

dumped abroad, it could be brought back into this country at prices which would affect our own economy. That was one of the basic purposes behind that part of this legislation, to prevent such a possibility.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, the real nub as to whether the material ought to be sold to foreign friendly countries or NATO countries involves the U.S. balance-of-payments problem. Offers of excess stockpile materials might induce some countries to create a domestic stockpile of their own.

The question would hinge on the flexibility of the friendly countries with regard to the price at which sales could be made, assuming we were given full protection against the return of the materials to this market, or its utilization in the world market in such a way as to depress prices, or in any other way which would be adverse to the general economy.

The committee report, as I see it, has made it clear that the term "fair market value" means not less than the current domestic market price. With respect to a number of commodities, there are world prices which may be less than the current domestic market price.

At the same time I notice that the committee has sought to give the President some degree of freedom of action by its provision that the President may—and I refer to the language on page 19, lines 8 to 12—determine that such construction—namely that "fair market value" means the current domestic price or above—is inconsistent with the purposes of this act.

In that connection, would it be considered one of the purposes of this act to dispose of, in a very constructive way, surpluses which were of no use to the United States in the stockpiling program?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe so. For the record, let me read briefly the purposes of the bill.

First, the bill is intended to provide more statutory guidance on the purposes for which materials would be stockpiled.

Second, provide for disclosure to Congress and the public pertinent information on the management of the stockpiles.

Third, revise and consolidate the laws relating to stockpile management.

Fourth, permit disposals of surplus material without requiring congressional action on each, while retaining for the Congress the power to disapprove proposed disposals.

Fifth, make contracts for furnishing materials to the stockpile subject to the Renegotiation Act of 1951, as amended.

Then there is a paragraph under the explanation of the amendments in the report:

The amendments are intended to allay any concern that excess materials might be applied and sold at prices that would be disruptive of orderly markets. The authority for the President to determine that the definition should not apply is intended to provide protection against artificial prices and frustration of the basic purposes of the legislation. This authority would also be conclusive when there is uncertainty or controversy over the current domestic market prices.

Mr. JAVITS. What I am envisioning is a situation in which certain NATO countries which hold large dollar credit balances could be persuaded to return some of these dollars to the United States in exchange for excess materials from our stockpile. To be arbitrary, let us assume that \$1 billion could be involved in the purchase of excess materials by a NATO country which could serve as the basis of a stockpile within that NATO country. It would have the advantage of relieving some of the burden of our international payments and of strategically establishing a stockpile in a friendly NATO country, thus decentralizing the implications of the stockpile, and also freezing it in the hands of the country for which it would be a strategic reserve of a material which is surplus to us, but not to that country.

Under those circumstances, it might very well be that the world market price would be inconsistent with the domestic price of the particular material. The President, under suitable conditions and assuring against return of the material to the United States without approval of the United States, might have to negotiate a price which might be somewhat more than that related to the world price. There is a great amount of interest involved in doing that, if it could be done.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Based on what the Senator from New York has said provided the material sold did not later appear for sale or use in this country, without question the President could do it. I believe also that, under the terms of the bill, Congress would have a right to take a look at the transaction.

Mr. JAVITS. Exactly. That is why I was about to say that, in our legislative intent, it should be made clear that section 11(d) is not completely restrictive, because Congress could prevent a sale from happening, and Congress has given itself full protection. Surely it cannot be said that there is too much freedom of action allowed the Executive in this bill in view of the fact that future disposals will be subject to approval by the Congress.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator has in mind some of the countries which have recently been selling dollars for gold, that they would obtain some of these materials instead of the gold, I surely would join with him, as I am also sure would other Senators.

Mr. JAVITS. That is exactly what I had in mind. I wanted to be sure when we were giving ourselves greater freedom of action we would not be restricting ourselves under the bill.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able Senator from New York. His remarks are most constructive. What he says in this overall connection has to do with something many Americans are thinking about.

Mr. JAVITS. I assure the Senator that I will join in any effort in that direction, and I know of no more effective ally than the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Many thanks. May I add one thought for the consideration of the able Senator. We have ma-

terials which are world materials, of which there is much world production. We would hope such materials were not sold at the world price to Europe, then shipped back to the United States. The Senator from New York understands that problem.

Mr. JAVITS. I do.

Mr. SYMINGTON. With the exception of that type of reservation, what he has said is both and accurate and constructive.

We have discussed the subject of currency. I notice in the Sunday newspapers that whereas world trade increased from \$48 billion in 1938 to \$298 billion in 1964, since 1938 the increase in gold has been only from \$25.9 billion to \$39.9 billion.

Mr. JAVITS. There is no question that we are being stretched on a new "cross of gold," probably more so than in the days of William Jennings Bryan; and unless we apply ourselves to finding a way in which the world credit mechanism can be used without being restricted by a completely artificial standard, we are going to be doing many things that are harmful. We have not yet found a way to base credit on production and resources, which is what we do domestically, but cannot seem to accomplish internationally. We face a great challenge. The international methods of payment cannot be met by a series of regressive actions which could very well touch off a real worldwide depression or recession.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator for his able contribution.

Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr. President, on behalf of the copper users of my State, I commend the Senator from Missouri on the legislation which he has conceived, and steered to passage. I am glad to have supported this bill. Several factories in New York have been forced to curtail operations and furlough workers because of the copper shortage. S. 28, however, will allow all copper in excess of national stockpile needs to be transferred to the materials reserve inventory; and it directs that materials in that inventory, no longer needed to carry out the purposes of the act, be sold at fair market value. When enacted into law, this bill will allow the sale to domestic users of over 200,000 tons of copper—more than enough to solve the present problems of copper fabricators and users all over the country. Copper-using employers will thus be able to expand their operations, providing increased employment opportunity. The major impact in New York State will be felt in the Rome area.

The legislation, of course, includes appropriate safeguards against precipitous sale or other disposal of critical materials. I, was therefore, very pleased by Senator SYMINGTON's assurance to the majority leader that he would take whatever action is necessary to insure the speedy sale to the public of at least 100,000 tons of copper ingot.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

The bill (S. 28) was passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the bill was passed.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I congratulate the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] on the outstanding service he and his committee have rendered on the Materials Reserve and Stockpile Act of 1965, which has just been passed.

I am delighted that, in his colloquy with my colleague the majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], and later in his statement to the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD], he said he and his committee were going to hold prompt hearings on the copper bill that my colleague [Mr. MANSFIELD] and others have introduced. I congratulate the Senator for his interest in the mining States.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator, a great expert in the mining field, for his kind remarks.

AID FOR THE GOLD MINING INDUSTRY

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in the closing remarks on the bill (S. 28) which has just been passed, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] stated that we were now being stretched on a cross of gold.

The gold miners of the Nation have long been stretched on the cross of gold. Indeed they have been crucified. It is pertinent that the issue be raised at this time, as it has been raised before in several sessions of the Congress, and will be in the future, and we are engaged in other aspects of the gold problem.

This is not a partisan matter. The crucifixion has taken place equally under Republican and Democratic administrations. The gold miners of the Nation have been and are subject to unique discrimination—a strange paradox under our free enterprise system.

Alone among all the industries and activities of our society, this one industry is rigidly confined by Government fiat to a price established 30 years ago, and is compelled to sell only to the one agency which has imposed this strangulation; namely, the Federal Government.

As a result, this once great industry which was developed in the West in the great States of California and Colorado, and of course in Alaska, in South Dakota, and other Western States, is on the point of being extinguished, with the result that gold miners have been thrown out of work, as our Nation's gold supply steadily dwindles.

For several years, efforts have been made to find a remedy, which has always fallen afoul of the strange concept in the minds of those who control the Treasury Department—and this applies to Secretaries of the Treasury under both Republican and Democratic administrations—that any attempt to aid the gold miners would somehow have a disastrous effect on the monetary value of gold and on the dollar, although the

varieties of legislation which have been introduced repeatedly, not only by me but also by others, in order to provide a remedy, have nothing whatever to do with the price of gold. The sponsors of the proposed legislation have repeatedly and emphatically disclaimed any attempt to tamper with the gold price and with the stability of the dollar. These attempts at legislation failing, efforts have been made repeatedly to urge Secretaries of the Treasury, whoever they were, in both Republican and Democratic administrations, if they could not subscribe to the proposed legislation, at least to come forward with an alternative which would prevent the gold miners from being permanently unemployed and this once great industry from vanishing from the American scene.

I invite the attention of the minority whip, the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], to the fact that the gold mines of his State have virtually ceased operation. They have also virtually ceased operation in the State of Alaska and some time since in the State of Colorado. A few elsewhere are barely hanging on but must soon close unless relief is forthcoming.

It is unthinkable that successive administrations cannot come forward with a valid and reasonable proposal to prevent this unique discrimination—unique under our free enterprise system—and permit a once great industry, important to the economy—not important merely as a monetary standard but important increasingly in industry—to survive.

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield with pleasure to the Senator from California.

Mr. KUCHEL. I wish to avail myself of the opportunity to indicate my enthusiastic approval of the interest which the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] is taking in this subject.

I come from a State which is known historically as a great gold-producing State. Everyone knows the story of the gold which came from the State of California to the Lincoln administration in time to save the Union from being cut in twain.

Today, the gold mines of my State are closed. It is a shame. It is an outrage. I would hope that perhaps two members of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs this year might proceed to hold appropriate hearings on the subject.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL] who has on every occasion been a warm supporter and advocate of every kind of legislation that would attempt to bring back the gold mining industry.

I am hopeful that with his support, and the support of others similarly interested, we may be able at long last to secure some kind of constructive attitude from the Secretary of the Treasury, whoever he may be.

I confess to feeling not too hopeful, in view of this hitherto rigid, blind, non-partisan, bipartisan refusal to face the facts. However, we shall continue our efforts, and by continuing them and re-

fusing to consider ourselves beaten, I hope we may prevail.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM—II

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, in commenting yesterday on the tragic events in South Vietnam last weekend, I stated:

Much of the news thus far released from South Vietnam, the Pentagon, and the White House raises many more questions than it answers.

News releases since then concerning the tragic assault on our base and airfield at Pleiku still continue to raise many questions and make the circumstances surrounding the attack "curiouser and curiouser."

Some of these questions were posed in Mr. Charles Mohr's column published in the New York Times yesterday, which was printed in the Record yesterday at the conclusion of my remarks.

One question posed by Mr. Mohr was:

The question is, therefore, that if the Vietcong unit at Pleiku was—as is so often the case—using captured weapons, would this sustain the argument that North Vietnam made possible this particular attack?

Mr. Mohr also questioned the size and intensity of the attack. He stated:

Administration sources also contend that the size and intensity of the attack indicated that it was a major blow carefully timed by Hanoi. Yet reports from the field indicate that a company—or less—of Vietcong troops took part in the bloody but brief encounter.

According to a further report published in today's New York Times and emanating from the Pentagon, the attacking force numbered only 100—1 Vietcong company.

I ask unanimous consent that this report as it was published in the New York Times this morning, entitled "U.S. Aides Praise Pleiku Defenders," be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a further question raised by Mr. Mohr was—

whether South Vietnamese security troops were ignoring long-standing American advice to increase night patrols.

According to the Times report, the—outermost perimeter defense was 2 to 2½ miles from the inner perimeter surrounding the compound with barbed wire.

Where were the patrols in this outermost perimeter defense area?

Still another question asked by Mr. Mohr—

is why all three attack carriers of the U.S. 7th Fleet were in the South China Sea near the Vietnamese coast at the same time. The usual pattern is one of dispersal, with each carrier operating off different parts of east Asia.

The United States has suffered one Pearl Harbor. It cannot risk a second and the concentration of our carriers of the 7th Fleet in one area is an open invitation to surprise enemy attack.

The final question—

Posed by Mr. Mohr—

is how much of the responsibility for Pleiku can be held not just to Hanoi, but to failure to prosecute the antiguerrilla war on South Vietnam itself in a more vigorous and successful way.

It is good to know that separate investigations have been ordered by both South Vietnamese and United States authorities into why we were caught Sunday morning at Pleiku by surprise by only 100 Vietcong soldiers who succeeded in killing at least 8 American soldiers and wounding 126.

But it should be remembered that last October the American airfield at Bien Hoa was similarly caught in a surprise attack and we lost 5 jet bombers and had 22 jet bombers damaged. At that time also there was an investigation.

What steps were taken as a result of that investigation to tighten security around our bases? We have not been told, but obviously, in the light of what took place last Sunday morning, those steps were not effective.

In a cogent editorial in today's New York Times, the point is made that if—the Pentagon is to continue to order U.S. military personnel to Vietnam, it has the obligation to provide them with the best protection possible.

The editorial states:

Certainly far better security than has been provided is possible, and has now become absolutely essential.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire editorial from today's New York Times entitled "And Protecting U.S. Forces" be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 2).

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, while these questions do raise serious doubts as to our preparedness to wage the war in Vietnam, there still remain the overriding questions as to our policy in waging war there in the first place.

Calling the war in Vietnam the "war that cannot be won on the ground where it is being fought," Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his column in the Washington Post this morning, pointed out:

We have had a very clear demonstration of the strategic reality in Southeast Asia. The American Army at Pleiku was unable to protect itself against a comparatively small guerrilla attack, against a force estimated officially at about two squads and one platoon. The American forces got no warning of the attack from the Vietnamese people in the nearby hamlets where the raid was prepared. It got no protection from the Vietnamese security guards.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Lippmann's column be printed in full in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 3).

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, there is danger in Vietnam. There is danger in Vietnam to U.S. prestige in the whole free world. And that danger does not lie in submitting the dispute in Vietnam to an international settle-

ment as I and others have repeatedly urged. The danger lies in continuing a fruitless military engagement that cannot be won on the field of battle, but can only be settled politically. The senseless slaughter of U.S. fighting men in South Vietnam should cease.

The dangers to the United States in the continued military stalemate in South Vietnam are pointed out this morning in an excellent editorial in the New York Times entitled "The Dangers in Vietnam." I ask unanimous consent that the entire editorial be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit No. 4)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, certain portions of that editorial are worthy of special note.

The editorial states:

The only sane way out is diplomatic, international, political, economic—not military. A solution will not be found by exchanging harder and harder blows. Surrender is out of the question and "victory" for either side is impossible.

This is what I have been saying and urging for several months now. We can presume that the government at Hanoi is not composed of fools. They have received the message contained in the air strike made from our fleet Sunday. They know that the planes from our carriers could have leveled Hanoi as quickly as they struck at the military bases in southern North Vietnam. They know that they would then be overrun by the Red Chinese ostensibly coming to their aid and that for years thereafter they would be dominated by Red China as they had been for 2,000 years in the past.

As the editorial in the New York Times concludes:

Perhaps a new start can be made from an untried base—that Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese and Russians are all sensible human beings who are ready for peace in southeast Asia, or at least willing to consider it. There would be prices to pay, but there would be gains as well as losses. Diplomacy is surely not yet a lost art or a dead language.

Since all competent observers agree that the war in South Vietnam cannot be won militarily but only politically, let us seek every possible means without delay through every international diplomatic channel available to us to set those negotiations in motion without further delay.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1965]
U.S. AIDES PRAISE PLEIKU DEFENDERS—SAY FORCES DID GOOD JOB IN REACTING TO ATTACK

WASHINGTON, February 8.—Defense officials insisted today that the defense arrangements were good at U.S. installations in South Vietnam that were attacked yesterday.

The Vietcong guerrillas killed at least 8 Americans and wounded 126 in the grenade and mortar attack at Pleiku that precipitated the retaliatory bombings of North Vietnam.

The Communist guerrillas, penetrating to within 30 yards in one of the assaults, cut the barbed wire of the inner perimeters of a U.S. Army compound. They planted dynamite charges near aircraft on a nearby airfield.

But according to an official U.S. military assessment, a "good job" was done in protecting the area. Once the attack was underway, according to official reports, the U.S. forces retaliated "within seconds" and "with considerable professionalism and skill."

The statements followed some congressional criticism that security arrangements at the U.S. installations had been inadequate.

INVESTIGATIONS ORDERED

Nevertheless, Defense officials said that both United States and South Vietnamese military officials had undertaken separate investigations.

The investigations were said to be similar to one that followed the Vietcong mortar raid on the American airfield of Bienhoa, near Saigon, last October, when 5 jet bombers were destroyed and 22 were damaged.

The investigations at Pleiku were ordered to analyze what happened and to determine what, if anything, could be done to improve military security, a Defense official who had just returned from the scene said. He added, however:

"The security there represents the considered judgment of very professional and skilled officers and it's going to be difficult to improve upon it. It is important to tighten up, but improvements are hard to come by."

Defense officials gave additional details of the Pleiku attack and at the same time emphasized the professional skill of the attacking guerrillas.

ATTACK WELL COORDINATED

The attackers were well coordinated, according to the defense report. The mortar shelling of the compound and airfield were timed with the cutting of the barbed wire enclosure to start at 2 a.m., it was pointed out.

Defense officials said they were unaware of a report that half of the assigned South Vietnamese guards in the area were not at their posts. At the Pentagon it was said that the outermost perimeter defense was 2 to 2½ miles from the inner perimeter surrounding the compound with barbed wire.

Inside the barbed wire line both South Vietnamese and U.S. Army guards were stationed. At the compound a U.S. sentry was stationed between two South Vietnamese Army posts about 200 yards apart. This sentry was singled out for special praise.

It was he, officials said, who heard the Vietcong guerrillas, challenged them and was killed. His action alerted the troops in the compound, most of whom were asleep in their barracks.

But "within seconds," an investigating officer said, the American soldiers flung open windows and began firing at the attackers. There was "no indication of panic and no promiscuous firing of weapons," the officer reported.

REACTION WAS SWIFT

The reaction at both the compound and the airfield, where 9 helicopters were destroyed, 9 to 11 damaged and 6 light observer planes damaged, was speedy and effective, it was reported.

The Vietcong force, which poured about 60 rounds of mortar shells into the barracks area and selectively hit targets at the airfield—ignoring fuel supplies—apparently was relatively small. According to the latest report, about 100 men attacked the airfield, half of them assigned to the mortar batteries. "A dozen or two" were seen in the barracks area.

One Vietcong prisoner was taken, it was said. He was described as badly wounded

and every effort was being made to save his life.

The size of the U.S. forces at Pleiku was not given here. The Vietcong attack appeared to be in company strength. Vietcong companies are estimated at 100, about half the size of a similar unit in the U.S. Army.

There is no reliable indication of Vietcong unit strengths, officials here stressed. Only for guidance to U.S. forces, the Vietcong units are estimated as: platoon, 25 men; company, 100; battalion, 450 to 700; and regiment, 900 to 1,100. No Vietcong units stronger than a regiment have been officially recognized.

By comparison, a U.S. Army platoon numbers 45, a company 200, a battalion 1,000, and a division 15,000. Brigades are composed of battalions and vary in strength. Any unit of two or more divisions would comprise a corps. South Vietnamese Army units are similarly organized.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1965]

PROTECTING U.S. FORCES

From a military no more than from a political point of view can the successful Vietcong attacks against U.S. bases in South Vietnam, which killed or wounded 134 Americans, be brushed away in cursory fashion.

At Pleiku, as at Bienhoa last November, Communist guerrillas easily evaded South Vietnamese security guards, and laid down mortar fire on airfields and barracks. A Communist patrol even penetrated the perimeter defense and attached demolition charges to a barracks. U.S. planes and helicopters, nicely lined up like "sitting ducks," were destroyed or damaged.

It is true, as Secretary McNamara said, that it will never be possible to provide complete security against raids and sneak attacks for all American installations in South Vietnam. But that statement is a useless generalization; there is never any such thing as complete security in any war.

Certainly far better security than has been provided is possible, and has now become absolutely essential. The Hawk missile battalion, now assigned to South Vietnam, merely complicates the problems of local security; the missiles—if they are to provide proper antiaircraft protection to airfields—must be widely dispersed on high ground normally well beyond the airfields' perimeters. There is no use sending missiles to South Vietnam if they are going to be blown up by saboteurs.

Local security for American installations can be tremendously strengthened by assumption of responsibility for local security of installations largely staffed or used by U.S. forces. If American-manned aircraft are going to operate from Vietnamese bases, the planes and their crews deserve protection. U.S. Army engineers or Navy Seabee battalions could build dispersal revetments for parked aircraft in South Vietnam, bunkers and shelters for personnel and sandbagged or protected barracks.

If the Pentagon is to continue to order U.S. military personnel to Vietnam, it has the obligation to provide them with the best protection possible.

EXHIBIT 3

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 9, 1965]

TODAY AND TOMORROW—THE VIETNAMESE AFFAIR

(By Walter Lippmann)

It is hard to believe that the raid on the American installations in South Vietnam was not closely related to Prime Minister Kosygin's visit to North Vietnam. It is hard to believe, too, that Mr. Kosygin would have picked the day after his arrival in Hanoi to touch off the raid. He was in no position to help the Vietcong to carry out the raid nor to protect North Vietnam against American

retaliation. It is most probable, therefore, that the affair was ordered and directed by men who intended to spoil Mr. Kosygin's mission in southeast Asia and to interfere with his role as a principal power in bringing about a negotiated settlement.

Most probably, therefore, the gambit was directed both against the Soviet Union and the United States, which happen to have a parallel interest in preventing a big war in eastern Asia and of containing the expansion of China. The administration is no doubt right in interpreting the raid on Pleiku as a test of American will. Had the United States refrained from retaliating, the Chinese and their supporters in Asia and elsewhere would have called it a demonstration that the United States is a paper tiger, and that therefore the Soviet policy of peaceable coexistence is unnecessary and absurd. The other side of the calculation was that if the United States reacted, as in fact it did react, it would demonstrate that in Asia the Soviet Union is a paper tiger unable to defend its clients.

From the Chinese point of view the gambit worked successfully. It showed, on the one hand, that the Americans are highly vulnerable on the ground in South Vietnam; it showed on the other hand that the Soviet Union has no power to protect east Asia against the United States.

Much depends on what lessons are drawn in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi, and Washington from the affair.

We have had a very clear demonstration of the strategic reality in southeast Asia. The American Army at Pleiku was unable to protect itself against a comparatively small guerrilla attack, against a force estimated officially at about two squads and one platoon. The American forces got no warning of the attack from the Vietnamese people in the nearby hamlets where the raid was prepared. It got no protection from the Vietnamese security guards. In fact, when asked at his Sunday press conference whether the United States could not protect its own forces in South Vietnam, Secretary McNamara replied that he did not "believe it will ever be possible—and I think when I say this I reflect the views of our Joint Chiefs—to protect our forces against sneak attacks of that kind." Sneak attacks is in this case another name for guerrilla warfare.

But that is only half of the lesson which was demonstrated this past weekend. The other part of the lesson is that the U.S. fleet, standing a hundred miles offshore, is capable of inflicting devastating and unrequited damage on the Asian mainland. There was no power in South Vietnam to protect our own forces or to retaliate. But at sea there exists an enormous American power which is quite independent of our forces on the mainland.

The peace of the world may depend on whether all of the powers concerned take the meaning of these lessons to heart.

For us, the meaning is that the commitment to participate in the land war in South Vietnam is an entanglement, is a hostage to fortune, which exposes us to defeats and humiliations. The best that the more convinced believers in the commitment can say is that if we stay there long enough and accept the losses which they regard as tolerable, the Chinese and North Vietnamese will eventually grow tired and become different. For myself, I would not count too much on American patience being greater than Chinese patience. It is less likely that the American people will wish to wash their hands of the whole business of containing China if they do not have to lose American soldiers week after week in a war that cannot be won on the ground where it is being fought.

The meaning of the affair must not be missed in Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. Let them remember that, reduced to its fundamentals, the situation is that the U.S. pos-

sesses paramount sea and air power in the far Pacific, and no one can count on such a degree of restraint in the use of that power that it will never be used. The United States is not a paper tiger. That phrase reflects the greatest delusion on which our adversaries could possibly gamble. The truth is that President Johnson profoundly desires to avoid war but his power to do that is not unlimited nor can he be counted on not to be provoked if the provocation is continual and cumulative.

There should be no mistake about this anywhere.

EXHIBIT 4

[From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1965]

THE DANGERS IN VIETNAM

The Vietnamese situation has entered a new stage. The war will not be the same since the Vietcong attack on Pleiku and the reprisals against North Vietnam which continued yesterday. It seems axiomatic of this type of warfare that it either escalates or it stops. For the present, it is escalating and becoming more expensive in lives and more perilous every day.

Pleiku has once again proved, as Secretary McNamara said, that the American forces cannot protect themselves against this type of sneak attack. Its sequel served notice on Hanoi—and indirectly on Peiping and Moscow—that the United States will retaliate when Americans are attacked. The whole affair indicates forcibly that the long-recognized dynamism of the Vietnamese conflict has risen to a dangerous level.

Secretary McNamara says that the situation has not reached a crisis; but it has done so in the sense that the United States is becoming less and less able to restrict the conflict to minor proportions. The possible choices of action or inaction are being steadily whittled down. The United States is gradually approaching a point where it either goes on to a major engagement involving North Vietnam and Communist China, or it actively seeks a diplomatic solution, which amounts to a disengagement on reasonable and honorable terms.

President Johnson has in the past denied that the United States has any intention of carrying the war to North Vietnam. Yet he considered it necessary in the past few days to help the South Vietnamese raid North Vietnam twice. Since it is not to be expected that the Vietcong in South Vietnam will cease their attacks or their tactics, and since Peiping and Moscow are committed to help Hanoi, the dangers of the future are only too obvious.

The Americans working on the Vietnamese problem in Washington and Saigon must often feel as if the problems have a nightmarish or fourth dimensional quality. Western ideas, modes of thought, and methods do not function as it seems that they logically should. Mortars and bombs do speak a universal language; but they may ultimately lead to the unthinkable conclusions of a nuclear war.

The only sane way out is diplomatic, international, political, economic—not military. A solution will not be found by exchanging harder and harder blows. Surrender is out of the question and victory for either side is impossible.

Perhaps a new start can be made from an untried base—that Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Russians are all sensible human beings who are ready for peace in southeast Asia, or at least willing to consider it. There would be prices to pay, but there would be gains as well as losses. Diplomacy is surely not yet a lost art or a dead language.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TYDINGS in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE CONGRESS AND A NUCLEAR NAVY—ARTICLE BY SENATOR JACKSON

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague Senator JACKSON recently examined the case for a more rapid development of our nuclear powered naval forces in a penetrating article entitled "The Congress and a Nuclear Navy." The Senator has earned a well-deserved reputation for foresight in questions of national security and has often been in the position of urging necessary programs on a reluctant Defense Department.

I recommend this article to my colleagues and ask unanimous consent that it be printed at this point in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Navy magazine, October 1964]

THE CONGRESS AND A NUCLEAR NAVY

(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, chairman, Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee)

Today the central issue for America is this: How can we best protect our national security, promote our economic well-being, and safeguard individual freedom?

In the light of history it is clear that our vital national interests depend on a certain imbalance of power favorable to the free peoples—an imbalance which will persuade those who might threaten aggression to cease and desist.

I strongly believe that America's current military posture is basically well designed to serve our foreign policy purposes; namely, to create power relationships which will discourage expansionist states from using force, or threatening its use, to pursue their goals. Essentially, our military policies and programs—together with those of our allies—are designed to deter the use of force not by an all-or-nothing brinkmanship, but by convincing an adversary that we can and will respond appropriately to his provocations, whatever they may be.

SHOULD EXPLOIT SEAPOWER

Today, we have a powerful and versatile military deterrent—and the American Government has acted to maintain its credibility, by giving evidence of a will to use our power—if necessary. In the confrontation over Cuba, when Khrushchev found that he might be starting something bigger than he was ready to risk, and when he discovered that our will was firm, he moved to get his missiles out. In the Gulf of Tonkin, we retaliated quickly—but with fitting restraint—against the unprovoked attack upon U.S. Navy ships in international waters. We gave clear evidence that we were no "paper tiger." In the process, the significance of seapower and the freedom of the seas was dramatically highlighted.

By and large, the United States has done a good job in recent years in building its

military strength. The present danger is that we may not capitalize on certain clear advantages which we have won. I have particularly in mind our unexcelled seapower and our long lead in nuclear propulsion for naval vessels. We have advantages in this area shared by no other power. We should exploit these advantages in order to maintain a clear superiority in seapower over our adversaries.

Some of us in Congress have been concerned for a long time to develop a nuclear powered fleet as a strong support and resource in the conduct of American policy.

Today there are a whole series of potential trouble spots around the world which we can get to by way of the great waterways—if we will make the best possible use of our opportunities. And in this era of revolutionary change and sudden crisis time itself is a most precious factor. A nuclear fleet is sustained power at sea. With sufficient nuclear capability we can focus maximum naval power in a troubled area in quick time, and stay there as long as needed to restore stability and lend support to those who fight for freedom. Such a capability could mean the difference between a successful implementation of foreign policy objectives—or a failure. With it we could handle several crises simultaneously—and in these days crises never seem to come one at a time or in just one part of the world.

FLEXIBILITY AND CHOICE

Furthermore, a nuclear-powered fleet is a multipurpose weapon—providing both a strategic weapons system and a series of options in dealing with limited conflicts and the continuing problems of the cold war. This floating security system includes the following elements: strategic weapons—the nuclear missile and the jet bomber; a moving airfield; airlift for ground troops; a floating base for Marines; and a formidable American presence which speaks with the language that no adversary can miss.

Such a multipurpose system offers us needed flexibility and a choice of means in pursuing our foreign policy purposes.

We are all aware of what our nuclear submarines can do. We are already well underway in the transformation of our submarine arm into a modern deterrent force. To date, we have authorized the building of 41 Polaris submarines and 45 attack submarines—all nuclear. It was appropriate that our first emphasis should have been in this area, for in the recent past our greatest need was to build as rapidly as we could, a highly invulnerable nuclear retaliatory force—one that could survive an enemy's surprise attack, and strike back with devastating effectiveness. I well remember going to the floor of the Senate in 1957 to argue for a greater effort and a higher priority for the submarine missile-launching system. As a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I joined with my committee colleagues to speed development of the Polaris program—and we are proud of the major contribution the Congress made in this historic effort.

Today, Polaris has taken its place as a formidable element in our strategic deterrent force, contributing to our vital lead over the Soviet Union in nuclear strike power.

THE LEISURELY DOD

But are we moving as fast as we should to develop a nuclear-powered surface fleet? I believe the answer to this question is "No."

I do not believe one can justify the very leisurely effort of the Defense Department in building nuclear-powered surface ships. Only three units have been completed, constituting the first all nuclear-powered task force, the carrier *Enterprise*, the cruiser *Long Beach*, and the frigate *Bainbridge*. Only one other nuclear warship is under construction—a case where Congress upgraded to nuclear power status one of the conventional

destroyer leaders requested in the 1962 submission. The Defense Department accepted the change, and the second nuclear-powered destroyer leader *Truxtun* was laid down June 17, 1963. However, no more nuclear surface warships have been programed for the future.

It is indisputable that nuclear propulsion provides significant military advantages for surface ships—just as it does for our submarines—notably the quantum jump in speed and mobility.

The nuclear ship can go anywhere in the world and do its assigned job—without logistic support. There is no concern for replenishing propulsion fuel.

The operational advantages in time of combat are self-evident.

BETTER AND BETTER CORES

A nuclear carrier is capable of not only sustaining its own requirements for a far longer period than a conventional carrier, but it can also provide support for conventional escort vessels.

Our technology is rapidly improving. Since the first nuclear aircraft carrier went to sea, reactor fuels have been developed which produce twice the power and last twice as long as the fuel used by the *Enterprise*. Our nuclear engineers are developing new nuclear fuel core designs that will provide nuclear energy to last the life of the ship. In the words of Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, former commander of the first nuclear task force and now commander of the antisubmarine warfare force of the Pacific Fleet:

"I have learned, often through bitter experience, that real improvements in our hardware are only made through building and evaluating in service. You don't even know your true problems, much less solve them, as long as you stay on the drawing board. Tremendous improvement has been made in nuclear propulsion plants in the past decade. In order to continue making improvements we must expand our building program for nuclear-powered ships."

The increased cost of nuclear power is not significant in relation to its military advantages. Our Joint Committee on Atomic Energy—after careful review—estimated that the total lifetime cost of the nuclear carrier with its aircraft is only about 3 percent more than the lifetime cost of the conventional carrier with its aircraft.

The practicability of nuclear power for surface ships has been graphically demonstrated by the successful operations of the *Enterprise* in the Cuban crisis and by the spectacular round-the-world cruise of history's first nuclear task force.

A PROTOTYPE FORCE

Today we have a prototype task force—and it has proved its worth and its reliability. What we need next are several operational task forces. We should program them in orderly fashion and start producing them promptly.

In the early years, Congress found it necessary to combat the reluctance within the Defense Department to use nuclear propulsion for submarines. Now history seems to be repeating itself—there is evidence of a marked reluctance with the Defense Establishment to use nuclear power for surface vessels.

It is no secret, of course, that faulty judgments by responsible Government officials may destroy a good project whose time has really come. No project is so good that it cannot be stalled or killed by overanalysis—or by unsound analysis.

After hearing Defense Department witnesses cite certain cost effectiveness comparisons to support their contention that the advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface warships are not particularly significant, our Joint Committee on Atomic Energy unanimously concluded that those Defense Department studies contain a fundamental

weakness that negates their validity. As the unanimous, bipartisan Joint Committee report of December 1963 stated:

"The comparisons cited were based on the assumption that, in wartime, logistic support forces will be able to operate unhampered and without losses as they do in peacetime. The defect in this analysis is immediately apparent.

"We must plan for time of crisis. It is precisely in such situations that the superior mobility, maneuverability, and reliability of nuclear warships will give the United States an unequaled naval striking force. It is fundamentally illogical and wasteful to fit our new first-line warships with powerplants that are, perhaps, already obsolete."

Well, Congress continues on the alert. We cannot let the Navy get committed to a future of planned obsolescence.

Our adversaries are acting to improve their capabilities over, under, and on the seas. The Soviet Union is seeking to gain control of strategic waterways as part of its long-range plan to dominate or neutralize vital channels of commerce from Gibraltar to Panama to southeast Asia.

Now is the time to capitalize on the great advantages which our lead in nuclear power development has given us. We have the knowhow. We have the resources. We have the example of how handsomely our bold action in the Polaris program has been rewarded.

A final word: The fact that the Congress has supplied much of the energy to build a nuclear Navy vindicates the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in establishing at the heart of our system of government the principle of congressional review—the duty of the Legislature to subject to its tests the judgment of those in positions of authority in the executive branch.

SOUTH VIETNAM—ADDRESS BY HON. WILLIAM P. BUNDY TO WASHINGTON, MO., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in an address delivered some 2 weeks ago to the Washington, Mo., Chamber of Commerce, our distinguished Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, the Honorable William P. Bundy, carefully reviewed the historical and political factors involved in South Vietnam and southeast Asia. His informative remarks will be helpful in evaluating and understanding the tragic course events have taken this week in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bundy's analysis of American policy in South Vietnam and southeast Asia be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

I would like to speak on the topic you have chosen—American policy in South Vietnam and southeast Asia—totally without regard to partisanship. That topic and the issues it raises concern all of us, as Americans.

I shall talk, if I may, to three related sets of questions:

I. How did we come to be in South Vietnam? How does what we are doing there relate to our wider purposes in the world, to our specific purposes in Asia, and, in a word, to our national interests?

II. What has been the course of events in Vietnam that has brought us to the present situation?

III. What are the key problems, and what can we do to help in solving them and in achieving our objectives?

I

The first question requires a look at history.

Even when the Far East was much more distant than it is today, we Americans had deep concern for developments there. Americans pioneered in trade and missionary effort with China and in opening up Japan to Western influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but began almost at once to prepare the way for independence and self-government there—an independence promised by act of Congress in 1936 and achieved on schedule in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide interests of many types in the Far East, though only few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart from the individual Americans who had served over decades as political advisors to the independent Kingdom of Thailand.

Events then took a more ominous turn. We became aware that the ambitions of Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a threat not only to the specific interests of ourselves and other Western nations, but to the peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. China, in which we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th century system of foreign special privileges, was progressively threatened and large parts overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We responded to aggression by conducting with our allies a major Pacific war that cost the United States alone 272,700 casualties and over a hundred billion dollars.

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated, and the way apparently cleared for an Asia of free and independent national states that would be progressively freed of colonialism, that need threaten neither each other nor neighboring states, and that could tackle in their own way the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy the aspiration of their peoples.

That kind of Far East was a pretty good definition of our national interests then. It is equally valid today. We cared about the Far East, and we care today, because we know that what happens there—among peoples numbering 33 percent of the world's population, with great talent, past historic greatness, and capacity—is bound to make a crucial difference whether there will be the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and work together without strife, and—most basic of all—we ourselves, in the long run, survive the kind of nation we are determined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake in a peaceful and secure world as distinct from a violent and chaotic one. But there were three great flaws in the 1945 picture after the defeat of Japan.

1. In China, a civil war had been raging since the 1920's between the Government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist movement. After a brief and edgy truce during the war against Japan, that civil war was resumed in circumstances where the Government had been gravely weakened. We assisted that Government in every way possible. Mistakes may have been made, but in the last analysis mainland China could not have been saved from communism without the commitment of major U.S. ground and air forces to a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near East, we did not make—and perhaps could not then have made—that commitment. And there came to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled with hatred of the West, with the vision of a potential dominant role for China, but imbued above all with a primitive Communist ideology in its most virulent and expansionist form.

2. In Korea, a divided country stood uneasily, half free and half Communist. With our military might sharply reduced after the

war, as part of what may have been an inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our forces and reduced our economic aid before there was in existence a strong South Korean defensive capacity. With Soviet backing, North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought 157,530 U.S. casualties, cost us at least \$18 billion in direct expenses, and in the end, after Communist China had also intervened, restored an independent South Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

A recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on, or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

A recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests; that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

An understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required.

3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a third major flaw, the difficulty of liquidating colonial regimes and replacing them by new and stable independent governments. The Philippines became independent and with our help overcame the ravages of war and the Communist Huk rebellion. The British, too, who had likewise prepared India and Burma and made them independent, were in the process of doing the same in Malaya even as they joined with the Malaysians in beating back a 12-year Communist subversive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained its independence, too, without support, but with scars that have continued to affect the otherwise natural and healthy development of Indonesian nationalism.

French Indochina was the toughest case. The French had thought in terms of a slow evolution to an eventual status within some French union of states, a concept too leisurely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen to the leadership of dedicated Communists.

We all know the result. Even with substantial help from us, France was unable to defeat the Communist-led nationalist movement. Despite last-minute promises of independence, the struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could only have been won, again, by a major U.S. military commitment, and perhaps not even then. The result was the settlement at Geneva. The accords reached there were almost certainly the best achievable, but they left a situation with many seeds of future trouble. Briefly:

1. North Vietnam was militantly Communist, and had developed during the war against the French an army well equipped and highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the south and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure, but prepared to resort to other means if needed.

2. South Vietnam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralized and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces who had fought with the French. Under the accords, external mili-

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Facing the Facts in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1965

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, the eyes of the world are focused on Vietnam. The deceitful, ruthless Communist attacks on South Vietnam bases a few days ago emphasize once again the importance of that struggle and the lengths the Communists will go in gaining control over all of Vietnam and southeast Asia.

Recently, on January 26, 1965, Richard M. Nixon discussed the Vietnam problem with the Sales Executives' Club of New York. His message was most timely, penetrating, and appropriate, and I commend it to the attention of my colleagues in the Congress.

Under leave to extend my remarks, I submit Mr. Nixon's speech for inclusion in the RECORD:

"FACING THE FACTS IN VIETNAM"—ADDRESS OF RICHARD M. NIXON, SALES EXECUTIVES CLUB OF NEW YORK, JANUARY 26, 1965

I would like to take as my text today one of Winston Churchill's statements which will lead us to a discussion of what I believe is the most important decision that Lyndon Johnson, the President of the United States, and the American people will make during these next 4 years.

Let me read this statement. The time, 1938, immediately after the partition of Czechoslovakia. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons, said this: "The belief that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion."

It was true then. I think it is also true today. And, as you might have guessed, I am referring to another small state—not in Europe, but in Asia—the state that is much in the news today because of the troubles we are having there, Vietnam.

This subject has been discussed so much that you are, perhaps, tired of it. Certainly many Americans are very tired of what has been happening to Americans—to our Embassy, to our consulates, to our libraries, and to our people in Vietnam, where we are trying to help.

We get the impression that the Vietnamese do not want to help themselves, and so take it out on us. It would be very easy to become frustrated at this point, to become defeatists, to throw up our hands or to find out how not to handle the situation, which is the usual weapon of diplomats.

But I would suggest that this week, while tributes to Winston Churchill are being paid all over the world, we should remember what he said in 1938.

I would like to talk about Vietnam in terms of American public opinion, of the stakes that are there for Americans in the

cause of freedom, of the alternatives we have, and the choice I think we should make.

First, what is American public opinion concerning Vietnam today? This can be broken down into different groups. The first is the growing group that is following the line of Senator MORSE, of Oregon. They say, let's wash our hands of the place and get out before we are thrown out. Every poll indicates that more and more Americans are frustrated with what is happening there and want us to get out.

The second group—also growing—perhaps the largest in the country, seems to be represented by most of the editorial support of the major Eastern papers. They feel that we must find a negotiated solution to the problem. We must neutralize Vietnam, on some sort of guaranteed basis. Senator FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, is the major spokesman for this group. Walter Lippmann is, perhaps, the major spokesman among the Nation's columnists and pundits.

Then, of course, there is a third group—perhaps the smallest—which contends that the way to end the war in Vietnam, and the only choice for America, is to find a way to win it.

There is unanimity in all of these groups over one point: Our present course of action in Vietnam will not do. And I want to be very blunt about that. We are losing the war in Vietnam, and if there is not a change in strategy, we will be thrown out in a matter of months, certainly within a year. This is the problem that confronts America today.

Let's see what the stakes are. What is this battle all about? We start with one small state, as Winston Churchill would have termed it. It is not a very important state, as states go. Only 15 million people. But, looking at those people and this state, we find that the great majority of those 15 million people do not want to come under Communist domination. They have heard from their friends in North Vietnam and know what communism is. They have proved that they are willing to fight to avoid becoming Communists.

A great lie has been perpetrated throughout the world, not deliberately, but perhaps by oversight, to the effect that the South Vietnamese will not fight for their own freedom. But 200,000 casualties suffered in the battle against communism proves otherwise.

This is Vietnam, 15 million people, not wanting to be Communists, very bravely fighting with 60 percent of their country already under Communist domination. Looking at those people and that small state, I think that perhaps everybody in this room would probably say it is not worth risking a war—a big war—over those few people and that little state.

This is only part of the stake. Let us look at the bigger part.

What if the stake also included all of Southeast Asia? You have heard this before, and many now tend to downgrade this kind of analysis because they think it is too pessimistic. But I have made four trips through this area, two in the last year, and these are my conclusions:

First, if Vietnam is lost, all of Southeast Asia is lost. Look at the surrounding countries. Laos has already been lost. Cambodia is leaning so far in the direction of communism that Vietnam could push it over the brink. Thailand is a country that wants to be on our side, but it is a nation that has always been on the winning side, and this is the only way its independence has survived for a thousand years. Burma is an economic slum, with immense problems and immense pressures, and it will go. Malaysia could not possibly stand with its 10 million people surrounded by a sea of communism.

Then there is the biggest prize in southeast Asia, Indonesia. News about Sukarno has not been pleasant lately, but the prize

is 90 million people on the richest land in that entire area, with an immense mineral potential which has hardly been tapped.

What will happen to Indonesia? A reporter from the New York Times on January 8 wrote from the scene: "Diplomats think Sukarno is heading toward alignment with Communist China. Communist successes in Vietnam have convinced him that Chinese communism is the wave of the future in Asia."

That is why the battle in Vietnam is not just about Vietnam. It is about Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and all the rest. If the Asians in that area—who have been overrun by the Japanese and the Chinese—get the impression, as Sukarno has, that because of what is happening in Vietnam the wave of the future is communism, they are going to go Communist before the wave engulfs them.

That is not all of the story. The biggest prize of all is, of course, Japan, a miracle of development and the greatest industrial power in Asia—the only country with the possible chance to counterbalance China once China develops its industrial might.

The 200 million in southeast Asia, next to the United States, form the biggest trading area for Japan. If these people come under Communist domination, or are influenced by Communist control, Japan will inevitably be pulled toward neutralism, toward even pro-communism, in order to survive.

I remember a very graphic illustration of this many years ago at the beginning of the Korean war. One of our top experts on communism, when asked if we were justified in going into Korea to save that country, said that what we have to realize is that to the Communists the war in Korea is not about Korea, but Japan. Of course, he was right, because if Korea had gone Communist at that time, when Japan was just recovering from World War II, Korea would be like a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Japan would possibly have been pulled toward neutralism, or even communism.

The fall of southeast Asia would produce an even greater impact, and in summary, this is what is involved: The battle for Vietnam is the battle for Asia. It affects southeast Asia and Japan. In the long run, the Pacific could become a "Red sea."

How? Look again at the map. Indonesia stretches a thousand miles across the Pacific, and is only 14 miles from the Philippines. You can see what would happen if Indonesia came under Communist domination and the Philippines were subjected to guerrilla activities which presently exist in Vietnam.

There are even greater stakes in what I would call an almost mystical sense. They are mystical in that they involve what goes on in the Communist mind, both in Moscow and in Peiping.

We've all been reading about this conflict that began between Khrushchev and Mao, and now seems to have been swept under the rug for the moment. Oversimplified, this conflict is really an argument between the "hardliners" and "softliners" in the Communist world. The "softliners" want co-existence with the West, and don't wish to provoke another confrontation such as we had recently in Cuba. They want to beat the West through economic competition.

The "hardliners"—not only those who dominate China's Government, but those now in a minority in the Soviet Government—take a different view. They say world communism can only gain its ultimate objective through the continuing support of revolution throughout the world. They believe that rather than downgrade this kind of operation, they should step it up in Viet-

nam, in Africa, in the Near East, and in Latin America.

In the event that Vietnam falls, or is neutralized, which is the equivalent of falling, this will be an immense vindication of the "hardliners," who will then be able to argue that if it worked in Vietnam, it will work every place. They will say that the West has no effective answer to indirect aggression.

Let us go back to our analysis of Korea. The Korean war had to be fought, and this war did one thing, if it accomplished nothing else. It stopped the Communists from using "overt aggression" to accomplish their objective of taking over a country. The practice proved too dangerous.

The war in Vietnam involves indirect aggression—the taking over of a country by revolution. Our capacity to meet indirect aggression is what will determine whether we get in or stay out, find a way to win, or agree to neutralization.

But let us see if there really is an easy way out of this dilemma. We have already indicated that Vietnam is being lost the way we are presently waging the war, or helping the Vietnamese to wage it. Is there an easy way out?

The most popular suggestion first, neutralization. Sounds good; after all, Switzerland is neutral, Holland is neutral, Austria is neutral—why not Vietnam?

The same situation does not apply. When we have a nation immediately bordering on an immense power complex such as Communist China, neutrality, when you agree to it, is only surrender on the installment plan.

Look at Laos. We entered into the Laotian neutrality agreement with the best of intentions. We thought this meant that Laos would be saved. But what it finally meant is indicative of the fate of Vietnam.

Neutrality, where the Communists are concerned, means three things: We get out; they stay in; they take over.

Neutrality will not work, though it sounds good as an easy way out. It is a good way to inform the people of Asia that we are on the losing side and that eventually the Communists will win.

The second point of view is also popular, and part of the "how-not-to-do-it" school. This school of thought prevailed at the time of the murder of Diem. In effect, it was said that before we can have a military victory we must have political reform. Those subscribing to this principle find out all the difficulties involved in winning the war in Vietnam and, particularly, point out something that is very true—there is great political dissension in that country at the present time. The Buddhists are tremendously stimulated and, in many cases, controlled by the Communists.

We had political reform, and Diem is gone. Still a military victory eludes us. This same school still holds that we must have political reform before military victory.

I couldn't disagree more with this kind of thinking. We in America must learn that America's form of democracy works well here, although it is not a very easy system to run. But it cannot be imposed on peoples with entirely different backgrounds in Asia, Latin America, and many other places of the world.

When we proceeded on the assumption that political reform had to come before military victory, I was there in Asia soon afterward, talking with the chief of state of another country friendly to the United States. He told me that the murder of Diem meant to him—and to many other Asian leaders—just three things: It's dangerous to be a friend of the United States; it pays to be a neutral; it sometimes helps to be an enemy.

This same deadly pattern seems to be engulfing some of our policy decisions in Vietnam.

There is another easy way out. This one sounds to Americans—particularly to the philanthropic, good-hearted people of this great country of ours—as the real solution to guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. They say to make the people happy by providing the rice, food, schools and all of the other things that make for the good life. When they have all of these things, they feel, the Communists will not be able to take over.

I wish this were true. It would cost us only money, and no lives.

But a conversation I had with a village chief proves otherwise. When I asked him what one thing he would want if he could get it from the United States, he replied simply that all he wanted was security. Not a new well, more rice, a better school, more peace corpsmen—just security. And small wonder. In a village only a few miles away, the Communists had torn its chief apart only a few nights before.

We finally get back to the very difficult decision we have to make. We must realize there is no easy way out. We either get out, surrender on the installment plan through neutralization, or we find a way to win.

It is not easy to win. It is very easy to say that if we just extend the war to the north it will end within a matter of months. But, this may not be the case. Most of the military experts agree that unless we, in effect, "quarantine" the war in Vietnam by cutting off all Communist-dominated interference from Communist North Vietnam and from Laos, there is no chance for the South Vietnamese to defeat the guerrillas in South Vietnam.

I believe this is the decision we should make—"quarantine" the war and use American air and sea power to cut supply lines and destroy staging areas in North Vietnam and Laos which now make it possible for the guerrillas to continue their actions.

But let me make one thing clear: There should be no use of atomic weapons. They are neither necessary nor advisable. We should use American manpower only in the air and on the sea. The South Vietnamese can handle the ground fighting.

Let us look at this strategy. It is a risky one. Won't the Communist Chinese come into the war? It would be very easy to reassure you that they would not come in. I don't believe they will. On the other hand, in making a decision to win the war in Vietnam we must not discount that risk. Now is the time to face up to the fact that what we are dealing with in Vietnam is Chinese Communist aggression.

It is dangerous and foolhardy to try to gloss over the truth as to what the war in Vietnam really involves:

First, the war in Vietnam is not about Vietnam but about southeast Asia.

Second, the confrontation in Vietnam is, in the final analysis, not between the Vietnamese and the Vietcong nor between the United States and the Vietcong, but between the United States and Communist China. If Communist China were not instigating and supporting the Vietcong, there would be no war in Vietnam today.

Third, a U.S. defeat in Vietnam means a Chinese Communist victory which could decide the fate of Asia for generations to come.

In summary, the risk involved in ending the war in Vietnam by winning it is far less than the risk involved in losing it.

Looking for example, at Red China's position, let us consider the reasons they might not enter the war.

At the present time, the Soviet Union and Red China are enemies not allies as they were at the time of the Korean war. From that standpoint, this is the best time to stop Chinese aggression. The Soviet Union is not now interested in the Chinese gaining success in Asia, or any place else.

Second, without the Soviet Union, Communist China is a fourth rate military

power. With the Soviet Union's logistical support, it could be dangerously formidable.

Third, time is not on our side, but on Red China's side. Every day that passes, the Chinese nuclear capability increases. Five years, ten years—we might not be able to make a stand there, or any place else, without risking a nuclear war. Now we can.

We must also recognize that the Chinese industrial capacity at present is very small, compared to what it will be later. Anyone who has visited Hong Kong or Taiwan knows what the Chinese people can do when their remarkable personal characteristics are mobilized in an industrial society. In 15 or 25 years, Red China could become one of the great industrial powers of the world.

The question is, do we wait until then or do we now show them that we want to live in peace with them and with others but that we will not tolerate direct or indirect aggression in which they impose their form of government upon the people of another nation against their will.

There are risks, yes. But the risks of waiting are much greater. This becomes apparent when we look ahead and realize that if South Vietnam is lost, and southeast Asia is lost, and the Pacific becomes a Red Sea, we could be confronted with a world war where the odds against us would be far greater.

All that I have said is somewhat pessimistic, but I would like to leave one optimistic note with you. While the military, political, and strategic problems are immense, from the standpoint of good news I can assure you that the battle of ideas in Asia has been won, and is being won, day after day.

Ten years ago, the Communists were arguing in South Vietnam that to go Communist would mean a better way of life. This is not the case today. People all over Asia know that in Communist China and North Vietnam life is not nearly as good as it is in Japan, Taiwan, or Malaysia and Thailand, the countries that have chosen freedom rather than communism or socialism. This message is sweeping that vast area of the world.

So at a time when we have won the ideological battle, our problem is: Can we now prevent the Communists from accomplishing through raw power what they cannot accomplish through persuasion?

The course of action I advocate is one that is not popular in America and would probably not get a vote of confidence in Congress or by a Gallup or Harris poll. I will remind you, however, that Winston Churchill, in 1911, took a very unpopular stand when, seeing the buildup of the German fleet, insisted on taking the Royal Navy and modernizing it. But the British people were forever grateful that he did it, because the British fleet saved Britain in World War I.

Before World War II, Churchill was like a voice in the wilderness talking about Czechoslovakia and stopping Hitler. It was unpopular then, both in Britain and in the United States. But, when he became Prime Minister, the British, American, and all free peoples were grateful that he had the vision to see the danger. When this danger became apparent to everyone, he was there to lead them.

In 1946, we heard of the Iron Curtain, in an announcement by a major world statesman that the Soviet Union, which had been our ally during the Second World War, was now a potential enemy of freedom.

Nearly everyone assumes that when Churchill made that speech in 1946 that it was met with universal acclaim. Not at all. In America and in much of the free world, Churchill was chided for being a warmonger. But, within a year came the Greek-Turkish aid program and the Marshall plan, and he was proved right.

I would suggest today that we have a similarly difficult problem in southeast Asia.

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And I repeat Churchill's statement: "The belief that security can be obtained by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion."

I think that we in America, in this generation, are fortunate that we have the privilege to live in a century which produced a man like Winston Churchill. We will be even more fortunate if we heed his words as we honor his memory.

Ifs, Including Taxes, Mark 1965 Outlook

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 8, 1965

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, in a year-end economic review of Massachusetts business in the Boston Herald, George Minot covered the problem of the impact of shifts in defense spending. He commented:

If there is any self-evident fact, it is that New England will make as significant a contribution to a world that may well be gradually disarming as in one where military defense necessarily occupies as large a role as it does now.

This is a healthy realization that with a little imagination our economy can respond to economic change and move on to even greater achievements.

This goal will not be achieved without a great deal of thought and preparation, but Mr. Minot's article is a hopeful sign that the appropriate steps will be taken. I insert his article in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

IFS, INCLUDING TAXES, MARK 1965 OUTLOOK: MILITARY LOSSES CAN BE MET

(By George Minot)

It's too bad these first-of-the-year business and industrial reviews don't mean what they say—they are not reviews at all. If they were, the articles in them would be far easier to write.

For New England had a big year in 1964. In almost every field you can think of—from industry to recreation and agriculture—those who put their shoulders to the wheel came out well.

There were big 1964 advances in transportation, in education, and in cleaning up old areas and making them new.

Visitors to Boston would hardly know the place. The West End, the North End, and the South End—all are undergoing major face-lifting operations. Boston no longer gives the impression it is living on past glories. It is alive, going forward.

It is still the "hub" of all New England. The prosperity of the entire section depends more on the prosperity of Boston than many Massachusetts legislators or officials from other States, sometimes are willing to admit. Here, one needs hardly be told, are the great educational institutions, the great medical centers, the great musical and scientific centers.

Here—and you hesitate a minute—is the home of the Red Sox and the Bruins. And the only place they can go is up—to the eminence of the Celtics, for instance.

But in a first-of-the-year review you don't want to look back on what happened or didn't happen in 1964.

It's 1965 that interests you now.

When you start to talk about what is going to happen in coming months you at once be-

gin to tread on more dangerous ground. There are too many of those things the experts call imponderables. For instance, there is the matter of taxes.

If you look at any of the State capitals, or if you have listened to some of the inaugural addresses of incoming Governors these last few weeks, you will notice that all of them need money.

Gov. John W. King, the first Democrat to win reelection as Governor of New Hampshire on a fine record he made in his first term, is going to seek the first increase in State taxes since 1957. Along with most other Governors in this section, he sees a need for increased aid to education, a pay raise for many State employees, and reorganization of State departments to make them more efficient.

The story is much the same in Vermont, where another Democrat, Philip H. Hoff, was first elected 2 years ago, that State's first Democratic Governor in 109 years. Re-elected in the great sweep of last November, Hoff now, for the first time in the State's history, has fellow Democrats in the jobs of lieutenant governor, State secretary, treasurer, auditor of accounts, and attorney general.

Maine didn't elect a Governor last fall, and Republican Gov. John H. Reed continues in office, but now he has a legislature solidly controlled by Democrats. Reed is seeking a budget of \$175,418,000 to operate the State for the next 2 years, of which almost \$10 million is for supplemental appropriations. To pay for this program Reed is seeking a tax increase on timberlands and tobacco and, like Governor King in New Hampshire, wants a markup in liquor prices, both these States being in the liquor business.

Massachusetts, perhaps more than its neighbors to the north, needs a broader tax base. During the campaign Governor Volpe talked a great deal about a sales tax which its advocates say would bring in \$125 million or more revenue. But in the past the State legislature and the labor leaders have hesitated to recommend this source of revenue.

Each year there is talk about a State lottery or legalized off-track betting. The money derived from these questionable sources hardly would be a drop in the bucket, however, because the needs of the State are so large.

While the New England States are searching frantically for new and painless money sources, State officials always keep in mind the high rate of tax mortality among politicians. Taxpayers continually are demanding more services; they want bigger and better schools and highways, for instance, but they show a tendency to vote against candidates and elected officials who talk too much about higher taxes to pay for these things.

They keep in mind such facts as that in the 5 years from 1958 to 1963, State and local tax rates rose twice as fast as Federal taxes. They are told that State and local taxation is now increasing twice as fast as income, and economists tell them that since World War II the Federal debt has gone up only 20 percent while State and local debt has gone up some 600 percent.

There is an optimistic side to the tax picture, because the Federal Government has promised a "substantial" reduction in excise taxes which make up a \$14 billion package and cover almost everything from automobiles to whisky. Nobody knows yet what the people in Washington mean by "substantial," or which taxes will be cut or when.

Businessmen hear all sorts of rumors, speculation, and informed word. And hundreds of them, representing practically every excised-taxed industry or business in the country, are on record regarding the "urgency" of outright elimination or at least reduction in Federal excise taxes. Overall reduction probably will wind up in a House-

Senate conference, and a good guess would be that the tax cut would run between \$3 and \$4 billion.

Thus if the tax picture is cloudy as businessmen look into 1965, so is the matter of the whole economy. There are a number of "ifs" on the horizon. There:

If there is a steel strike.

If the steel companies further raise prices.

If the Federal Reserve is forced by the balance of payments to tighten money.

If Britain devalues the pound.

If the situation in southeast Asia should develop into a major conflict.

If the outflow of gold is stepped up drastically.

If the predicted leveling-off in business, which many persons predict for the latter part of the year, should develop into a downturn.

Most of these things, of course, will never come to pass. But they make the outlook more cloudy than the easier task of looking back through 1964. In that year, despite some heavy layoffs in individual electronic plants and the continued shrinking of the once-dominant textile industry, this region still showed a gain of 34,100 jobs from the year before, with just short of 4 million persons employed in nonagricultural jobs.

Statistics perhaps do not mean much to individuals who either are gainfully employed or are looking for work—anyone than do long-range forecasts—but anybody interested in New England business cannot help but see that the area will gain tremendous economic advantage through the location in Cambridge of the huge National Aeronautics and Space Administration's research center—once the political and local squabbling ceases over just where its final site will be located.

Most of the prophets of doom who were so noisy not many weeks ago about the projected closing of such military installations as the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard at Kittery and arsenals at Springfield and Watertown are quiet now.

They have made their protests to the New England congressional delegation and received assurances that the politicians in Washington would see what they could do.

But the chances of any reversal are almost negligible.

Those protesting today are the same ones who told you that New England never would survive the blow of some 40 years ago when it became evident that a considerable part of New England's textile industry was moving South.

This area proved capable of adjusting itself then and attracted new industries and changed its pattern of economy.

The defense conversion and military cutbacks present a problem, but there is no question that these challenges cannot be met at all levels of the economy. And there is no reason that good planning should not be able to turn this problem into an opportunity.

The statement has been printed many times, but it cannot be emphasized often enough: that New England has scientific and technical skills unequaled in any other part of the country, and that it has a "labor market" the envy of other localities.

Here, small businessmen and those who work for them have the know-how, a term perhaps impossible to define, but something that is recognized all over the world. Nowhere is there a work force so highly and so individually trained. Nowhere are there educational institutions that can surpass Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Brandeis, Tufts or Northeastern.

The whole impact of the gradual change-over in the defense and disarmament fields is going to upset many areas in months to come. Nevertheless, if there is any self-evident fact, it is that New England will make as significant a contribution to a world that may well be gradually disarming as in

one where military defense necessarily occupies as large a role as it does now.

Take a single instance, one brought up the other day by Everett Ware Smith, president of the New England Council. It was that of Presque Isle, Maine.

Two or three years ago that northern Maine community lost its Snark missile base. Along with it, the community lost 275 civilian jobs and some 1,200 military personnel. Instead of collapsing, Presque Isle brought 200 new jobs into the area to replace those which were lost when the base closed. Everybody there got behind a drive to build Presque Isle into a bigger, stronger, and more vital area than ever before.

What this community did, others can do. And will.

Our Responsibility to the Aged

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HENRY HELSTOSKI

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, February 9, 1965

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Speaker, the subject of medical care and hospitalization for the aged has brought to my office, and I assume, to many offices a vast volume of mail. Most of the correspondence which I have received to date has been from my constituents, who expressed themselves in favor of a medicare plan which would alleviate their financial hardship in obtaining proper and adequate medical attention.

We all know that the elderly citizen does not possess the necessary funds to properly treat his ailments, which require immediate and full attention through qualified and trained personnel.

Among the many letters which I have received to date, there came a very timely and thought-provoking article which appeared in the Bergen Record of Saturday, January 30, 1965. Two of my constituents, Mr. Frank Uhl and Mr. Murray Ganhard, have directed my attention to the article, which I think should be brought to the attention of this honorable body.

Therefore, under leave to extend my remarks, I am including the article which I refer to above:

GOLDEN YEARS: AGED POINT OF MORAL ISSUE
(By Thomas Collins)

The Federal Government recently lent \$25,000 to a cooperative in Louisiana that was engaged in making fruitcakes. It was a 15-year loan, at 4 percent.

A 66-year-old retired man or woman who has cancer would like a little of that benevolence. They can't have it. If they could borrow \$25,000 they might be able to buy a cure. At least they could buy a softening of the pain and some comfort for the time remaining to them.

A couple of months ago a severe drought spread across the United States. Counties began appealing to the Federal Government for emergency help. The U.S. Agriculture Department came through, offering drought aid to 900 counties in about 27 States. Among other things, it offered livestock feed at cutrate prices to livestock raisers in 24 States.

The 66-year-old retired man or woman who is twisted with arthritis cannot get cutrate medicines, or doctors, or hospitals—or cutrate anything they need to save their lives and stop their hurting.

If you think this column is building up to an endorsement of Medicare you are wrong. If you think it is building toward the premise that our Government will do more for a fruitcake or a hungry hog than it will for a pensioner in pain, you are on firmer ground.

In the drought crisis, the Agriculture Department went further than cutrate livestock feed. It offered emergency loans to farmers in 928 counties to tide them over the crisis.

The 66-year-old retired man or woman cannot get from the Government an emergency loan to tide them over a heart attack.

Tornadoes, hurricanes, and such, usually bring forth greater benevolences than fruit cakes or hogs. A tornado can roar through the property of people in any region of the United States, lifting the roof, knocking down the fences, and upsetting the privy in the backyard * * * and amid the glorious publicity about it all that comes in the papers and on TV to the victims, and the tributes paid to their courage, they can get Government help to get back on their feet.

The 66-year-old retired man or woman lying in lonely courage at home with a bleeding stomach can get no help unless they can pay for it. They can declare themselves paupers and get some help. But the fruitcakes, the hogs, and the privy need no declaration of poverty—only people.

A farmer raising one of the major crops of the country can get from the Government an all-risk insurance policy that provides protection for his crops. A 66-year-old retired man or woman can't get the same thing for their health.

A city or town can get lots of money from the Small Business Administration of the Federal Government to develop their communities and get life moving again. The town puts up \$2; the Small Business Administration puts up \$8.

The 66-year-old retired man or woman, lying in a semi-invalid condition all across our country and yearning to get life moving again would like a little of that.

The things that are said here have not been designed to say it is right for the Federal Government to be giving away so much money for so many causes. Nor is it intended that they give the impression that the ailing old folks should get on the gravy train that is passing by.

Rather, these words seek to point up the fact that some of the human beings around us are not so important as voters, and not so important as economics.

This is one of the grave moral issues of our time. It is beyond the practical and the economic. It gets into the realm of our religious beliefs, and what kind of people are we. Politics, the medical profession, and health insurance companies shouldn't decide it—our moral concepts should.

Older people in this country are in urgent, painful need of better medical consideration than they are getting. Anybody who wants to dispute this will have to come up with something better than the 2,000 letters a month this column is getting from the people who do the suffering.

Supplemental Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture

SPEECH

OF

HON. PAUL H. TODD, JR.

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, February 8, 1965

Mr. TODD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the imposition of restrictions on our conference committee. This is

not a politically wise position for a new member from my district. However, both I and the distinguished Congressman whom I succeed, the Honorable August Johansen, were sent here to vote according to our own best judgment after the arguments had been properly heard. He did not, and I shall not, do otherwise.

We are about to decide whether we resolve today, before proper and thorough studies by this Congress, an issue which is in no way related to the urgency of the supplemental appropriation to the CCC. We vote on whether we abandon or continue a system of committee study which has assisted Congress to order thoughtfully its activities.

The advantages to be gained by yielding to our emotions are obvious. The responsibilities of this body lie elsewhere.

Let us properly hear the arguments on these two unrelated issues, soon but at another time, and decide them individually, and on their own merits.

Address by Mayor Robert F. Wagner

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. LEONARD FARBSTEIN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 26, 1965

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, it is my privilege to submit herewith the keynote address by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, of New York, at the Gracie Mansion Conference on Narcotics Addiction held on February 3, 1965.

The mayor has recognized this very serious problem and obviously is making every effort to cope with it. I am certain that under his expert and knowledgeable guidance great progress will be made to eradicate this scourge. I am particularly pleased to bring to the attention of this body the accomplishment of the city of New York in this connection.

The address follows:

KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY MAYOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AT GRACIE MANSION CONFERENCE ON NARCOTICS ADDICTION

I thank each and every one of you who have come here for this Gracie Mansion Conference on Narcotics Addiction.

I hasten to explain to the literal-minded from out of New York that the New York Hilton Hotel is not considered to be an extension of Gracie Mansion. We hope to have some of you at Gracie Mansion tomorrow.

Unfortunately, the limitations of space at Gracie Mansion are such that the entire conference could not be convened or contained there. Nevertheless, I hope that all of you attending this conference will feel that you are, indeed, meeting under the auspices of the highest level of the executive branch of the city government. That was my intention in convening the Gracie Mansion Conference on Narcotics Addiction.

At this point, I want to make a keynote statement for this conference. My hope and expectations are that from this conference will emerge signposts in the direction of new programs and modifications of existing ones; in addition, we will look for the outlines of a plan for greater collaboration and concert in the conduct of the massive effort required to deal with the narcotics problem, and even for a mechanism for fuller and freer exchange of information on new devel-