

proach to legislation." The Congress was understandably pressed to get a law on the books as previous temporary tariff legislation, slated to expire at midnight, June 30, would have ballooned duty-free imports to \$500 per person. However, in the heat of moving this bill into law I believe we did an injustice to two countries with whom we have long enjoyed the friendliest of relations—Mexico and Canada.

Supporters of the bill argued that our unfavorable balance of payments required that we discourage travelers from spending too much money abroad. One Senate proponent stated the intent was, among other things, to "restrain the 'jet set' from spending too much money" overseas.

Those who pointed out that Mexico and Canada constituted no dollar drain—or gold drain—on our economy were told that the country—and the world—needed to be made psychologically aware than the United States means business when we say the gold drain will be stopped and the balance of payments restored to equilibrium.

There is little doubt that a psychological effect resulted, especially in Mexico and Canada. It seemed incredible to many of us in the House that these two great nations with whom we share common—and, I might add peaceful—borders—and with whom we presently enjoy the friendliest social, political, and economic relations in many years, should suffer as the result of this legislation.

In restraining the jet set we have also discriminated against and inconvenienced the ordinary person who likes to visit and shop in Mexico and Canada. And we have also done a disservice to our good friends in those countries. Tourism, for example, is Mexico's biggest source of dollars and much of that income is derived from visitors who like to visit the colorful and friendly border towns. In passing, Mexico spends more money with the United States each year than we spend with her. She is able to endure this unfavorable balance of trade largely because of high border-town receipts.

Our Canadian neighbors must also resent this law and speculate whether they should not follow our lead and discourage their citizens from spending about \$475 million each year traveling in the United States. Canada, too, spends more money with us than we spend with her.

Mr. Speaker, this amendment to Public Law 89-62 is clearly within the spirit and intent of the legislation brought forth by the House Ways and Means Committee. The hearings on the law—and the passage of the law itself—did, in fact, draw attention to the many-sided approach the administration has successfully mounted to help solve the problem of a negative balance of payments.

However, many of us believe that our two neighboring countries of Canada and Mexico are deserving of our special consideration and my bill represents a reaffirmation of the strong bonds of mutual interest we share with them.

If we fail to enact this amendment

then on October 1, 1965, the United States will apply to Mexico and Canada regulations which are inequitable, to say the least.

(Mr. WELTNER (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. WELTNER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

COAST SURVEY FAVORS PRIVATE SHIPYARDS

(Mr. GARMATZ (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GARMATZ. Mr. Speaker, in the continuing debate with respect to costs in naval shipyards versus costs in private shipyards, it is disturbing to read that the Navy's Bureau of Ships has again attempted to suppress vital information.

Allen M. Smythe, an energetic journalist whose articles are carried in a number of metropolitan newspapers throughout the country, wrote in the Boston, Mass., Globe on July 26, 1965, of a recent submarine cost survey unfavorable to the Navy shipyards which has been kept under wraps, apparently deliberately.

This article is so astounding—a tribute to Mr. Smythe's resourcefulness—that I include it in the body of the RECORD at this point:

SECRET SURVEY FAVORS PRIVATE BUILDERS—NAVY YARDS' COST-CUTTING FAILS TO CLOSE GAP

(By Allen Smythe)

The military construction bill now in its final stages in Congress has an important bearing on Navy spending and Pentagon policy on surplus base closings.

The measure has been drafted without knowledge of an adverse report (now called work sheets) on submarine construction costs that has been suppressed by the Navy.

The report is the last of a series of surveys that have shown that costs in Navy yards are higher than in private shipyards.

Several years ago private industry financed for \$18,000 a survey by Ernst & Ernst that showed all repair overhaul and construction costs higher in Navy yards.

As costs were to be deciding factors in Navy yard closings, the Bureau of Ships hurriedly bought an offsetting survey to be made by the Arthur Anderson Co. for \$197,000. To the Navy's embarrassment was substantially the same. Among other things, it showed that on new submarine construction defense savings of 10 percent could be made (15.2 percent to the Government) if built in private shipyards.

Before Secretary McNamara ordered the Portsmouth and Brooklyn Navy Yards closed, the Navy made a desperate, belated effort to cut costs. Then the Bureau of Ships ordered a supplementary report on submarine building costs from the Anderson Co.—at a cost of \$47,000—that was hopefully expected to show a drop in costs.

It didn't. So, its 30 pages of financial facts were promptly concealed. The only copies released were given to the Senators of New Hampshire and Maine who have discreetly not divulged its contents.

The Bureau of Ships, bypassing its own

secretariat, had Secretary McNamara's office freeze the report. The order was signed by David McGiffert, congressional assistant to McNamara, who has just been nominated as Under Secretary of the Army. However, the freeze order indicated incorrectly that the report had been given to and discussed by the proper congressional committees.

The report shows the comparative costs between four submarines built at the Portsmouth Navy Yard and five built at the private shipyards of Newport or Newport News, Bethlehem Steel, and the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics at Groton, Conn.

It states that, if the four submarines had been built at the private shipyards, "savings to the Department of Defense of 20.3 percent, or savings to the Government of 23.9 percent, could have been made."

Using private-shipyard costs as a denominator, this shows Navy-yard costs to be 26.7 percent higher than private shipyards, or if taxes are excluded, to be 31.4 percent higher. The report further shows that the three private yards made a profit on the five submarines of only 2.3 percent.

Despite the report, an aggressive congressional delegation pressured the Pentagon to extend the closing date for Portsmouth to 10 years. The admirals, who naturally do not like to have any Navy bases closed, are intensifying their efforts to cut costs and have issued several releases claiming reductions.

However, auditors familiar with the situation say that, because of the obsolete equipment and Navy management, costs can be reduced only a few percent at best. They also state that work quality could be endangered by too much pressure to cut costs. They point to the subtle reference to the *Thresher* submarine in the report.

In early December of 1963, McNamara was ready to announce closing of the Boston, Philadelphia, and San Francisco Navy Yards as surplus. A leak from his secretariat and the White House caused an uproar in Congress. Above the uproar was heard the voice of House Speaker JOHN McCORMACK, "They are not going to close my shipyard."

He was right. The Pentagon was forced to order a new impartial survey. This was completed by July 1964, by Adm. Eugene Flucky. His report listed the Navy yards at Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Portsmouth, and San Francisco as least useful to the Navy. All were just below Boston.

ROBERT KENNEDY, then Attorney General, was reported to have offered the best legal defense for the Boston Navy Yard of any submitted for other shipyard closings. However, it did not help him aid the Brooklyn Navy Yard when he later decided to run for Senator from New York.

In spite of leaks the report was held secret by the policy board for further study until after the election. Two weeks after the election, McNamara announced he had picked Brooklyn and Portsmouth for immediate closing.

(Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. SCHMIDHAUSER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

(Mr. MULTER (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. MULTER'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

REPEAL OF SECTION 14(b)

(Mr. PEPPER (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, I have been attacked off the floor by the Republican leader in the House for supporting President Johnson's recommendation that section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act be repealed. And I wish to say that I am proud to be associated with and to be a supporter of this great Democratic program which in the past 5 years has given my district, as well as the Nation, the greatest period of prosperity it has ever known.

I want to emphasize, however, that I voted for the repeal of section 14(b) out of my conviction that it is best for my district, my State and the Nation. Whether or not so-called right-to-work laws are the principal cause, it is nevertheless true that per capita personal income is lower, average weekly wages in manufacturing are lower, and minimum wage rates are lower, if they exist at all, in the right-to-work States than they are in those States which allow a reasonable degree of union security. According to a study sponsored by the Duke University Research Council, per capita personal income is, on the average, \$490.87 per year lower in right-to-work States than in nonright-to-work States. The average weekly wage in manufacturing is \$11.18 a week lower. And the minimum wage is 53.6 cents an hour lower.

I am convinced that a uniform system of labor-management collective bargaining is best for the whole country and best for Florida. Florida's interest lies more with the industrial States than it does with Deep South States such as my native State Alabama or the Midwestern agricultural States that have little hope of becoming great industrial States in the near future.

Florida does have the potential to become a great industrial State. Its climate is an unmatched attraction for the scientific and highly skilled personnel that are required in the sophisticated industries of the space age, and it cannot fulfill its industrial potential without responsible and secure unions and a philosophy of free, responsible collective bargaining. Florida's right-to-work amendment was adopted more than 20 years ago when its population was only one-third what it is today. It was submitted by a highly misappportioned legislature with only 1 vote to spare in the State senate and was approved by only a 25,000-vote margin among the voters of the State. In Dade County—in which my district is located—the right-to-work amendment was rejected by 57 percent of those voting in the referendum.

Repeal of section 14(b) is another step in the emancipation of our great Southern region. It will enable our workers and our businessmen to take their place in our national economy, rather than cling to regionalism, to share in the full stream, the throb of the economic life of this great Nation.

I am proud to have supported this and the other bold recommendations of President Johnson in the 88th and 89th Congresses. His is the greatest program to help the American people which has ever been offered by any President. And our Republican colleagues as a party have fought it step by step—just as they sought to confuse and defeat every proposal that the Democrats have put forward under President Johnson, President Kennedy, President Truman and President Roosevelt to provide better wages, better working conditions, better education, better health, better housing, better social security, better jobs and lower taxes for the American people.

The program which we are putting into law is progressive where the needs of the people are concerned and fiscally responsible where their tax dollars are involved.

It has included legislation adopted in 1964 reducing income taxes on persons and corporations by \$14 billion; legislation adopted in 1965 reducing excise taxes by some \$4.6 billion; and legislation in 1962 providing a tax credit for new investment and subsequent revision of the guidelines for depreciation by the Internal Revenue Service which together afforded overall benefits for business in excess of \$4 billion.

I am indeed proud to have had a part in such a program and to have worked with an administration which has done so much for business and for all the people of our country.

David S. King
THE VIETNAM CRISIS AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY

(Mr. KING of Utah (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KING of Utah. Mr. Speaker, the President has acted wisely in asking authority to increase our forces in uniform by 340,000 men. I want to be among the first to go on record supporting his request of yesterday. The Communist world must understand, beyond the slightest shadow of doubt, that we mean business about preserving the independence of the South Vietnamese people. The gravest question confronting our Nation today is Vietnam. As was our own shore in the 1770's, Britain and Pearl Harbor in the 1940's, Korea and Berlin in the 1950's, Vietnam is now the flaming frontier of freedom. As much as I abhor war, I hate tyranny still more. I applaud our country's determination to negotiate from strength. I support the President's policy. I set forth my thinking on Vietnam in detail in an address at the University of Utah just last Friday, July 30. I want to share that message with my colleagues. The text of my address follows:

ADDRESS BY REPRESENTATIVE DAVID S. KING AT THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, JULY 30

On May 4, 1965, President Johnson asked Congress to appropriate an additional \$700 million to meet the mounting military requirements in fighting the Vietcong, which request was quickly granted. Then on July 27, 1965, the President recommended increasing the draft from 17,000 to 35,000 per

month, and sending 125,000 troops into the combat zone.

At this point we ask ourselves a number of questions. We want to know where all this is taking us. We read the obituary of a soldier killed in action. We think to ourselves: This was somebody else's son. Tomorrow, it may be mine. We find ourselves wondering whether the problem in Vietnam isn't as deadly as its snake-filled jungles. Why is everything blanketed with diplomatic doubletalk? Can't someone really tell us what it is all about?

And so, realizing my limitations, I approach the problem of the present war in Vietnam. I call it a war because I have the impression that that is what it is. There are other difficulties—semantic and philosophical. I get the impression that lately we have been deceiving ourselves. We call the War Department the Department of Defense. Soldiers are no longer called soldiers, but servicemen. And wars, which weren't supposed to happen after V-J day, because they were too terrible to talk about, are now called almost anything else, to divert attention from what they really are.

I share your feelings of revulsion for war, even though some bureaucrats now call this organized butchery by another name. I hate war's contempt for human life, its waste, its indifference to the refinements and sensitivities which crown the efforts of civilized man. Moreover, I understand that peace is not easily come by. It must be striven for, and I am willing to make the effort. For that reason I favored the Atom Test Ban Treaty, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, our cultural exchange program, and a stronger United Nations.

Our policy in Vietnam today involves a more-or-less open-ended commitment to provide military, and economic assistance to the South Vietnamese in their fight against the terrorism of the Vietcong. Our stated objective is not so much to guarantee democracy in South Vietnam as to guarantee its right of political self-determination without dictation from others. This objective has been agreed upon by the leadership of both political parties.

There are aspects of this policy which concern me. My greatest fear is that the fighting could escalate into world war III. And yet, despite my fears, I have come to the conclusion that the American people should fully support their country in the above policy, which, I reemphasize, is completely bipartisan, and has been endorsed by our four most recent presidents. I support this policy, not because it makes me happy; and not because it is above reproach; but because it offers the only acceptable course of action now open to us. I feel that peace will be better served by strength than weakness. It is foolish to argue that we need only pat the Communist tiger on the head to make him go away and lie down. He has never done that before. Patting the tiger only makes him contemptuous of our weakness. Instead of becoming more tractable, he becomes more belligerent; at least this is true when we stand in the way of his dinner, as we now do in Vietnam. But just getting out of his way won't solve our problem, either, for sooner or later, after eating everything else in sight, he will turn upon us, for his last, best meal of all. To maintain strength today, may be to avoid catastrophe tomorrow.

The American people have now reached that position where they must resolve their inner conflicts and make a hard, historic decision. I feel that that decision must be to continue our firm resistance to the Vietcong.

We cannot fight decision with indecision. This does not suggest that we do not strive for peace. We can still follow Adlai Stevenson's admonition: "Every time we drop one bomb, make two offers to negotiate." We

must pursue every possible avenue for reducing tensions, and bringing about accord. But let us not forget that Adlai Stevenson, that great apostle of peace and understanding, immediately before his untimely death, said:

"We must contain communism in southeast Asia as we have contained it in western Europe. We have to establish a line in southeast Asia where aggression across it will be met. All we can hope to do is to establish the right of self-determination. We can't impose our will. But we must convince the Communists they can't impose their will, either."

The area generally known as southeast Asia, and to which Vietnam can rightly be considered the key, is highly significant to the United States.

The State Department has given us the following interesting background information:

"Over 200 million people live in the non-Communist countries south of China and east of India, a region rich in culture, land, and resources—the one part of Asia that is relatively underpopulated. From it come Asia's most important food exports, 70 percent of the world's tin, and 70 percent of the world's natural rubber. Lying athwart the crossroads between two oceans and two continents, southeast Asia is a region of great importance not only to the people who live there but to all the free world.

"The Communists of North Vietnam and China are eager to take over this fertile area, not by the type of open aggression used in Korea but by attack from within, by covert aggression through guerrilla warfare, and by infiltrating trained men and arms across national frontiers. Communist success in Laos and South Vietnam would gravely threaten the freedom and independence of the rest of Southeast Asia. It would undermine the neutrality of Cambodia, would make Thailand's position practically untenable, would increase the already great pressure on Burma, would place India in jeopardy of being outflanked, would enlarge Communist influence and pressures on Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, and would impair the free-world defense position in all of Asia. It would confirm the Asian Communist belief that a policy of militancy pays dividends, and could undermine the will of free peoples on other continents to defend themselves."¹

North Vietnam has made its aim the complete absorption and Communization of South Vietnam. This is true, in spite of the fact that the overwhelming majority of these people to the south, who number almost 15 million, have shown a distaste for communism. To accomplish this proposed takeover, the North Vietnamese have organized the National Liberation Front, whose members are referred to as the Vietcong. In addition, the President of North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, has authored a shrewd military program designated as the war of national liberation. It involves the use of the above Vietcong as undercover agents, infiltrators, terrorists, and gangsters to ultimately subdue the South Vietnamese. Here is a war conducted in a manner seldom before seen. Thousands of agents infiltrate a particular area. Their object is to win converts to communism by any means necessary. First, they use propaganda and the hard sell. Then they use terrorism.

Let me quote from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in an interview given in February of this year:

"What you have in Vietnam is a new kind of fighting man who is as distinct as the infantryman or the aviator—and that is the

terrorist. He will be given the order to go in and terrorize a certain village. So Monday morning there will be a dozen bodies on the street.

"The bodies will be those of old men, women, and children—not people who have done anything in particular. It's just killing at random to create terror.

"Then they will kidnap the village chief, cut off his head, and put it on a pole and walk it around. So by 3 o'clock afternoon they don't have too much trouble getting 16- and 17-year-old boys to join the Vietcong. They've killed 16,000 village chiefs."

The Vietcong are, theoretically, indigenous to South Vietnam. Originally, most of them were. Their leaders were natives of South Vietnam who had been regrouped to the north under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement and who had been trained there and sent back into the south again. They have always received their directions from North Vietnam, their leadership from North Vietnam, and their supplies and ammunition from North Vietnam. They have always been assisted by a substantial number of North Vietnamese. I should further add that in recent months the North Vietnamese seem to have virtually run out of native South Vietnamese for staffing their Vietcong operation. Attrition in Vietcong ranks has resulted from desertions and defections, battle casualties, illness and infirmity. With each passing day, the percentage of South Vietnamese who make up the membership of the Vietcong is growing less and that of the professional soldier from North Vietnam is growing larger.

The above plan of Ho Chi Minh was certainly clever. In the first place, we couldn't even prove who our enemy was. The North Vietnamese still contend that the war is a civil war, fought entirely by South Vietnamese. Until recently, this position was difficult to disprove. In the second place, it gave to the Vietcong the tactical advantage which guerrilla soldiers always enjoy when fighting against conventional troops in a jungle environment. This advantage is 8 to 1. Third, the plan made skillful use of politics, and terrorism, and propaganda, as well as military force, to accomplish its objectives. Fourth, since it did not involve overt aggression, it was difficult for us to induce allies to intervene, as they would have had to do if overt aggression had been involved.

It is apparent that the Communists are very hopeful for the success of this type of operation. If it is successful, it will be used elsewhere. It is particularly appropriate for use against emerging, underdeveloped nations, such as Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Thailand.

There has been much argument in the press about whether or not it has been proved that the Vietcong in South Vietnam were directed and supplied by North Vietnam. Whatever doubt there may have been, was put at rest by the State Department's so-called white paper, entitled "Aggression From the North," dated February 1965. This paper thoroughly documents the assertion that the present war in South Vietnam is the result of help, planning, leadership, manpower, and supplies received from the north. I take the liberty of quoting a few paragraphs:

"South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

"The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war. * * * Vietnam is not another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as sanctuary. Vietnam is not another Malaya where

Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control. Vietnam is not another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support. Above all, the war in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government. There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Vietnam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Vietnam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Vietnam's commitment to seize control of the south is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

"The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the north and ordered into the south by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Vietcong, the officers and most of the cadre, many of the technicians, political organizers, and propagandists have come from the north and operate under Hanoi's direction.

"The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the Vietcong army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist states have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and the have been channeled primarily through North Vietnam. The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Vietnam is the Communist Party in the North, the Lao Dong—Workers'—Party. As in every Communist state, any party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist world."

I might add that information which has come to me indicates that no less than 40,000 persons are known to have come down from the north and identified themselves with the Vietcong operation in South Vietnam.

At this point it would be well to review the historical antecedents which have given rise to our present intervention. In 1949 Vietnam, including both North and South, became an independent state, within the French Union. Because of local Communist aggressiveness, it was agreed that the French should remain in Vietnam to render military aid. The Vietnamese had no army to speak of. On December 23, 1950, the United States signed a mutual defense assistance agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for indirect U.S. military aid through France to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in their fight against communism. After 4 or 5 years of brutal warfare, it became apparent that the French were incapable of driving the Communists out of Vietnam, so a military truce was signed. Part of the Geneva Accords of 1954, it drew a line of demarcation along the 17th parallel, dividing the Communist-held territory to the north from the non-Communist territory to the south. The truce which was signed by France and North Vietnam alone, specifically provided that the territorial integrity of the two sectors which were thus created should be recognized and protected

¹ "Vietnam, the Struggle for Freedom," Department of State Publication 7724, August 1964.

by each, and that neither should attack the other, directly or indirectly. A period of time was allowed for those in the north who so desired, to emigrate to the south, and those who desired to do so in the south, to emigrate to the north.

It is interesting to note that over 900,000 North Vietnamese chose to emigrate to the south and cast their lot with freedom, whereas less than 100,000 moved from the south to the north, to identify themselves with the Communists.

An International Control Commission composed of representatives of India, Canada, and Poland, was created to supervise the truce. The commission has never functioned effectively.

This truce was entered into in good faith by the French, who were representing both themselves and the South Vietnamese. We might wonder why the North Vietnamese were so willing to sign this nonaggression pact when they had already decided to take over South Vietnam. The answer, no doubt, lies in the fact that Ho Chi Minh felt that South Vietnam would collapse either immediately or upon the application of slight pressure from the north. The signing of the Geneva Accords gave him the additional advantage of insuring the evacuation of the French. The moral issue involved in the immediate violation of this treaty apparently troubled him not at all.

Although the United States did not sign any of the Geneva Accords, it did execute, unilaterally, a declaration of policy, which stated, among other things, that the United States would view with grave concern any renewal of the aggression, in violation of the aforesaid agreements; and, that the United States would continue to seek to achieve unity in Vietnam through free elections under United Nations supervision.

In October 1954, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, at the latter's request, pledging U.S. aid and support to South Vietnam.

On January 1, 1955, the United States began sending direct supporting assistance to the Vietnamese armed forces pursuant to the aforesaid agreement of December 23, 1950. It will be noted at this point that the United States delayed 4½ years after the initial Communist aggression against Vietnam, before rendering any kind of direct assistance. On February 19, 1955, the southeast Asia collective defense treaty (SEATO) came into force. In a protocol to the treaty, the "SEATO umbrella" was extended to cover Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, should these countries request SEATO assistance in resisting Communist aggression. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1. On March 7, 1955, the United States, under the Eisenhower administration, and the government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, signed an agreement providing for direct U.S. economic aid to South Vietnam. Between 1956 and 1960, during the Eisenhower administration, the United States twice issued a letter of intent, and once a joint communique, all of which indicated in clear terms that the United States was prepared to offer such assistance as it felt was necessary to help South Vietnam in its struggle. The joint communique, it might be added, was issued at the request of President Diem.

Between May of 1961 and the present time, under the Kennedy-Johnson administrations the United States has again issued letters or joint communiqués in the total number of eight, all of which have reaffirmed this country's intention to give needed help, military and economic, to the beleaguered South Vietnamese, and all of which were issued at the latter's request. I might add that the Congress of the United States on three different occasions has voted overwhelmingly to support our Vietnamese commitment.

The position of the United States now is that the integrity of these many commitments must not be compromised. This is not just a matter of honor, although the use of that word is not inappropriate. There are many free and emerging nations in southeast Asia who have constructed their entire foreign policy on the strength of the United States solemn commitment that it would not permit South Vietnam to be chewed to pieces and devoured by the Communist tiger.

If this commitment cannot be relied on, then the most stabilizing force in southeast Asia will be gone. The Communists, who make no apologies for their determination to engulf all of southeast Asia, will then have won a great moral victory. If Thailand, for example, the only nation in southeast Asia to have maintained her independence throughout the period of colonialism, cannot rely on our commitment to contain Communist aggression, then the keystone in the arch of her foreign policy will be dislodged. There are many nations who now openly support this country's policy in South Vietnam. In all cases, this support has become a significant factor in their own foreign policy. Thirty-six nations are now giving assistance to South Vietnam, mostly humanitarian aid for the relief of victims of the Vietcong terrorists or assistance in education, sanitation, etc. Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have committed troops and arms. There are approximately 55 other nations who are technically neutral on this issue, but many no doubt will be with us when the matter is resolved. There are some 25 nations who are openly hostile to our position.

Simply, if we refuse to close the floodgates to a Communist inundation in South Vietnam, then we shall either have to close them in some neighboring country, or else allow the Communist flood to completely engulf the countries of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, East Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia and perhaps even Australia, New Zealand, the Philippine Islands and others. Even the great subcontinent of India might be threatened. All this would follow as a result of the simple proposition that the Communists have made it plain that they will keep pushing until they are stopped.

It has been said that he who ignores history is condemned to relive it. How short our memories are, and how easily we forget our lessons. During the 1930's Adolph Hitler marched into the Rhineland, the Sudetenland, and Austria. Mussolini marched into Ethiopia, and the Mikado into Manchuria. When they first started down the road to power, they were still weak. They could have been easily stopped. The free nations of the world, however, could not quite summon the needed courage or decisiveness. The "peace-in-our-time" deception was accepted as a comfortable substitute for the stern decisions which had to be made. Winston Churchill, in his monumental "History of World War II," devotes all of volume I, entitled "The Gathering Storm," to pointing out the historical fallacy of relying on weakness to promote peace. World War II was the price we paid for this fallacy. So when the war was over, we solemnly promised ourselves to never let it happen again.

If history teaches anything at all, it is that we cannot impress the Communists by reneging on our moral commitments.

Although a valid argument could be made to support the thesis that we are obligated by treaty to defend South Vietnam, our real reason for doing so is not a legal one at all. It is based on the rightness of the proposition that, as Dean Rusk said: "The integrity of our moral commitments is the pillar of peace in southeast Asia."

The question has often been raised whether the South Vietnamese want our intervention, and want to be free from Communist domination. The answer is:

they do. Let the record speak for itself. First, as I mentioned above, over 900,000 refugees moved from North Vietnam to South Vietnam in 1954-55. They are still there. They do not want to return. We have reason to believe that as many as 2 million more might have come if they had not been prevented by the Communists. In contrast to that, there were only 90,000 to 100,000 who emigrated in the other direction.

Second, consider the fact that 500,000 South Vietnamese have fled from Communist-controlled territory within South Vietnam, and have now sought sanctuary with the Saigon Government. We have no record of any flow in the opposite direction, except for those who have been forcibly conscripted into the Vietcong army. As in the case of the Berlin wall, the flow is all in one direction.

Third, consider the terrible casualties which have been incurred by the South Vietnamese. The number of deaths resulting from actions of terrorism will never be known, but it has certainly reached the tens of thousands. These facts speak for themselves. If the Vietcong were receiving the local support which they claim they are, these actions of terrorism would be unnecessary.

Fourth, consider the fact that during the recent periods of political instability, and crisis, in Saigon, when responsible government was almost nonexistent, there was never one single suggestion made, either officially or unofficially, by any responsible group, that Saigon should try to compromise with Hanoi. During all the political turbulence, there has never been one responsible person who has attempted to politically exploit the issue of peace at any price.

Fifth, consider the fact that the Vietcong, as pointed out above, have now almost exhausted their supply of South Vietnamese recruits. The current recruits to the Vietcong army are now almost exclusively North Vietnamese professionals. This would suggest that Ho Chi Minh's plan to draw his strength from South Vietnam has failed. This failure is corroborated by the fact that Hanoi for the first time, last week, inferred by official statement, that the war might go on for many years. Until then, not one official word had ever been offered to suggest that the war would not be ended quickly.

Much has been made in the press of the fact that over half of South Vietnamese territory is currently controlled by the Vietcong. This assertion is correct only in theory. Much of the territory claimed by the Vietcong is absolutely uninhabited, or is thinly inhabited, or consists of areas which have never known responsible national government. It must be remembered that here we are dealing with a people who, as Ambassador Lodge has said, have developed a sense of "peoplehood" but not of "nationhood." For centuries large portions of these people have never known a central government, and have been taught to extend their loyalties no further than the tribal or village organization. It is not realistic, therefore, to draw adverse inferences from the fact that many of these culturally deprived people, pressured by the bullying tactics of Vietcong terrorists, may have switched their allegiance to the latter. Our best estimates are that approximately 25 percent of the 13 million rural South Vietnamese are now controlled by the Vietcong. An additional 35 to 40 percent are subject to Vietcong harassment. The remaining 35 to 40 percent are under Government control and are generally free from harassment. The urban population of about 3 million is under Government control.

In some quarters, it is declared categorically that the war cannot be won. As evidence in support of this statement, reference is made to the great loss of territory

suffered, and to the poor morale and to the unstable South Vietnamese Government.

There is no question but what the South Vietnamese are, at the present, losing rather than gaining ground. Victory cannot be easily won. The trail will be long and agonizing.

The following thoughts, however, should be kept in mind. First of all, it should be remembered that the terms "victory" and "defeat," in the military sense of those words, are not too meaningful in this context. The problem in South Vietnam is more political than military. As the Saigon government develops in stability and maturity, the causes for its military losses will thereby be removed.

It must also be remembered that our task is not so much to win a military victory over the Vietcong as it is to make them realize that they cannot hope to take over South Vietnam. When that is done, we can push for a settlement, based upon that realization. Our object is not to destroy the Vietcong, nor to destroy, nor even to embarrass, the North Vietnamese Government. Our military objectives are far more limited, and therefore more attainable.

Keep in mind also that our forces too have won some conspicuous victories in spite of their self-imposed limitations. The fact that the Vietcong are now resorting more and more to conventional warfare is evidence that their original program of conquest by guerrilla infiltration has been thwarted. Already they are beyond their original dateline for victory. Keep in mind also that as they resort more and more to conventional warfare, they lose the eight-to-one advantage which they enjoyed in fighting as guerrillas. To the extent that they engage in conventional warfare, they expose themselves to conventional air and artillery attack, and to greater casualties. The evidence which has come to us is that their military casualties are currently far exceeding our own. Clearly, then, they cannot win victory, even from a military point of view, by pursuing their present course.

It has been reported in recent newspaper columns that desertions from the South Vietnamese army are at an all-time high, and that morale is at an all-time low. Both of these statements are outrageously false. Desertions have recently approximated 10 per 1,000 per month. These desertions, however, are not defections. Most deserters return home to their families, or do a little farming. Many of them later return to the army voluntarily. Their desertions are more in the nature of an AWOL. Although the numbers are higher than is healthy, the facts are that in June they were lower than they had been in previous months.

It is not true that the American image has suffered. The evidence indicates that among the South Vietnamese the American rating remains high. For example, recently an American shot and killed a Vietnamese woman. The event has raised very little local furor. This is in sharp contrast to the Gerard incident in Japan a few years ago in which a marine accidentally shot and killed a Japanese woman who was picking up scrap metal. That caused so much popular resentment as to virtually precipitate an international crisis.

It has been argued that our bombing missions have been completely ineffectual. The evidence is that they have been most effectual. It must be remembered that our military objective and response has been intentionally limited.

The most perplexing aspect of the Vietnamese operation involves the possibility of carrying this country past the flash point which could trigger off a nuclear holocaust. There is no question but what the concern is well founded. It is for this reason that our policy has been to keep all of our responses of a limited nature. There is good reason

to believe that Communist China will launch no offensive against us, as long as we launch no offensive against it. Her bite will not equal her bark. China realizes full well that even without using nuclear weapons we could lay waste most of her industrial establishment in a matter of weeks, and could undo all that the Communists have done since their takeover, with the alarming political consequences which would follow. Admittedly, this viewpoint could change, but currently it would seem logical to assume that this is the Chinese position.

We have been most careful to refrain from bombing objectives which are beyond the purview of a legitimate military response. The State Department has good evidence indicating about where the flash point lies. Every precaution has been taken to insure that our responses fall short of this flash point, and with margin to spare.

It is for this very reason the war has inevitably dragged on, to be consternation of those of us in the West who, true to our tradition of decisiveness and quick action, want to get things over in a hurry.

It is for the very reason that we want to avoid even the remote semblance of an unjustifiably provocative act, that we have had to adjust the tempo of the war back to virtually that of a tortoise's pace.

President Johnson's pronouncement last week suggests that this tempo may be slightly increased. There was nothing in his statement, however, to indicate that this country will engage in aggressive warfare.

It has been stated that this country has not explored with sufficient zeal the possibilities for a negotiated peace. It is not my purpose to argue the truth or falsity of this statement. It may well be that something might have been done that was not done or that something may now be done which is not being done. If this is so, then no step should be left untaken to carry us in the direction of an amicable but meaningful settlement of our differences.

I call attention to the fact, however, that time after time this country has made overtures of peace to Hanoi. I shall not burden my presentation with documentation of this assertion. I am satisfied, however, from what briefings I have received from the State Department, that America has made so many overtures of peace that it cannot go much further without compromising its position. By the very nature of things, purposeful negotiation under present circumstances is almost an impossibility. Ho Chi Minh has staked lives and treasure on an immediate and total victory. Victory, to him, means the complete communication of South Vietnam. He has indicated his clear intention to accept nothing less.

We, on the other hand, have clearly defined our goal as the guarantee to South Vietnam of its right to determine its political destiny without outside interference. We have made it clear that we will settle for nothing less. So what we insist on as an absolute condition to settlement, Ho Chi Minh rejects as an absolute barrier to settlement. There is no known way of dividing human liberty down the middle, and of giving half to each side. So until one side or the other is willing to renounce its minimum conditions, settlement would appear to be impossible.

Mr. Walter Lippman, eminent columnist, takes the strong position that we have bitten off more than we can chew. As I interpret his position, it is that we not try to defend all of South Vietnam, but only those enclaves—most of them urban communities—which are militarily easily defensible. He then suggests that once we have made known our more limited objectives, we take responsible steps to effectuate a political settlement.

Much could be said in support of or in opposition to this proposition. In brief, however, I call attention to the fact that 85 percent of the South Vietnamese live in rural

areas. Presumably most or all of them, under Mr. Lippman's theory, would be thrown to the tiger. If our policy of protecting the right of free people to self-determination is sound, then why does it not apply as much to rural as to urban dwellers? It seems to me that following the Lippman policy would subject us to great moral censure, and would weaken our prestige and stature in the eyes of our allies. Moreover, there is a very practical argument against Mr. Lippman's proposition. The purpose of our policy is to put South Vietnam in a viable condition to survive without help from us. To chop the countryside up into little bits, and to cut the great productive rural areas away from the urban areas and turn them over to the Communists, would practically guarantee the death of the city areas, without continuing help from us. In other words, it would seem to me that the Lippman policy would so weaken the South Vietnamese nation as to require the permanent garrisoning of American troops to keep it alive. To negotiate successfully with the Communists, it is apparent that we need to put South Vietnam in as strong a position, rather than in as weak a position as possible. As stated earlier, we cannot placate the tiger by patting him on the head.

The question has been raised concerning the legitimate function of the United Nations, as well as the SEATO organization, in the settlement of the Vietnam crisis. There will come a time no doubt when the United Nations can perform a valid service. At the present time the likelihood of its doing so is small. First of all, we are confronted with the Soviet veto in the Security Council. Second, we are confronted with article 19 of the U.N. Charter, which deprives the vote on the U.N. Security Council to any nation delinquent in paying its assessment for peacekeeping operations. It is common knowledge that the United States is trying desperately to keep the United Nations from foundering, by working out an accord with the Soviet Union regarding the latter's delinquent payments. To place the Vietnamese question before the Security Council of the United Nations at this time might subject this organization to strains which it is not able to bear.

Regarding the SEATO organization, it should be said simply that the language used in the treaty is of such looseness as to absolve the participants from any specific legal obligation to intervene in Vietnam. The spirit of the treaty, however, if not the letter, unquestionably calls for intervention. The action taken by our country was completely consistent with this spirit, and may well pave the way for others to more aggressively participate. As already mentioned, however, we are already receiving tangible, although admittedly modest, assistance from some 35 nations.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that the situation permits very little dogmatism. The above-discussed need for decisiveness does not preclude the constant need for reappraisal. No one in his right mind denies that we are incurring great risks. In my opinion, however, the greater risk lies, not on the side of action, but inaction. I conclude with the ringing words in the inaugural address of President John F. Kennedy:

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

John Fogarty
RESISTANT MALARIA HITS US
FORCES IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PEPPER). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from Rhode Is-

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land [Mr. FOGARTY] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Speaker, on August 3, 1965, the Washington Post carried a story by its distinguished science reporter, Nate Haseltine. The story pinpointed malaria as the chief medical problem among American servicemen in Vietnam. Mr. Haseltine has performed a real public service in bringing this story to public attention.

I wish, however, that the story had gone into the problem in more depth. I wish there had been the real sense of urgency that I feel about this problem of malaria.

I wish he had said bluntly that our ability to fight a war in those areas of the world that still have malaria is less today than it was 20 years ago.

I wish he had written that while we have eradicated malaria from U.S. territory, the mosquitoes that carry the disease are still here.

I wish he had pointed out the fact that people are coming to this country who are carriers of malaria and that these resistant forms can be brought to this country and that the drugs will be no more useful here than in Vietnam.

Most important of all I wish he had made it loud and clear that U.S. manpower trained to fight this disease is critically and dangerously in short supply.

I have heard many explanations of why we are in this dangerous situation. None of them really seem to me to get at the heart of the matter. Perhaps it is just as well to leave it that way and get at what must be done. Here the course is clear.

We need:

First. An organization empowered by the President to speak for and to the Government of the United States on the subject of global malaria eradication;

Second. Expansion of research on the biology of the parasite and the mosquitoes, not just on drugs and insecticides;

Third. Close collaboration through the World Health Organization with those countries where malaria still exists so that our doctors and other specialists can know first hand this enemy of all of the people.

There are dedicated men who are ready and willing to lead this kind of war, a war in which mankind will win. I hope and pray that simple decisive action will be taken now to bring these men together and give them the tools needed to do the job.

RESISTANT MALARIA HITS U.S. FORCES IN
VIETNAM

(By Nate Haseltine)

The development of a resistant form of malaria has become a chief medical problem among American servicemen in Vietnam. The disease form poses no special problem to the natives of the southeast Asia country, who have an inbuilt degree of immunity.

It strikes hardest the Americans stationed there, most of whom never before were exposed to malaria in the United States. Even those taking the prescribed preventive medicines, chloroquine and primaquine, are subject to the mosquito-borne infections.

The treatment is the same for any malaria—more chloroquine, plus the more old-fashioned quinine—and usually under hos-

pitalization. And the recurrence rates are higher among those who suffer the Vietnam variety, according to those working on the problem.

For obvious military reasons, the rate of infections and numbers of those afflicted have not been divulged. But a medical source concerned with countermeasures said malaria has become a chief military medical problem in that country.

Geographically, there, he said, it is widely distributed. The problem of refractoriness of the causative organism (plasmodium falciparum) was first recognized in American personnel in Vietnam about 3 years ago.

With the subsequent buildup of American troops there it has become a greater and greater hazard.

The greatest present hope, and the greatest effort, is in the development of newer and better drugs, according to Col. William Tigertt, chief of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research here.

Ironically, the combination drugs now proving less effective, chloroquine and primaquine, were originally developed after World War II to conquer the specific organism involved in the Vietnam area.

A first inkling that the organism could develop a resistance, or become refractory to the drugs, was reported in 1960 out of Colombia, where it was no special military concern.

To what extent the problem concerns the Vietcong is unknown, but at least one report has indicated the enemy welcomes such a development. That was a story that the Vietcong sought out malaria eradication forces as special targets.

The explanation given is that most natives of the now-divided country have a built-in resistance to the prevalent organism. They suffered its consequences early in life, and either died or survived.

Not so with American personnel there, since malaria was practically eradicated in the United States 20 or more years ago. This makes them easy prey for the mosquitoes, better living sites for the organisms injected into the bloodstream by infected mosquitoes.

The research effort going into the problem was described as intensive, and concentrated chiefly at the Walter Reed Institute. But the need was said to be not as great as the all-out effort that went into the development of the combination preventive treatment.

One report widely circulated, that the treatment involved high enough doses of chloroquine to endanger the eyes of the malaria sufferers, was squelched yesterday by Colonel Tigertt. He said it would require 10 times the dosages of the drug as now prescribed to reach the range where it might cause eye disorders.

The eye peril of chloroquine was first uncovered after its long-term use, and in relatively massive dosage form, for other conditions, chiefly collagen diseases.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. KING of New York (at the request of Mr. GERALD R. FORD), for today through August 20, on account of official business as a U.S. delegate to the Third U.N. Congress in Stockholm, Sweden, on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders.

Mr. KASTENMEIER (at the request of Mr. ZABLOCKI), for an indefinite period of time, on account of illness.

Mr. POOL, for the week of August 9, 1965, on account of official business.

Mr. CAMERON, for August 5 to August 5 to August 17, 1965, on account of legislative and personal business.

Mr. STALBAUM, for August 9, 1965, on account of official business.

Mr. ADAMS, for August 9 and 10, 1965, on account of official business.

Mr. FOLEY, for August 9, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. RANDALL, for 15 minutes, today.
Mr. FOGARTY (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico), for 10 minutes, today; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. WOLFF (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico), for 30 minutes, on August 9; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. FINO in two instances.
Mr. GROSS and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. ICHORD and to include an editorial.
Mr. ZABLOCKI in two instances.
Mr. O'HARA of Illinois in three instances.

Mr. KIRWAN (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) during debate on the independent offices conference report, and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. RYAN (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) prior to the vote on the conference report on saline water.

(The following Members (at the request of Mrs. REDD of Illinois) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama.
Mr. BOB WILSON in two instances.
Mr. GRIFFIN in three instances.
Mr. DERWINSKI in two instances.
Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania in five instances.

Mr. PELLY in two instances.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM in three instances.
Mr. MORSE in three instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. WALKER of New Mexico) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. POWELL in two instances.
Mr. McGRATH.
Mr. MULTER in three instances.
Mr. MORRISON.
Mr. EVANS of Colorado.
Mr. DULSKI.
Mr. TUNNEY.
Mr. HELSTOSKI.
Mr. ROYBAL in six instances.
Mr. TODD.
Mr. STALBAUM.
Mr. HOLIFIELD.
Mr. FARBSTAIN in three instances.
Mr. GILLIGAN.

Mr. DIGGS.
Mr. MATSUNAGA in two instances.
Mr. MILLER in three instances.
Mr. PHILBIN in two instances.
Mr. MOORHEAD in three instances.
Mr. FRIEDEL in two instances.

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day's activities, and everyone in town will contribute to making the occasion a successful one.

The spirit to be found at Becket this weekend, however, is not new. It has been there ever since 1740, when the first sturdy pioneers made their way into the scenic valley. Fierce Indian attacks drove those early settlers back, but not until they had cleared the land and built a sawmill. Others came in 1775, chiefly from eastern Connecticut, and their descendants are still there today. In 1765—just two centuries ago—the town was incorporated, as a small group of men gathered on the parade ground to pledge their hands and hearts to the success of a new enterprise. The place was named Becket, probably after the estate in English Berkshire owned by the Lords Barrington.

During the turbulent events of the Revolutionary War, the people of Becket responded to the call of their new land with patriotism. The parade ground became a training headquarters for the Colonial Army, and every resource of the community was taxed to provide for American soldiers. Many of Becket's sons gave their lives for the land they helped to settle.

During the 19th century, Becket grew with the rest of America. An old town history states that in 1829 there were "two gristmills, five sawmills, three carding machines, and two clothiers works." The town boasted two post offices and no less than four licensed taverns. The history continues:

With the exception of two physicians, two merchants, a few mechanics, and one minister of the gospel, the inhabitants are farmers; industrious, frugal, plain in manners, and independent in spirit.

In the past 100 years, the scarcity of water power and exhaustion of mineral resources has slowed Becket's growth. In 1927, the Ballou Dam broke, inundating the town under 25 feet of water, and the ruined factories were abandoned. But with characteristic determination, Becket carried on. Homes were rebuilt, stores were reopened, and in fact the Berkshire Tissue Co. is a thriving industry today.

I have spoken of the "spirit" to be found in Becket. A good example of that spirit occurred in 1798. Richard D. Birdsall, in his history of Berkshire County, tells us:

In Becket, where no majority sect and thus no town support of the Gospel had even existed between 1788 and 1798, 60 citizens banded together in February to form a Congregational Church Society and penned a hardheaded preamble to their covenant: "We the subscribers having found, by several years experience, the great difficulty of settling and supporting a minister, in the usual way of taxation, or even to supply the pulpit, by reason of the great number of ana-baptists and Methodists, who have appeared in opposition to taxation and have carried their vote, and to avoid contention with our neighbors of different denominations agree to support the church by voluntary contributions." While neither large nor wealthy, the little Congregational group of Becket did persevere until they had built a meeting-house and settled a minister; and the membership thereafter enjoyed a gradual but uninterrupted growth. Here was one town at least to which liberals could point as proof

that the luxury of religious freedom did not always endanger the Gospel ministry.

This is only one illustration of the kind of spirit found in Becket. There are countless others. Her people have faced danger with determination, calamity with courage, and success with modest simplicity. Their spirit has sustained them for 200 years. It is likely to do so for at least 200 more.

PRESIDENT'S ATTACK ON GERALD R. FORD

(Mr. GOODELL (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished columnists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, today made some perceptive comments on the real meaning behind the President's sudden attack on the gentleman from Michigan, Republican Leader "JERRY" FORD, last Sunday. I believe the Members of the House should take particular note of these comments which I quote as follows:

For example, if Mr. Johnson had been less attentive to his courtship of General Eisenhower, it is at least doubtful whether he would have tried to stigmatize one of the prominent members of the Republican Party—presumably FORD—in his uncharacteristic attack down at the L.B.J. Ranch last weekend.

The President defined the prominent member as an inexperienced man or a bitter partisan, who, he said, had both broken and distorted a Presidential confidence by revealing Democratic Senator MIKE MANSFIELD's private criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Democratic politicians in a position to know are convinced that the real purpose of the President's attack was to divert the Nation's attention from the differences over Vietnam between Mr. Johnson and Majority Leader MANSFIELD—reflecting widespread Democratic sentiment in the Senate.

The President feared, and with good reason, that the press would probe deeply into the reasons for MANSFIELD's disagreement with the Johnson policy. This could have led to a rash of stories dramatizing their policy conflict. MANSFIELD seems unable to understand the necessity for the President's strong stand in Vietnam.

What better way to guard against a searching inquiry than to pick a public fight with a prominent member of the Republican Party?

The ploy succeeded. Newspapers have carried reams of copy about the L.B.J.-Ford match and scarcely a word about the real contest between the President and MANSFIELD.

One reason Mr. Johnson could risk taking on FORD and not worry about his political rear is the fact that General Eisenhower is firmly in his corner on Vietnam policy. Most important, no matter how his Vietnam policy works out, he will be able to claim that Ike was with him all the way.

THE GAMBLE OF MODERATION IN VIETNAM

(Mr. ROBISON (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, 1 week ago yesterday the President again used the press-conference device to give the Nation an updated report on our troubles in Vietnam. The remarkably dramatic buildup which preceded the press-conference, forecasting the possibility that some momentous decisions were in the making and were to be announced by the President on this occasion, led only to an equally remarkable feeling of let-down relief when Mr. Johnson let it be known that he had decided merely to continue his policy of what—for want of a better expression—might be called "flexible moderation."

The fact that the President's message—which was delivered in a muted, almost soothing tone—was generally met with that sense of relief in the Congress and around the Nation is both understandable as well as significant at one and the same time.

Most subsequent editorial comment was immediately favorable. To quote from two such sources, we find this excerpt from an editorial in the Wall Street Journal for July 29:

In battlefields like Korea or Vietnam, the question remains, as the President aptly phrased it, "Why must young Americans—born into a land exultant with hope and golden with promise—toll and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?"

The question cannot be brushed aside. Vietnam is not only a far but a strange land. Who rules it is of no consequence in the daily affairs of Americans, and all too often it seems that the Vietnamese themselves put too little value in their freedom. It is not easy to say to what purpose Americans die there.

Yet it seems to us that the President has answered the question as well as any man could.

Also this excerpt from an editorial in "The Christian Science Monitor" for July 30:

The President's words, we feel, were well chosen to give an impression of both resolution and reasonableness. His words "we will stand in Vietnam" are not open to misinterpretation. On the other hand, he was equally categorical in stating America's determination not to expand the war needlessly or do anything to provoke the Soviet Union. Equally welcome was the repetition of the President's pledge to help end poverty in southeast Asia and to strengthen the economic life of South Vietnam.

It was evident, in any event, that the President had chosen his words with extreme care, and, as the Monitor notes, that he had carefully mixed in both resolution and reason.

To those who were concerned that we were losing militarily what has become to be, more and more, an American war, he declared that:

"We will not surrender. And we will not retreat."

Then, giving some additional force to those words, he announced a stepup in draft calls and the dispatch of an additional 50,000 troops to southeast Asia. And so to those who looked for it, this was evidence of our renewed determination—as Mr. Johnson put it—to "stand in Vietnam."

So much for resolution.

But, then, on the side of reason, to reassure those who feared we might be losing whatever chance of peace still remained, he was just as careful to point out that he still had no intention of leading us into anything other than a limited—or measured—war. And this reassurance, together with the emphasis he placed on making a new approach to the United Nations to see if it could, somehow, bring us nearer an honorable peace, and the President's rather surprising acceptance of the idea, long urged by some, for internationally supervised elections not just in South Vietnam but throughout all Vietnam—as Mr. Johnson put it—apparently won for him at least the temporary support of such erstwhile critics of his policies as columnist Walter Lippmann.

On this last suggestion of the President's—that of elections to be held in both North and South Vietnam, which would appear to strongly favor a pro-Communist result—it should be noted that Mr. Johnson's position is somewhat ambiguous, for self-determination for South Vietnam is one thing, while self-determining elections for all of Vietnam is quite another. Thus we find one of the Washington papers, the Evening Star, properly asking, editorially, on Monday of this week, how our acceptance of any such arrangement could possibly square with Mr. Johnson's firm words, spoken some weeks ago at Baltimore, declaring:

We will not withdraw (from Vietnam), either openly, or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

Of course, no one can accurately forecast, now, the results of any such election—whether held just in the South or in both North and South Vietnam—but that, Mr. Speaker, is not the point.

The real point, it seems to me, in assessing the net effect at home and abroad of what Mr. Johnson said and did not say about Vietnam last Wednesday, was best stated by Norman Thomas—no less—in a letter to the editor of yesterday's New York Times, in which Mr. Thomas observed:

Our consensus-loving President, in his carefully constructed statement on further military investment in Vietnam, gave some quotable sentences to every shade of thought in America except the advocates of immediate preventive war with China or of immediate withdrawal of all our troops.

Now, one can well understand the President's anxiety to exhibit none of the characteristics of either a "hawk" or a "dove"—to use a Washington euphemism—and, under the circumstances, this is probably the only attitude he can assume. But so long as he holds to such an attitude, which risks large amounts of ambiguity in order to gain some degree of flexibility, I must question whether the American people have actually gained any clearer understanding than they have had before concerning the real stakes in Vietnam, and why we must play out the game.

If Mr. Thomas' observation was correct—and I suspect it was—then we probably have the answer to why the results of a nationwide public-opinion poll, as reported on in the New York Times for July 30, which poll was taken by

telephone on an hourly basis after last Wednesday's Presidential press conference, showed such a significant shift from overwhelming endorsement of Mr. Johnson's Vietnam policies, to endorsement tempered by a strong "I don't know" trend.

According to the article in the Times—and I know no more about any such poll than what it contained—a spokesman for the firm taking the poll said that the "don't know" category climbed from a 22.22-percent figure at the end of the first hour's survey, to 43.26 percent at the end of the sixth and final hour, which—said the spokesman—was the highest such percentage ever recorded by this firm in recent years on any comparable issue.

Mr. Speaker, what does all this tell us, if anything? Well, of course, each of us must draw our own conclusions, but it seems to me the fact that we are about to have to dig in ever deeper in South Vietnam, in a long, probably costly, and certainly frustrating, sort of a stalemated war, has simply not gotten home to the American people despite the President's words. Or, if that fact has gotten home in any degree, those same people still want to know, "Why?"

If this is the case, and if a majority of us can agree that this effort—unpleasant though it may be—still has to be made, then this is a problem not just for an already overburdened President to deal with but for the Congress, which has a considerable responsibility here, too, to face up to squarely.

Frankly, I do not think the hope of producing any kind of an acceptable solution to our present problem is very good—now, or in the immediate foreseeable future. In view of its own internal problems, I cannot see how the United Nations can be of any real help—though certainly this is a possibility that we have to continue to pursue. Nor, apparently, has Ambassador Harriman brought home with him any really good news.

And so, barring some unexpected development, we are involved up to our ears in a dirty, nasty, tragic war, a different kind of war, as the President put it, which is going to be as frustrating to deal with as a jigsaw puzzle from which certain key parts have been lost. One of those key parts is the hope for victory in the traditional military sense—and I think it is unrealistic to harbor such a hope, or even to look for any reward for our increasing efforts other than a somewhat soggy settlement someday, as Philip Geyelin put it in a recent Wall Street Journal article on Vietnam.

If the American people are going to support this kind of a war and the sacrifices it will entail, they will first have to be helped to better understand why we have to wage it until it can be brought to some sort of honorable conclusion.

Mr. Speaker, I still feel that their understanding would be promoted and their support solidified, if the appropriate committees of this Congress would undertake to examine into our present Vietnam policy, in accordance with our constitutional powers and responsibility to receive such constructive criticism of that pol-

icy, and such suggestions for military or political alternative courses as they deem fit—even as the President and his advisers have just reconsidered those alternatives behind closed White House doors—and then to submit to Congress itself, for appropriate debate and action, a new Presidential mandate tailored to fit the dimensions of our present problem.

Mr. Speaker, I suspect that the President has been loath to have us do this for fear that there will be criticism of his policies, or that some of his decisions will be openly questioned. I can understand this, just as I can understand his desire not to give those who are the aggressors in South Vietnam any reason to question the true depth of our national resolution.

But, Mr. Speaker, if we are ever to have a strong, viable foreign policy with respect to southeast Asia, or anywhere else in this troubled world, it will have to be one founded on the broadest possible base of public understanding and support obtainable.

I believe that this Congress should participate in the development of that understanding and support as a Congress of and for the people, and not as individual Members of Congress holding our own informal hearings on Vietnam in our own districts or elsewhere, because the body to which we belong and which has the ultimate responsibility for doing so, has failed to act.

There are great uncertainties involved in the course upon which the President has evidently decided to lead us. They are explained as well as anything else I have yet seen in James Reston's column in yesterday's the New York Times. That those uncertainties and the public doubt they may engender will grow and fester, as time goes by, seems likely, and the time for Congress to guard against the hazards of such doubt by building a better base of popular understanding and support is now.

Under leave to include extraneous material, the Reston column, entitled "The Gamble of Moderation," follows in its entirety:

WASHINGTON: THE GAMBLE OF MODERATION
(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, August 3.—The administration seems to be settling down for a long war in Vietnam. Either the fears of military disaster nor the hopes of a negotiated peace are as prevalent now as they were in June. There is very little talk of "victory" now, but merely of avoiding a humiliating defeat and securing an honorable compromise.

The Capital looks wonderful and feels terrible. It is radiant with flowers. The long plazas are green from the gullywashers of July, and even the polluted Potomac is majestic in the summer sun. But the mood is solemn; not worried, really, or fearful, but increasingly resigned to a prolonged struggle.

SINCERE PEACE EFFORTS

President Johnson has done a lot to reassure those who felt he was trying to tame Asia, Texas-style, and not really seeking peace. He convinced Arthur Goldberg that he was seeking a fair compromise, or Goldberg would never have left the Supreme Court for the United Nations. Senators FULBRIGHT and MANSFIELD, who opposed his militant policy toward Vietnam in the spring, no longer doubt the sincerity of his efforts

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to negotiate a settlement, and even U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, whose early efforts for peace were brushed off and even resented by the President, is now convinced that Mr. Johnson is earnestly trying to end the fighting.

Also, the operations on the battlefield have gone better for the United States and the South Vietnamese than the pessimists feared at the beginning of the Vietcong monsoon offensive. The holding operations have held. The Johnson advisers who wanted a massive commitment of the reserves to Vietnam have been turned down. Thus the moderates have prevailed, and for the short run are reassured; but despite this, the doubts about the President's policy prevail and in some ways are more serious than they were 6 weeks ago.

STALEMATE OR SETTLEMENT?

The reason for this is clear enough. Six weeks ago American policy was based on the assumption that a stalemate would lead to negotiations, but now the policymakers are not so sure. Instead of feeling that the Communists would agree to a settlement once they realized that a military victory was out of the question, now there is a vague suspicion here that maybe a stalemate is more acceptable to the Communists than a compromise settlement.

A stalemate is certainly more costly to Washington than to Peiping or Moscow. They are not committing their men; we are. They are investing very little in the struggle; Washington is putting up between \$2.5 million and \$3 million a day. The American effort is dividing the Western allies, diverting the energies of the American Government from the development and unification of the West, and hurting the United States in the eyes of most of the uncommitted nations.

Thus the American military effort is following a familiar pattern. It was hoped that the naval retaliation in the Gulf of Tonkin, and then the bombardment of North Vietnam, and then the commitment of the Marines to battle would convince the Communists of Washington's determination and lead to negotiations. But all these assumptions proved to be false, and now the new assumption—that a stalemate in the land war after the monsoon would bring peace talks—is beginning to be seriously questioned.

Nevertheless, the President is operating on a shortrun plan of using limited power for a limited objective. If he cannot get negotiations through creating a stalemate, he will then consider the sterner measures of heavier bombardment of North Vietnamese cities and ports.

This flexible approach policy clearly does not satisfy many of his associates. It is not enough for some who do not think the Communists will talk until they fear the destruction of their cities, and it is too much for others who keep talking about negotiations when there is no prospect of negotiations.

MORE OF THE SAME

But the President is going on with it, anyway, not knowing any better course of action, and the likelihood is that this is going to continue long after the monsoon ends in late October.

Meanwhile, orders have been given to reinforce the American garrisons in southeast Asia without weakening the American force in Europe. A specific instruction from Secretary of Defense McNamara has gone out to this effect.

The first thing—as Washington sees it—is to hold the line, test the stalemate theory and keep probing for peace, but with an increasing realization that this is probably going to take a very long time.

COMPULSIVE UNIONISM

(Mr. QUILLEN (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to insert in the RECORD a letter to the editor of the Knoxville Journal, Knoxville, Tenn., which was written by Harley Fowler, one of Tennessee and the Nation's most outstanding attorneys.

Mr. Fowler is a member of the law firm of Fowler, Rowntree & Fowler, of Knoxville, Tenn.

In closing his letter to the editor, Mr. Fowler states:

A society is not great which would sacrifice the flower of its youth in distant lands that the people there might be free and at the same time place the yoke of tyranny upon its own people.

I am happy to make this distinguished American's thinking on such an important matter available to my colleagues and to the readers of the RECORD:

AUGUST 2, 1965.

EDITOR,
Knoxville Journal,
Knoxville, Tenn.

MY DEAR SIR: I am writing concerning the effort in Congress to pass legislation which would compel workers throughout the country to belong to and pay dues and assessments of labor unions. I've wondered what the individual members of the unions thought about this proposed requirement. Do they want to belong to an organization to which people are compelled to belong? I've wondered if they realized that this would result in having two factions within the union, one the loyal members who voluntarily joined who would seek to sustain the union, and the other those discontented persons who were compelled to join and who would try to destroy it and would succeed if they became the majority of the members. That's why the most prominent of those who have actively sympathized with the labor movement have felt that membership in unions must be voluntary and have been opposed to compelling membership—the closed shop. Among these are Justice Brandeis, Justice Frankfurter, Samuel Gompers, and Justice Goldberg.

In the case of *American Federation of Labor v. Sash & Door Company*, 335 U.S. 538, 93 L. Ed. 222, Justice Frankfurter, quoting with approval the language of Justice Brandeis in a former opinion, said: "The objections, legal, economic, and social, against the closed shop are so strong, and the ideas of the closed shop so antagonistic to the American spirit, that the insistence upon it has been a serious obstacle to union progress. * * * But the American people should not, and will not accept unionism if it involves the closed shop. They will not consent to the exchange of the tyranny of the employer for the tyranny of the employees."

Samuel Gompers expressed the same thought when he said: "No lasting gain has ever come from compulsion. If we seek to force, we but tear apart that which united is invincible." Former Justice Goldberg, at the 1962 convention of the American Federation of Government Employees, is reported to have said:

"In your own organization you have to win acceptance not by an automatic device which brings a new employee into your organization, but * * * by your own conduct,


your action, your own wisdom, your own responsibility, and your own achievements."

It has been judicially commented that corporations have no souls—prompted by the thought that a group of individuals, regardless of their virtues individually, will, acting under the corporate name, do that which they personally would not want to be charged with. This is true of any association. And so those who would by their vote give a group of men acting behind closed doors the right to deprive a man of his inalienable right—a God-given award—to feed his family, are making a public record which is indefensible now and will become more apparent with the lapse of time—when the Negro shall have been denied membership in unions and others thus discriminated against, when men have been expelled from membership in the union because of the way they voted politically, when the lethargy of the closed-shop States has through the land been substituted for the increase in hourly earnings, the new manufacturing jobs, the decrease in unemployment and the increase in per capita income now prevailing in the right-to-work States as contrasted to the closed-shop States.

A society is not great which would sacrifice the flower of its youth in distant lands that the people there might be free and at the same time place the yoke of tyranny upon its own people.

Sincerely,

HARLEY FOWLER.


THE UNITED NATIONS
AND VIETNAM

(Mr. UTT (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson has painted himself into a corner, and a rather sticky one at that. It may have been a seductive error, but it is fatal to the security of the free world. Standing in the same sticky corner are most of the political leaders of the country, at least those who have so strongly supported the United Nations as the world's best hope for peace.

It was evident from the President's address to the Nation of Wednesday, July 28, that he had yielded to the demands of the second echelon in the State Department, and to the hue and cry of the international intellectuals, as well as to the carping by many Democrat Senators, to transfer the mess in Vietnam to the tender and loving care of the Communist-controlled United Nations. The result of this should be obvious to everyone.

The U.N. is determined to bring Red China into the United Nations. This was made most apparent by Ralph Bunche, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs, in a recent press conference in Los Angeles, when he stated:

The United Nations is working for the seating of Red China as a member—

And he predicted this would occur within 2 years.

The U.N. will follow the same pattern that it did in the Korean conflict when we were within a stone's throw of a smashing victory over the Red Chinese.

The U.N. prevented this victory and called for an armistice, when our enemy was on the ropes. Incidentally, we are still operating under that armistice, after 12 years, and no peace treaty has ever been signed. Our military forces are still pinned down at the 38th parallel, trying to enforce that armistice.

The United Nations is responsible for the Communist control of Laos. It interfered in the Bay of Pigs and made concessions on behalf of the United States which should never have been made. This included a commitment to protect the integrity of Communist Cuba by the use of our Navy. Now we have satisfied its appetite with a fresh morsel to chew on. The U.N. will present a proposal for peace by surrender, calling for the unification of all Vietnam under a free election, the outcome of which will be a total Communist victory. The Vietcong, through its political arm, which is known as the National Liberation Front, controls 80 percent of South Vietnam. Even the terms of surrender will be dictated by Red China and the National Liberation Front.

The President will be forced to accept any recommendations by the United Nations, because of world opinion, and because the leading political figures of this country have failed to recognize the U.N. for what it is, and they will hesitate to turn their backs on this sacrosanct organization. Those of us who have pointed out the fallacies of the U.N. are considered to be narrow-minded extremists and, in fact, downright immoral for speaking out against it. It would be more popular to speak out against motherhood than against the United Nations.

I have strongly supported President Johnson on his original intention to stop Communist aggression. I thought that he would rather be right than President, but now I am convinced he would rather be President than right. The administration denied that Harriman's visit to Moscow was in any way connected with the Vietnam crisis, but Harriman came back and reported that his talks with Kosygin indicated Russia's interest in peace—at a price. With peace at any price, it is apparent that there will be no victory in Vietnam, and all of the casualties to date will have been in vain, and there is no excuse to maintain our military forces, nor to build them up for additional bloodshed, when our goal is no longer victory.

Let's review a few figures. When President Eisenhower left office, there were 567 military advisers in Vietnam. President Kennedy built this military contingent up to 16,000, and now President Johnson is committing 125,000 Americans, but the campaign oratory last year accused the Republicans of irresponsible escalation of the war. General MacArthur said "There is no substitute for victory." The only way we can have a victory is by using 200,000 or 300,000 Chinese troops from Formosa that we have trained and supported over these many years, as well as contingents from South Korea and the Philippines, using our Navy for a complete blockade and our Air Force for cover, to knock out military installations in Hanoi. But there should

be no American ground troops. Then you would have Asiatic ground troops fighting the Vietcong, and it would no longer have the appearance of Caucasians versus the Asiatics.

McNamara has made at least six trips to Vietnam and has come back with six different versions—so do not be unhappy because you are confused. So is Mr. McNamara. The only difference is that his confusion is better organized and better documented than yours.

GOODYEAR PRAISED FOR REFUSING TO BUILD RUMANIAN RUBBER PLANT

(Mr. McCLORY (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, the question of how much the United States should trade with the Communist countries continues to confront our Nation. Certainly the answer to this perplexing puzzle is not just academic.

Each day American soldiers face the Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each day the Berlin Wall stands in mute testimony to the conflict between the Communist and free worlds.

Despite these realities some would-be policymakers appear to be of the opinion that virtually unlimited trade with the Communists should be encouraged. The hope of such a policy is that nations who trade together will be friends. However, many Americans are wary and skeptical of such reasoning.

Aware that differences of opinion do exist and persist on this subject, I was startled to observe that a prominent Member of the other body criticized Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. on Monday July 26, 1965, for declining to provide a synthetic rubber plant with all its advanced technology to Communist Rumania. Apparently, the Goodyear management does not share the same rosy view held by the Member of the other body that strategic materials and technical knowledge should be shared with the Communists.

The argument is advanced that Rumania desires to free itself from Soviet domination and yearns for more economic ties with the West. Whether Rumania has the intention or the ability to liberate itself from its Soviet ties is problematical to say the least.

In any event, it seems patently unfair to me to condemn an American business concern for deciding not to give its technical know-how to a Soviet satellite state. In order that all sides of this situation be presented, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to include with these remarks an article from the Goodyear publication Wingfoot Clan entitled "Facts for a Senator's Consideration."

FACTS FOR A SENATOR'S CONSIDERATION

Your company's role in the controversy surrounding the possible construction of a synthetic rubber plant in Communist Rumania is the reason for this report of facts significant to every employee.

Senator WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Democrat, of Arkansas did not have all the facts in his possession in a recent speech on the Senate

floor, and his charges now have made it possible for Goodyear to set the record straight for the first time, an opportunity which the company welcomes.

Fortunately, the Nation's press and news magazines plus quite a few columnists are now digging into the background and some very objective reporting is taking place.

To make certain that all employees are aware of Goodyear's actions, the clan is presenting a chronological report of events to date and an explanation of the reasons for company policy in the matter.

On June 9, 1964, a trade delegation from Communist Rumania visited the Goodyear plant at Beaumont, Tex. This was one of several U.S. manufacturing facilities in various industries visited by the Rumanians, at the request of our Government.

Although the company was reluctant to approve this visit, it was decided to do so in an effort to cooperate with our Government.

While in Beaumont, the Rumanian delegation got a casual look at activities but was not permitted to observe detailed manufacturing processes involved in the creation of polyisoprene rubber, the product which exactly duplicates natural rubber and is considered one of the free world's important manufacturing secrets. There are only two known commercial producers of polyisoprene rubber in the world—Goodyear and the Shell Oil Co. It is the basic product used in the manufacture of critical military vehicle tires and high speed airplane tires.

During the tour, the Rumanians requested samples of the synthetic polyisoprene rubber and Goodyear applied in June 1964 to the Government for an export license to comply with this request, again cooperating with our Government. The license was actually granted by our Government in December of 1964 but was never used by Goodyear.

Goodyear never applied for a license to build a plant or to export know-how.

But even before the granting of the license to send the rubber samples, the company had declined to participate in the development of a polyisoprene rubber plant behind the Iron Curtain. On October 1, 1964, Goodyear had advised the State Department by letter that the company did not desire to build such a plant because the company did not believe such information should be sent behind the Iron Curtain because of its strategic value and because we felt the Communists could use this synthetic natural rubber to disrupt natural rubber prices, if they so desired. This action would seriously affect the economies of such countries as Malaysia and Liberia, who are friendly to the United States, and who depend on natural rubber for export.

No public statements were made of the decision since all activity in the area was considered confidential and no definite action had progressed beyond the discussion state.

On October 22, 1964, however, Washington newsmen reported that Goodyear had declined an invitation to build the plant. This they learned from news sources inside the Government, not from Goodyear. The news stories appeared in hundreds of publications across the Nation, with most reporting that Goodyear felt this highly prized technical know-how could become available to other Communist nations.

The first company statement on the subject came on the pages of this paper December 3, 1964, when a report similar to this one was prepared to inform employees of the facts—there was no public release. The Wingfoot Clan is printed solely for the purpose of keeping our employees informed and is not an external publication.

Many of you will recall the article—it was a no-nonsense statement of fact in which Goodyear, a private enterprise organization, said that it was passing up a substantial profit because it believed that such action was in the interest of national security. The

plants would also be used for electric power production.

Mr. Connorton said that talks on the power phase of the project were now going on with Consolidated Edison and other power producers near the city.

An atomic desalting plant here might cost as much as \$500 million, Mr. Holum said. He also explained that a congressional act would be needed to authorize Federal participation in construction.

BIGGEST PLANT OFF VENEZUELA

The largest desalting plant in the world is on Aruba Island, off the coast of Venezuela. It produces about 3 million gallons of fresh water a day.

A plant here might produce 150 to 250 million gallons of drinking-quality water a day, officials said—or up to 10 percent of the city's average daily water use.

It takes 2.5 million gallons of sea water to obtain 1 million gallons of sweet water. The cost of desalting water is decreasing steadily. In 1952, when a Federal saline water program was started, the cost was \$5 for every 1,000 gallons. The cost now stands at \$1 for every 1,000 gallons. And it could be cut in half again in plants producing 20 million gallons a day.

A study of a proposed plant at Los Angeles that would cost \$300 million and produce 150 million gallons of water a day indicated that the cost would be 22 cents for 1,000 gallons, Mr. Holum said.

But Armand DiAngelo, the Commissioner of Water Supply here, said that the Los Angeles figure was prior to distribution. He estimated that desalted water would cost 28 cents at the tap here—against a present average cost of 12 cents for 1,000 gallons.

He pointed out, however, that other cities and towns in the country pay as much as 50 cents for 1,000 gallons.

"Desalting is a drought-proof way of obtaining water, Mr. Holum asserted. He also noted that distilled sea water is too good; it lacks flavor. But you can bend it with fresh water" in the mains, he said.

If studies indicate that desalting sea water is practicable here, it would take 3 or 4 years to build the first atomic plant officials said.

Dr. Jack A. Hunter, assistant director of the Office of Saline Water in the Department of the Interior, speaking at a second press conference held by the Nuclear Energy Writers Association at the American Institute of Physics, 335 East 45th Street, explained one reason why it would take considerable time to build a plant.

He said that if an order for enough metal tubing for one moderately large desalting plant—producing 100 million gallons a day—were given it would take all the tubing manufacturers in the United States 3 years to fill it, using their present idle capacity.

Dr. Hunter said that tubing manufacturers, who had heard of this scale of demand, had come to him and asked, "Is this for real?"

It takes a maze of thousands of miles of 2-inch tubing to build a plant that desalts water by flash distillation. Raw sea water, heated, flashes into steam. The steam rises and condenses on more metal tubes, leaving its salt below. The sweet water is then captured in trays and the concentrated brine is thrown back into the ocean.

STUDY STARTS NEXT WEEK

The joint Federal-city exploratory survey will begin next week. Mr. Holum said that it would be a quick look from the technical point of view to see what might be done, and that Federal people would "work around the clock" if necessary to get it off to a swift start.

If the results were positive, the survey would be followed by a detailed engineering and feasibility study that would take about a year before construction could start, he said.

Gov. Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey will lead a State delegation to Washington today to talk with Federal officials on the water crisis. The conference will include the possibility of a desalting plant for New Jersey, Mr. Holum said.

The presidents of the Public Service Electric and Gas Corp., the Jersey Central Power & Light Co., and the Atlantic City Electric Co. will go with Mr. Hughes and his aids.

Mr. Holum called desalting for the city area a tremendously complicated, tremendously exciting undertaking. Mr. Connorton said that water experts were unanimous in saying you cannot think just of New York City, but you must think of the region, and he said the city was eager to cooperate with other municipalities in assuring plentiful water supplies.

Consumers used a bit under a billion gallons of water here yesterday, leaving 212.4 billion gallons in the reservoirs, or 44.6 percent of capacity. Last year at this time there were 351.2 billion gallons left, or 73.7 percent of capacity. In normal years, 380.3 billion gallons are still in storage in early August, almost 80 percent of capacity.

THE VIETCONG BOAST OF BACKING IN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, George K. Tanham, an eminent student of Asian affairs, in his book "Communist Revolutionary Warfare," observed how domestic activities in France, on the part of Communists and other Vietminh sympathizers, figured prominently in the military doctrines of General Giap.

In a recent statement on the floor of the Senate I made the point that the American home front must be regarded a crucial area in the present Vietnamese struggle.

On Tuesday, August 3, 1965, an article appeared in the New York Times, entitled "Vietcong Boast of Backing in United States."

The article says that the clandestine radio transmissions of the Vietcong regularly tell guerrilla insurgents that most of the American people support their struggle, and continued:

In a typical broadcast, Tran Van Thanh, a member of the central committee of the National Liberation Front, the political representation of the Vietcong, said world public opinion was a decisive factor in the Vietnam conflict.

Mr. Thanh described the Vietnam debates on American university campuses and said their results had attracted the attention of millions of Americans. He said Washington officials had failed to justify their policies at these debates and in similar discussions in Britain.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times article "Vietcong Boast of Backing in United States," be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETCONG BOAST OF BACKING IN UNITED STATES—RED RADIO SAYS AMERICAN PUBLIC FAVORS GUERRILLAS

(By Seymour Topping)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, August 2.—Liberation radio, the clandestine transmitter of the Vietcong, regularly tells guerrilla insurgents that most of the American people support their struggle.

As proof, the broadcasts report on public protests in the United States against the Vietnam policy of the Johnson administration. The Vietcong adherents are assured that they are certain to win if they keep fighting because world public opinion is on their side.

In a typical broadcast, Tran Van Thanh, a member of the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front, the political representation of the Vietcong, said world public opinion was a decisive fact in the Vietnam conflict.

Mr. Thanh described the Vietnam debates on American university campuses and said their results had attracted the attention of millions of Americans. He said Washington officials had failed to justify their policies at these debates and in similar discussions in Britain.

BACKING IN WEST REPORTED

"This means that righteous United States and British citizens all came to the conclusion that U.S. imperialists are stupid and criminal aggressors," Mr. Thanh said, "that the aggressive Johnson policy in Vietnam must be ended and that the National Liberation Front is the organizer and leader of the struggle and victory and is the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people."

The Vietcong leader, who is a member of the Liberation Front's delegation to Communist China, said the whole Communist world was also supporting their cause, but he made a distinction between Peiping and Moscow. "The U.S.S.R. gives us adequate support," he said. But he added, "China supports us with all of its heart."

The Vietcong radio also has been broadcasting appeals to Americans to halt the buildup of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. One such appeal has just been made by Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the Liberation Front.

DEMONSTRATIONS HAILED

Hailing demonstrations in the United States against the administration's Vietnam policy, Mr. Tho said it had become a stirring popular movement.

"This is the correct attitude of a large number of people of various walks of life in the United States in defending their vital interests and opposing the adventurous policy of bloody aggression of the U.S. Government in Vietnam," Mr. Tho asserted.

It is not yet clear to what degree this Vietcong propaganda has succeeded in offsetting the impact of the American military buildup on the South Vietnamese people.

In Government-controlled areas it is possible to define at least two attitudes toward the recent decision to augment the U.S. forces.

Many Vietnamese have accepted it as evidence that the United States does not intend to abandon the country after some face-saving negotiations. Others insist that the Americans cannot remain forever and that the country's problems must be solved by a strong Vietnamese Government.

Many Vietnamese peasants look upon the enlarger American presence as security against the Vietcong. However, in many areas where the Vietcong operate, the sharp increase in U.S. air attacks and expanded military operations inevitably means additional suffering and casualties for civilians.

JOINT ECONOMIC HEARINGS SHOW EXPERTS FAR APART ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM

Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. President, a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee headed by Representative HENRY REUSS has just concluded hearings on the kind of international mone-

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tary reform this Nation should work toward at the international monetary conference Secretary of the Treasury Fowler recently proposed.

The postwar expansion of free world economies and especially of international trade has been a happy miracle. Vastly improved standards of living, greatly strengthened national economies throughout the free world and a fantastic 150-percent increase in world trade has characterized this prosperous period.

A key ingredient of this growth has been the easy availability of liquidity—or more simply ready cash to finance international trade and internal economic growth.

Where did this explosion in liquidity—to match the explosion in trade—come from? It came from the U.S. deficit in our balance of payments. Our deficit dollars have enabled the rest of the world to secure the cash—now largely the gold we have lost and the dollars we have lent and spent.

But Uncle Sam is coming to a grinding halt in his generous balance of payments losses. This year we will come far closer than we have to equilibrium. We may shortly have a surplus instead of a deficit and start soaking up some of that ready cash that has permitted world trade to expand.

Now what happens to a world that should grow in economic strength and to a world trade that could develop immensely in the next few years?

Obviously we must somehow reform the world money—or monetary system—so that enough money will be available for this purpose without killing the hen that lays these golden eggs—Uncle Sam.

But the experts are far, far apart on what to do, when to do it, or indeed whether anything needs to be done. This confusion and disagreement could be very costly. It could lead to a world deflation and depression for want of an adequate international money system.

I ask unanimous consent that an excellent article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr., of the New York Times, describing the quandary of international money experts as revealed at the recent joint economic hearings, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, July 30, 1965]
MONETARY REFORM: CONGRESSIONAL PANEL ENDS HEARINGS, BEWILDERED BY DIVERGENT OPINIONS

(By Edwin L. Dale, Jr.)

WASHINGTON, July 29.—A somewhat bewildered congressional subcommittee has completed 3 days of hearings on reforming the world monetary system today, having heard 10 witnesses and 10 different proposals for reform.

The witnesses were mainly academic, but they included a banker, a joint presentation by two Senators and a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers.

While the papers presented were widely regarded as impressive, their most striking characteristic was the lack of agreement on where the world should go from here.

This dispersion of views on international finance contrasted strongly with the coalition some years ago of economic opinion—with

relatively few exceptions—on the desirability of using Federal budget deficits to spur the expansion of the economy.

CONCLUSION EXPRESSED

An observer at the hearings this week turned to Alexander Pope today to express the conclusion of many:

"Who shall decide when doctors disagree?"

Some of the witnesses wanted the role of the dollar as a reserve currency for the rest of the world reduced, some wanted it maintained or even increased.

Some believed the problem of reform was "urgent," but some felt the problem was greatly exaggerated.

Most wanted reform worked out through the International Monetary Fund, but some favored a solution through a small group of the leading financial nations.

Some believed that the problem of the United States payments deficit had been exaggerated, others felt it was still serious and was being attacked by undesirable remedies.

Some wanted a little more flexibility in currency exchange rates, and some wanted even less than there is.

Possibly the most surprising proposal came from the two Senators, EUGENE J. MCCARTHY, Democrat, of Minnesota, and VANCE HARTKE, Democrat, of Indiana.

Saying that the world faces an imminent deflation—a point disputed by a number of the other witnesses—they urged that nations pay gold to the Monetary Fund, which would use it as backing for "trade credits" to its member nations.

One witness, James C. Ingram of the University of North Carolina, was so despairing of international agreement on reform that he proposed that the United States unilaterally convert the world to a "dollar exchange standard" by refusing in the future to pay \$35 an ounce for gold. This, he believes, would end the role of gold.

Several witnesses, led by August Maffry, a vice president of the Irving Trust Co., supported creation of a new composite currency reserve unit made up of the leading currencies.

But Robert A. Mundell of the Brookings Institution told the panel, "there is no case in history where a synthetic currency has been artificially created unconnected with a dominant political unit."

While disagreement was the dominant note, the witnesses did show some agreement.

For example, those who touched on the point were unanimous in saying that the role of the dollar as the key world currency for private transactions should be maintained, as distinct from its role in official monetary reserves.

There was also agreement that over the long run, the total of official reserves in the world would have to grow.

But whether they should be "owned" reserves or "borrowed" reserves found the witnesses diverging, as on so many other questions.

Henry C. Wallich of Yale University, the former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, even challenged the view that nations now need and want more reserves, saying this was true only of Britain and Japan.

The hearings by the subcommittee, headed by Representative HENRY S. REUSS, Democrat, of Wisconsin, were the first of their kind, devoted specifically to the question of world reform.

They came at a time when the administration has begun an intensive internal discussion of what the U.S. position should be.

And they disclosed about as much difference of opinion among the experts inside the country as is already known to exist among the leading nations.

PROPOSED PURCHASE OF TWO MODERN FISHING TRAWLERS FROM POLAND

Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. President, the Secretary of the Interior, in a letter to the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], has proposed that the Interior Department purchase two modern fishing trawlers from Poland. The proposed purchase would be made with counterpart funds. The vessels would then be leased by the Interior Department to members of the private commercial fishing industry.

I would like to urge careful consideration of such a proposal before any action is taken. There is no question in my mind that the American fishing fleet is antiquated and badly in need of modern, technologically advanced trawlers. The question which occurs to me is, should such trawlers be purchased from Poland at this time? There are three aspects of such a purchase which give me concern.

First and foremost is the effect which such a purchase would have on the shipbuilding capacity of the countries involved, from a national defense point of view.

I have argued many times in the past that the United States must preserve a substantial capacity for shipbuilding and ship repair work. Military authorities from Secretary McNamara on down agree on this. Every vessel—fishing or otherwise—which is built in this country will bolster our own capacity. Eighteen shipyards have gone out of business during the past 10 years. We must bear in mind the facilities and the skilled labor which may be kept on tap if these ships are built in the United States—and may be lost if they are built abroad.

And if a large shipbuilding capacity is important to our own national security, then it is surely important to the national security of Poland—which, I need hardly remind you, is a Communist nation. Thus the proposed purchase might well injure our own defense capacity and build up that of Communist Poland. However optimistic we may be about the possible liberalization of the eastern European nations, I do not believe that we have yet arrived at the appropriate point to begin contributions to their national security.

The second aspect of this proposal which makes me stop and think is the possible impact on the fishing industries of the countries involved. The letter of the Interior Department to Senator MAGNUSON declared in part:

One of the most significant factors involved in the decline [of the fishing industry] has been the inability of our fishing industry to sponsor the entry into the fisheries of comparatively large, efficient, and technologically advanced fishing vessels.

I would suggest that, if our fishing industry has not introduced such vessels into their fleets, it is because such vessels are expensive and the Government has not given them any assistance in constructing such trawlers. Now that the Government is apparently ready to give some assistance, why should the money not be expended in the United States?

Vehicles though he violated the law 5 or 6 weeks ago.

I say for the benefit of the U.S. attorney in Washington, D.C., that his negligence, in my judgment, and his inexcusable violation of the District traffic laws, has cost the District of Columbia some money to ticket his car.

It also takes some time if that ticket is processed. Certainly the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia should be counted upon to place law enforcement first in his own conduct.

How does Mr. Acheson, the chief law enforcement officer for the District of Columbia, believe policemen should know whether the Volkswagen belongs to him or some poacher on this reserved parking area?

Traffic Division Aid Mr. A. L. Clay deserves great credit for ticketing Mr. Acheson's car. Unless traffic aids strictly enforce the law in these areas, poachers park in spaces so that officials of the Government who are on official Government business and display proper identification—which Mr. Acheson apparently never even asked for—are unable to find a space to park their automobiles.

I have a hunch that Mr. Acheson would be one of the first to complain if he had the proper identification and could not find a space to park, knowing that spaces reserved for official Government business purposes were being used by the general public.

It is not easy for me to criticize the U.S. attorney.

There are some others in the Department of Justice who had better learn what it means to have uniform application of law enforcement, irrespective of the status of the individual violator.

Mr. President, I have on my desk some other traffic tickets of other officials of the Government that I only wish generally to call attention to tonight. I wish to say that the senior Senator from Oregon, chairman of the Subcommittee of the District of Columbia Committee that has jurisdiction over the Police Department in the District of Columbia, intends to do everything he can, so long as he is in the Senate to back up the police in exercising their legitimate rights and duties.

Law enforcement officers such as Mr. Acheson, the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia, believe it or not, in my judgment cannot square their conduct in this matter with their responsibility to back up uniformity of practice in the administration of law enforcement. But Mr. Acheson is not alone.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I had pointed out that all that Mr. Acheson needed to do was to place on his car an official permit, which he did not even have, did not even ask for, and, up until last night, had never asked for. I do not know what he has done today.

I also said in my speech that it cost the District of Columbia money to process the ticketing, although Mr. Acheson succeeded in having the Corporation Counsel fix the ticket—and he fixed the ticket without the slightest justification.

Articles published in today's Washington Post and Washington Star describe how the U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia has set forth his crawfishing alibis and rationalizations for being a law violator, although he is the U.S. attorney. I do not intend to let him get by with that, without disclosing how he has stultified his high position. The best that can be said for his crawfishing is that, in essence, he has pleaded nolo contendere, which does not make him guilty.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the article entitled

"Two Fixed Tickets Fail To Perturb Acheson," published in today's Washington Post.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TWO FIXED TICKETS FAIL TO PERTURB ACHESON

A batch of canceled Washington parking tickets came into Senator WAYNE MORSE'S office again yesterday and there among them, plain as day, was the name of U.S. Attorney David C. Acheson, with two canceled tickets.

But it's all much ado about nothing, said Acheson, when he was told of this later. He's paid his share of parking tickets, he said, when he was wrong, but he figures he was right on these two occasions.

The tickets were for parking on property reserved for Government officials. Acheson is a Government official and he was on official business both times, he said.

MORSE, the Oregon Democrat who has been cracking down on ticket fixing in Washington, receives these tickets from city officials as a matter of routine. Acheson's canceled tickets went right along with the rest.

Acheson was given \$3 tickets on June 18 and June 22 at the Bureau of the Budget and the Treasury Department on space reserved for Government officials. In a memo to his staff, he protested this and said it seemed "I should be given some kind of identification on my car so I may use these spaces."

And there was the rub. Government officials are supposed to have permits showing on their cars when they park on Government property.

District Motor Vehicle Director George A. England said yesterday he'd have been glad to give Acheson a permit if Acheson had requested one.

Acheson's answer is that he was unaware of the permit requirement but has since learned that he needs one.

Senator MORSE, commenting on the incident to the almost empty Senate floor, said it was an inexcusable violation of traffic laws and a bad example that had cost the District of Columbia money. He said it wasn't an isolated case and that tickets had been canceled for others in the Justice Department.

Thinking it all over yesterday, Acheson said he believed he was right in his stand, but maybe it wouldn't be a bad idea to take a cab.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have an idea that this law enforcement officer has such an insensitivity about the desirability of a uniform application of the law, even as it involves a U.S. attorney, that I doubt if anything could perturb him.

Be that as it may, let his own crawfishing alibi speak for itself.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an article entitled "MORSE Hits Acheson on Ticket 'Fix'," published in today's Washington Star.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MORSE HITS ACHESON ON TICKET FIX

The District's chief prosecutor was himself accused last night in the Senate of breaking the law.

"U.S. Attorney David C. Acheson fixed two parking tickets," Senator WAYNE MORSE, Democrat, of Oregon, said.

That meant that Acheson neither paid the \$3 fine on each ticket nor went to court to explain why he shouldn't pay. Instead, he asked city attorneys to cancel the tickets.

They were put on his windshield June 18 and June 22 when he was parked on Budget

Bureau and Treasury Department space reserved for Government officials. And Acheson was there on official business.

To MORSE, the cancellation of the tickets was an inexcusable violation of traffic laws. Furthermore, Senate District Committeeman MORSE said Acheson was setting a bad example as a public official.

To Acheson, cancellation of the tickets was understandable, even though he should have had an official parking permit, available for the asking. But then, his car was an official one, on official business.

What was MORSE'S reaction to the facts in the Acheson case?

"He should have told them to a judge."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the article reads, in part:

To Acheson, cancellation of the tickets was understandable, even though he should have had an official parking permit, available for the asking. But then, his car was an official one, on official business.

The car was a little Volkswagen. What policeman would have thought that, without a parking permit, the U.S. attorney was on official business? That is no way, I say to the U.S. attorney, to cooperate with a police department that is seeking to carry out its trust and its obligation. It does not help the morale of the Metropolitan Police Department, let me say as chairman of the subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia that has supervision over the Police Department, to have the U.S. attorney follow a course of action that results in having tickets fixed. We expect the police to engage in a uniform enforcement of the law in respect to their responsibility.

Mr. Acheson's crawfishing speaks for itself. I merely want the RECORD to show that his conduct disgusts me. It is sad that we have a U.S. attorney who has no higher regard for the high honor of his position than, in the first place, to violate the law, and then to be such a poor citizen as not to be willing to pay his fine, without going to have his ticket fixed.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOME RULE

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Without Delay," relating to the home rule issue, and published in the Washington Post of today, August 5, 1965.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WITHOUT DELAY

"The restoration of home rule to the citizens of the District of Columbia must no longer be delayed," President Johnson declared in a special message to Congress 6 months ago. But the House District Committee has devoted those 6 months to nothing but delay. The committee has left the President's home rule bill precisely where it was in February. It has held no hearings, and it has scheduled none.

President Johnson is not a man of unlimited patience, fortunately, and he does not care to have his bills ignored. Now he has amplified his first message with a formal communication to the Speaker of the House, and the tone has an edge to it.

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"On February 2, 1965, I transmitted to the Congress a home rule bill for the District of Columbia, with a special message urging its prompt and favorable consideration," he reminds the House. Noting the large majority that passed the bill in the Senate, the President continues: "I cannot emphasize too strongly my conviction that this action by the Senate must not meet the fate of home rule bills passed by the Senate in previous Congresses. The House, too, must be given the opportunity, and promptly, to restore the basic rights of democracy at the very heart of the greatest constitutional system in the world."

The House District Committee is controlled by rural southerners who have recognized the home rule bill as civil rights legislation. They are using the same dilatory tactics that were developed and refined in decades of rear guard action against all the national voting rights bills. As in the cases of the earlier civil rights bills, the opponents of home rule know that they constitute a minority of the House. They know that they will be beaten if the bill comes to the floor. Left to their own devices, the committee could have been expected to wait until the end of the present session before starting hearings, and then letting those hearings dribble on interminably.

President Johnson's latest communication is a disaster for the men who run the House District Committee, precisely because it means that they will not be left to their own devices. President Johnson, as majority leader of the Senate, overrode the tactics of delay 8 years ago to pass the first national civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. He is now, apparently, about to apply the same electrifying technique to the appalled District Committee.

The President does not fail to recognize the meaning of home rule for the civil rights of Washington's people. "The Congress has been aroused to redress denials of the right to vote in every part of this country—except the District. We affront its citizens and leave a significant part of our work unfinished by this unnecessary and invidious discrimination." The ballot is no less precious in Washington than in Alabama or Mississippi. As the President accurately said last February, "The people of the District are ready and eager to join fully in the democratic process."

Mr. MORSE. I commend the Washington Post for its editorial. I sincerely hope that our colleagues in the House will either report the home rule bill quickly from the House Committee on the District of Columbia or will proceed without delay to get the necessary signatures on a discharge petition, so that a home rule bill can be passed this session.

Frederic D. Morse
TACTICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Tactics in South Vietnam," published in the Washington Post of today be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TACTICS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The President very plainly has gathered behind the Government's policy of remaining in South Vietnam a very substantial national consensus. The debate on Vietnam policy now seems to be moving from the broad issue of whether this country's Armed Forces should stay or leave to the question of what the Armed Forces should do, now that it has been decided that they must stay.

Military operations of the past few days have inspired some misgivings about the employment of American forces. There are legitimate doubts about the wisdom of the missions involved, the feasibility of the operations and the skill of their execution. The doubts have been raised by the Marine operation at Chan Son, by the continuing B-52 raids with their negligible results, by the emphasis on hit and run as distinguished from take and hold operations.

Maj. Gen. Lewis W. Walt has expressed a compassion and sorrow over civilian casualties at Chan Son that do him and his service credit. But his well-expressed regrets have not directly refuted the report that the Marines made a reprisal attack on a civilian occupied village in response to sniper fire that originated there. In an ugly civil war of this kind there are bound to be civilian casualties when the tide of battle moves into occupied places. We may harden our hearts to this kind of calamity; but opinion in this country will not long countenance indiscriminate reprisal or retaliatory action against civilian occupied places.

The massive B-52 raids, likewise, have an aspect of indiscriminating and indiscriminate destruction that is disquieting. Is the strategic bomber really a weapon of sufficient target selectivity to recommend it for searching out small bodies of rebels who mingle with a civilian population? Such employment would have had a very low priority in any World War II operations and even with the abundance of power we have to waste it is to be doubted on any showing made so far that such B-52 strikes have earned any higher priority now.

Apart from these particular efforts there is the broad question of how American forces are to be used generally. The tactical theory of many of the prime combat units we have sent in emphasizes the pursuit of the enemy and not the taking and holding of territory. But in a civil war, people in the territory that is held by first one side and then another suffer more than the military forces. We cannot commit ourselves to a policy under which we never seek out a Vietcong force in a populated area, but if our troops very frequently are used in forays that expose Vietnamese peasants to alternating occupation, the end in South Vietnam is not difficult to foresee.

Out of compassion for the South Vietnamese villagers must we not devise a strategy that is based more on taking and holding rather than hitting and running? No civilian population can be expected to withstand a fluctuating battle of this kind in which the peasant is always caught between contending military forces. The area to be taken and held may have to be limited to the forces available for this task. And the offensive strikes against Vietcong concentrations may have to be largely confined to non-populated areas. It is a way of fighting the war that will be harder on the military. But it will be easier on civilians who in the past few operations seem to have borne the brunt of the battle. General Westmoreland, fortunately, has not been indifferent to these considerations. It is to be hoped that more regard will be given to the safety of civilians in combat areas in the future.

Americans in overwhelming numbers seem sadly reconciled to the ugly fact that we must fight this war. They will not be reconciled to fighting it by methods and tactics that needlessly involve Vietnamese civilian men, women, and children in the worst cruelties of military action.

TRIBUTE TO MRS. GEORGE WARREN

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, honor is now being paid to my fellow citizen and

fellow Newporter, Mrs. George Henry Warren. Rarely has one lady contributed so much of herself, her talents, and her energies as has Mrs. Warren to Newport, and equally rarely has a city so benefited from one individual.

Together with the support of community leaders such as Mrs. Ottavio Prochet, she has built the Preservation Society into one of the driving forces not only of Newport, but of our whole Rhode Island community.

The Preservation Society of Newport County was founded in 1945 by Miss Maud Wetmore, the daughter of George Peabody Wetmore, who served as the last U.S. Senator from Newport before me. Following Miss Wetmore, Mrs. Warren has been the driving force behind the society's avowed purpose of preserving Newport's rich heritage for future generations and of transfusing new life to buildings that were so useful in days gone by. Under her presidency, the society's membership has reached about 1,700. Nearly a million people have visited the buildings owned by the society, and last year 125,000 visitors paid admission.

The publicity generated by the society has been a major factor in the growing Newport tourist industry. Every year the society has mailed 250,000 pieces of literature throughout the country. The U.S. Information Agency has also distributed some of this publicity abroad. The society has also been responsible for many illustrated articles in well known magazines on such famous houses as "The Breakers," "The Elms," as well as 18th century structures such as "The White Horse Tavern," "the Hunter House," "The Hazard House," and "The Brick Market."

The Newport Preservation Society has suggested constructive ideas for utilizing the historical buildings and houses of Newport in developing the modern needs of an urban society. Presently, the society has commissioned a noted architectural firm to offer plans for the adjustment of historic preservation to inevitable urban renewal and highway construction.

Thanks largely to the efforts and devotion of Mrs. Warren, a heritage of great historical value is being preserved for our Nation.

It is a special tribute for me to pay tribute to her since our families have been friends for several generations and I hope will continue to be so.

PROVISION FOR PRINTING AS A SENATE DOCUMENT ELEMENTS OF ENTITLEMENT TO AND BENEFITS AVAILABLE UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1965

Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] wrote me, as chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration, on August 3, 1965, asking that Senate Resolution 134 be reported by the committee, to be printed.

The Committee on Rules and Administration had no authorization to meet yesterday.

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dered the formation of a continental conscience, which began taking shape as the national aspirations of the various colonies matured, to emerge when they ruptured their bonds of colonial subordination. From that moment on, that conscience steadily deepened its roots and, stimulated by the fear of recolonization, it gained ground rapidly despite localistic sentiments which have not yet disappeared and which have contributed to delay the progress of the movement for continental union.

Without disregarding the value of prior efforts toward continental rapprochement, it may be properly said that the baptism of pan-Americanism took place in this city of Washington, in 1889, on the occasion of the first international conference of American States, which created the then International Bureau of the American Republics and opened a series of meetings which, little by little and not without hesitation and mistrustfulness went on to form the pan-American system.

It would undoubtedly be interesting to examine the progress of this system, but, for the sake of brevity, I will resist the temptation, although such an analysis would enable me to show, step by step, the contributions which Brazil has made to the system. I will limit myself to remarking that Brazil was present at the first Inter-American Conference and that it did not merely attend but took part in all others with the single exception of the second. Furthermore, Brazil hosted several meetings of the system, among which were the Third Conference, held in 1906, one of the most notable in the series; the Third Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations, in 1942, when the decision was made to break relations with the countries responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War; and the Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security on the Continent, in 1947, at which the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, thenceforward known as the Rio Treaty, was discussed and signed.

The Americanist sentiment in Brazil had its inception prior to the independence of the country itself. Indeed, as far back as 1819 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the then United Kingdom of Portugal and Brazil had weighed the convenience of the creation of an American League, an idea that was echoed by José Bonifácio, patriarch of Brazil's independence and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new nation, when in outlining Brazilian foreign policy in 1822 he stressed its clearly Americanist aspect. While Brazil did not participate in the several Hispano-American congresses which preceded the Inter-American conference of 1889, it did appoint a representative to the congress held in Panama in 1826 and later, in 1866, under the urge of its Americanist sentiments, it protested energetically against the bombardment of the Chilean port of Valparaiso by Spanish ships.

In July of last year, in a speech defining our foreign policy, President Humberto Castelo Branco revealed his perfect understanding of Brazil's Americanist vocation when he remarked that the world today is increasingly featured by the interdependence of the problems and the interests of each nation. The President recognized that the interests of Brazil coincide in many cases, in concentric circles, with those of the continental community, and went on to make the perfectly coherent statement that "the Brazilian Government maintains the country's traditional adherence to the sentiments and ideals of Pan Americanism."

In the cultural field, this adherence is evidenced by Brazil's action within the several agencies of the Inter-American system, featured by an open and constructive collaboration regardless and even in spite of its unique position as the only Portuguese-speaking nation on the continent. The Americanist tendency of Brazil leads it to engage in inten-

sive and concentrated cultural activities on the continent, where it maintains several cultural institutes similar to the one that is sponsoring our meeting tonight all of which are dedicated to the diffusion of a truly bilateral cultural exchange between Brazil and each host country. Besides this, my country has long been offering in its major university centers facilities for the training of an already substantial number of students from the various Latin American countries, aiming at the promotion of a currente of reciprocal understanding and varied interchange, this applying also in regard to the United States, whose cultural attractions are so well received in Brazil.

In the economic field, Brazil's contribution to the Pan American system dates from the earliest manifestations of concern over the problem of economic and social development on a continental scale. At the IV consultative meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, held in this city in 1951, the Brazilian delegation took the initiative in presenting a number of proposals which laid the groundwork for a series of economic and financial norms. Brazilians were aware at an early stage that in view of the international financial situation and of the terms of international trade the economic and social development of the continent had ceased to be an individual problem for each country and had become a common aspiration which would have to be satisfied jointly. For this reason, and to provide a measure of the real dramatic nature of the problem, Brazil in 1958 called on the countries of the hemisphere to undertake Operation Pan America. The same reason impelled it to join the ranks of those who advocated and promoted the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, leading also to its present full involvement in the Alliance for Progress, which is so much in line with the efforts of development and with the measures which Brazil has been adopting towards the increase and better distribution of its national product. This spirit of conjugation of efforts explains Brazil's active participation in the Latin American Free Trade Association and its keen interest in the movement for Latin American economic integration as envisaged by that association, devoid of opposition to anyone whatsoever or of imperilment of the effectiveness of the Pan American ideal.

It is undoubtedly in the political field that Brazil's most impressive contribution to the Pan American system is registered, but because of the touchy nature of that field, any measurement of such contribution becomes especially difficult and delicate. In the desire to avoid considerations of a historical nature on this point, and believing that Pan Americanism is indebted to Brazil for its open and constant participation in the life of the continent even more than for any particular proposal or initiative, I feel compelled to make some remarks on the attitude of Brazil within the hemispheric community. It will not be an attempt to discourse on Brazil's foreign policy, a subject already covered with thoroughness and clarity by Ambassador Juracy Magalhães in the address which he presented at the opening session of this Seminar, but simply the indication of some points evidencing Brazil's contribution to the system under study.

I feel thus that I should mention, as an example of that contribution, Brazil's pacifist vocation and its respect of the territorial integrity of its neighbors. Brazil has never waged a war of conquest and, in the single real war which it was compelled to fight in self-defense—I do not refer to the two World Wars because they transcend the continental picture—Brazil had the scruple of entering into prior stipulation with its allies that the integrity of the territory of the temporary enemy would be respected. Brazil's frontiers were determined in accord with universally accepted juridical principles, on the basis of treaties executed with all the neighboring

countries, and the few disputes in which it was involved were settled through peaceful negotiations or by international arbitration.

Along with this pacifist vocation and exemption from territorial ambition, together with features that are exclusively its own in the Pan American scene and the particularity of being a country with great problems and, at the same time, great realizations and great possibilities, with an area and a population representing half of South America, Brazil has a special position within the Pan American system, not always comfortable but certainly of vital significance to the system. The importance of this position is accentuated by the circumstance that the continental community continues to suffer, as it did to a much greater degree before the coming of the good neighbor policy, from the mutual impact of suspicions and distrust between underdeveloped countries that need aid but which seem to resent this aid, and a super-developed country which has already shown its desire to help others but still finds difficulty in winning or in deepening the trust of those others. Brazil has traditionally been a catalyzing element that has made possible the conciliation of diverging opinions within the Pan American system. Being Latin American culturally, psychologically and economically, Brazil is also great enough and sufficiently self-confident to be exempt from resentment over the growth or the power of any other country whatsoever, and to accept the initiative or the democratic leadership of any such in a position to promote or lead in benefit of the continental interests. Not having hegemonic aspirations—perhaps it has a people that can in all fairness be considered as being cordial by nature—Brazil is fated to exercise this difficult role of conciliator within the Pan American system, at least until the cessation of that mutual impact of suspicions and distrust, which needs to be overcome on either side.

Owing perhaps to its self-confidence and to its condition as a power that is both great and small at the same time, Brazil realizes, as others also do, that the Pan American system needs to be broadened and, even more than that, to be strengthened and perfected. Because of this awareness, Brazil is ready and really desirous to contribute toward the renovation of the system so that it be capable of adjusting itself to new circumstances and thereby avoid irreparable loss of prestige or a retreat, by force of overshadowing threats to the phase of unilateral action that was closed when the negative aspects of the Monroe Doctrine were superseded. Brazil gave proof of its desire for the strengthening of the Pan American system when it proposed, with this specific purpose in mind, the holding of a special Pan American conference which I pray God will come to pass without delay for the good of the system. Another clear proof of Brazil's resolution can be seen in its open and disinterested commitment in search for a solution to the crisis that arose recently on this continent, especially through its participation, within the limit of its possibilities, in the specially constituted inter-American armed forces. The seed cast by the constitution of said forces should in due course receive the utmost care and attention because in today's disturbed world, the inter-American system, like any other, can only achieve full realization when it becomes able to defend itself collectively, and collectively to insure the maintenance of internal order.

Ladies and gentlemen, I do not know to what extent I have been able to acquaint you with my consciousness—assuredly patriotic, yet frank—of Brazil's contribution to the Pan American system. I warned you at the onset of the difficulties which I foresaw in the treatment of this theme, and for that reason I undertook to be at your disposal for an exchange of questions and answers which, thanks to your participation, will complete

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and surpass my exposition. If I may ask your attention for one more minute, I will use it to mention that in advocating Brazil's participation in the First World War, a notable Brazilian statesman, the then Senator Rui Barbosa said that our nation was going to defend "the territorial stability of its existence, our own territory, our moral heritage in America." In my view, ladies and gentlemen, this moral heritage, which such an outstanding interpreter of the national conscience equated with the physical existence of the country itself, is the synthesis and the best expression of Brazil's contribution to the Pan American system.

Fe O Multer
We Will Stand in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following editorial from the July 29, 1965, edition of the New York Herald Tribune. All Americans are determined to stand with the President's action in Vietnam. American interest and honor are at stake in this struggle, and we will not relent in the pursuit of our goal to restore peace and the right of free choice to the people of South Vietnam.

The editorial follows:

"WE WILL STAND IN VIETNAM"

After a tense week of strategy discussions and the swirling speculations they occasioned, President Johnson's announcements at his press conference seemed undramatic, muted. There was to be no declaration of national emergency; the National Guard and Reserves would not be called up; monthly draft calls would be doubled; Congress would be asked for unspecified additional sums for the Armed Forces; American troops would be immediately increased to about 125,000, instead of the higher figures that had been guessed at.

Yet if the net of Mr. Johnson's statement, and of his answers to questioning, seemed about soothing, the effect came from contrast with previous rumors. The President's news was serious enough, and he made no attempt to conceal its gravity. The 50,000 additional troops going to Vietnam are more than General MacArthur employed in the Inchon offensive; the 125,000 who will be in Vietnam after the reinforcements arrive will be nearly as many as were in the combined U.N. fighting forces in Korea at that time. Increasing the monthly draft call to 35,000 would mean that in a year 420,000 young Americans would be conscripted, or nearly as many as all the military and paramilitary forces that the South Vietnamese Government has available.

Moreover, the President did not predict any easy victory on the basis of the decisions he announced. Rather, he left open the possibility that more men would be sent to South Vietnam; that the Guard and the Reserves might be called into service; that there would be heavy additional drafts on the Treasury—reports in Congress already speak of as much as \$1 billion added to military appropriations.

Thus the new American commitment is serious; it is not necessarily decisive. That is because the United States is, as the President has so often emphasized, fighting a

defensive war in South Vietnam. It is fighting to convince the Communists that they cannot win, and must—"inevitably," is the President's word—come to the conference table. Defensive strategy does not rule out offensive tactics, and the role of our forces is by no means necessarily limited to mounting guard over its own installations. But the aim is still to turn back aggression, not to escalate the war. The escalation, like the original covert aggression, has come from the other side, and the United States is meeting it.

Why? Americans, in the President's phrase, did not "choose to be the guardians of the gate." Initially, American assistance to the struggling young Republic of South Vietnam was economic and technical; the military guaranties were intended to preserve the people's right of choice. That is still the goal, in the teeth of rebellion launched and fostered from the north. Unless the United States achieves that goal, by force or by diplomacy, South Vietnam will be violently subverted; there will be a green light for similar Communist ventures in every quarter of the globe—and, as Mr. Johnson put it, "no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promises."

Thus it is that American interest and American honor are equally at stake; thus it is that President Johnson—with the evident reluctance of a man who is frankly ambitious to achieve peaceful progress for his country and clearly confident of his ability to do so—has said: "We will stand in Vietnam." And the Nation will stand with him.

More Harm Than Good

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, irresponsible, self-appointed civil rights leaders are attempting to create chaos in the city of Chicago. Proper criticism of the misguided antics of many of the civil rights performers comes from people whose reputation for legitimate support of civil rights is well founded.

In order to correct the impression that Chicago is now controlled by irresponsible street mobs who are representative of the citizens of the city, I insert into the RECORD an editorial from yesterday's Chicago Sun Times which gives evidence of the sober thought that prevails in the city:

MORE HARM THAN GOOD

The civil rights movement here has had no more sincere supporter than Dr. Edgar H. S. Chandler, executive director of the church federation of greater Chicago. He has come to the conclusion that emphasis should be switched away from excessive street demonstrations and toward the conference table task of solving specific community problems involving the schools, housing, and employment.

"The protest has registered," he says, "Let us now all together register progress. Let protests be disciplined and directed to specific abuses that can be corrected."

Dr. Chandler specifically disfavors futile and dangerous demonstrations as the night march into Mayor Daley's home neighborhood. Such demonstrations do the civil

rights cause no good; they cause resentment and ill will. They antagonize white persons Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. says are needed to bring changes.

Like the right to free speech, the right to picket is not unlimited. It should be exercised judiciously. What good purpose is served by deliberately antagonizing Mayor Daley's neighbors? His office, not his home is the place for protests. And even there, as Dr. Chandler says, it is time to get out of the streets and on with "the nitty gritty of specific steps toward justice."

"Justice in the Night"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, we have all been witnesses to a healthy trend developing in this country, which has already begun to put an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of justice in America, especially as it affects the poorer and more disadvantaged groups of our citizens.

This trend promises to bring the ancient ideal of equal justice before the law closer to becoming a reality for all our people.

In this connection, Mr. Speaker, I insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD an excellent editorial entitled, "Justice in the Night," recently broadcast by Mr. Robert P. Sutton, vice president of CBS radio and general manager of radio station KNX in Los Angeles.

The KNX editorial makes the point that one good here-and-now way to begin the effort to raise the quality and promote better standards of administration of justice in the United States would be to improve what it terms our notorious traffic court treadmills of bargain basement justice.

In support of this conclusion the editorial quotes Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark as saying:

There can be no more important court in this whole land than the traffic courts. Here, respect—or disrespect—is created for law, for order, for the courts, for government.

KNX also commends the new California law, advocated by our State's progressive Gov. "Pat" Brown and passed by the legislature this year, which establishes a modified form of night court to accept pleas, conduct arraignments, and set dates for trial—but not to conduct actual trials. The editorial continues:

This measure does not go all the way, but it is a step in the right direction of providing elemental justice for the workingman who cannot take time from his job in daylight hours by affording him more equal access to justice, along with the individual who can go to court any time without suffering personal hardship.

The KNX editorial follows:

JUSTICE IN THE NIGHT

Bargain basement treatment of traffic offenders is one prime cause for disrespect of

working in a small school that was hit very hard by the flood, and, if not for this program, the school would still be unusable. This program has helped many of us who had a hard time finding a job and if the program ends, many needy boys will just be out of luck. So please let us continue to work.

James G. Fulton
War in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. JAMES G. FULTON

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand, recently appeared on NBC's "Meet the Press" and at public meetings of the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council; Detroit Great Decisions 1965; Los Angeles World Affairs Council; and the San Francisco World Affairs Council.

It is a pleasure to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the following selected group of questions on southeast Asia brought to my attention by my good friend, James Linen, president of Time, Inc.:

WAR IN VIETNAM

Question. Mr. Minister, Thailand is greatly endangered, I believe—and I believe this is your view—by the advance of communism in southeast Asia, and I know you are very interested in the problem of Vietnam. Do you think the war in Vietnam can be won?

THANAT. I think so, and I say so categorically.

Question. What is it we should be doing that we are not doing now, because we don't seem to be winning it as we are currently performing?

THANAT. I think what we should try to do is to bring about security within South Vietnam itself, first. Namely, to repel and to expel the aggressors which are now within South Vietnam, and then we should give security to the people of South Vietnam, especially the countryside people. When these people have security, when they are protected, then they will cooperate very closely with the Government authorities.

I think this is the clue to the problem. First the military problem, next the problem of security, and then we should show our determination that the free world, the non-Communist countries, is resolved to resist Communist encroachments and aggressions. I would say that the homefront is very important because those brave people who are fighting against the Communists expect the homefront to support them, to give them the feeling that they are doing a good job.

I believe that if we can give those fighting men, the gallant people who are doing the fighting now, the feeling that they are performing a useful role, then the struggle can achieve success.

Question. Do you see any danger in an increasing American involvement in Vietnam, including direct participation of American soldiers in the fighting against the Vietcong? In other words, should we and can we be fighting the war that is essentially the war of the South Vietnamese?

THANAT. I still think that the brunt of the fighting is borne by the South Vietnamese. Now the Vietcong, as I said, not only are controlled and supported by outside power, especially North Vietnam, but they receive equipment and war material from even farther countries. I think that it is necessary if South Vietnam is to remain free and in-

dependent, it has to receive the support also of a free nation, like the United States, the leader of the free nations. Otherwise it would be completely overcome by the Communist aggressors.

Question. While you stated in your remarks that you were not at liberty to talk about the support Thailand was giving to South Vietnam, is Thailand lending any material aid in South Vietnam, and if so, what is the nature the aid?

THANAT. The Government of Thailand has been extending some material aid; some economic aid to South Vietnam and also some other kinds of aid too. However, what Vietnam needs even more than military aid is political and moral support. As a supplement to the military aid and economic aid we have given to them, we can help them to keep their chins up and to continue to struggle successfully for the preservation of their freedom and independence.

Question. Mr. Minister, we have neither been able to win the war so far nor have we succeeded since the President's proposal in Baltimore on April 7, in bringing the Communists to the conference table. How do you propose that we do either of these things? For example, we are bombing North Vietnam now, but we have restricted our bombing to south of the 20th parallel. Are you in favor of escalating further and, for example, bombing Hanoi?

THANAT. I would not be in favor of limiting ourselves unilaterally. I would not be in favor of binding our hands and feet while the other side, our enemies or our opponents, are free to do whatever they like. But in regard to the war in South Vietnam, it is my impression, and the impression is based on evidence now available, that things are getting better. But you cannot win a war in a matter of weeks, especially when our side is cautious enough not to do anything that may lead to a larger conflict. That is why it may take a little more time, or at least some time, before we reach a point from which we can have an agreement or an understanding that the other side will not continue hostilities.

Question. May I ask you whether you would favor bombing Hanoi?

THANAT. As I said, if the situation is necessitated, I would not be opposed to that.

Question. We have heard about the military effectiveness of the air strikes against North Vietnam. Would you give us your opinion of the political effectiveness of these raids in North Vietnam? And a related question—leaflets have been dropped on a few occasions in North Vietnam to warn the people away from target areas. Leaflets were also dropped on Thailand when Allied air raids were carried out against targets there during World War II. Based on your experience as a former target for leaflets, how would you evaluate the effectiveness of this kind of effort?

THANAT. I think the use of the word "target" for leaflets is quite appropriate because during World War II once when I was working in the underground, I was almost struck by a barrel containing leaflets. It missed me by a few yards, and I can say that the leaflets hit pretty close to their targets. I think the effects of leaflets, as the effects of air strikes, will take some time. They are not a drug that you can take within your body and expect the pain to vanish in a few minutes. In Thailand during the war I could see that the people paid a great deal of heed to the warnings and predictions contained in the leaflets. So if the people in North Vietnam are about the same as the people in Thailand, and I don't think there is great dissimilarity between them, I think the effects will be positive.

NEGOTIATIONS ON VIETNAM

Question. Since you believe that the war can be won—and you said you say that categorically—would you be against an attempt

to negotiate a settlement now or in the near future?

THANAT. We have never been against worthwhile negotiation. If you look into our records you will see that my country participated in the Geneva Conference of 1954 in regard to Korea, and then in 1962 Thailand also took part in the Geneva Conference in regard to Laos, so we are not at all averse to negotiations, provided that negotiations would not lead to concessions and to surrender to the aggressors, and especially to the Communists.

Question. Mr. Minister, what do you think we can negotiate on?

THANAT. That is the question that I myself have put to some of those who talk to me about South Vietnam. What can be negotiated? In my opinion we cannot negotiate the surrender of South Vietnam or for that matter of any nation.

What we would like to see negotiations conducted upon would be to guarantee the right to free existence for South Vietnam and for any other countries in southeast Asia or in the world. I think that is the main point. That is to say, when you negotiate you must negotiate to get support for freedom and independence of the countries concerned and not their surrender.

Question. Well, you use the word "negotiation," but you really mean victory, don't you, for the West?

THANAT. Well, of course I would prefer to see victory. I have no doubt about that.

Question. But you recently said in an interview in U.S. News, that the United States must continue to support South Vietnam or withdraw. Talk of a negotiated peace is irrelevant. What did you mean by that?

THANAT. It is because of our past experience. As I said, we took part in a conference on Korea, we took part in a conference on Laos. But after the agreements were signed, as a result of those two conferences, we have not seen faithful observances and implementation of those agreements by the Communist side. That is why we are wary and we are reluctant to go back to any conference table which will not give us reasonable expectation for faithful respect and observance of any international agreement that may result from those negotiations.

COMMUNIST CHINESE THREATS TO THAILAND

Question. Mr. Minister, the Chinese Foreign Minister tells us that Thailand is next on his list as a target for Communist-supported war of national liberation. How do you evaluate this threat, and how vulnerable is Thailand to the kind of war that is being fought today in South Vietnam?

THANAT. It amounts to a declaration of war. When a country says against another country that "we will start a war," be it a guerrilla war or an open war, it doesn't make much difference. It has been a declaration of war on the part of Communist China on Thailand. Now, of course, it is guerrilla war, and we are taking necessary measures and steps to meet the situation.

We didn't take it lightly. We heeded the warning, the danger signal, and I assure you that both the Government of Thailand and the people of Thailand are doing everything to preserve our freedom and our independence.

Question. What specific evidence is there of Communist China's intentions to infiltrate and to dominate Thailand?

THANAT. We start from a statement attributed to the Foreign Minister of Communist China, Che'n Yi, who said that the guerrilla warfare will begin in Thailand before the year is out. They have been trying to bring about the first phase of the subversive war. I'm referring to the process of sending agents, of recruiting sympathizers, of training cadres in Thailand, and of trying to build armed caches. All this is part of the first phase, and we are doing everything

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we can to make it stay at that first phase—or even to erase it.

We also have evidences that important headquarters have been established not very far from Thailand. Since we don't have common border with China, the headquarters is not very far from North Laos, and they appointed their top security people to come to work there. As a matter of fact, one of them used to be the Deputy Minister for Security Affairs. They also have very frequent visits from top people—top security and top military people to the area. They also started what they euphemistically call the "Patriotic Front of Thailand." It looks as though the Chinese Communists are following the same patterns that they have followed in some other places. The so-called "Patriotic Front of Thailand" is not dissimilar from the Pathet Lao in Laos, or from the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. It seems that they have not devised any new methods or means.

Question. Has there been any evidence of infiltration into Thailand from across the Mekong?

THANAT. They come from all sides, all parts. Through the forest, across the Mekong, across the paddy land. It has been going on for quite some time, and recently we have detected an increase in infiltration and subversion. Infiltration takes various forms. They come into Thailand as hawkers or what you may call traders; they may also take a more feminine form. I mean they also send their women agents into Thailand equipped with lipstick and all the necessary things to make them attractive. All forms of infiltration carry with them grave danger, and we have to take increased measures to meet with the situation. One of them was to ask our national assembly just before I left my country for an additional budget to get the money to finance the operations against the illegal activities conducted by the other side.

Question. In view of the high percentage of Chinese in Thailand cities, especially Bangkok, is there danger that they will sympathize with Communist China?

THANAT. The Chinese in Thailand are treated better than in many other countries in Asia, and the Chinese know that. They enjoy peace and a great measure of prosperity. They enjoy security for themselves and for their families. So I suppose they know what is good for them. As far as we have seen, the Chinese in Thailand have shown a great deal of loyalty toward the land which has sheltered them and has given them full opportunity for development.

Question. I am concerned about the possibility of some of your people being persuaded to go to Hanoi or to China to be trained similarly to the Vietcong in Vietnam. Is this a problem in Thailand, and are you coping with it without serious difficulty at this time?

THANAT. The fact is that there have been some people, but they are Chinese born in Thailand. Besides that, there are some of the hill tribesmen. We have many evidences that they didn't like it over there, and quite a few of them have tried very hard to come out of that so-called paradise.

At the same time, I should like to say we used to have in Thailand something like 80,000 Vietnamese refugees who lived in Thailand, and we tried to repatriate them back to Vietnam. Half of them went to North Vietnam. We would like to send the rest, either to North or South Vietnam, it does not matter. Words come back from North Vietnam telling those who remained in Thailand not to go back to North Vietnam under any circumstances. Whatever they took along with them—sewing machines, fountain pens, watches, and so on—were confiscated. So they said you'd better stay in Thailand.

Question. Several years ago, business and industry in Thailand seemed to be dominated by the Chinese. Has this situation changed,

and how was the change accomplished, if that has happened?

THANAT. I am glad to say that the Thais have learned to engage in business, and that at the present time my people have gone into business a great deal more. In the olden days most of them thought that the best way of life would be to become government officials. But nowadays with the kind of salaries that they get from the government, there is, to put it very mildly, a certain disaffection for officialdom.

SEATO

Question. Now that De Gaulle has refused to participate in the latest SEATO conference, does this pretty well sabotage SEATO as a viable treaty organization?

THANAT. Well, in the first place, France is still in SEATO. It decided only to send an observer, allegedly on the ground that it does not agree with the American policy in South Vietnam. But I can assure you that to us it doesn't make any difference. In any case I am willing to say that I think that France still has an interest in belonging to SEATO because it can derive many advantages from membership in SEATO. The only thing is that while it is willing to take advantage of the benefits and enjoy the privileges of membership, it is not quite willing to discharge some of the duties and obligations of a member.

Question. Is SEATO a paper tiger?

THANAT. SEATO may be a paper tiger, but I think inside the paper tiger there are fangs.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Question. How much validity would you place on the domino theory, that if South Vietnam should go communistic, the rest of Asia, including Thailand, would also fall?

THANAT. I am not very apt at this game of domino, but I would agree with the theory. We agree with the theory in the sense that we have always stressed that the security and freedom and liberty of an area should be looked upon in a comprehensive form or manner. One cannot take a part of a region and disregard the rest. I personally have been stressing this fact ever since I took office some 6 years ago. As far back as 1959, when the situation in Laos gave grave concern to many people, I pointed out, especially at the SEATO meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, in 1959 that the main objective was not so much Laos, but South Vietnam. So to that extent I fully agree that the defense of an area, specifically the region of southeast Asia, should be undertaken in comprehensive form.

Question. How do you explain the current attitude of the Cambodian Government?

THANAT. I wish someone would tell me that. I saw Sihanouk in Jakarta; he shook hands with me in spite of the fact that he has been praying for my death for quite some time. In the first place I should like to say that there doesn't seem to be such a thing called Cambodian Government. There is only one man called Prince Sihanouk, and I'm not exactly aware that there is any Cambodian Government in existence. Everything revolves around Prince Sihanouk, and it is he who decides in what directions the country should go. I would say that the general motive behind what Prince Sihanouk has been doing is that he believes that Communist China will ultimately be the winner in southeast Asia, and for that matter in the whole of Asia. Cambodia being a small nation, he thinks that it wouldn't be able to stand up to China, so as a way of insurance he tries the best he can to propitiate and to win the favors of the leaders of Communist China. We in Thailand say that the way he is behaving looks to us like facing the crocodile and trying to be the last to be eaten.

Question. What is the feeling of the Thais toward De Gaulle and his policy for southeast Asia?

THANAT. Well, I think he is a great man—for Europe.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Question. Would the Foreign Minister say something about the relations between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand?

THANAT. Thailand was the first Asian nation to recognize the United States, and Thailand extended technical assistance to the United States first. I think the first offer of technical assistance from Thailand to the United States was in the time of President Lincoln, when our King wrote to President Lincoln offering some elephants as a labor-saving device. Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, President Lincoln politely declined the offer. So, you didn't have the privilege of seeing the elephants roaming along the Potomac.

I must say that we see eye to eye on almost everything. We may have had our frictions here and there as some of the American Ambassadors may testify. We have some small disagreements here and there, but I think the American people and the Thai people want about the same, namely to enjoy life as free individuals. Now I must say to show my independence, as seems now to be quite fashionable, that each and every nation should want to show independence. Thailand, I think, should go on record as showing a gesture of independence towards the United States, too. I must say that if we agree with you, with your ideals, with your fundamental policies, and now with your policy on South Vietnam, I must say that it is not exactly to please you. We believe in a policy of peace, of freedom, of liberty, because we believe in it. And that perhaps more important than believing in such a policy as a result of foreign aid or as a result of coercing or as a result of arm-twisting.

Question. Do the citizens of Thailand feel that the United States is intruding in southeast Asia?

THANAT. I don't think the United States can be looked upon as intruding. On the contrary, we would like to see the United States stay in southeast Asia, and especially in South Vietnam. I have seen no indication that the people of South Vietnam would want the United States to leave. Of course the Communist side has been trying to give the wrong impression—that the war in South Vietnam is a civil war. That is purely propaganda or perhaps psychological warfare. But I can say that no one who believes in the defense of freedom and liberty in southeast Asia would want the United States to leave the scene at the present time.

Question. Is there any "Yankee go home" sentiment in Thailand?

THANAT. I have never heard the phrase used—except in some Western countries.

Question. What do you have to say about the wartime alliance of Thailand and Japan?

THANAT. This is a question much in need of clarification. Officially Thailand was forced to cooperate with the Japanese during World War II—after expending in our defense not only bullets but people, as well as all the obsolete planes which were shot down by Japanese planes. At that time the Thailand government asked a Western nation for help. That nation was not the United States, I want to assure you. The reply came, and it was to the following effect: help yourself.

Right from the beginning I joined many of my countrymen in the underground movement, which started almost immediately in Thailand, to fight the Japanese, to fight against Japanese occupation. Until the end of the war we never ceased fighting. I am proud to be one who was in that movement.

MEKONG RIVER PROJECT

Question. Will you give an appraisal of the achievements and the prospects for the Mekong Basin development project?

THANAT. We in Thailand highly value the generous proposal made by President Johnson in his Baltimore speech. We found in that generous offer a sign of a man of peace. What he aims at is peace—and that is why he made the offer of \$1 billion to be used in insuring the economic and social development of southeast Asia. At the present time, some work is being done in Bangkok to avail ourselves of his generous offer. Also, the Mekong Commission under the auspices of the United Nations is meeting to consider in what way it can avail itself of the offer. Besides that I think the Asian Highway project may make use of the offer made by the President.

The Mekong project is a very interesting project in itself because it comprises four nations—Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. And in spite of the vicissitudes of international politics, of rupture of relations between Cambodia and Thailand, meetings of the Commission have continued to take place, so a worthwhile economic project can be even more important than politics.

In Thailand we also have many other projects which may be national in general character, but may have indirect regional character. I'm referring to the project that we are entertaining to set up a university in south Thailand. It will be sponsored by the Thai Government, with the help of some other institution like the John F. Kennedy Foundation, of which both the American Ambassador, Mr. Graham Martin, and I are member officers. We hope that the University of the South in Thailand will soon come into being. And if it comes into being it will serve not only the people of Thailand but possibly and most probably the people in Malaysia and Indonesia if peace is restored between Malaysia and Indonesia. I hope that the U.S. Government will explore these projects, and will help us in implementing them.

KINGDOM OF THAILAND

Thailand, formerly known as Siam, is a translation of "Muang Tai" (Land of the Free), the term by which the Thai people call their country.

Government: Constitutional monarchy.

Reigning monarch: His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Her Majesty Queen Sirikit.

Capital: Bangkok.

Area: 198,247 square miles.

Population: About 29,700,000 (July 1964 estimate).

Language: The Thai alphabet has been used in its present form since the 13th century. The language developed through adaptation of Pali and Sanskrit.

Religion: About 93.6 percent of the people are Buddhists; there are also Muslims, Christians, and others. The King is constitutionally the upholder of all faiths.

Education: Seven-year primary education is compulsory. There are five universities in Bangkok, and two others in the north at Chiangmai and the northeast at Khonkaen.

Exports: Rice, rubber, tin, teak, tapioca flour, castor seeds, corn.

Imports: Textiles, petroleum products, machinery, motor vehicles.

Helping the Victims of Crime

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EDWARD R. ROYBAL

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, because of the wide public interest in California's

new program of reimbursing the victims of violent crimes, I would like to include in the Appendix of the RECORD a very enlightening and encouraging editorial on this subject appearing in the Washington Evening Star on August 3, 1965:

HELPING THE VICTIMS

California has taken a long step forward in enacting a law to reimburse victims of violent crimes with State funds.

The plan reportedly was suggested by Superior Court Judge Francis McCarty, of San Francisco. Arthur Goldberg also advocated such protection in several speeches while he was on the Supreme Court.

Regardless of the authorship, the whole concept deserves attention, for it lifts the State out of the "revenge" mood characterizing so many cases, and turns attention to the victim as well as the assailant.

Under the California law, families of murder victims and also persons incapacitated by crimes would be paid out of a fund administered by the department of social welfare. Payments would be based on need, and persons convicted of these offenses would be ordered to pay fines into the indemnity fund.

In signing the measure, Governor Brown observed it was "ironic that California must spend millions of dollars for rehabilitation of lawbreakers, for their food, clothing, medical care and other expenses, yet their victims are left to fend for themselves."

Similar laws have been put into practice in New Zealand and Great Britain. The latter country, which approved the program last August, has made awards in more than 200 cases and in May paid out more than \$57,000 to 64 persons including 11 policemen.

Other States—and particularly, perhaps, our own crime-plagued District—would do well to emulate California's enlightened and compassionate plan. As Mr. Goldberg remarked last year, "the victim of a robbery or an assault has been denied the protection of the laws in a very real sense, and society should assume some responsibility for making him whole."

The Late Hon. Fritz Lanham

SPEECH

OF

HON. O. C. FISHER

OF TEXAS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 4, 1965

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Speaker, I do not believe I have ever served with a more honorable Member of this body than the late Fritz Lanham. He was the perfect gentleman, cultured, eloquent, considerate, and always fair and accommodating in all his dealings.

Mr. Lanham was an authority on Texas history. His father, Samuel Willis Tucker Lanham, served five terms in this body, and then was Governor of Texas. Both of these distinguished Texans not only lived in history—they helped make it. Fritz was a dedicated and resourceful advocate, devoted to the State he loved and the Nation he served.

In Congress Fritz Lanham left his mark. He was author of many important legislative acts. He was independent in his thinking, and always put the welfare of the country ahead of petty party considerations. Men of this type

are becoming few in number, but they live in history and they live in the hearts of their countrymen.

It is indeed an honor to me to join with others in paying tribute to the memory of this great man. He was my personal friend. He went out of his way to favor me on more than one occasion. But his greatness is not confined to his capacity to make friends, but rather because of his contribution to the history of the times during his long career of public service. We who survive would do well to emulate his example and adopt more of his sensible, conservative philosophy.

To Mrs. Lanham and the family I extend my deepest sympathy in their bereavement.

A Tricentennial Survey of Wisconsin Catholic History

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 5, 1965

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, the tercentenary of the establishment of the first Christian—Catholic—mission in Wisconsin and the central United States is being observed this year. The historical event upon which this commemoration is based is the erection in October 1665 of a little chapel of bark by Father Claude Allouez, S. J., on Chequamegon Bay, just west of the present city of Ashland, Wis. It was there that he established the mission of the Holy Ghost.

Father Lawrence Brey, assistant pastor of St. Mary's Church, South Milwaukee, Wis., recently presented a paper at the 95th anniversary meeting of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters citing Father Allouez' work and including a brief history of the Catholic Church in Wisconsin and the central United States.

Under permission to extend my remarks I include Father Brey's paper, "A Tricentennial Survey of Wisconsin Catholic History (1665-1965)," and commend it to my colleagues.

The paper together with notes and appendix follows:

A TRICENTENNIAL SURVEY OF WISCONSIN CATHOLIC HISTORY (1665-1965)

(By Rev. Lawrence S. Brey, assistant pastor, St. Mary's Congregation, South Milwaukee, Wis.)

(NOTE.—A paper presented at the 95th anniversary meeting of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, at Madison, Wis., May 8, 1965 (social sciences section), Wisconsin Center Building, University of Wisconsin.)

The year 1965 marks the tercentenary of the beginnings of the Catholic faith in the area now known as the State of Wisconsin, calling to mind the establishment of the area's first Catholic mission by Father Claude Allouez, S. J., near Ashland in 1665. At first thought this anniversary would seem to be of merely sectarian concern, or at the most the concern of specialists in local and regional history. But this limitation will be dismissed promptly by anyone who reflects

on the profound impact left on the Badger State and its development by the peaceful invasion of black-robed missionaries 300 years ago.

Along with the light of faith went such concomitants as the civilizing of the Indians, the development of roads, towns, and communities, the fostering of agriculture, and the introduction of institutions of learning, as well as hospitals and other institutions. Moreover, the very history of the growth and development of the Catholic Church in Wisconsin is in itself an object of broad cultural interest, not only for its own content of color, vitality, and adventure, but also in that it parallels and makes one more aware of the secular history and development of Wisconsin.

There are many ways of considering the three-century history of Wisconsin Catholicism. The simplest and perhaps most popular would be the chronological or chronicle-style method—simply beginning from the beginning and rambling at ease through the fascinating years and eras of Badger Catholic history. Another method would be to consider it in more or less ecclesiastical terms, tracing its original missionary status to the point of its becoming a diocese and later subdividing into additional dioceses. A fascinating history of the church in Wisconsin could very well also be built upon the lives of the various bishops of these dioceses, up to and including their present spiritual shepherds (Archbishop William E. Cousins, of Milwaukee; Bishop Stanislaus V. Bona, of Green Bay; Bishop William P. O'Connor, of Madison; Bishop George A. Hammes, of Superior; and Bishop Frederick W. Freking, of La Crosse). The names of great and colorful missionaries and circuit riders, such as Allouez, Marquette, Mazzuchelli, and Kundig, could well form the framework or starting point for this historical survey. Likewise the glorious list of dates, from 1665 to the present, dates pregnant with testimony to great men and events of the Wisconsin Catholic past, could provide the framework of a historical litany both scientific and inspiring. Certainly our survey could also be made on a geographical basis, tracing the movement of the great "glacier" of the Christian faith from its beginnings on the State's uppermost shores near Ashland, down through Green Bay and the great Fox-Wisconsin-Mississippi waterway, south through Milwaukee and Prairie du Chien, until finally it blanketed the entire State, leaving virtually no "driftless area" whatsoever. Last but not least, the history of Catholic educational, cultural, social, and charitable institutions and agencies can in itself present a format for the study of Wisconsin's 300-year Catholic history from the aspects of the humanities and human welfare.

But even though we will synopsise these social and cultural contributions at the close of this paper, for the present, in the limited time available, we feel that there is no better way to demonstrate in broad lines the Wisconsin Catholic heritage than to merely recount briefly some of the highlights of Catholicism's 300-year history in Wisconsin and in general give a "bird's eye view" of this fascinating and true story.

The response to Christ's command to bring His church and His teachings "to all nations" began on Pentecost Sunday in the year A.D. 33, and in an astonishingly short time materialized in missionary endeavors in the Roman world, the Hellenic world, parts of Africa, and southern and eastern Asia. With Columbus in 1492 the Christian faith finally came to the New World. In 1565 the Catholic faith was formally introduced to mainland America through the erection of a Catholic mission at St. Augustine, Fla. One century later, Father Jacques Marquette, S.J., began his famous exploratory and missionary journeys in North America, and on October 1

of that same year, 1665, the Catholic faith made its first permanent entrance into the area that is now Wisconsin. Although Father Rene Menard, S.J., did in fact put foot on Wisconsin soil 4 years earlier for a brief time, it was in late 1665 that another black-robe, Father Claude Allouez, S.J., established the first church and mission in Wisconsin, in the form of a crude bark chapel constructed by himself near the present site of Ashland, on Chequamegon Bay.

This humble chapel, built near La Pointe, just west of Ashland, Wis., and named by Father Allouez, "The Mission of the Holy Spirit," was the first Catholic chapel on the American continent west of Lake Huron and north of New Mexico. In September of 1669, Father Marquette, S.J., succeeded Allouez at the La Pointe mission, ministering to the Huron and Ottawa Indians, until the Sioux drove them out. In 1673 Marquette, in the company of Joliet, navigated the Fox-Wisconsin-Mississippi waterway, entering the Mississippi on June 17, 1673, near the site of Prairie du Chien. Marquette's association with the "Great River," which he named "The River of the Immaculate Conception," is immortalized in the seal of Marquette University, bearing his image and the inscription, Numen Flumenque—"The Divine Will and the River." Meanwhile, in 1670, Father Allouez returned to Wisconsin and concentrated on the Green Bay-Oshkosh area. Marquette died in 1675. Father Louis Hennepin in 1680 also traversed the Fox-Wisconsin-Mississippi river system, and was captured by Indians. In 1686 Nicholas Perot built a fort at St. Antoine, on Lake Pepin, and later donated the yet-venerated silver ostensorium to the church at Green Bay.

By 1728 the Jesuits withdrew entirely from the Bayfield-La Pointe region. In 1764 Wisconsin was made part of the Quebec Catholic Diocese, and by 1789 it was incorporated into the new Baltimore Diocese. Already the foundations had been laid, and the process of Wisconsin Catholic development from a missionary status into a mature unit of the universal church was well under way by the late 18th century.

The 19th century witnessed the extended process of building on the foundations, augmenting the juridic and organizational aspects of Catholic life, promotion of further missionary pursuits, and consolidation of earlier ones. In this latter connection, the 1830's witnessed the beginnings of the phenomenal achievements of such religious pioneers as Father Frederick Baraga and Father Samuel Mazzuchelli, O.P. The former spearheaded a missionary revival in the La Pointe area, revived European interest in the Wisconsin Church, and was responsible for permanent and far-reaching missionary gains in the Upper Peninsula and along the now Wisconsin-Michigan frontier, and was to become the first bishop or Marquette, Mich. The latter, Mazzuchelli, blazed a trail of faith and civilization from Mackinac Island and Green Bay to Dubuque and the tristate area. A classical example of Wisconsin "circuit-riding" missionaries, Mazzuchelli designed and built 25 churches, planned and founded cities (such as Schullsburg and Davenport), and was chaplain of the first Wisconsin Territorial Legislature at Belmont. Both the Indians of the north central forests and the lead miners of the driftless area were to benefit from the tireless labors of this unusual man. Last year, 1964, marked the centenary of his death.

The 1830's also witnessed a formal penetration of the Christian faith into the southeastern quadrant of the Badger State. If a "red letter date" might be affixed to these beginnings, it could very well be the year 1835, when Father Florimond Bonduel offered the first holy mass in Milwaukee. Bonduel, by the way, later ministered to the settlers and Indians in the Green Bay and Wolf

River regions. Just as Mazzuchelli endured such hardships as living out of near-empty saddlebags for days, sleeping on the ground, and barely escaping the tomahawks of drunken braves, so too Bonduel had his share of hardships, ranging from difficulties with Federal agents and with Chief Oshkosh, to physical endurance and dangers.

1839 marked the arrival in Milwaukee of Father Patrick O'Kelly, the community's first resident pastor. Soon afterwards another Mazzuchelli-like giant, named Martin Kundig, was to do spiritual spadework in Milwaukee paralleling the pioneering of Solomon Juneau in Milwaukee's secular development. The ecclesiastical high point of Milwaukee's early days, and Wisconsin's as well, was the year 1843, when Pope Gregory XVI established Milwaukee as a diocese. All of Wisconsin, as well as some adjacent territory, was included in its jurisdiction. John Martin Henni was appointed first bishop of Milwaukee.

Events and developments of an organizational nature, as well as continued missionary and parochial work, continued at an increasing pace. Tiny St. Peter's Church, now preserved on the campus of St. Francis Seminary, served as the first cathedral. In 1846, Milwaukee's incorporation as a city coincided with the founding of its first Catholic school. Two years later Wisconsin achieved statehood. The following year, 1849, marked the return of the Jesuits after a long absence. Fathers Frederick Huebner and Anton Anderledy, S.J., came to Milwaukee and embarked on parish and educational activities, the latter later culminating in Marquette University. In 1856 St. Francis Seminary, the "mother seminary of the old Northwest," was dedicated at Milwaukee.

The Civil War years found Wisconsin's Catholic population at the 200,000 mark. Of these, many served in the Union Forces, and two Wisconsin priests served as chaplains. But even in the midst of fratricidal conflict, the Kingdom of God and the cura animarum must continue. In 1863 a log chapel was built and dedicated atop Holy Hill, marking the founding of a spiritual and geographical landmark that was to become a famous national shrine. One year later, elsewhere in the Kettle Moraine, another Civil War parish, St. Matthew's, was founded at Campbellsport. And in 1866, a year after hostilities ended, the Wisconsin Catholic Church was subdivided into two additional dioceses, Green Bay and La Crosse. Bishops Joseph Melcher and Michael Heiss were appointed as their spiritual shepherds.

The latter half of the 19th century, as well as the Fin de Siecle, was to be known as "the period of the foreigner," for both Wisconsin and the church in America. A large influx of Irish, German, Polish, and other immigrants contributed to the growth and culture of both church and State. Bilingualism was to be a common feature of many areas. In Milwaukee, Der Seebote, a pioneer organ of the Catholic press in Wisconsin, was a German-language paper. But in 1870, the Star of Bethlehem arose on Milwaukee's horizon, this being the name of the city's first English-language Catholic weekly. The same year saw the construction of the Catholic Normal School in Milwaukee, which was to be a center of teacher education and a nucleus of church music renaissance. Finally, in 1875, Milwaukee was raised to the status of an archdiocese. The last two decades of the 19th century saw Bishops Heiss and Katzer succeed Henni, as second and third Archbishops of Milwaukee, and witnessed their opposition to the controversial Bennett Law, which they believed endangered the educational rights of the family. In 1899 the three Wisconsin bishops (Katzer, Messmer, and Flasch) publicly applauded Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, "Testem Benevolentiae," which censured certain alleged latitudinarian tendencies in American Catholicism.