 15 years ago, was one of the soundest investments this Nation ever made.

In the field of basic research, many of the major scientific breakthroughs of our time would have been impossible—or at the very least, much longer in coming—had it not been for National Science Foundation grants in the basic sciences.

In the field of education, it is enough to say that more than half of all our high school teachers have now received vital refresher training through the Foundation's education program.

In the classrooms, the Foundation has played a major role in modernizing scientific curricula to make them responsive to our age.

And in a more recent activity, the Foundation has launched a program to strengthen the science departments of many of our smaller universities throughout the Nation by providing new laboratories, modern equipment, and fellowships to promising graduate students.

It should be emphasized that the role of the National Science Foundation is to aid, not to arbitrate. But through its aid—skillfully administered and intelligently applied—it has brought American science to a new level of excellence.

This, the 15th Annual Report of the National Science Foundation, reflects another year of scientific growth and progress, and I am pleased to commend it to the attention of the Congress. It mirrors the past and illuminates the future.

It is the story of change—to master change.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 1966.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE OREN HARRIS

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Honorable OREN HARRIS:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., January 27, 1966.
HON. JOHN W. MCCORMACK,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I have the solemn duty to inform you that I have this day transmitted to the Honorable Orval E. Faubus, Governor of Arkansas, my resignation as a Representative in the Congress of the United States from the Fourth District of Arkansas, effective at the close of business February 2, 1966.

Although I look forward to assuming a new status in life as Federal judge of the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, it is with deep feeling that I leave the House of Representatives. I am grateful for the privilege of the association during my years in this great institution. It has been a rich and rewarding experience for Mrs. Harris and me, which we shall always cherish.

May the providence of God sustain you and every Member throughout the years ahead.

Humbly and gratefully, I remains always
Sincerely yours,

OREN HARRIS,
Member of Congress.

Enclosure.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., January 27, 1966.

HON. ORVAL E. FAUBUS,
Governor, State of Arkansas,
Little Rock, Ark.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: It is with mixed feelings and a sense of pride that I hereby tender to you my resignation as a Member of the House of Representatives in the Congress of the United States from the Fourth District of Arkansas, effective at the close of business February 2, 1966. This is pursuant to our understanding when I visited with you in the hospital in Little Rock, December 21, 1965.

As you are aware, I will become U.S. district judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas at 11 a.m. Thursday, February 3, in my hometown, El Dorado, Ark.

I am humbly grateful for the special honor and privilege of having served our State and district in the Congress for these 25 years and 1 month. It has been a joy to me and my family to have had the association during these years, which we shall ever cherish.

I want to thank you for the courtesies you have always extended to me, as well as the cooperation in our efforts to serve the people of our State of Arkansas.

With genuine respect and esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

OREN HARRIS,
Member of Congress.

RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. CALLAWAY (at the request of Mr. HALL) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Speaker, I commend the President on his decision to resume bombing over North Vietnam feeling that under the circumstances, this was the right and only choice to make. This Nation sincerely wants peace, but knows full well that appeasement is not the answer. Only through strength and firmness in the face of aggression can we truly achieve the peace we seek, and therefore I am convinced that this decision is a necessary and positive step toward winning the war. Moreover, this action is needed to back up the efforts of our fighting men. I have long said that in committing vast numbers of troops to fight and die in Vietnam, we are honor and duty bound to back them up in every way we can. Let us hope that this decision is only a first step toward the full military backing needed to win this war, and that it will be followed by a further step—the closing of Haiphong—that is so vital to victory in Asia.

NO CUTRATE BENEFITS FOR OUR VIETNAM VETERANS

(Mr. RANDALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Speaker, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee faces a large stack of bills that have been recently introduced relating to proposed benefits for what is improperly described as our cold war veterans. In some recent remarks on the floor of the House, I urged upon the chairman and members of that committee that the time had come for more action and less talk both by the committee and the Congress, to provide too long delayed benefits for those who are now serving in some hot spots of the cold war.

Our Veterans' Affairs Committee has a big job, if it does nothing more than compare the provisions of more than 100 such bills already introduced in the 89th Congress. Very few of these bills are identical. They differ as to effective dates, eligibility, termination dates, and the extent of benefits provided.

The several bills can be divided into two general classes. First is a group of bills that follow S. 9, sponsored by Senator YARBOROUGH, which has already passed the Senate and which would provide benefits for all veterans who served between January 31, 1955, and July 1, 1967, who have been released under conditions other than dishonorable and who have served for a period of more than 180 days. Under this kind of bill, the benefits for education and training would be related to length of service. As a rule of thumb, the formula for entitlement for education and training would be 1½ days of schooling for each day served since induction. In other words, 2 years of service would earn the maximum of 36 months as a period of education or training to which an eligible veteran would be entitled. Such a formula would seem to be fair and equitable and even a lesser formula which provides 1 day's education

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for 1 day's service could not be the subject of strenuous objection.

Over in another category is a classification of bills which generally follow H.R. 1006 which provides only limited benefits to persons serving in combat zones after January 1, 1962. In other words, benefits are limited under this class of bills to those post-Korean veterans who have served 90 days of active duty in a combat zone. These proposals are called the "hot spot" bills. The so-called administration bills heretofore introduced by request are described as low-cost bills, in that they would limit the cost to approximately \$100 million for the first year. The so-called high-priced bills would require expenditures of up to \$275 million for the first year. These would not be limited to education and job training, but would include housing benefits, hospital benefits, job counseling, placement rights, numerous other readjustment benefits, including service-connected compensation at wartime rates, specially equipped automobiles for those who have lost use of a limb, and specially built homes designed for those confined to a wheel chair.

As we observed at the beginning of these remarks, it is the content or substance of these bills that is important rather than any particular title that may be affixed to any of them. Some are called Combat Veterans Equalization Benefits Act. Some are titled Cold War Readjustment Assistance Act. Others are called Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Act. But, again, the name or title is not nearly so important as the provisions contained for eligibility and the range of benefits granted.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think very much argument is needed to underscore the necessity that some sort of veterans benefit bill for those now serving should receive early approval. It should be a bill which will contain comprehensive veteran benefits. These thousands upon thousands of our young Americans who are subject to compulsory draft have been required to interrupt their civilian pursuits. They should receive benefits comparable to those received by veterans of World War II and the Korean conflict. Yet, since January 31, 1955, which was the cutoff date for eligibility under the Korean GI bill, about the only assistance the Federal Government has offered these post-Korean veterans is unemployment compensation.

It is high time to right this inequitable situation. Those who now serve in our Armed Forces are being called upon to share a disproportionate burden of citizenship. While they serve, others near their age go on preparing for occupational and professional careers. Enactment of a bill providing for some benefits is nothing more or less than an act of justice toward those who are sacrificing civilian gain for military duty.

Opponents object to the cost. Those who argue for a slowdown in domestic spending contend that no new programs should be begun, yielding high priority to funding for Vietnam. Yet these same persons forget that the cost of an education and training program for today's servicemen should properly be viewed as

just one of the necessary costs of the current war. While on the subject of the costs, there is a temptation to consider such cost as an outlay that may never be returned rather than an investment that will yield big returns. It is true the original GI bill involved an outlay of over \$15 billion, yet it has since been proven that this bill actually "cost" the taxpayers nothing. It has been demonstrated that it generated over \$20 billion of new income and that those who were educated, according to the Census Bureau estimates, are now paying an extra \$1 billion a year in Federal income taxes because of added earnings directly traceable to their education made possible by the GI bill.

On the 20th anniversary of the original GI bill, which was called the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, statistics show this bill helped produce 460,000 engineers, 360,000 teachers, 197,000 in the health field, and 150,000 scientists, as well as 699,000 in business administration and 2,500,000 skilled craftsmen in the trades and industrial pursuits.

If the figure of \$1 billion a year in new or additional income taxes paid because of the GI bill is correct, then on the 20th anniversary of the bill, this would mean \$20 billion in new income from the 7.8 million veterans who received benefits of some kind.

Mr. Speaker, it is my intention to prepare for immediate introduction a bill which contains a range of benefits comparable to those provided for World War II and Korean veterans. My bill will propose more liberal eligibility provisions than the combat or hot-spot bills, with an effective date nearer the Korean cutoff than most that have been thus far submitted.

While it is understandable that greater benefits should be provided for those serving in "hot spots," it is very disappointing that a program should be limited only to such veterans as the administration measure would propose. Remember, these young men had no control or choice over the area to which they were assigned. Remember also we plan to spend several billion more dollars on our race to the moon. We have already allocated over \$1½ billion for the anti-poverty program. It has been announced we plan to continue our costly foreign aid program. Then why is it we cannot find a way to provide generous benefits to these young men who are sent to support our foreign policy and respect for our flag.

The question might well be asked, Is it not wiser to spend national funds to help a man receive an education than it is to give him a relief check later as an untrained and uneducated person who cannot find a job? The burden of military service does not fall on all alike. The very least a grateful nation can do, in my judgment, for these young veterans who have lost time from their normal lives in order to serve their country, is to provide benefits that they may equip themselves to reenter the mainstream of life and live as Americans should—free, productive, and self-supporting.

This Congress must meet its responsibility to our returning veterans as

earlier Congresses have done. The time has come for less talk and more action. Now is the time to get on with the job of passing a good GI bill. Above all, let us pass a bill that is not a cutrate piece of legislation, watered down by administration proposals to omit home or farm loan provisions and omit also on-the-job or on-the-farm training provisions. May there be no radical departure from the time-honored philosophy expressed in the previous GI bills which provided generous benefits for a man's willingness to put his life on the line for his Nation.

FEDERAL ACTION NEEDED TO CRACK DOWN ON HIGHWAY DEATHS

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, it was my privilege to serve for 7 years as chairman of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Motor Vehicle Safety, and I am heartened to see that the programs we initiated then, such as the driver education program, have served as models for many other States. But there is a clear need for Federal action in this area, too, and if we want to make the 89th Congress a truly historic session, we must enact legislation to eliminate the carnage on our highways.

There is a definite need for a Federal role here, for if ever there was an interstate instrument it is the automobile. Clearly, action at the national level is needed to effectively supplement State efforts. I have introduced legislation to provide a comprehensive Federal program to attack the mass murder on our roads which claims the lives of 1,000 Americans every week. And I urge my colleagues to join in solving this appalling and ever mounting problem.

My bill, H.R. 9629, is a broad measure designed to provide the States with the Federal assistance they require. The bill establishes a traffic safety center in the Department of Commerce and assigns it the responsibility for coordinating all Federal and State efforts toward mitigating traffic accidents. It provides incentives for States to establish and improve motor vehicle inspection and driver education programs; promotes research and development necessary for the production of safer cars; and lays the groundwork for standardizing minimum safety requirements, traffic control devices, accident reporting and driver licensing. In addition, the bill would create an Advisory Council on Highway Traffic Safety, consisting of experts in the field, to assist in drafting of national standards.

This legislation is a companion bill to S. 2231, introduced in the Senate by Senator RBICOFF—a great leader in the cause of traffic safety—and cosponsored by Senators BARTLETT, LONG of Missouri, MONDALE and TYDINGS. I think that the need for Federal action in this area, which we have recognized and advocated, has been clearly corroborated by the intensive investigation of the American

Trial Lawyers' Association. I can highly commend to my colleagues, and to all who are concerned with this problem, the Association's excellent study, "Stop Murder by Motor," which was just released this month. I salute the Association's President, Mr. Joseph Kalner, for this outstanding example of public service, in this critical area. And I strongly urge the House Public Works Committee and the Senate Commerce Committee to schedule early hearings on this important legislation.

One simply cannot exaggerate the havoc and the human misery wrought by traffic accidents. More Americans have been killed on our highways in the last 25 years—1,510,000—than have died in all the wars from the Revolution up to Vietnam—605,000. In 1964 alone, 1.7 million Americans were injured in traffic accidents—precisely the same number as the total hospital beds in the entire United States. Latest statistics show that last year's deaths on U.S. highways totaled over 50,000. These ever-growing figures are outrageous, but they are starkly realistic and something must be done about it. The time for bold and forward-looking action is long overdue, and we must not lose any time in making an all-out attack on the highway death toll.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Center, which my bill seeks to establish, would work with the States in developing adequate standards of vehicle safety, strict licensing and inspection requirements, and driver education programs for secondary schools. In 1962-63, only 60 percent of our public schools offered driver education programs, and only 24 States provided financial support to these programs. When one considers that about 8,000 children of secondary school age reach driving age daily, I think it becomes clear that a more determined effort is required to afford them the instruction they need and deserve.

In addition, the Federal Government must take the lead in establishing uniform safety standards for automobiles, as it has for airplanes and trains. The recent contribution of \$10 million by the auto industry, to the Highway Safety Research Institute at the University of Michigan, evidences its recognition of the fact that more work needs to be done in the promotion of motor vehicle safety. Senator GAYLORD NELSON has observed that 87 percent of all accidents occur at speeds of 35 miles per hour and below, and that countless lives could be saved each year if cars were equipped with such modest devices as collapsible steering columns, shoulder harnesses, and doors which would remain closed in a crash. Senator NELSON has long and actively sponsored legislation to promote the production of safer cars, and I believe that his bills, too, represent the kind of responsible, progressive action which is needed at the Federal level.

Mr. Speaker, there is obviously no panacea solution to this grievous problem, but a number of excellent measures have been introduced in this Congress, all of which take cognizance of the need for imaginatively conceived and vigorously implemented Federal action. The

need for Federal action is clear beyond doubt; the nature of this action may require more precise delineation. I believe, however, that my bill and those introduced in the Senate, go a long way toward defining the role which the Federal Government should be playing, and are specific and thoughtful enough to warrant the immediate attention of the appropriate committees.

VIETNAM—LET US CLOSE THE CREDIBILITY GAP

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, leaks from the White House—the principal source of information these past weeks on developments in Vietnam—indicated last week that the administration planned to return to the policy of bombing selected targets in North Vietnam. The public relations campaign for this reversal of policy got underway with a conference at the White House between administration policymakers and leaders of the Congress followed by the announcement from anonymous informed sources that most congressional leaders "are taking a harder position than when they went home after the last session."

Some reports suggest that American troop strength in Vietnam will be more than doubled and could exceed by 60 percent or more the number of troops sent by this Nation to Korea.

Mr. Speaker, I worry—as do our colleagues on both sides of the aisle—about the conduct of this tragic war in Vietnam—about the unexplained shifts of policy, the starting and stopping of bombing in the North, the failure to make any real progress after the commitment of 200,000 American troops, the uncertainty about our objectives, the failure to divulge information which those who sacrifice in this war have a right to be told, and the gap between what they are told and reality.

After the decision was made to escalate this war on the ground, along with others of both major parties, I have made public suggestions such as a Kennedy-type quarantine of North Vietnam. My purpose, whenever I have made such policy suggestions, has been to urge a course that would safeguard the freedom and independence of South Vietnam with a minimum loss of American lives. No one can argue against a policy that would value the lives of our gallant servicemen so highly that not one soldier, not one sailor, nor one airman would be unnecessarily sacrificed. I hope and pray that the administration will seek to minimize American casualties in southeast Asia.

On this point serious doubts have been expressed by responsible public spokesmen. For example, former Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis LeMay, on October 22, 1965, is reported to have said that U.S. actions in Vietnam up to that time "were getting people killed who should not be killed." More recently, reliable newsmen on the scene in South Vietnam have been reporting that the cessation of air attacks on the North has

given the enemy the opportunity to increase and strengthen significantly the forces against which American troops will be fighting.

One columnist, Joseph Alsop, writing from Saigon in a column published on January 26, 1966, in the Washington Post, reports:

The pause for the peace offensive has allowed all the worst damage to be repaired, new defenses to be moved into place, and huge forward stockpiles to be built up for added pressure on the south. Thus most of the fruits of the hard effort of the last 8 months have now been thrown away.

Worse still, however, has been what may be called the morale loss in the north. It is a truism that just as the South Vietnamese build their hopes on confidence in America's strength of will, so the North Vietnamese build all their hopes on the belief that America lacks the strength of will to survive the present test. Every Vietnamese expert in the service of the U.S. Government agrees on this point.

Every sign indicates that the peace offensive has strongly bolstered this North Vietnamese belief that they can count on victory in the end, because the United States is basically weak willed.

Their main response to the peace offensive has been to push into South Vietnam, with much aid from the bombing pause, more and more of North Vietnamese regular troops. So many are now present in the South that they add up to a major invasion.

When the country is at war with 200,000 troops in the field, the only serious consideration should be the gains and losses in the war. And as far as the war is concerned, the balance sheet shows no gain and much loss.

The Secretary of Defense has acknowledged the serious military loss for the United States and South Vietnam resulting from the removal of any effective military pressure on North Vietnam. He asserts, however, that "these military penalties are a small cost to pay because the United States is achieving the goal of showing the world that we want peace."

He does not tell us in specific terms what the gains and benefits have been so that we can judge whether they are in fact adequate compensation for increased American casualties. They have not been enough to lead any additional nations—even among our SEATO allies—to send a division or even a company to fight with American and South Vietnamese troops. These gains have not cut off the flow of goods carried on ships flying the flags of our allies to North Vietnam. What concretely have we gained by the so-called peace offensive? What foreign nation that opposed the policy of the United States before the peace offensive is now ready to endorse it?

Mr. Speaker, all Americans earnestly, ardently want peace. There are no warhawks here. The warhawks are in Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow. To attain peace without abject surrender of South Vietnam to the Communists, our enemies must want peace. Any reading of the latest Mansfield report would convince one that Hanoi and Peiping do not want peace now except under terms similar to the Laos agreement.

Although the Constitution expressly confers on the Congress the power to de-

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clare war and although this Nation is in fact at war—as the President has said—the Congress today finds itself unable to provide even useful advice to the administration because it does not know enough of the facts needed to form valid judgments.

For 2 years, the press has been predicting a great debate in Congress on Vietnam. There has been none. Epithets such as “McNamara’s war,” “hawks,” and “doves” have been heard in the Congress, but little calm and reasoned debate. The debate, such as it is, has gone on in teach-ins and demonstrations, often by uninformed people substituting publicity gimmicks for logic.

It is time for this long-deferred debate to get underway in the Congress. Now, as policy is again changed, is the appropriate hour.

Mr. Speaker, the debate will be constructive and informed only if it is begun with a full report from the President clearly and specifically stating the Nation’s current objectives in Vietnam, reviewing the conduct of the war so far, and presenting the facts which argue for and against the various courses of policy now open to the Nation in Vietnam. Perhaps the debate should be stimulated by a new congressional resolution on Vietnam.

The need for a report from the President to the Nation is clear to anyone who has read the report on Vietnam by a group of U.S. Senators headed by the distinguished majority leader of that body. This group made its tour of southeast Asia and conducted its study at the request of the President. Its report to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate has been issued under the title, “The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow.”

Senator MANSFIELD, who has made several earlier trips to Vietnam, thoughtfully included in this report as an appendix the report which he and another group of Senators made after completing a similar mission 3 years ago.

This latest Mansfield report has received much attention in the press. Its conclusions have been characterized rightly as grim. It concludes by reporting:

The situation, as it now appears, offers only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations or the alternative prospect of a continuance of the conflict in the direction of a general war on the Asian mainland.

It offers little hope of a satisfactory peace by negotiations and finds “the only visible alternative” to be “the indefinite expansion and intensification of the war which will require continuous introduction of additional U.S. forces.”

I am surprised that this somber assessment has not stirred more alarm than it has. I am equally surprised that the administration has expressed no opinion on the conclusions of this report. If it is an accurate assessment, I cannot understand the failure of the administration to alert the Nation to these grave dangers before they were reported by Senator MANSFIELD’s delegation. If it is an inaccurate assessment, it is incumbent on the administration to correct its errors.

The Mansfield report, if sound in its

conclusions, is a more stinging indictment of the administration than any which I have encountered.

A comparison of this latest Mansfield report with its predecessor of 3 years ago indicates that substantial Communist gains took place between the start of 1963 and early 1965. On February 25, 1963, Senator MANSFIELD offered this appraisal of the outlook in South Vietnam:

Success was predicted to the group almost without exception by responsible Americans and Vietnamese, in terms of a year or two hence. The word “success” is not easy to define in a situation such as exists in South Vietnam. It would mean, at the least, a reduction of the guerrillas to the point where they would no longer be a serious threat to the stability of the Republic. If that point is reached, road and rail communications would once again become reasonably safe. Local officials would no longer live in constant fear of assassination. Rice and other major commodities would again move in volume to the cities. Development throughout the nation would be feasible. In short, the situation in South Vietnam would become roughly similar to that which eventually emerged in Malaya, and it is significant that a good deal of the present planning in South Vietnam is based upon the Malayan experience.

While such a situation would fall far short of the development of a bastion in South Vietnam, as the objective has been described on occasion, it would, nevertheless, be adequate to the survival of free Vietnam. It would not necessarily permit any great reduction in U.S. aid to the Vietnamese Government for some years, but it would, at least, allow for a substantial reduction in the direct support which American forces are now providing to Vietnamese defense.

Although the 1963 report expresses some caution about the “rapid accomplishment” of these goals, they were clearly in sight.

What a contrast is the 1966 report. It describes the situation in South Vietnam early in 1965 as “near desperate.” It goes on to say:

After the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, repeated coups had weakened the cohesiveness of the central authority and acted to stimulate public disaffection and indifference to the war. At the same time, there was a greatly accelerated military drive by strengthened Vietcong forces. Their control expanded over large areas of the country, particularly in provinces adjacent to the western borders. Communications and transportation between population centers became increasingly hazardous, except by Vietcong sufferance. In short, a total collapse of the Saigon government’s authority appeared imminent in the early months of 1965.

At present, after the commitment of 200,000 American troops, the Mansfield report declares:

The overall control of the country remains about the same as it was at the beginning of 1965.

Mr. Speaker, I have called this Mansfield report an indictment of the administration. For example, during the period when the optimistic hopes of South Vietnam were dashed and the situation became desperate, there was no frank statement from administration leaders informing the public of the disaster. The administration did not revise its prediction of October 1963 that American troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1965. The dominant theme of Presidential utterances was that the United States would not widen the war,

and would not send American troops to do fighting that Asian troops should do. The Secretary of State assured the public that our plans “pointed the way to victory” and that there was “steady improvement” in South Vietnam.

In January 1965, when according to the Mansfield group the Saigon government was near “total collapse,” the President delivered his state of the Union message assuring the Congress that things had improved so much on the international scene that “today we can turn increased attention to the character of American life.”

Vietnam received only 140 words in the 1965 state of the Union message, and none of them had the tone of urgency.

This year the state of the Union message, though wordier about Vietnam, was again completely devoid of any information about the progress of the war.

In short, the administration has not been candid with the American people. When Ambassador Goldberg publicly acknowledges that a “crisis of credibility” hampers the administration, it is clear that something is seriously wrong with the administration’s public information program. There is nothing wrong, however, that candor will not correct.

Let me suggest some of the questions to which the administration should now give frank answers:

First. What facts support Secretary McNamara’s recent statement, “We have stopped losing the war”? When were we losing it and when did the change take place?

Second. How much, and in what ways, did the bombing of North Vietnam between February and December of 1965 impede the military and economic activity of the enemy?

Third. What is the balance sheet in concrete terms of the peace offensive and the bombing pause? What advantages and what losses have resulted or will result for the United States and South Vietnam?

Fourth. To what degree are the military and economic efforts of North Vietnam sustained by goods brought in by sea? What flags do the ships involved fly?

Fifth. Would the administration agree to an end to hostilities on the basis of an agreement like that which was reached on Laos in 1962, giving Communists a place in a coalition government and a veto in the commission established to supervise the execution of the agreement?

Mr. Speaker, these are some of the questions that cry to be answered publicly and authoritatively. With this information the Congress and the public could better judge the effectiveness and wisdom of past administration policy and aid the administration in moving wisely in the future.

Unless there is a full report to the Nation on Vietnam, the administration will find it increasingly difficult to hold the support and the confidence of the public.

VIETNAM PROBLEM

(Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to ex-

tend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, this is a sad day indeed.

The acknowledgement that all our efforts toward peace have been of no avail, and that a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam has been ordered, is a serious blow to those of us who have urged an exhaustive exploration of every possible chance for negotiations.

However, at long last, we have overtly moved toward the United Nations. This has been the recommendation of many of us in Congress. As recently as 2 weeks ago many of my colleagues and I sent a letter to the President urging him to put this problem before the U.N. Now that move has been made. Let us pray that this international body will bring understanding from the chaos and that we will see an end to the killing and wanton destruction wrought by this dreadful war. Let us hope, as well, that all other impediments to peace are swept aside and that all parties to the war—Peiping, Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and South Vietnam—are brought to the peace table so that a lasting peace will ensue. For this is what we seek—a peace that will be secured by a mutual understanding that brute force and aggression does not solve problems, but creates them.

Never before in times of adversity has there been as much divergence of opinion within our citizenry. We must insure that which we fought for in Vietnam—true freedom—by enlisting the support of all Americans in common purpose. I speak for my constituency who truly seek peace and are concerned lest even the slightest avenue be overlooked.

As an individual Member of Congress, I have made three separate trips to Vietnam at my own expense to gather as fully as possible the facts necessary to sustain informed judgment and appraisal. I have attended weekly briefings by State and Defense Department officials and joined with his Holiness Pope Paul in calling for a Christmas truce. I have been in constant touch with the President, urging that all efforts be extended in exploring every possible avenue to peace. I have in progress a survey of the opinion of the residents of my district to guide me in representing them before the Congress. I have held four town meetings so that the people in my district can directly communicate their views to me. There is no door closed between my constituency and my office for residents to articulate their views in guiding me. This is the way it must be in a democracy—and this same procedure must be followed between our various branches of Government to honestly interpret the views of the people of this Nation.

I have made numerous appeals in Congress and have joined my colleagues to bring reason to bear before precipitous action, just as today I am again calling for a concurrence and full debate by the House before further escalations are made and that the 1934 resolution passed by Congress is not a continuing mandate but one that requires constant review with changing circumstances and conditions. For many, including myself, are

not aware of the full facts involved in arriving at decisions of the greatest importance to our people.

I am gratified to learn from the President's statement that determined efforts will continue to explore all possible roads to peace.

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

(Mr. DADDARIO (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, during the past 15 months, through its Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, the Science and Astronautics Committee has conducted a review of the National Science Foundation. That activity has resulted in a report entitled "The National Science Foundation: Its Present and Future," which is now submitted to this body as a House report.

The main thrust of the report is simple. It is based on the premise that a large portion of our Nation's welfare in the future rests with science and technology—and that a more active and stronger Foundation will be necessary if we are to secure that welfare.

The report itself is relatively complex and sophisticated, if for no other reason than that it is dealing with complex and sophisticated matters. Hence, it attempts to describe some of the background of government-science relationships and to highlight the current extent and nature of these relationships as a basis for its rationale. Indeed, our subcommittee spent months in studying these facets before it ever began hearings, and the hearings in turn were carried on over a period of 7 weeks.

This is the first general legislative review of the National Science Foundation since it was founded more than 15 years ago. It is natural that within that period, during a time when there has been more concentrated scientific growth than in any other period of our history, changes have occurred which demand our attention and compel us to close examination and recommendations in keeping with the shifting scene.

There can be no doubt about the importance of the National Science Foundation in a world which looks to us for leadership. The Vice President, the Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, placed this in a most succinct perspective the other day when he addressed the Committee's Panel on Science and Technology. He pointed out that the exportation of knowledge and know-how was as important as the exportation of capital in relieving the critical needs of the world. This is a proposition with which few will argue.

We believe that this report contains important suggestions for strengthening the National Science Foundation so that it may fulfill its unique role in the development and growth of knowledge. We face a challenge in too many fields to enumerate where only knowledge can provide solutions.

I commend this report to my colleagues for their study.

INDEPENDENT BANKERS OPPOSE GRAB BY CHASE MANHATTAN BANK TO FURTHER CENTRALIZE BANKING IN NEW YORK STATE AND FURTHER WEAKEN THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM

(Mr. PATMAN (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, what with a half dozen or more giant banks in New York with assets exceeding \$1 billion, as well as a long history of holding company operations, it is not inaccurate to say that banking in the State of New York is tending more and more toward superconcentration and eventual monopoly.

By at least two separate rulings from his Office, Comptroller of the Currency Saxon has given permission for Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., a \$11 billion financial behemoth, to acquire the stock of the Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. of Buffalo, itself with assets of over one-third of a billion dollars.

The Independent Bankers Association of America is opposing this shocking and disturbing move by Chase in the hopes that independent banking and free competition may not be further eroded in New York State.

Following is the association's brief in opposition to Chase Manhattan's application under the New York holding company law:

NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT—APPLICATION OF CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., PURSUANT TO SECTION 142(1)(b) OF THE BANKING LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR PRIOR APPROVAL, TO ACQUIRE AT LEAST 80 PERCENT OF THE CAPITAL STOCK OF LIBERTY NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF BUFFALO—BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION BY INDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

To the Banking Board of the State of New York:

The Independent Bankers Association of America appreciates this opportunity extended by your chairman, Mr. Frank Wille, to present its views in this brief in opposition to this application. The association has a membership of more than 6,800 banks, including 107 in New York State.

In its 35 years of existence, the IBAA has stood for the preservation of competition in banking and against the devices which lead to concentration in banking.

Our association and the Independent Bankers Association of the 12th Federal Reserve District were active in securing enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.

The IBAA opposes the acquisition proposed in this application because if approved it could become a pattern for expansion of the power of large banks not only in New York State but throughout the country.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Section 142(1)(f) states among other factors, that "the banking board shall take into consideration . . . primarily, the public interest and the needs and convenience thereof." This factor would appear to exhort the board to view this proposal in the light of its impact upon banking customers, not merely the interest of the banks involved; in the light of the impact upon the economy of a repetition of such proposals, not merely the effect these may have on the banking structure of the future.

The proposal in this application concerns two national banks and involves a device

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ever, interest rates are too high and loans too restrictive. We are fully in support of the efforts of Congressman WRIGHT PATMAN, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, to draft legislation to give Congress a voice in monetary policy now in almost complete control of the Federal Reserve Board.

PUBLIC REACTION AGAINST INTEREST RATE INCREASES

(Mr. PATMAN (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, Federal Reserve Board's action raising interest rates on December 3 shocked the entire Nation.

The people were appalled at the ability of a bare majority of the Federal Reserve to completely thumb its nose at the President and to take action to slow down or destroy much of the Great Society program.

Much of the dismay and deep concern over the Federal Reserve's arrogant action was reflected in the Nation's press. Many columnists spoke out eloquently against the action. In particular, I commend to my colleagues the following articles from the Washington Post and the New York Times:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 12, 1965]

FED INDEPENDENCE WORRIED J.F.K.
(By Hobart Rowen)

At the Democratic Convention in Los Angeles in 1960, one question that worried candidate John F. Kennedy's advisers was how can we handle Federal Reserve Chairman William McChesney Martin if he balks at the New Frontier program?

Inasmuch as the Eisenhower years had been dominated by Martin's tight money policy, the Kennedy men assumed that some drastic measures might be in order.

With the brashness of inexperience, some of the Kennedy "mafia" suggested that Martin be fired, outright. But others in the brain trust evolved a more complicated and theoretically more practical plan for a super-coordinating committee, similar to the National Security Council, which would establish a uniform economic policy.

When publicized, the plan agitated the banking and business communities. But Mr. Kennedy abandoned this awkward scheme for the simple reason that Martin did not try to run a course independent of the White House. Like Mr. Kennedy's own economic advisers, Martin was concerned by heavy unemployment and idle plants.

And while he never fostered a money policy as easy as Representative WRIGHT PATMAN would have desired he didn't return to the automatic tight money posture of the Eisenhower days. So no club was needed, and Martin joined amiably with three other key presidential advisers in what has become known as the "quadriad."

All of this is relevant because the divided course that Mr. Kennedy's advisers feared in 1960 has finally come to pass—5 years later—under President Johnson. The President, although mindful of economic factors that hold an inflationary potential, doesn't think the time has come to put on the brakes.

Martin, on the other hand, convinced by the opposite analysis, has moved to tighten money, so as to head off inflationary prices "before they have become full blown and the damage has been done."

The upshot is that a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy, so successful since 1961, is shattered—for the moment, anyway.

No one yet knows what really will happen, because much will depend on just how much credit the Federal Reserve feeds into the banking system.

The Fed can tighten up the supply of money by selling securities on the open market. That drains money from the banks—money they otherwise could lend.

The Fed, on the other hand, can increase the money supply by buying securities, thus pumping cash into the banks.

When the Fed raised the discount rate last weekend it underscored this part of its announcement: "The action contemplates, however, the continued provision of additional reserves to the banking system, in amounts sufficient to meet seasonal pressures as well as the credit needs of an expanding economy without promoting inflationary pressures."

This has been confusing to some people. If the Fed's game is to slow down the economy, why does it raise interest rates on the one hand, but insist that it will provide additional reserves? It seems, at first blush, to be a meaningless exercise in which the amount of money remains the same—but at higher cost to everyone, to the pleasure of no one but the banks.

The rationale of the majority at the Fed is that the higher rate will choke off some marginal plans for business expansion. But in view of the escalating Vietnam war, the relatively small increase in the cost of borrowing isn't likely to deter many businessmen.

A spot check of economists in Washington doesn't suggest that the new forecast for skyrocketing plant and equipment spending next year will be seriously affected by higher interest rates.

One possible explanation for the seeming paradox is that bank reserves will not in reality be as ample as the Fed has promised. The level of additional credit needed for "an expanding economy" will probably be less by Martin's definition than it would be by the administration's definition.

This is the problem that the President will have to consider as he resumes the 5-year-old search for ways to box Martin in. I suggest his best route is through a gradual realignment of the Federal Reserve structure.

He might, for example, recall the 1961 recommendation of the highly respected Commission on Money and Credit, which suggested cutting the number of FRB Governors from seven to five, and limiting the term of each from 14 to 10 years, with one expiring every odd-numbered year. This would give a President a steady stream of his own appointments to the Board.

The 2-year gap which now exists between the beginning of a presidential term and the 4-year term of the FRB Chairman should also be eliminated. (Martin himself agrees that it was only a legislative accident that failed to synchronize these terms.) Whatever the mechanics, ways must be found to coordinate the role of the central bank with the rest of the Government. Any other course makes no sense.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 13, 1965]

WHAT ROLE FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE?

(By M. J. Rossant)

If past performance is a guide, the Joint Economic Committee's new investigation of Federal Reserve-Administration relations will get bogged down debating the pros and cons of the latest policy decision of the money managers, neglecting the far more important issue of whether the latter should be making their decisions independently.

Money, of course, cannot manage itself; so the critical question is who should do the

managing. At the moment the independent Federal Reserve has both critics and defenders. There are some who disagree with what the money managers did but, like Voltaire, defend its right to have done it. There are others who think it did the right thing but deplore its acting unilaterally.

ROLE OF THE MANAGERS

The champions of independence for the Federal Reserve argue that this is the only way to insure sound policy. Encouraged by its decision to part company at long last with the Johnson administration, they point out that continued coordination would clearly have been unsound. In this view, the money managers must be like judges, isolated from politicians and political pressures in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Federal Reserve is a creation of Congress, but it has the right to act independently of both the legislative and executive branches. Yet its control over the Nation's money supply—its ability to create or extinguish credit—is so powerful an economic weapon that it may well be too important to be left to the money managers.

This was not the case in the days when the Federal Reserve was first established. Then it was responsible only for price stabilization. Then too the executive branch took the view that it had no business interfering with the vagaries of the business cycle.

Today, the Federal Reserve is committed to promote full employment and economic expansion in addition to price stability. What is more, the White House has responsibility, as well as formidable weapons of its own, for maintaining prosperity. So there is a strong case for integrating the flexible restraint of monetary policy with the blunter weapons of fiscal policy.

Some critics in fact call for complete coordination. They do not think that the Federal Reserve should be considered as a supreme court of economic policy, with what amounts to a veto power over the party in power. Instead, they argue that the President, who is charged with formulating overall economic policy and is answerable to the electorate, must not be thwarted by a small group of men shielded from the public.

During his long reign as head of the Federal Reserve, William McChesney Martin, Jr., has generally been prepared to compromise, aware that the adoption of too independent a position, might endanger his freedom of action. He has often sounded as if he were at odds with the President, but his bark has been far worse than his bite. In failing to act as independently as he talked, Mr. Martin has guaranteed his own survival—and that of the Federal Reserve. And precisely because he has been accommodating, it is probable that his present falling out of step, while dramatic, may be only temporary.

THE BANK'S POWER

Even if it is, and even if it was the right thing to do, the Federal Reserve has demonstrated that it has the means to throw a monkey wrench into the plans of the White House. Many who are not on the Johnson administration's side, question whether such freedom is desirable in a democracy.

The most potent argument against giving increased authority to the executive branch is that it would encourage inflation as it did after World War II, when the money managers increased the money supply at the behest of the Treasury.

But the Federal Reserve then was under no compulsion to do so. It could have refused to cooperate, as it finally did. Indeed there seems to be a far greater risk of swinging from defiance to subservience under its present status than if the Federal Reserve had a closer relationship with the White House—by permitting the President to choose his own chairman and by setting up an economic general staff with a place for the Federal Reserve.

POLITICAL CONTROL

With such an arrangement, the money managers might be less inclined to disruptive talk and more to effective action. If they were a recognized part of an economic general staff, they might be more successful in making their presence felt in the inner circle of policymaking.

Some authorities believe that political control might result in greater freedom for the Federal Reserve as well as smoother coordination of economic policies. But if it did not, if limiting its independence resulted in mere subservience on the part of the Federal Reserve and unsound policies for the economy, the Nation's voters would at least be able to fix the blame.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 7, 1965]

THE FED JUMPS THE GUN

By raising the discount rate in advance of a scheduled meeting of the Government's policymaking quadrad, the Federal Reserve Board has underscored the danger of investing power over monetary policy in an independent agency.

There are legitimate grounds for differences of opinion over the need for less stimulative policies, as Treasury Secretary Fowler pointed out in his New Orleans speech. But inflationary pressures can be combatted by fiscal as well as monetary measures. What the Fed has done with its gun-jumping decision, taken in advance of a thorough analysis of next year's budget, is to deprive the administration of the freedom that it requires in order to conduct an effective economic policy.

If one could accept at face value the Board's claim that it will continue to supply the banking system with sufficient reserves to meet the needs of an expanding economy, the boost in the discount rate and the upward drift of interest rates in the money markets might not be so serious. But the day-to-day implementation of Fed policy is in the hands of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a body that includes five presidents of the District Federal Reserve banks as well as the seven Governors of the Federal Reserve Board. Since the bank presidents are insulated from the authority of both Congress and the White House, the FOMC is free to pursue restrictive policies that may be sharply at variance with the aims of the administration.

President Johnson will be able to redress the balance on the Federal Reserve Board when the term of Vice Chairman Balderston expires in January, and a second opportunity will come in 2 years with the expiration of the partial term of Governor Daane. But these moves may not affect the unbridled power of the FOMC.

If Congress is to discharge its constitutional responsibility for controlling the money supply, if monetary policies are to be coordinated with the other economic policies of the Federal Government, the following reforms will be needed. The term of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board should be made coterminous with that of the President, a proposal that has been endorsed by Chairman Martin. The inordinately long, 14-year terms of the Governors should be reduced to 5. And, finally, responsiveness to the wishes of the electorate should be insured by limiting the membership of the FOMC to the seven appointed Governors of the Federal Reserve Board.

Congress would never entertain the notion of delegating its fiscal power to an independent agency, and by the same logic it should not surrender its control over the money supply. Power over monetary policy, for better or worse, should be invested with the incumbent administration. The Board's action, the end of which is not yet in sight, exposes the pitfalls of an anomalous system in which the Presidents' ability to shape economic policy is sharply attenuated.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Dec. 8, 1965]

FOXES IN L.B.J.'S HENHOUSE

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)

Soon after Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, he received this private advice from one of his most influential advisers: No domestic problem will be tougher than controlling Bill Martin.

The full impact of this prophecy fell last weekend like a sledgehammer.

The decision of the Federal Reserve Board, under Chairman William McChesney Martin, to boost interest rates was President Johnson's worst political setback. Not only does further tightening of money threaten economic expansion, but the bold defiance of his wishes is a severe blow to the President's prestige.

This question then arises: Why could a President who tamed Congress, big labor and big business not tame Martin?

The answer: The cherished independence of the Federal Reserve Bank is all but unassailable. Moreover, Treasury Secretary Henry H. Fowler's year-long strategy of appeasing Martin by avoiding an open rupture all these months was perhaps less successful than a frontal assault on the Fed.

The Federal Reserve Board—acting as the national bankers' bank—is a deviation in the otherwise symmetrical American system. Martin, a nonpolitician with rigidly orthodox economic views, need not heed the advice of the White House.

But Martin does have his own constituency: The Nation's commercial bankers—or more specifically, the New York banking community. Martin has privately informed administration officials of the increasing pressure on him to tighten credit. Its source: Big bankers, obsessed with the bugaboo of inflation.

This banker's mentality was aggressively articulated to Martin by Alfred Hayes, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Financial insiders regard Hayes—not Martin—as the grey eminence of the interest rate hike. And Hayes, an unabashed tight-money man, is concerned first with banking—not the overall economic results of higher interest rates, such as a possible rise in unemployment.

The Manhattan bankers' influence over the Fed is direct control over Washington's decision affecting their own pocketbook. In the opinion of one L.B.J. adviser, this means the foxes are guarding the henhouse.

Nevertheless, despite Martin's clear legal power, it may be argued that administration strategy in dealing with Martin only emboldened him.

From the time he took over at the Treasury last March, Fowler took the soft approach. Last spring he tactfully acquiesced in Martin's reduction of bank free reserves—money held in excess of money loaned out (thus tightening the money supply). Treasury officials privately told Democratic Senators they had no intention of interfering with the Fed's regulation of the money supply.

As recently as his November 8 appearance at the Economic Club of New York City, Fowler defended—to ringing applause of the conservative-oriented audience—the Fed's independence and noted that he had been criticized by Democratic Senators for that stand.

All the while, Fowler privately urged Martin to postpone any decision on interest rates until the President's budget was released early next year. By that time, Mr. Johnson would be able to change the ideological complexion of the Reserve Board by filling a vacancy coming up January 1.

Martin apparently decided early last week to defy the President and Treasury. Although specifically asked to call the President before such action, he did not call. Rather, he was determined to raise interest rates before a scheduled meeting at the LBJ Ranch

last Monday so that he would not have to say "no" to the President's personal appeal.

As a result, Martin informed Fowler last Friday morning at the White House that he had made up his mind. It was too late to stop him. The Federal Reserve Board voted the increase that afternoon.

Some critics of Martin hold that since there was no conceivable way for the President or Fowler to stop the Fed's action, they should have secretly agreed to the increase effective early next year, thus avoiding the political—though not the economic—defeat.

But that avoids the real issue. The Martin affair again raises the question whether this vital economic henhouse should be guarded by the banking foxes of New York—or by the public's elected officials.

VIETNAM

(Mr. BROWN of California (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, the President has today announced the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam. Many of my colleagues have risen to praise this decision. The leadership from both sides of the aisle here in the House have pledged their support to the President. Some voices are raised to call for more than just a resumption of the bombing—they call for a vast increase in the level of bombing, for the hitting of Hanoi and Haiphong, and for the use of more powerful non-conventional weapons.

From all sides we hear it said that "The pause was a failure—the other side is not interested in peace." I do not wish to debate this point at this time. But those who are honest will admit that the previous 11 months of bombing was a failure. That 11-month period saw the United States forced to multiply its ground forces many times over merely to hold its own in South Vietnam. That 11 months saw a substantial increase in the fighting forces of the National Liberation Front, both from infiltration from the north and from local recruitment in the south. That 11 months saw a strengthening of the will to resist the bombing in North Vietnam, and an increase in the assistance coming from other countries. More than anything else, that 11 months saw the end of any fiction that we were merely helping support and maintain a friendly government, and made it clear that the United States was waging an American war to show the world that the American mandate runs wherever the President of the United States says it runs, including the mainland of Asia.

To resume the bombing, after this 11 months of failure to achieve any constructive results with such a policy, demonstrates again and more forcefully the sterility of the U.S. position in Vietnam.

I feel the deepest sorrow for the President, that he feels compelled within himself to take this course, for I know that he would do what was right. I feel even more sorrow for the American people, and for the people of Vietnam. There comes a point of no return in the course of events, and we may well have reached that point in Asia. We may now be committed to a course leading to the death of

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millions and the destruction of any hope for a new order of law and justice in the world in our lifetimes.

I do not believe in the imminent arrival of an ideal world. I do not think that the time has come in human history when force as an element in human relationships can be eliminated. But I know as certainly as I know anything in this life that the United States cannot achieve any worthwhile goal from the course it is pursuing in Vietnam. It can and will bring untold suffering to all of Vietnam. It can and probably will deny South Vietnam to communism, if it wishes to occupy that country with hundreds of thousands of troops for generations to come. It can and probably will spend \$50 or \$100 billion to do these things—billions that could be used to solve the problems of this country and the world, instead of making them worse.

And in doing these things we will weaken democracy and strengthen the totalitarian tendencies of our own society, we will condemn American imperialism in the eyes of all Asia, we will strengthen the ideological power of communism around the world, we will weaken still further the ties of the western alliance.

Mr. Speaker, for these reasons I cannot join in the chorus of praise we have heard here today for the President's decision to resume the bombing of North Vietnam. I think that he has made a tragic mistake. And I think that time is running out for the President to correct the mistakes this country has made in Vietnam over the past 15 years.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. LAIRD (at the request of Mr. HALL), for 20 minutes, today, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. HOSMER (at the request of Mr. HALL), for 25 minutes, on Wednesday, February 2, 1966, and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. PERKINS.

Mr. RANDALL and to include extraneous matter.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HALL) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. PELLY.

Mr. RUMSFELD in two instances.

Mr. HOSMER in two instances.

Mr. YOUNGER in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HUNGATE) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BECKWORTH.

Mr. MILLER in five instances.

Mr. PICKLE.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 41 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 1, 1966, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS,
ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1956. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, transmitting a communication relative to the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic, pursuant to section 107 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended; to the Committee on Agriculture.

1957. A letter from the Chairman, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, transmitting a report covering refunds and credits of internal revenue taxes for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1963, pursuant to section 6405 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (H. Doc. No. 370); to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed.

1958. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Properties and Installations, transmitting notification of the location, nature, and estimated cost of an additional facilities project to be undertaken for the Marine Corps Reserve utilizing authorization contained in section 701(2) of Public Law 83-390, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2233a(1); to the Committee on Armed Services.

1959. A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations) transmitting a report on military construction, Naval and Marine Corps Reserves construction authorization under Public Law 89-188, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2233a(1); to the Committee on Armed Services.

1960. A letter from the Under Secretary of the Navy, transmitting a report on the NROTC flight instruction program, pursuant to section 2110(b) of title 10, United States Code; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1961. A letter from the Director, Selective Service System, transmitting the 15th annual report for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965, pursuant to section 10(g) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1962. A letter from the Chairman pro tempore of the District of Columbia Armory Board, transmitting the eighth annual report and financial statements of the Board's operation of the District of Columbia Stadium, and the 18th annual report and financial statements of the Board's operation of the District of Columbia National Guard Armory for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965, pursuant to section 10 of the Armory Board Act (Public Law No. 80-605), as amended, and section 10 of the District of Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 (Public Law No. 85-300), as amended; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

1963. A letter from the president and chairman of the board, Potomac Electric Power Co., transmitting a copy of their balance sheet as of December 31, 1965, pursuant to 37 Stat. 979; to the Committee on District of Columbia.

1964. A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting the interim report of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, on the pollution of Lake Erie,

Lake Ontario, and the international section of the St. Lawrence River; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1965. A letter from the Secretary of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, transmitting a report on the amount of Export-Import Bank insurance and guarantees on U.S. exports to Yugoslavia for the month of December 1965, pursuant to title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1966 and the presidential determination of February 4, 1964; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1966. A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, transmitting the annual report on the activities and progress for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1965; to the Committee on Government Operations.

1967. A letter from the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report on the proceedings of docket 12, Chief William Fuller, et al., on behalf and representing an identifiable group of the Indians of California, known as the *Federated Indians of California, petitioners v. the United States of America, defendant*, pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1968. A letter from the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report on the proceeding of docket 162, *The Yakima Tribe, petitioner v. The United States of America, defendant*, pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1969. A letter from the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report on the proceeding of docket 47-A, *The Yakima Tribe of Indians, petitioners v. The United States of America, defendant*, pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1970. A letter from the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report on the proceedings of docket No. 124 and docket No. 67 (consolidated) and docket Nos. 124, 314, and 337 consolidated therewith, intervenors docket Nos. 15-D, 29-B, 89, 311, and 315, the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma also known as the *Miami Tribe, and Harley T. Palmer, Frank C. Pooler and David Leonard, as representatives of the Miami Tribe and all of the members thereof, petitioners v. The United States of America, defendant*, pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1971. A letter from the Chief Commissioner of the Indian Claims Commission, transmitting a report on proceedings of docket 324, *Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma, petitioners, v. The United States of America, defendant*, pursuant to provisions of section 21 of the Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1055; 25 U.S.C. 70t); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1972. A letter from the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "To Amend the Shipping Act, 1916"; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1973. A letter from the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "To Amend the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933", to permit the Commission to require the carriers in the offshore domestic trade to keep uniform accounts and permit Commission representatives to inspect the accounts and

records of such carriers; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1974. A letter from the Postmaster General, transmitting a report on the estimated amount of the losses or costs (or percentage of costs) incurred by the postal service in the performance of public services during the current fiscal year, pursuant to section 201 of Public Law 87-793, approved October 11, 1962; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

1975. A letter from the Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, transmitting a report on positions in grades GS-16, 17, and 18, pursuant to section 1105a of title 5 of the United States Code; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

1976. A letter from the Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, transmitting a report on positions established during calendar year 1965, in accordance with section 1581, title 10, United States Code, pursuant to section 1582, title 10, United States Code; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BINGHAM:

H.R. 12407. A bill to amend the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 to authorize certain grants to assure adequate commuter service in urban areas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

H.R. 12408. A bill to amend section 13a of the Interstate Commerce Act, relating to the discontinuance or change of certain operations or services of common carriers by rail,

in order to require the Interstate Commerce Commission to give full consideration to all financial assistance available before permitting any such discontinuance or change; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BROWN of California:

H.R. 12409. A bill to amend the Federal Firearms Act; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. TEAGUE of Texas:

H.R. 12410. A bill to enhance the benefits of service in the Armed Forces of the United States and further extend the benefits of higher education by providing a broad program of educational benefits for veterans of service after January 31, 1955, and certain members of the Armed Forces; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. FRIEDEL:

H.R. 12411. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for the establishment of a National Eye Institute in the National Institutes of Health; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. ICHORD:

H.R. 12412. A bill to authorize the release of platinum from the national stockpile, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. PERKINS:

H.R. 12413. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code to increase the rates of pension payable to widows of veterans of the Spanish-American War; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. BROWN of California:

H.R. 12414. A bill to enhance the benefits of service in the Armed Forces of the United States and further extend the benefits of higher education by providing a broad program of educational benefits for veterans of service after January 31, 1955, and certain members of the Armed Forces; and for other

purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. DORN:

H.R. 12415. A bill to enhance the benefits of service in the Armed Forces of the United States and further extend the benefits of higher education by providing a broad program of educational benefits for veterans of service after January 31, 1955, and certain members of the Armed Forces; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. RONCALIO:

H.R. 12416. A bill to enhance the benefits of service in the Armed Forces of the United States and further extend the benefits of higher education by providing a broad program of educational benefits for veterans of service after January 31, 1955, and certain members of the Armed Forces; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MORTON:

H.J. Res. 817. Joint resolution to establish an Atlantic Union delegation; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, 390. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Nevada, relative to supporting the service men and women in Vietnam, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. COLLIER:

H.R. 12417. A bill for the relief of Ioannis Kiriazis; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Senate

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1966

(Legislative day of Wednesday, January 26, 1966)

The Senate met at 10 o'clock a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

Rev. Edward B. Lewis, pastor, Capitol Hill Methodist Church, Washington, D.C., offered the following prayer:

Dear Lord of all, we recognize today that the peace we seek for the world is beyond our understanding. Thus, we need Thy help.

We have not consistently followed the path of peace. Now we find ourselves with others in the world in the wilderness of bewilderment in finding again that path. We come to Thee in prayer asking for light in darkness and courage in the principle of freedom and justice for all men.

We pray for Thy guiding and staying hand in the deliberations and decisions of our President, his Cabinet, his advisers, and especially this session of the Senate of the United States on national and international issues.

Give to our leaders hope that will keep alive negotiations for peace, faith that there is a way, and love for God and mankind that will clarify thinking and decision.

We pray in the name of the Creator of life and peace. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal be considered as read and approved.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I object.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a morning hour, and that statements therein be limited to 3 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President—

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I renew my request and ask unanimous consent that the Journal be considered as read and approved.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President—

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Vermont.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield, without losing his right to the floor, so that I may ask unanimous consent, with the concurrence of the distinguished acting minority leader, the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURRIS], to suggest a recess until 10:30 o'clock, at which time the Senator from Vermont would have the floor.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I intended to ask if I might proceed for 7 or 8 minutes for a discussion on current events after the Senate reconvened. I make that request.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senator from Vermont will have the floor for 7 or 8 minutes when the Senate reconvenes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That will be for 7 or 8 minutes.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—

Mr. MANSFIELD. We shall return after the recess, because the Senator from Vermont has the floor; then we shall have a period for the transaction of routine business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana?

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I ask the distinguished majority leader what the plans are for the remainder of the day?

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is planned to have a period for the transaction of routine business, and then, if any Senator wishes to speak on the Taft-Hartley Act, section 14(b), or any other subject, he may do so. I anticipate that the session will not be very long today.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader. I am thinking of the many employees in the Capitol who may have difficulty getting home this evening.

Mr. President, I withdraw my objection to the request of the Senator from Montana.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, do I correctly understand that the request for the morning hour is merely for the purpose of making statements?

Mr. MANSFIELD. To have a morning hour for the purpose of allowing Senators to make speeches, and matters of that kind.

Mr. ERVIN. And that no motions will be made?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

ROBERT G. THOMPSON

Mr. HART. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Vermont yield to me for a moment, to permit me to insert an editorial in the RECORD?

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, without losing my right to the floor, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Michigan for the purpose of inserting an editorial in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled, "Beyond Death," published in yesterday's Washington Post.

I underscore nothing in the editorial; it speaks eloquently and to the point.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BEYOND DEATH

When mortal men consider their own frailty and folly, they may well conclude that death ought to bring its own absolution for even the sorriest of sins. The pursuit of punishment beyond the grave is mere vindictiveness. We think the majesty of the United States is marred by the decision of the Defense Department to forbid the interment of Robert G. Thompson's ashes in Arlington National Cemetery.

Good men and bad men alike lie at rest in Arlington. Men of every faith—and of no faith—slumber there. In this cemetery, created on the estate of Robert E. Lee, there is, as indeed there should be, a Confederate Monument, erected by the Daughters of the Confederacy in honor of the South's dead heroes—men who believed it honorable and right to take up arms against the United States. And there rests there, too, in honored glory—whether in life he had been valiant or craven—an American soldier known but to God.

Robert Thompson was a Communist when he was inducted into the Armed Forces early in the Second World War. He was a Communist when he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for valor in the Pacific and when he was honorably discharged from service. He was a Communist when he died last October. It can be said in his behalf that he made no effort to conceal the fact.

It is true that in 1949, he and 10 other Communist Party leaders were convicted under the Smith Act and sentenced to 3 years in prison and that he jumped bail and was subsequently sentenced to an additional 4 years for criminal contempt. On the basis of these sentences and the fact that a year ago an Army regulation was adopted denying burial in a national cemetery to anyone sentenced by a Federal court to more than 5 years imprisonment, the Attorney General has given the Defense Department a pettifogging legal justification for its act of empty meanness. Thompson was punished in life; there is no point to punishing him in death.

RECESS UNTIL 10:30 O'CLOCK A.M.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Does the Senator from Montana renew his request for a recess?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I renew my request that the Senate stand in recess until 10:30 o'clock a.m.

The motion was agreed to; and at 10 o'clock and 4 minutes a.m. the Senate took a recess until 10:30 o'clock a.m. today.

At 10 o'clock and 30 minutes a.m., on the expiration of the recess, the Senate reconvened, when called to order by the Acting President pro tempore.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield to me without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. AIKEN. Without losing my right to the floor, I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, do I correctly understand that the Journal is considered as read and approved?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, do I correctly understand that permission has been granted that when the Senate finishes its business today, it will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Vermont will permit me to do so, without losing his right to the floor, I suggest the absence of a quorum, the time for the quorum call not to exceed 2 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Will the Senator withhold that request for a moment?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair announces that the unanimous-consent request for routine business has now been granted without objection.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous agreement, the order for the quorum call is rescinded, and the Senator from Vermont is recognized.

THE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IN VIETNAM

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, President Johnson has now directed a renewal and possible increase in the bombing of North Vietnam.

Under the constitutional and statutory powers vested in the Presidency he has authority to do this.

Even if 90 percent of the American people were opposed, he would still have this power.

Now that the decision has been made to engage in an expanded military action which may ultimately lead to a con-

flict of unprecedented and unlimited proportions, we must spare no effort to avoid defeat and to hold our losses to a minimum.

Although the Communist countries apparently gave little credence to the recent peace offensive of the President, there is no question in my mind that President Johnson did earnestly desire to put an end to the war in southeast Asia.

Any person in his position wants to be liked and admired as well as to earn a good spot in history.

He wants to be highly respected by the rest of the world and, as President Eisenhower so ably demonstrated in 1953, the surest way to popular acclaim is through the restoration of peace.

President Eisenhower further enhanced his popularity and secured an enviable place in history when he backed Gen. Matthew Ridgway in his opposition to sending large numbers of U.S. troops into Vietnam in an effort to make secure that part of their colonial empire for the French.

Since we now seem to have passed the point of no return, we should take a good, hard look at the situation as it is today.

The number of U.S. servicemen supporting the South Vietnamese Government has now increased to about 200,000, will be doubled within the next few months, and it will likely be redoubled within the next year.

This figure is exclusive of the Navy and other forces based at Guam, in the Philippines, in Thailand, in Honolulu, and elsewhere.

It is exclusive of the 16,000 to 18,000 South Korean troops engaged in the conflict.

Aside from the forces from South Korea and Australia, we can look for only minor assistance from other countries in our Vietnam efforts.

In fact, if South Korea is now being infiltrated by Communist operators to the extent recently indicated by Marine Gen. Wallace Greene, it is unlikely that we can look for any substantial increase in our strength from that source.

Most of the land area in South Vietnam has come under Vietcong control, while U.S. bases are all virtually under a state of siege—an unorthodox siege, it is true, but, nevertheless, one effective enough so that it is hardly safe to venture outside the fortified areas except in force.

Our forces have to date suffered approximately 10,000 casualties.

Some who a year ago supported the decision to bomb North Vietnam now feel that the reason this operation failed is that it has not been vigorous enough.

They now insist that Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor and other than strictly military targets be also bombed.

Some substantial and respected persons have advocated the use of atom bombs—small ones, that is. The other day a representative of a respected and well-known national organization came to my office to urge the use of atom bombs in the Vietnam war. The demand that we use atomic weapons will increase as our casualty lists grow.

Regardless of the fact that an atom bomb could not distinguish between bel-

ligerents and nonbelligerents, is there any reason to doubt that, should we use the atomic weapon against North Vietnam, that the Communists would almost at once retaliate by using the same type of weapon against our air and military bases in the south?

We should think long and hard before resorting to nuclear weapons in southeast Asia.

We are now at the point where we have to deal with realities, not desires.

It is no longer possible for us unilaterally to call the shots.

It is not what might have been or what ought to be that now concerns us. It is what is.

As indicated by the Mansfield mission report, there is "only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations."

Since much of the world has regarded the bombing of North Vietnam as "aggression" by the United States and since the assistance by the North Vietnamese to the Vietcong in carrying out their savage operations against the people of South Vietnam have been minimized, I believe that the President's peace offensive was necessary even though its effectiveness as a means for ending the war may be questioned.

It seems to have convinced some nations of the justice of our assistance to South Vietnam, even though they are unable or unwilling to assist us.

Who is making the decisions in southeast Asia today? Is it Russia or China?

The reaction of Russia to the President's plea for peace has been particularly disappointing.

From her attitude one might well conclude that Russia not only does not desire peace but actually seeks to encourage a greater war in southeast Asia, evidently hoping that we will concentrate such a large part of our Armed Forces there that the defenses of democracy will be weakened in other parts of the world.

Or is China undertaking to shape events so that the two great nuclear states will ultimately destroy each other, leaving the Chinese Republic the dominant power in world affairs?

Actually the tiny nation of North Vietnam appears to be the catalyst which is welding the two great Communist nations together for military purposes.

I trust that those who make the decisions for our country will bear in mind that while the war of democracy versus communism cannot be won in southeast Asia, it can be lost there.

In fact, communism will not be defeated on the battlefield anyway except on the battlefield of men's minds.

If any phase of the conflict between these two ideologies must be fought with arms, we should not let our enemies choose the battleground.

From now on our No. 1 concern must be the preservation of the United States and its institutions.

There can be no halfhearted effort in this respect.

Our people, regardless of whether or not they support the acts of this administration, must be prepared for extraordinary sacrifice.

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Vermont may have as much time as he may desire, and that the time be extended to allow other Senators to participate in discussing this most momentous speech.

Mr. AIKEN. I thank the majority leader.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, this sacrifice will have to be paid in terms of resources, freedom, and life itself.

There may be a chance that a world nuclear war can be avoided.

There may be a chance that we may escape the devastating effect of a general land war in Asia, the kind of war we are least likely to win.

We cannot proceed on the hope for miracles, however, therefore, we must be prepared for the worst—and without delay.

President Johnson has asked for some \$13 billion with which to increase the tempo of the war in Vietnam.

This \$13 billion is only the first drop in the bucket.

Commonsense and experience should tell us that.

The President asks us to rescind the tax cut on telephone charges and automobiles in order to help to meet this cost.

It is ridiculous to expect that the income from these rescissions would even begin to pay the cost of an escalated war.

If President Johnson means business—and I believe he does—he will ask for the suspension of the General Tax Reduction Act of 2 years ago.

He will ask to have the loopholes of overgenerous deductions and special tax privileges plugged.

And he will ask for such new taxes as may be necessary.

There is no sense in waiting until after election to recommend the inevitable.

Lives are more precious than votes.

Secretary of Defense McNamara asks for an increase of 113,000 men in the Armed Forces.

Whom does he think he is kidding?

Winning a guerrilla war requires a ratio of 10 to 1 on the side of the law, and the enemy already has 200,000 men in the field.

The Secretary knows that an escalated war will require universal conscription.

To wait until after election to announce this is just another attempt to lull the people.

Besides increased taxation and conscription, we must be prepared to accept the concentration of powers and restrictions on our liberties which inevitably accompany any major war.

We must be prepared to accept these controls for an indefinite number of years.

Are we ready to accept a system of priorities—price controls and wage controls?

What about ration cards?

Are we prepared to control hoarding which may already be underway?

Are our shelters adequate to insure the perpetuation of at least a part of our population in the event of a nuclear war?

Have we the facilities necessary for the control of sabotage, subversion, riots, and criminal law violations?

We do not like to contemplate these things; yet they must be considered and acted upon unless the danger is far less than it now appears.

This time we cannot wait until catastrophe strikes.

So long as there is the slightest chance for peace, we should pursue it, even while preparing for the worst, but we must prepare.

Since the Vietnam war began to escalate rapidly 3 years ago, I have repeatedly tried to make clear my belief that a major war would have disastrous results for the United States either militarily or in the loss of personal liberty at home.

Although I have at all times recognized the responsibilities of the United States to the people of South Vietnam, I never for an instant regarded my vote for the concurrent resolution of August 1964 as a vote to give the President authority to wage war at will in southeast Asia.

I opposed as strongly as I could the start of a new war in North Vietnam.

And I believe the President has erred in taking new steps which may lead to a cataclysmic world conflict.

It appears, however, that my voice has been ineffective and that the President has decided to take such steps.

The most that is left to me now is the hope that the President is right and that I have been wrong.

If, through the renewed action for which he assumes responsibility, the war can be brought to a quick and satisfactory ending, I will gladly admit the error of my judgment and be among the first to render him acclaim.

To this end, it is my purpose to support his request for higher taxes and for such controls over the American economy as may seem necessary to hold our losses to a minimum and to enhance the prospects for ultimate victory.

To divide our Nation in this time of crisis would be to court certain disaster.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Once again, the distinguished Senator from Vermont has performed a public service. I say "once again" because that has been his forte down through the years, regardless of the issue which was being discussed.

There has been a good deal of reference in the press in late months to the categories of the dove and the hawk. Personally, I do not pay too much attention to those designations. What I think the Senator from Vermont typifies and personifies, if I may use the word, is the owl. He is the wise man, the man who looks ahead, the man who is unswerving in his support of the United States, but who is also aware of the dangers which confront us in any given situation.

Before I comment on the distinguished Senator's speech, I should like to read a

statement which I made this morning before the Senate convened. The statement reads as follows:

The President has weighed the arguments, considered the alternatives, and made his decision. He had counseled with the leadership on a number of occasions on this matter and requested our views, which were frankly given and fairly considered by him.

On the basis of his constitutional responsibility, the President has acted. He has my sympathy and understanding, and I will do my best to support him to the best of my ability. I fully appreciate the difficulty and the agony of the decisions which was his—and his alone—to make.

I listened to a portion of his broadcast to the people this morning, and I was pleased and impressed with his statement that he had instructed Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, a real "owl," to take this matter of peaceseeking to the U.N. Security Council. I applaud him for so doing.

I was also impressed by his reference to Pope Paul's appeal for neutral arbitration and his interest in the proposal of the Holy Father.

I would suggest also that it could not be out of tune at this time, or at any time, to ask the two cochairmen of the Geneva Convention the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom—to try once again to get together so that this agreement, this meeting first set up in 1954, and then in the Laotian crisis in 1962, this grouping of States, be once again reconvened.

I know that this has had and still has the full support of the present administration.

The Senator from Vermont has mentioned something about the possibility of nuclear activity. The very use of the word "nuclear" makes me shudder, and I hope that those who are in favor of the use of such weapon—and unfortunately there have been some who have so stated—will not be taken too seriously, because I do not believe such advocacy represents the feelings of the administration, of Congress, or the American people, nor does it, for that matter, represent the feelings of the peoples of the world.

Last week I also heard the figure "600,000 Americans in Vietnam" being used by a Member of this body in an address which he made before an audience in his home State. Today the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] has raised the figure to the vicinity of 800,000. I think he gave a very good breakdown of the number of Americans now in Vietnam, the number of Americans being used by the 7th Fleet, the number of Americans stationed in Thailand, and, inferentially, at least, the number of Americans on the way. He also pointed out that when we fight a guerrilla war, we must have a ratio in the vicinity of 10 to 1. I have seen figures as high as 15 to 1 and as low as 5 to 1. What the exact figure is I do not believe anyone is in a position to know at this time, because it seems that the ratio differs with the circumstances and the needs requisite at a particular moment.

The distinguished Senator from Vermont also referred to other possibilities inherent in an Asia land war. He men-

tioned General Ridgway, one of the outstanding soldiers in the history of this country, a man who follows well in the tradition of Gen. George Marshall. He did not mention, however, General MacArthur, who is quoted as saying that the only way to win is through victory, and who also said what the difficulties would be if we were engaged in a land war in Asia.

I should like to read a brief comment made by General Ridgway when he was commander of the 8th Army in Korea at the time the truce negotiations were under way.

The American people must realize the need for infinite patience. There will be no immediate, final solution. The American people must learn to accept a solution that reflects reality. In the world of today we must maintain an equilibrium of force so that none of them become destructive. A *modus vivendi* must be found for people who were put on earth to live, and a way must be found to enable them to exist side by side without being at one another's throats. It can be done.

May I take this occasion, if the Senator will allow me to do so, to express my wholehearted sympathy and support for the efforts, covering 37 days, made by the President of the United States to seek an avenue or a door to the negotiating table.

I think I probably know Lyndon Johnson as well as any other Member of this body knows him. I have been closely associated with him for 24 years. I know how deeply concerned he is about Vietnam. I know the agonizing days and nights he goes through. I know of his intense desire to bring this most difficult of all situations which has ever faced an American President to some sort of honorable conclusion.

I believe that President Johnson faces today, and has faced over the past several months, difficulties far exceeding those faced by President Wilson at the time of the First World War, far exceeding those faced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at the time of the Second World War, and far exceeding those faced by President Harry Truman at the time of the Korean war.

This is a most serious situation, and I applaud the President for the many avenues he has sought and tried, for the many doors on which he has knocked, for the many times he has had conversations and conferences, for sending ambassadors over the world and for the instructions which he gave to the ambassadors—all to try to bring this situation to the conference table so that a satisfactory solution and conclusion might be reached.

It is therefore no fault of the President, as the distinguished Senator from Vermont has said, that these attempts have failed over the past 37 days. He has tried. He is concerned deeply. I do not think it is so much a matter of his place in history as it is a matter of finding a way by which he can, under honorable conditions, bring this most difficult confrontation to a satisfactory conclusion.

The American people must know the truth. They must know the potential involved in southeast Asia. They must be

made to know all of its ramifications. We in the Senate, regardless of our views, whether we are called doves, hawks, or owls, have a responsibility. That responsibility is being lived up to, and I am sure it will be lived up to even more in the future.

This is a grave time for the Nation, and it is a grave time for the President, who, under the Constitution, has this awesome responsibility. He cannot shove the buck to us. He knows that. He knows that, in the final analysis, there is only one man in this Republic who can make the decision. He is subjected to that responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic and as President of the United States of America.

I repeat: So far as the Senator from Montana is concerned, he will do his very best to give the President of the United States as much in the way of support as he possibly can.

I thank and commend the distinguished Senator from Vermont for laying out what he thinks should be done and for making the Senate—both sides of the Senate—more aware of the difficulties inherent in the situation which faces us and by making it known, in his simple, logical manner, to the American people, as well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be inserted at the appropriate point in the Record the statement made by the President of the United States today, a statement made by Secretary Rusk at his news conference today, and a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council from Arthur J. Goldberg, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, requesting that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

My fellow Americans, for 37 days, no bombs fell on North Vietnam. During that time we have made a most intense and determined effort to enlist the help and support of all the world to persuade the government in Hanoi that peace is better than war, that talking is better than fighting, and that the road to peace is open. Our effort has met with understanding and support throughout most of the world—but not in Hanoi and Peking. From those two capitals have come only denunciation and rejection.

In these 37 days, the efforts of our allies have been rebuffed. The efforts of neutral nations have come to nothing. We have sought without success to learn of any response to efforts made by the governments of Eastern Europe. There has been no answer to the enlightened efforts of the Vatican. Our own direct private approaches have been in vain. The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that was published 3 days ago—they persist in aggression, and they insist on the surrender of South Vietnam to communism.

It is plain that there is no readiness to talk—no readiness for peace—in that regime today.

And what is plain in words is also plain in acts. Throughout these 37 days—even at moments of truce—there has been continued violence against the people of South Vietnam, against their government, against their soldiers, and against our own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We yield to none in our determination to seek peace. We have given a full and decent respect to the opinions of those who thought that such a pause might give new hope for peace. Some said 10 days might do it. Others said 20. Now we have paused for twice the time suggested by some who urged it. Now the world knows more clearly than ever before who insists on aggression and who works for peace.

The Vietnamese, American and allied troops that are engaged in South Vietnam—with increasing strength and increasing success—want peace, I am sure, as much as any of us here at home. But while there is no peace, they are entitled to the full support of American strength and American determination. We will give both.

As constitutional Commander in Chief I have—as I must—given proper weight to the judgment of those responsible for counseling with me: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, my national security adviser, and America's professional military men represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These advisers tell me that if continued immunity is given to all that supports North Vietnam aggression, the cost in lives—Vietnamese, American, and allied—will only be greatly increased. In the light of the words and actions of the government in Hanoi, it is our clear duty to do what we can to limit these costs.

So on this Monday morning in Vietnam, at my direction—after consultation and agreement with the Government of South Vietnam—U.S. aircraft have resumed action in North Vietnam. They struck lines of supply which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

Our air strikes on North Vietnam from the beginning, have been aimed at military targets and controlled with great care. Those who direct and supply the aggression have no claim to immunity from military reply.

The end of the pause does not mean the end of our own pursuit of peace. That pursuit will be as determined and unremitting as the pressure of our military strength on the field of battle. In our continuing pursuit of peace, I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg to ask for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council. He will present a full report on the situation in Vietnam and a resolution which can open the way to the conference table. This report and this resolution will be responsive to the spirit of the renewed appeal of Pope Paul; that appeal has our full sympathy.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to meet with representatives of the press later this morning, to give to the country and to the world a comprehensive account of the diplomatic effort conducted in these last 5 weeks in our continuing policy of peace and freedom for South Vietnam.

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 31, 1966

(NOTE.—The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State Dean Rusk's news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:)

Secretary Rusk. Earlier this morning President Johnson confirmed that U.S. aircraft have resumed action against the lines of communication which support the continuing movement of men and arms against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

I wish to summarize for you the unprecedented diplomatic effort of the past 40 days—an effort aimed at peace—and the tragically negative response from Hanoi. To understand the full import of the past 40 days you must recall the months and years of unremitting effort by the United States and others to achieve peace in southeast Asia.

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We had no assurance at Christmas time that a suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam would move us closer to peace. Hanoi had refused to come to the Security Council of the United Nations in August 1964, in response to an invitation initiated in the Council by the Soviet Union. A call by 17 nonaligned nations for negotiations without preconditions had been harshly rejected by Hanoi, as was President Johnson's call for unconditional discussions at Baltimore last April. A Commonwealth committee had been rebuffed. The Secretary General of the U.N. had not been permitted to visit Hanoi and Peiping. Suggestions by the President of India were denounced. The machinery of the Geneva conferences was paralyzed by Hanoi's recalcitrance. Contacts with Hanoi and Peiping had failed to disclose a serious interest in peace. A pause in the bombing last May had yielded only a polemical rejection.

Nevertheless, the President decided, on the advice of myself and his other senior advisers, and in agreement with the Government of Vietnam to extend the Christmas pause for a further period. He did so because of America's strong preference for peace in southeast Asia, a desire which takes into full account the decades of suffering and violence inflicted upon the people of Vietnam. He did so because a number of governments, including a number of Communist governments, had insisted that a suspension of the bombing would create a situation in which the possibilities of peace could be greatly improved. He did so because there was unnecessary confusion at home and abroad about where the responsibility lies for the absence of peace—or even of discussions or negotiations about the possibility of peace.

Shortly after Christmas, therefore, we were in touch with all the governments of the world, more than 115 of them, as well as with his Holiness the Pope, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Six special Presidential envoys visited 34 capitals and personal communications from the President went to the chiefs of government of many more.

Hanoi was informed at an early stage of the suspension of the bombing. They were told that no decision had been made regarding a resumption of bombing and that if Hanoi would reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension. There was no ultimatum, in word or in fact, but rather an invitation to move toward peace. All governments were reminded of the far-reaching suggestions which the United States had made about the possibilities of peace, suggestions which were summarized in the so-called 14 points. It was made clear that, as far as we were concerned, there could be a conference, less formal discussions, or private and tentative contacts through the most discreet channels.

We know that many governments, including Communist governments, were active during this period and that our own direct and indirect contacts were strongly reinforced from many capitals. We were in touch with most governments several times during this period.

It is with genuine regret that I must report that the response has been negative, harsh, and unyielding. Channels which had been opened by us, one after the other, yielded no move toward peace. Throughout the period since Christmas, Hanoi and Peiping denounced our efforts toward peace with a continuing barrage of such epithets as "fraud," "trick," "deceit," "swindle," "hoax," "farce." The negative attitudes of Hanoi and the liberation front have been clarified in the last few days in an unmistakable fash-

ion. Ho Chi Minh in letters addressed to a number of heads of state stated: "If the United States really wants peace it must recognize the NFL SV as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam and engage in negotiations with it." In a statement released just yesterday, the front itself said, "All negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are entirely useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Vietnam their troops and all kinds of war materials."

But they made clear their negative view by deeds as well as words throughout the period of suspension of bombing. Infiltrations of men and materials from the north into South Vietnam continued at a high level. Acts of violence in South Vietnam itself continued with relatively minor fluctuations at virtually the same record high levels set in the last quarter of 1965. By these acts they made it entirely clear that their purpose remained what it has been from the beginning—namely, to take over South Vietnam by force.

It has been necessary, therefore, for us to meet our responsibilities to our commitments to South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people. I joined with other senior advisers to the President to recommend to him that he resume the necessary military action to support the South Vietnamese and allied forces and to meet the aggression from the north.

This does not mean that, as far as we are concerned, the search for peace will stop. Far from it. The President told you this morning that the matter is being presented to the Security Council of the United Nations. I will add that the other processes of diplomacy will continue in full operation, publicly and privately, directly and indirectly, in order that any possibility of peace can be explored and tested.

It is possible that one of the obstacles to peace has been a failure on the part of Hanoi to understand that the United States will in fact meet its commitment. It is not easy for a democracy such as ours to prevent such a basic miscalculation on the part of a totalitarian regime. If they are relying upon a military victory in the south, they must abandon that hope. If they are relying on international opinion to divert the United States from its commitment, they must recognize that the world community does not support their aggression. If they are relying upon domestic differences among us to save their cause, they must understand that that will not occur. The way to shorten this war is to make it very clear to Hanoi that the course upon which they are embarked is futile and that if they are prepared to sit down and talk like reasonable men, answers can be found which will relieve both themselves and their brothers in the south of the violence of which there has been more than enough.

JANUARY 31, 1966.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to request that an urgent meeting of the Security Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Vietnam.

As you know, the U.S. Government has, time and time again, patiently and tirelessly sought a peaceful settlement of this conflict on the basis of unconditional negotiations and the Geneva Accords of 1954. We have done so both inside and outside the United Nations.

In President Johnson's letter of July 23, 1965, to the Secretary General, in my letter of July 30, 1965, to the President of the Security Council, and in my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General, we appealed for whatever help in ending the conflict the Security Council and its members or any other organ of the United Nations might be able to give. We have also been in constant touch with the Secretary General in order to

keep him fully informed and to seek his counsel and assistance. A great number of U.N. members, acting jointly or separately, have with our earnest encouragement sought to find a means of moving the conflict from the battlefield to the conference table.

As you are also aware, because my Government was advised by many others that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam might contribute to the acceptance by its government of our offer of unconditional negotiations, we did suspend bombing on December 24 and continued that suspension for some 37 days. At the same time, President Johnson dispatched several high-ranking representatives to explain to His Holiness the Pope and to the chiefs of state or heads of government of a number of states our most earnest desire to end the conflict peacefully and promptly. Our views were set forth in 14 points which were communicated to a very large number of governments and later published and which were summarized in the third paragraph of my letter of January 4, 1966, to the Secretary General.

I should like to repeat that summary to you as follows:

"That the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a ceasefire might be the first order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, that the United States desires no continuing military presence or bases in Vietnam, that the future political structure in South Vietnam should be determined by the South Vietnamese people themselves through democratic processes, and that the question of the reunification of the two Vietnams should be decided by the free decision of their two peoples."

Subsequently, the President in his state of the Union address on January 12 reiterated once again our willingness to consider at a conference or in other negotiations any proposals which might be put forward by others. I am authorized to inform the Council that these U.S. views were transmitted both directly and indirectly to the Government of North Vietnam and were received by that Government.

Unhappily, there has been no affirmative response whatsoever from Hanoi to our efforts to bring the conflict to the negotiating table, to which so many governments lent their sympathy and assistance. Instead there have been from Hanoi, and of course from Peiping as well, merely the familiar charges that our peace offensive, despite the prolonged bombing pause, was merely a "fraud" and a "swindle" deserving no serious consideration. The most recent response seemed to be that set forth in President Ho Chi Minh's letter to certain heads of state which was broadcast from Hanoi on January 28. In this letter President Ho Chi Minh made quite clear his unwillingness at this time to proceed with unconditional negotiations; on the contrary, he insisted on a number of preconditions which would in effect require the United States to accept Hanoi's solution before negotiations had even begun. This is obviously unacceptable.

Therefore, Mr. President, my Government has concluded that it should now bring this problem with all its implications for peace formally before the Security Council. We are mindful of the discussions over the past months among the members of the Council as to whether a formal meeting could usefully be held in the context of other efforts then in train. We are also aware that it may not be easy for the Council itself, in view of all the obstacles, to take constructive ac-

tion on this question. We are firmly convinced, however, that in light of its obligations under the charter to maintain international peace and security and the failure so far of all efforts outside the United Nations to restore peace, the Council should address itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous endeavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it.

We hope that the members of the Security Council will agree that our common dedication to peace and our common responsibility for the future of mankind require no less. In this connection, we are mindful of the renewed appeal of His Holiness the Pope only 2 days ago in which he suggested that "an arbitration of the U.N. confined to neutral nations might tomorrow—we would like to hope even today—resolve this terrible question."

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Montana for his remarks. I repeat that I never questioned the desire of the President to establish peace in the world. Any President would so desire. I am sure Lyndon Johnson is no different in that respect from the others.

I also appreciate the Senator's reference to Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who, I believe, was Army Chief of Staff at the time we went through a similar conflict of opinion, and who he advised against our sending large numbers of men to southeast Asia to help the French.

I well recall General Ridgway telling me after a hearing one day that if we sent 2 million men into the Vietnam area, they would be swallowed up. Now conditions are different from those in Korea, where we had relatively nearby bases and short supply lines. I do not believe that if the Soviet Union and the Chinese worked hard in trying to find a location for a showdown they could have found one more disadvantageous to us than in southeast Asia.

Again I thank the Senator from Montana for his statement.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I am deeply moved, and millions of Americans will be deeply moved, by the outstanding speech the Senator has just made in this body. It is my hope that the Senator's speech will be printed verbatim not only for the New York Times, but across this Nation in newspaper after newspaper.

Not only did we hear a historic speech from the Senator from Vermont, but we heard a historic speech from the majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD]. It, too, must receive very wide circulation among our people, for, in my opinion, this has now become an issue for the people. This is an issue of which the American people want war or peace. The people are entitled to know all the facts on both sides of this historic controversy.

Mr. President, the Senator from Vermont stated that he had taken a position for some time urging that we not get ourselves involved in an escalation of the war in Asia. He has said that he hoped he was right and that if the President

proved himself to be right he would be the first to acclaim the President.

Let me say to the Senator from Vermont that I, too, would acclaim the President if his course of action leads to peace. However, I do not believe that escalating the war will produce peace. It may produce a surrender, but not peace. Then eventually the Asias will reorganize and continue their war against us until we too come to recognize that we cannot maintain a dominating foothold in Asia.

The Senator from Vermont has been right in his position, but I say regretfully, but respectfully, that I believe my President has been dead wrong in conducting his Executive war in Asia and is dead wrong in his announcement this morning that he has ordered a renewing of the bombing and of the inevitable escalating of the war.

The majority leader spoke of his close association with the President and his great affection for him.

Let me say that I love the President of the United States as an individual, as a friend, and as a leader. But, I love my country more.

In my judgment, the course of action that my President is following in connection with escalating the war in Asia, is not in the best interests of my country, for I share the view of the Senator from Vermont that Asia, of all places, is no place for us to become involved in a massive war. If woe betake us and we have to go into such a war, I believe such a war is immoral, illegal, and unjustifiable. I believe that war is unthinkable forevermore. We should face the fact that humanity cannot survive another world war. I cannot share the hope, because I believe that it is simply a false hope, that we can obtain a peace by making war in Asia.

Of course, I am pleased that the President has announced he is going to take the issue to the Security Council. I am sorry that at the same time he is going to escalate the war.

I want to see the resolution he is sending to the Security Council. Taking it to the Security Council, so far as it is possible success is concerned, is dependent upon what position we take in the Security Council and what the resolution proposes. The proposal to take it to the Security Council comes at least 2½ years late. But, better late than never.

I highly commend my President for coming to the point of view that the United States should go to the Security Council. I have pleaded for that for a long time past—many times. I have been requested in the past by the White House to prepare a series of proposed resolutions and legal arguments in support of taking the issue to the United Nations.

It is extremely unfortunate that at the same time he has renewed the air raids on North Vietnam, for this will make it far more difficult for the U.N. to take effective action than if the raids had remained in suspension.

I close my remarks by stating that I hope, when this matter is taken to the Security Council, that we will make clear to the Security Council that we do not

intend to let the issue rest there. If the Security Council or any member thereof decides to veto that resolution, then I wish to say to my President this morning, that we should call for an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and lay the threat to the peace of the world before it. What we need in southeast Asia now are many divisions of United Nations peacekeeping forces, not warmaking forces. What we need in southeast Asia is the drawing of a good many neutral buffer zones across South Vietnam that will seek to stop the killing. What we need, of course, is to make perfectly clear to the world that we are ready to let the nations of the world sit in judgment on this war and seek to exercise the procedures called for in the United Nations Charter in trying to end it.

That is my plea. That is my prayer. I hope that among the various alternatives open to us that at least we will say to the Security Council, "We are asking for a United Nations conference on the war in southeast Asia, because under the United Nations Charter there are a great many procedures that the Security Council can follow." The Security Council could call for a United Nations conference which would bring not only the Security Council members, but all the members of the United Nations into focus on the problem and lay the matter before that enlarged body. I would hope that consideration would be given—although I will go along with any proposal that makes it possible for the United Nations to take jurisdiction—to the possibility of the Security Council, or the enlarged group that I have just suggested, might call for reconvening of the Geneva conference. This would bring the Communists into the picture. I know that many do not like the thought of bringing the Communists into the picture, but to think of bombing them out of existence is wishful thinking. They happen to be a great power and force in Asia, and they will continue to be a great force and power in Asia, no matter what war efforts the United States makes in Asia.

Under the canopy of the United Nations, through a reconvened Geneva conference, there could be offered some hope of trying to bring reason to bear in bringing to an end the immoral killing that characterizes this war.

I close by saying that I do not accept in full the observation of my majority leader in regard to the power of the President of the United States. I do not believe that the President of the United States, under the Constitution, has the power to conduct this executive war in Asia. He is conducting it, anyway. I know that there are many in Congress who would like to give him authority to continue to conduct it. However, in my judgment, the time has come to place a check upon the President of the United States in regard to conducting an executive war.

I believe that one of the salutary effects of placing this issue before the United Nations might be ending at long last the unilateral action of the United States in southeast Asia. Members of the United Nations who signed the U.N.

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Charter, as well as the United States, should start living up to their obligations, too. Let us pray and hope that the President's belated decision to go to the Security Council will lead to peace.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. I commend the Senator from Vermont for a well-reasoned speech full of good judgment, and I believe, timely admonition.

Apparently, his views have been and are much the same as mine, because for several years, ever since I visited Vietnam some 5 years ago, I have felt that this would be the worst place in the world to fight communism. I believe that we have to fight communism but, like the Senator from Vermont, I believe that much of this war has to be fought in the hearts of people all over the world. With our limited resources, both in manpower and financially, we should not be picking out an area to fight the Communists where they have all the advantages and we all the disadvantages, as is the case in Vietnam.

The administration has been totally unrealistic on this war situation, and I believe it has been something less than frank with the American people in not giving them all the information they are entitled to have and in not telling them all that we would have to encounter in fighting a war in southeast Asia.

Approximately 2 years ago we were advised by top officials of the administration that the war would be over in a few months. They should know better than that, I believe that the public could and should be told now at least some of the real problems we face, certainly better estimates as to the cost to the United States and more of what is involved in this war. The Communists have a pretty good idea of what we will need to win. Why cannot we tell our people what the Communists already know?

For example, the estimate of 600,000 troops we will need in southeast Asia is a conservative one and is something that our people should be told.

I agree with the Senator from Vermont that Congress should appropriate the money necessary to prosecute the war and raise the necessary money through taxation and other means, and fully support it in every way.

For myself, I see no alternative at this time but to support the President in the decision he has made—at least for the time being.

Mr. AIKEN. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his kind remarks. I join those who hope that the President's appeal to the United Nations may be effective in promoting peace in southeast Asia. We must not forget, however, that Russia is a member of the Security Council and that Russia has, apparently, decided that southeast Asia is the best place to have a showdown.

While I do not give up hope, I seriously doubt that any appeal to the United Nations will be effective. The United Nations has had plenty of oppor-

tunity to take action, had it been permitted to do so. I have no doubt that 90 percent of the members of the General Assembly would do all they possibly could to effect peace in southeast Asia, but it requires only one member of the Security Council to block that action.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will my colleague [Mr. AIKEN] yield to me?

Mr. AIKEN. I am very glad to yield to my colleague.

Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, during his many years in the Senate, my senior colleague has made many major contributions to the national welfare. However, today, in my judgment, nothing that he has accomplished in all that time is as important as the statement he has just made. I commend him for it.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Vermont yield?

Mr. AIKEN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Kentucky. I am ready to yield the floor, but I yield to him at this time.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, we are indebted to the distinguished Senator from Vermont for this plain and simple way in which he has pointed out the possible eventualities that may fall upon this country by an escalation of the war.

I am one of those who believe that the bombing should not have been resumed, at least at present. I did not make my statement upon some vague hope—important as that may be—but I had thought that the military forces there would be able to meet any present military situation—unless there were large introductions of forces from North Korea. Also, we know there is a supply situation which limits our forces ability for a time. I have believed that there were at least additional weeks before the security of our forces would be affected. But the most important factor, was whether resumption would lead to those extensions of conflict of which the Senator spoke.

But the President has made his decision, and we appreciate his burdens and his great responsibility. I join the Senator from Oregon in the statement he made, as I did over a year ago, in appreciation of the President's statement that he would submit this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations.

We are acquainted with the reasons against this course—the fear that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution and thus harden its position.

But, if there should be a veto in the Security Council, the issue could be referred to the General Assembly.

I know how difficult it would be to secure action where the great powers would be concerned. Nevertheless, this is a hopeful course that the President of the United States will undertake and we should support him in his effort to secure action by the United Nations. The Senator from Vermont has pointed out the task that this country may have to assume, and in doing this the Senator from Vermont has rendered the country a valuable service.

In conclusion, we are beginning to debate issues which should have been undertaken a long time ago. We rely upon

the Committee on Foreign Relations. I said a year ago that the committee should constantly consider this problem, and advise the Senate on the subject. We must work together in this solemn cause to find an avenue toward an honorable settlement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). Is there further morning business?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe that the President had no choice about resuming bombing and the other efforts being made by this Nation to assist South Vietnam.

This Nation is there because the Communist aggressors are there. This is a part of world struggle that has continued since 1946, an effort by Communists to subjugate by force everything they can subjugate, an effort to take over everything that they can take over.

They are not going to leave the anti-Communists any area that borders on Russia and China unless they believe we have the force to hold them. They have made that abundantly clear in place after place. This is a part of that overall problem.

The Geneva accords were agreed to. This Nation was not a party to it. We knew about it. We were consulted about it.

The Geneva accords were violated time and time again by Communist aggression.

We did what we could to help South Vietnam sustain itself. It was faced with constant aggression to the point where our naval vessels were in the area and were attacked on the high seas by torpedo boats of North Vietnam.

At that point we voted for a resolution. We said that we approved measures directing a strike back at aggression in the area. We approved of such additional measures as the President might deem necessary to resist aggression in that area.

What did the President do? At that time we struck back at the bases from which the enemy vessels were operating in the waters in the vicinity of North Vietnam. That was an act of war. But we did not start it. They did. We struck back. We authorized the President to take such additional measures as he deemed necessary.

Those people were sending down organized forces from North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The President sent in forces to help South Vietnam sustain itself.

Reference has been made to the United Nations. My understanding of the United Nations Charter is that members of that organization agree not to use force against one another to settle international problems, but they do not agree not to use force when the other fellow uses force on us.

Red China is not a signatory to the United Nations Charter. They say that the United Nations has no right to be consulted in this case. The government in Hanoi is not a signatory to the United Nations Charter. They will not abide by a decision not to use force.

We are in a fight. One may call it what he will, but acts of war are being committed by both sides against one another.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Louisiana may have as much time as he deems necessary.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We hope to limit that struggle and keep it within bounds and we hope for a peaceful settlement.

We will discover that when North Vietnam thinks they are in a position to defeat us before the entire world, with two other Communist powers behind them. They are not going to let us out of there, short of defeating us, if they can.

When we are in a war we should fight to win. That is what we have done in the past in any fight when we wished to prevail.

Any time one goes to the conference table with the Communist powers they are going to let it be known in a hurry that they are not going to give victory at the peace table that we cannot win on the battlefield. This country cannot win, if it cannot stand casualties, and blanches at the sight of blood.

We have lost 1,500 men. They have lost 30 times that many, at least. They have a backward, primitive nation.

If we have arrived at the point where our determination is so weak and our support of the President is so little, that we cannot stand with our President against a small Communist power, then, we had better get out of South Vietnam; and not just Vietnam but all of Asia.

Every friendly leader in the area will be in a foot race to get out if he has been on our side; and the others will find some way to accommodate themselves to the Communist spirit.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a series of questions?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. When I complete this thought I will be glad to yield to the Senator from North Carolina.

If the United States cannot stand fast against Communist aggression, does anyone think that India is going to stand against Communist China? Does anyone think that Pakistan or Indonesia is going to stand against Communist China? Who is going to stand against Communist China when they see that they cannot count on the United States to stand by with fortitude?

I yield to the Senator from North Carolina.

Mr. ERVIN. I wish to ask the junior Senator from Louisiana if this is not true.

When all is said and done, and the matter is faced with realism, there are only three possible courses by which we can put an end to the fighting in Vietnam.

The first is negotiation. The second is by winning the war. The third is by withdrawing or surrendering.

Are there any other alternatives possible in the Vietnam situation?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator did not put the question quite this way, but I assume in the third possibility that he stated could include abject surrender the surrendering of all equipment and troops to them.

Mr. ERVIN. Is not withdrawal a surrender?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. At least we get some of the men home if we withdraw.

Mr. ERVIN. When one withdraws from the battlefield one surrenders the battlefield to the enemy, does he not?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. Does the Senator from Louisiana agree with the Senator from North Carolina that the President has done and is doing everything in his power to obtain a settlement by negotiation and thus far he has been unable to find anybody willing to negotiate with him?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. He has done exactly that.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator from Louisiana agree with the Senator from North Carolina that communism is determined to extinguish the light of liberty all over the face of the earth?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is my opinion. If the Communists feel that they can extinguish the light of liberty, they will do everything they can to get rid of it. They are seeking by every means to prevail. It is more than an effort to win over the minds of men. Any man who agrees with the philosophy of the freedom and liberty of man is likely to have his head cut off if he speaks against his Government as some people here speak against our government. We have seen that in the Soviet Union and Communist China. People who express such views against a Communist state have their heads chopped off.

Mr. ERVIN. Before putting to you my next question I would like to make this plain: If I had been running the United States all by myself during recent years, I would not have placed any American servicemen in South Vietnam. But the question confronting America at this hour is not whether we should put our servicemen in South Vietnam. They are already there. Are we not in the position which Grover Cleveland called a condition and not a theory?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. We are. We have committed ourselves in Vietnam.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not the Senator from Louisiana agree with me in the proposition that if history teaches anything, it teaches that even the most righteous man cannot live in peace unless it pleases his wicked neighbor for him to do so? Does not the Senator from Louisiana agree with me in the proposition that if North Vietnam and those who back North Vietnam would stop furnishing men and weapons and equipment, the war would cease?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I believe the Senator is correct about that. He is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. One more question. Despite our great admiration and our great affection for Members of Congress, is it not possibly true that the admirals and generals who have spent their lives studying war can make a more accurate determination of what is advisable, not only to win the war in South Vietnam, but to protect the lives of American boys who are already there?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. They can. That has been their judgment.

Mr. ERVIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. There has been some talk about the difficulties of fighting a war on the mainland of China. I have heard that statement put in many different ways. President Eisenhower has been consulted about this matter. My best understanding is that he has repeated his statement of support once again as to the wisdom of the course we are pursuing there.

Furthermore, there is a difference in marching an army off into China and helping South Vietnam defend itself. I recall that General MacArthur favored holding South Korea, but not marching an army into China itself.

If China should decide to go into India and bring the people of India under the domination of the Communist government of Peiping, it could be said that in helping India we were becoming involved on mainland Asia. No one has contended that we should not have helped India or Pakistan to help defend themselves if they were attacked by the Soviet Union or some other Communist power.

Our defense positions that we hold in South Vietnam are every bit as defensible, and in some respects much more defensible, than those that we had when we resisted China in Korea. We did not fight a land war in China. To say that we should not risk a war to resist aggression, and help a friendly power in Asia resist Communist aggression is quite another thing.

It is always possible to find military experts who would disagree, but the prevailing view is that we can and should help the people there to defend themselves from communism.

Our positions in South Vietnam are excellent compared with those of our adversaries. We are located where we can haul in the materiel needed for our troops. Our adversary has great difficulty in getting in an adequate amount for his needs. We can haul in large quantities of supplies, as much as we need to supply our troops.

Unless and until Red China and any other Communist powers come to decide that they really want to live in peaceful circumstances with the United States—and certainly Red China has not decided that—neither has Hanoi—they are going to continue to probe our will, probe our determination, test our zeal, and test our unity by such activities as we are confronted with in South Vietnam. When they use force against us, the only way to stop it is to use force in return. That is what we have been doing.

It has been said that we cannot win, or at least that our difficulties of winning are insurmountable. Someone has said that it is necessary to have a 10-to-1 advantage to wipe out the guerrilla forces.

My understanding of warfare is that when two nations fight and one decides that it will resort to guerrilla activity, it requires great numbers to combat the guerrillas. But the way to get a 10-to-1 majority in most wars is to keep fighting and winning until the adversary has less than a 10-to-1 ratio.

In the Civil War, when the South had paid a tremendous price in casualties, it

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was suggested the General Lee should break his army up into guerrilla bands and that their chances would be better to win the war as a guerrilla effort. Perhaps the war could have been carried on on that basis, but with the war continuing and one adversary winning and the other losing, there comes a time when the side that is losing must decide to quit.

With the dangers this Nation faces, I say we have no hope to come out of this situation in any honorable way other than to fight it and win it. If we cannot win it, we should at least make a genuine effort to win. If I do say so, that leaves a lot to be desired, so far as what the Nation can do.

What can we do to help? In my judgment, the best thing to do here is to unite behind our Commander in Chief. He is the one who has to bear the brunt of the responsibility. He has to decide what we will do. He must take the final step. He must make the final plan for victory or for the success our forces may achieve while fighting on any battlefield.

It has been suggested that this Nation appeal to the United Nations; that the President request Ambassador Goldberg to suggest that the United Nations look into this matter. We shall find that that will be a rather frustrating experience. The Communist powers will be ready to say every false thing that their vicious tongues can utter against the United States. They will call us every vicious word and name that can be said about us. If we are able to get any kind of resolution to uphold us through the Security Council, in all probability the Soviet Union will veto it. After 2 or 3 more months of denunciation by a number of large and small powers that are Communist or friendly to Communist powers, eventually the General Assembly might vote on the question. If any action at all were taken that would favor our side, the Communists would not respect it. They would not abide by it. Once again, we would be confronted with the fact that we had a resolution from the General Assembly, but Communist China is not a member of the United Nations. Neither is the Hanoi government.

If the resolution is favorable to us they would refuse to abide by such a resolution. Then, we would be back where we started. Who would do the fighting? The situation would be as it has always been: We would have to do the fighting.

I applaud the President's determination to make greater efforts and to use our forces so as to make the side of anti-communism prevail in South Vietnam. I pray that we will prevail.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I have been much interested in the Senator's spirited defense of the administration. But at this time I cannot understand why the administration needs any defense. Certainly in my remarks I emphasized the sincerity of the President in desiring peace. I called upon the American people to make such sacrifices as may become necessary to win the war or come as near winning

it as possible. So I do not see why the President needs any defense.

I have expressed the hope that the President's judgment would be right; the hope that he has taken the right course; and the hope that the war might be ended satisfactorily within a short time—perhaps not so quickly as Secretary McNamara promised at one time, when he said that most of our boys would be home by Christmas. That was 2 years ago.

But the Senator from Louisiana made one statement that bothered me somewhat.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not undertaking to quarrel with the views of the Senator from Vermont; I am simply undertaking to state my own views. I find some things in the Senator's speech with which I agree, and perhaps some things with which I do not agree. But other Senators have had their say, and I am simply stating my views. I am not seeking to take issue with the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I am not disagreeing. I think taxes ought to be raised, according to the President's request; but the President did not begin to go far enough in order to wage war in any satisfactory measure.

But what disturbed me a little were the remarks of the Senator from Louisiana that we have to defend democracy wherever we find it in the world. He pointed out India as one of the countries we might be called upon to defend. I was wondering whether the Senator, well informed as he is on administration matters, could say whether there is any point beyond which we would not go to defend Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, India, the African countries, or any other place where democracy might be threatened? Is there any point beyond which we would not go?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I do not know the answer to that question. But there is no place in Asia where it would do us much good to make a stand if we were to pull out and leave after we had committed ourselves, as we have in Vietnam. I do not believe the people would trust us or count on us, feeling that they could not count on the United States to fulfill its commitments.

I should say that all such situations would have to be judged by the circumstances of the particular case. I would certainly hope that where such situations arose, the United Nations could be helpful to us, just as it was in the difficulty between India and Pakistan. So the situation does depend on circumstances.

Suppose the Communists decide that they will try to take Berlin again, as they decided sometime ago they would take it. How far would we go?

President Kennedy said that we would go as far as necessary, but we would not let them take it. In this case, once we are committed, I think we must continue, if we can find a way to an honorable peace, I would strongly favor following such a course; but if not, we shall have to fight unless we are willing to let the Communists take over.

Mr. AIKEN. On the 2d of June 1964, I took the position that the United States

had an obligation to South Vietnam; that we might have to station troops in Thailand, provided Thailand wanted them and would cooperate fully with their own forces. But at the same time, I questioned the advisability of undertaking to police the whole world or to escalate the war further. That is why I asked whether there is a point beyond which we cannot go.

In this case, I think perhaps we have been mousetrapped into letting Russia and China choose the arena for a major showdown. I do not know for sure, however. Cuba would have been much nearer to us. But Russia did not choose to have a showdown in Cuba. It goes without saying that if Russia was able to put missiles in Cuba, she can put many more in Vietnam without our knowing about it.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I approve of what was done with regard to taking the missiles out of Cuba. I think the Senator will find I am on record as saying that by not making a stronger effort to furnish more military aid in the Bay of Pigs invasion we made a mistake.

Mr. AIKEN. I hope, when the President has his tax bill before us, the Senator will support him in his request to retain the tax on automobiles and phone calls. I think what he is asking for will be but a drop in the bucket compared to what will be needed.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The budget provides that twice as much will be needed in 1967 in Vietnam as was needed in 1966. That is provided in the President's message. It may be necessary to do more than that. The President has said that if more is needed, he will request what is necessary.

Mr. President, that concludes what I have had to say. It seems to me we are not going to get any peacekeeping force in Vietnam to head off the Communist aggressors. I have doubts that the United Nations will make a useful contribution to this matter. But since the President has indicated he wishes to lay the matter before the United Nations, he is entitled to our support as our Commander in Chief. I hope the President may find a way to settle honorably the controversy in which we find ourselves. Until that time, we should fight to defeat the aggressors.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I was pleased to hear the distinguished Senator from Louisiana finally conclude by saying that, though he had previously doubted the advisability and efficacy of taking the issue to the United Nations, nevertheless he entertained some hope that it might be beneficial. I share in that conclusion.

A basic and, I fear, grievous error has been committed over a period of years in step-by-step treatment of the difficulty in Vietnam as if it were, and in permitting it to become, an American war. This violates the principle of collective security.

In the principle and practice of collective security, the free world may be able to contain the surge of international communism. Standing alone, it is questionable that the United States has the

power and the resources and the wisdom so to do.

This is a serious hour in the United States and in the world. I know there will be those who will be critical of the Senate in conducting what may appear to some to be a divisive debate in this hour. Senators have made errors of judgment, but so have three Presidents. So have the heads of our armed services. Unfortunately, there has been a plethora of mistakes, and in that all of us have shared.

Where are we? The Communists have us committed on a battlefield where we suffer the greatest possible disadvantages. They have us standing there virtually alone. I hope that one objective of the President's move with respect to the United Nations is to enlist the aid of the nations of the free world.

It was for the purpose of averting the kind of catastrophe that now threatens the world, or to mitigate a catastrophe, or to mediate such a threat of catastrophe, that the United Nations was formed.

Mr. President, it is late. The hour is very late, I fear. But let us hope it is not too late.

Some people seem to regard Vietnam as the end of the earth, or the center of the earth. It is neither.

The vital interests of the United States can be found in many places, and in many places they are greater than they are in Vietnam. We can no more exclude those other vital interests or neglect them than we can afford to ignore the threat to peace in Vietnam.

The important thing in this conflict is not Vietnam, North or South; but, rather, it is the equation among the three leading world powers today.

The power struggle in the world involves the vital interests of the United States. Indeed, it involves the survival of the humanity of the world.

Shall we pursue a course which promises one of two results—first, the healing of the breach between Communist China and Communist Russia, out of which we have taken some hope in that there was a fissure in the monolithic unity of international communism? Shall we pursue a course which bogs the United States down in a war with China, leaving Russia free to work her machinations in Africa, in Latin America, in the Mediterranean, in Eastern Europe, or in other places? Or shall the principal thrust of our Government be to contain the limits of this war within bounds which we can reasonably hope will be manageable, and enlist the offices of the United Nations and other neutral powers and other great influences such as Pope Paul, the intellectuals of the world, all men of good will, to find a way to smother this raging fire?

I hope and believe that it is this latter course which the President has chosen.

Mr. President, let us be candid and acknowledge that there are many voices in Washington today who say that it would be easier to knock China out now than it would be 10 years from now. I have heard it frequently. I believe it is fair to say that it is partly because of that rising insistence that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has come alive to

its public responsibility its constitutional responsibility.

I was in the Congress after the end of World War II, and I heard voices giving the same message, voices from the identical sources from which I hear them now.

It will be better, they then said, to knock out Russia now than to wait until she has nuclear weapons. Fortunately, we did not follow the advice of preventive war then. There has been some rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States; we are not now threatening to destroy each other, though events have been marching step by step as if inexorably to the point where a world conflagration might ensue. God forbid.

Let not the extremists prevail. If the extremists do not prevail, there is yet hope for mankind to avoid a world war.

I have been deeply disturbed that it has been dangerously near. I frequently hear the phrase used, "land war in Asia." Mr. President, once this Nation were committed to a war with China, public opinion in this country would not permit our men to be matched man to man with the masses of China.

A war between the United States and China would quickly degenerate into a nuclear war. That is my belief. It may be that my view is in error, but feeling as I do that the important thing involved is the equation among the three great powers and the danger of war between those three great powers, I have risen today to speak these thoughts.

The most hopeful event of today is the reference of this matter to the United Nations. I am not advised of the form of the reference, or the manner of the resolution, but it is a step in the right direction that we take the matter there, where the pressure of world opinion can be focused.

I am not sure how helpful or how effective it will be, but it is the brightest hope of the day.

Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, it had not been my purpose to enter into debate at this time. I feel that the words of the President of the United States require careful study and consideration—and this will involve no criticism of anyone for the fine contributions made in this morning's discussion—but any Senator who has not heretofore prepared a careful, considered, and extensive analysis of the situation cannot speak with benefit to the Senate or the country. The events of these days and of this period must not to be treated by off-the-cuff speeches.

It was my purpose, when the parliamentary situation of the Senate permitted, to make some observations about the conduct of the war, commenting particularly on the lack of candor with which Congress, the press, and the people have been treated, and commenting somewhat on the role played in all of these harrowing operations by the Secretary of Defense. This morning, I am impelled to make only one observation, and that is occasioned by the words of the President of the United States which have been commented on with much the same approach that I have, but so elo-

quently and to the point, by the distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE].

Whatever else may be the situation, whatever mistakes have been made in the past, I, for one, am compelled to observe that if mistakes have been made, Congress cannot divest itself from participating in those mistakes, and that the vote that we cast—and the Senator from New Hampshire participated in voting at that time—involves us with the President in the conduct of this conflict, a conflict from which we cannot retreat with honor to ourselves, or safety to the free-loving and peace-loving peoples of the world at the present moment. I support the President's decision to resume bombing. We can do no less as long as there is an American boy fighting on the ground in Vietnam.

However, the point in the President's remarks this morning that I found particularly encouraging was the reference of this matter to the United Nations. The words he uttered in approving the position taken by many, including His Holiness, Pope Paul, insisting that solutions of problems we are facing in south-east Asia shall not be a unilateral solution.

I have never believed that the United States could get to the conference table and effect a unilateral peace at this time. I doubt whether the President thought so. I suspect that these long negotiations and endeavors—this peace offensive—has been largely for the purpose—a purpose which I hope has been accomplished—of impressing the world with the fact that this country desires peace whatever the attitude of our enemies.

I regret that the comments on this matter of participation by the United Nations as an organization at this time have, in most cases, been either too cynical or too hopeful. There are those who continue to believe that the United Nations in its present situation and under its present handicaps has the power and the influence to bring about peace anywhere.

There are those, on the other hand, who persist in the belief that because of the handicaps and obstacles it faces, the United Nations as a peacemaking and peacekeeping organization is useless. Such people believe we are only making an idle gesture when we try to enlist the United Nations.

The Senator from New Hampshire does not adhere to either of those positions. The Senator from New Hampshire feels very strongly that the United States of America has sufficient influence in the world, and sufficient power, if it chose to exert it, to make the United Nations organization face these problems.

The Senator from New Hampshire feels that this country has been altogether too lenient, altogether too lacking in firmness of approach, in firmness of utterance, in steadfastness of purpose, in failing to demand that the United Nations perform its functions. When we begin to talk to the United Nations in a way that indicates to the membership of that Organization we are saying what we mean and that we mean what we say, then and then only

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will those nations within that organization who are supposed to be—and at heart I hope and believe are—on the side of freedom, the side of law instead of war, of peace instead of bloodshed, will really begin to function.

Mr. President, I doubt whether they are going to face that responsibility until we face ours within the United Nations.

Let me suggest one point, Mr. President—the only point that I have not heard suggested in the discussions of the situation in southeast Asia.

I agree with those who have said that this must not be purely an American war. So long as the nations of Asia can be given the impression that it is the white man fighting against the yellow man—even though there may be some yellow men on our side—just so long can it be unjustly asserted that this is an American war, a war of American aggression and imperialism, just so long will the nations of Asia who, however they may feel in their minds about communism and the principles involved, in their hearts will find their sympathy to be with their own race, against the white man, who has been exploiting them for so many generations.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from New Hampshire yield at that point?

Mr. COTTON. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. I commend the Senator from New Hampshire very highly for the statement he is making. I dismiss the comment about his remarks being off the cuff. The Senator from New Hampshire always speaks well extemporaneously; and once again is making a valuable contribution to this historic debate.

If the Senator from New Hampshire will permit me to make one more comment in reference to the United Nations, I completely agree with the observation that he has made about the United Nations. Over and over again, I have stated for the past 2½ years that I did not know whether it would work, but that we should try. I have stated, in speech after speech, that we would place the members of the United Nations in the posture of finding whether they are going to live up to their obligations under the charter; but there has been no justification, in my opinion, for their not living up to our obligations. That is why I have pleaded to carry out our obligations under the charter and take the issue to the United Nations and make clear, as the Senator has declared, that they should live up to their obligations and proceed with the peacekeeping procedures of the United Nations to stop this war.

Mr. COTTON. I thank the Senator from Oregon. I did not want to take too much time in the morning hour for too long remarks, but I wish to finish the point I was about to make, that we should avoid making this a unilateral war a war conducted by the United States of America, with only token assistance or participation by others, particularly the Asiatics.

But there is one point I have not heard emphasized. This morning in the Senate we are prone to feel some gloom and discouragement as to the prospect of an early victory. Because of that we fail to ask ourselves what happens if we win.

It is hard for the Senator from New Hampshire to believe that after all the billions of dollars we have invested in our military organization and our national defense, with all the talent, all the resources, and all the power of this great country, we cannot bring this war to a successful conclusion. And I mean conventional weapons; we must not resort to nuclear weapons.

But even now, suppose we bring this war to a successful conclusion, repel the aggressors, and establish boundaries between North and South Vietnam, what happens then?

Mr. President, we not only do not want a unilateral war and a unilateral victory by the United States over its foes; we do not want a unilateral peace to be enforced by the United States alone. Even if we take the most optimistic viewpoint about the conclusion of hostilities in southeast Asia, how many years would our men be guarding the borders, as they are today between North and South Korea? How many years would they be policing, and enforcing a successful, victorious peace between North and South Vietnam? That, too, we want to avoid.

The only way to avoid a unilateral war and a unilateral peace, the only way not to have it a purely American war and an American enforced peace, is through the concerted action of other nations; and the United Nations, imperfect though it may be, is the only instrument at hand for such united action. We have regarded the United Nations—and I think justifiably—with much disappointment. It has performed some very constructive functions in preserving the peace in many countries, which those who are critical of it are prone to forget. On the other hand, we know that it has thus far failed in preserving peace between the two great protagonists in the world—the free nations and the Communist bloc.

This is understandable with a Communist veto in the Security Council and many new and neutral nations in the General Assembly.

Mr. President, we have been paying far more than our share of the costs—certainly the peacekeeping costs and, to an extent, the regularly assessed dues and costs of the United Nations. Members of the Senate and Members of the House, the press, and the people in many sections of the country have been protesting. I never go home to visit with my people that someone does not ask, "Why don't we make the other members of the United Nations pay their dues?"

I have never failed to resist those views. Instead, I have tried to explain and to discourage the feelings of our citizens who think we should insist on every nation paying its just share in the United Nations, or else have us get out and scuttle and let the United Nations go where the League of Nations went. I count the cost very low, even though we bridle a

bit about paying more than our share. I count the cost really low to contribute what we are obliged to contribute to the only organization in this world that is organized for and dedicated to peace instead of war, to justice, and to the protection of the weak against aggression. Because the United Nations does not practice the principle of one man, one vote laid down by the Supreme Court in our own country, the United Nations has constantly been taking in the new, small, emerging nations, each of which has the same vote and the same power in the General Assembly, at least, as does the United States of America.

Year by year, we have seen looming on the horizon certain events that some of us gravely deplore. Year by year, the best that our friendly United Nations have felt that they could do for us in many cases has been to abstain from voting. Year by year, by a constantly narrowing vote, we have been approaching the time when into the United Nations might be admitted, or invited, a nation or nations that have never once even professed, to say nothing of showing by deed, their desire to maintain peace in the world and to protect the weak against aggression by the strong. The time may come when that will happen. So far as the Senator from New Hampshire is concerned, it will happen after every effort has been made to prevent it, because I cannot see how the United Nations would ever be strengthened by admitting into its body nations that will not even profess a desire to fulfill the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations. However, it may happen; and when it does, we shall hear across this country the greatest outcry we have ever heard to have the United States scuttle the United Nations and to get out.

What has been said heretofore will be a mild, mere whisper, compared to what will be said then. Even though I have raised my voice constantly against the admission of Red China into the United Nations, and shall continue to do so, I am not prepared to say that in any contingency that can be imagined I would suggest our deserting the United Nations, so long as there is the slightest hope that with our participation and assistance the peace of the world may yet be maintained. If that hope should disappear, the situation would be different. But so long as it is certain that if we should withdraw from the United Nations at any time in the future, the United Nations would be doomed—and that would be a grave decision for this country to make—with all those things looking us in the face, the question of appealing to the United Nations concerning the present conflict in South Vietnam or southeast Asia becomes almost minor, grave though it is, explosive though it is, dangerous as it is, and tragic as it is. It becomes almost minor, because the United States has reached a point—and we should realize it, and I commend the President for speaking of it—where we must decide whether we are acting firmly and aggressively in insisting that the United Nations

be a functioning body for peace, and be absolutely unyielding, and adamant in the position we take.

For many years, the Senator from New Hampshire, when he was a Member of the House and later as a Member of the Senate, voted for every foreign aid bill. But for the past 4 years he has voted against foreign aid bills, not because he does not believe in foreign aid, but because he believes that foreign aid has become improperly administered and improperly channeled. He believes we have come to the end of the road in lavishly and indiscriminately dishing out foreign aid to a hundred nations.

We have been weak kneed and irresolute. The State Department, I know, has many explanations. I have heard some of them. I suppose that some of the distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, too, have many answers to this charge. But I say that so long as we are so yielding, so long as we lack the firmness to stand up for our rights and stop trying to buy our peace, stop trying to bribe people, and to stop trying to ingratiate ourselves with people—until we stand up and speak with a clarion voice in the world, we shall continue to be spending American lives not only in southeast Asia, but all across the world. So long as we are willing to fight these battles single handed, so long as we are willing to finance and to pay the price of giving, giving, and giving to nations, regardless of their willingness to stand with us, we shall appeal in vain to our friends in the U.N. The idea that there is something narrow, something selfish, something un-Christian about saying that we will not give aid to a nation until it proves and demonstrates by deeds, not words, that it stands on the side of peace and on the side of freedom and self-determination on the part of the weak peoples of the world, is dead wrong. The situation has reached the point where other nations have come to regard the support of this country militarily, financially, spiritually, and in every other way, as an inherent right, and we have permitted that concept to stand.

Mr. President, the real ray of hope in what the President says is the indication that he intends to put real pressure on the United Nations to get off of its knees and stand on its feet and become an important factor and force for peace in the world.

I hope he means that. I hope he means that from this hour the American people can look to the President for that kind of leadership. I have the very greatest respect and deepest affection for the President resulting from the years that we were associated with him on the floor of this Senate.

I must say very frankly, for these are not times to mince words, that I have a high regard and respect for the Secretary of State, but I do not want to see the Secretary of State and the State Department waging this war.

I must add that in all of my 19 years that I have served in the Congress there has not been a single Cabinet officer, Republican or Democrat, in whom I have not had confidence, even though I disagreed with them.

There has not been a single one I could not trust until we began to suffer under the ministrations of Secretary McNamara. I cannot speak of him with the same confidence and the same respect that I can speak of the Secretary of State.

I believe that the resignation of Secretary McNamara would do more toward winning this war and strengthening our defense posture than the addition of 400,000 men in South Vietnam.

But the President is the Commander in Chief. I pray to God that his reference to the United Nations, the demand that the United Nations assert itself, is not a mere pious hope, but that it represents a firm determination with respect to the United Nations, of which we are not only a part but the part that makes it go, that he intends to require action by that body as the price of our continued support.

This war must cease to be an American war. The peace that follows must not be an American peace, to be enforced unilaterally by this country and having frontiers in Asia patrolled by American boys.

That is the ardent hope of this Senator.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COTTON. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to say by way of comment on this great speech by the Senator from New Hampshire that my reaction is amen and hallelujah at the same time. It is a speech that has been long overdue on the floor of the Senate. I congratulate the Senator.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be inserted in the RECORD a transcript of the CBS news forum yesterday afternoon on the subject of "Vietnam Perspective—The Congress and the War," which was participated in by Senators CLARK, MORSE, MUNDT, and STENNIS, and Representative BOGGS.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE—THE CONGRESS AND THE WAR

(As broadcast over the CBS television network Sunday, January 30, 1966)

Guests: Senators JOSEPH CLARK, Democrat, of Pennsylvania; WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon; KARL E. MUNDT, Republican, of South Dakota; JOHN STENNIS, Democrat, of Mississippi, Representative HALE BOGGS, Democrat, of Louisiana.

CBS new correspondent: Eric Sevareid.
ANNOUNCER. In its continuing special coverage of the conflict in Vietnam, CBS News presents "Vietnam Perspective, the Congress and the War." And to lead the discussion, here is CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid.

Mr. SEVAREID. Good afternoon.

The United States now has a quarter-million soldiers, sailors, and airmen in and near the divided land called Vietnam. More marines have just landed. We are in a major war if not a great one. Since Christmas Eve, no American bombs have fallen on North Vietnam which the Government of Lyndon B. Johnson regards as the real motivating source, the real headquarters of the attempt to take over all of Vietnam.

This bombing pause was to give the Hanoi regime time to think about peace negotiations, we hoped. The President says the enemy has not responded and Ho Chi Minh's statement of yesterday does appear to be a rather flat refusal.

Here in Washington there is a general conviction that we are now about to resume bombing North Vietnam and there is a feeling, strong if somewhat vague, that this will mean the casting of the die, no turning back, and that anything could then happen—perhaps military victory, perhaps the beginning of peace talks, perhaps eventually war with China itself.

The bombing pause also gave the Congress of the United States time to think, and in the last few days many second thoughts have been expressed. Even the President's legal authority for making war in Vietnam is questioned by some. The long-awaited great debate in Congress about this war apparently has started.

In the next hour and a half the lines and the texture of that debate will, we should think, be reflected by what is said around this table by six Members of the Congress, men who represent at least roughly the full spectrum of thought on Capitol Hill.

Let me say at this point that this city of Washington and its surroundings are covered by the heaviest snowdrifts in many years and these men have come to this city today by tow car, police car, and on foot to keep this engagement.

Let me introduce them around the table. First, Senator JOHN STENNIS, of Mississippi, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, member of the Foreign Relations Committee, perhaps the Senate's most outspoken opponent of our Vietnam policy.

Representative HALE BOGGS, of Louisiana, the Democratic whip in the House.

Senator KARL MUNDT, of South Dakota, member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator JOSEPH CLARK, of Pennsylvania, also a member of that committee.

Representative GERALD FORD, the Republican leader in the House was to have been here. He may yet make it. He is coming from the snowdrifts of Virginia. If he does make it, there will be a chair for him.

Well, gentlemen, however we got into this war and under whatever commitments and authorizations, the immediate question in most people's minds seems to be how we go about it from here on out.

A few responsible Americans say we should simply get out of Vietnam. Some argue for a holding defensive action from the bases we already have there. Others want us to pursue an active, hard-hitting battle by all possible means including the bombing of North Vietnam again.

I would like to start this part of the discussion as to what we are to do now with Senators STENNIS and MORSE.

Senator STENNIS.

Senator STENNIS. When we first sent troops into Vietnam in 1954 I strenuously opposed the movement on the Senate floor because I thought it might lead to war and that we would be in there and have to fight it alone. But regardless of the original situation, the wisdom of going in at all, we are there now and I have reached the painful conclusion and I have lived closely with this the last 2 years as chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee. I have reached the painful conclusion that we must see it through. We must fight it through if necessary to a military victory or to honorable peace terms.

Now, we have already put the American flag in issue. We have committed our boys. The flag and our men have been fired on. Blood has been lost. Over 1,800 men have been killed. Our honor and our prestige are both at stake. And that is why I say even though costly it may be, and however far we

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may have to go, to back off now would be more costly and would cost us more in the long run in additional uprisings, outbreaks in Asia, in South America, even in Europe itself, and perhaps in Africa.

Now, it has become clear to me that the Communists in Asia have firmly decided to make this war a test, a test of our military power, how much will we have to use it, and more than that, a test of our national purpose and our will to win.

They believe, I think, that a long, grinding, hard war on the ground will drain away our willpower and that we will finally withdraw; our way to easy peace, largely on their terms. So I think now we must make a national decision that it is our purpose to win and then set about to do the things that are necessary for that victory, and, of course, I think that will include applying military force to break this stalemate we are in now where we can't possibly win without more force.

We must strengthen our forces and move forward, and that means we are driven to resumption of bombing of targets in North Vietnam as a necessary part of the support of our men that are already on the battlefield.

That includes powerplants and petroleum supplies, fuel supplies, ports, harbors, and I think on that point that after the President as Commander in Chief has made the decision as to whether or not we resume the bombing—I think we should—then the military, professional military men can well select the targets and that we in the Congress should not worry about that.

I believe that if we do not proceed along this line, we can expect a continued stalemate, a long, long, bloody, unbearable war that could last for 10 or 15 years, and also that would bleed us and bleed us and that is the Communist line, their hope.

As I said, if we don't make it here, we will have to make it elsewhere in many places.

Mr. SEVAREID. Thank you, Senator STENNIS. Senator WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Well, as my very much respected friend, JOHN STENNIS, knows, I think he was completely right in 1954. I shared his view that it was a mistake to go in. We should not be in there. And I think it is still a mistake, and I think he is wrong now in advocating that we escalate this war and for the reasons that I will give briefly now and expand them later.

First, I want to say that I am perfectly willing to rest my entire case upon the report of the Mansfield committee, the committee composed of Senator MANSFIELD, our majority leader, Senator MUSKIE, of Maine, Senator INOUE, of Hawaii, Senator AIKEN, who is the dean of the Republicans in the Senate, and Senator BOGGS, of Delaware, the report that they made after they came back from their Asian tour entitled "The Vietnam Conflict, the Substance and the Shadow."

And you find in this report many warnings to the American people in opposition to the major thesis that my good friend from Mississippi has just sought to defend. But—and I wish that the American press would start printing that report in installments so that the American people can see it, for the facts of this report have got to get out to the American people if we are going to avoid the slaughter, in my judgments, of tens upon tens of thousands of American boys in Asia for the next many years. Because you are not going to end the war in Asia by forcing the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese to a surrender table. A surrender table will never be a peace table.

The major thesis I want to defend this afternoon is that we are without a scintilla of international law right to follow the course of action that we are following in Vietnam. Sad for me to say it, but the American people must face the ugly reality. We are an international outlaw in South Vietnam. We have

no right under the U.N. Charter. We have no right under the Geneva Accords to be in there. We stand in violation of one section of the Geneva accords after another.

Let me take, for example, our setting up the puppet government in South Vietnam. The Geneva accords didn't provide for two governments in Vietnam. It provided for two military zones, one in the north and one in the south, to which the French military forces repaired; provided for a 2-year period for elections in South Vietnam, to call for the unification of the area, to provide for free elections on the part of the Vietnamese people. Who stopped it? Our country stopped it. We took a Vietnamese exile out of New York City and Washington, D.C., by the name of Diem. We financed him, we militarized him, we set him up as a puppet government in South Vietnam in clear violation of the literal language of the Vietnam accords.

I am at a complete loss to understand why we would violate those accords although at the time we didn't sign them, although we said we would accept them as principles of international law. The sad, ugly reality in that chapter is going to be written against us in the history of international law. It is the United States that from the very beginning was really the major aggressor in South Vietnam.

Next, may I say that I have here 13 articles of the United Nations Charter which in my judgment we stand in violation of as far as carrying out our obligations there. What is my remedy? Not to get out. I agree you can't get out but bring others in. If we just try to get out because of what we have done in South Vietnam, there would be the greatest blood bath I think in human history, but what we need to do is to bring others in on a peacekeeping basis and not a warmaking basis.

So I applaud again, although I had advocated the use of the United Nations, I applauded the Pope's suggestion that this matter be submitted to the United Nations for arbitration. That is one of the outs and one of these articles I point out will provide for that.

But I close these opening remarks by saying in my judgment let the American people face the fact that if you think you can win a war in Vietnam that will not lead to a massive war in all of Asia, you are mistaken, and you are going to have to keep hundreds of thousands of American troops over there for decades to police Asia if you try it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator, I want to turn to Representative HALE BOGGS, of Louisiana. Are you this pessimistic about it?

Mr. BOGGS. Well, Eric, remember, I saw you the night that I returned and I was not pessimistic then and I am less pessimistic now.

Let me say that I am in total and complete disagreement with Senator MORSE. Senator MORSE is consistent in that he was one of the two U.S. Senators who voted against the Vietnam resolution of 1964. His position has not changed, it is not different. I would say, however, that what he advocates would lead to only one thing as it was described in a very thoughtful editorial in the Washington Post this morning entitled "Unconditional Surrender."

Now, one doesn't become an expert by going to a country and spending a few days, a few weeks or an unlimited period of time, but I think one does acquire a feel that he doesn't have unless he does go.

I discovered several things in Vietnam.

No. 1, our position is only now being felt there. In order to judge our posture, I tried to put myself in the shoes of the other man, look at it from the point of view of Hanoi, of Peiping, and as I see it, their situation is much different from what it was 6 months ago.

We keep referring to 1954 and the years in between. Actually, however, we have only had power in Vietnam since last summer when we started moving troops in.

At that time there is no question about the fact that that war was being lost. Village after village was being subjected by the Vietcong. The only really secure area in all of South Vietnam was Saigon.

Today the situation is quite different. It is different in a great many ways. The people have hope. I think they know what they are confronted with. There is an American presence, and I might say further, Eric, that that presence has had a profound impact elsewhere in the area.

Here on the wall—I don't know whether our viewers can see it or not—is a map of the world. Vietnam cannot be disassociated from the rest of the world any more than Greece and Turkey could be disassociated with the rest of the world after World War II, and the same arguments that Senator MORSE makes with respect to Vietnam were made with respect to Greece and Turkey after World War II. And the impact in the other areas is already being felt, particularly in areas like Indonesia where just a year ago the Communists practically had control and where today that control has been substantially eliminated.

Mr. SEVAREID. Representative BOGGS, I think later on in this program we want to talk a good deal about this question of the effect in other parts of the world and our whole posture in foreign policy in the world as a whole because of this war.

Do I gather from what you are saying that you would put the emphasis now on fighting, not on an attempt to get peace negotiations?

Mr. BOGGS. I would subscribe to what Senator STENNIS said, that there are military decisions that have to be made and these must be made by the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, in consultation with his military people.

There is emphasis on fighting, Eric. There are 200,000 men there and the idea that we can let those men stay there with one hand tied behind their back is one that I don't subscribe to. I think the effect would be that the American people would not support that type of action.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?

Senator CLARK. I find myself substantially more in agreement with Senator MORSE than with my good friends from Mississippi and Louisiana. And in particular I rely a good deal more on the Mansfield report than does my good friend HALE BOGGS whose views about the facts appear to be quite different from the views of the five Senators.

Let me point out the last statement in the Mansfield report. It is short.

"In short, such choices as may be open are not simple choices. They are difficult and painful choices. They are beset with many imponderables. The situation offers only the very slim prospect of a just settlement by negotiations, or in the alternative prospect, a continuation of the conflict in the general direction of a war on the Asian mainland."

I am 100 percent opposed to putting the prestige of the United States in a general war on the Asian mainland where we are going to be confronted by ground troops, so many more in quantity than we, our chances of success are minimal.

I support the military position of General MacArthur who warned us against this, of General Eisenhower, who refused to go to a ground war on the land mass of Asia, of General Gavin, of General Ridgway.

I think they are right and I think these people who want to bring us into this war and make it an American war when President Kennedy told us that it was their war, the Vietnamese people's war, they have to win it, they have to lose it, we can help them with material, with advisers, with money, but it is their war.

It has now become an American war and if we follow the advice of Senator STENNIS, it will become an almost completely American war.

We had 10,000 people in South Vietnam, according to the Mansfield report, 2 years ago. We had 34,000 1 year ago. We have almost 200,000 there now.

Senator STENNIS has been quoted, and he can speak for himself, as saying we will need at least 600,000 there. I think it is time to stop, look and listen.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT, of South Dakota, you have been listening the last 15 minutes of this—

Senator MUNDT. Eric, I think—

Mr. SEVAREID. Furrowing your forehead. Now, what would you do at this point?

Senator MUNDT. I think what we have heard here demonstrates what has been discussed around every coffee table around the country, what we hear discussed in the cloakrooms and the committee rooms of Congress, and perhaps involves some of the issues which we should be discussing on the floor of the Senate.

Instead of repeal of 14(b) or some other measure, it seems to me this is the biggest and most important issue before the country. And I have said in the Foreign Relations Committee, and my colleagues have heard me, and elsewhere that I think under our system of government we should have the maximum of consultation with Congress in the formation of policy but a minimum of consultation from the standpoint of battle strategy, selection of military targets. That has to be left to the Commander in Chief and to his military commanders in the field.

But we have been talking this afternoon primarily about matters of policy which resolved, as opposed to simple language, is the issue, do we move forward or do we move out?

Now, there has been injected a third suggestion by Senator MORSE that maybe we can duck that issue by having it decided in New York by the United Nations, but it is a little late for that when we have got over 200,000 American boys under gunfire in South Vietnam. We have to consider their security and their safety, and I am not sure what kind of outcome you would get from a United Nations debate up there, whether you would jeopardize your security or make your security better, but in all events, I would like to see some kind of declaration of policy, and I believe WAYNE will agree on this point, sent down from the White House to the Senate and let us have a debate and resolve whether or not our policy is to stay there and make sure that we do not reward aggression or to pull out, or if it is the will of the majority of the Senate to send it to the United Nations, so be it.

WAYNE. I think you introduced yesterday, if I remember right, a resolution which would have the impact of doing this kind of backward by rescinding the resolution to which the President continues to allude, which was a bit ambiguous concerning policy.

Mr. SEVAREID. Now, gentlemen, you have talked—Senator STENNIS has talked about a national decision. You have talked about a declaration of policy. The President has gone so far on the authority of that August 1964 joint resolution opposed by only two men in the whole of the Congress, including—one of the two was Senator MORSE—I am not quite sure what your—

Senator MUNDT. May I suggest that that resolution included a lot of other things except declaration of policy. It was a bit ambiguous.

Mr. SEVAREID. Yes. That was a resolution that gave the President, as he interprets it, the right to do what he has been doing in terms of military action, the commitment of American ground forces.

How do we get to a point of another declaration of policy? What ought it to be?

Senator MORSE. Eric, let me say first, as KART mentioned, the two resolutions I introduced yesterday, one to provide for the rescinding of the August 1964 resolution and the resolution itself has a statement in it that authorizes the Congress to rescind it if it changes its mind. And I shall always be proud to have my descendants read that I didn't vote for it. But I also introduced a resolution yesterday calling upon the Foreign Relations Committee to proceed with an investigation and hearings on our Vietnam policy.

But basic to that, understand my position. It is that the President ought to be proposing a declaration of war if he wants to take increasing thousands of American boys to their death in Vietnam. I have suggested in the past that he ought to reread Woodrow Wilson's great declaration of war message of April 17, 1917, to the joint session of Congress.

It is a good constitutional lesson set forth in it for the President because Woodrow Wilson pointed out that he was without constitutional authority to make war in the absence of a declaration of war. And I have suggested that President Johnson ought to read Franklin Roosevelt's message following Pearl Harbor asking for a declaration of war. He recognized he couldn't make war without a declaration.

So as JOHN and the rest of us around this table know, it has been my consistent position that no President, including President Johnson, has any constitutional right under article I, section 8, of the Constitution to lead a single American boy to his slaughter in South Vietnam without a declaration of war.

Again, I say, Mr. President, when are you going to recommend it?

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator STENNIS.

Senator STENNIS. Well, first, with all deference to Senator MORSE, I think it is really tragic and unfortunate that he call this position of the United States an international outlaw and by inference put that stigma on the men that are fighting over there.

Senator MORSE. Not at all on the men but on you people that support it.

Senator STENNIS. All right. Now, the idea that we are there illegally, with deference to you, I think it is ridiculous. We went there to their aid at their request. It is an old Biblical principle, come over into Macedonia and help us.

Now, we went with that altruistic, friendly spirit. We knew that the real issue there was Asiatic communism because the guerrillas were literally cutting those little people to pieces.

My objection then was that we were going in alone, but anyway, we went, we are there, we are committed. Now debate is all right. I like debate. But I think the time for talk has about run out. We have been on this policy for 12 years. A declaration of war now—why, three Presidents of the United States have participated in this policy as have Congresses for 12 years. We appropriated money every one of those years. Last year the issue was up on the floor in an appropriation bill that I handled. No one challenged an item in that bill to pay for this war—billions of dollars.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I wanted to, if I may, raise one point in connection with what Senator STENNIS has said here.

Are these actions, the present actions of President Johnson, do you feel in consistent line with the commitments made by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy?

Mr. BOGGS?

Mr. BOGGS. Yes. I think they are totally inconsistent with the commitments made by President Eisenhower and by President Ken-

edy and with similar commitments made by President Truman when he was confronted with Communist aggression in Korea.

Under our Constitution the President is the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. President Kennedy probably took the gravest risk in the history of mankind when he demanded that the Soviets remove the missiles from Cuba. He didn't wait for a declaration from Congress. He had a clear and present danger and he acted because of that clear and present danger.

Now, having said that, let's set the record straight. No President has conferred more with Congress than has President Johnson. He has had dozens of joint leadership meetings at the White House with both the Republican leadership and the Democratic leadership. As late as a few days ago he had 20 Members of the Congress there, including some who have been quoted here, and out of the 20, Democrats and Republicans, I think I can say that 18 of them substantially agreed with the problems confronting us in southeast Asia.

Now, remember, Senator MORSE hasn't changed his position one iota as far as I know. He said what he said previously. He is saying it again. I don't see any solution to the problems as he presents—as he talks about them, and it is very easy to use expressions like "international outlaw." When you go there and you recognize the terror that the Vietcong has employed against innocent people, slaughtering the mayors of the towns, the intellectual leaders, teachers, professors, doctors, the word "outlaw" would be best applied to that group rather than to the United States of America.

Mr. SEVAREID. I want to hear from Senator CLARK for a moment.

Senator CLARK. Again I find myself reluctantly in disagreement with my good friend from Louisiana. I think President Johnson's policy is quite inconsistent with that of both General Eisenhower and of President Kennedy. General Eisenhower authorized the giving of a small amount of economic aid during his term of office. President Kennedy made it very clear, as I said a few moments ago, that this is their war and not our war.

I think we crossed the Rubicon to make it our war rather than their war when last May we authorized another \$700 million for Vietnam. I made a rather extensive speech pointing out that I thought this was a mistake but I voted for it in the end because I felt the President should have the benefit of the doubt.

There is no doubt to my mind that this has now become our war and not theirs, that the policy is inconsistent, that the action is illegal. This is not to say that the action of our vicious and terroristic opponents is not illegal, too, because it is. Who broke the Geneva accords first, we or they, is still a subject of some debate.

I hope, my good friend JOHN STENNIS, that there will be no effort made by the Armed Services Committee to jam through a \$12 billion appropriation with only 5 hours of debate the way it was done the last time. I don't think we have had a debate in any depth in the Congress about this and I agree in that regard with my friend, Senator MUNDT.

Senator STENNIS. Senator, if I may say, I invited debate. I handled the appropriations bill last year for the Department of Defense, the \$700 million and the \$1.7 billion, and I invited debate at that time, and the second bill that passed along in August or September, virtually no debate on that subject.

Senator CLARK. Senator—

Senator STENNIS. That was wide open and long thought. We are not going to try to jam anything through.

Senator CLARK. Glad to hear it.

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Mr. Boggs. Senator CLARK keeps referring to me in his disagreement with me, and I must say that—

Senator CLARK. That is because you were just speaking.

Mr. Boggs. I must say when he describes this as an American war that I must respectfully disagree with him. It so happens that the description is not proper. There are over 600,000 South Vietnamese troops armed and carrying on the major part of the defense of South Vietnam. That is what it is. It is a defense of their country. There are 20,000 or more South Koreans there. There are Australlians, a division or two. Well—

Senator CLARK. Fifteen hundred men.

Mr. Boggs. Well, there will be more. New Zealand is there.

Senator CLARK. Two hundred and fifty.

Mr. Boggs. And there are other commitments being made by other people throughout the world. It is not an American war but it is an American commitment and we intend to live up to it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, all of you here, except Senator MORSE, voted for that resolution of August 1964 which the President cites as his authorization for this kind of war. Why is it that it is only now that this is coming under question? Is the Congress changing its mind?

Senator MUNDT. I don't think it is coming under question only now really. This was tied in with different conditions. It was not as clear cut as I would like to have had it been. I think we concern ourselves a little too much about whether or not there are any inconsistencies between what Johnson is doing and Eisenhower was doing and Kennedy doing. I don't think they are inconsistent. They are vastly different. Eisenhower went in with an economic commitment, as Senator CLARK pointed out, and that only. I think a total of two Americans died over there in accidents during the entire Eisenhower administration.

Mr. Boggs. Senator, if you will yield—

Senator MUNDT. Just a minute. When Senator Kennedy came along, he put in some troops. Now President Johnson is putting in arms. Conditions are different. That doesn't mean that it is an inconsistency. It was moving in the direction of this whole thing, and I do not believe that the President should send down a declaration of war but he should send down a declaration of policy when 15 Senators claim they were confused and didn't quite understand what they were voting for, that it was too ambiguous and—

Mr. SEVAREID. I wonder if we could—

Senator MUNDT. I think we should at least be clear enough what the policy is and let us vote on it.

Mr. SEVAREID. I think Senator STENNIS—

Senator STENNIS. Mr. President, I don't think it is important to go back into this but we sent 200 Air Force mechanics in uniform into South Vietnam as early as May 1954, and that is when I first objected on the floor and we were promised that they would be withdrawn.

Senator CLARK. You are right.

Senator STENNIS. Within 6 months they were withdrawn, but 800 more or 400 more were sent in. That is the beginning of our military participation which has continued since that time.

Now, those things are all moot, though, now. We are in there. We are committed. This policy is a continuation, slow, gradual continuation.

Mr. Boggs. Well, now, let's address again to Senator MUNDT's statement about policy and why we are there. Now, President Johnson made an address, I thought a memorable address, at Johns Hopkins University in April last year, 1965. He spelled out in great detail why we were there. And, as a matter of fact, he invited the Communists—the

Communists said they had to have unconditional negotiations and he said, let's have unconditional negotiations, and they said, well, you have got to stop bombing. So we stopped bombing in May for a week or so.

They said, oh, well, that is not long enough. So for 38 days, now, there have been no bombs dropped on any target in North Vietnam and the reason this debate is going on now, Eric, is because the question is right before us as to whether or not bombing will start again. That is why this debate is happening. And the issues are exactly the same now as they were then except for one very significant difference. For 38 days this Government has sought by every honorable means to bring up Hanoi to the conference table, to negotiate, as the President said, unconditionally.

Not only has the—not only the President sought that but Governor Harriman, Ambassador Lodge has gone to 30 capitals. Ambassador Goldberg has gone everywhere. The Holy Father, Pope Paul, has called for negotiations, and yet Hanoi says, as I cited a minute ago, the only negotiation is with the Vietcong and you let them take over the country.

That is the issue.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we are going to come back to this in a moment. I will have to interrupt for about 1 minute or less to let our stations have a word. So now a pause for station identification.

* * * * *

Mr. SEVAREID. Now back to "Vietnam Perspective, the Congress and the War."

Before we leave the subject of what we ought to do in this fight in Asia, in the immediate future, I would like to get—cover one point we really have not covered and that is what we do about the Vietcong itself, or the National Liberation Front.

Are we leaving some stone toward peace unturned here by not giving them some kind of recognition?

Senator MORSE?

Senator MORSE. Well, I want to comment on that and reply to JOHN, but I will take that point first.

Of course, Brother Boggs here has talked about the President's Johns Hopkins speech, but unconditional discussion, but he didn't offer unconditional discussion except semantically because his Johns Hopkins speech excluded direct negotiations with the Vietcong, and let's face it, the Vietcong has the most powerful enemy force in South Vietnam. They control over 75 percent of the land area. They control most of the—the majority of the people, and yet we have up until just recently wanted to exclude them from negotiations. The President has said they can come in with the North Vietnamese but they happen to be the most powerful force in Vietnam.

But now I want to say this to JOHN. I can well understand how he would take the position—many that share his view take the position—we mustn't talk about all these violations of treaties by the United States with the American people. The American people mustn't be told the ugly facts about what our Government has been doing. And, of course, the German people weren't told either before the rise of Hitler. And I want to state, the American people as they listen to me on this telecast this afternoon, you and you alone own American foreign policy, not the President of the United States. All this talk and this debate about the President being the Commander in Chief does not justify the Commander in Chief taking American boys to their death in South Vietnam without a declaration of war or without living up to our United Nations commitments.

And so I ask again, Mr. President, why don't you take it to the United Nations Security Council?

And what is our Ambassador's alibi? Arthur Goldberg has been saying as his be-

hind the scenes discussions indicate the members of the Security Council don't want it to be taken before the United Nations.

What has that got to do with our treaty obligations? I want to put them on the spot. I want to put France and Russia on the spot in the Security Council and take my country off. I want to get a resolution before the Security Council calling for arbitration as Pope Paul has asked for, calling for the matter to be referred to the General Assembly, calling for a United Nations take-over for peacekeeping purposes.

The sad fact is our country is fighting a unilateral conducted war in Asia that is going to lead us, I fear, into a massive war, and you, the people, have to stop it. And you know how you can stop it. Make clear to your President, make clear to your Senators and your Congressmen, that you want to stop, that you want to use all the procedures of international law available to you, and then if they don't want to do it, then exercise your precious right as free men and women and beat them at the polls starting in 1966 and 1968.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MORSE, I didn't expect to go on this long with that, but in view of that rather lengthy and fervent speech, I think a very brief rejoinder from Senator STENNIS might be in order.

Senator MORSE. Well, I am pretty well—

Senator STENNIS. Just this. Just this. On the United Nations referral, again there is nothing illegal or unlawful that these men we have sent forth to fight have done or that their Government has done, and referral of this matter to the United Nations—if you have a plan, Senator, or anyone has a plan that can be put to them for a matter of their approval and use a device to get something that has already been agreed on, that would be all right, but to defer to them for a solution would be giving them a problem that they cannot solve. We are going to have to—

Senator MORSE. Why do you say that?

Senator STENNIS. We are going to have to put up the men and the money to win this war and we had better go on and do it under our command and those that are fighting with us. I am not willing to turn it over to anyone.

Senator MORSE. JOHN, what you are saying—

Senator STENNIS. Because we are having to carry the load already.

Senator MORSE. What you are saying is we should tear up, just as though it is a scrap of paper, this charter that we signed.

Senator STENNIS. No. No.

Senator MORSE. This calls for exactly the procedure that I am calling for and you can't erase the indelible language of the charter.

Senator STENNIS. The United Nations—Senator MORSE. Article we have been defying.

Senator STENNIS. Intervene and doesn't want to have anything to do with it and— (Simultaneous conversations.)

Senator STENNIS. Doesn't want to have anything to do with it and we would be—

Senator MORSE. We have a duty to—

Senator STENNIS. Jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

Senator MORSE. We have a duty to lay it before them. That is what the charter says. You are violating the law. You don't like to have me call us an outlaw Nation but we are as long as we tear up that charter as a scrap of paper as far as our failure to keep our obligations.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Boggs.

Mr. Boggs. Senator MORSE has again made some rather remarkable statements. In one of them he compared our actions to the actions of Hitler prior to World War II, which to me is an astonishing thing for anyone to say.

Senator MORSE. That is not what I said.

Mr. Boggs. Well, that is the way I—

Senator MORSE. The facts are being kept from the American people as Hitler kept the facts from the German people.

Mr. BOGGS. Well—

Senator MORSE. The people don't know what is going on—

Mr. BOGGS. Well, I say to you that that is untrue, that the analogy is outrageous, and it is a surprising statement for anyone to make, particularly a U.S. Senator. The truth of the matter is that no President, no administration, has tried harder to inform the American people. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, has spent a week before various committees in the Congress in the last few days. The President has had meetings after meetings at the White House with Republicans and Democrats alike, and as far as support is concerned at home, I am perfectly willing, Senator, to take my case to the polls come next November.

Senator MORSE. You are going to have to.

Mr. BOGGS. And stand—well, you bet, and I am looking—I will stand right on what I am saying here today. And incidentally, the people of the United States, if the polls mean anything, support the policy of the Government by an overwhelming majority.

The President is carrying on an astonishing balance between naked Communist Chinese aggression and he has done that with a use of minimum American forces, and he has maintained the support of the American people.

Now, I would say the statements calling the United States an outlaw, comparing us to Hitler, these things really help Hanoi. They certainly don't help anybody in America.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I want to, if I may—

Senator MORSE. If I may reply to that, a typical smear, I am always welcome to—

Mr. SEVAREID. Can we come back to that a little later?

Senator MORSE. I want to say to Congressman Boggs the Communists are not going to determine my course of action. I want to say that the American people are entitled to the facts and if he thinks the American people are getting the facts, I have a whole series of secret documents I would like to have this administration make public. I would like to have them make public the Galbreath report made for President Kennedy before the—

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, we are getting into something that none of us will have the opportunity to pursue because we don't know the premise of the documents you are talking about.

Senator MORSE. I am asking to have them made public, that is all.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, we are not going to be able to do it on this program.

I would like to—

Senator MORSE. I would say in answer to Brother Boggs that we are not getting the facts.

Mr. BOGGS. Well, you haven't—

Mr. SEVAREID. If I may for a few minutes turn this discussion around at least one corner, wars don't just happen on battlefields or somewhere else. This war is, if it goes on, going to affect every family and everybody's fortune in this country, at home. I think maybe we ought to talk a little about prospective price of this war. Our ability and our willingness to pay it. We have had the budget, we have had the economic message now. I am sure you all have a lot of thoughts about that. And I think the Congress will be expressing its views on the cost of this war in many specific votes for many months to come.

I would like to hear now—I think starting perhaps with Senator MUNDT, of South Dakota—are we going to have guns and butter or guns or butter, or what, Senator?

Senator MUNDT. Well, I guess I am standing in for JERRY FORD on that because that was not the topic assigned to me, but I am very glad to respond to it, Eric, because I don't believe that we can have guns and butter with equal emphasis on both without something or somebody being sacrificed, and I am afraid it is going to be the war effort, and I don't see anything wrong about having a little general sacrifice among citizens generally when we are in a war, and we all agree on that around this table.

You call it a major war. I think it is a major war. We are in it whether it is declared or undeclared. The boy who is fighting and dying is just as dead and is in just as much peril regardless of the name of the operation.

Since we are having this great contest in which we all share in the victory or all suffer from the defeat, I think the President should also insist on some sacrifices from people generally, that there should be a cutback in these domestic programs which are not essential as of the moment.

Let's take slum clearance, conceivably a very sound and desirable program, but we have had slums as long as we have had cities and I don't think we should do anything to detract from the importance of getting this Vietnamese thing solved satisfactorily with an enduring and enforcing peace.

We shouldn't do anything in terms of making it easier for the people who are at home.

That is what I had in mind when I say, Mr. BOGGS, that there should be a declaration of policy.

I read the Baltimore speech. It was satisfactory to me. I understand it. But I think that conditions should change. The war has gotten bigger and he ought to make clear what our policies and programs and objectives in Vietnam are and what the relationship of the civilian population is to this war.

Mr. BOGGS. Well, you can't—

Senator MUNDT. I think we lose support when you say this is such a war, we can fight it with one hand and spread goodies out among the people with the other.

Mr. BOGGS. All I can say, Senator is, and I know that you—

Senator MUNDT. That was not in the Baltimore speech.

Mr. BOGGS. Right. I know that you are a well-informed man and I have profound respect for your knowledge, but the President has made a great many declarations since then. Only recently he went to Independence, Mo., for an occasion honoring our former President, President Truman, and there he made another statement very similar to what he said in Johns Hopkins which is the simple declaration that we are going to resist—

Senator MUNDT. * * * (inaudible).

Mr. BOGGS. That we are going to resist naked aggression and we are going to abide by our commitments and that if we want peace, all he would have to do to have peace is for Hanoi to stop aggression. That is what our policy is. And it is based on—

Senator MUNDT. When he says it in Independence he has to use the first perpendicular pronoun singular "I." When he says "We," Congress—we can support him, we can support him, I am sure, in that kind of program if we get a chance and did some sacrificing at home.

Mr. BOGGS. Just a few days ago, addressing a hundred intelligent boys and girls who were selected to come here by some foundation, he again stated the position of our Government.

Senator MUNDT. I would rather have him talk to the Congress than the Boy Scouts.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, gentlemen, we apparently are going to try—

Mr. BOGGS. Excuse me just a minute. He met last week for 3 hours with the leaders of Congress.

Senator MUNDT. That is 20 out of 531.

Mr. BOGGS. And I can't speak for the President of the United States, of course, but I think I can say without fear of contradiction that, No. 1, he has nothing to hide.

Senator MUNDT. I agree.

Mr. BOGGS. And No. 2, if it is necessary that he restate our position, I am sure he will do it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I don't know that we have ever before tried to finance a major war on top of a booming economy, on top of almost full employment, and on top of already high taxation. I want to turn to Senator CLARK for a moment about this. Can this be done? Are we going to get wage and price controls, for example?

Senator CLARK. Well, I think the President's budget was a very skillful effort to have us have both guns and butter. Of course, the question is how many guns and how much butter.

If we were to adopt the policy which I have advocated, which is in short the General Gavin position, to hold strong enclaves in South Vietnam, not to let anybody throw us out, not to scuttle and run, but not to seek out and destroy an elusive enemy hiding in elephant grass and jungle, I don't think we are going to have to have as much more money for guns as some of my belligerent friends seem to believe.

Mr. SEVAREID. I think Senator STENNIS believes that would cost more in the long run.

Senator CLARK. Well, he may, and no doubt in a moment he will have a chance to tell us why.

I believe, however, that if we get to a situation where, despite the objections of people like myself, this war is escalated and it becomes more and more expensive, then we may have to choose between increasing taxes on the well-to-do, on the wealthy, on those living on inherited income, or in the alternative, taking it out of the hides of the poor, and I for one would be in favor of raising more revenues to keep the Great Society programs going as opposed to leaving the present tax structure where it is, which is pretty much lower than it has ever been in any major war before.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator MORSE—

Senator MORSE. Well, I only want to say on the guns and butter issue, you can't fight a massive war in Asia and not eliminate a large part of the expenditures that you plan to raise the level of your domestic economy. The President's budget message already makes substantial cuts in the poverty program, makes substantial cuts in public works programs, makes substantial cuts already.

But what concerns me about this discussion is the failure to meet up to the fact that we haven't got any support in Asia. My colleagues around this table can't maintain any—can't mention a single major country in Asia that is supporting this operation.

Listen to what the Mansfield report says, and I still say I will rest my case on the Mansfield report. He says:

"With a few exceptions, assistance has not been and is not likely to be forthcoming for the war effort in South Vietnam from nations other than the United States. On the contrary, the longer the war continues at its present pattern and the more it expands in scope, the greater will become the strain placed upon the relations of the United States with allies both in the Far East and in Europe.

"And I just took a Senate delegation through a 5-week tour of Asia and nowhere in the 5 weeks did I find anything but lip service for our war in Asia, and in Hong Kong we got a briefing that left no room for doubt in my mind that if we escalate this war, we give China no course but to come in."

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Mr. SEVAREID. That is exactly what I want to get into in the latter part of this program which I would like to come to in a few minutes, but I do think we ought to—people ought to be told a little more about what this war, if it continues, is going to mean to families and—

Mr. BOGGS. May I address myself to that just a moment?

Mr. SEVAREID. I think Senator STENNIS has asked for the floor.

Senator STENNIS. I will be brief on this. I think the first priority business now is to win this war. That is not only in money but in sentiment and first priority in policy, not only our Government but we ought to try to convince our allies in Europe and in Asia, too, that it is the first order of business with us, and I think that trying to carry on all the other programs almost at their top level leads our would-be allies to believe that we are not as serious about this thing as we should, perhaps makes our enemies think that we are on our way out after all.

I do think the President can quickly shift his emphasis, though, even in a week's time with reference to the funds.

Now, there is no trouble about getting money appropriated. I think if it goes on it will have to be on a large scale and that we will have to have, well, it almost comes to some kind of controls of strategic materials and could come very rapidly, but certainly we ought to emphasize the winning of the war and say we are going to defer many of these other programs.

Senator MORSE. John, you can't possibly have a war without price controls and wage controls and complete control of the economy. We had to do it in World War II and this is going to get into that kind of a war.

Mr. SEVAREID. I want to ask Mr. BOGGS—

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. SEVAREID. What he—

Mr. BOGGS. I think that in order to understand this, we have to look at where we have been and where we are.

Now, Senator MORSE referred to World War II and we might refer to several other wars. World War I, for instance. We had a gross national product of about \$40 billion in this country, the base for conducting that war.

Mr. SEVAREID. World War I.

Mr. BOGGS. World War I. World War II, which was an enormous operation, our gross national product was still less than \$100 billion. As a matter of fact, when Franklin Roosevelt became President of the United States, it was less than \$50 billion but we were in a gigantic depression.

In Korea the gross national product of this country was about \$280 billion. Today the gross national product of this country approaches three-quarters of a trillion dollars. It is about \$700 billion. It is estimated that it will be about \$725 billion in this calendar year.

The cost of Vietnam at the moment represents about 1½ percent of that gross national product.

Now, the base is so much greater that to make the analogy between this situation and some of the others is not entirely accurate. So that I think we have to have all of those facts before us.

As a matter of fact, last year alone the gross national product of the United States increased by \$47 billion, which is the equivalent of the entire gross national product of India or the entire gross national product of Canada, and it is more than the entire gross national product of all nations on earth except for three or four of them.

So the base that we operate from is a very strong base indeed.

Senator CLARK. It is a great pleasure for me to agree completely for once with my good friend from Louisiana. I think the President's budget is realistic in the light of the present situation which confronts us. I think what Congressman Boggs said about

our gross national product is pertinent. I think we can have this war fought the way I would like to see it fought and still have the majority of the Great Society programs go forward, and if that becomes unfeasible because we are threatened with some inflation, then in opposition to my good friend from South Dakota, I would raise taxes instead of striking out the Great Society program.

Mr. SEVAREID. Gentlemen, I think the President predicted a fiscal year deficit, 1967 fiscal year, of more than—of less than \$2 billion.

Senator CLARK. Yes, but, Eric, that is on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, there was a surplus of \$500 million.

Mr. SEVAREID. Does Senator MUNDT think that such a prediction over an 18-month period—

Senator MUNDT. Out in South Dakota where I come from, a merchant doesn't try to determine how successful he has been in business by simply considering the amount of cash he takes in. He always thinks about the cash he takes out.

Now, as Congressman Boggs talks about this great national income, how it has been accelerated, getting larger and larger, that is true, but it is also true that in this whole period we have engaged in so much deficit spending that while the national income has been getting larger, so has the national debt.

Mr. BOGGS. No, it hasn't.

Senator MUNDT. Now at an alltime high.

Mr. BOGGS. No.

Senator MUNDT. Probably \$325 billion, and you will be trying to lead your troops down the aisle of the House this year for another extension of the debt limit, and you know you will.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr.—

Senator MUNDT. Because of the fact we are not trying to balance the budget—

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman—

Senator MUNDT. We are spending money faster than we are taking it in.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, that just isn't so.

Senator MUNDT. Like the one-eyed merchant.

Mr. BOGGS. It just isn't so.

Senator MUNDT. Are you going to say that you are not going to ask the Congress to increase the debt limit this year?

Mr. BOGGS. Let me tell you why it is not so. The debt ceiling at the end of World War II was about \$340 billion but we had a gross national product of less than \$250 billion—at that time less than \$150 billion. Today we have a debt ceiling or debt of about \$321 billion but we are making \$720 billion. So that our income is twice what we owe.

Now, let's leave it—even in South Dakota they understand that, don't they?

Senator MUNDT. Are you willing to tell the American public today that you will not ask for a debt increase limit this year?

Mr. BOGGS. No. I am not willing to say that.

Senator MUNDT. Of course you are not, because you are still engaging in deficit spending.

Mr. BOGGS. No. I am not willing to say that because I don't know—I want to say this, that I associate myself with what JOHN STENNIS said. I think that whatever is required in South Vietnam must be provided and I also associate myself with what Senator CLARK said, that if it does require additional revenues to finance some of these—the war in Vietnam, and some of the essential programs—you know, it is easy to get confused in terminology. Let us look at some of these things. One of the biggest is education. I just don't believe that any society where education is a dominant fact in whether we move ahead or not, that we can cut back on that. I just don't think we can.

So that as I see it, we have to have a bal-

ance. We have to maintain a balance, but I say to you, Mr. Moderator, that never has a country been in this kind of a position before in all of the history of mankind so far as economic strength is concerned.

Senator MORSE. Can I—

Senator MUNDT. There seems to be—

Mr. SEVAREID. Wait a minute. Excuse me 1 second. You seem to be saying—are you saying that we really can fight this growing war in Asia without individuals in this country running much risk of a personal pinch financially?

Mr. BOGGS. No, I am not saying that.

Senator MORSE. I want to make a couple of comments very quickly. First, Congressman Boggs' statement on education. As chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education, let me say this administration is planning to cut back on education and drastically on education, and I shall oppose it.

But I want to say that my difference with JOE CLARK and with you, Congressman BOGGS, is that you are arguing from a premise that your Vietnam situation is going to continue to stay within the budget estimate. And what I am trying to get you to see is that the Vietnam situation, once you resume the bombing, is going to escalate into a major war throughout Asia.

Mr. BOGGS. Well, that is your premise.

Senator CLARK. I—

Senator MORSE. But I—

Mr. BOGGS. That is not my premise.

Senator MORSE. I don't think there is any way you can possibly avoid it and I heard nothing in my trip to Asia that would justify anybody believing that you are not going to get an escalated war—

Mr. BOGGS. Well, I was there and—

Senator MORSE. Wait until you drop the first bomb on China and you will see what China is going to do.

May I say very quickly, Eric, you know why they don't want a declaration of war? They couldn't enforce that declaration of war even against some of our allies. They couldn't enforce it against Russia. You have a declaration of war and one of the first things you do then, you completely change your international law relations overnight with every noncombatant nation in the world, and you drop a blockade around North Vietnam—name the countries that will respect the blockade. Of course, we can start with Russia. She isn't going to respect the blockade and the first Russian ship you sink, you are in a war with Russia, and it will be fought not in Asia but in New York City, Washington, D.C., and everywhere else.

Mr. BOGGS. Eric, just to get the record straight, I don't want to be on an hour and a half program and not have my own position stated and understood.

In the first place, I don't advocate war. What I advocate I believe leads to peace and I realize that I am in complete disagreement with Senator MORSE because it is my fundamental belief, based on whatever knowledge one can gain from history as I read it, that if we surrender, if we pull out, if we accept the terms of Ho Chi Minh at Peiping, there we will not have achieved peace.

If we could achieve peace by doing that, well, maybe it might be a rather cynical thing to do, but maybe we could sacrifice these people in South Vietnam. But in my judgment, this would not bring peace.

I think we would have to stand somewhere else and the escalation would come not on our side but in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Thailand, in Australia, and ultimately we would be confronted not with peace but with world war III on the terms that Senator MORSE described.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, this is what I think, gentlemen—we ought to spend the rest of this program talking about it. Exactly the

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kind of thing that you have just now mentioned.

Senator MUNDT. May I say—

Mr. SEVAREID. The affect on the future in the world.

Senator MUNDT. May I say to Hale that he has not only said something now with which Senator CLARK agrees. He has said something with which I agree.

Mr. BOGGS. Thank you.

Mr. SEVAREID. There are many questions, many serious and grave questions, obviously many of them of a speculative nature at this point in this war about our overall foreign policy and what is being done to it by this war.

Does it, for example, intensify the so-called cold war with Russia? Does it tend to drive China and Russia closer together or further apart? Does it weapon us politically, militarily, in other parts of the world? A lot of such questions.

Senator MORSE?

Senator MORSE. May I say this in answer to what I think was a clear implication of Congressman Boggs, that I am seeking a settlement that Ho Chi Minh and Peiping would approve of.

I certainly am not, but I am also saying that we haven't any unilateral right to determine what that settlement should be either. It ought to be determined by the noncombatants acting through this charter, and I am at a loss to understand how we can meet in 1965 and forget 1945 so soon, because we committed ourselves in this charter not to resort to war and that is exactly what we are doing, and what makes anyone think in this administration or in the country that we have either the resources or the manpower to police the world?

And let us remember that we are the only major power except for that rather weak base that Great Britain has in Singapore that is maintaining overseas military bases.

Now, all the other nations of the world that tried it in Asia got driven out, and what concerns me are the American boys 50 and 100 years—and girls, too—from now. We cannot police Asia. We have got to work out in my judgment an international understanding whereby we will have the nations lined up against the Communists to enforce the peace by peacekeeping procedures.

That is what I am pleading for. And that is why I think we ought to try Pope Paul's suggestion of getting it into the United Nations and proposing arbitration and see what they do.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator STENNIS, isn't this war in a very long-range sense a step, an effort, however, blundering and groping to get some kind of balance of power to keep the peace in Asia as it has been kept pretty well for the last 20 years in Russia?

Now, do we feel that—I take it you feel that this effort of ours is going to lead toward that kind of stabilization to a degree rather than that this effort in itself is going to upset Asia into—knock it over into a third world war.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I think if we do not carry it to a conclusion that is successful that that is really the end of any stabilization and any policy that we are interested in. I believe it is a total collapse.

Now, after we have carried it to a successful conclusion, frankly, I think we have a terrific problem ahead from our viewpoint in getting things stabilized there so as to hold in check this spread of Asiatic communism, and frankly I don't think we are going to be able to do it alone because we have only 6 percent of the population and 7 percent of the land area and limited in our manpower and our resources.

But certainly how it ought to collapse is for us to fail to win this war. It is absolutely essential. And from there on I think further steps must be taken successfully to consolidate some kind of plan that

will be effective. I do not think the present ones are. That will be effective toward stabilizing that great area of the country. And I don't say we would have to withdraw if we don't get it, but we certainly would have to reconsider the whole policy and move to a new position.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT?

Senator MUNDT. Now getting to the topic on which you asked me to discuss matters, and I am glad to be on it because this is now looking ahead, the thing that has brought my support of the administration's policies in Vietnam and the thing that will continue to bring it so long as I am convinced that we are moving in that direction, is that I firmly believe we decrease the likelihood of global warfare and the nuclear warfare by refusing to reward aggression in Vietnam and refusing to accept defeat, and as long as this administration policy follows that line, as long as I think it moves in that direction, I am going to continue to support the President, and I wish he would put it that clearly to Congress. This is the thing which I have been talking about, not a declaration of war.

Who are you going to declare war on? Russia and China and North Vietnam and the North Liberation Front? Or do it on the installment plan. That might move us in the way of escalating the war that we are all trying to hold out.

Now, you asked us to say something about what this implies in terms of future relations with Russia and China, and I think that the only way you can discuss that is to try to conjecture as to where this war is going to go. Our relations with Russia and China are going to be substantially different if we don't accept defeat there than if we do accept defeat. So much depends entirely on the imponderables.

Is there going to be a spreading of differences between Russia and China? Are they going to move toward each other? Nobody can speak with accuracy on that. We can't tell. Is there going to be any tendency on the part of either Russia or China to discontinue their continuous aggression by military tactics and by subversive activities?

Are they ever going to be content to let little countries like Vietnam work things out for themselves? What is going to be their attitude on the nuclear bomb, the thing that nobody talks about, Eric, but the thing that is in the back of the minds of knowledgeable people, this terrifying though, what is going to be the relationship of the free world to China once they get a delivery system for the bombs they are building now?

We say we mustn't do this in Vietnam or do that in Vietnam because of the reactions of China. China isn't going to go away. In 4 or 5 years it is still going to have reactions, and what are those reactions going to be if she gets a delivery system for a whole arsenal of atomic bombs and continues her hatred of everything sacred and everything free and everything white and everything American as she does now?

These are the imponderables.

Mr. BOGGS. Let me recount a bit of history. I was there during the week of the Cuban crisis with the other congressional leaders with President Kennedy and after Khrushchev had written his letter to the President saying that he would withdraw the missiles, President Kennedy said almost in an aside, he said, "The threat to world peace is no longer dominant in Russia. It is now in China." And the real test of what happens to mankind is what transpires after China obtains the hydrogen bomb.

About 2 years later I was back in the same room in the White House with President Johnson, most of the same people, and the briefing was on that very subject, the fact that China had exploded a nuclear device. And the question was directed to Secretary

McNamara—I can say this now because it was published in the New York Times just a few days ago—as to what the present danger is, and the answer came back that there was no real present danger but within 10 years, assuming the continuation of militant, aggressive communism in China and the development of an adequate delivery system on the part of the Chinese, the danger would be real and very acute.

Well, now, I think, Senator, that that is really what we are talking about and that is what the debate is all about in Vietnam. And I think that history is pretty much on our side. I believe that much of this militancy was synonymous with the Soviets a decade or two ago, and we stood firm in Greece and Turkey and Berlin and in Cuba, and now we are faced with the same situation as I see it in China and we must stand firm again.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?

Senator CLARK. This is the subject, Eric, to which you asked me to address myself for perhaps 3 minutes, and I should like to make seven points.

The most important, indeed the vital aspect of our foreign policy in the foreseeable future, will be our relations with Russia and China. The Vietnamese war is really only an incident in that overall relationship, an unhappy, an unfortunate incident which I hope we can terminate promptly with honor.

I agree with Senator MUNDT. I don't want to accept defeat. I am against it. I disagree with Senator STENNIS that we could fight a holy war against godless communism to total victory in this kind of day and age. Most wars end short of unconditional surrender. I hope this one will.

My second point is that if we could arrive at a detente with the Soviet Union or with the various matters with which we are now in disagreement, wars of national liberation, the German problem, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, most of our problems of peace would be solved, and this to my way of thinking should be the major objective of our foreign policy to deal with those rough, tough, mean Russians in a way which is to their self-interest, economic and social, and to our self-interest.

I believe this is not impossible. I don't think we are doing nearly enough on our side to arrive at that result.

Third, the Russian-Chinese quarrel is serious. We should do nothing to drive them together. If we start bombing Hanoi, if we start bombing Peiping, not only will we lose Saigon but we will throw Russia into the arms of a leering China and we will be in very grave difficulty.

My fourth point is that China is still at the belligerent stage of its revolution and we must persuade China that they are not going to win by undue belligerence, whether it be by financing wars of national liberation elsewhere or by achieving total victory over South Vietnam and the Americans.

And my fifth point is that our diplomacy should be adjusting itself to an overall effort hopefully with the support of the Russians, and the other Communist nations to persuade China that mutual and peaceful coexistence is essential to her well-being as well as to ours.

My sixth point is that world war III is unthinkable, under no circumstances should we allow the thought of a nuclear war, the bombing of Peiping, the unleashing of nuclear weapons in Vietnam or China to drag us into a holocaust which would destroy our civilization.

And finally, my seventh—in other words, I am against preventive war now as I have been since the end of World War II.

My seventh and last point is that Vietnam makes all of this very difficult indeed and we should do our best to come to an adjust-

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ment under which we have an honorable peace, under which nobody throws us out but so we can get back to the really important matters of foreign policy which is our relations with Russia and China.

Senator MORSE. Eric, may I say I completely agree with the seven points that JOE CLARK has just enunciated, but I want to make a comment on KARL's and JOHN's talk about aggression. It sounds like Dean Rusk. Somebody ought to ask the question who is aggressing?

Now, there isn't any doubt that the North Vietnamese have violated the Geneva accords. But so has the United States, and from the very beginning. And here is Vietnam—the North Vietnamese say, "We are going to put out of South Vietnam and help our brothers, the Vietcong, put out the United States, which is in violation of the accord, and that is the reality that Dean Rusk doesn't want to face up to and I am afraid most of the administration.

Well, wait until we get a judge on it. If you ever get before the United Nations you are going to get it judged on, but I want to get that behind me, and I want to say that a group of us had a meeting not so long ago with the Russian Ambassador. I was invited to it. And there is a lot of talk, you know, in this country about bombing Hanoi and we asked him, "What would be the position of your government," and he said, of course, if we bomb Hanoi we couldn't bomb Hanoi without killing Russians and they, of course, would go to the support of North Vietnam.

Then we asked him about bombing nuclear bases in China, and he said, "What is the date for that? Can you tell us when you plan to do that?"

Then he made very clear, as I found wherever I went in Asia, that if you move into China, you are going to get involved in a land war with China because you can bomb her out as far as her cities and nuclear installations are concerned, but you are going to have to meet her on the ground and you are going to have to meet her with hundreds of thousands of men, and that causes me to say, Eric, what I said in the beginning—that we are keeping from the American people facts as were kept from the German people, and we are.

Let the administration open the safe of the Foreign Relations Committee, bring out and let the American people see it before they start dying by the hundreds of thousands what the top military advisers of this Government said about a land war in Asia, and I want to say there is nothing that has changed the situation.

You are not going to produce peace by a land war in Asia. You are going to produce peace by doing what JOHN STENNIS, I think, clearly implied, getting some other nations to line up with us to keep the peace, not make war but keep the peace. And that is why I supported for example, the United Nations action on the Gaza strip, in the Congo, and Cyprus, in Pakistan, and India. It was all right for Arthur Goldberg to urge the Security Council to take action on the war between India and Pakistan. Why doesn't my President say to Goldberg, "Get up there and offer the same resolution for United Nations take-over in South Vietnam."

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Boggs.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Moderator, Senator Morse has reiterated some statements that he made earlier which I addressed myself to at that time.

I would like to elaborate a bit, if I may, on some of the very thought-provoking statements made by Senator CLARK a moment ago. One I think is a split between the two types of communism, the Soviet brand and the Chinese brand.

I think this is indeed a very real thing. In every Communist Party on earth this struggle is going on between the Chinese

Communist and the Russian Communist. The significant thing, I believe, JOE, is what the impact might be if we did withdraw from Vietnam without, to use your very fine phrase, "an honorable peace," because that is what I want, too.

Senator CLARK. I think all six of us want that.

Mr. BOGGS. Right.

Senator CLARK. Five of us.

Mr. BOGGS. In my judgment, unless we achieve that, the Chinese type of communism would become dominant on the earth and it is a militant, aggressive type, and I think, as I said earlier, that this would indeed lead to world war III.

There is much evidence of this, Eric. Japan is a good example. Japan has labored diligently since the conclusion of World War II to establish a viable democratic society and has done remarkably well. Now, the impact on Japan if the Chinese Communists became dominant in the world in my judgment would be very severe indeed.

So in our consideration, the consideration of our Government, this clash between these two branches in the Communist world is just as important as anything else under consideration.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Boggs, the Chinese attempts to influence other countries, Latin America, Africa, Indonesia, apparently have been going backwards—

Mr. BOGGS. Yes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Not forward.

Mr. BOGGS. I think that is because we have made our presence felt. I believe that had we not had the presence that we now have in Vietnam, that the movement would have been forward rather than backward. And if our presence fails there, believe me, you will see it move forward in Latin America.

Mr. SEVAREID. Do you look at Asiatic communism as a kind of monolithic force that can be controlled from one headquarters, be effective in many continents?

Mr. BOGGS. I look at the Chinese Communist leadership today very much like the Russian Communist leadership under Stalin and his group of people. I think it is old, that it is doctrinaire, that it is inflexible. I think—and I use the word "think" because I don't know any more than anyone else does—that as the young leadership comes forward and the need for the development of the country increases—industry, education, public works, and so forth—that there might very well be something similar happening in China that happened in Russia.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. MUNDT.

Senator MUNDT. Let me say in that regard that I do hope that we don't bet too much of America's future and too much of the peace of the world on the assumption that you have a great big cleavage between Russian and Chinese communism that is going to break apart and serve us. There would be a lot more persuasion on what Congressman Boggs is saying if the Russians were not putting SAM missiles in around Hanoi killing American boys right now. Let us hope the split develops but let's not develop—and I am sure you don't intend to let it develop—

Mr. BOGGS. No.

Senator MUNDT. On the assumption—this is—

Mr. BOGGS. Of course not.

Senator MUNDT. Assumption, and it is so rare that I agree with Senator WAYNE MORSE in public, let me say I agree when he says that he thinks we should try to get the allies of the United States and all other free countries, whether allies or not, interested in helping us find a solution to this Vietnamese situation which avoids defeat and avoids rewarding aggression, and there are specific steps this administration should take, and here is where I depart from the administration.

I had supported its program in Vietnam except its weak diplomatic leadership, its weak political leadership in international capitals. I don't condemn it for not being able to carry peace around like somebody selling Fuller brushes from capital to capital, looking for a buyer. It was a noble effort. I still hope it succeeds. But I condemn it because it fails to do anything about inducing our allies, Britain and Norway and Greece, to stop shipping supplies into the Communists.

It is a horrible thing to think about England, using British bottoms to carry British supplies to North Vietnam to help the North Vietnamese kill Australians. Canadian wheat through Hong Kong. The same thing holds true—we've got a club. We provide aid to over a hundred countries in the world. WAYNE MORSE and I have been trying to reduce it down to at least 70, I think we had in our amendment, as a starting point. But we are providing AID money, American taxpayer money, if you please, to foreign countries who are helping the Communists in Hanoi. And in China and in Russia. And that is what I condemn, a failure to exert important American leadership to try to consolidate some free world support behind our effort in Vietnam.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Moderator—

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator STENNIS.

Senator STENNIS. May I make two points. The time is about up. One is that this has been a congressional debate, nationwide television coverage. Doubtless some quotes from it will be in the papers, even in Vietnam, in Stars and Stripes.

I want to make this clear. In spite of a sharp division in thought here around this table, I have no doubt myself once the President considers all the alternatives and announces what his next move and step is going to be as Commander in Chief in this war, that it will have very solid support here in the Congress and throughout the Nation, I really believe, and we will move forward as one, almost. And I want the boys that are in Vietnam and on their way there to clearly understand that.

Now, No. 2, with reference to the future in Asia. I have no solution there but I say again if we back up and our present position in this unfortunate situation now we are in, I don't think we need to worry about our leadership in Asia after that. We won't have any leadership. We will be relegated ourselves to a secondary position and we will be a follower. And I say this, that I wish that the President could be more effective with our NATO allies and with our Asiatic allies, and I don't know that he is to blame on that. Perhaps this pause has been trying to rally some support for that cause.

I am terribly disappointed. I think they ought to be told that we absolutely cannot further keep 250,000 men, for instance, in Western Europe unless they can give us active support now—if not in manpower—manpower, certainly, with diplomatic support of the very strongest kind. The same thing in Asia. Japan, with all deference, has been under our umbrella and I am glad she has, but she could help.

Senator MORSE. I want to very quickly say that I disagree with certain things that JOHN has just said and Congressman BOGGS said in his last comment. You will lose your support in Asia if we continue to make war in Asia and don't get others in to help us keep the peace.

Congressman BOGGS thinks that you have got to see this thing through, or we are going to be in an impossible position in Asia. Well, where are our Asian supports—Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, India, Pakistan? The great nations of Asia are not with us in regard to this matter—

Senator MUNDT. Korea is in it in a big way. Senator MORSE. What?

Senator MUNDT. Korea is in it in a big way. Senator MORSE. Korea is our military dependency. So is Thailand, Thailand is our sanctuary. Talk about secrecy. Some of you didn't like to hear me mention it. Let this administration tell what we have been doing in Thailand, time and time again, setting up our military base from which we are bombing into North Vietnam.

But the point I want to make here is I think you are overlooking what is going to happen to Chinese communism, too. We talk about 10 years from now on the assumption that you are going to have the same kind of monolithic communism in China 10 years from now. Any of us think that we would have the kind of changes in Russia that happened the last 10 years? Ever think the incentive motive would start getting into Russian communism?

Now, these despicable Chinese Communist leaders are old and are going to die soon, and you watch out as the Chinese people become more and more enlightened for a change, not away from what we will call communism, but away from the kind of communism that these desperate men are ruling in China at the present time.

And I think we make a mistake if we build up a situation here where we take the position that we are going to try to dominate and control Asia because you will turn the Asians against us.

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Moderator—first let me say that I thought the statement made by Senator STENNIS was most appropriate about supporting our forces there. There is one thing that was very gratifying to me when I was in Vietnam and that is that we have as fine an Army, Navy, and Marine Corps as you will find anywhere. They are well motivated. They are wonderful Americans in every sense of the word.

There is one matter that I don't think has been touched on adequately in this whole hour and a half and that in my judgment has been the impact of what the President has attempted to do in the last 38 days.

Now, the reason we are having this discussion is because there is debate now as to whether or not bombing should be resumed. But it is well to understand that for 38 days not a bomb has been dropped, and during that period of time our Ambassadors—maybe some of them have not been terribly effective, but I think men like Harriman and Goldberg are very able men indeed—they have made it crystal clear in my opinion that the United States wants peace, that it will negotiate unconditionally, and that we have taken away this propaganda device that the Communists have used, and they can no longer say that we won't negotiate.

As a matter of fact, I quoted in the beginning the editorial from the Washington Post this morning entitled "Unconditional Surrender," and I think that has been a tremendous gain on the part of this Government in the capitals of the other nations on earth.

Mr. SEVAREID. I wonder if we could go back to what we started with here, which is the question of resuming bombings. For what it is worth, I would like to see if I can get a yes or no answer from each of you as to whether you think we ought again now to bomb North Vietnam.

Senator STENNIS. Unquestionably, yes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator MUNDT?

Senator MUNDT. I think that is strictly a military decision to be decided by the Commander in Chief and the commanders in the field. I don't think Congressmen should try to decide military strategy.

Mr. SEVAREID. Senator CLARK?

Senator CLARK. I think it is a political decision which has to be made by the President of the United States only secondarily

acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief. I hope he will decide for political reasons not to resume the bombing at least for the time being.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. BOGGS?

Mr. BOGGS. I agree substantially with what Senator MUNDT has said, although my personal opinion is that bombing must be resumed very soon.

Senator MORSE. It would be fatal for peace in Asia, and may I say in regard to these comments about who is supporting our boys in South Vietnam, in my judgment the escalation of this war is going to kill thousands and thousands additional of those boys that shouldn't be killed.

We ought to stop the escalation of the war, and as I said, get other nations in there quickly, or at least, try to, and that will—

Mr. BOGGS. How are you going to get them in Senator?

Senator MORSE. I have told you, by letting Goldberg go to the United Nations tomorrow and file a resolution and put it squarely up to them.

Mr. SEVAREID. The pot is beginning to boil again just as we have to shut off the boiler, I am sorry to say. It has been a long period. You have been articulate, decisive. We are very grateful you all could come.

I have very little to add except one or two thoughts. I think perhaps this has been a sample of the state of mind of the American Congress as a whole, a foretaste of what is likely to come up there in the way of debate for months ahead.

Congress is divided, in some measure, on the justification of the war, by a large measure on how it should be conducted; I am sure about the size of the risk involved in setting off world war III, and now 18 months after our first engagement with the enemy in the Tonkin Gulf, after nearly a year of bombing in North Vietnam, serious and sustained congressional discussion of the war seems to be really just beginning.

Perhaps that is quite comprehensible. We have arrived at our present condition in Vietnam only step by unanticipated step. There was no Pearl Harbor, no declaration of war by them or by us.

Perhaps it is fair to say that Americans as a whole have rather little collective memory of this war. They have trouble pronouncing the names of the enemy. They are not quite sure whom they are supposed to hate. And they are not at all clear what the ultimate stakes might be.

So, sustained debate or events or both could crystallize all this and bring it into some focus. Many people here hope that it will. That will be hard to do, perhaps, unless the Congress is clear in its own mind as to the war, its cause, conduct, identity of the real enemy, the nature of the final goal we seek, and we hope that the debate has been part of that process.

This is Eric Sevareid in Washington. Good afternoon.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Gore] for the words articulated probably better than I could express my thoughts on this matter.

I applaud the President's excellent decision to take the Vietnam problem to the United Nations and I am glad that his decision to renew the bombing of North Vietnam is combined with this effort to achieve a diplomatic resolution of our strife.

At this point, I request unanimous consent to insert in the Record, at the end of my remarks, a copy of a speech I made on November 8, 1965, to the St. Charles Parent-Teacher Club of Providence, R.I., in the course of which I advanced seven

points or recommendations with regard to Vietnam, the fifth of which was:

Let us make an even stronger effort to turn this problem over to the United Nations, as was Korea. To do so effectively, we would have to agree, whether we liked it or not, to abide by the results of the United Nations collective judgment.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL REGARDING VIETNAM, DELIVERED IN PROVIDENCE, R.I., NOVEMBER 8, 1965

The problem of Vietnam continues to exacerbate our national mood with more persistence than any other foreign policy matter for a decade. As the draft calls mount, our involvement, which in many ways seems so distant, comes closer and closer to the families of each of us. And as the draft cards burn, the Nation is swept into an ideological debate which becomes less and less relevant with each irrational act.

My own concern with Vietnam is tied intimately to my day-to-day work as a Senator, and particularly as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was just under 3 years ago that I accompanied Senator MANSFIELD on a 40-day Presidential fact-finding mission to Vietnam and other countries on the periphery of Communist China. The analysis which we made of the basic weaknesses and problems confronting South Vietnam have unfortunately held up very well indeed.

It is against this background that I would like to venture a few thoughts on Vietnam today; in particular, to voice my hope that the administration will continue on its course of firmness and restraint, and to offer my idea of a long-range resolution of our commitment in that unhappy land.

At the outset, I wish to express my complete support for President Johnson and my general endorsement of the excellent way he is conducting the affairs of his office. Few Chief Executives in history have been faced with such a rapidly shifting panorama of events—both domestic and foreign—and even fewer have had the good fortune to be able to deal with history with such success as he already has.

I have supported the bulk of the hard and unpleasant decisions he has made in Vietnam so far because I have been convinced that he has had no clear alternative to the course we have followed. Now, particularly, I support him in his restraint and his opposition to those who wish an inordinate escalation of our involvement in Vietnam. I hope the administration will sustain an attitude of patience that can come only from a true sense of history.

I believe before we can peer into the future and sensibly plot our course in Vietnam, we must first look at the past. One of our most fatal weaknesses is to think of a particular moment as a time all by itself rather than as simply a fleeting pause in the continuous stream of history. But, we must use the moments given to us as moments not just to act or, worse, to react, but to think ahead. While we cannot change the course of history that has already run, our actions today can alter the course of the stream of history to come.

In southeast Asia we find an area whose most conspicuous unifying force since the days of the Khmer Empire and the Le dynasty was the rather loose administration of France over Indochina. The people in the area are of assorted religions and philosophies, and varied ethnic strains and education. The great power center in the area is—and has been for 2,000 years—China, a people with the oldest continuous civilization in the world, but also a nation that has

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continuously sought to dominate the countries on its periphery and which has always been attracted by the rich Rice Bowl of Indochina. The history of southeast Asia is replete with efforts of the Chinese to take over those people and, often, they have succeeded for a period of time.

But the Chinese expansionist drives have been limited in the past by their own technological ability.

At this juncture in history we are faced by a new China with new technology that poses a virulent threat to the peace of the world. Given a free rein, she might serve as a powerful magnet to the still hungry masses of the Far East.

Now, let us examine our present position. It seems to me that we have at least tacitly weighed and rejected two extreme alternatives in recent months.

The first, which we wisely resisted, was unilateral withdrawal. If we had pulled out, the Communist North Vietnamese and their Vietcong cohorts surely would have simply rushed in to fill the ideological and military vacuum which we left behind. Or worse, the Communist Chinese might have been tempted to score, at no cost, the great victory they were denied in Korea.

The other extreme alternative was to escalate to full scale war and an American occupation of South Vietnam, committing if need be all of our ultimate weapons at whatever risk of involving other big powers, notably Communist China, and at whatever risk of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Happily, each of these harsh alternatives was rejected. Between them, the Johnson administration has fashioned a rather skillful middle course, involving a very substantial U.S. military commitment which has decidedly stopped far short of indefinite escalation.

It is a commitment which has been exercised with wisdom and restraint and which, by and large, has been directed at limited objectives. There has not been a nuclear escalation and the Chinese so far have not seen fit to enter the fray. While victory in the usual sense is by no means assured to us, there have been a few signs that the tide of battle may be swinging slowly in our favor. I emphasize the word "may." We have, at the least, established before the world our credibility as an ally and our willingness to stand by our commitments.

There is of course, the distinct possibility that our involvement will drag on to a protracted war of 3, 5, or 10 or more years, and with that protraction could come risks of further and further escalation of the conflict. We have only to remind ourselves of the terrible war we had to wage against a similar foe in Korea where the tactical situation was much more to our favor because the conflict was confined to a narrow peninsula surrounded by sea that was under our control. There the land boundary separating South Korea from the Communists is but 135 miles while the sea boundary is 712 nautical miles. In South Vietnam, unfortunately, the land boundary to be defended is 875 miles and the sea boundary 865 nautical miles. Thus the vulnerable land frontier in South Vietnam is more than six times longer than the Korean front. Another measure of difficulty is the fact that last year alone the South Vietnamese Army suffered 25 percent more battle casualties proportionately that we incurred during the entire 3 years of the Korean conflict.

So, we continue to face extremely difficult odds in Vietnam and we may at times be sorely tempted to use means that will not be appropriate to our objectives.

For example, I must say that I have already at times wished we would use more restraint with regard to the bombing of targets in North Vietnam. I say this because I believe that while our bombing may seem to be suc-

cessful in its immediate tactical objectives, I believe it is counterproductive in its political effects, in that it tends to strengthen Communist unity and morale. And let us remember that this is a political, not a tactical war.

Also, when it comes to honoring commitments to South Vietnam, we must remember that this is a two-way street. By this I mean that just as we are in South Vietnam because the government of those unhappy people asked us to be there—so, if their government asks us to depart, we should be willing to depart.

But, if we are asked to stay—and I see no sign that we won't be—we must accept the fact that it could turn out to be a very long-term commitment and that we may have to stand fast and hard in South Vietnam over an extended period of time.

This is especially apt to be the case because the Communists and particularly the oriental Communists, have added a new dimension to warfare, and that is time. Just as Einstein added time as a fourth physical dimension, so must time be added as a factor to the total political warfare of today, particularly when such wars are masked under the term "wars of liberation." And time stretched out is a dimension with which we Americans hate to work, just as it is a dimension that the Communists like to use freely.

We like neat, quick, clear answers. A 20-year war makes us shudder, but not our enemies. They accept and seem to revel in muddy answers and lifelong struggles.

As was once said of Mao Tse-tung in the conduct of his successful revolution in China, Hanoi and the Vietcong have been trading time for space and cities for men.

But we must also recognize that the greatest power in Asia, whether we like it or not, is Communist mainland China, a position that is emphasized by its acquisition of nuclear capability. If we peer into the future, I think we must accept the premise that China will play the dominant role there. Our problem over the long haul is to make sure that, while China may dominate its immediate neighbors there—just as do we in the Americas and as has every great nation in history—she won't devour them. And, this means holding the line at this stage of Communist Chinese virulence and expansion with all its emphasis upon atheism, materialism and hatred of the United States.

It seems to me that once the Communists accept the fact that we are not leaving, that we will not be impatient for quick victories and that we have adopted their viewpoint toward time—they will be deprived of the keystone of their own strategy. And we, for our part, will find that time works in our favor, both from the short term and long term viewpoints.

From the short-term viewpoint, our patience and implacibility may convince the Communists to call off their troops and save their energies for another day. They certainly should be eager to see us depart, for our continued presence in southeast Asia must be as galling to them as a Chinese presence in Latin America would be to us.

From the long term viewpoint, I believe, the passage of time itself contributes to the internal distress and progressive dissolution of the Communist system. This results from the fact that communism as a system goes against the basic natures of human beings; there is thus constant internal pressure to erode the system and with the passage of time the erosion in fact changes the nature of the system. We have already seen the beginnings of the process demonstrated in the European Communist nations, where the achievement of material well-being has sharpened the taste for more freedom and dictated a relaxation of the controls on which the system depends.

Our present problem in Asia, therefore, is

to persist and stand fast, whatever the difficulty, and confront the Communists on their own terms. The world should heed President Johnson's pledge that we have a long-term objective to restore peace and that we, for our own part, do not intend to withdraw until peace is restored.

We must also I believe be thinking beyond military strategy. We should, in fact, formulate and follow a systematic, step-by-step plan not only for concluding the military engagement but for securing the peace which should follow. We must anticipate the knotty problems of negotiating a viable peace with ample provision for political stability and economic reconstruction. We must especially see to the needs of the Vietnamese people and make stringent guarantees that no reprisals will be taken against any of the South Vietnamese, who have fought the Communists so bravely.

I submit we can do this by taking the following seven steps:

First, in order to properly support all our efforts, we must continue our military pressure in South Vietnam on the Communists. We can do this with the least expense to our side by digging in at the coastal cities where we command the air and the sea. At the same time, we can militarily probe and expand the area under our control when we wish and on our own terms in order to make life miserable for the Vietcong. We should do this in full acceptance of the possibility of a long stay in Vietnam and hence take such positions that our casualties and losses will be held to the minimum possible.

While doing our best in the border areas to interdict help coming from North Vietnam, I believe in general that we should not escalate but rather should deescalate our bombing of North Vietnam. And, when there is a pause in our bombing there, it should be for a matter of weeks, not days, if we are serious in our hopes that such a pause might be productive of any steps toward the conference table or any reduction of Communist pressures.

Secondly, and most important from both tactical and political standpoints, I believe our fighting load should be far more greatly shared there with our Asian allies. By doing this we could dispel the impression held by so many Vietnamese that this is a white man's colonial war. It would also help us to get away from the present pattern where we react violently if American soldiers are killed, but gloss over the killing of 10, or even a hundred times that number, of Vietnamese. Let us make as our goal at least the matching in numbers of American troops there by our non-Vietnamese Asian allies. We are presently a long way from such a goal since the total number of allied Asian troops there is a couple of thousand. This is only 3 percent of our land forces alone in South Vietnam. Actually, there are probably several times more American troops in South Vietnam than there are members of the Vietcong born in North Vietnam. And there have been no traces of Chinese in South Vietnam and only a trace of the Chinese in North Vietnam.

Third, let us engage, as President Johnson has suggested, in a greater economic and educational development program. In doing this we should avoid a unilateral approach. We should make far greater use of the United Nations' technical assistance program in the area, even though neither North nor South Vietnam is a member of the United Nations. We would again, be sharing the burden with other nations. President Johnson's proposal at Baltimore for a lower Mekong River development project to be engaged in by all the countries interested in the area is a fine one. The Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) should be utilized to the fullest in this connection as this would be further effort in internationalizing our economic efforts in southeast Asia. We should

move vigorously ahead with the proposed Asian Development Bank.

At present, the number of American civilians employed by AID and other agencies in South Vietnam is 791. Yet, by contrast, the present number of U.N. technical assistance people in Vietnam is 23. I would like to see these figures reversed and have 791 U.N. technical assistance people there, preferably from Asiatic nations, and 23 of our AID people merged amongst them.

Also, I believe our Peace Corps volunteers should be in this area where they are so acutely needed, and I hope that the Peace Corps will be ready to send in a substantial contingent as soon as possible.

Fourth, as Senator MANSFIELD has suggested, we should urge Great Britain and the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva Conference and seek a neutralization of both Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, a neutralization that would be fortified with ironclad guarantees.

Fifth, let us make an even stronger effort to turn this problem over to the United Nations, as was Korea. To do so effectively we would have to agree, whether we liked it or not, to abide by the results of the United Nations collective judgment. In this connection, Secretary General U Thant has been pressing for negotiations: it would be interesting to see if he could come up with some sort of U.N. peacekeeping formula or force.

Sixth, we must accept the fact that no matter whether under Geneva Conference or the United Nations auspices, we would have to talk and negotiate with whomever was at the conference table, no matter whether that table was convened by the cochairman of the Geneva powers or the Secretary General. This would inevitably mean we would have to negotiate with the Vietcong.

The question of dealing with the Vietcong is one that we will have to accept before we arrive at any final settlement. To make an extreme analogy, in connection with our own Revolution, no matter whether General Washington's forces had won or lost, the British would have had to deal with Washington and not with the Government of France. This would have been true even though it was French gold that sustained our troops in our Revolution and there were more French troops than American at Yorktown.

In the modern parallel, it seems quite clear that we will have to deal eventually with the Vietcong, even though they have been fully supported and decided by the Government of North Vietnam—just as our own American revolutionaries were supported by France.

Indeed, the relationship between the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Government is so close that it is the northern government which so far has stated the terms of settlement. These terms were set forth in a four-part statement by the Premier of North Vietnam last April in response to President Johnson's four-point proposal made in his speech at Johns Hopkins.

While there are considerable differences in the formal language used in each case, it seems to me quite apparent that the two sets of proposals are by no means incompatible.

Both sides, for example, agree to the principle of withdrawal of foreign military forces and bases, although the United States, of course, stipulates that peace must come first.

Both sides agree to the principle that all of Vietnam shall have independence, sovereignty and self-rule, although the United States makes it clear that South Vietnam shall have the clear right to remain separated from North Vietnam.

Both sides appear to agree on the need to let the people of Vietnam resolve their problems without fear of retribution or interference, although we have made it clear that this must not preclude international inspections.

And finally, both sides appear agreed on the principle that the people of South Vietnam should elect their own government and run their own affairs, although I hasten to point out that the Communists in this instance have attached a crucial, and so far unacceptable, condition.

The crucial reservation is that self-rule in South Vietnam shall be in accordance with the problem laid down by the National Liberation Front, which in effect is the political arm of the Vietcong. This political program, when analyzed combines a neat mixture of double edged slogans and appeals to motherhood with insulting expressions about the United States. If the insults are removed, the remaining points revolve around questions of semantics. "Progressive democracy" means one thing to a Westerner and another to a Communist.

My seventh and final point is that regardless of the obvious ambiguities and uncertainties, we on our side must resolve to implement President Johnson's suggestion of last July and continuously emphasize our willingness to abide by the Geneva agreement of 1954, accepting the results of fairly conducted elections as long as there was specifically set forth provisions for amnesty and safety for all in Vietnam, North and South. Since the government that might emerge as the end result of such elections could develop into a nationalist Communist regime, like that of Yugoslavia, there would have to be included a plan for expatriation as political refugees of any who wished to do so. Borneo would, I believe, be the best site for such a haven as it is close, climatically similar and would strengthen the anti-Communist complexion and Government of Malaysia.

The national government that would emerge being composed of Vietnamese, that government would probably be as hostile as it safely could towards the dread Chinese octopus, its historical enemy to the north. Because of this and also because of our own national interest, some sort of ironclad guarantees for the safety and independence of an eventually reunified Vietnam would have to be undertaken by other nations, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union.

We must also face up to the fact that, from the viewpoint of the flow of history, our mission in southeast Asia will prove difficult if we conceive it as being to create South Vietnam in our image or to have it remain forever separated from North Vietnam. Just as the two Germanies will some day be unified, so will the two Vietnams. In toto, then, I believe our mission is to make sure that when this happens, such a unified Vietnam will not prove a threat to the peace of the world and that our own South Vietnamese allies will not be maltreated as the result of unification. If these two steps are achieved, our American national security will be adequately protected.

President Johnson's speeches at Johns Hopkins, San Francisco, and in Washington on July 28, 1965, all open the way for such a course.

But we must, I believe, also always keep in our minds—and our opponents' minds—the fact that our long-range objective is to achieve peace in the area and to avoid indefinite massive escalation of military operations in southeast Asia.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this proposal is very similar to that advanced by Pope Paul calling for arbitration by the United Nations.

I congratulate the President on this move and pray that they will reward his efforts to achieve peace in southeast Asia.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, in view of the developments over the weekend and this morning with respect to the sit-

uation in Vietnam, I should like to suggest to the Senate seven points for peace.

First. The most important, indeed the vital, aspect of our foreign policy for the foreseeable future will be our relations with Russia and China. The Vietnam war is really only an incident in the overall relationship—an unfortunate incident which I hope we can terminate promptly with honor.

I do not propose to accept defeat in Vietnam; neither do I believe we can fight a successful war against communism to total victory in that area, on that terrain, so far away from home in this day and age, without accepting unreasonable risk of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. Most wars end short of unconditional surrender. I hope this one will, with an honorable negotiated settlement.

Second. A detente with the Soviet Union on the various matters with respect to which we are now in disagreement would solve most of the difficulties of bringing a just and lasting peace to the world. If we could agree with the Russians on a policy of peaceful coexistence, an end to wars of national liberation, a solution to the Germany problem, a treaty against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban treaty, a stay on the deployment of anti-missile missiles and meaningful progress on disarmament, we would have gone a long way toward peace.

This should be the major objective of our foreign policy: To get started as quickly as possible on the complex and difficult job of collective bargaining with the rough, tough negotiators for the Soviet Union, to achieve a result which is to their economic and social self-interest, as well as ours.

I do not believe this task is impossible; but I also do not think our State Department is doing nearly enough on our side to arrive at that result.

Third. The Russian-Chinese quarrel is serious. We should do nothing to drive these Communist giants together. If we start bombing Hanoi, if we start bombing Peiping, not only are we likely to lose Saigon but we will throw Russia back into the arms of Communist China and be confronted again with a monolithic and powerful adversary.

Fourth. China is still in the belligerent stage of its revolution. The Russians have already learned that military solutions to matters in disagreement with the West cannot be successful; now the Russians can help us get that message across to China. And that means China must learn that its attempt to finance and support wars of national liberation, as well as its encouragement of Hanoi and the Vietcong to press for total victory in South Vietnam, work against China's long-range interests.

Fifth. Our diplomacy should turn away from the matters which now preoccupy it to an overall effort to achieve the support of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist nations in an effort to persuade China that mutual and peaceful coexistence is as essential to her well being as to ours.

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Sixth. World war III is unthinkable. Under no circumstances should we even contemplate a nuclear war. The bombing of Peiping, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam or China, a landing on the coast of North Vietnam or of China involve an unacceptable risk of a holocaust which would destroy civilization. I am as strongly against preventive war against China now as I have been against preventive war against the Soviet Union ever since the end of World War II.

Seventh. Resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and escalation of the war in South Vietnam through a policy of search and destroy make the achievement of these major objectives of our foreign policy difficult if not impossible. I commend the President for his determination to continue to seek negotiations under which we may obtain an honorable peace. I am delighted that he has instructed Ambassador Goldberg to present a new initiative for peace to the United Nations Security Council. I am pleased that he is cooperating with Pope Paul in his efforts to bring about arbitration of the controversy. We must terminate the war in Vietnam as promptly as possible to get back to the first priority of our foreign policy, which is to improve our relations with Russia and, with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, present a united front against the belligerence of the Chinese Communists.

In this regard, with deep regret, I find myself in some disagreement with the able and much beloved Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], whom I see in the Chamber.

I would hope that he was unduly pessimistic when he told the Senate this morning that we are going to have a long, hard war which will be difficult to terminate short of an all-out war in southeast Asia.

I know why he thinks that. I read the report to which he was a party with five Senators who went to Vietnam. The report was prepared by the group of which the majority leader was the chairman.

Nobody can tell what the future will hold. The Senator from Vermont may turn out to be right, but I would hope there was enough initiative in our diplomacy, with the President at its head, and that there will be more and more initiative by the State Department than we had in the last few years, so we can find a solution to this matter before all of those American boys will be killed, who inevitably will get killed in an effort to achieve total victory in southeast Asia.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Vermont for having opened this discussion on the floor of the Senate today. I was one of the 15 Senators who signed the letter to the President, urging him to delay the resumption of bombing of North Vietnam.

The President has chosen to resume bombing. I am of the same opinion that I was at the time we sent the letter; namely, that the military case for bombing had not been made nor had the diplomatic case for bombing been made.

In any case, the decision on the part of the President has been announced and, as other Members of the Senate have indicated, there will be full support by way of authorizations and appropriations, I am sure, so the method which has been decided upon can be pursued as effectively as possible.

I was pleased that at the same time this announcement was made, the matter of referring the conflict to the Security Council was included. I think it would have been more effective from the diplomatic viewpoint if the announcement about referring it to the Security Council had been made separately from the announcement about resumption of bombing; but, in any event, this is a great step forward.

We have moved, with reference to the United Nations, in recent years, as if it had no real concern in the Western World; as if it were an agency which could deal with problems in Europe or Asia; but that when it came to problems involving the United States or the Western Hemisphere, somehow or other, they should be settled outside the United Nations.

Here we have indicated our confidence in the United Nations by preparing to take this most serious matter before the United Nations itself.

I think the debate which has been carried on on the floor of the Senate and the interrogation of administration witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee last week have been most helpful by way of preparing, at least, for decisions in this most critical area.

There has been a movement toward a more realistic and objective judgment. We have come to the knowledge that the United States is directly involved in the negotiations. Hanoi has publicly announced that it is one of the principals in this dispute. I think we are on the verge of acknowledging, too, that the Vietcong are a real force in the war in South Vietnam.

I was interested in noting in the debate that there was little or no reference to the Tonkin Bay resolution. It is my judgment that this resolution has less bearing on this matter or discussion than any other document. The President received no additional grant of authority when the resolution was adopted than he had before it was adopted. He had no more authority after it was passed than he had before it was passed. I think it does somewhat of a disservice to the functions of the Senate to bring that matter into the debate. I think it tends to discount the power of the President in the resumption of the bombing.

I am hopeful that, as a result of the experience we have had with that resolution, in the future when similar problems may arise and similar dispositions may be made, the Senate will be more prone to adhere more closely to its traditions under the Constitution and may move away from a kind of foreign policy by way of resolution. I hope it will go back to the traditional practices and processes under which the Senate has proceeded on foreign policy matters, and take only formal action, and that we will depend more on the Constitution itself.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am very much interested in the comments of the Senator from Minnesota, particularly toward the last of his comments, dealing with the resolution of August 1964.

Last Saturday I introduced a resolution to rescind that resolution. According to its provisions, it would be subject to rescission at any time Congress saw fit to rescind the prior resolution.

I also introduced another resolution calling for public—and I stress the word "public"—hearings on the whole situation involving the U.S. war in Vietnam.

I quite agree with the observation of the Senator from Minnesota that Congress ought to take another look at attempts to transfer to the President certain powers that, in my judgment, under the Constitution cannot be transferred to him. That is why the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Gruening], and I have been rather lonely voices in the Senate, protesting the resolution of August 1964.

But that is water over the dam.

Now we have to decide whether we are going to take the American people further down the road by Executive order. Once again, from the floor of the Senate, I warn the American people that we are being led down the road away from a constitutional form of government based upon three coordinate and equal branches of government and being made to travel down the road of Executive power.

History is replete with examples that when the power of self-government is in fact turned over to the Executive—I care not under what form of government—the loss of freedom develops.

I have introduced this resolution in the interest of my country. The preservation of our constitutional system of three equal and coordinate branches of government is more important than the powers which the President may seek to add to Executive power.

Under this administration we have traveled far down the road toward government by Executive power. That is why I think the previous resolution ought to be rescinded and the President ought to come down before Congress and ask for a declaration of war. When he does come here it is my prediction that the American people will repudiate him.

Mr. McCARTHY. As the Senator knows, I too am concerned about our constitutional responsibility in the Senate in the field of foreign policy and about the need that there be a sharing of that responsibility between the Senate and the President.

The Constitution as drafted by the Founders did not really set one branch against the other, the executive against the legislative, particularly the Senate; but provided for a sharing of decisions.

At the time the Constitution was drafted, it was assumed that there would be a declaration of war and a treaty which would settle that dispute. It was assumed that there then would be a period of stability of 10 or 20 or 30 years.

This is no longer the case. The fact that history is different now does not pre-

clude the Senate from following those procedures or establishing procedures so it can, with the Executive, share its part of the burden.

I am concerned over statements by some Members of the Senate who say we must trust the military with this problem, that this problem is one of military action, and that we should not question the generals, but trust them.

If we were to accept that philosophy as a part of our foreign policy, we could then proceed to a programing in the State Department and eventually a methodology by which the President would determine the principles, and then the principles would then determine the kind of action we might take. We cannot run such a risk.

In the past the Western nations have been protected because of the lag that has obtained between the time of the new engagement and the invention of new weapons. Weapons of the previous conflict were used. We have been saved because of the fact that we were fighting with weapons of a previous war.

The danger in 1966 is that we will fight with modern weapons, with resulting disaster.

To ask the Senate to trust the military, as some have asked us to do, is to ask the Senate to repudiate its duties under the Constitution and its responsibilities under the Constitution. I and many other Senators do not intend to give up those responsibilities.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the Senator will permit the Chair to ask, is there further morning business? Do Senators wish to speak in the morning hour?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] begins his discussion on H.R. 77, I would like to make a comment relative to the tenor of the debate in the Senate Chamber today.

I am delighted that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Aiken], the ranking Republican in this body, and one of our most senior Members, saw fit to launch the debate on southeast Asia. He did so with his usual calm and understanding, with his full awareness of the potentialities of the situation that confronts us. He did so in his usual, wise, and considerate manner. I am delighted that the "owl" undertook to launch the debate. I am delighted with the debate that has taken place today, because there were no personalities involved. It was carried on in the traditions of the Senate. I think this discussion was long overdue, and it is to be hoped that we will have more of such debate in the future.

Mr. HART. Mr. President, the RECORD earlier today will show I was present. Having read my mail, if I did not say a word as this debate closed I would be scolded by those at home who do know the answers—and not all of these knowledgeable persons are at home; some are here.

Very frankly, I doubt I can contribute anything that has not already been said. I do wish that in this Congress as well as in this country there would be a little more willingness to be tentative, tenta-

tive in our judgments of what the history of the moment requires, tentative in our judgment of the motives of others, both those who speak and those who sit and listen and think.

It is unfortunate that a Member of this body feels he must rise and say something lest he be clobbered as forfeiting responsibility. It takes no courage to get up and speak for peace. I can think of no shorter cut to popularity.

I think all of us hoped that the President would be able to arrive at a decision that would avoid resumption of aerial bombing. Some have publicly voiced that hope; others of us have advised him privately that we would hope that on all the facts—some of which we cannot know—relevant to such judgment, this course could be followed.

If I thought resumption of bombing was merely the frustrated response of a giant power like the United States which says to a smaller country, "Forward march," and the country does not march, then I would rise in protest.

But I am convinced that there is no man in this country or in this world more anxious to see us get to a conference table under circumstances which will establish conditions for a peace that is real, one that will not come back to haunt our children.

We could obtain a peace easily. We could leave Vietnam—that would give us peace—and in the lifetimes of most of the Members of this body, it probably would not make any difference, except to reduce our taxes. But if it was misread by others in the world it might have enormous implications for our children.

Mr. President, I suppose that what I am really saying is that—as other Senators have voiced this morning—I am delighted that the President has referred this issue to the United Nations. Read Ambassador Goldberg's message to the Security Council President, please. But, as others have cautioned, this is no short-cut, either. The harshest note on which this debate could close would be to suggest that there are some problems in this world that are never solved. But it is a hard truth. We know it to be true in our family life, and history tells us that it is true with respect to the family of nations and their problems.

There are some Ph. D.'s in history in the Senate. I am not one, but I have the impression that we will find this lesson throughout history, especially in our relations with the rest of the world, or the nations' relations with other nations—the lesson that for some problems no answer really is at hand, no matter how decently disposed are all parties.

For most of 300 years, the underlying problem in European history was the conflict between Christianity and the Moslem world. It was a problem that was never solved. This did not excuse those living in a particular generation from seeking to resolve, to compromise or to modify it. But notwithstanding all such efforts no one solved it, and it was sort of absorbed by other problems—the Renaissance, the age of discovery, the machine age.

The relationship between the free societies and the less free societies is the

problem which confronts us today, the beginning point of which usually is marked by the attitude that developed in Russia about 1920. Conceivably this relationship is one of those problems which never really is solved. I suspect it is. And it is for this reason, I suspect, also, that my children will find Vietnams around the world in their lifetimes, too; and finding them, I hope that they will not say that their fathers could have solved the problem merely by getting up and making a speech. In our search for intermediate solutions we must not wonder whether someone else's devotion to his country is any less than our own just because he has trouble being as convinced of the wisdom of our own suggestion as we are; we must acknowledge the necessarily tentative nature of our own judgments.

As human beings, we are fallible, and we will remain fallible, even if we talk here for a month.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield at that point?

Mr. HART. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I should like very much to associate myself with the remarks and observations just made by the distinguished Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART].

There is another part to this story that should be told, for the benefit of the American people.

As a member of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Defense Department, it has been my responsibility and my opportunity to sit in at the recent hearings that we have held with relation to the \$12 billion and some \$348 million which is being asked to conduct whatever needs to be done in the next fiscal year in Vietnam.

I have been quite impressed with what has been stated by the Senator from Michigan this afternoon. I regret very much that I was not in the Chamber when other Senators spoke on this subject, but I was encouraged and very much impressed by the attitude and the statements made by Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, before that hearing.

Many people do not know this, but here is a man who has been bandied about around this country, who has been accused of conducting what has been characterized as "McNamara's war." Yet, at that very meeting there were many responsible and sincere Members of this body who were badgering the Secretary of Defense—when I use the word "badgering," I use it in the kindest sense—to go the full limit and do everything that was absolutely necessary in order to win the conflict in Vietnam. And of course, that is appealing. That sounds very fine. Who does not wish to win? Yet this man sat there with the calmness and the patience of Job, explaining that what we were trying to do was to achieve a limited political goal in Vietnam, and that in order to do it we had to conduct a restrained offensive.

That is the policy of our Government—a restrained offensive.

In other words, Mr. President, what we are trying to do is to avert that one act

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which will set off the trigger of an atomic or a thermonuclear war that might burn this entire world.

I would hope that in our anxiety to see results, we are not going to commit that one act of indiscretion, of injudiciousness, which might compel other nations to possibly live up to their commitments—whatever they may be—and inject themselves into the fray, where they do not belong, and touch off a nuclear or thermonuclear holocaust. That is the one thing that the administration is trying to avert.

Now the question may be asked: If that is the case, why did we resume bombing?

I have heard evidence on that question, too. Since the cessation of the bombing, there has been a terrific build-up in South Vietnam, so much so that the President of the United States, who is responsible for the safety and security of 195,000 American soldiers who are committed there must now make a decision on bombing. We will continue, as we did in the past, not to try to overturn the Hanoi government, not to commit that one act which might compel Red China and Russia to come into this conflict, but at the same time make them understand that they cannot win by violence, that they cannot subject other peoples to their will through violence, and that America will open wide and keep open wide the door to bring this issue from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

That is all that the President of the United States is trying to do, the one man who has the power, the one man who has the responsibility of making this decision.

Senators can sit here. They can debate. They can say what they believe. I daresay that if we are wrong on this 31st day of January 1966, we can come into the Chamber tomorrow, the 1st day of February 1966, and take another guess.

But, the President of the United States cannot have that second guess. He has to be right. He has to do what is right in the eyes of the world, and what is right for the safety of those 195,000 American soldiers now in Vietnam.

It is debatable whether we should have gone into Vietnam when we did, in the first place. But, the fact is that we are there now, and that we are holding a bull by the tail. We have such a divergence of opinion in this body as to emphasize the task of the man at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, and I wish to join my colleagues in saying here, on the afternoon of January 31, 1966, that I pray to God that Lyndon Johnson is right. I pray to God that he will do the things that must be done to bring this issue from the battlefield to the negotiating table.

I thank the President, and I thank my colleagues.

Mr. HART. I am very grateful for the comments of the Senator from Rhode Island. There is one aspect which this debate should not belabor, and which the Senator from Rhode Island wisely mentioned at the end of his remarks: Should we have been in Vietnam in the first place?

Argument on this point can be raised in a number of ways. But the overwhelming fact of life is that we are now

there. It is like telling the pedestrian in the middle of a 10-lane highway that he should not be there. "Fine," he will say, "but how do I get out?"

It is like a social worker telling the troubled, abandoned mother of 13 children, "You should not have had so large a family; you should have seen me 13 years ago."

Let us not spin our wheels on what might or should have been. The President cannot indulge in such luxury and I think we should not. Much of value has been spoken this morning and from both sides of the aisle. Certainly no comment will be of greater value than the brief but eloquent observation by the thoughtful majority leader, Mr. MANSFIELD. As we close this debate I want to thank him and the distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] for setting a theme which has encouraged thoughtful comment.

DISTRICT OFFICIAL CRITICIZES PROPOSED ABOLITION OF SCHOOL MILK

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I have been inviting the attention of Senators to the sad effect of the cut by the Budget Bureau in school milk funds appropriated by Congress and to the proposed elimination of most of the school milk program.

No justification has been given for this slash. It would not save a penny for the taxpayer. It would simply deprive schoolchildren of milk and increase the excess stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation.

Without leaving Washington, any Member of Congress can see the stupidity of this action.

Here in the District of Columbia, officials have followed an excellent and unique policy—alone of American major cities—by providing totally free milk daily to all elementary public schoolchildren and to children in participating private schools regardless of economic need.

Mrs. Aleta Swingle, District schools food service director, has called this action a "tremendous loss to the District."

I ask unanimous consent that an article in the Washington Star, reporting Mrs. Swingle's reaction, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SCHOOL AID RAFS PLAN TO ABOLISH U.S. MILK SUBSIDY

A cut in the Federal milk subsidy for school children proposed in President Johnson's Department of Agriculture budget would be a tremendous loss to the District," the District of Columbia school food service director said today.

The President's budget proposes eliminating an average 3.19 cents per half-pint subsidy on milk provided to all children regardless of need, and concentrating instead on making totally free milk available to needy children.

Mrs. Aleta E. Swingle, District schools food service director, said if the elimination of the subsidy is accepted by Congress, elementary school children in the District who do not qualify because of need would probably have to buy their milk at 5 cents a half pint.

The District has been unique among major cities in providing totally free milk daily to all elementary public school children and to children in participating private schools, regardless of economic need.

A free half pint has been provided for about 20 years and this school year a second half pint was provided, financed mainly by Federal impact aid funds.

The District gets about \$1 million from the Federal subsidy, \$275,000 from District funds and \$200,000 from impact aid funds for the milk program. At the junior and senior high school level milk is also subsidized, but children pay 2 cents a half pint.

BALL GIVES FIRST HISTORIC AND GLOBAL JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, in the view of foreign policy experts, the speech by Under Secretary of State George Ball yesterday on Vietnam is of first-rank importance.

It is said that this speech by Under Secretary Ball marks the first time the Johnson administration has explained in full detail its world view of why we are in Vietnam.

The President has been an eloquent and frequent defender of our policies in Vietnam for many months.

But the Ball speech now puts the U.S. involvement into full historic perspective.

In the administration's view as expressed by Ball, we are not simply in Vietnam to repel local aggression, or to stop a militant Communist regime. We are in Vietnam "to prevent the Communists from upsetting the fragile balance of power through force or the use of force."

Ball sees the closest historic analogy to our position in Vietnam in the 1947-48 war in Greece, when the clear aggression of the Communists was decisively and successfully met by the Truman administration.

Secretary Ball documents the contention that Vietnam is not a civil war, but clear aggression by North Vietnam.

Ball also emphasizes that if Communist China is allowed to move into Vietnam, it "would mean according to China a status it had never been able to achieve by its own efforts throughout the ages."

The Under Secretary also calls our attention to the fact that Communist Russia has changed since the United States and Europe "built a dam" to contain Communist ambitions. Ball argues that, given time, a containment policy in Asia, holding back Chinese ambitions may similarly bring "a peaceful relation with the rest of the world."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this highly significant speech by the Under Secretary of State be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE GEORGE W. BALL, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY ALUMNI ASSOCIATION, EVANSTON, ILL., JANUARY 30, 1966

Sooner or later the time will come when each of you will experience my sense of shock when your generous invitation led me to count up the years since I first became an

alumnus of Northwestern University. I took my degree from the undergraduate school in 1930. More than a third of a century has passed since that time.

That period of more than one-third of a century has been a fortunate time in which to live, an exciting time of change and ferment—particularly for an American. For during that third of a century our country ceased to be a voice offstage and moved to the center of world affairs.

When I received my first degree from Northwestern University many Americans pretended that the rest of the world did not exist. We were still bemused by isolationism as we had been ever since we rejected the League of Nations in the early twenties. We were self-centered and self-deluding—so much so that when we faced the spectacle of the Western World in flames from Hitler's lunatic ambitions, many Americans quite solemnly contended that this was none of our affair.

But history has forced us to grow up. We have faced the harsh realities of danger and responsibility—and acquitted ourselves with honor and courage, as befits a great power.

For we are indubitably a great power today—a very different country from what we were in 1930—a wiser, more mature, and more responsible country. Our economy is four times as large—our role in world affairs many times as great.

Most of the western European nations—which in the thirties controlled vast areas of the globe—are today largely preoccupied with their own affairs. Today we garrison the distant outposts of the world, not in support of colonial interests, but in fulfillment of world responsibilities. Six hundred thousand of our countrymen are in uniform overseas. We are providing some form of economic assistance to more than 95 countries. And an America once determined to keep out of entangling alliances now has more than 40 allies on five continents.

Today also we are fighting a shooting war in a country that until recently for most Americans was only an exotic place-name on the map of a distant continent.

Our engagement in Vietnam is but one aspect of the world role we are playing. But because we are spending both lives and resources in that faraway land because the issue being decided profoundly affects our fortunes and our future, I should like to talk with you today about how we got there and why we must stay.

The beginning of wisdom with regard to Vietnam is to recognize that what Americans are fighting for in the jungles and rice paddies of that unhappy land is not a local conflict, an isolated war that has meaning only for one part of the world.

We can properly understand the struggle in Vietnam only if we recognize it for what it is, part of a vast and continuing struggle in which we have been engaged for more than two decades.

Like most of the conflicts that have plagued the world in recent years, the conflict in Vietnam is a product of the great shifts and changes triggered by the Second World War. Out of the war, two continentwide powers emerged, the United States and the Soviet Union. The colonial systems through which the nations of Western Europe had governed more than a third of the people of the world were, one by one, dismantled. The Soviet Union under Stalin embarked on a reckless course of seeking to extend Communist power. An Iron Curtain was erected to enclose large areas of the globe. At the same time, man was learning to harness the power of the exploding sun, and technology made mockery of time and distance.

The result of these vast changes—compressed within the breathless span of two decades—was to bring about a drastic rear-

rangment of the power structure of the world.

This rearrangement of power has resulted in a very uneasy equilibrium of forces.

For even while the new national boundaries were still being marked on the map, the Soviet Union under Stalin exploited the confusion to push out the perimeter of its power and influence in an effort to extend the outer limits of Communist domination by force or the threat of force.

This process threatened the freedom of the world. It had to be checked and checked quickly. By launching the Marshall plan to restore economic vitality to the nations of Western Europe and by forming NATO—a powerful Western alliance reinforced by U.S. resources and military power—America and the free nations of Europe built a dam to hold back the further encroachment of Communist ambitions.

This decisive action succeeded brilliantly. NATO, created in 1949, stopped the spread of communism over Western Europe and the northern Mediterranean. But the world was given no time to relax. The victory of the Chinese Communists in that same year posed a new threat of Communist expansion against an Asia in ferment. Just as the Western World had mobilized its resistance against Communist force in Europe, we had to create an effective counterforce in the Far East if Communist domination were not to spread like a lava flow over the whole area.

The first test came quickly in Korea. There the United Nations forces—predominantly American—stopped the drive of Communist North Korea, supported by materiel from the Soviet Union. It stopped a vast Chinese Army that followed. It brought to a halt the Communist drive to push out the line that had been drawn and to establish Communist control over the whole Korean peninsula.

The Korean war was fought from a central conviction—that the best hope for freedom and security in the world depended on maintaining the integrity of the postwar arrangements. Stability could be achieved only by making sure that the Communist world did not expand by destroying those arrangements by force and threat—and thus upsetting the precarious power balance between the two sides of the Iron Curtain.

It was this conviction that led to our firm stand in Korea. It was this conviction that led America, in the years immediately after Korea, to build a barrier around the whole periphery of the Communist world by encouraging in the creation of a series of alliances and commitments from the eastern edge of the NATO area to the Pacific.

The SEATO treaty that was signed in 1954 was part of that barrier, that structure of alliances. It was ratified by the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1.

Under that treaty and its protocol, the United States and other treaty partners gave their joint and several pledges to guarantee existing boundaries—including the line of demarcation between North and South Vietnam established when the French relinquished their control over Indochina. Since then three Presidents have reinforced that guarantee by further commitments given directly to the Republic of Vietnam. And on August 10, 1964, the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2 and the House by a vote of 416 to 0 adopted a joint resolution declaring their support for these commitments.

Today we are living up to those commitments by helping South Vietnam defend itself from the onslaught of Communist force—just as we helped Iran in 1946, Greece and Turkey in 1947, Formosa and Korea in 1950, and Berlin since 1948.

The bloody encounters in the highlands around Pleiku and the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta are thus in a real sense battles

and skirmishes in a continuing war to prevent one Communist power after another from violating internationally recognized boundary lines fixing the outer limits of Communist dominion.

When we think of Vietnam, we think of Korea. In Vietnam, as in Korea, the Communists in one part of a divided country lying on the periphery of China have sought by force to gain dominion over the whole. But in terms of tactics on the ground Greece is a closer analogy. For there, 20 years ago, as in South Vietnam today, the Communists sought to achieve their purpose by what is known in their lexicon as a war of national liberation.

They chose this method of aggression both in Greece and Vietnam because tactics of terror and sabotage, of stealth and subversion, give a great advantage to a disciplined and ruthless minority, particularly where, as in those two countries, the physical terrain, made concealment easy and impeded the use of heavy weapons.

But the Communists also have a more subtle reason for favoring this type of aggression. It creates in any situation an element of confusion, a sense of ambiguity that can, they hope, so disturb and divide free men as to prevent them from making common cause against it.

This ambiguity is the central point of debate in the discussions that have surrounded the South Vietnam problem. Is the war in South Vietnam an external aggression from the North, or is it an indigenous revolt? This is a question that Americans quite properly ask—and one to which they deserve a satisfactory answer. It is a question which we who have official responsibilities have necessarily probed in great depth. For if the Vietnam war were merely what the Communists say it is, an indigenous rebellion, then the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict and helping one side to defeat the other by force of arms.

The evidence on the character of the Vietnam war is voluminous. Its meaning seems clear enough: The North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi systematically created the Vietcong forces; it provides their equipment; it mounted the guerrilla war—and it controls that war from Hanoi on a day-to-day basis.

The evidence shows clearly enough that—at the time of French withdrawal—when Vietnam was divided in the settlement of 1954, the Communist regime in Hanoi never intended that South Vietnam should develop in freedom. Many Communists fighting with the Viet Minh army were directed to stay in the south, to cache away their arms, and to do everything possible to undermine the South Vietnamese Government. Others—80,000 in all—were ordered to the north for training in the North Vietnamese Army.

The evidence is clear enough also that the Communist rulers of the north resorted to guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam only when the success of the South Vietnam Government persuaded them that they could not achieve their designs by subversion alone.

In September 1960, the Lao Dong Party—the Communist Party in North Vietnam—held its third party congress in Hanoi. That congress called for the creation of a front organization to undertake the subversion of South Vietnam. Within 2 or 3 months thereafter, the National Liberation Front was established to provide a political facade for the conduct of an active guerrilla war. Beginning early that year the Hanoi regime began to infiltrate across the demarcation line the disciplined Communists whom the party had ordered north at the time of the settlement. In the intervening period since 1954 those men had been trained in the arts of proselytizing, sabotage and subversion. Now they were ordered to conscript young men from the villages by force or persuasion

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and to form cadres around which guerrilla units could be built.

Beginning over a year ago, the Communists apparently exhausted their reservoir of southerners who had gone north. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the south have been native-born North Vietnamese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infiltrate elements of the North Vietnamese Army in increasing larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in organized units in the south.

I mention these facts—which are familiar enough to most of you—because they are fundamental to our policy with regard to Vietnam. These facts, it seems to us, make it clear beyond question that the war in South Vietnam has few of the attributes of an indigenous revolt. It is a cynical and systematic aggression by the North Vietnamese regime against the people of South Vietnam. It is one further chapter in the long and brutal chronicle of Communist efforts to extend the periphery of Communist power by force and terror.

This point is at the heart of our determination to stay the course in the bloody contest now underway in South Vietnam. It also necessarily shapes our position with regard to negotiations.

The President, Secretary Rusk, and all spokesmen for the administration have stated again and again that the United States is prepared to join in unconditional discussions of the Vietnamese problem in an effort to bring about a satisfactory political solution. But so far the regime in Hanoi has refused to come to the bargaining table except on the basis of quite unacceptable conditions. One among several such conditions, but one that has been widely debated in the United States, is that we must recognize the National Liberation Front as the representative, indeed, as the sole representative, of the South Vietnamese people.

Yet to recognize the National Liberation Front in such a capacity would do violence to the truth and betray the very people whose liberty we are fighting to secure. The National Liberation Front is not a political entity expressing the will of the people of South Vietnam—or any substantial element of the South Vietnamese population. It is a facade fabricated by the Hanoi regime to confuse the issue and elaborate the myth of an indigenous revolt.

History is not obscure on this matter. As I noted earlier, the creation of the front was announced by the North Vietnam Communist Party—the Lao Dong Party—in 1960, soon after the North Vietnam military leader, General Giap announced that: "The north is the revolutionary base for the whole country." But the Hanoi regime, while applauding its creation, has taken little pains to give the front even the appearance of authenticity.

The individuals proclaimed as the leaders of the front are not personalities widely known to the South Vietnamese people—or, indeed, to many members of the Vietcong. They are not revolutionary heroes or national figures. They have little meaning to the ordinary Vietcong soldier who fights and dies in the jungles and rice paddies.

Instead, the names he carries into battle are those of "Uncle Ho," Ho Chi Minh, the President of the North Vietnamese regime, and General Giap, its military hero. When Vietcong prisoners are asked during interrogation whether they are members of the National Liberation Front, they customarily reply that they owe allegiance to the Lao Dong—the Communist Party of North Vietnam—which is the equivalent of the Hanoi Communist regime.

The front, then, is unmistakably what its name implies, a Communist front organiza-

tion created to mask the activities of Hanoi and to further the illusion of an indigenous revolt.

The name of the organization was carefully chosen. It bears the same name as the National Liberation Front of Algeria. But there the resemblance ends, for the Algerian front did, in fact, represent a substantial part of the Algerian population. It played a major role in an insurgency that was clearly an indigenous movement and not an aggression imposed from outside.

The Algerian Front, moreover, commanded the respect and, indeed, the obedience of the people. When it called a strike, the city of Algiers virtually closed down. By contrast, the front in Vietnam has shown its fictional character by revealing its own impotence. On two occasions, it has called for a general strike. These calls have been totally ignored by the people of South Vietnam.

The Algerian front was a vital force in the Algerian community. It secured the overt allegiance of the old, established Moslem groups and leaders. As the revolt progressed, Moslems serving in the Algerian Assembly and even in the French Parliament announced their support for the front.

But the front in Vietnam has utterly failed in its efforts to attract the adherence of any established group within the society—whether Buddhist, Christian, or any of the sects that form substantial elements in Vietnamese life.

Quite clearly, the people of South Vietnam, if they are aware of the front at all, know it for what it is: the political cover for a North Vietnamese effort to take over the south—in practical effect, the southern arm of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.

To be sure, the Vietcong military forces include a number of indigenous southerners under northern control. Neither the United States nor the South Vietnamese Government has ever questioned that fact. But the composition of the Vietcong military forces is not the issue when one discusses the role of the front. The issue is whether the front has any color of claim as a political entity to represent these indigenous elements.

The evidence makes clear that it does not. It is purely and simply a factitious organization created by Hanoi to reinforce a fiction. To recognize it as the representative of the South Vietnamese population would be to give legitimacy to that fiction.

The true party in interest on the enemy side—the entity that has launched the attack on the South Vietnamese Government for its own purposes, the entity that has created, controlled, and supplied the fighting forces of the Vietcong from the beginning—is the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi. And it is failure of that regime to come to the bargaining table that has so far frustrated every effort to move the problem of South Vietnam from a military to a political solution.

In spite of these clear realities, we have not taken, nor do we take, an obdurate or unreasoning attitude with regard to the front. The President said in his state of the Union message, "We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals—4 points, or 14, or 40—and we will consider the views of any group" and that, of course, includes the front along with other groups.

As the President has also said, this false issue of the front would never prove an insurmountable problem if Hanoi were prepared for serious negotiations. But we cannot, to advance the political objectives of the Communist regime in Hanoi, give legitimacy to a spurious organization as though it spoke for the people of South Vietnam.

A European friend once critically observed that Americans have "a sense of mission but

no sense of history." That accusation is, I think, without warrant.

We do have a sense of history and it is that which enables us to view the war in South Vietnam for what it is. We Americans know that it is not, as I have said earlier, a local conflict; it is part of a continuing struggle to prevent the Communists from upsetting the fragile balance of power through force or the threat of force.

To succeed in that struggle we must resist every Communist effort to destroy by aggression the boundaries and demarcation lines established by the postwar arrangements. We cannot pick and choose among these boundaries. We cannot defend Berlin and yield Korea. We cannot recognize one commitment and repudiate another without tearing and weakening the entire structure on which the world's security depends.

Some thoughtful critics of our Vietnamese policy both in Europe and America challenge this. They maintain that the West should not undertake to defend the integrity of all lines of demarcation even though they may be underwritten in formal treaties. They contend that many of these lines are unnatural since they do not conform to the geopolitical realities as they see them. They contend in particular that—since the passing of colonialism—the Western powers have no business mixing in the affairs of the Asian mainland. They imply that, regardless of our commitments, we should not try to prevent Red China from establishing its hegemony over the east Asian landmass south of the Soviet Union.

Proponents of this view advance two principal arguments to support their thesis. They contend that the very weight of Chinese power, its vast population, and its consequent ability to mobilize immense mass armise entitles it to recognition as the controlling force of southeast Asia.

As a second reason for acknowledging the Chinese hegemony, they contend that for centuries China has maintained a dominant cultural and political influence throughout the area.

They claim, therefore, that southeast Asia lies within the Chinese sphere of influence and that we should let the Chinese redraw the lines of demarcation to suit themselves without regard to the wishes of the southeast Asian people.

This argument, it seems to me, does not provide an acceptable basis for U.S. policy.

The assertion that China through hundreds of years of history has held sway over southeast Asia is simply not accurate. Successive Chinese Empires sought by force to establish such sway, but they never succeeded in doing so, except in certain sectors for limited periods. For the people of southeast Asia have, over the centuries, shown an obstinate insistence on shaping their own destiny which the Chinese have not been able to overcome.

To adopt the sphere of influence approach now advocated would, therefore, not mean allowing history to repeat itself. It would mean according to China a status it had never been able to achieve by its own efforts throughout the ages. It would mean sentencing the people of southeast Asia against their will to indefinite servitude behind the Bamboo Curtain. And it would mean turning our back on the principles that have formed the basis of Western policy in the whole postwar era.

Nor can one seriously insist that geographical propinquity establishes the Chinese right to dominate. At a time when man can circle the earth in 90 minutes, there is little to support such a literal commitment to 19th-century geopolitics. It is a dubious policy that would permit the accidents of geography to deprive peoples of their right to determine

their own future free from external force. The logic of that policy has dark implications. It would rationalize the greed of great powers. It would imperil the prospects for developing and maintaining an equilibrium of power in the world.

The principles of the United Nations Charter are doctrinally more in tune with the aspirations of 20th-century man.

This does not mean, however, that the political shape of the world should be regarded as frozen in an intractable pattern; that the boundaries established by the post-war arrangements are necessarily sacrosanct and immutable. Indeed, some of the lines of demarcation drawn after the Second World War were explicitly provisional and were to be finally determined in political settlements yet to come. This was true in Germany, in Korea and in South Vietnam as well.

But those settlements have not yet been achieved, and we cannot permit their resolution to be pre-empted by force. This is the issue in Vietnam. This is what we are fighting for. This is why we are there.

We have no ambition to stay there any longer than is necessary. We have made repeatedly clear that the United States seeks no territory in southeast Asia. We wish no military bases. We do not desire to destroy the regime in Hanoi or to remake it in a Western pattern. The United States will not retain American forces in South Vietnam once peace is assured. The countries of southeast Asia can be nonaligned or neutral, depending on the will of the people. We support free elections in South Vietnam as soon as violence has been eliminated and the South Vietnamese people can vote without intimidation. We look forward to free elections—and we will accept the result as a democratic people are accustomed to do. Yet we have little doubt about the outcome, for we are confident that the South Vietnamese who have fought hard for their freedom will not be the first people to give up that freedom to communism in a free exercise of self-determination.

Whether the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam will wish to unite is again for them to decide as soon as they are in a position to do so freely. Like other options, that of reunification must be preserved.

In the long run our hopes for the people of South Vietnam reflect our hopes for people everywhere. What we seek is a world living in peace and freedom, a world in which the cold war, with its tensions and conflicts, can recede into history. We are seeking to build a world in which men and nations will recognize and act upon a strongly shared interest in peace and in international cooperation for the common good.

We should not despair of these objectives even though at the moment they seem rather unreal and idealistic. For we would make a mistake to regard the cold war as a permanent phenomenon. After all, it was less than two decades ago that Winston Churchill first announced in Fulton, Mo., that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent." And two decades are only a moment in the long sweep of history.

During the intervening years major changes have taken place on both sides of the Iron Curtain. A schism has developed within the Communist world. The Soviet Union has become the second greatest industrial power. The Soviet people have begun to acquire a stake in the status quo, and after the missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union has come face to face with the realities of power and destruction in the nuclear age and has recognized the awesome fact that in the 20th century a war between great powers is a war without victory for anyone.

The changes taking place within the Soviet Union and among the nations of Eastern Europe are at once a reality and a promise.

Over time—and in a world of rapid and pervasive change the measurement of time is difficult indeed—we may look forward to a comparable development within Communist China, a maturing process that will deflect the policies of Peiping from bellicose actions to a peaceful relation with the rest of the world.

After all, it is not the American purpose simply to preserve the status quo. That was not our history and that is not our destiny. What we want to preserve is the freedom of choice for the peoples of the world. We will take our chances on that.

WAR ON FAMINE

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, today's issue of the Washington Daily News carries a fine editorial "The War on Famine" discussing my proposal to use America's productive capacity to alleviate hunger in the world.

I am especially pleased that the News studied the proposal carefully and comments on my suggestion of a Farmers' Corps to help food-deficit countries increase their own production by using the varied tools and methods we have developed in this country.

The editor is right when he concludes that all our agricultural productivity could not stave off the world famine ahead—that we also must combine food assistance with know-how to stimulate production by the hungry nations themselves.

Our food can also be used to encourage population control measures and speed this second method of averting a food and population crisis.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have the Daily News editorial printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News, Jan. 31, 1966]

THE WAR ON FAMINE

Vietnam overshadows other issues at this time but Congress later in the session must come to grips with the combined problem of mounting hunger in the underdeveloped world plus a costly and wasteful agricultural policy here at home.

Our food-for-peace program in the words of Senator GEORGE McGOVERN, of South Dakota, is "an ingenious combination of self-interest and idealism." Self-interest because it avoids storage charges on vast surpluses, idealism because it promotes the comforting feeling that we are relieving hunger abroad.

But our surpluses are diminishing. The wheat stockpile has been reduced from 1,245 million bushels in the 1957-61 period to something more than 800 million bushels as of today. A reserve of something over a half-billion bushels—a year's domestic consumption—is considered essential to national security.

Senator McGOVERN has legislation before Congress completely changing the shape of the farm-subsidy program. In brief he would take the wraps off production, have the Government buy the increased surpluses over national needs and give the food away abroad. He figures this wouldn't cost any more than present subsidies which are designed to hold down production.

But even Senator McGOVERN would admit, we think, that even top U.S. agricultural production could not feed the hungry world—couldn't even stave off the coming world famine which soon is to be caused by the overproduction of human beings plus the underproduction of food. And even if we could produce the food, there aren't enough ships to carry it.

Then there is the book by two American agronomists, William and Paul Paddock, urging that foreign aid concentrate on increasing food production—instead of steel mills—in the "Hungry Nations." They hold that our gifts of food do a disservice to the recipient nations by encouraging population growth which cannot be sustained.

We think there is a lot to this argument, though there is not even a remote chance that the United States will withhold food from famine areas in any effort to regulate populations. And even if birth control programs succeed beyond the wildest dreams, they cannot work fast enough to stave off disaster.

There may be at least a partial solution, it seems to us, in one of Senator McGOVERN's propositions. He would set up an American organization along the lines of the Peace Corps, composed of retired farmers and other experts in modern agricultural methods who would be willing to serve abroad for limited periods, teaching agricultural science.

Senator McGOVERN is from a farm State. He was President Kennedy's food for peace administrator. He sees, as the hope for the world's hungry peoples, fertilizers, pesticides, better tools, improved irrigation methods, hybrid seeds, farm-to-market roads, rural education. His arguments make a great deal of sense, as they concern both foreign aid and the domestic economy. They should get serious study before the end of this session of Congress.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON THE TRAGIC WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, the President has made his decision. In this time of crisis, he will have the support of Americans as he seeks an end to the tragic war in Vietnam. I welcome especially his announcement of new initiatives in the United Nations.

But obviously the resumption of bombing in the North is not a policy. And we should not delude ourselves that it offers a painless method of winning the war.

Our objectives in Vietnam can be gained only by what we do in the South—by what we do to show the people of that unhappy land that there is a difference—that this is their war—that the defeat of the Vietcong will lead to a better life for themselves and for their children.

And there are many indications that we have not yet even begun to develop a program to make these objectives a reality. Just as an example, the Washington Star reported, on January 24:

In Long An, one of Vietnam's most fertile provinces, more than 85 percent of the peasant population are tenants. This land-ownership pattern may help explain why, despite a tremendous cost in lives and material, the war in Long An is no closer to being won than it was several years ago.

(Yet) the rice-rich heartland of the Saigon region and the upper Mekong Delta, linked together by Long An, remains the prize for which the war is being fought. Here, in less

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than 14 provinces, live almost two-thirds of the 15 million South Vietnamese * * *. American military and civilian advisers agree there are more Vietcong than a year ago.

Most important in Long An, however, government and the mass of peasantry still seem to be on opposing sides.

Land is of such paramount importance here that the Vietcong allow only the landless or very poor farmers to command guerrilla units or qualify as party members. The provincial government's social order is the exact reverse. Most of the military officers, civil servants, and community leaders come from the landowning gentry.

In the delta, out of 1.2 million farms, only 260,000 are owner-operated * * *. Some 3,000 rich Saigon families still are the big landowners.

And the day before, the Washington Post told us:

The village chief, a 35-year-old former Army officer named Do Hun Minh * * * explained through an interpreter that only four village youngsters since the year 1950 have been in high school. No youngster in the village has ever attended college. "The Vietnamese Government continues to support an exclusive educational system in a revolutionary war," says (Richard) Burnham (the U.S. aid mission province representative). "All this is the preservation of privilege. It is madness and until it is changed most of our efforts will be marginal." Those other efforts * * * are considerable. USOM pumps about half a million dollars a year into Bienhoa (province), arranging for medical teams and technical assistance, and building dams, schoolrooms, a potable water system, an orphanage, three fish markets, two electricity systems.

But knowledgeable Americans here say that the Vietcong still offer the only outlet for a bright boy from the villages. The static nature of Sondong assures that there is no legitimate route out of the rice paddy. The rural children cannot be officers, administrators, or district chiefs.

To such conditions, military action in the South or in the North is no answer. Military action is needed to allow social reform to take place. But if American soldiers are to fight and die to buy time for the Government of South Vietnam, that time must be used.

It is absolutely urgent that we now act to institute new programs of education, land reform, public health, political participation—and that we act to insure honest administration. In my judgment the development and implementation of such a program would offer far more promise of achieving our aims in Vietnam than any other steps we could take—including the bombing of the North.

As I have emphasized repeatedly, and I state again, our military effort will mean nothing if it is not followed by a successful pacification effort which inspires the people of South Vietnam.

But we have not yet made the effort necessary.

We are spending far more on military efforts than on all the education, land reform, and welfare programs which might convince a young South Vietnamese that his future is not best served by the Communists.

And the best talent and brains in our Government are focussed far more on military action than they are on programs which might help the people of

South Vietnam—and in the long run, help our effort as well.

This imbalance must change.

For if we regard bombing as the answer in Vietnam—we are headed straight for disaster. In the past, bombing has not proved a decisive weapon against a rural economy—or against a guerrilla army.

And the temptation will now be to argue that if limited bombing does not produce a solution, that further bombing, more extended military action, is the answer. The danger is that the decision to resume may become the first in a series of steps on a road from which there is no turning back—a road which leads to catastrophe for all mankind. That cannot be permitted to happen.

As we move into this new phase of the war, the President will need the support and encouragement of the American people. To be effective, however, both the Congress and the citizens of this country will have to be kept fully informed about the actions of the United States and the developments in Vietnam.

I believe he will have this support even where there might be some differences of emphasis or policy. This should be clearly understood in both Hanoi and Peiping.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Ratchford, one of his secretaries.

REPORT OF NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 372)

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

To the Congress of the United States:

I said in my state of the Union message this year that, "We must change to master change."

Failing that, this Nation will surely become a casualty to the relentless tide of history. For in assessing our prospects, we must remember that mankind faces not one but many possible futures. Which future our children's children enjoy—or endure—depends in large measure on our ability to adjust to the needs of the times.

But change comes not of itself. Neither the requirement for change nor the desire for change will see us through. In a complex world—growing more complex every year—only knowledge can keep us apace.

We must achieve a better understanding of our environment and our place in that environment.

We must continue to unlock the secrets of the earth below us, the sea around us, and the heavens above us.

And we must intensify our search into the very meaning of life itself.

It is not too much to say that every aspect of our lives will be affected by the success of this effort. The military and

economic strength of our Nation, and the health, the happiness, and the welfare of our citizens all are profoundly influenced by the limits—and potentialities—of our scientific program.

In the furtherance of this program, no organization, agency, or institution has had a more profound or lasting influence than the National Science Foundation. The establishment of this Foundation by the Congress, 15 years ago, was one of the soundest investments this Nation ever made.

In the field of basic research, many of the major scientific breakthroughs of our time would have been impossible—or at the very least, much longer in coming—had it not been for National Science Foundation grants in the basic sciences.

In the field of education, it is enough to say that more than half of all our high school teachers have now received vital refresher training through the Foundation's education program.

In the classrooms, the Foundation has played a major role in modernizing scientific curricula to make them responsive to our age.

And in a more recent activity, the Foundation has launched a program to strengthen the science departments of many of our smaller universities throughout the Nation by providing new laboratories, modern equipment, and fellowships to promising graduate students.

It should be emphasized that the role of the National Science Foundation is to aid, not to arbitrate. But through its aid—skillfully administered and intelligently applied—it has brought American science to a new level of excellence.

This, the 15th Annual Report of the National Science Foundation, reflects another year of scientific growth and progress, and I am pleased to commend it to the attention of the Congress. It mirrors the past and illuminates the future.

It is the story of change—to master change.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 1966.

REPORT ON AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACTIVITIES — MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT (H. DOC. NO. 371)

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, which, with the accompanying report, was referred to the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences:

To the Congress of the United States:

The record of American accomplishments in aeronautics and space during 1965 shows it to have been the most successful year in our history.

More spacecraft were orbited than in any previous year. Five manned Gemini flights were successfully launched.

Our astronauts spent more hours in space than were flown by all of our manned spacecraft until 1965. Ten astronauts logged a total of 1,297 hours 42 minutes in space.

The five manned flights successfully achieved included a walk in space, and

the first rendezvous between two manned spacecrafts.

A scientific spacecraft completed a 325-million-mile, 228-day trip to Mars. Mariner 4 thereby gave mankind its first closeup view of another planet.

The Ranger series, begun in 1961, reached its zenith with two trips to the moon that yielded 13,000 closeup pictures of that planet. The entire Ranger series produced 17,000 photographs of the moon's surface which are being studied now by experts throughout the world.

Equally important were the contributions of our space program to life here on earth. Launching of Early Bird, the first commercial communication satellite brought us measurably closer to the goal of instantaneous communication between all points on the globe. Research and development in our space program continued to speed progress in medicine, in weather prediction, in electronics—and, indeed, in virtually every aspect of American science and technology.

As our space program continues, the impact of its developments on everyday life becomes daily more evident. It continues to stimulate our education, improve our material well-being, and broaden the horizons of knowledge. It is also a powerful force for peace.

The space program of the United States today is the largest effort ever undertaken by any nation to advance the frontiers of human knowledge. What we are discovering and building today will help solve many of the great problems which an increasingly complex and heavily populated world will face tomorrow.

The year 1965—the year of Gemini, Ranger, and Mariner—is a brilliant preface to the coming years of Apollo, stations in space and voyages to the planets. I have great pride and pleasure in transmitting this remarkable record to the Congress that, through its enthusiastic support, has made possible.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 31, 1966.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session.

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLARK in the chair). Is there further morning business?

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I have a short speech on section 14(b).

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there further morning business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further morning business? If there is no further morning business, morning business is closed; and, under the unanimous consent agreement, the Chair lays before the Senate the pending questions.

PROPOSED REPEAL OF SECTION 14(b) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, AS AMENDED

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion of the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill (H.R. 77) to repeal section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and section 703(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting Act of 1959 and to amend the first proviso of section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the question presently before the Senate is whether it will proceed to the consideration of H.R. 77, a bill which would repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Let us look at the record.

The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 laid down certain standards for a national policy toward union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements. It prohibits the closed shop in all industries in or affecting interstate commerce. It allows labor and management to negotiate agreements for what is known as the union shop—anyone may be hired, but all must join the union and remain in good standing after 30 days of employment, at least until the termination of the contract. It allows another lesser form of union security agreement, the agency shop which does not require anyone to join a union, but does require as a condition of employment, that employees pay to the union amounts equivalent to the initiation fee and dues paid by union members.

The union shop, then, or some lesser form of it negotiated by labor and management, was adopted as national policy because of its consistency with the general policy toward labor originally established by the Wagner Act. This policy was to grant recognition to a single union only, in each plant, company, or other unit, for the purposes of collective bargaining. Basically, Congress wished to avoid the disruptions of dual unionism, and establish single jurisdictions in distinct crafts or separate shops.

In return, the union was required by law to bargain collectively, without discrimination, for all employees in the unit. Every employee, whether a member of the union, or not, was entitled to the gains obtained by collective bargaining.

These are fine sounding words—logical, orderly, consistent—words expressing national policy, single unionism, exclusive jurisdictions, collective bargaining for the benefit of all.

Section 14(b) is the not-too-well hidden joker in the deck.

National policy was nicely reaffirmed, and then someone left the barn door open, to allow State policy to supersede that of the Federal Government.

Section 14(b) states:

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.

Section 14(b) allows the States and territories to modify our national labor policy if they choose to do so, in the direction of further limiting negotiated agreements requiring union membership.

Basically, 14(b) is the opening wedge to denigrate organized labor. It has become a symbol; to organized labor it is the first true "gut" issue in years which, if not resolved favorably, could bring about a national right-to-work law; and to the fanatics of the right wing, it is the shining symbol of a false freedom.

On the surface, there is the National Right To Work Committee, founded in 1955 by E. S. Dillard and Fred Hartley, a coauthor of the Taft-Hartley Act.

Under the surface are the disrupting whispers of the ignorant and ill-informed, the bigots and hatemongers.

The battlelines are clearly drawn.

With this blight, 14(b) off the statute books, we can direct our efforts toward progressive causes. The repeal of 14(b) will not bring back the closed shop, as some darkly hint, for that is specifically declared illegal in Taft-Hartley. The repeal of 14(b) will bring us back to our established national policy with respect to union security contracts, a policy we witlessly departed from in 1947.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz in his excellent book entitled "Labor and Public Interest," stated with regard to right-to-work laws that he "used to ask my labor law classes a series of questions at the opening session of the course."

One question was:

Are you in favor of or opposed to the right-to-work laws?

Two out of three said they favored such laws. Then a later question was worded this way:

If an employer and a majority of his employees agree with respect to whether all employees should or should not become members of the union, should the government interfere, by law, with that decision?

Two-thirds of the class said they would oppose such a law.

Education apparently is the key to understanding.

I believe that the Senate should have the opportunity to vote on this issue. I believe that we should put an end to the delaying tactics of those who oppose repeal. I declare myself firmly in support of repeal, and will support every effort to gain that objective.

RECESS UNTIL 10 O'CLOCK A.M. TOMORROW

Mr. HART. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate at this time, I move, pursuant to the order previously entered, that the Senate stand in recess until 10 o'clock a.m. tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 1 o'clock and 6 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, under the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 1, 1966, at 10 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate January 31 (legislative day of January 26), 1966: