

on the subject. The majority leader has spoken on the subject. Other distinguished voices have been raised. But, somehow or other, it has not gotten over to the American people what the policy of this Government is with respect to Vietnam. Retaliation is not a policy.

The President made some general remarks yesterday. So did the Vice President. I would strongly urge that the President of the United States lay out before the American people what is the policy of the United States in a considered report to them, over television, over the radio, in the press, at a set time, announcing a set policy. If he did that and espoused the policy which he expressed—and the Senator from Florida, the majority leader, the minority leader, and other Senators feel as we do—he would obtain the overwhelming support of the American people.

Among the major questions the President should cover in outlining American policy are the following:

First, are the majority of the South Vietnamese people determined to fight for their country? Without that determination, we have no support for our position.

Second, do the South Vietnamese want us there? This is a very important question, for, again, our position is untenable unless our help is desired.

Third, are we trying adequately to obtain help from our allies—Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and others?

Fourth, are we willing to negotiate? Provided we do not sell out the South Vietnamese, we must show that we are willing to negotiate. Prime Minister Sato, of Japan, for example, who has suggested it, might well play a mediating role.

If the President stated the policy of the United States along the lines I have outlined, I think he would have the support of the American people. Rather than let the people divine what our policy is, the President could, and should, do something to resolve the doubts that exist, by setting out the bases and objectives of our actions.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the Senator. I do not agree entirely with everything he said, but I agree with him more than I disagree with him. What the President should do is a matter for the President himself to decide. He is the final authority for determining foreign policy. He must decide when the need is great enough. The Senator has said the people do not understand the President's position. I happen to be one of those who believe they do. The Gallup poll recently gave the percentage of people who approved of the policy being followed in South Vietnam. I think the percentage was 68 percent. I do not recall the figures exactly.

I agree that retaliation is no policy, but the President said, "We will go anywhere, and we will do anything, with honor and dignity, to improve that area and the world." There should be added to that statement the President's statement that we are going to retaliate whenever our troops are hit—and the President has extended that policy by saying

that whenever we are attacked in South Vietnam, we expect to retaliate with a limited effort, but it is going to be a tough one.

We do not wish to become involved in a war with Hanoi or with any other country. We are not trying to escalate the war, but we want them to see clearly that they are not going to get away with what they are doing; in the second place, if they do it, it is going to be expensive for them.

The President has said he is willing to talk with honorable people to try to solve these problems. It seems to me his policy is quite clear, but if the Senator from New York thinks it is not and that the President should go on television to explain his position, the Senator from New York is entitled to his judgment. It may be that the President will be convinced of what the Senator from New York has said and finally go on television and clarify the problem with respect to South Vietnam.

Mr. JAVITS. What I have in mind really is a white paper on the present situation, which will lay out the policy, without telegraphing any of its security aspects. I believe there are millions of people in this country who are in doubt about it. The President could clear up the policy for those millions. The feeling now is that one has to pick up the policy, divine it, by taking this Senator's statement or that Senator's statement, and say, "This is the position of the United States."

I think it is proper, coming from the Republican side of the aisle, to make this suggestion. I hope the President will do it, and do it promptly. I think it would do the country great good.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I desire to speak briefly on the subject of Vietnam. I am glad to state that I am in substantial agreement with the views expressed thus far today. There is an especially heartening aspect to what has been said, and that is the manifestation by Members of the Senate of a unified conviction that the course followed by the President was imperative and needed to maintain our honor and also to insure the security of the Nation.

During the war, I was mayor of Cleveland. For 1 year, I was Governor of Ohio. Up until the time Russia joined us as an ally, it was difficult to be mayor because there was a discordant note which came, I believed, from Communist sources, which resulted in the shutting down of important industries. The moment we were on the same side with Russia, that disturbing factor came to an end. From that point on, my problem of leadership was rather simple, because there was consolidated thinking on the part of the people and public officials, with only one objective in mind; namely, to save the Nation.

In the past 10 days or 2 weeks on the floor of the Senate, there has daily appeared a fusion of thinking—of courageous thinking—intended to follow a course which will make possible the future life of our country. There have been some notes not so sonorous, but on the whole with every hour that goes by, confirmation of the correctness of what the

President has done is beginning to appear.

I should like to speak briefly on one phase of the several subjects which have been mentioned in the Chamber today.

I have spoken on the question of pulling out of Vietnam. We cannot pull out of Vietnam without surrendering that whole area to our enemies. The moment we surrender it, instead of the first line of involvement being 8,000 to 10,000 miles away, it will be in Hawaii and on our continental shores.

I have also spoken on the subject of coalition governments. If examination of experience and history means anything, it means that out of history and experience we learn lessons concerning what to expect under given circumstances.

Coalition governments have been created. I therefore ask the question, What has been the experience of the free world with regard to coalition governments?

In the Foreign Relations Committee, I have asked the proponents of coalition governments to point out a single instance in which coalition governments have worked out in the end in conformity with the anticipation when the proposal was originally made for a coalition government. It cannot be pointed out.

The last disappointment was in Laos. In 1962, after suffering adversities in Laos, it was proposed that we create a coalition government. This was done with the neutralists in the middle, the rightists on the right, and the Communist on the left.

An agreement was drafted that when the compact was executed, all outside forces would depart—that is, the French, the United States, and the Communists. The points of departure were established so that observations could be made as to whether the parties were carrying their commitment into execution.

Two years and more have now passed by. The French are out. The United States is out. The Communists are still in.

Our gravest problem in South Vietnam comes from the fact that Laos is being used as the point of entry into South Vietnam. On that basis, 2 years ago, we negotiated. We sat down in good faith. We asserted that we wished Laos to control its own government, that Red China was to stay out, that the United States would stay out, and that Russia was to stay out. But we have had the same experience in Laos that we have had in 52 out of the last 53 important agreements that we made with the Communists. In every instance the agreements were broken.

I come now to the proposal of negotiation now. What are we going to negotiate? Are we going to negotiate a pull-out of the United States? Are we going to negotiate the establishment of a neutral government in South Vietnam? Let us take a look at what happened in what was once French Indochina.

In 1954, the Geneva accord was executed. My recollection is that 14 nations were signatories to that accord. The French pulled out, except for small num-

bers of troops merely to maintain peace and security within. French Indochina was fragmented into North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

General Eisenhower was President at that time. It was anticipated in the world that with the Geneva Accord, all would become tranquil in the Far East. The ink was not even dry on the Geneva Accord when the Communists began their pushbutton, riot-producing operations, their infiltration, and subversion into South Vietnam.

The Geneva Accord still exists. It provides for the tranquility of that area.

Therefore, my query is, "Under present conditions, what shall we negotiate?"

The Geneva Accord exists. All we have to do is abide by it. If North Vietnam will discontinue its attacks upon South Vietnam, its infiltration and subversion, its pushbutton, riot-producing operations, peace will prevail in South Vietnam.

But, obviously, Red China is not content with having peace maintained in that area. They wish disorder. They wish to communize the area. Someone may argue, "Let us give them South Vietnam."

That poses a question: What then? Will that be the end of the problem? Or, will the Communists proceed to move on into Thailand, into Malaysia, into the Philippines, into West and East Guinea, and finally look toward Australia?

Mr. President, at this point let me remind Senators that they are looking toward our shores, although we do not recognize it. There is more involved than mere conquest of southeast Asian territory.

If one could feel confident that by pulling out, by negotiating, by creating a neutral government, we would end our troubles, we would all say, "Amen, let us do it." But if we look to the past, we find, instead of acquiring a position of strength and freedom from losses of body and property and honor, through retreat our problem will become greater in the future than it is now.

There may come a time when North Vietnam will say, "We will quit the infiltration." The moment they say that, all our troubles will be ended.

I did not intend to speak at this length, but I am of the belief that it is necessary to let the American people know the gravity of the problem that faces them.

I take no exception to what has been said by the Senator from Idaho and my other colleagues in the Senate in advocating a different course of action. They are doing it in the sincere belief that that is the right course to take.

I wish also to say that Chamberlain at Munich, Chamberlain with respect to the Ruhr, and Chamberlain with respect to Mussolini, gave in, thinking that peace would be assured by giving in. The price for giving in became so great that we now realize that it would have been much better to stand our ground at the very beginning than to continue to surrender.

I would be less than frank, and I would be violative of my oath of office, when I said I would defend the Constitution of

the United States and fulfill my duties to the best of my ability, if I did not take this position, which, to say the least, is a difficult one. I commend Senators on both sides of the aisle for the fearlessness with which they are standing up and asserting that our country's future is at stake, and that we cannot become weak, and thus allow ourselves to be engulfed by an enemy that is intent upon destroying us.

ADDRESS BY THE NATIONAL COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN LEGION AT COLUMBUS, NEBR.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, on February 14 I was invited to speak briefly to the American Legion in Nebraska, at their midwinter meeting, held in Columbus, Nebr. This was because of my interest in the veterans' hospital situation in Lincoln, Nebr. On that occasion, the national commander, Mr. Donald E. Johnson, of the American Legion, made an address. I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY DONALD E. JOHNSON

Commander Keriakedes, National Executive Committeeman Galbraith, Alternate National Executive Committeeman Lowry, distinguished guests, ladies of the auxiliary, my fellow legionnaires, ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted to be back in the great Department of Nebraska, a next door neighbor to my home Department of Iowa.

It is with much pleasure that I note the progress of Nebraska's 1965 American Legion membership enrollment which, at the beginning of this month showed you were slightly ahead of the pace of a year ago. I am further pleased to report that at the national level we were running about 50,000 members ahead of that same time a year ago, and that our two millionth 1965 membership was recorded a full week earlier than a year ago.

Let's keep up the good work. We need every eligible veteran who will join ranks with us in what may well prove to be the most historic battle the American Legion has waged since that which led to the passage of the GI bill of rights.

I refer, of course, to the fight to have the Veterans' Administration rescind its infamous order of January 13 which calls for the closing of 31 VA installations including 16 regional offices, 11 hospitals, and 4 domiciliaries.

The American Legion was in this battle from the very outset. I was, in fact, en route to Washington for briefings by the Veterans' Administration at the very moment this news was prematurely released. Your National Rehabilitation Commission Chairman, Bob McCurdy, also was on his way to Washington for those meetings.

This was good, for we were able to map our strategy quickly and to put our plan of action into effect almost immediately.

Our first move was to conduct a news conference in the Washington offices the very next morning, at which time I issued a strong statement of protest on behalf of the American Legion, and called upon the Veterans' Administration to reconsider its order.

The following Monday, January 18, we arranged for conference telephone calls with all department headquarters, calling for a total mobilization of the effort and resources of the American Legion to prevent any diminution of services by the Veterans' Administration.

That call was followed up the next day by written memorandum to all national officers and department commanders and adjutants, outlining the action to be taken by departments, posts, and individual legionnaires. Such action includes the registering of your protests, in writing, to Members of your congressional delegation, to Senator YARBOROUGH, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs; to Representative OLIN TEAGUE, chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs; to William E. Driver, Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, and to President Johnson.

Further, we have asked that department service officers and rehabilitation chairmen furnish us with examples of the hardships that will be worked on individual veterans as the result of proposed closings and consolidations of VA installations.

In the meantime, all this material is being given total internal distribution through the media of our own communications such as American Legion News Service, the adjutant's letter, and all other contacts which national headquarters has with posts and departments.

Also, I plan to carry this message personally into every department which I will visit while the issue still is in doubt, and believe me it is far from settled right now.

On January 28, I was privileged to present American Legion testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs, and I came away with the impression that our position has the sympathetic (and in many instances very enthusiastic) support of a goodly number of our most influential and highly respected lawmakers.

The text of my testimony was made the subject of a special rehabilitation bulletin which, with a covering memorandum from me, again was mailed to national officers and to department commanders and adjutants, and was summarized in American Legion News Service.

On February 2, I sent a telegram to every Member of the U.S. Senate urging their support of an amendment offered by Senator KARL MUNDT to House Joint Resolution 234. This amendment, in effect, prohibits the Veterans' Administration from using any funds to implement its proposed closings.

The following day, by standing vote, the Senate approved that amendment. Now the war is not won, but I'm delighted to report to you that the action by the Senate constitutes a major victory for our cause. Since a standing vote is not recorded, we do not know precisely who voted in our favor, but to all those who did, the American Legion expresses its sincere appreciation and thanks.

Several States are reporting that their State legislatures have adopted resolutions in opposition to the closings proposed by the VA. The Department of Pennsylvania sent a 50-member delegation to Washington to confer with the Keystone State's congressional delegation. Twenty-four of Pennsylvania's 27 Congressmen attended the session and at the conclusion of the meeting they went on record with a resolution protesting the closing of the Wilkes-Barre regional office.

At this moment, I am tremendously encouraged with the progress of this battle, but we haven't won it yet and I shall continue to call upon all legionnaires everywhere to keep up the good fight until the final decision is in.

Don't ever discount, or underestimate, the value of individual effort in a campaign such as which we now are engaged. Every letter, every personal contact, and every bit of factual evidence which we can produce to prove just how wrong the Veterans' Administration and the Bureau of the Budget are will be helpful to our cause.

The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs is scheduled to open hearings on this matter on February 18, which is 2 days later than

lican leader, and all the other participants. That, in itself, is a display of the wisdom of the Senate and its high sense of national responsibility.

And yet, if that were all, it would not be enough. The President does not seek and we want no Pavlovian unity in this Nation. We do not crush, in the name of unity and in the fashion of Peiping, the 100 flowers as soon as they begin to bloom. We seek the unity of genuine national understanding, reached by reason freely pursued and sensibly expressed. And so the debate did not stop with deeply felt expressions of unity in support of the President nor should it have stopped there.

The Senate, majority and minority, has more to contribute than assurance of support for the President, and the Nation requires more of the Senate. The Senate has the experience, the knowledge, and the courage to look ahead—to consider paths which lie beyond the point of any immediate decision in foreign relations. Let no one doubt the importance of such a consideration. The Senate has the duty to ask itself, even as the people of the Nation ask themselves: "Where do we go from here?" And it has the duty to set forth its best thoughts, its most constructive and penetrating wisdom in a public consideration of the response to that question.

So it has been in this debate. So it was when the joint Republican leadership not only concurred in the President's recent decisions with respect to military action in North Vietnam but did not stop there. The Republican joint leadership went beyond that and suggested, in effect, that this military action should be expanded and that negotiations should be shunned at this time. The Republican leadership was looking ahead. It was not telling the President to enlarge and intensify the American involvement in the conflict in so many words. It was, in effect, saying merely that this course should be considered. It was entirely proper for the Republican leadership to urge the President to consider taking that course, even as to many of its leaders have for so long advocated. So far as I am aware, the only major exception to this advocated course for many years has been former President Eisenhower, who first rejected it in 1954.

The able Senators from Idaho and South Dakota, no less than the Republicans, were also performing a basic service in their statements on Vietnam. They left no doubt as to their support of the President's military decisions to date, with respect to North Vietnam but they also argued that we should not hesitate to explore the path of negotiation which might lead to a prompt end to the bloodshed in Indochina and, at the same time, preserve an opportunity for that region to remain outside the suffocating military embrace of Peiping. They were not telling the President to negotiate but were saying, in effect, that this course should be seriously considered. It was entirely proper for that suggestion to be made, supported as it was by a most cogent, restrained, and penetrating discussion. In both the approach of the

minority leader and that of the two able Democratic Senators who participated in the debate there was but a single common desire—to provide advice which might serve the President and the Nation and so facilitate an intelligent subsequent consent to whatever course the President, in his primary responsibility, might find it necessary to pursue in the days and weeks ahead.

Out of that kind of discussion, feared only by those who fear to think, I am convinced will come great assistance to the President in the discharge of his primary responsibilities with respect to policy on Vietnam. Out of that kind of discussion will come a most useful illumination for the people of the United States as to the course which offers the best assurance for safeguarding of the genuine interests of the nation in the region of southeast Asia.

So I commend once again the participants in this debate—all of the participants. They have performed, all of them, a most helpful service which reflects great credit upon the Senate of the United States.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, it is more than 20 years since the distinguished majority leader and I first became acquainted in the House of Representatives. He quickly gained for himself a reputation as a hard, indefatigable worker, a man of deep conviction, a man of resolute courage, who spoke that conviction no matter how unpopular or unpleasant it might be. All of those attributes have not only remained with him through the years; they have become intensified.

At the joint leadership meetings we have had with the President of the United States, the senior Senator from Montana has always spoken his piece, even if there were some gathered around the table who did no concur or who did not like it.

I have nothing but admiration for his courage, his patriotism, and his spirit of unity of purpose—that spirit that, when the chips are down and all the alternatives and substitutes have been examined, we march in a solid phalanx. That he has always done.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank my distinguished friend for his most gracious remarks.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I join the distinguished minority leader in congratulating the distinguished majority leader on the statement he has just concluded. No greater patriot is to be found anywhere than the distinguished senior Senator from Montana. Certainly there is no man who deals with complex subjects with a deeper understanding or a greater objectivity than he. I associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Illinois with respect to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, President Johnson is being deluged from all sides—newspaper articles, reporters and columnists, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the Halls of Congress—with recommenda-

tions as to the course this Nation should pursue in southeast Asia. These recommendations are pouring into the White House and onto the President's desk, where he, and he alone, as Commander in Chief must make the final decisions.

Many loyal and dedicated leaders have come to diametrically opposite conclusions as to the approach that the President should take. No one can, or would want to, impugn the motivations or the patriotism of those citizens, irrespective of the conclusions they advance.

The February 22, 1965, issue of Newsweek magazine outlines four alternatives that America might take. The article suggested that outright withdrawal "would be a devastating blow to U.S. prestige, which would probably result in eventual Chinese domination in the entire mainland of southeast Asia and loss of U.S. influence in the Philippines and Japan."

I agree with that conclusion. Obviously, if we should take any position that indicates that we have been forced into total withdrawal, it would be a great detriment not only to the nations around the globe to whom we are now committed, but also to ourselves. We would accomplish nothing except to encourage Communists in other areas of the world to step up their pressure against us, if they thought they might force us to withdraw.

Second, the article suggests that it should be noted that continued concentration on the guerrilla war in South Vietnam has not worked very well.

Again, I should have to agree with that statement, because it is obvious that the plan that has been in operation for the past year has not been particularly successful. We hope, however, that it will do better.

Third, the article states that an all-out assault on North Vietnam "raises the possibility of Red Chinese intervention." Such intervention might perhaps consist of as many as 30 divisions. These are possibilities which might require the President to make a momentous decision at any time.

The article continues:

Washington officialdom argues that such intervention is unlikely and that the United States and its allies could handle it if it occurred, but the kind of casualties that would inevitably accompany a major land war in Asia would almost certainly raise a public outcry in the United States for the use of nuclear weapons—which would make the danger of nuclear war between the United States and Russia acute.

Obviously, that is a fact. If it were to develop that the Red Chinese decided to move into this area with their troops, I cannot help but feel that the President and his advisers would have to decide how far they would go, including the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in order to stop the movement of Red Chinese troops into South Vietnam.

The final alternative, according to the article, is just enough escalation to bring North Vietnam to the conference table. The article states:

The hope here would be to achieve a negotiated settlement which would somehow insure that the United States, North Viet-

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nam, Red China, and Russia kept hands off South Vietnam.

It would seem to me from last week's events that clearly this is the course which we are now actually pursuing; seeking to make it clear to the Chinese and North Vietnamese that this is an expensive operation for them and that it will not be easy, that we will not be thrown out, that we will not be driven out, but that we will live up to our commitment. When they have a complete understanding that it will not be easy, but will be very costly to them, it would seem that we would then be in a much better position to talk about some kind of negotiation.

It would obviously appear that they would be much more anxious to negotiate with us under those conditions, if we first demonstrate to them that we shall live up to our commitments, and second that it would be horribly expensive for them to continue the action which they now pursue. Then we would not be negotiating from a position of weakness and our chances for a settlement favorable to us would certainly have improved tremendously.

Mr. President, each of these alternatives has time and time again been suggested to President Johnson. In making his decisions, he has wisely sought the counsel of former President Eisenhower, and, while he lived, he obtained the advice and recommendations of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who cautioned against this Nation's ever being involved in a major land war on the Asian Continent.

As President Truman put it a few days ago, and I am paraphrasing his remarks, "I have complete confidence in the day-to-day decisions being made by our Commander in Chief." By virtue of his position, he is better informed on the situation in South Vietnam than any other man in America.

I cannot help but feel the same way about it. I am encouraged by the knowledge that more than three decades of experience enters into his decision-making processes. This experience includes that which he gained, when he was a Senator, in serving as chairman of the Military Preparedness Subcommittee.

As we all know, President Johnson is now giving to this particular problem all of his talents, all of his energy, and all of his thinking in determining the best course for the United States of America to pursue in the southeast Asian crisis.

I fully concur with the statement once made by Sir Winston Churchill:

We don't increase our own security by throwing little nations to the wolves.

We did not do this in Greece or in Turkey. We did not do this in the Middle East. Assuredly, we did not do it when we adopted the Marshall plan to indicate our commitment to Western Europe. We did not do it in Korea, when it became painfully expensive to stay there. We have not done it in Africa. I believe and I hope that we shall not do it in southeast Asia.

The cause of our own freedom and the cause of peace cannot be served by negotiating from a position of weakness.

To do so would be to compromise the freedom of the South Vietnamese and the freedom of the entire subcontinent of southeast Asia.

I have heard it stated recently by those who would seem to know best, that the South Vietnamese have not fought better than they might have, up to this point, partly because of their concern that we would eventually negotiate away their freedom, that we would suddenly withdraw, and that the South Vietnamese people would then be left, helpless and hopeless, in the face of the onrushing hordes of Communists from North Vietnam and Red China. Up to this point, the South Vietnamese have not been totally convinced that we were going to stay there.

In recent weeks, they have been more encouraged to stand up and fight because of the very strong retaliatory measures which the President directed our military to take in response to Vietcong attacks on our forces at Pleiku.

Some critics have indicated that President Johnson has not indicated with sufficient clarity the willingness of this country to go to every reasonable length in seeking a peace with honor and justice. It seems to me that the proper response to this criticism is that America today has more military power at her disposal than any nation or any combination of nations on the face of the earth. America's restraint, in the face of this overwhelming military advantage, should convince friend and foe alike that the United States seeks no expanded war. We seek no domination. We seek nothing for ourselves but the assurance that the South Vietnamese people, to whom we have made a commitment, will be left alone, free from Communist tyranny, to pursue their own destiny in their own manner.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, what the Senator means by saying that we do not seek these things is that what we do seek is greater opportunity for our own security and for that of a peaceful world. That is what we are working for, and that is why we want to help our administration determine at the present time when to confer and what to do in order to reach that end.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his statement. That seems to be exactly what we are endeavoring to do.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I hope the Senator will yield when he is through.

Mr. SMATHERS. I shall be happy to do so.

President Johnson has not rested his case on our obvious military restraint. He has made it abundantly clear to anyone who would listen, including the Soviet Foreign Minister in personal conversations, that the United States seeks no broader war but, on the contrary, stands ready to cooperate in peaceful efforts at any time.

He has said that he would go anywhere, at any time, and talk with anyone about the prospects for peace, with justice and honor.

Thus far, however, in the southeast Asian crisis, the Vietcong, the Hanoi regime, the Communist Chinese, and Soviet Russia have demonstrated, not the usefulness, but the futility of conducting another Geneva-like conference at the present time. The United States did not start the aggressions in Vietnam. Short of capitulation, we cannot dictate when they will stop.

We can, however, pursue every possible alternative to convince the Vietcong of the expense and the futility of their present course. And this we are doing.

The United States became embroiled in South Vietnam in 1954. As has just been stated, the policy was established at that time by the then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, subscribed to by the very able President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and reaffirmed by the very able President John F. Kennedy. It has once again been reaffirmed by President Lyndon Baines Johnson. It is still in effect.

Thus far, President Johnson has acted decisively in responding to the Communist attacks on our troops in South Vietnam.

I am sure that no one is more anxious to see this problem settled peacefully, with honor, and justice, than is the President of the United States. Surely we would all like to settle this problem. Perhaps we can. But, Mr. President, we can only do that when we have convinced the Communists that they will have to pay very dearly if they continue to act as they have been acting, and that we do not intend to be forced out nor compromised out of South Vietnam.

We shall live up to our commitments there and elsewhere around the globe. We shall and we must continue though it will cost us a good deal of energy and effort, and even the precious lives of American men. Much is asked for, much is at stake. I am one who has a particular concern about this matter, because my own son happens to be on a destroyer operating at this particular time in the Gulf of Tonkin.

President Johnson will, I feel, consider a negotiated settlement when that course will assure America's vital interests in southeast Asia and promote the true cause of peace.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. First, I should like to compliment the Senator from Florida on his excellent statement.

The responsibility of the Senate is particularly heavy. The Senator from Florida spoke about his son. I think I speak for every Senator when I say that we would rather be out there than be voting or talking about this matter. It is easy to say there have to be casualties. The question is, When and where?

I agree with the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Florida that it is a calculated risk when the Chinese Communists are over there and we are over there.

Much as I admire my colleague, I think I would not merely say "amen" to what he has said, but I have a practical suggestion. The minority leader has spoken

neighbors. We foresee a day when this border will unite more than it divides.

As Speaker Sam Rayburn often said, "The way to have a friend is to be a friend." We hope that we can be worthy of that admonition.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

DECEPTIVE METHODS OF PACKAGING OR LABELING OF CERTAIN CONSUMER COMMODITIES

Mr. HART. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HARRIS in the chair). The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. HART. I have consulted with the distinguished minority leader, in order that the schedule which is burdened today may be eased. I ask unanimous consent that consideration of the reference of Senate 985 which is now on the table, and which by an earlier agreement was to be considered today, be deferred until tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Michigan asking that the bill lie on the table for another day?

Mr. HART. The Chair is correct—through today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the bill will lie on the table for another day.

Mr. HART. It is understood that the bill may be called up tomorrow.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois will state it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yesterday, as I understand, the Pastore ruling with respect to germaneness was waived, and I therefore assume that it still stands as of today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The so-called gold bill, as I understand it, is also the pending order of business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask for recognition to make a few remarks about a subject on which there was a good deal of discussion in the Senate yesterday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, it was a strange experience to listen to the senior Senator from Idaho and the junior Senator from South Dakota in this Chamber yesterday.

I confess that I listened with mixed emotions.

I was confused because I thought, as I listened, that the calendar—showing 1965—was in error. For as I heard their high hopes of doing business with the cruel and evil aggressors, it seemed that we must be back in 1954. That was the year of the hopeful, but alas, unrealistic negotiations with the Communists for the peaceful division of North and South Vietnam.

Or perhaps we were back in 1962 when a peaceful settlement was once again sought—this time in Laos—with the Red aggressors. We negotiated. We acted in good faith. The Communists took our good faith for weakness, and free men ever since have been paying the price in blood for our naivete.

But then I realized it was February 17 of 1965. As I translated, as best I could, the Senators' words into thoughts, I realized that our Nation was being urged to conduct another experiment to determine if the Communists have stopped lying and will now, like good men, keep their promises.

Mr. President, you know, and I know, that the Communists will not do any such thing.

I say to my distinguished colleagues who are advocating negotiation: Before you try to entice freemen back into the Red bear trap of negotiation, tell the aggressors to show some evidence of good faith. This they can do by simply complying with their Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.

But, again, you and I know that the Communists will not do this. They would have to give up the dividends of their deceit. They want more of those kinds of profits. They want them the same way—by negotiation.

Another round of negotiations like 1954 and 1962 and we shall find ourselves negotiated right out of Asia and right into a really big war.

If we do not man the ramparts of freedom on our outer defense line from Korea to South Vietnam, we shall inevitably be facing the enemy on the inner line from Alaska to Hawaii.

And I was sad, too, as I listened to their strategic appraisal of our position in southeast Asia. They spoke at different times, but it was more like a chorus—a chorus of despair sung to the tune of a dirge of defeat. I was truly sad to hear, in this Chamber, which echoes with the courageous words of brave men now gone, the opinion that we cannot win, that in effect we must break our word to the South Vietnamese. Who, then, Mr. President, will ever again accept our word?

All this is nothing but an unnecessary confession of defeat. However such proposals for negotiation under pressure may be explained or camouflaged by intricate rationals, it is simply a proposal to run up the white flag before the world

and start running away from communism. Of course, we will eventually have no more room to run.

I was also glad when I heard those speeches of despair yesterday in this Chamber. I was glad that they were made here—now—at this time—that they were not made to the freezing Continentals at Valley Forge—to John Paul Jones on the leaky *Bon Homme Richard*—to our embattled GI's at Bastogne—or to our Marines at the Chosen Reservoir.

I suspect that the urgings of the "you-can't-win" exponents would have been viewed less tolerantly than now.

And now, Mr. President, I would like to address my remarks to a few of the strategic conceptions expressed in the course of yesterday's debate.

In the course of his remarks the Senator from South Dakota told this Senate that Japan, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand "plus the Russians and our European allies have an interest in joining with us to stabilize southeast Asia."

This is really adding fable to myth. Russia. Does not the Senator know of Mr. Kosygin and his recent travels; his conferences with Mao in Peiping; his consultations in North Korea; his stay in Hanoi; his promises of military assistance to the North Vietnamese aggressors; the delivery, already, of some of those weapons; his arrogant denunciations of the United States; and Russia's demands for our withdrawal from southeast Asia?

Anyone who believes that the Kremlin will join with us to bring peace and freedom to southeast Asia can also, it appears, believe that Communists do not lie.

The senior Senator from Idaho has, also, made some interesting but puzzling statements. For instance, he proposes an "international agreement for the neutralization of the whole region that used to be French Indochina." Now, if that is what he wants there is no need for new negotiations. All that is needed is for the Communist aggressors to back up and live up to their agreements of 1954 and 1962.

The only thing to negotiate in a new conference would be how much the Reds could keep of what they have gained by breaking their previous agreements. And that will not settle anything.

His suggestion that the United States pledge "our armed might" in defense of Asian governments against Chinese attack raises an interesting point. Would such a pledge apply only to what the Senator terms "overt" attacks? If so, it is meaningless in view of the Communist preference for subversive "wars of liberation." But, if it does include indirect and subversive aggression, then the Senator is really proposing that we start moving not only into South Vietnam, but also into Thailand because Red China has called for the overthrow of that pro-American government and has already begun a propaganda, subversion and guerrilla campaign against the Thais. And Laos, too, is under Red attack. And

to the south, Malaysia is fighting off Sukarno, who is openly supported by Peiping and Moscow.

Thus, if it is proposed that we pledge to defend our friends in southeast Asia against aggression by subversion and infiltration—which are the typical Communist tactics—then, according to the Senator, we should be moving U.S. forces into most of southeast Asia right now. But, at the same time, the Senator is proposing we negotiate ourselves out of South Vietnam.

This is, it seems, a strategy of moving in all directions at the same time. It might confuse the enemy, but it would certainly confuse everyone on our side from Joint Chiefs of Staff to the humblest squad leader.

In all seriousness, Mr. President, there are some fundamentals that have been sidestepped in all this impassioned pleading for us to default on our promise to South Vietnam.

There is some vague idea that what is going on in South Vietnam can be neatly separated from the rest of the Communist aggression throughout the vast southeast Asian peninsula. This is strategic nonsense. South Vietnam's struggle against communism is inseparably linked with the other Communist-caused conflicts in the area.

If we let South Vietnam go, another giant step in the march of communism will be taken, and the remaining nations of the southeast Asian peninsula will be in ever-deepening danger.

Without South Vietnam where do we make a stand? In Thailand? Or do we defend Singapore? Would we let that great base, controlling the water corridor between the Pacific and Indian Oceans fall to Communist aggression?

To negotiate in South Vietnam while Communist aggression is spreading throughout the entire southeast Asian peninsula is like a man trying to paint his front porch while his house is on fire.

Mr. President, our Nation has taken a stand in South Vietnam. Three Presidents have faithfully stood by that pledge. It is not a partisan political issue. It is one of principle, of our good faith, and one, most certainly, of our own national security.

As I hear these claims that we cannot win, that we have got to negotiate—make a deal so we can get out of South Vietnam—I am grieved, but not surprised. This is not the first time our spirit has been tested in crisis.

Thomas Paine said it well, in 1776:

These are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I commend the Senator from Illinois, the minority leader, for the remarks he has made. It seems to me very clear that we must go to any conference table from a position of

strength rather than weakness. If we go to a conference table now, it will not be construed that we are acting from a position of strength.

Our boys are being killed. Our boys are being wounded. We cannot take that lying down. We must retaliate. As long as our boys in uniform in South Vietnam are doing their part, we must live up to our part at home.

As the distinguished Senator from Illinois has stated, if the Russians, the Chinese, or any other nation in that part of the world on the Communist side agrees to confer at the present time, they will do so because they feel that they can gain something from the negotiations, perhaps more territory or increased influence throughout the world.

The argument has been made that the United Nations can keep the peace in that part of the world. We have seen what has happened in instances in which we have asked the United Nations to join with us in keeping the peace in other sections of the world. No other nation joins with us in the endeavor.

The French, the Communists, and other nations—and I do not put the French in the same class as I do the Communists—do not join in the attempt to keep the peace. We know that we must get an affirmative vote on the part of the Security Council to obtain the support of the United Nations. That is impossible at the present moment.

If we yield at the present time and confer on South Vietnam, as the Senator from Illinois has so well said, our relations in many other areas of the world—not only in Vietnam, and Indonesia, but also in Japan, Korea, even Germany, the Congo and other parts of Africa—will be affected.

We have all of those things to consider. We must consider the course to pursue on the basis of what would occur in other places in the world as well as what would occur in South Vietnam.

The important point is that we should not confer unless we can confer from strength rather than weakness, and we must retaliate if our boys are killed and wounded. That means something to every one of us in one way or another. I commend the Senator for what he has said.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I appreciate the concurrence of my distinguished friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I commend the able Senator from Illinois for the statements which he has made. I commend him for the position which he has taken. I cannot help but believe that he is correct in what he has said. I cannot help but believe that, as much as we would like to negotiate an honorable peace and as much as we would like to get out of South Vietnam, we find that there is no cause to believe that there can be a fair negotiation, but on the contrary negotiating at this time would amount to a complete surrender of South Vietnam and the final giving away of Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia, comprising roughly 1.5 billion people in that important area. I hope, in a few moments, to make a brief statement along the same

line that the Senator has just taken. I commend him and associate myself with him. I hope that other Senators will do the same thing.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I had not intended to speak at this time because I thought that the distinguished Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] and the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE] were to engage in a colloquy with the distinguished minority leader. But I feel I should make a few remarks on the subject under discussion, and I think it is well that the subject is being discussed in the Senate.

As Senators know, I was not in the Chamber yesterday to hear the statement of the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and his brilliant subsequent colloquies with the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. MCGEE]. Nor was I present for the statement of the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN]. However, I have had an opportunity to familiarize myself with what transpired from the Record. I have also acquainted myself with the statement on yesterday of the Republican leadership with regard to Vietnam and have just listened to the statement of the distinguished minority leader on this question.

I want to say to the Senators who have participated, by these various means, in the debate on the Vietnamese question that they have made an outstanding contribution, a necessary contribution, a contribution in keeping with the best traditions of the Senate. They have raised and discussed with lucidity and discernment, and with knowledge and discretion this most serious problem.

What impresses most in these proceedings is the patriotic unity, irrespective of party, which is revealed in them. I say to the distinguished minority leader that, as always, he has displayed his great Americanism, his dedication to country far beyond dedication to party in his prompt support of the recent and most difficult decisions which the President has had to make with respect to Vietnam. It is what the Nation has come to expect from the minority leader when complex questions of the national well-being are involved. While he ought never to be taken for granted, and he never is, it is, nevertheless, a profound reassurance to know that the great Senator from Illinois can be counted on to put the best interests of the Nation first in any critical situation.

I think this debate on Vietnam, Mr. President, has been of profound significance if for no other reason than that every participant accepted an identical starting point—support for the President in a critical international situation. There is no doubt and no other government can have any reason to doubt that we stand together when the chips are down. The recognition of the President's paramount and immensely difficult responsibilities has been immediate and automatic, by all concerned. That his hand is upheld by all was made clear by the Senator from Idaho, the Senator from South Dakota, the Repub-

at the time of Dunkirk or that President Truman enter into negotiations with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter. Such negotiations could only have terminated in total surrender.

I do not think the position of the free world is as desperate now as it was at the time of Dunkirk or Pusan. And I am also confident that if we show the same will to persevere that Britain displayed at the time of Dunkirk and that we ourselves displayed at the time of Pusan, and if we refuse to listen to the counsels of despair, a time will ultimately arrive when we shall be able to negotiate in honor.

In addition, I feel compelled to comment on another statement made by the senior Senator from Idaho—a statement which is not only completely contrary to the facts but which I consider most unfortunate in terms of its impact on American interests in Africa.

The Senator is apparently strongly opposed to the modest assistance which we are now giving the legitimate government of the Congo to help them resist the pro-Communist rebels who have been operating with open foreign backing.

Despite the massive evidence that the rebellion has been organized and masterminded by the Chinese Communists, despite the long party line record of Christophe Ghenye, the rebel leader, despite the evidence that he has been receiving funds from Communist sources, the Senator prefers to believe that the rebel movement is not really Communist inspired, but basically African nationalist.

Also, despite the large quantities of Chinese and Soviet arms which have been captured by the government and put on display, the Senator tells us that the rebel source of supply—Algeria and Egypt—"would seem African enough."

The senior Senator from Idaho also deprecates our association with Tshombe. He says:

What matters is how the Africans see him. And African animosity toward Tshombe is so intense that he is even barred from associating with other African leaders, having been physically excluded from their meetings. To them, he is the African equivalent of an "Uncle Tom," a puppet of the imperialists who uses white mercenaries to subdue his own countrymen. I doubt that Tshombe will even win African acceptance. Our involvement with him serves only to turn the tide of African opinion increasingly against us.

I know there has been a good deal of propaganda about Tshombe being unacceptable to other Africans. This propaganda, however, was always grossly exaggerated. In the U.N. debate, for example, the representative of Nigeria made an impassioned defense of Tshombe. By itself, this should have been enough to demolish the charge that Tshombe is unacceptable to Africans, because, populationwise, Nigeria and the Congo together constitute the better part of Black Africa.

Conclusive proof of the untruthfulness of this accusation was given on February 12, when 13 French-speaking African states, meeting in Mauritania, called for pan-African support for Tshombe's government. The 13 African

chiefs of state said that they "energetically condemn the action of certain countries, notably Ghana, which harbor agents of subversion and organized training camps on their territory."

In addition to the support of the French-speaking countries, Tshombe can count on the support of Nigeria and Liberia, while Morocco, Tunisia, and Ethiopia are certainly not unfriendly. As of this moment, in short, Tshombe has the acceptance or support of a majority of the African nations.

America will not long survive as a free nation if we permit the rest of the world to go Communist. Our own national security demands that we draw the line against Communist expansion—in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe. It demands that we give assistance, as we have done ever since the Truman doctrine, to all those nations, large and small, who are fighting to protect their independence against Communist subversion and aggression.

It would be a terrible blow to the entire free world and to our security if the Communists were ever to take over the whole of Africa. And this is precisely what would happen if they succeeded in bringing the Congo under their control. The United States is supporting the government of Prime Minister Tshombe because it is now generally realized that Tshombe may well be the only Congolese who has the combination of qualities necessary to save his country.

As Senators will recall, the senior Senator from Idaho and I had some sharp differences over the question of the Congo at the time of the U.N. military action in Katanga. It was always my regret that when he and several other Senators visited the Congo in the fall of 1960, for the purpose of ascertaining the facts, they did not take the time to visit Elizabethville and to meet with Prime Minister Tshombe. I feel that the unfortunate prejudice which he still displays against Prime Minister Tshombe stems in large part from this lack of personal contact. In the absence of such contact, the Senator from Idaho inevitably believed some of the propaganda directed against Tshombe during this period by the three most formidable propaganda machines in the world—the Communist apparatus, our own apparatus, and the U.N. apparatus.

I hope that my friend, the senior Senator from Idaho, will consent to reconsider his position in the light of the facts I have here presented and of the present situation in Africa. I know that many people in the State Department, who at one time shared the Senator's personal prejudices against Tshombe, have completely revised their estimate of him as a result of their experience with Tshombe since he became Prime Minister.

And I would like to express the further hope that when Prime Minister Tshombe visits this country, as he is no doubt bound to do at some future date, the senior Senator from Idaho will meet him with an open mind and a willingness to reassess his position. I am sure that his views will be drastically altered.

I thank the Senator from Florida for his kindness in yielding to permit me to make this statement.

Mr. HOLLAND. I was happy to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.

I yield now briefly to the Senator from Texas.

Holloman
FE STRATEGY IN A STRAITJACKET

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a most powerful editorial from the February issue of Navy magazine.

The editorial is entitled "Strategy in a Straitjacket" and poses some provocative questions about our southeast Asian policies. It points out that the American habit of landlubber thinking has operated to restrict utilization of the seapower available to United States and South Vietnamese forces.

The editorial suggests several ways in which our seapower potential in the area can be effectively used to influence the crucial guerrilla battle on the land. I commend to the Senate this constructive criticism of our Vietnam operations.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STRATEGY IN A STRAITJACKET

A British Army sergeant, in Singapore for the defense of Malaysia, was interviewed recently by an American reporter. The talk soon turned to the agonizing war in South Vietnam and the Tommy put a question of his own:

"Why in the devil don't you use that mighty 7th Fleet of yours?"

The question is exceedingly pertinent and we can only hope that it is being asked in the highest councils of the Pentagon and White House. To be sure, some units of the fleet have been and are involved to a limited degree in the war. There are reconnaissance flights by carrier-based planes and snooping by our submarines. Destroyers have fired at menacing enemy torpedo boats and occasionally they keep tabs on the flow of sea traffic into and out of North Vietnam.

WE CAN DO MORE

But the full potential of the fleet, even under the limitations imposed by current American policy, is not being employed. Our forces are under orders not to risk expansion of the war by attacking North Vietnam, that "privileged sanctuary" which has been the arsenal, training station, and mastermind of the Communist Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. We will not argue the sense of this restriction here, except to say that one day—hopefully—we will realize that the war in Vietnam is our war.

What we are talking about and what the Tommy meant, of course, is the U.S. Navy's ability to influence the land battle. South Vietnam has a long coastline, and the Communist guerrillas control a substantial portion of it. Also, there are many miles of rivers in the country. We are not taking full advantage of these facts.

Why isn't the enemy continually harassed from the sea and inland rivers?

Why can't the fleet and its aircraft strike at targets within the borders of our South Vietnamese ally if American planes can bomb North Vietnamese installations in Laos?

Why aren't we giving our South Vietnamese allies more "on-the-job training" in carrying out surprise seabased raids against enemy supply depots, communications centers, and other targets?

Why haven't we organized a really adequate river force for offensive operations? Why aren't we increasing the production of new gunboats which have been designed for this type warfare?

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Why don't we step up our efforts to intercept Vietcong infiltrators and supplies being moved by coastal craft?

The failure to exploit our seapower—directly or in conjunction with the South Vietnamese—is a probable result of the national habit of landlubber thinking. It was not surprising that a British army sergeant asked why we were not using the 7th Fleet. The British, an island people, have always had an appreciation of the capabilities of seapower. Such a question could hardly have come from an American Army non-com—or four-star general, for that matter. Unfortunately, we continue to accept a discredited theory, advanced, ironically, by a British geographer—Sir Halford Mackinder. In sort of jingle form, it goes like this:

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the World Island commands the World."

Mackinder's theory was most recently upset in Korea when an amphibious landing at Inchon, spearheaded by the Marines, reversed the entire course of the war, the Korean Army having been, for all intents and purposes, crushed. Just as it made South Korea closer to the United States than to Communist China in the early 1950's, American seapower today makes Saigon closer to Washington than to Peiping.

But despite the Inchon demonstration that the maritime nations can control the rimlands and thus contain the heartland powers, the Mackinder theory still generates fear-myths which have placed us in a strategy straitjacket. One is that we must never again fight a land war in Asia lest we be swallowed up by China's limitless hordes. This together with our repeated pledge that we will not use nuclear weapons in Asia unless they are first used against us has severely restricted our flexibility. We must do nothing to risk escalating the war in Vietnam because it might bring the Chinese in. The enemy, of course, exploits this fear and thus is able to keep the initiative.

U.S. CHANGES NEEDED

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and now American Ambassador to Saigon, has been the master military strategist behind our Vietnam policy since late 1961. He has worked tirelessly, and with the best intentions, under extraordinarily difficult conditions. Nevertheless, the hard fact of the matter is that the war has been going badly and, after 18 months of coups and semi-coups, political instability in Saigon has never been greater. Despite huge increases in military and economic aid (now \$700 million a year) and in the number of American advisers (22,000) on duty there, victory seems further away than ever.

The late President Kennedy told President Ngo Dinh Diem about 60 days before the latter was deposed and murdered that it was time for "changes in policy and perhaps in personnel" by the South Vietnamese Government. But what was needed then and is desperately needed now is a change in U.S. "policy and perhaps in personnel." While it may not be his fault, Taylor does not have the confidence of the top leaders of two of the most powerful elements in Vietnam, the armed forces and the Buddhist activists. His land-oriented military strategy has not produced victory—in fact, the guerrillas control more than half the country and are stronger than ever. It is time for the voices of seapower to be heard—and heeded. The Navy and Marine Corps have the capabilities to make a more significant contribution in Vietnam—today, and under the restrictive ground rules that prevail.

It is one thing to shout "patience" when we are holding our own. But when the handwriting on the wall reads "defeat," virtue lies in impatience. During the early, bitter days of World War II, a poignant ex-

pression—"Too little and too late"—told why the battles and countries were being lost. We hope that it will not be our epitaph in South Vietnam.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Florida for yielding.

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield?

Mr. HOLLAND. I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.

JACK FOXE

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, during our congressional recess, there passed on, suddenly, a young man who held no public office, but had earned the prominence of a beloved public figure ready at the call of every pageant and public celebration that added to our Washington scene.

Jack Foxe was no stranger "on the Hill." He was the friend and faithful ally of many of us. He made his profession of the theater a respected image in our Capital; and he brought to us, in person, the people of the world of "make believe," and made them our friends.

He boasted no personal fortune; he had no patronage to bestow; but upon his untimely death the press of our city was moved to honest praise that could be the envy of the mightiest.

I truly believe that such a man is a vital part of our history. Those of us who knew him were the better for the knowing; and all of us can be inspired by a recital of the sincere estimates of Jack Foxe, who was so fittingly eulogized by Father Gilbert Hartke, O.P., of Catholic University, as "husband—father—friend."

To this end, I ask unanimous consent that the tributes by James O'Neill, Jr., as published in the Washington News; by Richard L. Coe, as published in the Washington Post; and by Harry MacArthur, as published in the Washington Evening Star, be printed at this point in the Record, in connection with my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Daily News of Feb. 15, 1965]

A GREAT LOSS: JACK FOXE WILL BE SORELY MISSED IN WASHINGTON
(By James O'Neill, Jr.)

When one of the great ones goes there is not the simple ache in the heart which one would feel for a lesser being.

There is, rather, a dreadful, frightening void, a lack of something, and your own life the more vacant.

Jack Foxe died. He was a man I loved. And all who knew him loved him.

He was a true professional, and this is the very top of the ladder.

He had no peers.

He was honest; he was so loyal you could set your watch by him; and he wore a smile on his heart, for he knew better than most of us that all flesh is heir to fault and many men are little men.

PRESS AGENT

Jack Foxe was a movie man. He was a press agent. You can dress that word up and call him a publicity man or an advertising expert, or whatever label you care to give.

But he was a press agent, the finest press agent who ever had to put up with actors, critics and film company executives.

He died of a heart attack, at Bowie race track, on Saturday.

Jack Foxe loved four things above all others. His lovely wife, Violet, and his pretty 15-year-old daughter, Patti Gene, first of all. Then came the film industry. His friends, and they were legion, moved up close to movies in his affections.

And then the races. Jack Foxe was not only the finest press agent I will ever know, he was the finest handicapper who ever read the Morning Telegraph.

SCHOLARSHIP

At 51, and born in New York's Hell's Kitchen, Jack Foxe had carved his own niche in the world. He went to Townsend Harris High School in New York on a highly competitive scholarship.

But an affection for show business overtook him and on graduation he came to Baltimore to usher in a theater.

He moved rapidly up the ladder and managed theaters in Springfield, Mass., and here.

Under the guidance of the late Carter Barron, Jack Foxe became a power in Loew's Theaters and with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer.

He became Metro's and Loew's "man in Washington," and so much so that when the divorcee parted the two companies he was spirited to New York to work solely in the Metro vineyard. A spate of this was enough and Jack came back to Washington a few years ago.

There has been no fete, festa, festival, or civic uproar in which he did not participate.

A member of the National Press Club, he was constantly laboring in behalf of its members to provide the finest in entertainment and sound counsel.

No cherry blossom festival, inauguration, parade or hooraw for dignitaries, from Castro and Khrushchev to Presidents of the United States, was complete without the fine hand of Jack Foxe, the Flack De Luxe.

This was his professional side.

HUMOR

There was another. It was the quiet, gentle, understanding man, with a grand temper to be loosed on miscreants, and a huge sense of humor, and of the ridiculous. Nobody ever fooled him. No one ever dared lie to him.

He was vastly admired by his competitors and there is not a newspaperman in Washington who did not care for this wonderful, considerate, generous, capable, outgoing human being.

I have known Jack Foxe for 15 years and he was my friend. You can count friends on the fingers of one hand. He was my thumb.

There is much more to tell, but it is personal and will rest with me.

I shall miss him fishing on the bay, or at Redskins' games or over a poker table, but his gay smile and unconquerable spirit will be with me always.

The film industry is poorer for his death, and so am I.

[From the Washington Post]

ONE ON THE AISLE: JACK FOXE

(By Richard L. Coe)

In a field notorious for brass knuckles, rhinoceros skins, and jangled nerves, Jack Foxe was conspicuously a gentleman.

Associated for over 30 years with Loew's and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 51-year-old Jack Foxe, whose funeral will be held today, viewed the wide, tricky field of public relations not as a day-to-day job but as a long-range profession. His approach to his work could serve as a guide to all of those in it.

He was, for instance, no space grabber but a space saver.

His rule was that if he didn't believe in the value of a story or personality, he didn't push

he did not study the whole matter thoroughly.

The American Walnut Manufacturers Association requested that the USDC include the export of veneer in the coverage of the order. It was not included and the wood used in the manufacture of walnut veneer for export accounted for 1.8 million board feet of walnut which was charged to domestic use. During the conversion period, an estimated 1 million board feet was lost because of the thicker cuttings. Also, the USDC is using the base period of January 1, 1964–December 31, 1964, for these figures although the first 45 days was not covered by the order. Consideration of all of these factors would indicate that the domestic use was less than 10-percent over the target, a most commendable record for the first year of a totally voluntary program.

The Secretary states further:

Furthermore, it should be noted that the prices our domestic users pay for walnut logs have continued to advance during the past year, notwithstanding the reduction of export market opportunities by reason of the controls. Thus, control of walnut log exports has not operated as an effective domestic price control measure, even if such a purpose were a justifiable objective.

Mr. President, the Export Control Act, which my colleague quoted, specifies that the purpose of the Export Control Act has as one of its legitimate ends stopping the inflationary impact.

I ask unanimous consent to have this specific order printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the order was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[50 App. U.S.C.]

§ 2022. CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF POLICY.

"The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to use export controls to the extent necessary (a) to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign demands; (b) to further the foreign policy of the United States and to aid in fulfilling its international responsibilities; and (c) to exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint of their significance to the national security. (Feb. 26, 1949, c. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7.)

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, it is unfortunate that the Secretary of Commerce should question this existing goal, when Congress specified in black and white that this was the goal. The industry reports that the inflationary spiral of the price of logs did continue in 1964 but was much diminished from prior years. The increase in price was about 10 percent or less, compared to annual rates of inflation as high as 50 percent in the years just prior to the order.

The Secretary continued:

In conservation terms, the results of the first year of controls are quite disappointing. Domestic log consumption has exceeded the 15-million-board-foot target by at least 4.5 million board feet. The excess of consumption over growth, instead of being 6 million board feet as originally allowed for the first year of controls, is more than 10 million board feet, or approximately two-thirds more than the total amount of new growth.

The results are disappointing, but they are a significant improvement over the

previous years and over projected cutting for the year, if there had been no controls in effect. This projection showed possible cuttings of 40 million board feet compared to growth of 16 million board feet.

The Secretary continued:

The situation does not seem to involve the possible extinction of the walnut resource. On the contrary, walnut trees are constantly being planted and constantly maturing. Demand is for the moment exceeding new growth, but market factors will undoubtedly bring about a balance, ultimately, between consumption and growth.

This is nonsense. When we cut more than we grow, we eventually run out. The maturity rate is now beginning to reflect conservation practices begun in the early 1900's. The cutting of 14-inch minimum diameter trees means cutting trees 50 to 80 years old.

The Secretary continued:

Among the important factors which could help to reduce domestic log consumption, for example, are not only price shifts, but shifts in consumer preferences (of which there is already some evidence) and increasing use of substitute materials.

The only common and practical substitute for black walnut is in logs from Africa; a type of mahogany grown there. Worldwide consumer acceptance of walnut is continuing and no sharp decline is expected.

The Secretary continued:

There might be strong reason to prefer Government controls to the free play of market forces if undue hardship would otherwise result for a significant segment of our economy. But in the walnut log situation I do not anticipate that the veneer cutters and users, and their employees, will experience great difficulty in shifting to the use of other woods, should that become necessary or desirable. As a matter of fact, many of them are already using other woods, and I am informed that a further shift has already begun in some degree.

The shift to other woods would be simple, except that there is no domestic product to shift to. In other words, a shift in wood would be a shift to an imported raw material.

The Secretary continues:

Even if technical difficulties were to develop in making the transition to use of other woods, it would seem preferable to try to ease these transition difficulties rather than continue export controls.

The only explanation of this paragraph seems to be that the Secretary seems to favor ARA or Appalachia projects to recover industries, rather than export controls to protect them.

The Secretary continues:

For, while the controls may benefit log cutters and users, they also work to the detriment of the log growers and log exporters by restricting their marketing opportunities.

There is no short-run benefit to domestic cutters and users, since they are affected by the domestic use quotas in the short run. They have to cut too. There is no detriment in marketing opportunities since the demand exceeds growth even with the controls. The log exporters have been disappointed in the program mainly because the USDC has allowed the foreign buyers to take up most of the export quota. American ex-

port firms were bypassed. However, Americans exporters still had more exports in all year—except 1963.

The Secretary continues:

Reduced export markets have had much of their adverse impact in the Appalachian region. This region, for reasons well known, is particularly in need of expanded, not restricted, market opportunities for its products.

The walnut cut in Appalachia is negligible—5 percent. Most of the walnut grows in six Central States far from Appalachia.

The Secretary continues:

Moreover, controls on the export of walnut logs are clearly detrimental to our balance-of-payments position, in that they reduce to some extent the dollar value of exports from the United States. While the amount involved may seem to be comparatively small in the context of the entire balance-of-payments deficit, it should not be ignored because of the cumulative effect of all gains, small as well as large.

Since extinction of walnut logs would result in total importation of replacement woods, the long-range effect of uncontrolled export would be disastrous to the balance-of-payments position. The amount of export dollars lost by the control is estimated to be \$10 million.

Also, the export of logs and veneer decreases the opportunity for the domestic walnut furniture producers, since it provides their foreign competitors with the resources needed to compete effectively. The export of furniture is highly desirable compared to the export of raw logs. The effect of the export of a piece of furniture compared to that of a log is that there is represented in the furniture approximately 60 times the value of the wood needed to produce the veneer in it.

The Secretary concludes:

The President in his recent message to Congress emphasized the national concern with regard to the balance-of-payments deficit. He has called upon all of private industry, large and small, to join in a cooperative effort to make management decisions which will increase exports and aid in reducing our unfavorable balance of payments.

For all these reasons, I have decided not to extend controls on export of walnut logs beyond the period of 1 year which was originally announced. Therefore, controls on export of walnut logs will not be in effect on and after February 14, 1965.

JOHN T. CONNOR,
Secretary of Commerce.

FEBRUARY 12, 1965.

Mr. President, let me make one observation. My colleague refers to the Secretary's message and about the Secretary's request that when we run out of walnut that will be too bad, that we will have to shift to some other wood. Study has disclosed that about the best substitute that can be found would be African mahogany. I believe that the large quantities of African mahogany, and the Philippine woods—to which my colleague has alluded—coming into this country to replace black walnut, would certainly shift the Secretary's balance of payments completely out of the water, because we would be importing those woods into this country, which would have a detrimental effect, so far as I can see.

VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, the charges of the minority leader, made earlier in the day, that my address yesterday was in effect, a proposal to "run up the white flag" in South Vietnam and a repudiation of our pledge to the Saigon government, are not only contrary to the facts, but contribute nothing to a rational discussion of the problem.

The minority leader is a fine patriot, but no better patriot than any other Member of this body. It serves no useful purpose to question the fervor, the devotion to country or, least of all, the courage of those of us who believe that the dilemma of southeast Asia must find a political, rather than a military solution.

Having stated my own views at some length yesterday, I do not intend to reiterate them today. Neither do I believe that it is necessary to call for an extension of the war in Vietnam as proof of one's support for the President.

Lyndon B. Johnson has repeatedly stated that he wishes no widening of the war in Asia. I support him in that position.

The military initiative we have recently undertaken in the form of retaliatory bombings of North Vietnam should, in my judgment, be accompanied by a diplomatic initiative defining the prerequisites for a satisfactory political settlement in southeast Asia.

I have closely reviewed the debate today. But, as history shall bear witness, nothing was said to compare, in accuracy of assessment, to the brilliant summation of Walter Lippmann, entitled "The Vietnam Debate," published in this morning's edition of the Washington Post. I could do no better than to read the Lippmann article for the RECORD:

We are just seeing another attempt to form a government in Saigon, and much depends, for the near future at least, on whether it is able to hold together for a decent time. For the reason why the situation in Vietnam has become so critical in the past 3 months is that South Vietnam has been crumbling and is at the point of collapse. The Vietcong have been so near winning the war and forcing the United States to withdraw its troops that Hanoi and Peiping have brushed off feelers for a negotiated peace. They believe themselves to be in sight of a dictated peace.

We, for our part, have found ourselves quite unable to put together a South Vietnamese Government which is willing or able to rally enough popular support to hold back the advancing Vietcong. The American Army fighting the Vietcong has been like men trying to drive away a swarm of mosquitoes with baseball bats. However, because there is nothing else to do, we keep on. We do not wish to face the disagreeable fact that the rebels are winning the civil war.

The easy way to avoid the truth is to persuade ourselves that this is not really a civil war but is in fact essentially an invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. This has produced the argument that the way to stabilize South Vietnam is to wage war against North Vietnam.

The more thoughtless and reckless members of this school of thinking hold that only by attacking North Vietnam with heavy and sustained bombardment can we snatch a victory in South Vietnam from the jaws of defeat. They have not yet carried the day in Washington. But the President, when he

ordered the retaliatory raids, no doubt intended to remind Hanoi and Peiping that that the United States could, if it chose to, inflict devastating damage.

Apart from the question of the morality and the gigantic risks of escalating the war, there is no sufficient reason to think that the northern Communists can be bombed into submission. We must not forget that North Vietnam has a large army—larger, it is said, than any other army on the east Asian mainland except China's. This North Vietnamese Army can walk, and nobody has yet found a way of bombing that can prevent foot soldiers from walking.

It is most likely that if we set out to devastate Hanoi and North Vietnam, this army would invade South Vietnam. In South Vietnam we could not bomb the army because that would mean that we would be killing our South Vietnamese friends. There is little reason to think that the Saigon Government and its very dubious troops would be able to fight back, or in fact that it would want to fight back.

The Asian Communists fight on the land, and they think about war in terms of infantry. I believe that the reason why they are not terrified, nor much deterred, by our kind of military power is that they believe a war on the mainland will be fought on the ground and will be decided on the ground. There they have not only superior numbers but widespread popular support.

For this country to involve itself in such a war in Asia would be an act of supreme folly. While the warhawks would rejoice when it began, the people would weep before it ended. There is no tolerable alternative except a negotiated truce, and the real problem is not whether we should negotiate but whether we can.

It is not certain, given the weakness and confusion in South Vietnam, that Hanoi and Peiping, who are poised for the kill, will agree to a cease-fire and a conference and a negotiation. But while this has, I believe, been the implied objective of our policy, the time has come when it should be the avowed objective, an objective pursued with all our many and very considerable diplomatic resources.

Mr. President, I share Walter Lippmann's misgivings as to whether Hanoi or Peiping may be willing to negotiate on any basis acceptable to the United States. But I see nothing to be lost in finding out.

As for any warhawk cries from the other side of the aisle, they leave me unimpressed. I remember Korea. I recall the enthusiastic bipartisan support given Truman's decision to enter that war. But when the casualty lists began to grow, when the fighting would not stop, when the going got tough, I also remember how quickly Korea became "Mr. Truman's war," and how the Republicans made it their principal campaign issue in 1952. I have not forgotten the Republican advertisements, featuring pictures of the horrors of the Korean war, castigating the Democratic Party as the "war party," and praising the GOP as the party of peace. And I remember Dwight Eisenhower's dramatic pledge to "go to Korea" to arrange a truce with the Communists.

Before we go down that road again, I should like to be certain there is no better alternative.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I was very proud, yesterday afternoon, to stand with the Senator from Idaho in the most thoughtful and courageous contribution that he made to our thinking on the crisis in Vietnam.

I am happy to join him this evening, very briefly, in a reply to the remarks that were made earlier today on the floor of the Senate by the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN].

Mr. President, yesterday on the Senate floor, I made clear my position on the Vietnam crisis. I said first of all that I approved of President Johnson's restraint in the handling of that crisis. I said secondly that the retaliatory air strikes which he ordered when our forces were attacked could be justified. I said thirdly that I was against American withdrawal from Vietnam unless we could achieve a satisfactory settlement by negotiation.

I suggested that while pursuing our military support of the Vietnamese Government, we also explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement to end the war in southeast Asia. If such efforts to reach a settlement fail, we would, of course, continue the military effort.

That position was heavily supported by the American people in a Gallup poll published on January 31 which showed that 81 percent of the American people favor an international conference to explore the possibilities of a negotiated settlement. My mail coming from South Dakota and elsewhere supports the same position by a ratio of 15 to 1.

It was thus with dismay that I read on the news ticker that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] regards this as "a proposal to run up the white flag before the world and start running away from communism." He implied that efforts to reach a settlement in Vietnam would lead to the collapse of American power all the way to Alaska and Hawaii.

Now, Mr. President, in all due respects to the very able distinguished minority leader, I regard his remarks today as good oratory and bad logic. I have never advocated running up a white flag and I do not advocate it now. I know something about war as a combat pilot in World War II. But I do not believe that every problem in the world can be solved by bigger wars or even by waving the American flag on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

In 1952 the Senator from Illinois supported the presidential candidacy of General Eisenhower who campaigned on a pledge to go to Korea and end the fighting. He won the election. He negotiated a settlement. He won widespread support for his efforts. It was not surrender to explore the possibility of a cease-fire and a settlement in Korea, and it is not now surrender to explore the possibility of such a settlement in Vietnam. It is, in fact, the statesmanship and diplomacy of reasonable men.

By the way, Mr. President, some of the people who are now urging President Johnson to accelerate the war in Vietnam were going up and down the country attacking President Truman for continuing the war in Korea more than a decade ago. They scornfully referred to it as "Truman's war" and cried out against the casualties in political speeches to the American people.

The Senator from Illinois deplors the fact that Senator Church and I spoke "in this chamber which echoes with the courageous words of brave men now

gone." Now, Mr. President, there are still brave men in the Senate, and the Senator from Illinois isn't the only one. It doesn't require any particular bravery to stand on the floor of the Senate and urge our boys in Vietnam to fight harder, and if this war mushrooms into a major conflict and a hundred thousand Americans are killed, it won't be U.S. Senators who die. It will be American soldiers who are too young to qualify for the U.S. Senate.

It does not even require very much bravery to stand on the Senate floor and say that one agrees 100 percent with the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. It is just possible that it required more courage for the Senator from Idaho to lead off this debate than for the Senator from Illinois to try to squelch it. I don't intend to be squelched by innuendoes that it is somehow un-American to try to settle by conference what we have been unable to settle on the battlefield in 11 years of fighting, in the expenditure of \$4 billion of American resources, and in the loss of several hundred of the cream of our American fighting forces.

Finally, Mr. President, the Senator from Illinois suggests that if we negotiate a settlement in South Vietnam, American military power will collapse all the way to Alaska and Hawaii. What nonsense. America's real military power in the Pacific will remain where it has always been—in our naval and air power right along the coasts of Asia. That is a power capable of utterly devastating China and indeed all of Asia. Indeed, if we can become disentangled from the inconclusive and costly jungle war in southeast Asia, we will be in a better position to use our power flexibly and wisely than we are today.

In short, Mr. President, we have everything to gain from exploring the possibilities of an end to the fighting in southeast Asia, and nothing to lose.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the remarks which have just been made by the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from South Dakota will make the speech that I had intended to make so much shorter.

Mr. President, I have waited to hear the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] because I was away from Washington with the official Senate delegation to the Mexican Interparliamentary Conference yesterday when each of them made his speech of great statesmanship on the Vietnam problem. This afternoon I read their speeches in the RECORD. I have waited until this opportunity to extend my congratulations and high commendation to them.

For well over a year the senior Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] and the senior Senator from Oregon have made speech after speech—sometimes three to five times a week—here in the Senate urging repetitively the major thesis of the speeches made yesterday by the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from South Dakota. In recent months both of those two great Senators, the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr.

McGOVERN] have indicated in public comments and in writings that they, too, are of the opinion that we cannot justify making war in southeast Asia outside the framework of international law, which has been our sad course of action.

After reading the speeches of the Senator from Idaho and the Senator from South Dakota and hearing them today, I have decided to forego the pleasure of breaking bread with the President at a White House buffet reception, and to perform what I consider to be a much greater service by speaking briefly to the RECORD tonight in opposition to the President's policies in Asia.

This afternoon the ticker carried a statement of the majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] to the effect that those who yesterday in the Senate spoke in favor of seeking a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Asia do not disagree with the present policy of the President in southeast Asia.

I wish my majority leader to know that I completely repudiate the policy of the President of the United States in southeast Asia. I wish the RECORD to show, and I wish my majority leader to know, that I completely disagree with the policies the President of the United States has come to follow in southeast Asia due, in my judgment, largely to the prolonged, over-the-months representations made to him by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, the Ambassador in South Vietnam, Mr. Taylor, the Deputy Ambassador, Mr. Alexis Johnson, the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, the Bundy's in the State Department and the White House, and those others who have been bent on escalating a war in Asia for well over a year.

The time has come for the American people to hold this administration to an accounting for the course of action that it has been following in southeast Asia. The senior Senator from Oregon is satisfied that the Pentagon and certain people in the State Department have been determined for a long time to involve the United States in a war in Asia.

Mr. President, I should like to say, "Keep your eyes on their acts of provocation, for they have not, in my judgment, given up their intentions to provoke more and more until finally they can have an alibi and an excuse for bombing the nuclear installations of Red China."

If they succeed in that nefarious program, the big show is on, and the world will then be involved in a nuclear war. Let those on the Republican side who talk about running up a white flag make all the insinuations and innuendoes they wish in seeking to reflect upon the patriotism of those of us who believe that the United States ought to keep faith with its ideals and return to the framework of international law. But let those Republicans who are now talking about white flags not forget that we are in South Vietnam today because of a horrendous mistake in 1954 by Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State.

Let the country know that what we are doing today, so far as American policy is concerned, is paying the price of a shock-

ing policy of hypocrisy and, in my judgment, deception practiced upon the American people by John Foster Dulles, both in his London Conference with Winston Churchill and with Anthony Eden, and also in his conduct at the Geneva Conference in 1954, from which he withdrew when he realized that the parties to that conference were not going to follow American orders.

He could not keep France in the war. He was determined to keep that war in Indochina going. When the nations participating in the Geneva Conference in 1954 refused to continue that war and entered into an agreement dividing Indochina into its four parts—Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Cambodia—John Foster Dulles picked up his satchel and walked out, leaving Bedell Smith as an observer.

The United States under the leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to sign the accords.

I hope that yesterday the President of the United States, at his conference with the former President of the United States, suggested that Eisenhower go to South Vietnam and observe for himself the price in American money and blood that this Republic is paying for his colossal mistake of 1954.

I am not surprised that the Republicans are rallying around the Republican banner. But I should like to say to them and to the President of the United States that millions of Americans are rallying tonight around the American flag demanding that this administration stop its warmaking policies in southeast Asia before we find ourselves in a massive and colossal war.

In speech after speech the senior Senator from Oregon has been warning of this danger on the floor of the Senate for well over a year. I have said we are on our way to a war in southeast Asia. We are in it. It is undeclared war.

That leads me to my next point. I repudiate the policies of the President of the United States in southeast Asia because in my judgment, under the Constitution, he cannot commit acts of war in North Vietnam and elsewhere in southeast Asia without a declaration of war, and there has been no declaration of war. Under our constitutional system the Commander in Chief may reply immediately in the defense of our country until a declaration of war can be acted upon. The President of the United States has no constitutional authority to proceed to lead this Nation into a war. That is exactly what the President of the United States is doing in these dark hours of the Nation's history.

Mr. President, we have become the international pawnbroker for the shoddy foreign policies of the two dying colonial powers of the world. We are spending billions of dollars of the American taxpayers' money and killing an unjustifiably increasing number of American soldiers to try to hold in check in Asia the military and colonial tyranny of our European colonial allies. We are betraying the history of our country and the future of peace and freedom.

When those of us are making a plea that we return to our treaty obligations

and that we lay before the signatories to those treaties their duty to join in seeking to work out an honorable negotiated settlement, either through the Geneva accords or through the United Nations Charter, we are urging a patriotic course of action that our Republic ought to follow.

I should like to say to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN], "Do not be concerned about the abuse and the attacks you will receive from the superpatriots, who seem to think that the only way to be patriotic is to advocate war."

Mr. President, I cannot reconcile that concept of patriotism with true patriotism.

I have just returned from Mexico. If we continue to follow the course of action that we are now following in southeast Asia, we shall lose the friendship and the respect of an overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world.

It was a sad experience for me, during the past 2 days in Mexico, to take note of the 24-hour security protection around the beautiful American Embassy in Mexico City by Mexican riot squads, each soldier armed with tear gas guns, and other personnel standing by to make use of other weapons to protect the Embassy, if that became necessary. Why was it necessary? Because they had heard that there was underway, a few days ago, a plan to attack the Embassy.

I pay my high respects and thanks to the Government of Mexico for doing what some other governments elsewhere in the world should have done—taking the necessary security precautions to protect our Embassy and to protect American property.

But this is symbolic. We will find throughout Latin America a growing uneasiness about American participation in war in southeast Asia. It was discussed again at our conference. I reported on the floor of the Senate some weeks ago that our State Department advised our ambassadors in some Latin American countries to call on the heads of state and ask for at least some token support for South Vietnam—some manpower, if they could supply it; if not, some doctors and nurses; and if they could not send human beings, to send, at least, some materiel.

The reports I have received are that that attempt to involve those countries in the war in southeast Asia is deeply resented—and it should be.

In my judgment, we do not have much time to return to the framework of international law. I will take the opinion of Walter Lippmann, as read by the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] tonight, over and above the opinions of Senators who have been speaking in the Senate, urging a further escalating of the war, because I am satisfied that a further escalating of the war will lead to massive world conflict. If the President of the United States follows that course, instead of becoming one of the greatest Presidents of our history he will go out of office the most discredited President in our history, because the American people will hold to an accounting any administration that leads us unnecessarily

into war. The President of the United States and his advisers are tonight leading the country into an increasing danger of massive war in Asia. It will not be stopped until the American people make perfectly clear to the administration that they want no more of these violations of international law.

As the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] brought out a few moments ago, there has been some comment, false analogy, and non sequitur argument in some of the speeches made by those who support a further escalating of the war, to the effect that the present situation is somewhat comparable to the situations that existed at the time of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war.

We must not overlook the fact that Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam were brought into being by a negotiated treaty. South Vietnam, along with the United States, did not sign the Geneva accords of 1954. In my judgment, since South Vietnam did not sign the Geneva accords of 1954, the United States cannot possibly justify supporting the conduct of the dictator in the civil war in South Vietnam on the ground that all we are seeking to do is to enforce the Geneva accords of 1954, which we did not even sign.

Let us return to the conference table and find out, as the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] suggested a few moments ago, whether there is any hope of trying to reach a negotiated settlement through the Geneva Accords. Like him, I have grave doubts now. We have gone too far; and the chief responsibility for having gone too far lies with the United States, for our conduct makes it most difficult to assume that we can persuade the parties to the Geneva conference of 1954 to meet again and work out a negotiated settlement. But we ought to try. As I have said so many times in so many of my speeches, we cannot escape our responsibilities under the United Nations Charter.

But it is said that the United Nations Charter is fast becoming a weak reed. If it is, I say again that the chief responsibility for that lies with our own country, for no nation in the world is guilty on the record of history of undercutting the underpinnings of the United Nations more than the United States, since we started to follow our illegal course of action in South Vietnam. We have a clear duty under the United Nations Charter to take violations of the Geneva Accords, violations of North Vietnam, Laos, and even Red China, and, on occasions, Cambodia and South Vietnam, too, to the United Nations for determination; but that we have refused to do. By not doing so, we have become an aggressor nation.

I wish to make one more point before I close this subject. The American people are not being told the facts about American policy in South Vietnam. The American people are being told what the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House want to tell them, and nothing more. That is not in keeping with the responsibility of Government officials toward the democratic system. That is the way uncontrolled executive power builds up to replace the checks

that the people are entitled to have exercised under our system of democratic government. So, in my judgment, our best hope is to go to the United Nations, although it will now take some rebuilding even of the procedures of the United Nations to get this matter into a jurisdictional position so that the United Nations can act.

So long as there is hope in this great crisis to produce peace the voice of the senior Senator from Oregon will be raised in support of such a peaceful approach.

Let me say to those who prefer blood to peace that I am satisfied that when history records the analysis and the appraisal of this debate, we who try to lead our country to the keeping of faith with its professed ideal that we believe in the substitution of the rule of law for a unilateral military action, which is but the rule of the jungle, will be judged by history as the ones who really followed a patriotic course in trying to protect mankind and prevent it from destroying itself in a nuclear war.

I am at a loss to understand how anyone in the Pentagon, the State Department, or the White House can think we can continue to commit attacks in southeast Asia without a declaration of war, driving Russia back into the arms of Red China. Russia cannot possibly hold any position of influence in the Communist segment of the world if she does not take the steps necessary to keep her treaty commitments to both Red China and North Vietnam, and come to their defense when they are attacked.

Mr. President, it makes me sad to find it necessary to criticize my Government in a matter such as this. But I have my trust, too. And the trust that I owe under my oath, taken at that desk, to uphold the Constitution, when I came to this body four different times over the past 20 years that I have served here, is to protest the course of action of my President when I think that course of action is not in the interest of my country.

I happen to think that the course of action that the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, and their advisers, are following in southeast Asia today is a course of action that, if it is not stopped, will lead the world into a massive war.

Mr. President, under my discussion on the Vietnamese problem I should like to add this paragraph.

I am exceedingly pleased that increasing numbers of American clergymen are beginning to recognize their responsibilities of spiritual leadership in regard to the shocking morality of American foreign policies in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks on South Vietnam a sermon preached in Washington, D.C. two or three Sundays ago by the Reverend James Clark Brown, of the Cleveland Park United Church of Christ—Congregational, Washington, D.C. This sermon is entitled "The Concern Christians Have About Vietnam."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MORSE. I would particularly recommend that Dean Sayre of the Episcopal Cathedral in Washington read this sermon.

This gentleman of the cloth, who could not make up his mind as to who he was going to vote for in the last campaign because he thought neither candidate was deserving, has apparently decided that the war in Vietnam is a good thing, despite the great issue of morality which is involved in the unjustifiable slaughter of human beings, all of whom—Christians, Jews, Communists no matter what their religion, faith, or nationality—happen also to be the children of God.

I am glad that we have the Reverend James Clark Brown and an increasing number of clergymen in this country who are beginning in increasing numbers to raise their voices in a plea for Christian leadership, for the application of the principles of Christian leadership in connection with the warmaking policies in South Vietnam.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following this sermon there be printed in the RECORD an article published in the Buffalo Evening News for Saturday, January 30, 1965, entitled, "The United States Does Not Know How To Fight 'Invisible' Foe in Vietnam—We're 'Own Worst Enemy'," written by Hugh Campbell.

There being no objection, the sermon and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EXHIBIT 1

THE CONCERN CHRISTIANS HAVE ABOUT
VIETNAM

(A sermon preached by the Reverend James Clark Brown, the Cleveland Park United Church of Christ (congregational) Washington, D.C.)

"Henceforth, in the future, be made strong in the Lord and in the power which His supreme might imparts. Put on the armour of God, so as to be able to stand firm against all the stratagems of the devil * * * Stand therefore, first fastening on the best of truth; putting on the breastplate of righteousness; let the shoes on your feet be the gospel of peace, to give you firm footing; and with all these, take up the great shield of faith, with which you will be able to quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one."—From St. Paul's letter to the Ephesians, chapter 6: 10-11; 14-16.

The New Testament is repeatedly concerned with comparing the Christian life to that of a loyal soldier. Surely it need not be said that such a comparison has no reference to killing, or preparation for destruction, but rather to the fact that both for the Christian and the commendable soldier—there is an expectation of and a readiness for battle with the enemy; there is a discipline of body, mind and spirit about each of them, dedicated as they are to unfailing obedience to the commands of their respective leader. Thus it seems wholly natural for the Apostle Paul to say to a friend, "Ephroditus, my brother and fellow worker and fellow soldier," (Philippians 2: 25), or when speaking to Timothy, for him to say, "fight gallantly, armed with faith and a good conscience" (I Timothy 1: 18), or again, "Take your share of hardship like a good soldier of Christ Jesus" (II Timothy 2:3).

Indeed, in the whole of Christian history two of the most conspicuously effective efforts in organizing followers of Christ with the result of maximum usefulness and influence have been, one, the organization of

the society of Jesus in the 16th century, and, two, the organization of the Salvation Army in the 19th century. Both groups have involved failure as well as success but their overall influence has been remarkable and is essentially due to the fact of their organization on a military principle. Ignatius Loyola had no specific intent of opposing the Reformation when he wrote his "Spiritual Exercises" and founded the famous Jesuit Society. It is nevertheless true that the Jesuits were effective in producing a genuine historical change of direction. They were instrumental, through their missionary and educational activities, their austere intellectual disciplines, in saving great sections of northern Europe for the Roman Catholic Church and in regaining lost territory. Loyola's success is in large measure due to the fact that he combined two elements of success which went together perfectly; his own soldierly experience prior to his commitment, and his recognition of the militant character of original Christianity. The key to his entire enterprise is found in his terse reference, "Christ our Commander in Chief." Says one of his biographers: "The only language Loyola could speak was the language of a warrior; it was always the banner and the battle, obedience and command, company and militia * * *. He demanded the virtues of a soldier but renounced the conditions that fostered them."¹

This brief reminder of how, from the very beginning of the Christian era—as well as in some of its most influential periods—the emphasis has been upon soldierly discipline; hard, happy, heroic living; readiness for battle with the enemy (cannot one even say eagerness for the battle, "Woe be unto me if I preach not the Gospel"). The truth of what we are thinking about comes forcefully to mind when, as 20th century Christian (or persons so aspiring to be) we are surely aware of two central facts:

1. If ever the world needed an authentic revival of the Christ-like life, it is our world. For you and I are confronted not simply with the enemy of personal evil represented in the seven deadly sins; such evil has always made battle against God's people and always will. Today, however, in addition to this, the spirit of evil is equipped with hydrogen bombs; the spirit of evil is operative in the power and practices of national governments, all governments to varying degrees including our own; and one consequence of all this is that our world is now threatened with a possible destruction of hellfire and brimstone which is incomparably more cruel than any such fate ever described by the most fanatic Calvinist preacher when talking about the wrath of God.

2. Surely thoughtful persons realize that if the Christ-like life, so desperately needed, is to have any realistic prospect of achievement—there is required of you and me now, as never before, a Christ-like faith actively applied in every area of life, nurtured by soldierly Christian disciplines which will bring a creative awakening to our frozen souls even as the coming of God's spring awakens and thaws loose the ice-locked waters of a thousand streams and sends them rushing toward the great sea which is their natural home.

How contemporary in its relevance, therefore, is the apostle's appeal that you and I "put on the armour of God, so as to be able to stand firm against all the stratagems of the devil * * * first fastening on the belt of truth, putting on the breastplate of righteousness, * * * and with all these, taking up the great shield of faith, with which you will be able to quench all the flaming arrows of the evil one."

Think with me of how we may best seek to implement this appeal within our life and

world today. Not long after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, President Kennedy was discussing this perilous event that had, for a time, put both the United States and Russia with their respective atomic arsenals on a collision course. "It all seemed easy enough," he remarked, after the Soviet bluff had been successfully called, but the trouble was no one could be sure, at the outset, that the Soviets really were bluffing. He was asked what he thought the odds were, at the outset, that the Soviets were not bluffing. He replied that he had thought the chance that the Soviets meant to go through to the end was "somewhere between one in three." By the most realistic use of our imagination it is impossible for any of us to comprehend the terror that would have been let loose in the world had the Soviets not changed their course of action. The consequence would have been what military theorists euphemistically call "a thermonuclear exchange." The current Pentagon estimate of the cost to this country of an H-bomb attack is 110 million dead Americans. Nonetheless, most thoughtful Americans are grateful, today, for the late President's willingness to run this fearful risk. For we know, as a fact of our life, that we have been destined to live at a time when the skies above us may, at any moment, turn from blue to black, erupting in the fallout of atomic war. We know, as a fact of our life, that whatever else may be said of our relationship to Communist China and Soviet Russia—they regard any nation's military weakness or the refusal to use the strength it possesses, when threatened, an invitation to their aggression and domination.

Having said this, think with me now in the context of our Christian faith of where we as a nation stand in relation to the crisis in Vietnam. Nobody but the President and his most intimate advisers has enough information about the situation in Saigon, Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow to become dogmatic as to what policy should be pursued. But surely this does not mean that we, as citizens, must impose a self-censorship of silence and supinely accept whatever decisions—or lack of decisions—which others decide for us. Indeed, one of the strange ironies of the Vietnam crisis is that while the American Government is spending nearly \$2 million dollars a day to finance our participation in Vietnam; and, since the war began in 1946, nearly \$6 billion has been spent of taxpayers money; these facts in themselves are dwarfed in significance by the fact that as of yesterday 400 Americans have been killed in Vietnam and the prospect of an expanded all-out war increases daily—the irony is, that, despite all this, the President of the United States has not yet made a major speech on the details of this war since he entered the White House.

"The time has come," says James Reston in this morning's New York Times, "to call a spade a bloody shovel. This country is in an undeclared and unexplained war in Vietnam. Our members have a lot of long and fancy names for it, like escalation and retaliation, but it is war just the same * * * a war that is not only undeclared and unexplained, but that has not even been widely debated in the Congress or the country."² Last August 5, in a campaign speech on Vietnam, the President said: "There can be, and there must be, no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose." But it is increasingly obvious that among his own advisers as well as the American citizenry generally, there is enormous doubt, apprehension, and uncertainty about both America's policy and purpose. Should we not as citizens, generally, be concerned that the President inform us—more fully than he has—

¹ Elton Trueblood, "Company of the Committed," p. 36.

² The New York Times, Sunday, Feb. 14, 1965.

of this country's objectives, policies as regards Vietnam—and of the rationale behind them? Should not the President himself be concerned so to tell us? Teddy Roosevelt spoke of the office of President as "a bully good pulpit" whereby one who occupies the office is in a singularly, fortunate position to educate, to motivate, and inspire, and to unite a divided and uncertain people. I say, respectfully, to date, the President has not done this in relation to Vietnam.

Let me ask you: Do you feel sufficiently informed and satisfied with the answers you have to the following questions?

1. "Is it not a fallacy to believe that any amount of retaliatory bombing (short of laying a massive radioactive carpet across the waist of the peninsula) would be effective in preventing the Vietcong from continuing to receive whatever supplies they do from North Vietnam?"

2. What is the answer to the statement of Senator WAYNE MORSE, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that "official testimony regarding the supplies of the Vietcong rebels makes clear that 90 percent of their weapons were captured from Government sources and that there is very little evidence that support for the Vietcong is coming from the north. They are strongest in the southern tip of South Vietnam, farthest from North Vietnam, and they are armed largely with American weapons captured from the Government forces?"

3. "How much of the success of the Vietcong is explained not so much by Communist supplies or direction, but by the justified despair and dissatisfaction of the Vietnamese people, now in their 20th year of continuous war; by their lack of confidence in the military dictatorship under which they live and which is possible only by reason of American support? If the purpose of the war in Vietnam is to establish freedom why do the Vietnamese people, themselves, have so little of it? 'There is no freedom in South Vietnam,' Senator MORSE recently said, 'and there has never been any freedom in South Vietnam since the United States took over. There has been no freedom since the first American puppet, Diem, became the first dictator of South Vietnam, followed by General Minh, followed by Khanh, and now followed by complete chaos.'"⁸

Tell us, Mr. President, more clearly than you have as to why you and your advisers apparently believe that the retaliatory raids which have already come as close as 35 miles from the Communist China border will create an atmosphere in which negotiations for peace can then be undertaken (by us) from a position of strength? Does not this reasoning assume that North Vietnam and Red China would be willing to do what we ourselves are unwilling to do—that is to negotiate from a position of weakness? Also, what would our reaction be if enemy bombing came within 35 miles of our border?

Mr. President, why have we not taken our case to the United Nations? Article 33, section 1, of the U.N. Charter reads: "The parties to any dispute—the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, conciliation * * * or other peaceful means of their own choice." Secretary General U Thant has said:

"I do feel very strongly that means must be found, and found urgently, within or outside the United Nations, of shifting the quest for a solution away from the field of battle to the conference table." Perhaps the most moving appeal that we see the futility of expanding the war in order to win the peace has been voiced by a young man, Capt. Norman W. Heck, Jr., who was killed by Viet-

cong guerrillas in South Vietnam, December 8, 1964. Nine days before his death, Captain Heck wrote the following letter to his fellow church members at Redeemer Lutheran Church in Highland Park, Ill. Pastor Robert A. Wendelin called the letter—which arrived on December 7—Captain Heck's "last will and testament," to his church:

CA MAU, VIETNAM,
November 29, 1964.

DEAR PASTOR WENDELIN AND MEMBERS OF REDEEMER LUTHERAN CHURCH: I'm writing this letter to you because I greatly appreciated the warmth and receptiveness displayed by all of you toward my wife, my family, and myself.

It is because of this demonstration of human understanding that I ask your consideration and support of an idea that is very near and dear to my heart.

I'm serving here in Vietnam as an adviser to a Vietnamese combat infantry battalion. I am thoroughly convinced that the Communists cannot be defeated by simply killing Vietcong.

There are many civic action programs underway with the goal of winning the support of the people by improving their social and economic conditions. There is a tremendous need for skilled technicians and people with a strong sense of Christian devotion to impart the many advantages of our way of life to these poor people who have so few blessings.

People who are willing to spend a year or two—with the possibility of losing their lives—while working at the grassroots of the problem area could contribute to the defeat of the Vietcong and thus insure the reduction of the threat of communism to our society.

I have not discovered a single Lutheran missionary working in this area. By sending some Lutheran ministers and laymen here in the "field" (not to Saigon but to the outlying area) to see what a wonderful opportunity exists to serve the Lord, the initial step could be accomplished.

It is easy to sit back and engross ourselves with the numerous blessings and scientific achievements of our society; but for those who desire a richer, fuller life and who would be gratified by contributing to the preservation of our many freedoms—there are many Vietnamese who would be eternally grateful for your assistance.

I pray that you will do your utmost to urge our Lutheran Church to solicit aid in the form of devoted skilled personnel to assist and guide these very needy people.

Sincerely,

NORMAN "RUSTY" HECK.⁴

That eloquent letter says much to all of us about many aspects of our Christian faith and life. Let me, just now, emphasize again a single sentence of it: "I am thoroughly convinced that the Communists cannot be defeated by simply killing Vietcong." Surely, the complex problems of Vietnam and southeast Asia cannot be settled by arms alone. "An infinity of social, political, economic, religious, tribal, nationalistic, historic and traditional factors are at work in Vietnam." How sad it is that often governments, like individuals, find it easier to compound a mistake by continuing in it rather than confessing a mistake and turning away from it. The French, after several years of war and the death of 240,000 of her finest sons who lay down their lives in Indochina, withdrew and it is to her honor that she did. Let us be guided by the spirit enunciated by the late President Kennedy: "Let us not negotiate in fear, but let us not fear to negotiate."

One final word: It is too easy, I know, to stand outside the terrible office of President

and raise questions and make criticisms. Nothing that I have here said today means, in any way, that I or others who raise such questions have less regard for the man who occupies the incomparably burdensome office of the President at this hour in our history. Indeed, he has our prayers and our affection for we are all Americans whose common desire is that we may be given the wisdom to know what is best to do—and the courage of God's spirit wherewith to do it. Amen.

[From the Buffalo Evening News, Jan. 30, 1965]

UNITED STATES DOESN'T KNOW HOW TO FIGHT INVISIBLE FOE IN VIETNAM—WE'RE OWN WORST ENEMY

(By Hugh Campbell)

(The author of this article has served as a Canadian member of the International Control Commission in Vietnam for 2 years, a position that has enabled him to see the war firsthand from both sides. An RCAF squadron leader in World War II, Mr. Campbell is a distinguished corporation lawyer with offices in Vancouver. He resides at Campbell River, British Columbia.)

The United States is now entering its third year of full-scale war in Vietnam. Any day now we can again expect the customary pronouncement from the American high command in Saigon to the effect that, while the situation is serious, it is not hopeless; and that the war can and will be won.

After nearly 2 years in Vietnam, I've heard a good many such assurances. But since, as a Canadian delegate on the three-nation International Control Commission, I had a unique opportunity to observe the war from both sides of the firing line, I think the Americans are talking through their well-padded brass hats.

The war, as it's now being waged, cannot be won by our side—because the Americans, for all their brave talk about developing new antiguerrilla techniques, are still using obsolete methods to fight a new kind of invisible enemy.

Exactly how invisible this enemy—the Communist Vietcong—can become was forcibly demonstrated to me one day on a dusty gravel road leading through the jungle in North Vietnam. It was a routine inspection patrol for the International Control Commission and, for no apparent reason, the Communist officer in the lead jeep suddenly suggested a halt.

We piled out of our jeeps and stretched our legs, apparently in the middle of nowhere. Just as inexplicably, he then suggested we resume the patrol. As the convoy started off, he beeped his horn, and, somewhere nearby, a whistle shrilled.

Instantly, both sides of the road were lined with troops, grinning infantrymen whose faded khaki uniforms contrasted sharply with the dark jungle background. They'd been there all the while, standing not a dozen yards from the convoy. But because of the foliage that covered their backs from helmet to canvass sneakers, they'd been invisible to three experienced officers.

There was nothing threatening about the mock ambush. The Communist troops were simply practicing camouflage, and used the International Control Commission as an unwitting umpire. And although their camouflage was excellent, it was the mobility of the troops that impressed me most.

They were many miles from any known base, and they carried on their backs everything necessary for living and fighting. They didn't need roads, jeeps, helicopters, or mobile kitchens. They were jungle fighters, as elusive as poison gas and twice as deadly—the kind of guerrillas who wore down the French masters of Indochina, and finished them off at Dienbienphu in 1954.

⁸ Senator WAYNE MORSE on the floor of the Senate, Wednesday, Jan. 6, 1965.

⁴ Published in an edition of Church Week, All-Church Press, Friday, Feb. 5, 1965.

The Pentagon, naturally, has been determined not to repeat France's mistakes. In the past 3 years they've poured in aid and advisers at the rate of more than \$1 million a day. So generous, so overwhelming has been this avalanche of assistance, that it has aided South Vietnam almost to death.

In 1962, there were fewer than 300 U.S. military advisers in the country—and they were making noticeable headway against the Vietcong. The advisers were scattered in tiny detachments around the country. They were tough, highly trained men, and they were revered by the Vietnamese.

But the Pentagon apparently reasoned that 20,000 advisers could win the war 20 times as fast as 300; they started airlifting them into Saigon by the thousands (in defiance, incidentally, of the Geneva truce agreement).

With them came wives, children, PX supermarkets, Coca-Cola machines, air conditioners, officers' clubs, station wagons, insurance salesmen, school teachers, public relations men—all the equipage of a progressive suburb, without which the American military seems unable to function abroad.

Suddenly, it stopped being a jungle war, with Americans fighting on the same terms as their enemies. It became instead a desk-soldiers' war, with the fatuities of Saigon's brass hats canceling the efforts of the men in the field.

A gap appeared between the South Vietnamese and their American protectors, and the gap has been widening ever since.

There's also a gap between the Pentagon's concept of mobility and that of the guerrillas. Putting troops on wheels or in helicopters has proven unrealistic in a jungle war. Disguised as peasants, the Vietcong simply watch the machines charge futilely by—perhaps into a mine trap or ambush—or, if they're detected, simply melt into the jungle.

Pursuit on foot is fruitless; the South Vietnamese troops, carrying enough American-made equipment to fight the Battle of the Bulge, would be ineffective even if they were as hardy as their enemy. But of course they aren't, since they're now accustomed to riding to work.

But all the mistakes haven't been committed by the military. There are a host of nonmilitary agencies fighting Saigon's war, from the spooks of the CIA to the flacks of the U.S. Information Agency.

Take, for instance, the unimportant but revealing case of the American pro football player who arrived in Saigon under State Department auspices to set up an athletic program for the Vietnamese. "Gonna teach these gooks football," he announced to all within earshot. Several days later, he announced a change in policy; the gooks he'd decided, were too small for football—so he was going to teach them soccer, a game he'd never played himself.

Or take the average American service wife in Saigon: for boorishness, offensiveness, and condescension toward her inferiors, she takes the fur-lined mug. The generous allowances, PX privileges, villa, chauffeur and servants are all new to her—and with rare exceptions, it shows. Her kids are no better. The spectacle of a bunch of crew-cutted gumchewing teenagers lordling it over the natives in the streets of Saigon is a lesson in how not to conduct foreign relations.

Or, finally, take the matter of Saigon's justly famous night life, which consists of scores of saloons, each equipped with a bevy of the prettiest little bar girls in southeast Asia. The patrons are almost exclusively American; and one South Vietnamese woman who owns a string of such establishments, told me she estimates that half her girls are actively pro-Vietcong, while the rest maintain a profitable neutrality by spying impartially for both sides.

The result of all this ugly Americanism has been exactly what you'd expect: the

South Vietnamese is starting to wonder if his Communist enemies might not be preferable to his American friends. Once he publicly mourned the loss of American lives. Now, the nearly 300 Americans killed in Vietnam seem meaningless compared with his own terrible losses—more than 160,000 dead.

Once he believed that his government, good or bad, would be free of foreign interference. Now he's convinced that his government—whatever assortment of generals happens to be in power at the moment—is a puppet of the Pentagon.

If the foregoing sounds like an anti-American tirade, it's not intentional. There still are hundreds of smart, dedicated, and effective Americans in Vietnam. They want to win this tragic war and, through a first-hand acquaintance with the realities of guerrilla warfare they think they know how to do it. Unfortunately, they're only fighting the war, not running it.

For this reason, the Communists are almost certain to nibble their way to victory eventually. When they do, it will be a disaster for the West. For all my reservations about life in the Saigon sector of the free world, I'm convinced, after seeing both places, that the South Vietnamese are vastly better off than their countrymen to the north.

When I went to Vietnam, I shared the common Canadian view of such faraway places. I half suspected that, for those unfortunate enough to live in such countries, life in the "free" sector was just about as miserable as life under communism. But a few visits to Hanoi and other Communist centers quickly disabused me of this notion.

I'll never forget the people who would pass me on the streets and whisper "A has les communistes," or the officials who risked their freedom to tell me privately of their hatred for the regime of Ho Chi-minh. It was a rude contrast with Saigon, where free speech, while not prevalent, is at least still possible.

For all their strategic failings, the Americans are fighting a just war. But they're going to lose it unless they make drastic changes—for at present, the American is his own worst enemy in Vietnam. By his obtuse policies and actions he has squandered the good will of his allies. Without it, he can't win. Without it, there is nothing left to win.

WORLD BANK FLOTATION OF \$200 MILLION BOND ISSUE IN UNITED STATES

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, on January 19, I had occasion to have printed in the RECORD an exchange of letters with the Secretary of the Treasury concerning the World Bank flotation of a \$200 million bond issue in the United States. This series of letters culminated in a communication from me dated January 8, requesting Secretary Dillon's detailed comments on this transaction. On January 22 an answer was received from the Treasury Department. I believe that this communication should also be made available to all those who are interested in the international monetary situation, especially as it affects our position in the world.

The Secretary of the Treasury has assured us that the approval of the U.S. Government for the World Bank's request to float the loan in the United States was taken without and dissent. We are also told that the transaction "will in no way affect our balance-of-payments deficit this year," although we have no way of knowing how it might be affected in 1966 or later. Frankly, I

take small comfort in the thought that we are storing up more trouble for the future.

But I am less interested in the technical aspects of this transaction than I am in the very much larger question of our financial policies toward the world. The Treasury response does not question the World Bank's need for further resources, and in effect says that—although borrowing in the European markets would be far preferable—the United States will continue to come up with funds whenever required by the international banking community. I am not at all satisfied that our policy has to be of such a quiescent nature.

In the first place, we need far more justification for hastening to provide additional resources for the World Bank. From its operations the Bank has amassed reserves which now are somewhere around the \$1 billion mark. It is true that after much hand wringing the Bank has agreed that a modest proportion of future profits may be diverted into the operations of its IDA soft-loan affiliate; yet it says that these enormous reserve funds should be maintained intact to preserve a climate of confidence throughout the banking community. From the size of the reserves, it would appear that the appetite for confidence is virtually insatiable.

Second, we are told at every opportunity, especially by those seeking more U.S. foreign aid money, that the underdeveloped countries have about reached the place where they can no longer finance hard loans of the kind extended by the World Bank. This makes me wonder whether the World Bank's resources will not increasingly be used to support projects in the developed countries which are members of the organization. If such is the case, I am totally confused as to the need for U.S. support for the economies of the developed countries.

Thus, Mr. President, I must record my lack of faith in the proposition that the World Bank should be provided with resources by the U.S. market whenever it requires them.

We hear a great deal of talk and we see many actions today by the industrialized countries—especially those in Europe—which stem from a desire to assert their independence from U.S. leadership in the Western World. The occasion of the World Bank's requirement for further resources, it seems to me, would be a great opportunity for the European countries to show their power and sophistication by encouraging the flotation of bond issues in their markets. However, we are told that these countries which are declaiming so loudly about their great strength and independence have not developed market conditions which would permit such flotations.

Rather than put any pressure on these countries to develop their markets and lower interest rates, the United States apparently prefers to continue to fill the gap and thereby relieve Western Europe of any such pressure of necessity.

At the present time, one of the most notable developments on the European

scene is the gleeful way in which the French are turning dollars into gold and causing difficulties for the United States. It seems that this development is a matter for much embarrassment within the U.S. Government; I would suggest that it should be the occasion for a reappraisal of our financial policies with respect to the international monetary scene and our so-called partners among the industrialized countries of Europe.

Every time the United States attempts to assert some leadership within the Western World we are told that our allies fail to follow the lead because of their strength and self-confidence; we are assured on every hand that the European scene has changed radically within the last decade. Such being the case, I see no reason whatsoever why our policies should not be adjusted accordingly. Yet I see no evidence that the U.S. Treasury Department is tailoring its policies to the changed situation. I suggest that the kind of thinking reflected by Secretary Dillon's response to my inquiries is severely outdated and will not be changed without an emphatic expression of views by members of the legislative branch of this government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD my letter of January 8 to the Secretary of the Treasury and Mr. Dillon's response dated January 22.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 8, 1965.

Hon. C. DOUGLAS DILLON,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to recall my letter to you of October 13, 1964, in which I expressed concern over the prospect that the World Bank would seek to raise new capital in the U.S. market. In your response of October 27 you stated that the United States should not at present prohibit "any and all attempts by the Bank to mobilize private funds for development through bond sales to U.S. residents." There nevertheless was at least an implication that the bulk of the \$300 to \$400 million of new capital required by the World Bank might be raised outside this country. According to the New York Times of December 29, however, the World Bank has now announced it will float a \$200 million bond issue in the United States beginning on January 18.

It seems to me that the key sentence in your October 27 letter was the following: "Any application by the Bank for bond sales in our market will be reviewed on its merits in the light of the concrete situation at the time—including our own balance of payments and the effect of any Bank borrowing thereon." Frankly, I am not aware of any measurable improvement in our balance-of-payments situation during the past 2 months; indeed, I would assume the contrary from the New York Times story of December 30, 1964, by Richard E. Mooney—a copy of which is attached. The article reports that the OECD annual review of the U.S. economy contains the advice "that more curbs on outflowing capital may be needed to put the country's international payments in better balance." Yet the proposed World Bank bond issue appears a dramatic move in the opposite direction.

In these circumstances, I would like very much to know just what sort of review of the Bank application took place within the U.S. Government. Specifically, was approval of the application given by the National

Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, and was the decision taken unanimously? How do you assess the impact on our balance of payments in concrete terms?

In short, I would appreciate learning the full story of this transaction and its implications; you need not be concerned about sparing me any details.

Sincerely yours,

WAYNE MORSE.

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, D.C., January 22, 1965.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR WAYNE: I am happy to answer the questions raised in your letter of January 8 concerning the World Bank bond issue in the United States. This \$200 million bond flotation was successfully launched last week. The Bank did this a few days earlier than contemplated in the report you cited, because market conditions were thought to be propitious.

The World Bank announcement on January 5 of the contemplated issue was made after the U.S. Government approved the Bank's request as required by its articles of agreement. You asked whether the National Advisory Council decision was unanimous. It was. I gave the proposal my closest attention, and let me also say that my own approval of the Bank's request was completely in accord with the considerations which I mentioned in my letter to you of October 27, 1964.

As I said in that letter, the World Bank management is fully aware of the need for utilizing European capital markets to the maximum extent funds are available on reasonable terms. I can reassure you, based on my conversations with the Bank management from time to time in the past 2 months in connection with the contemplated bond issue, that they have every intention to pursue assiduously this course. The Bank feels that it might be able to raise between \$100 and \$140 million in new money outside the United States for the remainder of its present fiscal year (which runs concurrently with our own). This amount is in addition to the \$298 million of new and refinancing operations arranged by the Bank outside the United States earlier this fiscal year. Included in the latter was a private placement entirely outside the United States of a \$100 million, 2-year, 4¼ percent bond issue with central banks and other Government institutions in 26 countries. The remainder was essentially a refinancing operation also involving a private placement of negotiable notes with an institutional investor outside the United States. A part of this transaction will be effected at the beginning of February. While the refunding transactions did not affect the total of the Bank's outstanding funded debt, in the absence of that financing an equivalent amount of matured debt would have been paid off net by the Bank, thereby adding to foreign exchange reserves abroad.

You asked about the effect on our balance of payments of the \$200 million bond issue. While the World Bank needs to have these funds firmly available to maintain continuity of its financial operations, particularly its substantial lending commitments, it will not actually have to disburse these newly acquired funds for some time. Accordingly, the World Bank management intends to place in the United States the proceeds of the issue in time deposits or investments which have maturities in excess of a year. In terms of the U.S. balance of payments, the outflow of long-term capital represented by U.S. purchases of the bonds will be matched by at least an equal offsetting inflow of long-term capital, and thus, the entire transaction will in no way affect our balance-of-payments deficit this year.

The manner and extent to which these funds will affect our balance of payments in 1966 or later will depend on a variety of factors when these funds are actually disbursed. I should point out in this connection, that the net effect of the World Bank's overall operations on the U.S. balance of payments since the inception of the Bank has been a favorable one. This has been particularly true in the period since 1958, which is the period of our most serious balance-of-payments problem.

Furthermore, dollar accruals of the World Bank are completely different in terms of potential calls on our gold stock from such accruals to the reserves of the surplus countries of Europe. Resort to the U.S. capital market in the latter case adds to their dollar reserves which in turn can readily be translated into calls on our gold. It was particularly in order to dampen the rapidly growing volume of such borrowings, with all that this implied, that the Interest Equalization Tax was adopted. This tax proved effective in helping further reduce the regular deficit in the U.S. balance of payments in 1963 and the first three quarters of 1964. While all the results for the fourth quarter of 1964 are not in, as you said, it may not turn out as we had hoped. I am following these developments very closely.

Finally, I need hardly reiterate my views on the important role the development of European capital markets can play in alleviating international payments imbalance. The need of the World Bank to enter the U.S. market reemphasizes my conviction of the importance of further progress. The Bank recognizes the significance of such progress. The Europeans, too, are increasingly recognizing the need.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS DILLON.

SUBSIDIZING NASSER

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, some days ago, when I debated on the floor of the Senate the proposal of the administration to continue to subsidize Nasser in carrying out his shocking policies of tyranny in the Middle East, I overlooked a letter which I had received from the Democratic Club of Portland State College, Portland, Oreg., in support of the position which I presented in my argument against the President's program, which he barely won by a vote of 44 to 38 in the Senate, which empowered him to continue to subsidize Nasser in what I considered to be Nasser's program of tyranny in the Middle East.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the letter of January 14, 1965, written by Bob Larson, president of the Democratic club, and the resolution which they passed at their meeting.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PSC DEMOCRATIC CLUB,
PORTLAND STATE COLLEGE,
Portland, Oreg., January 14, 1965.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: The PSC Democratic Club would like you to have the enclosed resolution inserted into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and if possible read at your convenience in the Senate or an appropriate committee of the Senate. Having read your views on foreign aid I am sure you agree with us that we should review any aid that may be ending up as waste. The PSC Democrats do not feel our foreign aid should be used

have urged the Department of Labor to permit this supplemental labor so that their employees would not be deprived of their jobs.

This reduction in the crop because of the failure to harvest goes even farther than that. The man who makes the boxes or who makes the cans or who transports the finished product to the market also has employees whose work hours would be shortened with this crop loss.

Usually, as far as the grower is concerned, in the long run, the lack of supply and the increased demand will raise his price to the point where he will possibly get as many dollars back from the short crop as he would have had he marketed his whole crop, but then this increase will be reflected in the price of fresh and processed fruit to the consumer. Is the Secretary acting in the interests of all our people when he deliberately follows policies that would result in raising the prices to consumers? It can result in the housewife deciding that the price of citrus is too high and she will resort to some synthetic product which is cheaper but one which I do not think many doctors would prescribe for babies to drink in place of pure orange juice.

This does not only affect the citrus industry. The Florida sugarcane industry has more than tripled during the last 3 years, largely as a result of the encouragement of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This season we have approximately 235,000 acres of sugarcane to be harvested in Florida. Domestic workers simply do not like to, and therefore will not, cut sugarcane on Florida's muckland. The Department of Labor has acknowledged this for many years. In the past they have always authorized enough supplemental foreign workers to assure that this crop could be harvested without losses due to lack of labor. However, during the current season, sugarcane producers have been turned down in more than a dozen requests that have been made to the Department of Labor for additional foreign workers that were needed to avoid the possibility of crop loss.

On January 17 and 18, we experienced temperatures as low as 18 degrees in the sugarcane belt, and the dangers of a crop loss suddenly became a reality. Several of the mills have been able to grind cane at only 80 percent of the rated capacity which means that many thousands of tons of cane that could have been ground are now damaged along with the remainder of the crop. Renewed appeals for necessary amounts of labor to minimize losses resulting from the freeze were also denied until recently, when the Secretary of Labor said that the sugarcane industry could have 300 more workers, when these workers are released by the citrus industry. The citrus industry has not been in a position to release these workers and any relief that may ultimately come from that direction will be too late to avoid losses that have already occurred. A survey of four of Florida's sugarcane mills last week shows that they estimate their losses to date—due entirely to lack

of sufficient cancutters—at a total of \$1,754,000.

Florida growers planted 3,500 acres of strawberries this year. Some 1,900 acres of strawberries were planted in the lower east coast area, and growers in that area have largely depended upon supplemental foreign workers to efficiently produce and harvest their crops. But, when these strawberry growers sought this year to obtain a relatively small number of supplemental foreign workers who were needed to lay down polyethylene weed-control covers, they were turned down time and again. The use of polyethylene weed-control covers would greatly minimize the amount of labor needed to control the weeds by hand. Yet the Department of Labor could not see this fact and continued to delay acting on these growers' requests until blooms or flowers set on the strawberry plants. It then became necessary to install the weed-control covers over blooming plants with the result that these blooms were severely damaged, and the first two pickings of the strawberry crop were lost. It is not enough to say that this loss was due to the lack of labor. This loss was due directly to the lack of prompt action by the Department of Labor.

In addition to losses such as those described, all segments of the industry in Florida report increasing losses in grade and quality of their crops due to lack of labor.

I want to make it clear as I said before that Florida agricultural employers prefer to use American workers. It is reasonable for them to expect a fair day's work for a fair day's pay, and our farmers want to give them this, but on the other side of the coin, I believe that they have a right also to expect the Department of Labor to supply qualified and willing workers or, if they are not available in sufficient numbers, to quit vacillating and denying what are obvious facts and readily certify as to the existence of the labor shortage so that crop losses will not be so large.

The entire attitude of the Secretary of Labor seems to be that he wants to look to the agriculture industry to solve our unemployment problems. But the simple fact is that neither the Secretary of Labor nor our farmers can force people to do manual labor in our fields and groves unless they wish to do it.

Mr. Speaker, it is my judgment that the situation that exists in Florida today and that threatens to become worse during the remainder of our season, will also pose a very serious threat to agriculture throughout this Nation in the very near future. I have it on good authority that many growers are talking in terms of cutting back their production of ground crops by as much as 50 percent unless some encouragement and assurance of adequate labor is forthcoming from the Secretary of Labor. This is the kind of situation when an executive officer of the Federal Government can easily be of valuable help to this country. I am talking about the kind of help that results from the cooperation of an industry that is vital to the total welfare of the United States. I do not know who or what caused the Secretary

of Labor to adopt such an unrealistic and unsympathetic attitude toward our agriculture industry, but he should move immediately to correct his errors of judgment, which already have cost farmers and growers and workers in Florida many millions of dollars—and will cost the consumers many millions more.

It is a somber fact that this Nation never has as much as a week's supply of fresh fruits and vegetables en route from the producer to the market and available to the consumer. The strength that holds this chain of food production and distribution together is no greater than its weakest link. Farmers in much of the Nation will soon be faced with a decision to plant as much seed as they did a year ago, to cut back their planting operations or not to plant at all. Their decisions will be made on an individual basis and will be based upon their respective judgments as to how this Government will respond to their plea for fair and reasonable treatment. The lack of any encouragement from the Secretary of Labor or—alternatively—the assurance of our Government that it will indeed be sympathetic and responsive to the needs of our industry will no doubt be the determining factor as each producer decides his future role as a food producer in this Nation. His decision will be reflected in a very short time in every grocery store across this Nation. The responsibility for this decision will not rest in the hands of the individual producer; it will rest in the hands of a few responsible officials in Washington who have not up to this point chosen to act responsibly. Let us hope that they are aware of the high stakes that are involved and avoid the needless crisis that will be threatened if they fail to act affirmatively and promptly in the public interest.

A PROCLAMATION

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a resolution which expresses support of the American people for President Johnson's heroic determination to wage carefully measured and meaningful retaliation against military installations in North Vietnam which serve as staging areas for training Communist forces to carry on continued aggression against South Vietnam.

This resolution would also assure the people of South Vietnam that the people of the United States stand firmly behind them in their long and tireless efforts to preserve for South Vietnam freedom and independence.

The resolution states further:

The people of the United States, through their elected representatives in the Congress of the United States, send to the people of South Vietnam their heartfelt admiration for the great sacrifices which the people of South Vietnam have endured during the past 20 years in their struggle to retain self-determination and human dignity.

I shall include a text of the entire resolution at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. Speaker, it is my sincere hope that the Congress will approve this resolution without delay as our answer to those who naively continue to believe that somehow we can negotiate a peaceful solution with the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists to the problem of Vietnam.

Those who propose negotiation never spell out with whom we are to negotiate or on what terms, nor do they take the trouble to recall that we have now been negotiating with the North Korean Communists for 11 years in hopes of arriving at a workable peace treaty which would bring peace and stability to Korea. During these 11 years of negotiations at Panmunjon, the Communists have violated every single provision of the truce negotiated by President Eisenhower in 1953.

North Korea today is one of the most formidable Communist military bases in the whole world, and this was accomplished by the Communists during the past 11 years while fruitless negotiations were going on.

Nor do those suggesting negotiations over Vietnam care to mention the fact that we have indeed been negotiating with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw, Poland, now for almost 5 years.

We have held more than 127 exploratory sessions with the Communist representatives in Warsaw, and as far as I know, the Chinese Communists have not made one single solitary concession which would indicate or create an atmosphere for any meaningful negotiations to resolve the problems of southeast Asia or curb Chinese Communist subversion in that part of the world.

Mr. Speaker, I hope this resolution will be adopted because it is important for the world to know that the people of the United States stand firmly behind the people of South Vietnam in their heroic struggle for freedom.

It is also important to know that the people of the United States stand firmly behind President Johnson in his brave decision not to capitulate to Communist infamy.

I have the highest respect for President Johnson's judgment, and while I know that he would never deliberately lead us into a needless war, neither would he surrender our freedom to Communist treachery.

Mr. Johnson indeed carries a heavy burden today. It would be my hope we can approve this resolution to show our dedicated President that we as Americans stand firmly behind him in these days of historic decisions.

Mr. Speaker, it is high time that we Americans realized that for us to fail in our positive action now would be an open invitation to world war III.

I know it is difficult for many people to understand the situation in South Vietnam and why we have to be there in the first place. But both President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have made it crystal clear that for the United States to abandon South Vietnam today would mean a complete surrender of the entire southeast flank of our Pacific defense perimeter.

It would be only a matter of days before South Vietnam was overrun by the Communists and not much longer before Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, and the whole of southeast Asia would be victimized by Communist aggression.

Those who cling to the belief that we can negotiate ignore the fact that it was only 10 years from Manchuria to Pearl Harbor and less than 18 months from Munich to the rape of Poland on September 1, 1939.

There are those who urge this entire matter be turned over to the United Nations, completely ignoring the fact that the United Nations has had several opportunities to deal with the problem of southeast Asia. The United Nations is in no position to take any overt action since the Soviets could use their veto power in the Security Council.

Wish as we may, southeast Asia is beyond the help of the United Nations.

General de Gaulle has been making all sorts of suggestions as to what we should do about this problem, but I believe the American people should know that his true role in this problem is only that of a kibitzer.

General de Gaulle has made no offer to commit his troops to enforcing any peace settlement that might be negotiated. As a matter of fact, General de Gaulle is not even in this game.

There are those who ask, "Do the South Vietnamese have the will to win?"

Mr. Speaker, I believe it is the South Vietnamese who should ask if we have the will to stand and support their efforts toward total victory.

It is my hope, Mr. Speaker, that adoption of my resolution would dispel any fears the South Vietnamese might have regarding our determination to help them preserve their freedom.

I am sure that President Johnson along with the South Vietnamese would be most eager to seek a peaceful solution and, yes, negotiate intensively, the moment the North Vietnamese Communists withdraw their troops from South Vietnam and cease their aggression and subversion.

For us to withdraw under any conditions short of complete Communist withdrawal would be merely to intensify the risk of world war III.

Peiping has clearly announced its military policy for all of southeast Asia. It has a militaristic appetite that feeds upon success.

Mr. Speaker, there are those who question the sincerity of our South Vietnamese allies and place the burden of their suspicions on the fact that South Vietnam has undergone major changes of government nine times in the last 2 years.

Certainly, the internal problems of South Vietnam are of deep concern to us, but the fact remains that the people of South Vietnam have endured greater hardship, sacrifice, and agony during the last 20 years in their struggle for freedom than we Americans have endured in the last 200 years of our existence.

I believe that the course chosen by President Johnson is the only course that can avoid world war III.

The President has announced his policy of carefully measured retaliation against military targets which serve as the basis for training Vietcong Communists for aggression against South Vietnam.

This carefully calculated escalation is the only course this Nation can take and, indeed, it serves notice on the Peiping and Hanoi Communists that this Nation would not stand by with impunity while they wage barbaric aggression against our allies in South Vietnam.

No man wants war less than President Johnson and I am sure that every single decision he has made has been carefully weighed against all of the consequences.

This is a period which can turn the tide for freedom. It requires complete understanding from the American people and it also requires complete dedication.

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I hope the following resolution will be carefully considered and adopted by the Congress.

My resolution follows:

Whereas the United States, during the administrations of President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson, has been committed to a policy of assisting the people of South Vietnam preserve their freedom and independence from Communist aggression; and

Whereas the North Vietnamese Communists have in recent months stepped up considerably their aggression against both civilian and military installations in South Vietnam; and

Whereas this aggression has caused the serious loss of life to American observers presently stationed in South Vietnam to help train South Vietnamese troops against Communist aggression; and

Whereas the President of the United States has had to order carefully measured retaliatory action against the North Vietnamese military staging areas where Hanoi and Peiping Communists have been or are being trained for aggression against South Vietnam; and

Whereas the President of the United States has made it abundantly clear that to withdraw American assistance from South Vietnam would expose the whole of southeast Asia to occupation by the Chinese Communist forces; and

Whereas such occupation would violate all the principles of the Geneva Conference of 1954 in which South Vietnam was guaranteed its independence and freedom from Communist aggression; and

Whereas withdrawal of American support from South Vietnam would only serve to hasten the day when Communist forces in Asia and China could wage all-out aggression against the rest of the world; and

Whereas the Hanoi and Peiping Communists have failed to show a single overt act which would indicate the problems of Vietnam could be settled through negotiation: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of Congress, speaking for the American people that—

1. This Nation stands firmly behind President Johnson's determination to wage carefully measured and meaningful retaliation against military installations in North Vietnam which serve as staging areas for training Communist forces to carry on continued aggression against South Vietnam;

2. That the people of the United States stand firmly behind the people of South Vietnam in their long and tireless efforts to preserve for South Vietnam freedom and independence; and

3. The people of the United States, through their elected Representatives in the Congress of the United States, send to the people of South Vietnam their heartfelt admiration for the great sacrifices which the people of South Vietnam have endured during the past 20 years in their struggle to retain self-determination and human dignity.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday on rollcall No. 16 I was not recorded as having voted. I was on official leave from the House. Had I been present I would have voted "nay."

UNITED NATIONS

(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks, and to include a resolution.)

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, it is with great honor that I rise to compliment the United Nations, which is celebrating its twentieth anniversary this year. We are all aware of the vital services which this world organization has performed in preserving international peace. I have supported this organization since its inception in the tumultuous days after the Second World War. Furthermore, I am proud, as are my constituents, to have the headquarters of the United Nations in the great city of New York.

As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Near East, I have personally witnessed its invaluable role in preserving the independence and stability of states in that area of the world. Were it not for the United Nations Emergency Force a serious international crisis would have ensued. The mediation efforts of Count Folke Bernadotte and Dr. Ralph Bunche were instrumental in creating the machinery whereby Israeli-Arab coexistence would be insured.

I, therefore, submit for consideration a resolution which can express the continued faith of the United States in the growth and strengthening of the United Nations. The resolution reads as follows:

H. CON. RES.—

Concurrent resolution expressing the continued faith of the United States in the growth and strengthening of the United Nations

Whereas President Lyndon B. Johnson said in his state of the Union message, "we renew our commitment to the continued growth and effectiveness of the United Nations" realizing "the frustrations of the United Nations are a product of the world we live in, not of the institution which gives them voice" knowing full well "it is far better to throw these differences open to the assembly of nations than permit them to fester in silent danger"; and

Whereas the renewal of this commitment on the 20th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations is celebrated by the observance of International Co-operation Year during which the nations of the world are implored to emphasize those areas in which their mutual interests achieve greater importance over the issues which cause friction; and

Whereas in each year of its history, the United Nations has become a more vital instrument of peaceful negotiation and settlement in issues directly affecting the stability of the world; and

Whereas the United Nations has recognized the re-evaluation of rising expectations throughout the world and in furtherance thereof the United Nations has concurrently maintained a vast effort to improve and "promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" through its economic and social functions; and

Whereas the United States has, in the past recognized the principle of fiscal responsibility towards a world organization; and

Whereas in his inaugural address the late President John F. Kennedy said "to those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, the United Nations offers a beachhead of cooperation which may yet push back centuries of poverty, fear and distrust to achieve a world where the strong are just, the weak secure, and the peace preserved": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Congress of the United States, That we do hereby reaffirm our continued commitment to the United Nations and endorse, encourage and sustain this crucial effort of mankind to achieve a greater society of nations dedicated to the proposition that peace, order and progress in the world can best be accomplished through cooperation in the United Nations.

HORTON AMENDMENT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS

(Mr. HORTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in the body of the Record.)

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, earlier this week, it was my privilege to be present at the annual Susan B. Anthony luncheon of the Rochester Federation of Women's Clubs. The gathering held in my home community of Rochester, N.Y., commemorated the 145th anniversary of the 19th century suffragette's birth.

Susan B. Anthony honored the history and heritage of Rochester. She waged war on discrimination and won. The 19th amendment to our Constitution guaranteeing women the right to vote is an eternal monument to her towering triumph, and its foundation was built in Rochester.

But, just as man does not live by bread alone, neither do women gain full equality by voting rights alone. Therefore, in the proud tradition of Susan B. Anthony's home, I have worked and voted for legislation to secure there additional rights. In the last Congress, we passed a law requiring equal pay for women performing the same work as men and we amended another law to ban discrimination against women in various Federal programs.

Now, in keeping with my efforts, I am pleased to announce that I have introduced today a constitutional amendment making equal rights for women the law of the land.

Our Constitution is a very great document, but its greatness hinges on the fact that it is susceptible to change. A change in providing equal rights is long overdue.

Our society still contains too many remains of ancient rules of law which treat women as inferiors. The amendment I support does not contemplate that women must be treated in all respects the same as men, but, while preserving in law obviously natural differences, it would do away with separate classifications for jury duty, property and inheritance rights, and other citizen benefits that bear no real relation to sex.

This amendment is not new but was first suggested in 1923. Since that time, it has been introduced in every single Congress. An impressive list of nationwide organizations have recorded their support of this proposal in the past.

Most recently, on September 14, 1964, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary submitted a report asking for favorable consideration of the amendment. The Senate report of the 88th Congress reminds us that "Adoption of this amendment will complete women's long movement for legal equality."

There remain many well-known vestiges of ancient rules of law which treat women as inferiors. In many States, a woman cannot handle or own separate property in the same manner as her husband. In some States, she cannot engage in business or pursue a profession or occupation as freely as can a member of the male sex. Women are classified separately for purposes of jury service in many States. Community-property States do not vest in the wife the same degree of property rights as her husband enjoys. The inheritance rights of widows differ from those of widowers in some States. Restrictive work laws, which purport to protect women by denying them a man's freedom to pursue employment, actually result in discrimination in the employment of women by making it so burdensome upon employers. Such protective restrictions hinder women in their competition with men for supervisory, technical, and professional job opportunities.

In this session of Congress I sincerely hope the House will take favorable action on this much needed amendment. The evils which this amendment seeks to cure are many. These evils have a historical basis in the inferior position of women in medieval days and under the old English common law, but they have no sound and reasonable basis in 20th century America. I ask for your cooperation and favorable action.

THE FARM LABOR SITUATION IN FLORIDA

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GURNEY] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. GURNEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. Speaker, I want to bring to the attention of this House today, a most serious situation in Florida.

The economy of my State of Florida is facing one of the gravest economic threats in all its history.

The great agricultural industry of Florida, the No. 2 money crop of the State, has already suffered losses running into many millions of dollars, and stands to suffer a much greater loss in the weeks ahead unless relief is received immediately.

What is this threat to our citrus, our green vegetables, our sugarcane?

Is it a threat of nature like our disastrous freeze of 2 years ago, or drought, or flood, or a swarm of insects?

No, none of these.

I am ashamed to tell this House, but the plague in this case is the U.S. Government itself.

The Great Society has not only declared war on poverty, but has also declared war on Florida farmers.

Nor is the war confined to Florida farmers. Although they bear the brunt of the attack and battle at this moment, farmers in California, Arizona, Texas, and many other States are in similar battles of varying intensity.

Nor is the war confined to agriculture. In our complex society, when one industry takes an economic beating, the effects are far reaching and felt throughout the land. Industries and people who handle agricultural products take their financial losses too. Jobbers, dealers, canners, wholesale markets, and retail stores and a host of other industries magnify the direct loss of the farmers manifold.

Take transportation—rail and truck—a very sizeable source of their revenues come from hauling food to market.

The livelihood of many a truckdriver, or truckowner in Florida depends upon hauling to market one crop, citrus, each year. There will be great numbers of these people this year who will not make enough this season to make both ends meet or to properly feed, clothe, and shelter their families.

Now what's the problem anyway? Why this loss of millions of dollars? And why is it so unnecessary?

The problem is simple. Florida farmers cannot get labor to harvest their crops, to pick the citrus, cut the sugarcane, gather in the vegetables.

They are unable to get sufficient labor because the U.S. Department of Labor and more specifically, the Secretary of Labor, Mr. Wirtz, has arbitrarily refused to help our people. He has shut his ears to their pleas and his eyes to their plight. He has even gone further in hearings held before the Senate Agricultural Committee a month ago. His answer to the presentation of overwhelming evidence in the form of incontrovertible facts and figures of severe labor shortages and consequent crop loss was simply to paraphrase, to say "There is no labor shortage, there are no crop losses."

The facts and figures were produced and introduced in evidence by responsible and leading citizens of my State of Florida. They were corroborated in some instances where he had personal knowledge, by the senior Senator from Florida, SPESSARD HOLLAND, a man who has had a lifetime of working knowledge of the citrus industry in Florida, as a grower, who has served on the Senate Agriculture Committee for years and who

is recognized and respected throughout Florida as an expert in agricultural matters.

Yet this Cabinet officer of our Government simply dismissed the massive evidence presented to him in these Senate hearings in a manner that can be only interpreted as "I don't believe you."

Now let us review the problem at this point.

Florida farmers are faced with the age-old problem of harvest. It has not changed in thousands of years, and it is the same in Maine and California that it is in Florida, and the same in the United States as in every part of the world. Mother nature ripens a crop all at one time. You cannot schedule a harvest like you can an automobile production line.

When the harvest ripens, the farmer needs a lot of willing and able hands to harvest the crop. Years ago, in an agricultural economy there was no problem, the whole family, the whole community gathered in the harvest.

But now in an urban society, the economic facts of life are that there just are not enough workers in any given locality, in our case Florida, to pick the crops. Laborers have to be brought in, recruited from somewhere else.

In Florida, our farmers have brought in so-called offshore labor, which refers to workers from the Bahama Islands.

Now this recruiting of offshore labor has been carefully and strictly supervised. First of all, it is governed by Public Law 414, the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The workers from the Bahama Islands are permitted to come in only temporarily for the harvest season. They may only supplement domestic labor, take up the shortage. They may not replace domestic labor. The applications for offshore labor are processed carefully by the Government and the numbers to be imported must be certified by the Department of Labor.

In years past this arrangement worked well. The Department of Labor recognized that sufficient domestic labor could not be recruited and certified enough offshore labor to take up the slack.

In recent years, and particularly in this present administration, and particularly under Secretary of Labor Wirtz, there has been a changing attitude. What has really happened is that Secretary Wirtz has arbitrarily taken the position that he intends to prohibit the importation of any foreign labor.

For example, this year at the National Cannery Association meeting in San Francisco, William J. Haltigan, Chief of Research and Wage Activities of the U.S. Department of Labor said, "The days of the bracero program are gone and the days of other foreign workers are numbered." He went on to say that agricultural labor "must be met through employment of domestic workers."

Incidentally, later in this same meeting and in answer to a question how domestic workers were going to be induced to do hard farm labor which they had no stomach for, he said that employers should induce workers by "making them feel wanted" and when asked for a con-

crete example of how, he said, "send them Christmas cards."

Now, Mr. Haltigan's prediction of the numbered days of foreign workers has been borne out in Florida in salutary fashion by his boss, Secretary Wirtz.

As his lieutenant made the speech, the Secretary was denying the requests of Florida citrus growers for additional off-shore workers and now, Secretary Wirtz threatens to cut off the whole program when the present certifications expire. To put it another way, it looks as though Florida citrus men will have no foreign pickers when the big Valencia orange crop ripens for picking in April.

Already, Florida citrus men have suffered a loss estimated at nearly \$6 million. This loss occurred on the early and mid-season crop with 3,500 off-shore laborers working in our groves, for the Department of Labor did certify this number, but this was not nearly enough to do the job. If these pickers leave Florida soon for the islands, the loss on the Valencia crop will be many times that already suffered.

There are groves today with fruit so thickly on the ground, you cannot see the dirt beneath. Millions of dollars of hard work and care and fertilizing down the drain because of the arbitrary attitude of one man, Secretary Wirtz. Literally, the sight is pathetic enough to make a person want to weep and then get angry enough to want to do something drastic to those responsible for this mess.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GURNEY. I am glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DOLE. I would like to point out that I had the privilege of witnessing this firsthand. Last Friday I went to Orlando, Fla. I was there and visited as a member of the Committee on Agriculture some of the groves, and I can attest to the facts stated by the gentleman from Florida that you cannot see the ground.

I believe perhaps the most striking illustration was the comment of one Duke Crittenden, who operates the Crittenden Fruit Co., about 37 North Carolinians who were brought from North Carolina to comply with the request of Secretary Wirtz that only domestic labor could be used. The comment was that of 37 who were brought, paid for, and transported by Mr. Crittenden, in 1 week only 1 remained. He is now referred to as the "lone ranger" in the groves of Mr. Crittenden.

This is an example that although domestic help may be fine, may be satisfactory and may be desirable, while we are experimenting with this so-called domestic help, the growers of Florida are losing millions of dollars.

As the gentleman has pointed out so well, as for the money lost, this is tragic history. The oranges have literally turned to garbage. But there is the huge Valencia crop, which will mature in mid-April. Something needs to be done about that.

I found this quite interesting from the standpoint of being a Kansan, since in Kansas we do not have citrus fruit. I thought it might be of interest to the

of the Digest "are used regularly in U.S. classrooms.

"If the Digest is to continue being used in the classrooms," Christensen declares, "teachers at least owe it to their students to warn them of its bias, its partisanship, and the dubious character of its reporting on the Washington scene."

American Sokol Centennial

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HUGH SCOTT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 18, 1965

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, this week many thousands of Americans of Slavonic origin or descent are celebrating the centennial of the founding of the first Slovak Catholic Sokol organization in the United States. This fraternal, cultural, and physical fitness organization, with its ideals of equality, liberty, and brotherhood, has made many contributions to the life of our country. A noted Slovak-American journalist, John C. Sciranka, recently sent me an article on the Sokol centennial which had been printed in *Katolícky Sokol—Catholic Falcon*—the official publication of the Slovak Catholic Sokol. I ask unanimous consent that this informative article be printed in the Appendix of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE SOKOL TRIUMPH AND OUR FELICITATION

Sokolism has proved to be the vanguard of fraternal, cultural, and physical fitness life among the new Americans.

Considering that there are some 35 million Americans of Slavonic descent living in the 50 States, there is a vast field for the Sokol Corps.

The Americans of Slavonic origin and descent have a rich heritage. Their history starts here even before the arrival of the first pilgrims on the Mayflower.

History proves that when the first Sokol Society was founded in 1862 in Prague, its founders, Tyrs and Fugner, succeeded in spite of many prevailing obstacles in uniting the Slavs.

In a very short period, Sokol organizations took root in various Slavonic countries, and we, their descendants are today paying tribute to their sacrifices during this Sokol centennial celebration.

And although living under the rule of despotic monarchs, and through two world wars and the Korean conflict, when the powerful empires and rich dynasties perished, Sokolism still flourishes.

The current centennial observance of the first Sokol organization in the United States and the issuance of 120 million Sokols physical fitness commemorative stamps, is indeed one of the greatest triumphs of Sokol ideals.

SLOVAK KING SVATOPLUK

This feat was accomplished by a Sokol unity, which was the dream and desire of our forefathers for the past 12 centuries.

At this time we recall the admonition of a Slovak King Svatopluk to his three sons, that only in unity there is strength. To exemplify this he used the separated and united twigs.

According to an old legend, Slovak King Svatopluk, after whom our group 7 of Wilkes-Barre, Pa., is named, summoned his three sons to his bedside before his death and

after a fatherly admonition, gave them a lesson in the now often repeated saying that "only in unity there is strength." He gave each a twig and asked them to break it, which they did easily. Then he gave them a bundle of twigs and asked them to break them. This they could not do. So he asked them to stay united in their kingdom, for only by unity they will keep off the onslaught of their enemies.

To our sorrow, the sons did not take heed of their father's advice and the seed of disunity was implanted into the hearts of future generations. Due to this disunity, first the Mongolian hordes, then the despotic imperialists, and in our generation the pagan nazism and atheistic communism have gained power in the Christian Slavonic countries.

Perusing through the pages of history we learn that the spark of equality, liberty, and brotherhood was ignited by the founding of the first Sokol organization in Europe in 1862. Shortly before this historical date the cause of Pan Slavism showed its potent strength under the leadership of Jan Kollar, the archpriest of Pan Slavism, Paul Safarik, L'udevit Stur and other Slavonic leaders.

SS. CYRIL AND METHODIUS

Simultaneously with the gospel of Pan Slavism and Sokolism came the observance of the millennium of the advent of Apostles SS. Cyril and Methodius to the present Slovakia and Moravia.

This millennium of SS. Cyril and Methodius in 1863 was observed by 80 million Slavs inspite of many obstacles. The Civil War was raging in this country and the true believers of Sokolism fought on the side of the famous emancipator, President Abraham Lincoln, whose birthday we are observing.

But in Europe, this millennium was a sort of baptism for Sokolism for the fact is that wherever these two apostles were honored, the Sokol ideal took root and continued to flourish even to this day inspite of any obstacles, tyrants or oppressors.

When the time came to organize the Czechoslovak legions, the Sokols in Europe and America were the first to give initiative and under the leadership of that immortal son of Slovakia, citizen of France and co-founder of the first Republic of Czechoslovakia, Gen. Milan R. Stefanik, the Sokols were in the forefront as leaders and legionnaires of this famous legion whose "march of the 70,000" through Russia will always live in history. The Sokols as legionnaires in France, Italy, Russia, and other countries will forever live as legendary heroes. They marched to victory under the Sokol banners.

Prior to World War I, the Sokol spirit should be credited with many accomplishments of the Slovak and Slav leaders. We mention here only the monumental achievements of Archbishop Jozef Strossmayer, famous orator at the first Vatican council and his great apostolate for the ideals of SS. Cyril and Methodius. Also Bishop Stefan Moyzes, and Dr. Karol Kuzmany, Catholic and Protestant leaders, who stood at the helm of the newly created Slovak Academy, the Matica Slovenská.

It was during this trying, nevertheless glorious period that Pope Leo XIII of the blessed memory issued the famous encyclical "Grande Munus" on September 30, 1880 in honor of SS. Cyril and Methodius as apostles of the Slavs, whom he also honored by renovating the basilica of St. Clement in the Eternal City, where St. Cyril is buried.

And it was the same Sokol spirit which led the Slovak and other Slavonic nations to the famous Velehrad, where SS. Cyril and Methodius preached and spread the gospel of brotherly love as true disciples of Christ, when Nitra, their original see already was in the hands of the enemies of the Slovak and Slavonic nations.

Today, the teachings of SS. Cyril and Methodius triumph for the sacred liturgy has again reverted to the peoples language.

SPIRITUAL TRIUMPH

In this glorious age of spiritual triumph, the Sokols are observing the centennial of their first organization in the United States. It is, indeed a double triumph for God and Nation, our Slovak Catholic Sokol motto.

With this great triumph, we are certain that the Sokol leaders will create the much needed Sokol Corps and adopt the firm program for the rejuvenation of the Slovak and Slavonic fraternalism in America.

During the Sokol centennial in the Capital of our great country, let us not only look to the past but use all our powers of concentration and wisdom for a better future.

Let us harness the vast talents of our American youth of Slovak and Slavonic origin and descent for the perpetuation and growth of those great fraternal and physical fitness ideals, initiated by our Sokol pioneers a century ago for greater America and the freedom of captive nations.

A View of the Vietnam Crisis

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 17, 1965

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Speaker, it is clear that not one of us, no matter in which branch of Government he may be privileged to serve, can supply the complete answer to the dilemma of Vietnam. Particularly because of this fact, it is important that we make available to ourselves all pertinent background information, in order better to understand the problem, and to permit us to make such individual contributions as might seem useful toward the eventual solution in the interest of the United States and of the free world.

In this connection, and under leave to extend my remarks in the appendix, I include a commentary which appeared in the issue of February 3, 1965, of the Washington Report of the American Security Council, written by Dr. James D. Atkinson, international politics editor of the Council, and distinguished member of the faculty of Georgetown University:

NONE SO QUICK

There has been a mounting campaign to get the United States out of South Vietnam. Many reasons are given for this position. For example, we are told that the people in South Vietnam are fainthearted in the fight against the Communist Vietcong. Yet these supposedly fainthearted people have been enduring casualties measured in the thousands every year—and for many years—in defending themselves against communism.

In the vast area that is washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean, the United States is fortunate—thus far—to have many staunch friends. These friends have indicated their friendship by joining with us in defensive treaties for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific Ocean area. Thus we participated with Australia and New Zealand in the ANZUS Treaty. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of the Philippines, and Thailand (Britain, France, and Pakistan are participants but are not in the Pacific) joined with us in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, SEATO. South Vietnam came under the protection of SEATO in accordance with article IV of the treaty. We have mutual defense treaties with Japan, Nationalist

China, and South Korea. Thus the measures which we take—or fail to take—in Vietnam will produce a political and psychological fallout extending far beyond that strife-torn country.

OTHER TAKEOVER EFFORTS STARTED

Some of the far-reaching effects which might result if there were an American policy of appeasement in Vietnam have already been foreshadowed. This is because U.S. policy has sometimes appeared to be hesitant and unsure. Thus during the last days of December 1964 a clandestine Communist radio station run by the Thailand Independence Movement began broadcasting propaganda against the present pro-American government of Thailand. There has been a fresh outbreak of the Communist Hukbalahap guerrillas in the Philippines. Since the long drawn out Huk revolutionary activity in that country which peaked in the early 1950's was supported by the Chinese Communists, it is likely that the current terrorist operations of the Huks are once again being stimulated by the Red Chinese. If this upsurge in revolutionary action by the Communists in southeast Asia is taking place as a result of what the Communists interpret as our lethargy in that part of the world, one may well ask what the effect would be if we were to embark on a policy of appeasement in South Vietnam.

The Chinese Communists are attempting to change the balance of power in the Pacific. Their appetite is insatiable. Earlier it was Korea. Then it was Tibet and later an incursion into India. But now and for the past decade it has also been a drive into southeast Asia. And always accompanying this revolutionary advance in the Pacific has been Chinese Communist mischiefmaking in Africa and in Latin America. Almost daily the press reports details of the Chinese Communist support of the Communist guerrillas in the Congo. And no longer ago than October 26, 1964, our good Latin American neighbor, Colombia, reported that Communist-sponsored guerrillas in that country were equipped with arms supplied by Communist China and Cuba. In short, Chinese Communist revolutionary activity is in conflict with American interests not only in the Pacific but elsewhere. American withdrawal from South Vietnam will no more appease the Red Chinese ambitions than would our withdrawal across the Pacific to Hawaii. Rather, it would stimulate them to further conquests and so might well trigger an all-out war.

The Soviet Union is giving propaganda and political warfare support to the Chinese Communist efforts in Vietnam. The official Soviet news agency Tass announced December 30, 1964, that a permanent office of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front would be opened in Moscow. On January 5, 1965, the official Communist Party newspaper Pravda printed an aggressive letter of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to North Vietnam's Foreign Minister. Said Gromyko: "The Soviet Union supports resolutely the just national liberation struggle of the people of South Vietnam against the armed intervention of American imperialism and the antipopular regime of Saigon. The Soviet Government demands that the United States stop all interference in the affairs of South Vietnam, that it withdraw its troops."

There are many public indications that the Soviet Union is in close touch with the Communist Vietcong. For example, on a Moscow Radio broadcast of January 14, 1965, Lieutenant Colonel Leontyev of the Soviet armed forces said: "The battle at Bin Ghia made it clear that the South Vietnamese guerrilla forces can now take on big engagements, engagements involving several battalions on either side." It has since been reported that units of battalion size have been brought into the South Vietnamese fighting from North Vietnam. From all of this it

would seem not only that the Vietcong is committing large units to the fighting, but also that the Soviet Union is becoming encouraged to take a more belligerent tone by what it believes to be signs of American vacillation in southeast Asia.

THE CHOICES

What options, then, has the United States with reference to our policy in South Vietnam? In blunt terms it would appear that we have two options: To go; or to stay.

The policy of going is sometimes called a policy of neutralization. This would mean the formation of a government in South Vietnam in which the Communists or pro-Communists would participate. Sooner or later—and, if past experience with coalition governments is a guide, it would be sooner—the Communists would dominate the government. Reduced to its essentials the policy of neutralization is a policy of scuttle and run, a policy of appeasement. Both on grounds of morality and of self-interest, it should be rejected.

But why should we stay in Vietnam? The answer to this question is really the answer to another question. And that is why we are in Vietnam.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POSITION

In his state of the Union message, President Johnson answered this question. Said the President: "We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us to help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago our President pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it. Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression now would only increase the danger of a larger war."

Both Radio Moscow and the Communist North Vietnam Radio Hanoi have commented somewhat impudently on the President's speech. Said Radio Moscow on January 7: "Once again he repeated the worn-out lines that American armed forces are in South Vietnam to give 'help' and safeguard United States security in South Vietnam." And Radio Hanoi on January 9 said: "In his state of the Union address to the U.S. Congress on January 4, Johnson once again disclosed U.S. stubbornness in continuing its aggressive plot in South Vietnam. Johnson brazenly stated that the United States would stay in South Vietnam."

But President Johnson's words are not "worn out." His words reflect the verdict of history on the policy of appeasement. A firm policy in Vietnam today is the best guarantee of avoiding a general war tomorrow. How much might not have England—and the world—been spared had the appeasers of the 1930's listened to the advice of Sir Winston Churchill. Militarily Communist China is still a paper tiger—less powerful than Hitler's Nazis in the early 1930's. Today Communist China's challenge in the Pacific can be met without excessive risk. But the peril to freedom in the Pacific will continue to rise with each year if we refuse to face up to this challenge.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

If we stay in South Vietnam what can we do to improve the situation? The following steps would start us in the right direction: (1) Increased interdiction of Communist supply routes into South Vietnam and such related measures as might be required. (2) Recognition that Vietnam is a theater of military operations by the appointment of a military officer rather than a diplomatic officer as chief of the country team of U.S. personnel there. The protection of the people from Vietcong terrorism is a prerequisite before any semblance of stability can be achieved and this is essentially a military operation. Appointment of a military officer as head of the country team would be in accord with the priority of requirements in

what is unquestionably an area of combat operations. (3) The establishment of a naval quarantine on North Vietnam as an aggressor against the peace of southeast Asia. The pressures on the present land supply routes by such a naval quarantine on North Vietnam will not be fully effective for several years. Precisely because of this, however, a naval quarantine would signal to our friends throughout the Pacific—and no less importantly to Communist China—the long-range determination of the United States to stop Chinese Communist aggression. The display of such firmness would be a psychopolitical act which would go far toward enlisting support for U.S. policy not in the Pacific alone but throughout the world.

A decision to stay in Vietnam is not the easy way out for the short run. Quite the contrary, it will mean an intensification of the long and hard struggle. It is to be expected in our political system that questions will continue to be raised about the wisdom of continuing to meet, indeed, even of having accepted the challenge in Vietnam. But viewed in a larger context, Vietnam is but a testing ground. Our resolve there is the measure of our will elsewhere. An American withdrawal from Vietnam would inevitably be followed by a withdrawal from other parts of the world in which it is said that we are "overextended." In such a context is Vietnam any more untenable than Berlin?

These words from the Book of Proverbs are helpful in evaluating the attitude of many toward our friends in South Vietnam: "None so quick to find pretexts, as he that would break with a friend; he is in fault continually."

The Threat of Communism to Our Youth

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. STROM THURMOND

OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, February 18, 1965

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I call to the attention of my colleagues an excellent editorial by Mr. Harry C. Weaver of station WOKE in Charleston, S.C., dated February 12, 1965. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has repeatedly warned our country against efforts to subvert the thinking of our young people in this country, and he has emphasized the danger in permitting members of the Communist Party to go from campus to campus in this country, preaching their Communist diatribes against our free enterprise system and our belief in God.

I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent editorial printed in the Appendix to the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Young people, throughout the world and our United States of America, are being used as pawns in the master plot of our Communist enemies to end freedom everywhere. These antifreedom forces understand clearly that youth is most vulnerable for questionable crusades and rebellions against authority, whether it be National, State, or local. With this knowledge, the Communists within our country and around the world are using the youth for their own deadly purposes.

study had concluded that a stable military environment between the United States and the Soviet Union could become unstable if tensions increased.

The purpose of Phoenix was to get an independent view by nongovernmental experts of how arms control fits into the complex military and political problem of attempting to control international tensions. The Institute for Defense Analyses was chosen as an independent contractor because of its experience on the earlier project and because it had done work on related problems for the Department of Defense.

The papers written by Vincent Rock for the Phoenix project make two interrelated points: (1) that arms control agreements, while they can contribute to the control of tension, are not enough to keep international tension within safe limits; the control of tension needs to be tackled over a broader front; and (2), that substantive arms control agreements will probably not be reached until there is more communication, understanding and reduced tension between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

The author considered various arms control measures: proposals to reduce the secrecy of Soviet society (which is important for on-site inspection); increased trade with the Soviet Union; and various other areas of interaction he deemed to be constructive and in keeping with U.S. interests.

2. JUSTIFICATION

As the report itself states, the judgments expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency. A research program in any field produces results to which exceptions can be taken. As far as the sponsoring Agency is concerned, however, judgment of a contract study should be based upon (1) whether the subject needed research, and (2) whether the contractor was responsibly selected.

As to the first point, the title of the study, "Common Action for the Control of Conflict: An Approach to the Problem of International Tensions and Arms Control" indicates that this was a subject pertinent to the activities of the Disarmament Administration and one which it should have studied.

As to whether the contractor was responsibly selected, the Institute for Defense Analyses was created at the request of the Department of Defense in 1956. It was formed so the Government could tap the reservoir of scientific talent represented by a number of the Nation's leading academic institutions. At the time the Phoenix contract was let, IDA's President was Mr. Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Eisenhower administration. Mr. Vincent Rock has held positions in the field of national security affairs under both Republican and Democratic administrations. In general, IDA appeared to be well qualified to conduct the study.

3. CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS

There are some criticisms that distort the report. For example, it has been claimed that Phoenix 1 urges: "That America converge her national institutions and values gradually toward Communism. * * * That we abandon Berlin. * * * That we set up Communist Parties in countries that do not at present have a Communist threat, that we retreat when threatened by the Soviets and that we overlook the assassination of pro-Western leaders."

None of these suggestions are made in the Phoenix report.

It has also been claimed that Phoenix 1 is a top-secret document. None of the Phoenix reports are classified in any manner.

Other criticisms involve assertions that certain foreign policy recommendations made by Rock are being followed as a guide for U.S. policy.

The Phoenix report was printed in July 1963. Many of the ideas contained in the report were advanced long before that date, although they were not previously approached from the standpoint of their relationship to arms control. The implementation of some of these long-standing ideas did take place after the publication of the Rock report. This was, however, coincidental. The fact is that the implementation of some of these ideas was related to an improved atmosphere in our relations with the Soviet Union.

A number of examples have been cited as foreign policy recommendations originated by Rock: "Example, the report recommended the United States seek Soviet cooperation in future space efforts."

Recommendations for international cooperation on the peaceful uses of space were made by the House of Representatives in House Concurrent Resolution 332, passed in June 1958; by President Eisenhower before the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1960; and by President Kennedy at a March 21, 1962, news conference. "Example, the report recommended that the United States consider assisting Soviet agriculture."

The expansion of farm exports was recommended by President Kennedy in his February 6, 1961, special message to Congress on gold and the balance-of-payments deficit, more than 2 years prior to the Rock report. "Example, the report recommended reducing restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union."

On July 14, 1958, President Eisenhower wrote Premier Khrushchev:

"Expanded trade between our countries could, under certain conditions, be of mutual benefit and serve to improve our relations in general. This would especially be true if it were accompanied by broad contacts between our peoples and a fuller exchange of information and ideas aimed at promoting mutual understanding as a basis for lasting peace.

"Our people have done a great deal in recent years to promote higher standards of living through expanded trade with many countries. They would like to trade with the Soviet Union as well, for the same purpose."

"Example: The report recommended increasing scientific cooperation with the Soviet Union."

In his January 9, 1958 state of the Union message, President Eisenhower recommended a worldwide program of science for peace. And President Kennedy said in his state of the Union message of January 30, 1961: "This administration intends to explore promptly all possible areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other nations to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors."

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY— STATEMENT ON STUDY FAIR (FOCUS ON ARMS INFORMATION AND REASSURANCE)

Various recent publications have contained false information about the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the above-captioned research study done by the Institute for Defense Analyses under the joint sponsorship of the Agency, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station.

The subject of the attack is a 32-page paper written by Mr. Bruce Russett, a political scientist at Yale University. It is entitled "Information and Strategic Stability." The volume in which it appears, "Studies on Information and Arms Control," contains papers by several non-Government researchers which: examine barriers in the Soviet Union inhibiting information useful in verifying arms control agreements; explore the diverse types of accessible information; and discuss reasons why conflicts may be caused by mis-information or misinterpretation of informa-

tion among adversaries in times of crisis. Mr. Russett addressed himself to the last subject. His ideas do not purport to represent any views but his own, as noted in the disclaimer at the beginning of the report. No specific arms control or reduction proposal has resulted from suggestions contained in the study.

It has been charged, for example:

1. That the Arms Control Agency "is trying to sap our military strength" and "blend our country into the Communist camp by making us too weak to fight."

This charge is completely false. U.S. arms control and reduction policy is directed at maintaining military balance by verified international agreements that would control and reduce armaments proportionately, thus giving no country an advantage over the United States. Such agreements were sought under the Eisenhower administration and are sought now because they would reduce the risk of war and the costly and dangerous burden of armaments.

2. That the research document states "the Government must use restraint in gathering intelligence data about Soviet intentions and capabilities."

The statement quoted appears nowhere in the Russett paper, nor has it been said by the Arms Control Agency.

3. That "the Disarmament Agency says there is 'significant danger in information which is too informative.'"

The U.S. Arms Control Agency has made no such statement.

4. That "one section recommends that, in order to prove to the Soviets that we have no designs on their territory, we would side with them to put down a rebellion in East Germany or Cuba."

The Russett paper does not recommend this, and the Agency does not support such an idea.

5. That "the grab-bag of surrender items put forth by the Disarmament Agency was dreamed up by the familiar Institute for Defense Analysis, which has to spend \$10 million of the taxpayers' funds to tell us how to give away freedom and be safe."

These are not "surrender" items; they were not put forth by the Arms Control Agency; and the Agency spent only \$10,000 as its share of this joint research project with the Department of Defense.

6. That the Russett paper proposes agreements that would delay or control the transmission of destabilizing information; e.g., "Automatic data-processing machines which would receive information, screen it, and give a sparse output."

The Agency has evaluated these and similar ideas and rejected them as impractical and lacking in merit as a basis for developing arms control proposals. At least one of these suggestions, however, has been grossly distorted and deserves comment. It has been charged, on the basis of the following quotations from the author, that he would sabotage U.S. submarines and unilaterally disarm our forces: "One proposed solution is for the Soviets to be able to demand that a few submarines, of their choosing, surface and make their positions known." This sentence is preceded by the author's statement that "It might be desirable, for instance, to assure the Soviets that no Polaris submarines were within firing range of the U.S.S.R.; and yet we could not afford to pinpoint the location of all of them." In context, the objective is to reassure the other side that we were not massing for an attack, if in fact we were not, thus avoiding a senseless preemptive attack by them on us due to nuclear jitters. Moreover, this and other ideas are presented from the standpoint of exchanging information, thus contemplating the possibility of reciprocal action by the Soviet Union. Finally, as indicated above, this proposal has not been adopted by the Arms Control Agency.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

February 18

Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 18, 1965

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, the situation in Vietnam is complex. Although the power exists to destroy North Vietnam, that course of action could lead to a Chinese invasion of South Vietnam and a Korean style war. Therefore, American airpower is not wholly relevant. And on the ground there is now a new type of war—a guerrilla war in which the Vietcong seems to have substantial support of the population. As the French learned in Algeria, large armies equipped with the most modern equipment are no substitute for the support of the population in guerrilla warfare.

In the midst of the complexities the New York Times and Walter Lippmann, the distinguished columnist, have written lucid and enlightening editorials and articles. The most recent appeared in today's New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune. I urge all my colleagues to read the following:

[From the New York (N.Y.) Times, Feb. 18, 1965]

THE PRESIDENT ON VIETNAM

If the United States has a policy in South Vietnam, its outlines do not emerge with any clarity from the statement President Johnson appended to his speech before the National Industrial Conference Board yesterday.

The President reiterates that this country wants no wider war, yet his statement surrenders all initiative to the Vietcong and their external allies. "Our continuing actions will be those that are justified and made necessary by the continuing aggression of others," Mr. Johnson says. He stresses that the United States seeks no conquest and that its sole aim is to "join in the defense and protection of the freedom of a brave people."

All this is admirable as a reaffirmation of the consistent American position on the Vietnamese conflict, but it provides no answer to two factors that have emerged with overwhelming force in recent weeks. One is that the South Vietnamese, ruled by a succession of fragile governments under the domination of bickering warlords, are showing little appetite for doing any fighting in their own defense or even for helping to guard our troops against sneak attack. The second is that the nature of the Vietcong guerrilla tactics makes it almost impossible to hit back at the Communist forces without carrying the attack into North Vietnam and thus creating the wider war the President wants to avoid.

Each northward strike enlarges the peril of active intervention by Communist China and increases the pressure on Soviet Russia to abandon the withdrawn position it so plainly prefers. What is still lacking in the President's formulation is any hint of the circumstances under which a negotiated settlement, of the type proposed by Secretary General Thant of the United Nations, might be approached. Without such a move, the potentiality of a vastly expanded war increases each day.

[From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune, Feb. 18, 1965]

THE VIETNAM DEBATE

(By Walter Lippmann)

We are just seeing another attempt to form a government in Saigon, and much depends, for the near future at least, on whether it is able to hold together for a decent time. For the reason why the situation in Vietnam has become so critical in the last 3 months is that South Vietnam has been crumbling and is at the point of collapse. The Vietcong have been so near winning the war and forcing the United States to withdraw its troops that Hanoi and Peiping have brushed off feelers for a negotiated peace. They believe themselves to be in sight of a dictated peace.

We, for our part, have found ourselves quite unable to put together a South Vietnamese Government which is willing or able to rally enough popular support to hold back the advancing Vietcong. The American Army fighting the Vietcong has been like men trying to drive away a swarm of mosquitoes with baseball bats. However, because there is nothing else to do, we keep on. We do not wish to face the disagreeable fact that the rebels are winning the civil war.

The easy way to avoid the truth is to persuade ourselves that this is not really a civil war but is in fact essentially an invasion of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. This has produced the argument that the way to stabilize South Vietnam is to wage war against North Vietnam.

The more thoughtless and reckless members of this school of thinking hold that only by attacking North Vietnam with heavy and sustained bombardment can we snatch a victory in South Vietnam from the jaws of defeat. They have not yet carried the day in Washington. But the President, when he ordered the retaliatory raids, no doubt intended to remind Hanoi and Peiping that the United States could, if it chose to, inflict devastating damage.

Apart from the question of the morality and the gigantic risks of escalating the war, there is no sufficient reason to think that the northern Communists can be bombed into submission. We must not forget that North Vietnam has a large army—larger, it is said, than any other army on the east Asian mainland except China's. This North Vietnamese army can walk, and nobody has yet found a way of bombing that can prevent foot soldiers from walking.

It is most likely that if we set out to devastate Hanoi and North Vietnam, this army would invade South Vietnam. In South Vietnam we could not bomb the army because that would mean that we would be killing our South Vietnamese friends. There is little reason to think that the Saigon government and its very dubious troops would be able to fight back, or in fact that it would want to fight back.

The Asian Communists fight on the land, and they think about war in terms of infantry. I believe that the reason why they are not terrified, nor much deterred, by our kind of military power is that they believe a war on the mainland will be fought on the ground and will be decided on the ground. There they have not only superior numbers but widespread popular support.

For this country to involve itself in such a war in Asia would be an act of supreme folly. While the warhawks would rejoice when it began, the people would weep before it ended. There is no tolerable alternative except a negotiated truce, and the real problem is not whether we should negotiate but whether we can.

It is not certain, given the weakness and confusion in South Vietnam, that Hanoi and Peiping, who are poised for the kill, will

agree to a cease-fire and a conference and a negotiation. But while this has, I believe, been the implied objective of our policy, the time has come when it should be the avowed objective, an objective pursued with all our many and very considerable diplomatic resources.

Free Enterprise

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE HANSEN

OF IDAHO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, January 19, 1965

Mr. HANSEN of Idaho. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks and to include extraneous material, I include in the Record two editorials aired by radio station KSL, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is heard in part of my congressional district.

The first editorial, aired during the week of January 17, 1965, deals with what can be accomplished by free enterprise as compared with a government monopoly.

The second, aired during the week of January 24, 1965, portrays graphically just how large \$100 billion is.

I commend the two editorials to the attention of my colleagues.

TELEPHONE

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the tale of two industries. Both are involved in communications. Both are nationwide. Both are monopolies in their field.

One is the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., which has just announced it will reduce its long-distance rates by \$100 million a year. The other is the U.S. Post Office, which plans to increase its rates by \$300 million a year.

In the past 30 years, the cost of a coast-to-coast telephone call has been reduced from \$9.50 to \$2.25—or \$1 after 9 p.m. In the same period, the cost of mailing a first-class letter has risen from 2 to 5 cents.

In those 30 years, the telephone companies have steadily paid dividends to their stockholders and have paid more than \$22 billion in taxes into the U.S. Treasury. Meanwhile, the Post Office has lost more than \$10 billion.

Through breathtaking technological advances in the telephone system, you can dial a number anywhere in North America, or put a call through in minutes halfway around the world. With a man carrying a bag from his shoulder just as he did 30 years ago, it takes 2 days to send a letter to the other side of town—with delivery once a day.

One of these industries is based on the free enterprise profit system. The other is run by Government.

Guess which is which.

THE BUDGET

Imagine yourself standing at the corner of Main and Broadway with \$100 billion baled up in \$10 bills that you want to give away.

You work hard at it. Peeling them off as fast as you can work, you give one away every second. You work at it 12 hours a day, 365 days a year.

But you hadn't better plan on early retirement, because it's going to take you 635 years to get the job done.

Or suppose you start a business and don't do too well at it. In fact, you lose \$1,000 a